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Key Highlights
Background
· The military operations in Northern Shan State, in which the junta has been facing debacles, have stalled for now due to intervention by the Chinese Government. In Rakhine, the Arakan Army (AA) made major gains in further setback for the Min Aung Hlaing regime.
· "Operation 1027" in Northern Shan State which was launched by the China-backed Three Brotherhood Alliance last October has given a renewed impetus to the groups fighting the regime.
· One of the members of the Brotherhood Alliance, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which is also called as Kokang Army, gained full control of Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone, following the mass surrender of the last junta forces and officials within the city on 5 January.
· 2,389 Tatmadaw soldiers, including 6 brigadiers, and 1,601 family members surrendered to MNDAA and were deported back to Lashio.
· The other member of the alliance, Ta’ang National Liberation Army claimed to have taken control of the towns in Northern Shan State. They are reportedly at striking distance of the largest city in the Northern Sha State, Lashio.
· The third member of the alliance is the Arakan Army (AA) which re-launched its separate military operations in Rakhine State in early November.
· The Brotherhood Alliance claimed that it had also captured Namtu, Kutkai and Hsenwi, including the headquarters of the 16th Military Operations Command in Hsenwi in late December and early January.
· With these advances by the pro-Chinese militias along the Chinese border, Beijing’s first objective of supporting Operation 1027, which is to push out the corrupt and volatile Myanmar military from the areas close to China, has been achieved.
· After which China brokered a ceasefire between the two sides. The shaky ceasefire has been effective since 12 January.
· Meanwhile, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), also a pro-China militia group, which so far has not taken a side in the military conflict had taken control of Hopang, the nominal capital of the Wa Self-Administered Division, with junta forces losing control of the east bank of the Salween River.
· The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), along with the All-Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) and local People Defence Forces, seized the town of Mabein in Northern Shan State after a three-day siege. The town is 50 kilometres north of Momeik, which was also taken control of briefly by the combined forces of KIA and ABSDF.
· During the first month of this year focus is the fighting in Rakhine State between the Arakan Army and the junta’s troops. The AA claimed that it had seized two townships from the junta, Palatwa in Chin State and Pauktaw in Rakhine State.
· Currently, AA is attacking Ramree Island, an isolated island town that could help AA to strengthen its foothold on the Rakhine territory.
· In Chin State, the anti-regime forces stopped making further progress in fighting, however, politically they moved in the direction of formation of a state government that would work together with other anti-regime forces to gain self-determination for Chin ethnic groups. The conflict in these areas, which is situated on the border with India triggers a flow of refugees to Manipur province of India.
· Among the refugees are defeated Myanmar military soldiers. The response of the Indian government in New Delhi is to close down the border.
· It is worth looking at a comparison of responses to Myanmar’s internal conflict by the country’s two giant neighbours, which can help to determine which one could be a longer-term partner for Myanmar in the time of crisis.
· Myanmar can also take a lesson from events in the past, how these two countries acted when a weaker neighbour was in a crisis. For example, can draw lessons from Nepal in 2015, when India imposed a blockade on Nepal in response to an Indian concern about changes to the Nepali constitution, violent ethnic conflict, and Nepal's increasing cooperation with China.
Analysis of the current conflict
For the past, several decades the conflict in Myanmar has been a two-front war, in which the military regime vs the ethnic groups fighting for self-determination engaged mostly in guerilla warfare. This current conflict is more complex, and it has become a multi-front war for the junta. The issues they are fighting have widened.
Currently, we have these categories of regime's opponents which are challenging the military authorities through armed struggle.
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The Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs)- These ethnically based groups have been fighting the regime since the early days of the country’s independence. Their call has been to grant equal rights and self-determination to the ethnic groups under one federal democratic system and federal army. Their view has never got support from the ethnic people they are fighting on behalf of, let alone the people from the entire country. They did not have support for failing to mount a serious challenge to the regime.
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The National Unity Government (NUG) / People Defence Forces (PDF)- This is a new kind of armed resistance the regime is facing; they are not fighting for ethnic rights or territory control. Their aim is mainly to reinstate a pro-Burma pro-democratic government. This group is led by influential and educated youth and politicians. Also, it has the most effective outreach to the international community. Despite these strong points, NUG/PDF may not have support from the entire country because of their pro-Bama stance, which for many ethnic people in Myanmar an outdated mantra.
