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RESEARCH MAILING -- CHANGES / SIGNUP

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WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW!

US IS RAPIDLY FALLING FURTHER BEHIND

China produces as many graduates in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering & Mathematics) as the next 4 countries combined. Meanwhile Europe's graduates are more and more in less and less useful subjects.

NOTE: Patent and Research Papers being filed also mirrors this chart!

RESEARCH

1- THE US GLOBAL TRADE IMBALANCE PROBLEM

• The US Has Two Central Structural Problems:

1. The US Consumes More Than It Produces versus China Producing More Than It Consumes.
2. Fiscal Stimulus (Deficit Spending) Is No Longer Viable for achieving US Economic Growth!! 

• Unless the Trump Administration strategically addresses these problems, it will fail!
• The $7tn US government is now 3rd largest economy in world, and Trump/Musk need US government recession to arrest US debt spiral (interest payments rise $100B-300B next 12 months).
• Speaker Johnson must persuade GOP deficit-hawkish Freedom Caucus to back Trump tax cuts (via budget reconciliation).  
• DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) needs to target $1T of public sector savings. 

2-  PREPARING FOR THE TRADE WAR WITH EUROPE

• The EU is a big trading partner for the US with around 15% of US imports from the EU. 
• European indices, along with China and other EMs, tend to be highly sensitive to tariff announcements. 
• Autos and Cyclicals generally are most vulnerable to rising trade uncertainty. Also of note, Goldman's GRANOLAS basket (GSK, Roche, ASML, Nestlé, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, L'Oréal, LVMH, AstraZeneca, SAP, and Sanofi) which have under-performed recently, tend to be outperformers when trade policy uncertainty rises.
• 30% of STOXX 600 assets are now in the US vs. 18% in 2012. The trend to re-shore in the US is expected to continue regardless of tariff imposition on Europe.
• Goldman's FX strategists are looking for EUR/USD at 0.97 and GBP/USD at 1.20 over 12-months partly on growth/rate differentials and partly on trade uncertainty – and of course the two things are interconnected.
• A lot of investors in the European equity market are dollar-based. This means that, unless they currency-hedge, they will lose in an FX fall, which discourages investment.
• Economists estimate that a 10% tariff rate on all US imports could knock 1% off Euro area growth (assuming full retaliation). Given the bank already forecasts low European EPS growth this would easily eliminate profit growth in 2025.
• US equities could prove more vulnerable if investors see these tariffs as a reason to reassess their assumptions about the risks that the Administration is willing to take with the growth and inflation outlook.

DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH

1- MONROE DOCTRINE 2.0 -- AN EXPANDING USMC

• It increasingly looks like a looming Monroe Doctrine Pan -North American trade stance is being framed. 
• With 25% tariff threats Trump quickly achieved forced action by Mexico and Canada which is but the opening salvo in aligning these southern and northern territories with US trade goals.
• Next is likely a more globally encompassing, impenetrable and beneficial trade agreement for all three USMC parties.
• Using Immigration and Opioids as the initial "binding agent" Trump is likely to next use the Auto industry as the key strategic "bonding agent".

2- HEDGE FUNDS HAVE BEGUN INCREASING THEIR SHORT POSITIONS

• The number of hedge fund strategies likely short the stock market is rising rapidly.
• The rise in the short count began before President Trump was elected and has gathered pace since then.
• Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) are also becoming more negative on the outlook. 
• Hedge funds have also adopted an increasing dim outlook.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC REPORTING

EMPLOYMENT (NFP)

• While we just hit another month of record foreign-born, (largely illegal alien), workers at 31.774 million, the number of native-born workers remains unchanged over the past six years, still below levels last hit in 2019, just before the covid crisis.
• Since July 2018, the US labor force has added 4.6 million foreign-born workers, while the number of native-born workers has declined by nearly 700K.
• The only job growth the past 6 years in the US has been for foreigners.

TREASURY QUARTERLY REFUNDING ANNOUNCEMENT (QRA)

• Bessent left intact former Secretary Janet Yellen’s agenda. As widely expect, the Treasury will next week sell $125 billion of debt in its quarterly refunding auctions, which span 3-, 10- and 30-year maturities, the same amount as in the past several quarters. The gross issuance will refund $106.2 billion of privately-held Treasury notes and bonds maturing on February 15, 2025, and will raise new cash from private investors of approximately $18.8 billion.  The securities are:
• A 3-year note in the amount of $58 billion, maturing February 15, 2028,
• A 10-year note in the amount of $42 billion, maturing February 15, 2035,
• A 30-year bond in the amount of $25 billion, maturing February 15, 2055.

