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On 4 March 2025, two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) struck Bannu Military Cantonment in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. The first blast targeted Kohati Gate, followed by another near the main entrance. The explosions caused significant damage, leaving deep craters and damaging nearby houses. Following the blasts, 16 heavily armed militants, including four suicide bombers, stormed the base, leading to intense clashes with Pakistani security forces.
The Pakistani military (ISPR) confirmed five soldiers and 13 civilians were killed, with 32 others injured. However, Jaish-e-Fursan (JFM), an affiliate of Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGB), exaggerated the toll, claiming it killed 95 security personnel, including elite SSG commandos and intelligence officers. Pakistani forces neutralised all 16 attackers after prolonged combat.
This highly coordinated assault marks a shift in Pakistan's militant landscape, surpassing previous attacks by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) in scale. The use of SVBIEDs, followed by a ground assault, demonstrates advanced planning, logistics, and intelligence gathering, raising concerns about growing militant capabilities.
HGB & JFM’s Role in Pakistan’s Insurgency
JFM was initially active in Afghanistan but relocated to North Waziristan in 2023, aligning with HGB after splitting from TTP. Their ability to mobilise 16 operatives for a single complex attack highlights a strong recruitment pipeline, external backing, or cross-border facilitation. Pakistani intelligence later confirmed Afghan nationals were involved, reinforcing concerns that militant leaders are operating from Afghanistan.
Terrorist Alliances: The Al-Qaeda Factor
HGB has longstanding ties to Al-Qaeda, but recent reports indicate a deepening alliance. A 3 March 2025 video by HGB’s Al-Hamza Suicide Squad confirmed collaboration with Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and remnants of Ilyas Kashmiri’s 313 Brigade—known for high-profile military and intelligence-targeted attacks.
The “Lal Masjid Revenge” Narrative
HGB framed the attack as “Intiqam-e-Lal Masjid” (Revenge for Lal Masjid), a reference to the 2007 Red Mosque siege in Islamabad. This serves as a powerful recruitment tool for jihadists radicalised by the Lal Masjid narrative, reinforcing militant propaganda efforts. The attack also coincides with recent government actions against Jamia Hafsa, the Red Mosque-affiliated seminary, further fueling the insurgency.
Militant Rivalries: HGB vs. TTP
The Bannu attack exposed deepening fractures between HGB and TTP. In response, TTP’s leader Noor Wali Mehsud publicly condemned HGB for targeting civilians, signaling a power struggle within Pakistan’s jihadist factions. While TTP pursues a national insurgency, HGB’s growing partnership with AQIS suggests a more transnational agenda.
Cross-Border Implications & Geopolitical Risks
The confirmed involvement of Afghan militants has heightened Pakistani-Afghan tensions. Islamabad has long accused the Taliban regime of harboring TTP and HGB fighters, and if such cross-border attacks continue, Pakistan may escalate military strikes inside Afghanistan. Additionally, foreign jihadist networks—potentially including ISIS-K—could be exploiting Pakistan’s tribal belt to expand operations.
Conclusion: Pakistan’s Shifting Militant Landscape
The Bannu attack signals a significant evolution in Pakistan’s insurgency. The rise of the HGB-AQIS-Lashkar-e-Islam nexus, coupled with growing militant rivalries, suggests a volatile and fragmented jihadist movement rather than a unified insurgency. With Al-Qaeda-linked factions regaining influence, and cross-border militancy escalating, Pakistan faces an increasingly complex security crisis.
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(Chatter) Islamic State (IS) Evacuates Positions in the Syrian Desert [Badiya], Homs Governorate, Syria | |
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On 5 March 2025, local sources reported that Islamic State (IS) has begun withdrawing from its positions in the Syrian Desert (Badiya) in Homs Governorate, dismantling its security apparatus and disbanding most of its operational cells that had been entrenched there since 2019. For years, Badiya served as a critical stronghold, allowing IS to conduct asymmetric warfare against the Assad regime and Iranian-backed militias while maintaining a concealed infrastructure for recruitment and operations. IS acknowledged Badiya’s importance in Al-Naba Issue 349, where a military official stated, “what the mujahideen in the desert hide is greater than what they advertise.” This underscored IS’ deep-rooted presence and mastery of the terrain, making their sudden evacuation a significant and unexpected development.
