- The junta in Myanmar faces a peril of internal divide, in the light of the recent sackings of senior military leaders. Among those who were sacked included a high-ranking military leader annotated to succeed Min Aung Hlaing. Such a situation could lead to an open war of competition for the leadership role.
- Although, it would be very optimistic to think that the junta is crumbling, due to these internal dynamics, however, learning from past experiences, the latest leadership crisis could be forced the junta to make some political concessions, to divert attention from its internal rift.
- A political overture by the junta to the pro-democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to help resolve the country’s political crisis could not be ruled out.
- As the junta is marking the 8th anniversary of the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) the junta is reaching out to even to those who have not signed the accord to join the anniversary event to be held in Nay Pyi Taw on 15 October.
- However, these possible moves by the junta are likely to be dismissed by the opposition groups as "too little too late", and Myanmar will likely remain in political logjam for the foreseeable future.
- The election the junta promised to be held in early 2025, after a population census a year earlier, is unlikely to resolve the problem.
- Meanwhile, the most persecuted minority in the world the Rohingya Muslims are expected to remain in an appealing situation in the refugee camps in Bangladesh, with the latest attempt by China to help repatriate the refugees to Myanmar.
Context
It is beyond anyone’s doubt that almost all of Myanmar’s top generals are ruthless and corrupt tyrants. Those who are more ruthless and corrupt tend to be more powerful. This is a scenario that has existed in the Myanmar military since it was first introduced to political power in 1958, barely 17 years after its establishment. No top leaders in the Myanmar army ever lost their positions only for involvement in corruption, most of them lost due to their ambition for the leadership role.
When the news came about the sacking of two senior junta members Moe Myint Tun, a close confidante of Min Aung Hlaing who is relatively young and ambitious and Soe Htut, home affairs minister, who oversaw the hangings of four pro-democracy activists in July last year, it was received by most of the analysts that the junta is facing intense internal rivalry.
It was widely reported that Moe Myint Tun, who chaired the Foreign Investment Commission and Foreign Currency Management committees was sacked for taking millions of dollars in bribes from foreign currency speculators. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General rank only a little over three years ago at the age of 54 and at that time he was tipped to become the next chief of the Myanmar military.
Both generals were removed from their respective positions on 25 September, and they are now known to be currently under house arrest while facing investigations. It is not ironic that the investigation is led by the deputy junta head Soe Win. Min Aung Hlaing reportedly used the two sacked officers to limit the powers of his deputy. The two positions are now filled with two Soe Win loyalists. A senior military officer Maung Maung Aye replaced Moe Myint Tun, and the new Home Affairs Minister is Yar Pyae, who is also a staunch Soe Win supporter.
It is yet to be seen how these corruption investigations would further divide the junta leadership. However, it would be very naïve to think that such a split would bring down the junta. Such episodes are not new for the Myanmar military and every time such incidents took place it survived such shocks. A similar rift erupted in the junta nearly two decades ago when former military intelligence chief Khin Nyunt was sacked for corruption. The junta went on to rule for another 7 years until 2011 when it transferred power to a nominally civilian government led by former president Thein Sein.
The junta may survive, but the question is can Min Aung Hlaing can keep his position. The junta head seems to be on the losing side of the latest power struggle. The latest incident also tends to indicate that 62-year-old Soe Win is becoming increasingly impatient to take up the leadership role. Min Aung Hlaing, who is five years older than his deputy may not have a lot of justification to continue in the position, as he is overseeing one of the biggest crises the Myanmar military ever faced during its more than 80 years of existence.
The power struggle at the top also has ramifications at the regional level, where the two top military leaders tried their loyalists to take up key positions in the regional commands. In a recent reshuffle, Brigadier General Kyaw Swa Oo was appointed as the commander of Coastal Command based in the Tanintharyi Region, a prime position that is attractive for most of the corrupt military officers. Many who served in the region in the past are known to have earned billions of dollars from illegal foreign fishing vessels as well as from local smugglers. Even though it is not known exactly to whom Brigadier General Kyaw Swa Oo put his allegiances to, however, he will likely be linked to Soe Win, who is taking the upper hand in the current power struggle.
The former commander of the Coastal Command Major General Saw Than Hlaing, a Min Aung Hlaing supporter is moved to Rakhine State where there is an active insurgency.
According to some confirmed sources Myanmar’s Navy Chief Moe Aung is also under investigation for his role in a corruption case. He is the son of a former senior junta leader Aung Thaung, whose family own a private bank, the Myanmar Amara Bank.
