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Weekly Analyst Review

5 January 2025

In this newsletter, we are honouring the life of Hylda Fenton – a dedicated protector who served our world for two decades with courage and integrity. Hylda's unwavering commitment inspired all who knew her. She passed away last week after a brave fight with cancer. Her legacy of strength, kindness, and service will forever be remembered. We will miss her deeply.

Bottom Line Up Front

On 31 December 2024, twelve Islamic State Somalia (ISS) militants carried out a large-scale, coordinated assault on a Puntland Forces camp in Dharjaale Village, Iskushuban, Bari Region. The attack began with a suicide bomber detonating a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at the forces' supply headquarters, followed by five militants launching a secondary armed assault on a nearby defensive position. Shortly afterwards, two more suicide bombers, including one armed with a medium machine gun, drove a second VBIED into the main camp. At the same time, four additional fighters stormed the base, engaging in direct clashes with Puntland troops.


The militants employed a range of weapons during the assault, including VBIEDs, explosive belts, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), highlighting a high level of coordination and operational planning. The attack resulted in the deaths of 22 Puntland soldiers, left several others wounded, and led to the destruction of at least ten military vehicles. According to Al-Naba, the militants involved came from seven different nationalities, emphasising the group's global recruitment efforts.


Identification and Propaganda Messaging

Al-Naba #475 identified the twelve suicide bombers involved in the attack by name: 1) Abu Anis al-Maghribi, 2) Batter al-Yemeni, 3) Abu al-Walid al-Ethiopian, 4) Abu al-Zubair al-Tunisi, 5) Mujahid al-Tanzania, 6) Musab al-Tanzani, 7) Munir al-Tanzani, 8) Qatada al-Jazrawi, 9) Jalibib al-Libi, 10) Abu Baraa al-Maghribi, 11) Jalibib al-Jazrawi, and 12) Abi Ibrahim al-Tanzani. These individuals were portrayed as martyrs and heroes, with their photographs prominently displayed in the publication to glorify their involvement in the attack and inspire potential recruits.


The emphasis on their national origins and the use of images serves as a powerful propaganda tool designed to project a sense of international unity and commitment among IS's ranks while reinforcing the group's ideological messaging about sacrifice and religious martyrdom.


Tactical Shift and Preemptive Strike Narrative

Naba #475 also declared the attack as a preemptive strike, framing it as a defensive measure rather than an act of aggression. The publication claimed that ISS intelligence had identified an imminent large-scale offensive by Puntland Forces, prompting the group to strike first to disrupt the planned operation and inflict significant casualties before their adversaries could mobilise. This framing aligns closely with the group's ideological narrative of defensive jihad, where violence is portrayed as a necessary response to perceived threats against the Islamic State.


The assault site, Dharjaale Village in the Iskushuban District, is located in the rugged, mountainous Bari Region, a known ISS stronghold. The challenging terrain provides natural defensive advantages, which the ISS has long exploited to evade large-scale military operations and maintain a strategic foothold.


Strategic and Operational Shift for ISS

This assault signals a significant evolution in ISS’s operational tactics. Historically, ISS in Somalia maintained a low operational tempo, conducting limited but precise attacks to reinforce the perception that it lacked the capacity for large-scale operations. However, the scale, complexity, and coordination of this attack—featuring multiple VBIEDs, suicide bombers, and direct armed confrontations—challenge that perception and reflect a shift toward more aggressive, high-profile operations.


The tactics used in this assault closely mirror those of their regional rival, al-Shabaab, whose operations frequently feature coordinated VBIED attacks and mass armed engagements, especially in Mogadishu. ISS's ability to penetrate 80 kilometres into Puntland-controlled territory and strike a critical military encampment not only erodes confidence in Puntland's security capabilities but also strengthens ISS's propaganda efforts. Such high-profile attacks bolster recruitment, presenting ISS as a formidable force capable of rivalling al-Shabaab's regional influence.


ISS as a Key Financial and Operational Node

Despite its historically low operational tempo—only two recorded attacks in the past seven months—ISS has continued consolidating its influence, particularly in the Al-Miskaad Mountains. Beyond battlefield operations, ISS plays a critical role as a financial hub within the broader Islamic State network. The group facilitates the flow of resources to other IS affiliates across Africa and the Middle East, reinforcing the organization's resilience even in the absence of frequent attacks.


This financial leverage enables ISS to sustain its insurgency, challenge rival groups like al-Shabaab, and resist Puntland’s counter-terrorism efforts. The Dharjaale assault underscores ISS’s increasing capacity for tactical operations and shaping regional power dynamics through a blend of financial influence, strategic propaganda, and operational effectiveness.


