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On 6 September 2025, Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP) militants carried out a wave of attacks in Bajaur District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. In Khar Village, ISKP claimed responsibility for an IED strike on a vehicle belonging to a member of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The explosion killed the targeted individual and damaged his vehicle.
On the same day, a suspected ISKP IED detonated during a cricket match in Khar Tehsil, killing at least one person and injuring several. Although ISKP has not formally claimed the cricket attack, the timing, location, and its simultaneous claim of the vehicle strike strongly suggest a coordinated effort. This raises the possibility that the cricket bombing was aimed at TTP militants present among the spectators, even if local civilians bore the brunt of the casualties.
The claimed attack marks the first ISKP incident in Khar Tehsil since November 2024, but not its first in Bajaur overall. Just three weeks earlier, ISKP claimed a vehicle-borne IED attack on a Pakistani Army convoy in Inayat Killi, demonstrating its ability to mount large, high-impact operations in what has historically been a TTP stronghold. In the last two weeks alone, ISKP has claimed at least two other bombings in Bajaur, indicating a deliberate uptick in activity.
These attacks highlight three key dynamics:
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Degrading Rival Networks: ISKP increasingly prioritises targeting the TTP, a fellow jihadist rival, rather than simply confronting Pakistani forces. By eliminating TTP militants even in public spaces, ISKP undermines their local authority and recruitment in a district they have long dominated.
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Psychological Impact on Civilians: By striking at a cricket match, a symbol of normalcy and community life, ISKP aims to sow fear, demoralise civilians, and project the Pakistani state as incapable of protecting its citizens even in everyday settings.
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Retaliation to Operation Sarbakaf: These attacks also reflect blowback from Pakistan’s ongoing counter-terror campaign, Operation Sarbakaf. ISKP and other militants are signalling that counterterrorism pressure will incur costs for both state forces and civilians, attempting to deter further operations.
The twin incidents show that ISK is regaining momentum in Bajaur and is capable of simultaneously targeting rival militants and civilians to maximise impact. Its pattern of occasional, high-profile strikes gives it outsized influence despite relatively few militants on the ground.
| | | TRAC Incident Report: Islamic State Central Africa (ISCA/Wilayat Wasat Afriqiyah) Militants Led an Armed Assault on Christians, Killing Over 100, in Ntoyo, Lubero District, North-Kivu Province, Congo (DR) | | |
On 8 September 2025, Islamic State Central Africa (ISCA) militants launched a brutal armed assault on Christians in Ntoyo, Lubero District, North-Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Over 100 Christians were killed during a gathering, and more than 30 homes were set ablaze in the attack. This marks one of the deadliest single incidents attributed to ISCA in recent years, far exceeding the typical scale of their operations.
The Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) remain a rarity in northern Lubero, as the government’s attention is firmly focused further south, particularly on the fight against the M23 insurgency. This imbalance reflects Kinshasa’s prioritisation of regional stability and economic corridors threatened by M23, while conflicts with ISCA have been relegated to a “second-class” status. That neglect has created an enabling environment for ISCA, as the group takes advantage of porous borders, absent state presence, and vulnerable local populations to assert control.
Typically, ISCA’s attacks in North Kivu remain low-scale, often involving small ambushes, assassinations, or intimidation operations that rarely exceed double-digit fatalities. The Ntoyo massacre, however, demonstrates a significant escalation. By unleashing overwhelming violence in a short span, ISCA clearly sought to terrorise and coerce the Christian populations into submission.
ISCA’s operational model functions like that of a chameleon: adjusting its scale and visibility to match circumstances. In quieter periods, it blends into the background with low-intensity violence, which both keeps pressure on locals and avoids significant FARDC countermeasures. When opportunities arise, such as in Ntoyo, it strikes with calculated brutality, projecting power at a time and place of its choosing.
