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Quotes of the Day:
"The two most powerful warriors are patience and time."
– Leo Tolstoy
"Anything imposed with force is synonymous with slavery."
– Osho
"A civilian man is one who will give a serious answer to a serious question. Civilianization itself is a certain sane balance of values."
– Ezra Pound
1. Special Operations Command transitions to new leadership
2. US Special Operations Command general retires
3. Hamas Agrees to Release Gaza Hostages, but Sets Conditions
4. Israel’s Military Signals an Easing of Its Gaza Offensive
5. Hamas Is Still at War With Itself Over Terms of Trump’s Peace Plan
6. Japan Set for First Female Prime Minister Amid U.S. Friction Over Trade, Security
7. This Program Rescued Army Recruiting
8. China’s Closing Window: Strategic Compression and the Risk of Crisis
9. The White House’s plan for Gaza deserves praise
10. The Promise and Peril of Total Defense (Resistance and Resilience)
11. Ukraine Says China Provided Russia With Satellite Data for Strikes
12. Vladimir Putin is testing the West—and its unity
13. How bad is America’s icebreaker gap with Russia?
14. Putin Warns West as Drones Appear in European Skies
15. 'Mock Taipei': China expands replica of Taiwan’s govt buildings in Mongolia; satellite images show site tripled in size since 2020
16. Is the Ukraine War 'Shapeshifting' Into the Vietnam War?
17. Shutdown Lays Bare America’s Latest Crisis: A Total Breakdown in Trust
18. New Report Warns U.S. Shipbuilding Collapse Threatens National Security
19. The Quantico Speeches: A Dangerous Reframing of the Military’s Mission
20. The Yankees Rookie Who Just Shut Down the Red Sox With a Pitching Display for the Ages
1. Special Operations Command transitions to new leadership
A big day in Tampa yesterday. Best of luck to both General Fenton and Admiral Bradley.
Special Operations Command transitions to new leadership
Stars and Stripes · Rose L. Thayer · October 3, 2025
Air Force Gen. Dan C. Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, passes the colors to Navy Adm. Frank Bradley, incoming commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, during a change of command ceremony in Tampa, Fla., on Oct. 3, 2025. (Cutler Brice/U.S. Special Operations Command)
Gen. Bryan Fenton expressed thanks and gratitude to his fellow special operators Friday as he retired from a three-plus-decades-long career as an Army Special Forces officer.
He last served as commander of U.S. Special Operations at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.
“The strength of our organization lies in the extraordinary service members, civilians, contractors and family members who serve within it — those who are willing to go above and beyond the call of duty to protect our nation and its interests,” he wrote in a farewell letter shared by the command.
Army Gen. Bryan P. Fenton, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, delivers a keynote speech during a graduation ceremony and Regimental First Formation at the Crown Arena in Fayetteville, N.C., on May 15, 2025. (K. Kassens/U.S. Army)
He previously served as commander of Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, N.C., and was the senior military assistant for two defense secretaries.
The Senate in August approved the nomination of Navy Adm. Frank Bradley as his successor.
Bradley has been the commander of Joint Special Operations Command since 2022 and is a Navy SEAL officer who graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Md.
“SOCOM is a unique organization. Forged from the OSS in World War II, your job is to connect people and to bring dilemmas to those who would do us harm,” said Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who presided over the change of command. “[Fenton] strengthened those connections. … Bradley’s charge is to expand them … ensuring SOCOM remains ready to go out into the darkness on land, in the air, on the sea, or in cyberspace to do our nation’s business.”
Rose Thayer
Rose Thayer
Rose L. Thayer is based in Austin, Texas, and she has been covering the western region of the continental U.S. for Stars and Stripes since 2018. Before that she was a reporter for Killeen Daily Herald and a freelance journalist for publications including The Alcalde, Texas Highways and the Austin American-Statesman. She is the spouse of an Army veteran and a graduate of the University of Texas at Austin with a degree in journalism. Her awards include a 2021 Society of Professional Journalists Washington Dateline Award and an Honorable Mention from the Military Reporters and Editors Association for her coverage of crime at Fort Hood.
previous coverage
Stars and Stripes · Rose L. Thayer · October 3, 2025
2. US Special Operations Command general retires
"For what it's worth?" General Fenton is worth a lot more than such a flippant comment. Kristina Wong should know better than that. She should be honoring General Fenton and not using him as a political pawn. But I guess some people are feeling defensive. General Fenton embodied every one of the standards the SECWAR outlined in his speech. Again he is worth much more than this flippant comment.
Excerpts:
On Tuesday, the head of Air Force Global Strike Command, Gen. Thomas Bussiere, announced his retirement from the post for “personal and family reasons.”
“FWIW, Gen. Fenton was planning on retiring, it was not tied to SecWar’s speech,” Kristina Wong, an adviser to the Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, said Thursday evening on social platform X.
Hegseth gave a speech to top U.S. military officials on Tuesday in Quantico, Va., announcing higher fitness standards, including for top generals, and altering the internal complaint and investigation process.
US Special Operations Command general retires
by Filip Timotija - 10/03/25 12:41 PM ET
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5537202-general-fenton-retires-ussocom/
The head of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Gen. Bryan Fenton, retired from his role Friday.
“As I hand over the reins, I do so with the utmost confidence in your ability to continue this vital work. The future of USSOCOM is bright because of our people, our commitment to winning and our relentless drive to transform,” said Fenton, who was the 13th commander of USSOCOM, in a letter that was published by the command Thursday.
“Thank you for your dedication, your service and your unwavering commitment to excellence. It has been my greatest privilege to serve among you and as your commander,” Fenton added.
USSOCOM is a command, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Fla., that trains, organizes and equips special forces from the Navy, Air Force, Army and Marine Corps to conduct missions against “state and non-state actors all to protect and advance U.S. policies and objectives.”
Fenton has served as the commander of USSOCOM since August 2022. He succeeded Gen. Richard D. Clarke, a retired four-star Army general.
In the letter, Fenton, who was a commander of Joint Special Operations Command in Fort Bragg, N.C., praised service members, contractors, civilians and others for being willing to go “above and beyond the call of duty to protect our Nation and its interests.”
“Over the past three years, we have faced a rapidly evolving global security environment. Despite the complexities and uncertainties, you have consistently demonstrated the ability to adapt, innovate and overcome,” the commander wrote.
On Tuesday, the head of Air Force Global Strike Command, Gen. Thomas Bussiere, announced his retirement from the post for “personal and family reasons.”
“FWIW, Gen. Fenton was planning on retiring, it was not tied to SecWar’s speech,” Kristina Wong, an adviser to the Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, said Thursday evening on social platform X.
Hegseth gave a speech to top U.S. military officials on Tuesday in Quantico, Va., announcing higher fitness standards, including for top generals, and altering the internal complaint and investigation process.
In August, the Senate greenlighted the nomination of Navy Vice Adm. Frank Bradley as Fenton’s successor.
3. Hamas Agrees to Release Gaza Hostages, but Sets Conditions
Some good news. POTUS and his team deserve a lot of credit to get this far and I hope they can sustain the effort to the finish line of a substantive peace agreement and path forward. Of course both Israel and Hamas have votes as they saying goes.
Hamas Agrees to Release Gaza Hostages, but Sets Conditions
Trump says he believes group is ready for a lasting peace and accepts that talks could go on beyond his Sunday deadline
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-hamas-deadline-israel-hostages-bbd88db4
By Alexander Ward
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and Summer Said
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Updated Oct. 4, 2025 12:13 am ET
00:04
/
01:12
Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,
President Trump released a video statement after Hamas said it was ready to release the remaining hostages in Gaza, if certain conditions were met first. Photo: Andrew Leyden/ZUMA Press
Quick Summary
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Hamas said it was ready to release remaining hostages in Gaza if certain conditions of a broader peace agreement were met.View more
WASHINGTON—Hamas said Friday it was ready to release the remaining hostages in Gaza as long as certain conditions of a broader peace agreement were met, offering no clear position on other elements of President Trump’s 20-point peace plan.
Late Friday, the U.S.-designated terrorist group submitted its official response to mediators, thanking Trump for his efforts to end the war but asking for several clarifications including a timeline for Israeli forces to withdraw from Gaza, clarification over defensive and offensive weapons as well as guarantees over ending the war.
Trump responded positively to Hamas’s message and urged Israel to stop the bombing as all sides hash out details of a finalized deal, a negotiation that could extend beyond his Sunday evening deadline for the group’s agreement to a peace deal.
“I believe they are ready for a lasting PEACE,” Trump posted on social media.
Later in an address from the Oval Office, Trump thanked a number of Arab countries for helping to mediate. “This is a big day, we’ll see how it all turns out,” he said. “We have to get the final word down and concrete.”
Trump said Israel must stop bombing Gaza so the hostages can be released safely.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in his own caveated reaction to Hamas’s response, said Israel would begin preparations for the release of hostages held in Gaza and work with Trump to end the war on Israel and the president’s terms.
Israel’s military didn’t specifically commit to stopping its attacks, but indicated it was moving to a more defensive posture, saying it would prepare for the release of the hostages and react quickly to any threat.
In order to end the war and ensure the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, Hamas announced “its agreement to release all occupation prisoners—both living and the remains of the deceased—according to the exchange formula set forth in President Trump’s proposal,” the group said in a statement.