1- THE US GLOBAL TRADE IMBALANCE PROBLEM

THE TWO MAJOR STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS FACING THE US

PROBLEM #1

The US Consumes More Than It Produces

while

China Producing More Than It Consumes

WHAT TO EXPECT THIS YEAR:

• US Treasury yields to fall below 4%  
• $37tn of government debt 
• Budget deficit of 9% GDP past 5 years huge catalyst for 50% jump in US nominal GDP since 2020

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE: 

• The $7tn US government is now 3rd largest economy in world, and Trump/Musk need US government recession to arrest US debt spiral, (interest payments rise $100B-300B next 12 months).
• Speaker Johnson must persuade GOP deficit-hawkish Freedom Caucus to back Trump tax cuts (via budget reconciliation). 
• DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) needs to target $1tn of public sector savings. 

THE 3-3-3 PLAN

Treasury Secretary Bessent thinks 10-year yields can decline as a result of his “3, 3, 3” economic policy targets – 3% real GDP growth, 3% fiscal deficit, and 3m barrels per day (bpd) increase in oil production. Yet they are not going to be possible without significant US economic disruption and statecraft.



• A 3% FISCAL DEFICIT might see some inroads made by DOGE’s ferreting efforts and the 1% voluntary shrinkage in the federal civil service already achieved. But with permanent tax cuts also lobbied for by Bessent --and a 15% corporate tax rate by the president-- it would need a lot of new revenue from tariffs, which he also floated.
• A 3% RATE OF REAL GDP growth needs help from the Fed and the long end of the curve, which won’t do so voluntarily while they worry about tariff inflation.
• 3M-bpd US OIL EQUIVALENT INCREASE won’t happen via market forces, even if Energy Secretary Wright just announced "Net-zero policies raise energy costs for American families and businesses, threaten the reliability of our energy system, and undermine our energy and national security… the Department's goal will be to unleash the great abundance of American energy required to power modern life and to achieve a durable state of American energy dominance."  While our energy analyst Joe DeLaura expects oil prices to drift lower, to get cheap oil the US may have to use the Defence Production Act to force firms to “Drill, baby, drill”; or subsidies – paid for by tariffs(?); or get help from Venezuela --not in the US camp-- or Iran --under “maximum pressure”-- or Saudi Arabia, who at current oil prices already can’t afford their megaprojects like the first (and last?) linear city, Neom.

PROBLEM #2

Keynesian Economics => Fiscal Stimulus (Deficit Spending) Is

No Longer Viable for achieving US Economic Growth!!

The US Deficit Spending no longer generates the GDP growth it once did. Specifically, Debt Growth no longer produces economic growth at a sufficient rate.

• In the US it now takes as much as $2.50 of New Debt to produce the $1 of economic growth.

• In the US it now takes as much as $1.50 of Deficit Growth to produce $1 of economic growth.

• Velocity of Money has become chronically smaller than Money Supply growth resulting in further GDP headwinds.

In Q4 2024 it took $5.80 of New Debt to produce the $1 of economic growth.

In 2024 it took $3.90 of New Debt to produce the $1 of economic growth.

2- PREPARING FOR THE TRADE WAR WITH EUROPE

WHAT THE COMING EU/US TRADE WAR WILL LOOK LIKE

Goldman Sachs strategists below revisited some key points and charts on European equities' sensitivity to renewed trade risks.

1. The EU is a big trading partner for the US with around 15% of US imports from the EU. Machinery/Equipment, Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals make up the largest shares of European exports to the US.

2. European indices, along with China and other EMs, tend to be highly sensitive to tariff announcements. The beta to world trade is higher for Europe than the US. Emerging Markets tend to show the most sensitivity. In Europe, the Nordics (OMX) and Germany (DAX, MDAX) are most vulnerable. In contrast, FTSE 100 has a low beta to world trade given its defensive characteristics and the UK is a services-oriented economy. Furthermore, in his most recent comments President Trump suggested that the UK - which does not have a trade surplus - would be less likely a target of US tariffs. Similarly, the SMI has historically been more insulated. It is also a defensive index and Swiss exports tend to be inelastic because of their ‘technologically advanced’ products. Much will depend on the format and any exclusions should Trump impose broad-based tariffs on Europe, especially with respect to pharmaceutical products.