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The Talang Palaung/ Kokang Army (MNDAA)/ the United WA State Army (UWSA)- Although these groups are ethnically based, their vested interest is quite different from the other EAOs. They operate on China’s instruction. They do not think they have any similarities with the Bamar people, they can relate themselves more to Chinese. They are unlikely to participate in the future federal system discussion. Their position on the autonomous status of the ethnic group they represent would be very different from that of the traditional EAOs like the Kayin National Union or the Chin National Front (CNF). This group would be looking for a pro-business governance system under centralized control.
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The Arakan Army (AA)- This is the only group which openly said its goal could be to declare independence from Myanmar. This is the group which received the most wide-ranging support from the Rakhine ethnic people. Their relaying point is very simple, extreme hatred for the Burmese based on old historical rivalry. The Burmese army has been trying to use the Rakhine nationalism for its benefit for the past many years. The military tried successfully, to divert anti-Bamar sentiment among Rakhine people to target the Muslims in the state. Now, with AA claiming that it can defeat the regime forces in Rakhine State and establish an administration of its own, a big unanswered question is how a future AA administration would treat the persecuted Rohingya community.
In a recent interview with BBC, the leader of AA, Twan Mrat Naing, spelt out, AA’s policy on Rohingya. He said all the residents of Rakhine State should have equal rights including the right to citizenship, however, the people of Rakhine may need more time to accept Muslims with their ethnic name Rohingya. He said as Rohingya are claiming that their ancestry in Rakhine State dates back to the 10th century, it would not go down well with the Rakhine people who think that they are the earliest inhabitants in the state. But one positive point mentioned by Twan Mrat Naing was that any approach to the Rohingya issue will be a rights-based approach and through democratic norms. However, in a recent incident with regard to the mistreatment of Rohingya by AA, the rebel group launched their attack against the Burmese military from the Rohingya village, drawing fire from the Burmese military against civilians. As many as 40 homes were destroyed, several were injured, and there are reports of deaths of many Rohingya civilians. This incident took place on 26 January.
While the junta faces defeats and debacles on the battlefield, however, it continues to maintain a status quo in terms of holding on to power. The junta boss seemed to have saved his job for now. A sham constitutional grouping the Defence and Security Council extended the mandate of the junta until August 2024. The sixth time to do so since the coup in 2021.
In terms of leadership Min Aung Hlaing held on to power despite losing support among the Buddhist nationalist backers of the regime.
However, currently, there are several reasons why his deputy Soe Win may think this is the right time for him to take control of the regime.
It could be possible that Soe Win is thinking of the following aspects that could convince him that this is the right time for him to take over the helm of the leadership.
o Min Aung Hlaing’s support among the pro-Buddhist nationalists is waning. This will be further clear in the coming weeks after more news of military defeats and defections come along. The key support for Min Aung Hlaing is coming from Setagu Monk, who has not spoken after the recent military defeats suffered by the junta.
o Constitutional breach- Although the constitution of 2008 is all but dead, Soe Win can use it to further weaken Min Aung Hlaing’s support among the nationalists by pointing out that he is floundering the Charter. Soe Win may also draw support from the leaders of the previous military regime who crafted the constitution to safeguard their political interests and personal safety.
o Economic crisis and fuel shortage under Min Aung Hlaing’s watch.
o Abuse of power by Min Aung Hlaing’s family and the cronies close to the family.
o Soe Win may also think about instigating insubordination against Min Aung Hlaing by the junior rank military officers.
However, the change of military leadership at this stage is not going to drastically change the political and military landscape in the country.
Since all the groups opposed to the regime no longer look at the military regime as a stakeholder in finding a political solution to Myanmar’s problem. All are looking for a Tatmadaw-free political future for the country.
External factors
Both the military regime and its opponents seem to have given up hope on possible international intervention to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. The only country active in terms of Myanmar’s affairs is China, it seems to keep all the options open including forcing the junta to open talks with its political opponents. However, Beijing never trusted Min Aung Hlaing since 2009 when he led an operation against the pro-China Kokang Army, during which many Chinese nationals were targeted.
But for geopolitical and economic interests China is pushing the Min Aung Hlaing regime to promote political reconciliation.
On the other hand, India and its current government in New Delhi have adopted the most irresponsible approach in terms of dealing with the situation in Myanmar.
Its approach is to grant support to the regime and the pro-democracy activists who fled to India due to the regime’s atrocities are not welcomed.
Some of the exiled Myanmar politicians and ethnic leaders managed to take refugees to India with the support of the Government of Mizoram, not the Central Government.
The hardline Indian Home minister recently said his country is to close the border with Myanmar.
Such acts give rise to the assumption that China has a more constructive and responsible approach in Myanmar than India.
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