“As for the other issues in President Trump’s proposal relating to the future of Gaza and the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, these are tied to a comprehensive national position, rooted in relevant international laws and resolutions, to be discussed within an inclusive Palestinian national framework —of which Hamas will be part and to which it will contribute with full responsibility.”
As many as 20 of the 48 remaining hostages are believed to still be alive.
Protesters holding pictures of Israeli soldiers held by Hamas during a demonstration in Tel Aviv. Photo: Eyal Warshavsky/Zuma Press
Mousa Abu Marzouk, a senior Hamas official, told Al Jazeera on Friday that “we agreed to the plan’s main outlines in principle, but its implementation requires negotiations”—a sign that the group wants more talks before fully signing off on Trump’s deal. “The plan cannot be implemented without negotiations.”
Releasing the hostages within 72 hours, he added, would be unrealistic under current conditions. Hamas has lost contact in recent weeks with some other militant groups holding a number of them, mediators have said.
White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt on social media posted a picture of Trump filming a video about Hamas’s “acceptance of his Peace Plan.”
A senior administration official said that in recent days, U.S. intelligence indicated Hamas was going to reject the deal and that Trump’s plan was unlikely to succeed.
The chain of dramatic events was set in motion earlier Friday, when Trump said Hamas had until 6 p.m. on Sunday to support a 20-point peace plan the U.S. and Israel agreed to on Monday. If Hamas blew through his deadline, “all HELL, like no one has ever seen before, will break out.”
“THERE WILL BE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ONE WAY OR THE OTHER,” Trump further wrote. Some Hamas fighters are trapped, the president continued, “waiting for me to give the word, ‘GO,’ for their lives to be quickly extinguished.”
Trump’s peace plan, if adopted, would see all 48 hostages released and the president chair a “Board of Peace” to oversee the interim governance of Gaza. Aid would flow into the enclave and an Arab-led stabilization force would swiftly keep order. Israeli forces would, over time, withdraw from the battlefield while maintaining a security buffer zone around Gaza. And Hamas would lay down its arms while forever renouncing its leadership role.
Hamas officials in Doha have indicated they are willing to accept Trump’s peace plan but are pushing to modify some of its terms, according to Arab mediators who have been in talks with the group this week.
The mediators said the militant group is asking for a number of changes, including the stipulation that it disarm and destroy its weapons, a demand Hamas has previously rejected. Hamas is willing to hand over its offensive weapons to Egypt and the United Nations for storage, but wants to retain what it considers defense systems, the mediators said.
Hamas has also renewed its demand for a timeline for Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and is seeking clarification regarding the formation of an international peacekeeping force for the enclave, including its mandate and deployment plan.
Divisions between the top leaders of Hamas over key elements of Trump’s peace plan are complicating the militant group’s response, the mediators said. The discussions with officials from Qatar, Egypt and Turkey, the countries with which Hamas has the closest ties, show the challenge in implementing a plan that requires the group to capitulate.
Previous U.S. attempts to pressure Hamas into a deal have failed, including a threat in March by Steve Witkoff, the U.S. envoy for the Middle East, who said the group’s failure to release the hostages would invite more Israeli military action.
Trump in recent weeks placed an increased emphasis on brokering a peace for Gaza after negotiations nearly fell apart last month following Israel’s attack in Qatar, a key mediator in the talks, to kill top Hamas political representatives. Since then, Trump secured Netanyahu’s support for the deal and received some buy-in from Middle East countries. Hamas remains the outstanding signature.
Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com
Appeared in the October 4, 2025, print edition as 'Hamas Says It Is Ready To Release Hostages'.
4. Israel’s Military Signals an Easing of Its Gaza Offensive
Positive steps forward. But obviously still a long way to go. Hopefully giving into POTUS pressure is face saving for both Israel and Hamas and provides them each with a way out of this mess. Hopefully we are on a path to peace.
Israel’s Military Signals an Easing of Its Gaza Offensive
Palestinians continued to report explosions and deaths, adding to uncertainty around President Trump’s peace plan
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-military-signals-an-easing-of-its-gaza-offensive-6d4e3d25
By Omar Abdel-Baqui
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Updated Oct. 4, 2025 8:02 am ET
A paramedic carries a stretcher amid damage to a residential neighborhood in Gaza City. Photo: ebrahim hajjaj/Reuters
Quick Summary
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Israel’s military signaled easing offensive operations after President Trump called for an end to bombing for a hostage deal.View more
Israel’s military signaled it was easing its offensive operations early Saturday, hours after President Trump called for an end to the bombing so that a hostage-release deal with Hamas could proceed.
The military said it would prepare conditions for a hostage release but didn’t specifically commit to a cease-fire, and its troops continue to surround Gaza City, where Israel has worked to clear out the civilian population with a major offensive under way.
An Israeli military spokesman warned Palestinians that the area around Gaza City remains a dangerous combat zone and that staying poses a significant risk. The military declined to say whether it would continue its attack, but said that its troops must remain alert and ready to respond to threats.
First responders and municipal officials in Gaza reported explosions Saturday. Footage aired on Al Jazeera showed Palestinian casualties being taken on stretchers in ambulances Saturday morning.
The unclear situation on the battlefield was the latest indication that the status of Trump’s peace plan—agreed to by Israel earlier this week and by Hamas on Friday—remained uncertain.
Hamas’s agreement to release all of its Israeli hostages came with caveats around the timeline for Israeli troop withdrawals, demands that it surrender its weapons, as well as guarantees over ending the war.
Smoke rises following explosions in Gaza City. Photo: dawoud Abu alkas/Reuters
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, said Israel would prepare the ground for the hostage release, but indicated he would only work to end the war on Israel’s and Trump’s terms.
Despite the caveats, Trump welcomed Hamas’s response as an acceptance of his plan and said the battlefield needed to be made safe for a hostage release. He also indicated that talks would be needed to close gaps between the parties.
“We have to get the final word down in concrete,” the president said in an address from the White House. “I look forward to having the hostages come home.”
Talks are expected to begin Sunday in Egypt, potentially with Trump special envoy Steve Witkoff on hand. Mediators were waiting for confirmation that Israel would send a delegation and to see how much room it would have to negotiate terms.
The reservations expressed by the parties highlight the fragility of the completion and implementation of Trump’s 20-point plan. Talks could extend beyond Trump’s Sunday evening deadline for Hamas to agree to a peace deal.
People in Jerusalem look at photos of hostages held by Hamas. Photo: Ohad Zwigenberg/Associated Press
Trump’s peace plan, if adopted as laid out on Monday, would see the president chair a “Board of Peace” to oversee the interim governance of Gaza. Aid would flow into the enclave and an Arab-led stabilization force would enter to keep order. Israeli forces would, over time, withdraw from the battlefield while maintaining a security buffer zone around Gaza. Hamas would lay down its arms while renouncing its leadership role.
Palestinians in Gaza are demanding a reprieve from the fighting, which has killed more than 67,000 people, with dozens killed in the past day, according to local health authorities, who don’t specify how many were combatants. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced multiple times by the war. Many have faced persistent shortages of food, and large parts of the enclave have been reduced to rubble by the fighting.
Hani Ramadan, a father of two children living in an apartment in Gaza’s Nuseirat area, said the Trump plan, at the least, would stop the war. “We have reached a stage where we just want any solution whereby we will not be targeted. We want to eat, drink and live.”
Over the past week, the mediators said Qatar, Egypt and Turkey—the countries with which Hamas has some of the closest ties—have warned the group’s leaders that this is their last chance to end the war in Gaza, which began when Hamas attacked southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, killing about 1,200 people and taking around 250 hostages.
Write to Omar Abdel-Baqui at omar.abdel-baqui@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com
5. Hamas Is Still at War With Itself Over Terms of Trump’s Peace Plan
Hamas Is Still at War With Itself Over Terms of Trump’s Peace Plan
Political leaders in Qatar lean toward accepting President Trump’s plan, but military commanders in Gaza resist surrendering arms and giving up hostages
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-israel-trump-gaza-peace-deal-50643a6d
By Summer Said
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in Dubai and Dov Lieber
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in Tel Aviv
Updated Oct. 4, 2025 12:24 am ET
Hamas fighters looked on during a handover of Israeli hostages in southern Gaza in February. Photo: haitham imad/Shutterstock
To the world, Hamas said it has accepted major parts of President Trump’s peace plan. Internally, Hamas remains bitterly divided over how to proceed.
On Friday, the U.S.-designated terrorist group said it was willing to release hostages and hand over Gaza, a landmark statement boosting Trump’s push for an end to the war. But Hamas used hedged language that some observers saw as problematic to clinching a final peace.
A big reason is that Hamas hasn’t reached consensus about disarming and under what conditions to let the hostages go, said Arab officials from countries mediating with Hamas. Those are the two most important demands in Trump’s plan.
Khalil Al-Hayya, Hamas’s top negotiator, and several other senior political officials support accepting the proposal despite significant reservations, Arab mediators said. But those Hamas officials, based outside Gaza, have limited sway over the group’s armed wing, which remains in the enclave.
Ezzedin al-Haddad, who rose to lead Hamas in Gaza after Israel killed Yahya and Mohammed Sinwar, has told mediators he is open to compromise. Mediators said Haddad is willing to give up rockets and other offensive weapons to Egypt and the United Nations for storage but wants to retain small arms such as assault rifles, which Hamas considers defensive.