This incident is not just an anomaly but a strategic signal. It demonstrates that ISCA is capable of mass-casualty operations far beyond its usual pattern, and it highlights the fragility of northern communities left outside Kinshasa’s security priorities. While the FARDC may respond with retaliatory operations, ISCA has likely calculated that the benefits, intimidation, recruitment, propaganda value, and local dominance outweigh the risks.
| | TRAC Incident Report: A 16-Year-Old Islamic State (IS) Sympathiser Conducts Armed Assault on a Police Station, Killing Two, in Izmir, Turkey | | |
On 8 September 2025, a 16-year-old assailant launched an armed attack on a police station in Izmir, Turkey, firing a Hatsan pump-action shotgun while shouting “Allahu Akbar.” The assault left two police officers dead and two others wounded before security forces neutralised the gunman. He was critically injured in the exchange of fire and is currently in intensive care.
Prior to the attack, the teenager posted a statement on social media declaring his intention to carry out an “istishhadiya” (martyrdom operation) to avenge “the oppression of Muslims worldwide.” He also uploaded footage from Islamic State (IS) Furat Media featuring Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, urging jihadists to strike Turkey in retaliation for its role in the war against IS. This deliberate framing places the attack squarely within IS’s ideological narrative and propaganda ecosystem rather than as an isolated act of violence.
The incident underscores Turkey’s enduring struggle with IS-linked radicalisation and sleeper networks. Turkey’s geography, straddling Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus, and its history as a transit corridor for jihadists moving to and from Syria and Iraq make it uniquely vulnerable to infiltration. Refugee flows, large urban centres, and relatively open transport links have all been exploited by IS to maintain low-profile cells inside the country. Although the last officially claimed IS attack in Turkey was over a year ago, counter-terrorism authorities have repeatedly disrupted plots in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.
While the attacker was young, his level of preparedness, ideological clarity and propaganda alignment suggest more than a simple lone-actor event. His conduct points to at least ideological grooming and operational coaching, consistent with the Islamic State’s external operations branch, the “Emni.” The Emni has historically overseen recruitment, indoctrination and training for overseas plots, often focusing on young and impressionable recruits who can be rapidly radicalised and then dispatched for high-impact attacks.
| | TRAC Incident Report: Aryan Freedom Network (AFN) Organizes National Leadership Assembly During Labor Day Weekend at Undisclosed Location, United States | | |
On 1 September 2025, the Aryan Freedom Network (AFN) held a National Leadership Assembly during the Labour Day weekend at an undisclosed location in the US. The event brought together not only members but also national and regional leaders from across the country to discuss the trajectory and expansion of the White Nationalist movement in North America.
The central focus of the gathering was on “the leadership,” positioning AFN’s national and regional figures as the driving force behind the movement’s strategy. With this event, the organisers emphasised how strong, coordinated leadership is essential to guiding the group’s growth and ensuring its expansion efforts remain unified and effective across different regions.
This is the first time TRAC has recorded an AFN gathering of this nature. Until now, the group has primarily hosted smaller-scale activities such as local “Meet & Greet” events and its annual Aryan Fest. The Assembly highlights AFN’s current focus on strengthening internal cohesion and unifying its various local chapters under a coordinated strategy.
Back in December 2024, AFN announced that it now operates in 34 states, claiming to be the largest nationalist socialist and pro-White organisation in the United States. It is worth mentioning that this number has risen to 36 states according to the AFN official website. This expansion highlights the group’s aggressive growth and ongoing efforts to establish a nationwide network. The combination of alliances, recruitment events, and increased state-level activity suggests a strategic approach aimed at broadening AFN’s influence and reinforcing its position within the far-right landscape.
| | TRAC Incident Report: Hamas’ al-Qassam Brigades Takes Credit for Killing Six Israeli Civilians and Injuring Several Others in an Armed Assault on a Passenger Bus, Ramot Junction, Northern Jerusalem, West Bank | |
(Claim) Al-Shabaab Claims Zakat Office Begins Distributing Zakat Al-An’am in Saakow, Middle Juba, Somalia
| | TRAC Incident Report: Unidentified Perpetrator Conducts Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) Attack Targeting 444th Combat Brigade Military HQ in Bani Walid City, Misrata District, Libya | | | | |