3. Which parts of the market are most sensitive? Stock market sectors that are defensive with high margins, such as Healthcare, tend to swing less with trade uncertainty. Goldman shows in the next chart that autos and cyclicals generally are most vulnerable to rising trade uncertainty. Also of note, Goldman's GRANOLAS basket (GSK, Roche, ASML, Nestlé, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, L'Oréal, LVMH, AstraZeneca, SAP, and Sanofi), which have under-performed recently, tend to be outperformers when trade policy uncertainty rises.

4. Are there any offsets/winners in Europe?  Yes, listed companies have lifted their US exposure over time. This is not just sales - 30% of STOXX 600 assets are now in the US vs. 18% in 2012. The trend to re-shore in the US is expected to continue regardless of tariff imposition on Europe or not; (albeit should tariffs be announced this is likely to accelerate the trend). Also, for companies exposed to the US, there are other offsets such as higher economic growth in the US, potential tax cuts and deregulation. Goldman's basket of European companies with US exposure (GSSTAMER) – which are largely producers in the US rather than exporters – has performed well since the summer as US growth data has proven resilient and USD has strengthened.

Disentangling US exposure: the ‘USA Tariffs’ basket (GSXETRFS) is composed of European names with high US sales exposure but limited US manufacturing presence in the US, while the ‘Made in USA’ basket (GSXEMADE) is composed of companies with high US sales exposure and significant US production. This pair trades very closely to European Trade policy uncertainty. And of course European defense companies may gain (and have done well recently), based on Europe spending more on defense partly as a way to mollify Trump’s desire for tariffs on Europe.

5. Will a fall in European currencies cushion Europe stocks? Yes, to some extent European EPS estimates do tend to rise with a falling currency, (especially given the global exposures of European companies), and we have observed this recently (chart below). Goldman's FX strategists are looking for EUR/USD at 0.97 and GBP/USD at 1.20 over 12-months partly on growth/rate differentials and partly on trade uncertainty – and of course the two things are interconnected. Arguably, this is a cushion to Europe, but empirically European equity is positively correlated to the Euro. Euro weakening normally comes alongside a rise in the risk premium, which offsets translation and/or competitiveness advantages.

6. A lot of investors in the European equity market are dollar-based. This means that, unless they currency-hedge, they will lose in an FX fall, which discourages investment. A strong dollar has tended to mean under-performance of non-US markets historically. This is something Goldman's markets group discuss too, arguing the general response over the last year has been for non-US equities to underperform US equities on tariff fears, especially in USD terms.

7. Is tariff risk now all priced? It depends on how much the tariffs, or the trade risks around them, impact economic growth both in Europe and globally. And of course the presence and timing of any tariffs is uncertain; the news on Monday and the delay to the imposition of tariffs on Mexico and Canada bears witness to the lack of certainty. Note that cyclicals, which tend to be the most vulnerable slice to tariff news, have performed well in all regions in recent months. While it is true that European cyclical performance has not been as stellar as in the US, this is likely mainly a function of the weaker macro data in Europe/China rather than the concerns about tariffs. The Goldman US strategy team argues that prior to Friday, the US equity market had been pricing limited risk of widespread tariffs, and that remains the case. For example, a basket of stocks with broad global tariff exposure has outperformed its typical relationships with US economic growth and interest rates since Election Day. Goldman economists estimate that a 10% tariff rate on all US imports could knock 1% off Euro area growth (assuming full retaliation). Given the bank already forecasts low European EPS growth this would easily eliminate profit growth in 2025.