But Hamas commanders inside Gaza fear they won’t be able to enforce compliance with disarmament demands among fighters if they accept a deal that amounts to surrender, the mediators said. The organization has recruited many young men since the war began, often those who saw their homes destroyed or family members killed. Such fighters might be unwilling to lay down their arms.
Khalil Al-Hayya, Hamas’s top negotiator Photo: Khalil Hamra/AP
The plan’s most contentious points are requirements that Hamas disarm, hand over its weapons and release the 48 Israeli hostages it still holds—alive and dead—within 72 hours of agreeing.
Critics within the group dismiss the proposal as “a 72-hour truce” rather than a genuine peace agreement, reflecting their lack of trust in Israel. Hamas on Friday said it wanted more “negotiations to discuss the details,” which appears to include the release of hostages.
Trump weighed in Friday on social media, saying he believed Hamas “is ready for a lasting PEACE.” He called on Israel to “immediately stop the bombing of Gaza” to ensure safe conditions for hostages to be released. His statement reflected agreement in the White House that Hamas had accepted the plan.
But Hamas’s military leaders insisted that any release of hostages must be tied to a clear timeline for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, mediators said. That was reflected in a caveat in Hamas’s response Friday, in which it said hostages would be released “with the provision of necessary field positions.”
Israel might be reluctant to end hostilities after Hamas left the disarmament issue unaddressed in its statement, and with significant conditions on the release of hostages.
On X, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.) called Hamas’s response “unfortunately predictable. A classic ‘Yes, but.’”
“No disarmament, keeping Gaza under Palestinian control, and tying hostage release to negotiations, along with other problems,” Graham said. “This is, in essence, a rejection by Hamas of President Trump’s ‘take it or leave it’ proposal.”
An Israeli offensive in Gaza City continued on Friday with airstrikes. Photo: mohammed saber/epa/shutterstock
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered a qualified reaction of his own to Hamas’s response, saying Israel would begin preparations for the release of hostages held in Gaza and work with Trump to end the war—on Israel and the president’s terms.
Israel’s military didn’t specifically commit to stopping attacks but indicated it was moving to a more defensive posture, saying it would prepare for the release of the hostages and react quickly to any threat.
Some observers said Hamas’s statement was intended to buy time for the group to resolve long-running tensions between its political and military wings. Disagreements over strategy have dogged the group throughout its war with Israel, which began with Hamas’s deadly attacks on southern Israel and the kidnapping of about 250 hostages almost two years ago.
On the battlefield, Hamas is battered but still fighting. The armed wing has lost most of its senior leadership and thousands of experienced fighters. Many of its newer recruits lack training, and Israel’s tightened control over Gaza has strained the group’s ability to communicate and coordinate operations.
To adapt, Hamas has devolved command to smaller units, Arab mediators and Israeli military officials said. These units often act independently, making their own decisions about when and how to attack Israeli forces.
Israeli military officials say Hamas hasn’t given up the fight. They see the group’s command and control as shattered, with small groups acting independently through guerrilla warfare, mainly using explosives, snipers and rocket-propelled grenades.
Haddad and other senior leaders exercise limited control over these units, a problem exacerbated by a financial crunch that has hindered Hamas’s ability to pay salaries. The Wall Street Journal has previously reported that the cash shortage is weakening Hamas’s hold over its rank and file.
Israel has taken over large portions of Gaza City since launching its offensive in mid-September. Many of Hamas’s fighters have already fled southward and most civilians have evacuated. Israel’s key dilemma is what to do if it takes over Gaza City but Hamas refuses to surrender.
Hamas’s armed wing has lost most of its senior leaders and thousands of experienced fighters. Photo: Doaa El-Baz/Zuma Press
Several thousand Hamas fighters remain in Gaza City, a senior Israeli military official said. Those forces are constantly observing the Israeli troops and looking for vulnerabilities, the official said. Two weeks ago, the official added, an RPG killed a company commander.
The Israeli official described Hamas’s remaining forces as mostly young and inexperienced but still determined. Acts of surrender are rare and usually occur only when militants are surrounded, the official said.
“This is why these negotiations are starting to become real. Maybe it’s the first time throughout the war that Hamas is starting to understand that they will be eradicated,” said Amir Avivi, a former senior Israeli defense official.
Mediators warn that if Hamas’s leaders accept Trump’s plan, some fighters could defect to other Palestinian militant groups. Many have already threatened to join factions such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad or the Palestinian Liberation Front. Coordination among these groups has largely collapsed, leaving uncertainty over whether a deal with Hamas alone could halt the fighting.
Qatar, Egypt and Turkey have tried to pressure Hamas leaders, warning them that this is their last chance to end the war in Gaza, Arab officials say. They have told Hamas that if the group rejects the deal, they will no longer be able to continue providing them with political or diplomatic support, the officials said.
In his social-media post, Trump said: “We are already in discussions on details to be worked out. This is not about Gaza alone, this is about long sought PEACE in the Middle East.”
An Israeli soldier recently prepared to launch a drone near the border with Gaza. Photo: amir cohen/Reuters
Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com and Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com
6. Japan Set for First Female Prime Minister Amid U.S. Friction Over Trade, Security
Japan Set for First Female Prime Minister Amid U.S. Friction Over Trade, Security
Sanae Takaichi wants more spending and has floated reopening trade agreement struck with Trump
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/japan-prime-minister-election-sanae-takaichi-08e09216
By Jason Douglas
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and Junko Fukutome
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Updated Oct. 4, 2025 5:49 am ET
Sanae Takaichi celebrates after winning the leadership election of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. Photo: kim kyung-hoon/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
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Sanae Takaichi was elected leader of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, making her the country’s presumptive first female prime minister.View more
TOKYO—Japan is set to have its first female prime minister, a staunch conservative who wants to borrow and spend more to rev up Japan’s economy and says she’s willing to reopen a hard-won trade deal with the U.S.
Sanae Takaichi, 64 years old, was elected leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party on Saturday, in a party poll that followed the September resignation of her predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba. Though the LDP lacks a clear majority in Parliament, she is expected to win enough support from lawmakers to succeed Ishiba as prime minister later this month.
Among Takaichi’s most pressing tasks: fortifying an alliance with the U.S. that has been strained by President Trump’s all-out push to reorder global trade. Japan agreed to invest $550 billion in the U.S. over the next few years in exchange for a tariff of 15% on U.S. imports of its cars, machinery, and other products. That’s a better rate than the 27.5% Japan was facing on cars before the agreement was made, but much worse than the low tariffs most of its exports enjoyed before Trump’s return to office.
On the election stump, Takaichi said she’d abide by the tariff agreement reached by her predecessor. She also, however, floated the possibility of renegotiation if her government determined the pact wasn’t working in Japan’s interests.
That is a sign that the terms of the deal—which, among other things, give Trump the role of selecting investments for Japan to consider funding—still don’t sit easily with a country that considers itself among the U.S.’s foremost allies and its strongest partner in Asia.
Takaichi's predecessor Shigeru Ishiba visited President Trump at the White House earlier this year. Photo: Andrew Leyden/Zuma Press
“If any aspects emerge that are highly unequal and detrimental to the national interests of both countries, we must firmly voice our concerns. There is also the possibility of renegotiation,” Takaichi said at a press conference in the days before the vote.
The remark points to the potential for further spats over trade and investment, analysts say. Under the terms of the agreement, Trump reserved the right to raise tariffs on Japanese imports if Japan refuses to fund specific investments.
“If she does want to try to reopen that, it is going to cause a lot of friction,” said Jeffrey Hornung, Japan lead at Rand Corp., a California-based research institute, referring to the trade agreement.
At a press conference following her victory Saturday, Takaichi moderated her stance somewhat, saying she didn’t want to overturn the agreement. She said if an investment wasn’t in Japan’s national interest, she would discuss it with the U.S.
An ardent Japanese nationalist, Takaichi was born in Nara, a prefecture famous for the sacred deer that draw thousands of tourists to its principal city each year. Like her mentor, the late Shinzo Abe, Takaichi is a strong supporter of Japan’s alliance with the U.S. and her conservative views on foreign policy and social issues give her a degree of ideological affinity with Trump.
That could help the two leaders build a rapport and strengthen the alliance, analysts say, which is also being tested by U.S. demands that allies spend far more on defense.
A tense negotiation is expected next year when Washington and Tokyo thrash out terms for a new five-year agreement detailing how much Japan pays for the upkeep of U.S. forces and facilities stationed within its borders.
Takaichi, though, is supportive of higher military spending, which should help soothe U.S. concerns. That stance dovetails with the policies with which she’s most closely associated: She is an unabashed supporter of activist economic policy, believing the government should borrow and spend freely to power growth and invest in technology, especially in areas deemed essential to national security, such as nuclear power and artificial intelligence.
Takaichi bows following the leadership election in Tokyo. Photo: Toru Hanai/Bloomberg News
Her victory adds to conservative gains in the world’s leading economies. Trump won re-election in the U.S. in November with a promise to crack down on immigration and impose sweeping tariffs on imports. Voter concerns over immigration, sluggish economic growth and stubbornly high inflation are fueling support for right-wing and center-right parties in countries including France, Italy and the U.K.
Takaichi won Saturday with around 54% of the votes cast in a second-round runoff against Shinjiro Koizumi, a 44-year-old scion of a Japanese political dynasty and a political moderate. She led the first round in a field of five, but fell short of winning enough votes to clinch the contest outright.
