Dear Naval Historical Foundation Family,

Welcome back to Thursday Tidings.

The Japanese military, looking to strengthen its East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere after the addition of the United States as a belligerent force in late 1941, made the decision in the late Spring of 1942 to invade Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands. Through intelligence, the United States learned of the plans and sent its carrier task forces and joint Australian-American cruiser forces to oppose the Japanese fleet carriers in the South Pacific. Under the command of Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, the Battle of the Coral Sea from 4-8 May 1942 was the first time since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that the enemy’s seemingly relentless advance into the Pacific was checked. The battle became the first large-scale naval battle between the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the naval and air forces of the United States and Australia. It was also the first time in which opposing aircraft carriers fought each other, a prelude to the Battle of the Midway, arguably the most important naval battle in American history. This week’s featured content centers on the Battle of the Coral Sea, a defining moment in American naval history and the Pacific Theater during World War II. 

This week's book review by Ed Calouro focuses on dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts. We have also once again included some helpful links on the U.S. Navy's role in the ongoing crisis in Ukraine.

As always, fair winds and following seas shipmates. This email is best viewed as a webpage for your reading convenience and best quality.

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Join Dr. Craig Symonds who tells the story of Yorktown's remarkable turnaround at the Pearl Harbor Navy Shipyard following Coral Sea that enabled her to be at Midway!

Featuring an expert panel including Vice Admiral Paul Sullivan and Rear Admiral Bill Cobb as they talk about the heroes of our Repair facilities. 

RECAP

Naval War in the South Atlantic -- 40th Anniversary

(The Fight for the Falklands/Malvinas)

The American Perspective

The NHF thanks members and friends who joined us for our first live event in over two years as we looked back 40 years at Falklands War from the American perspective.

Dr. Peter Haynes, Deputy Director of the Naval History and Heritage Command, opened with a thorough overview of the conflict which proved costly to both sides in both loss of hardware and human lives. The American perspective was then presented by former Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman who reflected on President Reagan's immediate decision to "Give Maggie everything she wants" in reference to requests from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Lehman then reflected how support was handled mainly through Navy-to-Navy channels. Dov Zakheim, charged with overseeing the flow of support, detailed the critical role logistics played in this conflict and how the United States enabled British success. Norman Polmar concluded the series of prepared remarks by summarizing lessons learned from the conflict that had applications for the American Navy in the ongoing Cold War with the Soviet Union. Dr. Sebastian Bruns of the Naval Academy then moderated a healthy give and take with the audience.

NHF Executive Director Rear Adm. Sonny Masso recognized the presence of the Royal Navy Naval Attache Commodore Phil Nash, RN, thanked the Navy Museum Director Dr. Chris Rentfrow and his team for their support and acknowledged support provided by Bob Carey of the Independence Fund, Bill Browning of Applied Math Inc., and retired Captain James Bryant. Their support will help underwrite our recording of the proceedings at our NHF YouTube site in the not-so-distant future. An announcement of the availability of that recording will be made in a future Thursday Tidings.  

L to R (Mr. Norman Polmar, Hon. Dov Zakheim, Secretary John Lehman, Admiral Masso)

L to R (Mr. Norman Polmar, Hon. Dov Zakheim, Secretary John Lehman, Dr. Sebastian Bruns)

Cover slide from CAPT Haines presentation

Dr. Peter Haines, CAPT USN (Ret), NHHC

50 Years Ago:

Easter Offensive, South Vietnam 1972

Recollections of the Role of USS Davidson (DE 1045)

By F.H. McCullough, III

Fifty-years ago, in the Gulf of Tonkin, during the evening of May 8, 1972, offshore North Vietnam, a U.S. Navy SH-3 Sea King helicopter was making its approach to the U.S. Navy’s guided missile light cruiser USS Providence (CLG 6), flagship of Rear Adm. Rembrandt C. Robinson, USN, the Commander (i.e., CTG) of various naval surface ships afloat constituting task groups TG70.8 and TG77.7. The helo was returning from a conference aboard the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea (CV 43) where senior officers met with the Commander of the US 7^th Fleet and others at the onset of a major escalation of the Vietnam War.  

The helo, with Admiral Robinson, three members of his staff, and the helo crew aboard, on approach to the Providence, suffered an operational malfunction, crashing into the fantail of the Providence and fell overboard into the Gulf. Killed in the accident were Rear Admiral Robinson, Capt. Edmund B. Taylor, Jr. USN, Chief of Staff; and Cdr. John M. Leaver, Jr., USN, Surface Operations Officer. The helo crew and the aviation staff officer were able to escape and were rescued. The significance of this accident was later revealed in the events and activities of that evening, May 8, 1972, when Operation Pocket Money (May 10, 1972, to October 10, 1972) and Operation Linebacker 1 (May 10, 1972, to October 23, 1972) were in their initial phases of execution on the direct orders of then-President Nixon. Rear Admiral Robinson was the only U.S. Navy admiral to have died in the Vietnam War.