8. How about positioning and Europe’s recent performance? These rising trade risks are coming after Europe has had strong year-to-date performance, but in the more medium term context Europe has been an under-performer. Valuations are on a sharp discount to the US (even adjusting for sector exposures) and positioning in Europe is low. Goldman found at its conferences in Asia and Europe that investors were already universally bearish on Europe. One thing the bank's markets group also noted was that US equities could prove more vulnerable if investors see these tariffs as a reason to reassess their assumptions about the risks that the Administration is willing to take with the growth and inflation outlook. In that case, risk premia could rise more broadly. This is interesting in the context of the US market already being priced for perfection; whereas this is certainly not true for Europe. Flows into Europe have been exceptionally weak in recent years (Exhibit 16). All this will not insulate Europe from a trade war – given its economic and market vulnerabilities – but does in our view limit the relative downside. We have been arguing that investors should diversify and the news on tariffs does not diminish that view. We especially like quality implementation like our Ex-Tech compounders or GRANOLAS. We would also note that the tariffs on China have been a little less large than feared, and Europe has high exposure to China.

DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH

1- MONROE DOCTRINE 2.0 -- AN EXPANDING USMC

It increasingly looks like a looming Monroe Doctrine Pan-North American trade stance is being framed.

A more globally encompassing, impenetrable and beneficial trade agreement for all three parties.

• With 25% tariff threats Trump quickly achieved forced action by Mexico and Canada, which is but the opening salvo in aligning these southern and northern territories with US trade goals.

Using Immigration and Opioids as the initial "binding agent", Trump is likely to next

use the Auto industry as the key strategic "bonding agent".

CHINA: Trump has stated that new 10% tariffs on China were an “opening salvo” and will go higher without

"a deal"?

• Trump Executive Order on trade contain a slew of national-security related China-focused investigations already underway, which are unlikely to only conclude that a 10% tariff is an appropriate palliative.

• Commerce, with Treasury and the USTR, will investigate the causes of large, persistent US trade deficits, as well as the economic and national security implications and risks resulting from them, and recommend appropriate measures, such as a global tariff or other policies.
• Commerce, with the Secretary of Defence and relevant agencies, will conduct a full economic and security review of the US industrial and manufacturing base to assess whether it’s necessary to initiate action to reduce imports that threaten national security.
• Commerce and the USTR will assess legislative proposals over China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations status and make policy recommendations regarding any changes. Together with the SCTM, it will also review the US-China Phase One Trade Deal to determine whether China is acting in accordance with it and perhaps impose tariffs; and China’s trade circumvention through third countries; and/or policies which burden or restrict US commerce.
• President Trump has now twice threatened 100% tariffs on any BRICS countries considering de-dollarisation.

EUROPE: There is also drama on a relatively smaller, but still market-moving scale in Europe.

• French PM Bayrou has rammed through the 2025 budget at the price of a parliamentary confidence vote, likely tomorrow, that could bring down the budget and 6-week-old government. Were that to come to pass, markets would be "ne pas content" to put it mildly.
• The contrast between Europe’s ‘Greece’ and the US’ ‘Rome’ could not be starker as Germany also prepares for its own federal elections, which seem unlikely to return a government capable of dealing with the profound structural issues it's grappling with.
• The “pro-growth” UK government is to allow Council Tax to rise 5%, and higher in places. The PM also says the country doesn’t have to choose between the US and EU, a geopolitical delusion being echoed everywhere. In the UK case, perhaps it simply means not being offered a deal by either? For the moment the best the UK is being pointed to by the EU is a defence “coalition of the willing to spend €500bn as starters”, which it has already said it can’t afford.

NOTE: Friday after the Financial Times reported that the EU is prepared to reduce its 10% tariff on US car imports to align more closely with the USA’s 2.5% rate in a bid to prevent a trade war with Donald Trump. Names like Ford and GM both saw a bump during afternoon trading, and before paring gains slightly heading into the last few hours of trading for the week.  FT cited Bernd Lange, chair of the European Parliament’s trade committee. As part of the deal, the EU would also increase purchases of American liquefied natural gas and military equipment. The move aims to ease tensions over the EU’s trade surplus with the US, a frequent target of Trump.