“Rather than feeling joy, I recognize the immense challenges ahead. I believe there are mountains upon mountains of work,” she said after her victory was announced.
Growing up in a middle-class household where both parents worked, Takaichi dreamed of being a rock musician. As a student, she rode a Kawasaki motorbike to Kobe University and joined a band as a drummer.
While little-known overseas, she has been a prominent political figure in Japan for years, holding several cabinet posts including minister for economic security.
Takaichi’s elevation is a sign the LDP is eager to win back conservative voters who have deserted the party since Abe’s killing in 2022. Many of those voters have drifted to the right, bolstering the fortunes of newer political parties such as Sanseito, whose anti-immigration, “Japanese First” platform propelled it from the online fringe to surprise electoral success in a parliamentary vote last year.
Her premiership could strain relations with Japan’s Asian neighbors, however. Takaichi is hawkish toward China and supportive of Taiwan, the self-ruled island that Beijing claims as its own. She is a regular visitor to Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japanese war dead including some war criminals. Such visits by serving Japanese leaders are seen as provocative in both Beijing and Seoul, where memories run deep of the atrocities Japan committed during its imperial expansion that ended with its defeat in World War II.
Write to Jason Douglas at jason.douglas@wsj.com and Junko Fukutome at junko.fukutome@wsj.com
7. This Program Rescued Army Recruiting
A success. We should be applauding the Army's innovative efforts. We have to deal with the recruiting pool as it really is and not as we would wish it to be.
But I fear this kind of reporting could cause some problems for the progreamwho do not view this through a positive and practical lens but rather a partisan one because it may not support a certain narrative.
Excerpts:
Mr. Trump’s election win and a higher unemployment rate among people ages 16 to 24 could have played a small role in improving recruiting, Army officials said. The Army’s recent success, though, would not have been possible without the program at Fort Jackson. About 22 percent of the Army’s more than 61,000 new recruits this year came in through the Future Soldier Preparatory Course, a senior Army official said.
Trainees in the program have 90 days to meet the Army’s minimum academic and body fat standards, or they are sent home. Those who pass go directly to 10 weeks of basic training.
A New York Times reporter was granted access to the program at Fort Jackson for a week in August. None of the dozens of trainees interviewed cited Mr. Trump’s election as a factor in their decision to enlist.
Many said they had come to Fort Jackson because they saw no other choice.
“I was tired of being homeless,” a 22-year-old trainee, who had grown up on a South Dakota Indian reservation, said.
A 34-year-old from Ivory Coast graduated from an online college that promised him an I.T. career but instead left him $90,000 in debt. Others had joined to escape home or to make their families proud. Some said their recruiters had told them that military service would protect their undocumented parents from deportation.
This Program Rescued Army Recruiting
NY Times · Greg Jaffe ·
The defense secretary cites a ‘Trump bump.’ But the Army’s recruiting surge wouldn’t have been possible without the program started three years ago at Fort Jackson.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/04/us/politics/army-recruiting-trump.html
Credit...
By
Visuals by Kenny Holston
Reporting from Fort Jackson, S.C.
- Oct. 4, 2025Updated 9:04 a.m. ET
His journey to the Army began last year when he lost his job as a hotel maintenance man and could only find work picking up trash at an Amazon warehouse.
Listen to this article with reporter commentary
Listen · 19:26 min
At 42, Joseph King had given up on ever meeting the military’s enlistment standards.
Then he heard about an Army program, launched three years ago during one of the worst recruiting droughts in U.S. history, that helps those who aren’t eligible to join because they are overweight or unable to pass the military’s aptitude exam.
In late August, Joseph was sitting in a classroom at Fort Jackson, S.C., with 13 other trainees, most of whom were half his age. The instructor was showing them how to calculate a salesperson’s income based on salary, sales and commission.
“What’s a commission?” the teacher asked.
The trainees were silent.
“Guys, I know this is insanely boring,” she said, “but we still have to learn it.”
Joseph rubbed his face. He knew what was at stake: health benefits, housing, a better life for his wife and five children.
Joseph King, 42, had given up on ever meeting the military’s enlistment standards until he heard about the Army program that offered assistance.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has credited the military’s strong recruiting numbers this year to a nationwide surge in patriotism and a love for President Trump. “What changed is a commander in chief that America’s young people believe in,” Mr. Hegseth told lawmakers this summer. “You can feel it in the ranks.”
Mr. Trump echoed the sentiment: “We’re getting the best people that you’ve ever seen.”
Mr. Trump’s election win and a higher unemployment rate among people ages 16 to 24 could have played a small role in improving recruiting, Army officials said. The Army’s recent success, though, would not have been possible without the program at Fort Jackson. About 22 percent of the Army’s more than 61,000 new recruits this year came in through the Future Soldier Preparatory Course, a senior Army official said.
Trainees in the program have 90 days to meet the Army’s minimum academic and body fat standards, or they are sent home. Those who pass go directly to 10 weeks of basic training.
A New York Times reporter was granted access to the program at Fort Jackson for a week in August. None of the dozens of trainees interviewed cited Mr. Trump’s election as a factor in their decision to enlist.
Many said they had come to Fort Jackson because they saw no other choice.
“I was tired of being homeless,” a 22-year-old trainee, who had grown up on a South Dakota Indian reservation, said.
A 34-year-old from Ivory Coast graduated from an online college that promised him an I.T. career but instead left him $90,000 in debt. Others had joined to escape home or to make their families proud. Some said their recruiters had told them that military service would protect their undocumented parents from deportation.
The program helps those who are not eligible to join the Army because they do not meet its fitness or academic standards.
Staff Sgt. Joseph Htway overseeing a math class. Sergeant Htway grew up in Myanmar and failed his Army entrance exam the first time, but passed on his second try.
Joseph had been trying to pass the test since he was an 18-year-old living in Birmingham, Ala., and knew this class was his last, best chance. Like all the other trainees, he had surrendered his cellphone and was assigned a metal bunk in an open bay.
If he could just make it to basic training, Joseph was sure he would be able to keep up with the younger recruits. “I know it without a shadow of a doubt,” he said. “I know me and my competitive side.”
The class broke for the day, and the civilian teachers went home. The students, their camouflage pants tucked neatly into their combat boots, marched with their drill sergeants to evening chow. Thirty minutes later, they were back in the classroom.
Several trainees who had grown up speaking languages other than English quizzed each other from a list of vocabulary words that frequently appear on the test.
A drill sergeant noticed Joseph’s leg bouncing nervously under the table and walked over to offer help. Joseph’s white scratch paper was a jumble of numbers and equations. The same problems always seemed to trip him up.
“Why are you trying to overcomplicate shit?” the sergeant asked. “It’s so simple.”
Joseph erased his work in a flurry and tried again.
Trainees in the academic portion of the program get three shots at the test during their 90-day stay.
Joseph’s second try was a week away.
‘This was my only option’
About 95 percent of recruits in the program make it to basic training.
Each Monday new trainees needing to raise their test scores or lose weight arrive at the base, where they are immediately greeted by screaming drill sergeants in Smokey Bear hats.
“Let’s go! Move your ass!” one yelled as the newbies rushed to find their green duffel bags. “I don’t have all freaking day to wait for you!”
Once they were in formation — backs straight, heels together, feet at a 45-degree angle — an officer gave them some advice. “This is a place where you find your motivation,” he explained. “You figure out your why, and you stick with it.”
The Army’s why for the course began in 2022, when it missed its recruiting goal by about 15,000 troops, or 25 percent. The following year the Army, Navy and Air Force all missed their goals.
The Pentagon was battling declining interest in military service and a shrinking pool of qualified applicants, caused by falling test scores, high obesity rates and an increase in young people reporting mental health problems. About three-quarters of American youth do not meet the minimum requirements to serve, according to the Pentagon.
Army officials tried to fix their recruiting problem with bigger enlistment bonuses. When that didn’t work, they launched the Future Soldier Preparatory Course at Fort Jackson. Today, about 95 percent of recruits in the program make it to basic training.
The Army still needs the program to make its recruiting goals, said Lt. Gen. Brian Eifler, the Army’s top personnel officer. The program also offers benefits that are harder to measure, he said. It has become a lifeline for people searching for housing, stability and a piece of the American dream.
One of those people was Jonathan Gleich, 34, from Marysville, Ohio. Eight months ago, when he walked into the recruiting office, Jonathan weighed about 330 pounds. He was cleaning medical offices at night. To pay for diapers and formula for their newborn son, he and his wife were donating plasma twice a week.
Jonathan Gleich was told he needed to lose weight to be able to join the Army.
The recruiter told Jonathan that he had to lose 30 pounds before he could even go to Fort Jackson.
“This was my only option to provide my family a future,” Jonathan recalled.
He worked out at least twice a day with the other trainees in his platoon. In between, they took classes on nutrition, where they learned to think of food as fuel, and on mental resilience, where they were reminded that all “pain is temporary.”
A few weeks in, when Jonathan’s weight plateaued, he began volunteering for extra workouts with the drill sergeants and was now down to about 260 pounds. To meet the Army’s body fat standard, he had to lose a few more pounds and another half an inch from his waistline.
The next weekly weigh-in and tape measuring — Jonathan’s ninth since arriving at the base — was scheduled for the following morning.
