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On 16 July 2024, three Islamic State militants opened fire on Shia Muslims celebrating the Ashura [Muharram] holiday from a rooftop near a mosque in Muscat, Oman. The attack resulted in the deaths of at least five people and injuries to over thirty others.
The Islamic State's Amaq News Agency quickly claimed responsibility for this first-ever documented Islamic State attack in Oman. To substantiate their claim, Amaq released a short video from the rooftop, showing the assailants shouting "Allah Akbar." Notably, the Amaq report described the attackers as suicide bombers, not riflemen, suggesting a potential discrepancy in the details provided.
In 2024 alone, Islamic State has claimed at least three other significant transnational assaults in Moscow, Iran, and Turkey, with Amaq being the first to claim responsibility for those as well. Similar to these attacks, it is likely that the Islamic State’s external operations branch, known as the Emni, was behind the planning, financing, and execution of the Muscat attack. Please see the Emni structure flow chart below
This attack is a significant anomaly in Oman’s generally peaceful and stable environment. Targeting a religious gathering during Ashura—a holiday of profound importance to the small Shia Muslim population of Oman (roughly 5%)—is a clear sectarian motive.
The influence of the Islamic State extends far beyond its physical strongholds. Their sophisticated media operations regularly disseminate propaganda designed to incite and inspire lone-wolf attacks. Central to this strategy is the Emni, the external operations arm of IS, which is redefining international asymmetrical warfare by orchestrating and facilitating attacks beyond traditional battlefields. As of mid-2024, there have been four significant Emni-led attacks, with half of these targeting Shia communities. This pattern underscores the group's intent to fuel sectarian violence and destabilize regions by targeting vulnerable and symbolic populations. Given the current trajectory, TRAC anticipates at least 2-4 more similar attacks by the end of 2024.
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TRAC Incident Report: Attempted Prison Break at the Mogadishu Central Prison Leaves Five Militants Dead, in Mogadishu, Somalia | |
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On 12 July 2024, an attempted prison break occurred at the central prison in Mogadishu, where both Islamic State and Al-Shabaab militants are detained. Reports suggest the incident began with a powerful explosion from a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at the main entrance, creating chaos and panic among the guards and causing them to flee. Other sources indicate that inmates accessed weapons, including AK-47s and hand grenades, within the Central Section of the prison, adjacent to the Prison Warden’s Office. The violence then spread to another main section known as Biya Muundo.
The police and military swiftly responded, neutralizing all five militant inmates who initiated the attempted prison break from the inside. Allegedly, no militants managed to escape, though this information provided by the government should be taken with a grain of salt.
Al-Shabaab’s sustained capability to execute armed assaults within Mogadishu, the heavily fortified capital of Somalia, underscores the militant group’s growing influence and control in the region—a challenge the Somali government is struggling to manage. Despite government claims that Mogadishu is the safest area in the country, the city remains a frequent target for attacks. The recent attempted prison break further exemplifies the escalating insecurity in the so-called secure capital.
In the wake of this incident, there is likely to be increased pressure on the Somali government and its international partners to bolster counter-terrorism measures and enhance the security of detention facilities. This event highlights the urgent need for a more effective and comprehensive approach to addressing the threats posed by militant groups like Al-Shabaab.
It is important to note that Niger also experienced a prison break just one day earlier, on 11 July 2024. This coincidence cannot be overlooked, as it may indicate a coordinated effort by the Islamic State Central Command to liberate seasoned fighters. As evidenced by an Al-Shabaab car bombing, just a mere two days later, at a cafe viewing the broadcast of the Euro 2024 Soccer Match Final, in Bondhere District, Mogadishu, killing at least 5.
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TRAC Incident Report: Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) Militants Clashed South of Dori, Séno Province, Burkina Faso | |
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On 10 July 2024, Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) militants clashed south of Dori in Séno Province, Burkina Faso. During the confrontation, ISGS militants reportedly killed one JNIM fighter.
This incident marks the second time in a week that these forces have engaged each other, following a previous clash on 4 July 4 2024, in Oudalan Province. Despite JNIM and ISGS having shared goals of dismantling Burkina's government to establish Sharia dominance, they frequently clash in Mali and Burkina Faso. These conflicts typically arise from expansionist efforts and tend to dissipate over a few weeks. Given the recent engagements, more clashes between these groups can be expected in the coming weeks.