GLOBAL STAGE: Presently in these early stages still all about economic statecraft:

• The US is to launch a sovereign wealth fund. Some will ask how a country running large twin deficits can save for such a fund – but thinking like an economist is wrong; others wonder which financial assets will be bid up by it? The Executive Order states the federal government directly owns $5.7 trillion of assets, and indirectly far more. These will now be leveraged “to invest in great national endeavours for the benefit of all of the American people.” That might mean TikTok, which doesn’t seem to make money, but is a national security issue; or crypto to fuse dollar-based Fartcraft to its main purpose - directing huge funds to national security/warcraft areas requiring long-term, low-cost capital.
• President Trump is proposing Ukraine grant the US rights to its critical minerals in exchange for military aid. Talk about a quid pro quo, or dollars pro quo, but again pointing to a Great Game of Global Trade – and further potential US interest in the ultimate outcome of the war.
• President Trump and Israeli PM Netanyahu were meeting in the White House at the time of writing – as the New York Times reports the US believes Iran is looking at ways to quickly build a nuclear bomb.
• The US State Department has swallowed up USAID, prompting Branko Milanovic to argue: “The main losses… will be felt by the comprador intelligentsias. The role of these intelligentsia was ambivalent. They were introducing some new knowledge in their countries, but they were often cut off from the domestic intellectual developments. They did not reflect the needs of countries, but of donors.” Just not the *US* donors, according to Secretary of State Rubio.
• The White House may shut down the Department of Education -- only created in 1979 -- further underlining how radical the structural changes taking place are on multiple fronts.

2- HEDGE FUNDS HAVE BEGUN INCREASING THEIR SHORT POSITIONS

BLOOMBERG'S Macro Strategist Simon White reports:

The number of hedge fund strategies likely short the stock market is rising rapidly.

It wasn’t long ago that being short stocks was niche, maybe even a bit gauche. Who would want to look inept by not being long the market as it charged relentlessly higher?

As recently as the summer, there was only one hedge fund strategy (of the 12 key ones tracked by Hedge Fund Research) whose returns where negatively sensitive to the S&P’s returns on a one-year basis.  Now that’s risen to six, the highest since June 2023.

Absolute return, macro and equity market-neutral are among the strategies currently with negative sensitivity to the S&P.

Hedge funds are considered smart money. That’s generally true in the aggregate. The number of strategies with a negative sensitivity to the stock market tends to pick up ahead of market tops, such as in early 2017 or late 2019. But that can persist after the bottom is in, presumably as some funds expect a deeper fall in the market.

Today’s rise in the short count began before President Trump was elected and has gathered pace since then. Despite

there being a modicum of buyer’s remorse that he might actually do as he says with tariffs, some hedge funds had already taken a dimmer view that trade policy would soon jolt a market that was already over-owned and overvalued.

Commodity trading advisers are also becoming more negative on the outlook.  The sensitivity of their returns, based on the HFR CTA index, are negative to stocks, and positive to bonds.

HFR’s index might not perfectly capture CTAs’ returns. But we can do a sense check with the DBi managed futures ETF. It has recently gone short the S&P, and long 10-year futures.

Hedge funds are not alone with their dim outlook, though.

Broad positioning data shows a recent and rapid shift into trades expecting a bad tariff outcome: long Treasuries, short SOFR futures – i.e. a bear flattener – as well a drop-off in stock longs, and a rise to at least decade-highs in net longs in the dollar and gold.

Given mercurial policymaking, there will be plenty of trading opportunities ahead.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS:

What This Week's Key Global Economic Releases Tell Us

US

EMPLOYMENT (NFP)

Slowly, the unprecedented payrolls fabrication of the Biden administration is starting to unravel. The BLS confirmed Friday what Wall Street had been saying for much of the past 3 years - that most of the job gains in the past few years, and especially 2024, were a mirage. (This all following the dramatic August 2024 preliminary data revision which vaporized 818K jobs that had never existed in the first place). Friday we are finally seeing the details behind this near-record revision.

As part of its annual revision to both the Establishment and Household survey, today the BLS said that the "seasonally adjusted total nonfarm employment level for March 2024 was revised downward by 589,000. On a not seasonally adjusted basis, the total nonfarm employment level for March 2024 was revised downward by 598,000, or -0.4 percent. Not seasonally adjusted, the absolute average benchmark revision over the past 10 years is 0.1 percent." As a result, the over-the-year change in payrolls for March 2024 was revised from +2,900,000 to +2,346,000.

The wheels of the US jobs market were falling off in mid 2024, and by the timeTrump came on board, the jobs market has become one giant Potemkin village on the verge of collapse.