New Oral History Available:

Rear Admiral Peter K. Cullins

Peter K. Cullins was an American U.S. Navy admiral who commanded the USS Waddell and the USS Little Rock, a 1000-man guided-missile cruiser and the flagship for Commander of the Sixth Fleet.

Cullins was born on November 19, 1928, in Annapolis, Maryland, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with a bachelor of science degree in 1951. On January 1, 1977, he became the first commander of the Naval Data Automation Command. In March 1980, he became Commander of the South Atlantic Force. He retired as a Rear Admiral the following year.

Commander William Bill Ault and the Battle of the Coral Sea

By NHF Staff

(8 May 2020)

In the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, Ault led Lexington’s group into combat, both in the attacks on the Japanese light carrier Shoho on 7 May and in those on the fleet carrier Shokaku on the 8th. During the latter action, both Ault and his radio-gunner, Aviation Radioman 1st Class William T. Butler, apparently suffered wounds when “Zero” fighters attacked the group commander’s plane. Ault tried in vain to return to a friendly deck, not knowing that Lexington had taken mortal damage in his absence. Unaware of Lexington’s distress, he radioed the ship at 1449, to tell her that he had only enough gasoline for 20 minutes. Yorktown, which had taken over communications for “Lady Lex,” heard Ault’s broadcast but failed to pick him up on her radar. Sadly informed that he was on his own but wished “Good luck,” Lexington’s air group commander asked that word be relayed to the ship that “we got a 1,000 pound bomb hit on a flat top.”

READ THE FULL ARTICLE

What Happened at the Battle of the Coral Sea?

By Rebellion Research

Opposing surface forces never sighted each other. The battle occurred because U.S. naval intelligence provided Admiral Nimitz with sufficient warning and understanding of Japanese intent and capability that he chose to commit the two carriers  Lexington (CV-2) and Yorktown (CV-5) against a Japanese force expected to consist of 2–3 carriers (Shokaku, Zuikaku and the small carrier Shoho.) Nimitz committed the Enterprise (CV-6) and Hornet (CV-8) as well, but they were unable to reach the area in time, due the timing of the Doolittle Raid.

The battle was a tactical draw (some accounts argue a tactical U.S. loss) but a strategic victory for the United States. The Japanese force failed in its objective to capture Port Moresby, New Guinea, which would have threatened the northeast coast of Australia. Although the Japanese had previously suffered setbacks, this was the first time that proved permanent. In addition, the Japanese carrier Shokaku was severely damaged, and attrition to the air groups of both Shokaku and Zuikaku caused both carriers to miss the decisive battle of Midway a month later, which almost certainly changed the course of that battle, and of the war.

READ THE FULL ARTICLE

Combat Narratives: The Battle of the Coral Sea

By The Naval History and Heritage Command

(Published 2017)

The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first carrier-versus-carrier battle in history; opposing surface forces never sighted each other.

U.S. naval intelligence provided Admiral Chester W. Nimitz with sufficient warning and understanding of Japanese intent and capability that he chose to commit the two carriers Lexington (CV-2) and Yorktown (CV-5) against a Japanese force expected to consist of two fleet carriers, Shokaku and Zuikaku, and the light carrier Shoho. Nimitz committed Enterprise (CV-6) and Hornet (CV-8) as well, but they were unable to reach the area in time, due the timing of the Doolittle Raid against Japan.

The battle was a tactical draw—although some accounts argue a tactical U.S. loss—but a strategic victory for the United States. The Japanese force failed in its objective to capture Port Moresby, New Guinea, which would have threatened the northeast coast of Australia. Although the Japanese had previously suffered set-backs, this was the first time that proved permanent. In addition, the Japanese carrier Shokaku was severely damaged, and attrition to the air groups of both Shokaku and Zuikaku caused both carriers to miss the decisive battle of Midway a month later, which almost certainly changed the course of that battle, and of the war.

The Japanese also lost the small carrier Shoho on 7 May to a gross over-kill of U.S. carrier torpedo and dive bombers, and was the first carrier lost by either side in the war. The cost to American forces was high; Lexington was sunk as a result of secondary explosions following torpedo and bomb hits, the Yorktown was damaged by a bomb—but not hit by torpedoes, which was the critical factor in her being repaired in time for Midway—the oiler Neosho (AO-23), which had survived being moored right in the middle of the attack on Battleship Row at Pearl Harbor, was sunk, along with the destroyer Sims (DD-409.)

