|
On 28 April 2025, Islamic State (IS) militants launched a surprise raid on a Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) checkpoint in the remote village of Jazirah Albu Hamid, Deir Ezzor province. The ambush resulted in the deaths of five SDF members and injuries to at least ten more. IS later claimed responsibility, framing the operation as retaliation for the alleged mistreatment of detainees at the al-Hol detention camp—an increasingly common justification in its propaganda.
Deir Ezzor’s Remote Villages: A Safe Haven for IS Activity
The attack site, Jazirah Albu Hamid, is so geographically obscure that its precise location is difficult to verify. However, TRAC confidently assesses that the village falls within the al-Kasrah subdistrict of Deir Ezzor. There is also a strong possibility that "Jazirah Albu Hamid" is a local variant or alternative name for the nearby village of al-Hamad, further underscoring the ambiguity surrounding territorial demarcations in Syria's rural conflict zones. Such imprecision is typical in reporting from these areas, where administrative boundaries are often blurred by years of war, shifting frontlines, and inconsistent local governance.
Despite this lack of clarity, the region itself is strategically vital. IS has a history of conducting operations in and around al-Kasrah, including a similar attack in January 2025 targeting the same general vicinity. The return to this isolated location indicates a behaviour pattern: IS deliberately focuses on areas with minimal or inconsistent SDF presence. These remote and lightly defended zones offer IS a low-risk environment to regroup, launch assaults, and retreat quickly, limiting their exposure to counterattacks or drone surveillance.
Resurgence in IS Operations Suggests Coordinated Escalation
The 28 April raid also fits into a broader resurgence of IS activity across eastern Syria. It was the second confirmed IS operation in under 24 hours, following a roadside IED attack on an SDF vehicle in Shahil the previous day. This close succession of incidents suggests a renewed effort by IS to reassert operational tempo and regain psychological momentum. After a prolonged period of diminished visibility—both on the ground and in their media output—IS appears to be gradually rebuilding its presence in the Euphrates River Valley. The group’s recent uptick in claims reflects a calculated return to narrative warfare, complementing its kinetic operations with propaganda designed to signal strength and continuity.
Al-Hol Narrative Remains a Central Propaganda and Recruitment Tool
IS's justification for the April 28 attack—the alleged abuses at al-Hol camp—ties into a broader messaging strategy that the group has leaned on consistently. Al-Hol has become a symbolic flashpoint for IS, used to rally support, justify violence, and maintain ideological cohesion. The group previously invoked this same narrative during its high-profile VBIED attack on the al-Hindi checkpoint in Shahil in May 2024. These references are not merely rhetorical; they create a moral framework for violence, reinforcing internal cohesion and legitimising future operations.
This pattern aligns with strategic directives issued by IS leadership. In March 2024, the group's spokesperson explicitly called for targeted attacks against individuals linked to the administration of al-Hol, including through suicide missions and raids. The recent activity in Shahil and al-Kasrah directly manifests that directive. These areas are known IS strongholds where the group retains underground networks, logistical pathways, and pockets of sympathetic locals—resources that are now being reactivated as part of this tactical escalation.
In sum, the Jazirah Albu Hamid raid is more than a one-off incident—it is emblematic of IS’s evolving strategy in eastern Syria: reviving operations in low-risk zones, weaponising grievances around al-Hol to justify violence, and gradually reestablishing both territorial presence and narrative dominance. The frequency and symbolism of recent attacks suggest that IS is entering a new phase of low-intensity insurgency aimed at eroding SDF control through attrition and ideological warfare.
| | | TRAC Incident Report: Student Kills a Classmate and Injures Three Others in a Knife Attack at the Notre-Dame de Toutes-Aides Secondary School, Nantes, Loire-Atlantique, France | | |
On 24 April 2025, at approximately 12:30 p.m. local time, a 15-year-old student launched a deadly knife attack at the private Notre-Dame de Toutes-Aides High School in Nantes, France. The assailant fatally stabbed a 17-year-old girl, identified as Lorène, and injured three other students before being subdued by teachers and arrested by responding police.
According to eyewitness accounts, the perpetrator was wearing a balaclava, black gloves, tinted glasses, safety boots, and a helmet, clothing choices that are a clear indication that the attack was premeditated. Police recovered two knives in his possession, including a bloodied hunting knife. During his arrest, the attacker reportedly asked officers to shoot him in the head, indicating a potential intent to commit "suicide-by-cop."
Shortly before the stabbing, students at the school received a 13-page manifesto via email. The document, titled “Immune Action – Revolt is already the greatest victory we can achieve,” was reportedly authored and distributed by the perpetrator himself, later identified as Justin Adar Polat. French authorities confirmed that he had sent the manifesto to several students before the incident.
The manifesto is ideologically charged and divided into three sections:
- “Globalised ecocide: the first aggression”
- “Systemic violence and social alienation: the second aggression”
- “Totalitarian social conditioning: the third aggression”
These themes align closely with radical far-left environmental and anti-system beliefs. The text denounces industrial society, discusses environmental collapse (“ecocide”), critiques social control (“totalitarian conditioning”), and references American domestic terrorist Ted Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber.