Another highlight from Friday's BLS' data revision was there are millions of illegal workers in the US, a topic which until the election was especially sensitive politically but no longer is. The BLS reported that in January, over a million, or 1,045,000 to be precise, foreign-born workers found a job (and as Standard Chartered explained last June, this is largely illegal or "undocumented" aliens) compared to only 8,000 native-born workers!

This means that while we just hit another month of record foreign-born (largely illegal alien) workers at 31.774 million, the number of native-born workers remains unchanged over the past six years, still below levels last hit in 2019, just before the covid crisis...

This also means that since July 2018, the US labor force has added 4.6 million foreign-born workers,

while the number of native-born workers has declined by nearly 700K.

The only job growth in the US in the past 6 years has been for foreigners.

TREASURY QUARTERLY REFUNDING ANNOUNCEMENT (QRA)

The US Treasury is offering USD 125bln of securities to refund USD 106.2bln, raising cash of USD 18.8bln (prev. USD 8.6bln Q/Q). Overall, the quarterly refunding was largely as expected, maintaining its nominal coupon and FRN auction sizes, while guidance saw a slight tweak.

• It expects to maintain nominal coupon and FRN auction sizes for at least the next several quarters, a slight tweak from the prior guidance that "Treasury does not anticipate needing to increase nominal coupon or FRN auction sizes for at least the next several quarters".
• The removal of the "increase" language, according to the TBAC report, stressed "the Committee felt that any shift in language should not be read to indicate an expected near-term increase in nominal coupon auction sizes".
• Some members preferred dropping the language altogether to reflect the uncertain outlook, but the majority preferred moderating the language at this meeting, likely to keep optionality open amid uncertainty ahead.
• It also maintained that the "Treasury plans to address any seasonal or unexpected variations in borrowing needs over the next quarter through changes in regular bill auction sizes and/or CMBs."
• Looking ahead, analysts will be cognizant of any change in the composition of the Treasury funding with Treasury Secretary Bessent previously expressing a preference for funding through duration as opposed to short-term bills.
• In TIPS, the Treasury plans to maintain the 30YR TIPS new issue at USD 9bln, increase the 10yr TIPS reopening auction size by USD 1bln to USD 18bln and increase the 5yr TIPS new issue to USD 25bln.
• For Bill issuance, the Treasury noted since Jan 21st, the Treasury has been using extraordinary measures to finance the government on a temporary basis, until the debt limit is suspended or increased. Debt limit-related constraints will lead to greater than normal variability in benchmark bill issuance and significant usage of CMBs.
• The buybacks were largely maintained for liquidity support, where it plans weekly ops. of up to USD 4bln per operation in nominal coupon securities, and in longer maturity buckets, to conduct two operations, each up to USD 2bln over the refunding quarter.
• Overall it expects it will purchase up to USD 30bln in off-the-run securities across buckets for liquidity support (unchanged from Q4), but up to USD 59.5bln in the 1mth to 2yr bucket for cash management purposes (prev. USD 22.5bln).

GLOBAL

WHAT DOES YOUR SCAN OF THE DATA BELOW TELL YOU? - THE MEDIA AVOIDS BAD NEWS!

We present the data in a way you can quickly see what is happening.