Unusual Silence Ends with a Surprising Withdrawal
For months, TRAC observed anomalous silence from IS in Badiya, leading to speculation that the group was exercising heightened operational security rather than reducing activity. However, recent intelligence indicates a complete withdrawal—a drastic shift even TRAC did not anticipate. This is not a disorderly retreat, but a coordinated and strategic move, as evidenced by the safe return of foreign and Iraqi fighters to Iraq without resistance. Meanwhile, local Syrian IS fighters, particularly the hardline ‘Hazimi’ faction, refuse to abandon their positions, suggesting internal ideological fractures within IS ranks.
A Strategic Pivot: From Desert Warfare to Urban Infiltration
The withdrawal from Badiya raises a critical question: Where is IS heading next? Intelligence suggests that IS is transitioning from entrenched desert operations to urban guerrilla tactics. Fighters have reportedly relocated to Aleppo, Homs, Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, and Dara’a, indicating a calculated dispersal to embed sleeper cells within civilian populations. This strategy mirrors IS's Iraq strategy after its territorial defeat, where local grievances were exploited to rebuild influence through covert networks.
Deir Ezzor’s Role & Cross-Border Mobility
A key factor in this shift is the role of IS’ current Caliph, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, whose Deir Ezzor roots highlight the region’s continued importance as an IS stronghold. The porous Iraqi-Syrian border, weakened by corruption within the SDF and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), provides IS with uninterrupted access to fighters, weapons, and funding. This cross-border network remains a vital artery for IS’ survival and resurgence.
The Future: Urban Insurgency & Cross-Border Expansion
Badiya, once IS’ bastion of guerrilla warfare, may have outlived its strategic purpose. The group’s future lies in urban warfare, blending into local populations while leveraging tribal support and regional instability. The relative calm in Syria may only be a deceptive lull before IS re-emerges in a more elusive, embedded form, posing an even more significant long-term security challenge.
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(Statement) Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) Unveils New War Strategy “United for Victory”: A Unified, Technologically-Advanced Insurgency Against Pakistan & China | |
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A high-level Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) meeting has occurred recently. It has been attended by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Republican Guards (BRG) and Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) under the Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) umbrella. BRAS thus announced a new war strategy, marking a significant shift in its approach toward achieving Baloch national liberation. This high-level decision, made during a three-day meeting, involves a structural reorganisation of BRAS into a centralised military force, the Baloch National Army (BNA). The aim is to unify various militant factions under a single military structure, moving beyond scattered resistance pockets to establish an organised, coordinated force capable of mounting a more effective insurgency against Pakistan and China.
A significant element of this strategy includes modernising guerrilla warfare tactics by integrating advanced technology on the battlefield. BRAS aims to neutralise Pakistan’s intelligence superiority, weaken its military outposts, and target strategic war equipment through intensified and innovative military operations. This move signals BRAS’s intent to escalate hostilities by using more sophisticated tactics and weapons to carry out attacks that inflict more significant losses on Pakistani forces.
Economically, BRAS plans to disrupt Pakistan and China’s influence in Balochistan, particularly by intensifying blockades on critical highways to cripple logistical, economic, and military supply chains. These measures are designed to counter what they see as the exploitation of Baloch resources, which BRAS views as part of a neo-colonial agenda. BRAS will strengthen ties with international diplomatic institutions, human rights organisations, various global forces, and international media organisations. It intends to internationalise the Baloch resistance and struggle. Overall, this diplomatic and media move seeks to modernise the militant group´s resistance efforts by expanding its propaganda machine, strengthening social media outreach, and more effectively countering enemy narratives.