At the end of the second day of battle, the air groups on both sides were severely depleted with extensive losses, with Lexington sinking and Shokaku out of action. Both commanders, Rear Admiral Frank “Jack” Fletcher and Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi, opted to withdraw, which resulted in years of criticism of both. 

• Battle of the Coral Sea Infographic (NHHC)
• H-Gram: Battle of the Coral Sea (NHHC)
• American and Australian Cooperation in the Battle of the Coral Sea (NHHC)
• Why the Battle of the Coral Sea Was Unique to Naval History (Smithsonian)
• Battle of the Coral Sea Documentary (WW2TV)

Dreadnoughts and Super-Dreadnoughts

By Chris McNab

Reviewed by Ed Calouro

Battleship buffs and authorities on capital ships are familiar with the dictum that once HMS Dreadnought was commissioned in 1906, all existing battleships thereby became obsolete. Indeed, all-big-gun battleships from 1906 forward were considered dreadnoughts or, subsequently, super-dreadnoughts. Capital ships built before 1906 with a mixed or intermediate main armament, were thereafter termed pre-dreadnoughts. Chris McNab, author of Dreadnoughts and Super-Dreadnoughts, takes a more nuanced approach in his book about these epoch-setting ships. A July 18, 1910 article in The Times concluded the construction of HMS Dreadnought resulted in more of an evolution, not a revolution in capital ship development. Just the same, McNab observed HMS Dreadnought set off an international naval race in capital ships, transformed naval tactics, and had an outsized impact on international relations.

Continue Reading the Full Review Here

If you are interested in naval technology, please consider reviewing Innovating Victory: Naval Technology in Three Wars, by Vincent P.O’Hara and Leonard R. Heinz.

Guidelines for getting involved in the NHF Book Review program can be found here,

and a list of titles available for review can be found here.

We are currently witnessing history in the making with the situation involving the Russian invasion of Ukraine beginning last week. How does the U.S. Navy fit in? How are strategists, theorists, and journalists gauging the role of the U.S. Navy in any impending conflict? Here are several articles of note that seek to answer these questions as the situation progresses. Article opinions reflect those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect any stance by the Naval Historical Foundation.

• Antiship Missile Lessons from Sinking of the Moskva (USNI)
• Russian Ship Near Hawaii's Waters Grabs Military attention Amid Ukraine War (Newsweek)
• Trained Russian Navy Dolphins are Protecting Black Sea Naval Base (USNI)
• Ukraine: Think Naval War (Small Wars Journal)
• Wily Ukrainian Tactics and Poor Design Led to Russian Warship's Sinking (The Heritage Foundation)

10-Inch Shell Gage from Charlestown Navy Yard, 1843

By John L. Morris

The gage shown was used for inspecting projectiles for the Navy’s ten-inch chambered cannon of 10,000 pounds. 33 of these weapons were cast for the Navy at West Point Foundry, New York, 1841-42. They served as pivot guns, usually one forward and one aft, aboard large steam-powered ships, until the late 1850’s. None of these weapons is known to survive, but a dimensioned drawing (below) is included in Olmstead, et al, THE BIG GUNS, Museum Restoration Service, Bloomfield, Ontario, Canada, 1997, pp. 43. The gage itself was made in Boston in 1843, probably in the “New Smithery” (erected 1825) at the Charlestown Navy Yard. The author attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate contemporary objects made at the Charlestown Navy Yard to compare markings. Perhaps this article will help locate such objects. A very comprehensive historical study of the Charlestown Navy Yard/Boston Naval Shipyard in three volumes of over 1000 pages, with hundreds of images, is here. Gage shown is from private collection, Herndon, VA.

New Novel Act of Justice

By Dick Couch

(Forward By George Galdorisi)

Every once in a while you discover a book that makes you say: “Wow, that could have been the reason why.”

In this new book, Act of Justice, New York Times bestselling author Dick Couch asks the question: “Why did it take the world’s greatest military ten years to finally track down Osama bin Laden?” Dick couch has penned an incredibly believable alternative history that is a page-turner.

If you have ever wondered why we didn’t nab bin Laden sooner, this alternative history will make you think and think deeply.

AMAZON LISTING

Coral Sea: Lest We Forget Documentary (ProtectOurCoralSea

/YouTube)

Coral Sea Full Stream Reenactment (AgrippaMaxentius

/YouTube)

Battle of the Coral Sea

(War History Online/YouTube)

This Day in Naval History - 5 May

Produced by NHHC