Nearby, Mayra Cruz, 18, of Ventura County, Calif., was squeezing in an extra session on a treadmill. One of the walls in the small, airless gym was covered with sticky notes on which the trainees had written their reasons for joining.
“To get out of the hopeless pit that my life was headed to,” one read.
“To show my family that I am not a disappointment,” another trainee had written.
Mayra Cruz was motivated to join the program to help her undocumented mother avoid deportation.
Mayra’s why revolved around her undocumented mother, who had immigrated from Mexico a year before she was born. Her recruiter told her about a program called “Parole in Place,” which allows the parents, spouses or children of active-duty service members to avoid deportation.
Mayra wanted to become a tank crew member. And she wanted to make sure her mother, stepfather and two brothers, ages 1 and 8, were safe.
“It’s pretty ugly right now in California,” she said.
The weekly weigh-in and measuring for the 263 trainees in the fitness program started at 5:30 a.m. The women went first, their black Army T-shirts tucked into the bottom of their bras so the drill sergeants would be able to quickly measure their waists.
“Female! Why are you still looking at me?” a drill sergeant yelled when one of the trainees hesitated in line. Some cried when they learned that they had not lost weight or inches. Others received quiet messages of encouragement.
“You got this, female!” a drill sergeant whispered to one recruit. “You got this!”
Mayra, who had lost 21 pounds and five inches during her two months at the base, came up just short of passing. She had three weeks left to lose the last bit of body fat.
Once the women had finished, the men followed.
Jonathan stepped on the scale, which showed he had shed two more pounds. His biggest worry was his waistline. A decade earlier, his weight had peaked at 430 pounds, leaving folds of skin that no amount of exercise could melt away. A drill sergeant with cold hands looped a tape measure around his stomach.
An Army dietitian inspects a trainee’s tray to ensure he has a healthy, balanced meal.
Then he followed a strip of dingy white tape on the floor to the last station, where he gave his numbers to an officer who plugged them into a laptop and told him that he had made it.
He pumped his fist and smiled. A trainee from his platoon rushed over to hug him.
“This whole process has been absolutely life-altering,” he said.
He still had to endure another 10 weeks of basic training without his phone, his freedom or his family, but if everything went as planned, he would make it back to Ohio for Thanksgiving. By then, he would be a soldier.
The sun was rising. All the trainees had been weighed and measured, and now they were marching in a tight formation to breakfast. A drill sergeant shouted the cadence for them to repeat.
“My way’s the right way,
Your way’s the wrong way,
If you wanna be a soldier
you gotta do it my way.”
Another nerve-racking test day
Joseph taking a practice vocabulary test.
It was test day for Joseph and the other 13 trainees in his platoon. They filed into a room with scuffed yellow walls and took a seat behind a computer screen.
A drill sergeant ordered them to lift their arms over their heads to show they hadn’t scribbled any notes on their skin. To pass, the trainees needed to score in the 31st percentile or higher. They had three hours.
Beneath the table, Joseph’s leg was pumping anxiously.
The first recruits finished with an hour to spare and strode to the back of the room. They dropped their scratch paper on a table, stood with their hands folded behind their back and waited for the drill sergeant to tell them their score.
“Let’s go!” a 19-year-old from Idaho quietly cheered when she learned she had passed.
She took a seat with a few other trainees who had also notched passing scores. “In a few months we’re actually going to be soldiers,” she whispered. “That’s wild.”
Trainees working on classroom assignments ahead of their exams.
Joseph was among the last to finish. A drill sergeant asked for the last four digits of his Social Security number and glanced down at his computer.
“You got a 24,” he said tersely. “Sit over there.”
Joseph joined the other trainees who had finished the test. Those who had passed spoke in hushed tones about the Army jobs that might now be available to them. One trainee was hoping to be a helicopter mechanic. Another wanted an airborne infantry slot.
“I don’t care what job I get,” a third said, “as long as I get out of here.”
Joseph closed his eyes, rested his forehead on the table. Somehow, despite three weeks of studying, his score had dropped four points.
“I don’t get it,” he said to himself.
He thought about all the times he had taken the test and failed — at least five since he turned 18. And he thought about how much he missed his family. The youngest of his children had turned 1 only a week earlier.
The recruits gathered in front of the brick barracks where they attended class, studied and slept. Ten of the 14 trainees had passed.
Lawrence Flores, a 21-year-old from Guam, was among those moving on to basic training. A few minutes earlier he had been celebrating. Now, as he approached Joseph, tears were streaming down his face.
Joseph didn’t want to take away from his friend’s joy.
“Don’t think it’s bad because one person can’t go with you,” Joseph told him. “Savor the moment. Savor the moment.”
One last chance
Bryan Soto, 27, raised his test score by more than 30 points — the biggest jump in his class.
A recruiter was waiting nearby to help the trainees who had passed pick a job.
Most Army recruits have some say over their career field. Those who come in through the Future Soldier Preparatory Course are typically limited to the toughest-to-fill positions — another reason the Army has been eager to keep the program in place.
First up was Bryan Soto, 27, who told the recruiter that he had joined to provide a better life for his daughter in Puerto Rico. He had raised his score by more than 30 points — the biggest jump in his class — and was hoping for a job as a helicopter mechanic.
“Realistic expectations,” the recruiter sighed.
His options: infantry, artillery or armor.
He settled for artillery.
The other trainees cycled through just as fast. The Army recruiter asked about their why, and they talked about providing for their families and pushing themselves out of their comfort zones.
Then she laid out their choices: “Do you want to train to kill? Do you want to learn to blow stuff up or do you want to ride in a tank?” Most reluctantly picked artillery. They were going to blow stuff up.
Joseph and the other trainees who came up short on the test were cleaning the barracks. He was trying to decide whether he should take the exam one last time or go home to his family. His drill sergeants, who could see the makings of a good soldier, were urging him to stay.
Joseph replied that he was going to “pray on it.” Privately, though, he said he was leaning toward leaving.
There are many reasons why people join the Army. In this moment, his lowest since arriving at Fort Jackson, Joseph had begun to think that maybe his why had changed.
“I’ve touched a lot of lives,” he said. “That was the main purpose. To see them leave and do good in their lives makes me happy.”
In the days that followed, Joseph decided to take his drill sergeants’ advice. He studied for three more weeks and on Thursday took the exam for a third and final time.
This time Joseph passed. He was on his way to basic training and a new life as a soldier.
Joseph said he was trying to decide whether he should take the exam one last time or go home to his family.
Read by Greg Jaffe
Audio produced by Patricia Sulbarán.
Greg Jaffe covers the Pentagon and the U.S. military for The Times.
Kenny Holston is a Times photojournalist based in Washington, primarily covering Congress, the military and the White House.
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NY Times · Greg Jaffe ·
8. China’s Closing Window: Strategic Compression and the Risk of Crisis
Excerpts:
Conclusion: The Moment of Maximum Danger
China’s 2025 National Security White Paper reveals insecurity, not confidence. By framing Taiwan’s annexation as essential to survival, the CCP is no longer managing competition but constructing a narrative of inevitability. This is how wars of necessity are manufactured out of wars of choice: by convincing leaders and citizens alike that crisis is not optional, but existential.
Strategic compression has brought Beijing to the edge of this dilemma. Demographic decline, economic stagnation, and political rigidity have narrowed its decision space while accelerating its timelines. Left unchecked, these pressures incentivize reckless gambles: a desperate strike before readiness, or a manufactured confrontation to consolidate legitimacy. Downs and Rocke’s “gambling for resurrection” dynamic captures this perfectly: when leaders believe time is running out, even high-risk conflict can appear preferable to decline.
Yet this moment of maximum danger is also the greatest opportunity for the United States and its allies. By combining deterrence, strategic friction, and off-ramp architecture, Washington can turn compression into the CCP’s constraint rather than its catalyst.
- Deterrence ensures that a war of necessity, acting now before readiness, is seen as prohibitively costly.
- Strategic friction denies Beijing the purchase to overcome the headwinds of its own compression.
- Off-ramp architecture efforts illuminate malign activity, counter Beijing’s siege worldview, and, crucially, shape off-ramps that prevent Xi from perceiving desperation as his only choice.
In the physics of compression, movement itself becomes the danger. Strategic friction must keep the CCP floating; denied the purchase to hurl itself through the closing window, yet held aloft from collapse. Perhaps this enforced stasis can prevent catastrophe.
Americans like decisive and extreme conclusions, but this will not fit for long-term rivalry. Although stasis is not victory, it is the necessary condition not only to prevent war, but also to thoughtfully check the regional instigator. With the order intact, America can resume its focus on economic interests.
China’s Closing Window: Strategic Compression and the Risk of Crisis - Foreign Policy Research Institute
fpri.org · Ryan Agee
Ryan Agee
Ryan Agee is a senior US military officer with 25 years in national security and special operations; his views are his own and do not represent the Department of Defense or the US government.
https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/10/chinas-closing-window-strategic-compression-and-the-risk-of-crisis/
When Beijing dispatched a relatively unknown rear admiral from its National Defense University to the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue, bypassing its own defense minister and forfeiting its plenary address, it did more than snub Asia’s premier security forum. It signaled a regime shifting from dialogue to confrontation. China has traditionally used the Singapore gathering to engage regional counterparts and frame its strategic intentions. By refusing the platform at a moment of rising tensions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) revealed its preference for manufacturing crisis rather than managing competition.