THIS WEEK WE SAW

Exp. =Expectations, Prev. =Previous

UNITED STATES

• US S&P Global Manufacturing PMI Final (Jan) 51.2 (Prev. 50.1)
• US ISM Manufacturing PMI (Jan) 50.9 vs. Exp. 49.8 (Prev. 49.3, Rev. 49.2)
• US ISM Manufacturing Prices Paid (Jan) 54.9 vs. Exp. 53.5 (Prev. 52.5)
• US ISM Manufacturing New Orders Index (Jan) 55.1 (Prev. 52.5, Rev. 52.1)
• US ISM Manufacturing Employment Index (Jan) 50.3 (Prev. 45.3, Rev. 45.4)
• US Construction Spending MM (Dec) 0.5% vs. Exp. 0.2% (Rev. 0.2%)
• US Factory Orders MM (Dec) -0.9% vs. Exp. -0.7% (Prev. -0.4%, Rev. -0.8%)
• US JOLTS Job Openings (Dec) 7.6M vs. Exp. 8.0M (Prev. 8.098M, Rev. 8.156M)
• US S&P Global Services PMI Final (Jan) 52.9 (Prev. 52.8)
• US S&P Global Composite Final PMI (Jan) 52.7 (Prev. 52.4)
• US ISM Non-Manufacturing PMI (Jan) 52.8 vs. Exp. 54.3 (Prev. 54.1, Rev. 54.0)
• US ISM N-Mfg Employment Idx (Jan) 52.3 (Prev. 51.4, Rev. 51.3)
• US ISM N-Mfg New Orders Idx (Jan) 51.3 (Prev. 54.2, Rev. 54.4)
• US ISM N-Mfg Price Paid Idx (Jan) 60.4 (Prev. 64.4)
• US International Trade (USD)(Dec) -98.4B vs. Exp. -96.6B (Prev. -78.2B, Rev. -78.9B)
• US ADP National Employment (Jan) 183.0k vs. Exp. 150.0k (Prev. 122.0k)
• US Unit Labor Costs Prelim (Q4) 3.0% vs. Exp. 3.4% (Prev. 0.8%, Rev. 0.5%)
• US Productivity Prelim (Q4) 1.2% vs. Exp. 1.4% (Prev. 2.2%, Rev. 2.3%)
• US Challenger Layoffs (Jan) 49.795k (Prev. 38.792k)
• US Initial Jobless Claims w/e 219.0k vs. Exp. 213.0k (Prev. 207.0k, Rev. 208k)
• US Continued Jobless Claims w/e 1.886M vs. Exp. 1.874M (Prev. 1.858M, Rev. 1.850M)

CHINA

• Chinese Caixin Manufacturing PMI Final (Jan) 50.1 vs. Exp. 50.5 (Prev. 50.5)
• Chinese Caixin Services PMI (Jan) 51.0 vs. Exp. 52.3 (Prev. 52.2)
• Chinese Caixin Composite PMI (Jan) 51.1 (Prev. 51.4)
• China gold reserves end-Jan USD 206.53bln (vs end-Dec USD 191.34bln); Gold reserves 73.65mln toz (prev. 73.29mln toz). Chinese FX Reserves (Monthly) (Jan) 3.209Trl vs. Exp. 3.2Trl (Prev. 3.202Trl)

JAPAN

• Japanese Overall Labour Cash Earnings (Dec) 4.80% vs. Exp. 3.60% (Prev. 3.00%, Rev. 3.90%)
• Japanese All Household Spending MM (Dec) 2.3% vs. Exp. -0.5% (Prev. 0.4%)
• Japanese All Household Spending YY (Dec) 2.7% vs. Exp. 0.2% (Prev. -0.4%)

AUSTRALIA

• Australian Building Approvals (Dec) 0.7% vs. Exp. 1.0% (Prev. -3.6%, Rev. -3.4%)
• Australian Retail Sales MM Final (Dec) -0.1% vs. Exp. -0.7% (Prev. 0.8%)
• Australian Retail Trade (Q4) 1.0% vs. Exp. 0.8% (Prev. 0.5%)
• Australian Balance on Goods (AUD)(Dec) 5.1B vs. Exp. 7.0B (Prev. 7.1B)
• Australian Goods/Services Exports (Dec) 1.10% (Prev. 4.80%)
• Australian Goods/Services Imports (Dec) 5.90% (Prev. 1.70%)

SOUTH KOREA

• South Korean Trade Balance (USD)(Jan P) -1.89B vs. Exp. -1.28B (Prev. 6.49B)
• South Korean Export Growth YY (Jan P) -10.3% vs. Exp. -13.5% (Prev. 6.6%)
• South Korean Import Growth YY (Jan P) -6.4% vs. Exp. -9.9% (Prev. 3.3%)

SWITZERLAND

• Swiss Manufacturing PMI (Jan) 47.5 (Prev. 48.4)

EU

• EU HICP Flash YY (Jan) 2.5% vs. Exp. 2.4% (Prev. 2.4%)
• EU HICP-X F&E Flash YY (Jan) 2.7% vs. Exp. 2.7% (Prev. 2.7%)
• EU HICP Excluding Food, Energy, Alcohol & Tobacco Flash YY (Jan) 2.7% vs. Exp. 2.6% (Prev. 2.7%)
• EU HCOB Manufacturing Final PMI (Jan) 46.6 vs. Exp. 46.1 (Prev. 46.1)
• ECB Wage Tracker: 2025 Estimate 3.256% (prev. estimate 3.2%)
• EU HCOB Composite Final PMI (Jan) 50.2 vs. Exp. 50.2 (Prev. 50.2); HCOB Services Final PMI (Jan) 51.3 vs. Exp. 51.4 (Prev. 51.4)
• EU Retail Sales YY (Dec) 1.9% vs. Exp. 1.9% (Prev. 1.2%, Rev. 1.6%); Retail Sales MM (Dec) -0.2% vs. Exp. -0.1% (Prev. 0.1%, Rev. 0.0%)
• EU HCOB Construction PMI (Jan) 45.4 (Prev. 42.9)