Broader Counter-Terrorism Challenges and Strategic Failures

The attack in Dharjaale occurred just one week after Puntland Forces, in collaboration with American forces, announced the launch of a counter-terrorism operation (CTO) targeting ISS positions in the Bari Region. Rather than deterring the group, the CTO announcement provoked ISS into launching a preemptive strike, effectively forcing Puntland Forces into a defensive posture instead of advancing their campaign. This reactive shift echoes patterns seen in other regions where IS affiliates, such as in the Sahel and parts of Syria, have exploited gaps in local security strategies to expand their reach. The incident highlights a broader issue in counter-terrorism efforts. While international collaboration and military operations can disrupt terrorist activities temporarily, they often fail to contain the ideological and operational growth of groups like ISS. 

Other Developments

TRAC Incident Report: At Least 10 People Killed and 30 Others Injured in a Suspected Islamic State (IS)-Linked Car-Ramming Attack Followed by a Shooting During the New Year’s Eve Celebrations, New Orleans, Louisiana, United States 

On the night between 31 December 2024 and 1 January 2025 a driver intentionally rammed his fully electric Ford F-150 Lightning pick-up truck into a crowd, killing at least 12 people and injuring 30 more. Witnesses reported that the attacker exited the vehicle and opened fire on survivors, prompting police to return fire. The suspect was shot dead on-site by responding officers. Given the complexity of the New Orleans attack, including the use of a heavy, fast, and nearly silent electric vehicle, TRAC highlights the likelihood that the victims were caught off guard. 


The attacker was identified as Shamsud-Din Jabbar, 42, a United States citizen born in Texas and a veteran of the US Army. His vehicle bore a flag associated with the Islamic State (IS), a detail that strongly suggests the attack was ideologically motivated. Security forces later discovered firearms in the truck and safely disposed of two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) found in the vicinity.


Jabbar’s background sheds light on his potential radicalisation. A former IT professional with Deloitte and a real estate agent in the Houston area, Jabbar appears to have stopped updating his work records in 2022, which likely coincides with the beginning of his ideological shift. Notably, in videos reportedly recorded while travelling from Texas to Louisiana, Jabbar expressed his intention to kill his family and join the Islamic State. Although IS insiders have circulated rumours of Jabbar pledging allegiance to the group, TRAC has not yet confirmed this claim.


Jabbar had served in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2010, receiving a 'Global War on Terrorism Service Medal.’ He was a member of the US Army Reserves from 2015 to 2020, leaving with an honourable discharge. The truck used in the attack was rented via the car-sharing platform Turo, which has also been linked to another incident on January 1 involving a Tesla Cybertruck explosion outside a Trump Hotel in Las Vegas. The proximity of these events has raised concerns about possible coordination.

TRAC Incident Report: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Launches Major Double Tap Assault, an SVBIED Followed by an Armed Assault, Targeting a Security Forces’ Post, in Dera Ismail Khan, Tank District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan

On 28 December 2024, a Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) suicide bombing targeted a joint Frontier Corps (FC) and Pakistani Army post on the Dera-Tank Road in Dera Ismail Khan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The attack involved a suicide bomber driving a stolen Toyota Hilux Vigo rigged as a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED). The vehicle had been stolen from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government’s Communication and Works Department on 10 December, indicating a premeditated plan to weaponise state resources for maximum psychological impact.


The suicide bomber was neutralised by gate security before reaching the checkpoint, causing the explosion to detonate at the camp's outer walls instead of penetrating the compound. Despite the structural damage, the early intervention prevented further casualties. Immediately following the explosion, armed assailants travelling in a rickshaw opened fire on the checkpoint, injuring four security personnel. Security forces returned fire, forcing the attackers to retreat from the area. Reinforcements from nearby regions, including Hathla, Kallachi, Dera Ismail Khan, and Tank, were deployed for a search operation to track down the assailants.


The attack demonstrates a significant escalation in TTP operational tactics, blending a high-impact SVBIED attack with small-arms fire, indicative of a multi-layered assault strategy. The use of a stolen government vehicle as the SVBIED highlights the deliberate exploitation of state resources, likely chosen to evade suspicion at checkpoints. This approach amplifies the attack’s psychological impact and directly signals the group's intent to target state infrastructure. The secondary rickshaw attack using small-arms fire immediately after the explosion was a calculated effort to maximise casualties and chaos while providing cover for the attackers to escape. Despite causing injuries to four security personnel, the defensive actions of the checkpoint forces successfully repelled the attackers, mitigating further damage.