A comprehensive training initiative has also been announced to educate BRAS fighters in combat tactics and ideological, intellectual, and revolutionary principles. This initiative highlights BRAS’s commitment to transforming its fighters into politically and militarily sophisticated insurgents who understand the broader strategic objectives of Baloch nationalism beyond individual factions. Hence, BRAS no longer sees its fighters as expendable tools to reach a goal but acknowledges them as valuable pieces outside of the physical conflict; they can also be ideological tools. Additionally, BRAS is actively working to strengthen alliances with other insurgent and libertarian organisations, further expanding its operational reach and solidifying a unified resistance under the BRAS umbrella. This signals a push toward eliminating factionalism within the Baloch independence movement and fostering a more disciplined, cohesive force.
Lastly, Baloch militant groups formed this meeting and a Sindh group, SRA, which confirms once more TRAC´s theory regarding Baloch-Sindh ties. Not only is the SRA learning and applying Baloch´s tactics and strategies, but by including them in this meeting BRAS has officially recognised them as equals in the struggle and fight against the Pakistani State and Military forces. SRA is no longer an alienated group whose enemy they share with BRAS, they are now equals.
In summary, BRAS is transitioning from a fragmented insurgency into a more structured, technologically adept, and politically engaged resistance movement. Its focus on military innovation, economic disruption, international advocacy, and ideological consolidation suggests that the Baloch insurgency is entering a more aggressive and sophisticated phase—one that poses a growing challenge to both Pakistani military forces and Pakistan-China ties regarding economic interests in Balochistan. This meeting marks a new chapter in Baloch-Sindh relations, TRAC expects further collaboration among the groups involved in this meeting.
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TRAC Incident Report: Bandits Dressed as Economic & Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Operatives Kidnapped 10 Hotel Guests, from White Hill Hotel on Shiroro Road, Niger State, Nigeria | |
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On 27 February 2025, a highly organised group of armed bandits masquerading as operatives from the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) carried out a brazen abduction at White Hill Hotel on Shiroro Road, kidnapping 10 individuals. The assailants disabled the hotel’s CCTV system before forcibly removing guests, indicating a well-coordinated and premeditated operation. TRAC is confident that the perpetrators had an inside accomplice within the hotel's staff, who likely facilitated their access, movement, and execution of the crime. Such insider cooperation would have given them critical intelligence on guest movements and hotel security measures, making the operation swift and efficient.
The sophisticated nature of the attack suggests meticulous planning. The bandits leveraged their authoritative disguise, deceiving victims into compliance assuming they were undergoing a legitimate law enforcement procedure. By posing as EFCC officials, the kidnappers were able to manipulate psychological compliance mechanisms, walking victims out of the hotel and into the waiting abduction vehicle without immediate resistance. This calculated deception ensured minimal disruption and delayed response time, increasing the difficulty of an immediate rescue.
This incident is part of a broader trend where criminal groups exploit public trust in official institutions by acquiring and misusing law enforcement and military uniforms. The ease of access to these uniforms, which are widely available at low cost in open markets, enables criminals to conduct kidnappings, robberies, and other illicit operations with reduced suspicion. The growing frequency of such impersonation tactics highlights a significant security challenge for Nigerian authorities, calling for stricter regulations on uniform distribution and enhanced public awareness campaigns to counteract this rising threat.
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TRAC Incident Report: Suspected Anarchists Arson of 16 Police Cars at Police Station Parking Lot in Albano Laziale, Alban Hills, Metropolitan City of Rome Capital, Lazio Region, Italy | |
Poster) al-Saif Media (Unofficial Islamic State): ‘Aim Your Rifle At Their Hearts’ (‘Ziele mit Deinem Gewehr auf Ihre Herzen’) – (German & English) | |
TRAC Incident Report: IED Explosion Kills 11 and Injures 65 During Congo River Alliance (M23) Leader Corneille Nangaa’s Rally in Bukavu, South-Kivu Province, Congo | | | | |