These incidents are seen as an attempt by Soe Win to consolidate his position and according to some reports, he is seeking backing from former junta heads including former military strongman Than Shwe, who still wielded a strong influence on the Myanmar military.
In such an uncertain situation only way out for Min Aung Hlaing would be to gain a legal constitutional position, through an election.
He reportedly sent a team of senior politicians to Japan recently to lobby for support from Tokyo to hold an early election in Myanmar, a report in Irrawaddy news agency said.
It said a former National League for Democracy (NLD) member Daw Sandar Min, chairman of the Arakan Front Party Dr Aye Maung, and pro-junta Neo Politics News (NP News) founder Kyaw Myo Min went to Japan for about a week starting around 17 September.
Daw San Dar Min was recently expelled from the NLD for her allegedly pro-junta position.
The trio met with two Japanese opposition members of parliament in Tokyo on 19 September and discussed holding elections in Myanmar. They said it could be a way to end the country’s crisis.
The junta is also actively lobbying the ethnic armed organisations to allow the elections in the areas under their control.
In recent weeks the junta reached out to several groups including the Kayin National Union (KNU) and the Shan State Army (South). A former head of the KNU, one of the largest rebel groups in the country, met the junta head Min Aung Hlaing in Nay Pyi Taw on 30 September to pledge his continued support to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signed in 2015 between the Myanmar government at that time and eight rebel groups in the country.
A team of Shan State Army rebel groups met the junta’s home minister during its recent trip to Nay Pyi Taw. However, the junta’s plan to woo the support of KNU backfired after the rebel group disassociated itself from the meeting between the junta head and its former leader Saw Mutu Sae Po.
These steps tend to indicate that the junta is trying to expedite the election process, in contrast to a recent announcement by Min Aung Hlaing that the elections are unlikely until 2025.
However, the junta is facing attacks in different parts of the country, and it only controls a third of the country, which could be the key obstacle to conducting the elections. Most of the country's territory is under the control of the people's defence forces, which are backed by the parallel government of Myanmar the National Union Government (NUG).
The junta’s current plan is to hold the elections after the next rounds of population census to be conducted in late 2024 and it is expected that the polls will not be held before early 2025.
In the meantime, the junta-appointed election commission is seeking support from authoritarian regimes in a bid to legitimize the elections when they are held in Myanmar. The head of the junta-appointed election commission visited Cambodia, and China in recent weeks and Russia this month, where he signed a memorandum of understanding to seek support from Russia on Myanmar elections.
Otherwise, any election conducted by the junta is most likely to be declared as a sham by domestic opposition and the Western powers.
Another bulk of problem waiting for the junta is the crisis in the western Rakhine State, where it is facing losing control of territory due to the increasing influence of a ethnic arms group, the Arakan Army (AA). Also, it faces a daunting task to repatriate nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees who fled to Bangladesh in 2016 and 2017. The junta which is facing an international tribunal on allegations of committing genocide of Rohingya Muslims is trying to repatriate the refugees with the help of China.
A recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) highlighted the failure of the regime as well as the regional and international actors to help resolve the Rohingya refugee crisis.
A report recently published by ICG Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Limiting the Damage of a Protracted Crisis, said Bangladesh and Myanmar’s military regime have, since the beginning of 2023 sought to start repatriating Rohingya refugees to Rakhine State, and with Chinese support.
“Each country has its reasons for wanting Rohingya to return. Naypyitaw hopes it can strengthen its defence at the International Court of Justice, where it has been accused of violating the Genocide Convention, and relieve international pressure in the wake of the 2021 coup.
Dhaka has its eye on the general election planned for January 2024, before which it hopes to have a foreign policy victory that dilutes the public’s impatience with hosting such a large refugee population.
As for Beijing, it is seeking opportunities to portray itself as a constructive international player, amid heightened tensions with Washington, and also hoping to gain further support from Dhaka and Naypyitaw in Asia,” the ICG report said.
The Brussels-based think-tank called on the European Union to increase its role in supporting the Rohingya Muslims.
ICG report called on the EU to
- Increase funding for the UN’s humanitarian appeal in Bangladesh to help meet the needs of Rohingya refugees, lest camp conditions deteriorate further.
- And to use the EU’s influential position in Bangladesh to encourage Dhaka to adopt a long-term strategy recognising that the vast majority of the refugees are likely to remain in the country for years to come.
- To support the Rohingya community who remained inside Myanmar.
- And to continue to support international efforts to hold Myanmar’s military accountable for its abuses against the Rohingya and other groups in Myanmar, both before and since the coup.
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