Ideological Indicators and Ethnic Background
While French authorities have not classified the incident as terrorism, TRAC assesses that several elements strongly indicate a politically motivated act. These include the manifesto's ideological depth, the planning's methodical nature, and the attacker’s calculated choice of costume and weapons. The manifesto draws from radical far-left themes, particularly anti-establishment, anti-capitalist, and eco-extremist ideologies. Notably, some passages reportedly contain anti-Semitic language, illustrating what TRAC has long identified as the "horseshoe effect"—a phenomenon where elements of far-left and far-right extremism converge in both rhetoric and tactics. This overlap is obvious among eco-fascists and segments of anarchist or radical environmentalist movements, who may target perceived agents of systemic control in similar ways despite differing ideological origins.
The attacker’s full name, Justin Adar Polat, has also drawn attention. TRAC notes that Adar is a Kurdish name meaning "fire" linked to Newroz, the Kurdish New Year celebration. While authorities have not confirmed his precise ethnic and national background, this detail suggests he may be of Kurdish or Turkish descent. However, there is no current indication that his ethnicity played a direct role in motivating the attack.
While the ideological motive is increasingly evident, TRAC also notes the possibility that a personal dispute fueled the attack. Given that the victim may have previously engaged with the perpetrator on the issues cited in the manifesto, such as social justice or environmental themes, it remains plausible that the fatal act was both ideologically and personally driven.
This incident highlights the growing concern around youth radicalisation, particularly the adoption of fringe far-left and eco-extremist ideologies. The attack stands out for its ideological zeal, tactical planning, and symbolic messaging. Though treated by police as a criminal matter rather than an act of terrorism, TRAC considers it emblematic of how lone actors—especially minors—can be radicalised through online content and extremist literature to the point of committing targeted violence in educational settings.
| | TRAC Incident Report: Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) Remote-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Targets Pakistani Army Convoy in Mar Gat [Margot], Mastung District, Quetta Countryside, Balochistan, Pakistan | | |
On 25 April 2025, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) militants detonated a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (IED) targeting a Pakistani Army convoy in the Mar Gat area of Mastung District, Balochistan. The blast reportedly killed ten soldiers, including senior military figures such as Army Head Shehad Amin, Deputy Provincial Commander Abbas, and soldiers Khalil, Zahid, and Kharm Saleem, among others.
While Mar Gat has seen fewer attacks than other hotspots around Quetta, it remains strategically significant due to its proximity to key supply routes and military transit corridors. This area serves as a logistical artery for the Pakistani military, making it a valuable target for insurgent disruption. The last major BLA attack in Mar Gat occurred in March 2024. Also, it involved the use of an IED against a military convoy, suggesting that the group continues to identify the area as both vulnerable and operationally worthwhile.
This latest attack reflects the BLA’s broader strategy across Balochistan, particularly in areas surrounding Quetta, where the group has maintained a sustained campaign of violence. Over the past year, the BLA has intensified pressure on Pakistani security forces through coordinated ambushes, targeted killings, and bombings. The consistent use of remote-controlled IEDs is a hallmark of the group’s tactics, offering a combination of lethality and low risk for the perpetrators.
Tactically, IEDs allow BLA militants to maximise impact while avoiding direct engagements. The death of high-ranking officers not only delivers a significant operational blow to Pakistani forces but also carries symbolic weight, amplifying the psychological and political impact of such attacks. These incidents reinforce the perception that BLA remains capable and determined in its pursuit of undermining state control in the region.
| | TRAC Incident Report: Suspected Free Papua Movement (OPM) Rebels Burn 10 Gold Mining Camps at East Embankment Mile 32, Kuala Kencana, Mimika, Central Papua, Indonesia | | |
On 21 and 22 April 2025, suspected members of the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka – OPM) set fire to 10 gold mining camps in the East Embankment Mile 32 area of Kuala Kencana, located in Mimika, Central Papua. While no casualties were reported in this incident, the scale of destruction underscores OPM’s escalating campaign against illegal mining operations in the region.
This arson attack occurred just days after OPM rebels reportedly killed at least 15 illegal gold miners in Yahukimo Regency, an act that highlights the group’s increasing hostility toward mining activities. OPM has long warned that illegal mining within their claimed operational zones must cease immediately, accusing miners of exploiting Papua’s natural resources at the expense of indigenous populations.
The absence of casualties in the Mimika incident suggests that miners had already fled the area, likely after receiving warnings or intelligence about a potential attack. TRAC assesses that these early evacuation points to the growing fear among local workers and the effectiveness of OPM's intimidation tactics.
The destruction of mining camps fits into a broader OPM strategy aimed at disrupting state-backed development projects and halting what the group perceives as the exploitation of Papua’s resources by non-indigenous actors. In pursuit of this goal, OPM has systematically targeted government contractors and non-Papuan migrants working in a range of civilian roles. These include construction workers, gold miners, truck drivers, motorbike taxi operators, teachers, and health professionals—categories frequently associated with state development or extractive operations.
| | TRAC Insight: Chinese National “Mr. Tang” Accused of Orchestrating Armed Mining Empire in Zamfara State, Nigeria | | (Video) Creation of new Group Tayyar al-Taghyir wal-Tahrir (Movement for Change and Liberation) by Former Al-Qaeda (AQAP) Figure, Al-Abr, Hadhramaut Governorate, Yemen | | TRAC Incident Report: Al-Shabaab Militants Torture & Assassinate Ethiopian Consulate Official, in Garowe, Puntland, Somalia | | | | |
