The First DCA held that property owners can remove trees from their property without local government approval so long as the property owners have obtained the required documentation under section 163.045, Florida Statutes, from an ISA-certified arborist. The First DCA also held that “residential property” as used in the statute is property zoned for residential use, or in areas that have no zoning, property used for the same purposes as property zoned for residential use. Under the statute owners are not required to reside on the land for it to qualify as “residential property.”

The Second DCA held that the trial court erred in determining that the Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners (“Board”) satisfied their burden in a rezoning case, but the Second DCA was constrained to approve the trial court’s order due to the limited scope of review in certiorari cases. Several property owners in southern Hillsborough County applied to rezone property to planned development in the Residential Planned-2 (“RP-2”) Future Land Use category. The Board denied the application and the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. On appeal, the Second DCA held that the circuit court erred in its assessment of the evidence. However, due to the limited scope of second-tier certiorari review, the Second DCA was unable to give relief to the Petitioners despite the circuit court’s error. View More

The Fourth DCA recently held that separately owned parcels cannot be combined for appraisal purposes to evaluate a claim under the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act (the “Act”). Furthermore, if there are any defects in the appraisal realized after the one-year deadline for filing a claim under the Act, the defects cannot be cured. View More

Appellants, Orlando Bar Group, LLC, sought monetary damages in response to early COVID-19 restrictions on the sale of alcohol. The trial court rejected Appellants’ theories that these restrictions amounted to a compensable taking, and Appellants filed a timely appeal. On appeal, the Fifth DCA addressed three of Appellants’ arguments: (1) whether the regulations amounted to a “per se” physical taking; (2) whether the regulations denied all economic benefits or productive use of the land; and (3) whether a compensable taking occurred under the Penn Central test. First, the Fifth DCA held that the regulations did not amount to a per se physical taking because the COVID orders did not violate Appellants’ right to exclude, nor did they physically appropriate the property. Second, the Fifth DCA held that the regulations were a temporary business limitation—not a complete or permanent loss of the land’s economic benefit. Lastly, the court applied the Penn Central test and found that the regulations did not entitle Appellants to compensation because the sale of alcohol is a highly regulated business, and the Governor and the state may impose additional restrictions on those businesses in emergencies. View More 

Petitioner, Nicholas Sheckler, purchased property in Big Pine Key, Florida that was later declared unsafe by Monroe County (the “County”). In response, Petitioner applied for a building permit, seeking approval to repair the damaged property. Before receiving approval, a special magistrate entered an order assessing fines against Petitioner that were set to increase if compliance with the order was not achieved. The fines accrued over a period of about eight months, totaling $123,500.00. Petitioner voluntarily paid the fines, but later that same day the circuit court reversed the portion of the special magistrate’s order that imposed the fines. The County sought a rehearing, arguing that Petitioner’s voluntary payment of the fines prior to the hearing mooted the appeal, and the circuit court agreed. On second-tier certiorari review, the Third DCA held that the nature of the fines, by imposing onerous penalties for nonpayment, amounted to a compulsory payment which are recoverable. The Third DCA quashed the decision of the circuit court for failing to afford procedural due process and failing to apply the correct law. View More

Appellant, the City of Miami Beach (the “City”), appealed a trial court order which enjoined the enforcement of a noise ordinance repeal against Appellee, the Clevelander Ocean, L.P. (the “Clevelander”). The Clevelander is a multi-story hotel that hosts outdoor events that consistently exceed ambient noise levels. Despite various changes in the City’s noise regulations throughout the years, the Clevelander received a certificate of appropriateness and two conditional use permits (“CUPs”) that allowed it to generate up to 78 decibels of noise. When the City repealed its Eastbound Noise Exemption, it attempted to enforce the noise ordinance against the Clevelander, who successfully sought an injunction in the trial court preventing its enforcement. Upon review, the Third DCA held that there was competent, substantial evidence to uphold the trial court’s order. The principle of equitable estoppel applied, and based in part on the decibel limit provided by the certificate of appropriateness and the CUPs, it would be unjust to enforce the repeal against the Clevelander, particularly when the City has induced economic activity and expansion of the hotel in the past. View More