This posture reflects more than diplomatic pique. It is the manifestation of what can be called strategic compression,[1] a condition in which a state’s decision space narrows even as the timeline for action accelerates. For China, compression arises from converging demographic decline, economic stagnation, and political rigidity. These forces produce a closing window in which Beijing perceives a diminishing opportunity to achieve its central project: the “national rejuvenation” with the main marker of absorbing Taiwan.
Washington must recognize both the danger and the opportunity this moment presents. The danger is that compression can drive Beijing toward reckless escalation, gambling that crisis or even conflict will preserve regime legitimacy. The opportunity is that deterrence, strategic friction, and off-ramp architecture can be leveraged to hold China in stasis, denying both a war of choice and a war of necessity.
Figure: “The Ascent”: Strategic Compression, Strategic Friction, and Deterrence Resulting in Stasis
Strategic Compression: A Closing Window
Compression is the pressure Beijing places upon itself; friction is the pressure others apply upon Beijing. Strategic compression is best understood as the simultaneous narrowing of options and acceleration of timelines that confront states when long-term ambitions collide with structural constraints. The concept is related to the classic “windows of vulnerability” debate in strategic studies. Lebow argued that leaders exploit perceived openings when adversaries are temporarily weak. Later scholars extended the idea: Doeser and Eidenfalk posited that foreign policy change often requires leaders to perceive a fleeting “window of opportunity” as both real and urgent. More recently, Hal Brands has tied these windows directly to great-power competition, warning that compressed states may lunge an advantage before their window of opportunity closes.
China today is a textbook case. Its demographic collapse (fertility below 1.1, shrinking labor force, and surging pension obligations) erodes both economic and military potential. Its economic stagnation (youth unemployment above 20 percent, debt-to–gross domestic product (GDP) ratios beyond 270 percent, and growth rates far lower than official statistics claim) undermines the CCP’s claim to technocratic competence. And its political rigidity (Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, purges of technocrats, and reliance on loyalty over capability) reduces the very adaptability compression demands.
Compression is both structural and perceptual, but the latter is the primary force. Leaders act not on perfect information but on how they read the trajectory of time. In Beijing, the perception is that delay is fatal: the path to “rejuvenation” risks being blocked by demographics, debt, and dissent. The 2025 white paper, China’s National Security in the New Era, makes this explicit by subordinating economic growth to security priorities and framing Taiwan’s annexation as essential to CCP survival.
Strategic compression thus creates a dilemma. Beijing can attempt reform, a path of delay, though uncertain and historically resisted. Or it can gamble that crisis, even conflict, offers the only way to break through the narrowing window. In either case, time itself has become China’s adversary.
CCP Attributes Under Compression
Demographic and Economic Decline
The CCP’s legitimacy has long rested on two pillars: rising prosperity and national rejuvenation. Both are faltering. China’s demographic decline is accelerating faster than even pessimistic forecasts predicted. Fertility rates have fallen below 1.1, population peaked in 2022, and the working-age cohort is shrinking by millions annually. The consequences ripple across the system: labor shortages, surging pension obligations, and a contracting pool for military recruitment.
Economic performance tells a similar story. While official figures continue to advertise ~5 percent GDP growth, independent estimates suggest real growth is half that. Youth unemployment (officially “suspended” from publication in 2023 after surpassing 20 percent) reflects a generation losing faith in the promise of upward mobility. Debt-to-GDP ratios above 180 percent, and likely closer to 300 percent by some estimates, reveal an economy built on fictitious capital and financial engineering. Foreign investment, once the backbone of China’s integration into global markets, has collapsed. These are not cyclical dips but structural stall points of a peaking great power.
Narrative Control and Crisis Politics
Authoritarian systems compensate for stagnation with propaganda. Xi Jinping has tightened control over media, education, and party messaging to frame China as besieged by hostile forces determined to block its rightful rise. The 2025 National Security White Paper codifies this framing, subordinating economic goals to regime security and elevating Taiwan’s annexation as a matter of existential survival.
This narrative thrives in crisis conditions. The CCP has demonstrated repeatedly that crises, whether real or manufactured, strengthen its grip. During the COVID-19 lockdowns, Beijing justified draconian controls as national defense of health. Maritime coercion against the Philippines or Taiwan is framed as a reactive defense against foreign encroachment. Even violent repression, from Tiananmen Square in 1989 to Hong Kong in 2019, was justified as necessary to preserve the party’s survival. The lesson Xi has drawn is that crisis validates the party; war, by contrast, carries existential risks that could expose regime fragility.
Gambling for Resurrection
Yet compression creates pressure for escalation. Downs and Rocke describe this dynamic as “gambling for resurrection”: when embattled leaders, facing declining legitimacy or looming failure, take high-risk actions because the downside is already existential. Xi’s tightening personalist system makes this risk acute. At seventy-one, his own legacy timeline intersects with China’s demographic and economic timelines. Having purged rivals and eliminated dissent, he has no safety valves left.
This is why strategic compression is so dangerous. For a regime that thrives in crisis but not in war, the narrowing window may incentivize exactly the kind of reckless gamble that could prove catastrophic: a rapid strike against Taiwan before optimal readiness, or a manufactured external confrontation to rally internal legitimacy. These would not be rational wars of choice but desperate wars of necessity, undertaken not because success is assured, but because delay appears fatal.
China’s Strategic Position Summarized
The CCP today faces a paradox. It possesses the world’s largest navy, expanding nuclear forces, and formidable coercive tools in the gray zone. Yet its foundations, population, economy, and governance are eroding. This creates a system both powerful and brittle: strong enough to coerce neighbors, weak enough to fear internal unraveling. In such a system, strategic compression does not just narrow options; it warps incentives. It encourages Beijing to equate inaction with defeat and to view the crisis not as a danger to avoid but as a tool to embrace.
US Responses to Strategic Compression
Strategic compression places Beijing at a dangerous crossroads, but it also creates space for Washington to shape outcomes. By applying complementary lines of effort (deterrence, strategic friction, and off-ramp architecture), the United States and its allies can deny both a war of necessity and a war of choice, holding China in stasis until its internal contradictions resolve themselves.
Entrapment in a limited war may look tempting, but it runs counter to the logic of compression: Beijing thrives in crisis, not in sustained conflict. A limited clash risks providing the CCP the very external confrontation it seeks to rally domestic legitimacy, tighten control, and divert attention from internal fragilities. By contrast, enforced stasis denies both the war of necessity and the war of choice, leaving China suspended between ambition and decline. The United States gains most not by provoking conflict, but by letting compression do its work; time erodes Beijing’s foundations far more reliably than a limited war that could backfire into wider escalation or regime consolidation.
1. Deter the War of Necessity
The most immediate risk is that Beijing, fearing the window closing entirely, chooses to act before it is ready. This “war of necessity” would prioritize timing over preparation: a rapid strike on Taiwan or coercive escalation elsewhere designed to achieve fait accompli before US intervention.
To prevent this, deterrence must make such action prohibitively costly and uncertain of success. Forward-deployed US and allied forces across the first island chain should demonstrate visible readiness and credibility. Multilateral exercises with Japan, the Philippines, and Australia should underscore that any aggression will trigger collective resistance. Revealing previously unacknowledged capabilities (hypersonic weapons, extended-range strike systems, or integrated special operations force–space-cyber concepts) can inject uncertainty into People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planning.
Deterrence must also extend beyond the military. The precedent of SWIFT sanctions against Russia illustrates the power of coordinated economic punishment. A credible plan to cut China off from Western capital, food, or energy markets in the event of aggression would force Xi to weigh not just battlefield risks but the collapse of the regime’s domestic legitimacy. The goal is not to guarantee that the PLA cannot fight, but to ensure Xi believes he cannot win.
2. Strategic Friction Against the War of Choice
The second risk is a “war of choice,” Beijing’s preferred scenario, delaying conflict until it achieves optimal military readiness. Here, the United States seeks to deny the People’s Republic of China (PRC) the ability to offset or outrun the headwinds of its own compression.
This is the logic of strategic friction: imposing cumulative resistance that slows Chinese advancement without direct confrontation. Heath et al. and Mazaar et al. both discuss strategic friction, even so far as citing senior PRC officials describing their current state as such. Blocking acquisitions of semiconductor assets through Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States reviews, restricting technology transfer in artificial intelligence and quantum computing, and enforcing intellectual property protections complicate the PLA’s modernization path. Securing supply chains for rare earths, lithium, and other critical minerals prevents Beijing from leveraging global chokepoints for both military and economic coercion.
Strategic friction is effective precisely because it exploits Beijing’s compression: every delay magnifies the gap between ambition and capability. By raising costs, slowing progress, and diverting resources, friction ensures that China cannot achieve the conditions necessary for a successful war of choice before its demographic and economic decline forecloses the option.
3. Off-ramp Architecture: Illuminate Malign Activity and Accommodate Narrative Off-ramps
The third line of effort must address the CCP’s most resilient weapon: its narrative. Beijing thrives by framing the crisis as a defensive necessity. The 2025 White Paper casts Taiwan’s annexation not as an ambition but as a requirement for survival. State media and PLA messaging increasingly emphasize “inevitable conflict,” conditioning both domestic and international audiences to view confrontation as forced upon China.