This attack closely aligns with the TTP’s strategic narrative, particularly following their 12 December statement calling for heightened aggression against Pakistani security forces and their families. The bombing operationalised this threat, occurring just a week after the group's deadliest assault on 21 December 2024. The TTP’s use of suicide bombings, especially with a stolen government vehicle, serves a dual purpose: amplifying fear while emphasising their capacity to strike at the core of state authority. Suicide attacks like these carry significant psychological weight, both for security personnel and the broader population. They aim not only for physical destruction but also to erode public confidence in the government's ability to maintain security. The stolen vehicle further reinforces this by symbolising a breach of state control and amplifying perceptions of vulnerability.


The attack also unfolds against a backdrop of escalating tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. On 24 December, Pakistan conducted airstrikes on alleged TTP safe havens in Afghanistan, prompting backlash and further straining bilateral relations. The TTP has seized on these tensions, portraying itself as a defender against Pakistani military actions while leveraging such attacks to reinforce its ideological narrative of resistance. By timing the Dera Ismail Khan bombing shortly after Pakistan's airstrikes, the TTP is strategically positioning itself as both retaliatory and proactive in its fight against state forces.

(Statement) Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen (ASY / AQAP / AQY) Claims to Have Executed 11 Abductees, Including Journalist Mohammed Al-Maqri, on Charges of Spying, Yemen

On 27 December 2024, al-Malahim Media, the official propaganda wing of Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen (ASY), also known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY), released a statement announcing the execution of 11 Yemeni nationals. Among those executed was prominent journalist Mohammed Al-Muqri, who had been abducted in October 2015 from Mukalla, Hadhramaut Governorate, during AQAP's control over the city.


AQAP claimed the announcement came in response to requests from the families of the abductees seeking clarity on the fate of their loved ones. The group alleged that the victims were executed for allegedly spying on behalf of Yemen's National Security Agency, which is backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This justification aligns with AQAP's pattern of using accusations of espionage as a rationale for carrying out executions, often aiming to solidify their control through fear and propaganda messaging.


Among the executed was journalist Mohammed Al-Muqri, who worked for the Yemen Today channel. AQAP stated that Al-Muqri had already been executed during his abduction, though details were only disclosed in the recent statement. His abduction dates back to when AQAP controlled Mukalla before it was retaken in a Saudi-led military operation.


Another notable execution was that of Naji A-Zuheiri, whom AQAP labelled a "spy" collaborating with the Yemeni government and the United States. The group specifically linked A-Zuheiri to the first U.S. drone strike in the Arabian Peninsula, which occurred in 2002 in Marib, attempting to frame the execution as retribution for past actions involving counterterrorism operations.


AQAP described the remaining nine executed individuals as members of the so-called "Al-Bayda Cell," a group captured in the Al-Somaa area before AQAP retreated from the region. The statement did not provide substantial evidence for the espionage claims, consistent with the group's historical use of such accusations to justify violence and eliminate perceived threats.


By now publicising the executions, the group aims to deter collaboration with Yemeni and international security forces by instilling fear through severe punishments for such cooperation. Simultaneously, AQAP seeks to reassert its presence and influence despite territorial losses, using propaganda to project strength and maintain relevance in areas where it once held control.

(Poster/ Right-Wing Extremism): InJekt Division Circulate Stochastic Poster ‘They Speak English but Their Motives are Hebrew’

This poster highlights Injekt’s antisemitic and conspiratorial rhetoric, blending neo-Nazi themes with overt hostility toward global political alliances. Featuring former U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the poster uses redacted eyes and black-and-white tones to evoke secrecy and manipulation. The accompanying text, “They speak English but their motives are Hebrew“, reinforces a core antisemitic trope that accuses Jewish people and Israel of controlling global politics through deception and hidden agendas.


This propaganda aims to stoke division and reinforce a narrative of betrayal among the far-right audience, portraying leaders like Trump as puppets serving Jewish interests rather than their nations. Targeting high-profile figures with veiled accusations, the poster seeks to mobilise its followers through mistrust and hatred. InJekt is following a strategy of escalating antisemitic sentiments under the guise of exposing “hidden truths” while attempting to inspire hostility toward political systems and international alliances.

(Poster) al-Azaim Media (Unofficial Islamic State Khurasan/ISK): Al-Naba #474: ‘The Global Hypocrisy “Saidnaya”’

(Chatter) Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF/PKK) Repatriate 150 Islamic State (IS) Families From al-Hol Camp, Hasakah Governorate, Syria

(Anonymous Anarchist) Anarchist Group Responsible for Telecommunications Pylon Fire Causing Major Outages in Rhône, France

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