GERMANY

• German HCOB Manufacturing PMI (Jan) 45.0 vs. Exp. 44.1 (Prev. 44.1)
• German HCOB Services PMI (Jan) 52.5 vs. Exp. 52.5 (Prev. 52.5); HCOB Composite Final PMI (Jan) 50.5 vs. Exp. 50.1 (Prev. 50.1)
• German HCOB Construction PMI (Jan) 42.5 (Prev. 37.8)
• German Industrial Orders MM (Dec) 6.9% vs. Exp. 2.0% (Prev. -5.4%)
• German Trade Balance, EUR, SA (Dec) 20.7B vs. Exp. 17.0B (Prev. 19.7B); Exports MM 2.9% vs. Exp. -0.6% (Prev. 2.1%); Imports MM 2.1% vs. Exp. 1.8% (Prev. -3.3%)
• German Industrial Output MM (Dec) -2.4% vs. Exp. -0.6% (Prev. 1.5%)

FRANCE

• French HCOB Manufacturing PMI (Jan) 45.0 (Prev. 45.3)
• French HCOB Services PMI (Jan) 48.2 vs. Exp. 48.9 (Prev. 48.9); HCOB Composite PMI (Jan) 47.6 vs. Exp. 48.3 (Prev. 48.3)
• French HCOB Construction PMI (Jan) 44.5 (Prev. 42.6)
• French Trade Balance, EUR, SA (Dec) -3.905B (Prev. -7.085B, Rev. -6.340B)

ITALY

• Italian CPI (EU Norm) Prelim YY (Jan) 1.7% vs. Exp. 1.4% (Prev. 1.4%); CPI (EU Norm) Prelim MM (Jan) -0.7% vs. Exp. -1.1% (Prev. 0.1%) Consumer Price Prelim YY (Jan) 1.5% (Prev. 1.3%); Consumer Price Prelim MM (Jan) 0.6% (Prev. 0.1%)
• Italian HCOB Manufacturing PMI (Jan) 46.3 (Prev. 46.2)
• Italian HCOB Composite PMI (Jan) 49.7 (Prev. 49.7); HCOB Services PMI (Jan) 50.4 vs. Exp. 50.5 (Prev. 50.7)
• Italian Retail Sales NSA YY (Dec) 0.6% (Prev. 1.1%); Retail Sales SA MM (Dec) 0.6% (Prev. -0.4%)
• Italian HCOB Construction PMI (Jan) 50.9 (Prev. 51.2)

SPAIN

• Spanish HCOB Manufacturing PMI (Jan) 50.9 vs. Exp. 53.6 (Prev. 53.3)
• Spanish Services PMI (Jan) 54.9 vs. Exp. 56.7 (Prev. 57.3)

SWEDEN

• Swedish CPIF Ex Energy Flash YY (Jan) 2.7% vs. Exp. 2.10% (Prev. 2.00%); CPIF Flash YY (Jan) 2.2% vs. Exp. 1.60% (Prev. 1.50%)

UK

• UK S&P Global Manufacturing PMI (Jan) 48.3 vs. Exp. 48.2 (Prev. 48.2)
• UK S&P Global PMI Composite - Output (Jan) 50.6 vs. Exp. 50.9 (Prev. 50.9); S&P Global Service PMI (Jan) 50.8 vs. Exp. 51.2 (Prev. 51.2)
• UK S&P Global Construction PMI (Jan) 48.1 vs. Exp. 53.4 (Prev. 53.3)
• UK Halifax House Prices MM (Jan) 0.7% vs. Exp. 0.2% (Prev. -0.2%)
• UK BBA Mortgage Rate (Jan) 7.49% (Prev. 7.5%)

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