Washington and its partners must illuminate malign activity. Rapid dissemination of PRC coercive actions, ranging from unsafe intercepts to maritime ramming, must provide undeniable evidence of Beijing as aggressor. Public diplomacy should contrast China’s rhetoric of defense with its record of expansion, elite capture, and debt-trap diplomacy. Indo-Pacific partners can be empowered through digital literacy campaigns and intelligence sharing to resist Chinese disinformation and build societal resilience.
Yet illumination alone is insufficient. Deterrence that only corners Xi risks triggering “gambling for resurrection” behavior. Washington must also shape an off-ramp narrative—a path that allows Beijing to de-escalate without humiliation. Sun Tzu warns the strategist to never place their enemy on death ground. Friction and deterrence must be accompanied with a release valve to deal with the frustrated energy. This could emphasize mutual restraint, regional arms control dialogues, or a face-saving role in global initiatives (climate, disaster response, infrastructure) that sustain legitimacy without confrontation.
By pairing firmness with off-ramps, the United States reduces the incentive for desperation gambles while strengthening the legitimacy of international norms. The narrative battle is thus about not only illuminating Beijing’s malign activity but also offering a win-win alternative that preserves peace without rewarding coercion.
Conclusion: The Moment of Maximum Danger
China’s 2025 National Security White Paper reveals insecurity, not confidence. By framing Taiwan’s annexation as essential to survival, the CCP is no longer managing competition but constructing a narrative of inevitability. This is how wars of necessity are manufactured out of wars of choice: by convincing leaders and citizens alike that crisis is not optional, but existential.
Strategic compression has brought Beijing to the edge of this dilemma. Demographic decline, economic stagnation, and political rigidity have narrowed its decision space while accelerating its timelines. Left unchecked, these pressures incentivize reckless gambles: a desperate strike before readiness, or a manufactured confrontation to consolidate legitimacy. Downs and Rocke’s “gambling for resurrection” dynamic captures this perfectly: when leaders believe time is running out, even high-risk conflict can appear preferable to decline.
Yet this moment of maximum danger is also the greatest opportunity for the United States and its allies. By combining deterrence, strategic friction, and off-ramp architecture, Washington can turn compression into the CCP’s constraint rather than its catalyst.
- Deterrence ensures that a war of necessity, acting now before readiness, is seen as prohibitively costly.
- Strategic friction denies Beijing the purchase to overcome the headwinds of its own compression.
- Off-ramp architecture efforts illuminate malign activity, counter Beijing’s siege worldview, and, crucially, shape off-ramps that prevent Xi from perceiving desperation as his only choice.
In the physics of compression, movement itself becomes the danger. Strategic friction must keep the CCP floating; denied the purchase to hurl itself through the closing window, yet held aloft from collapse. Perhaps this enforced stasis can prevent catastrophe.
Americans like decisive and extreme conclusions, but this will not fit for long-term rivalry. Although stasis is not victory, it is the necessary condition not only to prevent war, but also to thoughtfully check the regional instigator. With the order intact, America can resume its focus on economic interests.
[1] The notion of strategic compression draws from work on windows of opportunity and vulnerability (Richard N. Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Richard Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics), and more recent “peak power” arguments (Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower, Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China]), as well as the concept of “gambling for resurrection” (George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Optimal Imperfection: Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations, all of which highlight how narrowing options and accelerated timelines can push states toward risk-acceptant behavior.
The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the US Department of Defense, the US Army, or the US government.
Image: Adobe Stock
fpri.org · Ryan Agee
9. The White House’s plan for Gaza deserves praise
Rare positive press. I hope this plan works. We should all be hoping this plan works.
The White House’s plan for Gaza deserves praise
America, Israel and perhaps Hamas have changed their positions
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/10/01/the-white-houses-plan-for-gaza-deserves-praise
Photograph: Getty Images
Oct 1st 2025
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3 min read
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O
n September 29TH President Donald Trump stood with Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, and set out a 20-point plan for “eternal peace” in Gaza. It is tempting to be dismissive. Although the hyperbole was exceptional, it is hardly the first peace plan since the war began in 2023. And while the talking continues, the horror in Gaza persists. Yet dismissal would be a mistake. This proposal is a milestone because it sets parameters for a way out of the nightmare and marks a change in the positions of America and Israel, and, just possibly, Hamas.
Dig deeper
The principles of the plan are clear, even if the sequencing and details are not. The hostages would be released almost immediately. Hamas leaders and fighters would disarm and be granted amnesty or exile. A technocratic administration that excludes Hamas would take over, supervised by an international board under Mr Trump. The Israeli army would withdraw from Gaza in stages, handing security to an international force and newly vetted Palestinian police. In the long run the rehabilitation of Gaza, and reforms to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, could yet lead to statehood. Eight Muslim countries, including the main Arab powers and Turkey, back the deal.
This is new for America. In February Mr Trump entertained the idea of Gaza being ethnically cleansed of Palestinians to make space for a new Middle East “Riviera”. Since then, he has given tacit approval to the nihilistic fantasies of the hard-right parties in Israel’s coalition government, who dream of settling Gaza. Now, having lost patience with Mr Netanyahu after Israel’s strikes on Qatar in September, Mr Trump has signalled that “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza” keeping open the prospect of a two-state solution.
By supporting the proposal, Mr Netanyahu has pivoted, too. Until recently he was committed to a forever war in Gaza and indulged his hard-right coalition partners, partly because a ceasefire might end the government and his time in office (an election must be held by late 2026). Now he has suggested that he intends to fight the election on the platform that the peace plan secures Israel’s original war aims of getting the hostages back and Hamas out of power. Although he is unpopular, the plan is not: almost three-quarters of Israelis support it.
The final shift may be from Hamas. It has yet to formally respond and may have detailed objections to the sequencing of the Israeli withdrawal and the absence of guarantees if Israel changes its mind. But were it to accept in principle and in public that it is prepared to relinquish its weapons and its claim to govern Gaza, that would be a huge shift, in effect signalling it accepts that it is not the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
The pitfalls are obvious. Hamas could reject a deal, condemning Gaza to more misery. Mr Netanyahu and Hamas may sign up insincerely, with the real goal of sabotaging the deal later. The details over sequencing are hellish. Rebuilding Gaza may prove impossible to organise or fund. Israel’s politics could pull Mr Netanyahu or his successor back towards annexation. The PA may be incapable of reform and the interim government overstay its welcome. Notwithstanding proclamations at the UN, there is little evidence that a majority of either Israelis or Palestinians still have confidence in a two-state solution. It will take decades to rebuild trust.
Yet for all that, Mr Trump’s plan offers the best pathway out of the tragedy in Gaza. Its success would require sustained pressure from Mr Trump on Israel, and from the Arab states and Turkey on Hamas. But today’s unending mass suffering is unacceptable and so are the alternatives of occupation, anarchy or rule by a reconstituted Hamas. For dragging the negotiations to reality, Mr Trump and his team deserve praise. ■
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10. The Promise and Peril of Total Defense (Resistance and Resilience)
Excerpts:
Resistance and resilience, woven together, can make a nation unbreakable. Total defense is a bold, necessary idea for small states facing large predators. But the same networks that can keep a society alive under attack can also be twisted for political purposes. That risk is not abstract; it is historical, real, and present. The challenge for policymakers is not just to build the structures of total defense but to safeguard them from misuse. Without that protection, total defense may become self-defeating, fortifying a society against external threats while hollowing it out from within. The ultimate resilience lies not only in backup power grids and guerrilla networks but in preserving the trust of citizens. Without trust, there is no resistance, no resilience, and no total defense, only a brittle system waiting to break.
Image is a compilation of images
The Promise and Peril of Total Defense
Irregular Warfare & National Security Strategist | Intelligence & Latin America Professional | Opinions = my own. Sharing ≠ endorsement.
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/promise-peril-total-defense-sal-artiaga-9sa3c/?trackingId=ZbU4%2FlxOKcRz3EUNlPbucA%3D%3D
October 4, 2025
Opinion Paper
In recent years, the concept of “total defense” has regained popularity across Europe and Asia. The idea is simple enough on paper: in the face of an existential threat, a nation does not just rely on its military but mobilizes every sector, government agencies, private companies, civil society, and even ordinary citizens. Resistance and resilience are the twin pillars. Resistance is about denying an adversary control through guerrilla action, information campaigns, and sabotage. Resilience is about absorbing shocks and bouncing back, whether from cyberattacks, disinformation, or outright invasion. Together, they form the backbone of what planners refer to as total defense. However, there is a complication: the more comprehensive and society-wide the system, the more vulnerable it becomes to politicization. Networks built for survival in a crisis, such as communication chains, volunteer groups, and intelligence-sharing platforms, can also be redirected, intentionally or unintentionally, for partisan ends. That adds a new layer of risk to plans that are already fragile, as they are stretched between the need for speed and the danger of abuse.
The Logic of Total Defense
The origins of total defense can be traced back to small nations caught between great powers. Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic states all developed versions of the concept during the Cold War, when they knew they could not hope to match the Soviet Union tank for tank or plane for plane. Instead, they aimed to make their societies impervious to conquest. That meant teaching citizens how to resist occupation, hardening infrastructure against sabotage, and embedding military thinking into civilian life. The model has returned to the forefront today, thanks to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the persistent gray-zone campaigns by both Moscow and Beijing. Instead of waiting to be saved, nations want to make themselves indigestible. A hostile power might still invade, but the cost of subduing a resistant and resilient society would be too high.