This situation presents a critical opportunity for the Burkinabe government to act. The government has struggled to contain JNIM and ISGS when both groups are at full strength. However, as these groups are currently preoccupied with fighting each other, the Burkinabe government could potentially retake ground in the area around Séno. This would require deploying genuine security forces to the region. Unfortunately, this is unlikely, as the Burkinabe government has repeatedly demonstrated its indifference towards staffing a professional army, preferring to rely on volunteer militia forces instead.
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(Right Wing Extremism) Accelerationist ‘Z-Cell’ Group Shares Stochastic Poster ‘You Cannot Hide From Our Wrath’ | |
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After enjoying significant momentum in the early months of 2023, Z-Cell has struggled to regain its footing. Despite their recent re-emergence on Telegram, Z-Cell has failed to live up to its reputation. At the time of writing this report, all of Z-Cell’s Telegram channels remain inactive and set to private. Communication with the group is restricted to a bot or a single contact person, highlighting their diminished operational capacity.
Currently, Z-Cell’s primary activity revolves around publishing threatening posters and making grandiose announcements. The latest recruitment poster, accompanied by a lengthy text aimed at convincing individuals to join their cause, reflects a sense of desperation within the group.
The group's messaging is steeped in the themes of retaliation, anger, and acceleration. The emphasis on the “flawed system” and the promise of violent retribution against perceived oppressors underscore their radical stance. However, the desperation in their tone indicates a recognition of their diminished capacity and influence. By targeting “silent lurkers” and emphasizing the inevitability of their mission’s impact, Z-Cell attempts to rally support and intimidate opponents despite their weakened position.
Z-Cell went dark eight months ago, after announcing their affiliation with the group ‘Teufelsreich’, a Telegram branch of the Order of Nine Angles (O9A/ ONA). The alliance between the two groups was somewhat unexpected, given that Z-Cell showed no satanic elements but rather operated purely as Accelerationists. At the time of the merger, TRAC’s assessment suggested that Z-Cell utilized the alliance to firmly establish a presence among the most prominent racist groups, aiming to increase their membership and conduct attacks.
In early 2023, ‘Z-Cell’ made headlines by filming themselves in a nighttime vandalism assault on the GOP headquarters in Kent County, Grand Rapids, Michigan. After finding themselves some publicity, Z-Cell elements have been constantly advocating for more extreme attacks, publishing stochastic posters reading ‘Destroy Your Local Power Grid‘ and ‘Stop Talking Start Killing’. They are also alleged to have been involved in the train derailment in Van Buren township (Michigan) and generally advocated for attacks on power grids across the US.
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TRAC Incident Report: Suspected Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) Kidnaps Over One Hundred Students, in Gerbe Guracha, North Shewa Area, Oromia Region, Ethiopia | |
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On 03 July 2024, over 100 students from Debark University were abducted by suspected Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) militants while traveling by bus from the Amhara region to Addis Ababa. The incident took place near Gerbe Guracha in the North Shewa area of the Oromia region. The kidnappers have demanded a ransom of 700,000 birr (approximately 11,200 euros) for each student, with a 3-day ultimatum set from the date of contact on July 8, 2024.
A student who managed to escape into the bushes while the attackers were distracted described the gunmen. He reported that the attackers spoke Oromo and had a hairstyle popular among fighters from the OLA. TRAC’s intelligence confirms that the area where the abduction occurred is under OLA control, making them the most likely perpetrators behind the capture of the Debark University students.
The victims likely belong to the Amhara ethnicity, whom the OLA views as encroachers in their territory. This incident mirrors the ethnic conflicts in the Oromia region between 2018 and 2020, where Amhara populations were frequently targeted, leading to significant casualties.
TRAC has no further information if any of the ransom demands have been met nor if any student has been released.
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TRAC Incident Report: Unknown Persons Arson Attack on Tiergarten High School & Tag Slogan ‘If Gaza Burns, Berlin Burns’, Berlin, Germany | |
(Poster) al-Azaim Media (Unofficial Islamic State Khurasan / ISK) Circulates a Propaganda Poster, Calling Its Supporters to Hijra, Cyberspace | |
TRAC Incident Report: Al-Shabaab Complex Attack on a Military Convoy Kills 9 & Injures 20, with 5 Kenyan Soldiers Missing, in Banissa District, Mandera, Kenya | | | | |