Resistance as a National Strategy
Resistance is often romanticized, citizens in the woods, partisans striking at occupiers, underground presses keeping morale alive. In truth, organized resistance is messy, dangerous, and politically fraught. It requires networks of trust, pre-planned leadership structures, and communications that can survive the collapse of government. Modern resistance planning often involves clandestine preparations that only a handful of officials know about. Yet resistance also has a political dimension that cannot be ignored. Who gets to decide what “the nation” resists? In a polarized society, resistance networks could become tools not just against a foreign occupier but against domestic rivals. The danger is that what begins as a survival mechanism mutates into an instrument of factional power.
Resilience and the Civilian Burden
If resistance is about fighting back, resilience is about holding together. That includes cybersecurity defenses for banks, backup power systems, rapid-response medical teams, and even civic education campaigns to inoculate people against disinformation. Resilience often sounds more benign than resistance, but it too carries risks. Building resilience means collecting data, coordinating private companies, and often granting governments expanded powers over communication networks and logistics chains. The temptation to use these powers outside of a national emergency, during elections or periods of civil unrest, is always present. Resilience infrastructures can become surveillance infrastructures if guardrails are not strong.
The Fragility of Trust
At the heart of total defense lies trust: trust that the government is building these networks for national survival, not for partisan gain; trust that neighbors volunteering for civil defense are not secretly compiling political watch lists; trust that private companies sharing information with intelligence services will not see it misused. Once that trust erodes, the entire concept wobbles. Citizens may resist enrollment in volunteer networks, local officials may drag their feet, and companies may withhold data. In practice, the result could be worse than nothing, an expensive, elaborate system that exists on paper but collapses under pressure.
The greatest risk is not technical failure but political capture. Imagine a government that, facing elections, leans on civil defense networks to push its narrative, or uses resistance planning cells to monitor dissidents. The infrastructure built for defending the nation becomes a tool for defending the ruling party. History is full of these cautionary tales. In authoritarian regimes, “homeland defense” networks often double as instruments of domestic surveillance. Even in democracies, there is a slippery slope: emergency powers, once granted, are rarely surrendered quickly. The paradox of total defense is that the more comprehensive and effective it is, the greater the temptation to misuse it.
What if America Tried Total Defense?
Consider the United States. Imagine if a total defense system had been fully established over the past decade. With today’s levels of political polarization, those networks would likely be deeply contested. Volunteer organizations intended to prepare for foreign attack might fracture along partisan lines. Information-sharing systems could be accused of favoring one party’s narrative over another. A resistance network designed to protect communities from external aggression could be twisted into policing political opponents. Even resilience structures would not be immune. Cybersecurity partnerships with tech companies could be portrayed as tools for censorship. Civil defense training could become entangled in culture wars over guns, immigration, or federal authority. Instead of uniting the nation in preparation for external threats, a total defense system in today’s America might intensify mistrust and further weaken democratic institutions. This hypothetical illustrates the danger vividly: without trust and political restraint, total defense risks becoming just another front in a nation’s internal conflicts. In such an environment, the system designed to protect the homeland could erode it from within.
Total Defense in Today’s Context
Countries like Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland are pressing ahead with total defense planning, driven by very real threats. Their strategies are innovative, flexible, and rooted in the hard lessons of living next to a powerful adversary. Yet even they acknowledge the thin line between defense and politicization. The more a society mobilizes every sector for security, the more it must guard against the abuse of that mobilization. Resilience networks designed to keep hospitals functioning during cyberattacks must not be turned into tools for domestic surveillance. Resistance networks trained to deny an invader must not be deployed against political rivals.
This is the uncomfortable truth: total defense is fragile not just because of external threats but because of internal misuse. A society under pressure can absorb cyberattacks, sabotage, even occupation, if its people believe the system is working for them. What it cannot withstand is the perception that the system is being used against them. That is the extra layer of risk, an internal corrosion of legitimacy. And it is the one risk that cannot be solved with more technology or training. It can only be managed through transparency, accountability, and a culture of restraint.
Conclusion
Resistance and resilience, woven together, can make a nation unbreakable. Total defense is a bold, necessary idea for small states facing large predators. But the same networks that can keep a society alive under attack can also be twisted for political purposes. That risk is not abstract; it is historical, real, and present. The challenge for policymakers is not just to build the structures of total defense but to safeguard them from misuse. Without that protection, total defense may become self-defeating, fortifying a society against external threats while hollowing it out from within. The ultimate resilience lies not only in backup power grids and guerrilla networks but in preserving the trust of citizens. Without trust, there is no resistance, no resilience, and no total defense, only a brittle system waiting to break.
11. Ukraine Says China Provided Russia With Satellite Data for Strikes
Tit for tat on intelligence support for Ukraine (US) and Russia (PRC)?
Ukraine Says China Provided Russia With Satellite Data for Strikes
Ukraine’s intelligence service told Ukrinform that China provided Russia with satellite data used to target missile strikes on Ukrainian sites, including foreign-owned facilities.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/61447
by Kyiv Post | Oct. 4, 2025, 1:26 pm
The Russian national flag fluters in front of the Great Hall of the People before a welcoming ceremony for Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in Beijing on May 24, 2023. Photo by THOMAS PETER / POOL / AFP
Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service has obtained evidence that China supplied Russia with satellite intelligence used to target missile strikes on Ukraine, including sites tied to foreign investors, an official told the state-run news agency Ukrinform, according to a report released Saturday.
Oleh Aleksandrov, a representative of the agency, told Ukrinform there is proof of “a high level of cooperation between Russia and China in conducting satellite reconnaissance of Ukraine’s territory to identify and reconnoiter strategic targets for destruction.”
He added that some of the targets identified with Chinese data in recent months were facilities owned by foreign investors.
The agency declined to provide further details about which sites were struck using the intelligence.
On Aug. 21, a Russian missile attack destroyed a facility owned by US company Flex Ltd. in Mukachevo, in Ukraine’s Zakarpattia region.
Kyiv Post
Kyiv Post is Ukraine’s first and oldest English news organization since 1995. Its international market reach of 97% outside of Ukraine makes it truly Ukraine’s Global – and most reliable – Voice.
12. Vladimir Putin is testing the West—and its unity
Recognize, understand, EXPOSE, and attack the strategy.
Excerpts:
What should the allies do? First, they must expose everything. The temptation is to ignore small provocations or, lacking proof of Russia’s responsibility, hold back from accusations. But to ignore the grey zone is to concede it. And once conceded, it expands. Sabotage, cyber-attacks, election interference: each should be attributed and publicised swiftly, with evidence. That strips Russia of plausible deniability and educates Western voters that they are the targets of a campaign.
...
All this is hard to do even if America’s guarantee is solid. It is harder still when Mr Trump is an uncertain member of the alliance. This year he says he backs NATO, but last year he suggested he would “encourage Russia to do whatever it wants” to members who don’t pay enough. Such words are taken as an invitation to probe and divide. Mr Putin has been listening.
Vladimir Putin is testing the West—and its unity
NATO must resist Russia’s efforts to corrode it from within
The Economist · Oct 2nd 2025
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/10/02/vladimir-putin-is-testing-the-west-and-its-unity
DRONES OVER Poland; MiG fighters traversing Estonian airspace; telecom cables damaged deep beneath the Baltic Sea; airports paralysed by cyber-attacks and quadcopters; mysterious explosions and assassinations; bot swarms pumping out propaganda to disrupt elections: none of these on its own is a casus belli, but together they are adding up to something new and dangerous. Vladimir Putin is waging a grey-zone campaign against NATO: a cheap, deniable and calibrated effort to unsettle Europe that is carefully short of outright conflict. “We are not at war,” Germany’s chancellor, Friedrich Merz, said this week. “But we are no longer at peace, either.”
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The damage has never been serious, so what is the point? Mr Putin knows he cannot defeat NATO in a stand-up fight, yet his aim, given the grand sweep of his writings and speeches, is more than just to be a nuisance. He is trying to achieve three things, and he needs to fail at all of them.
First, Mr Putin aims to break the unity of NATO. His goal is to make Europeans doubt each other and in particular question America’s commitment to the alliance it created in 1949. He aims to sow suspicion that Article 5, which treats an attack on one as an attack on all, cannot be relied on; and, eventually, to prise America away from Europe altogether. NATO, Mr Putin has often stated, is devoted to dismembering Russia; so it must itself be destroyed from within.
At the turn of the century America was mightier than all its enemies and friends put together. Osama bin Laden began the unravelling. His strike on the twin towers in 2001 lured America into overreach in Afghanistan and Iraq, prompting a backlash at home against foreign commitments. China’s rulers dream of a similar American exit from East Asia. That is why Xi Jinping, too, is using grey-zone incursions to make Taiwan feel vulnerable—and to cast doubt on America’s commitment to its Asian partners. With his carelessness for the security order that has underpinned the world since 1945, Donald Trump is making Mr Xi’s task easier.
The same is true in Europe. Mr Trump’s response to the drone incursion into Poland was to say that it “could have been a mistake”, even though a show of solidarity was called for. It is not hard to connect those words to the violation of Estonian skies by three MiG-31s ten days later. Mr Trump needs to stress his commitment to military action in Europe if it becomes necessary. If sabotage and violations of airspace are shrugged off as routine, deterrence becomes a matter for debate—and once it is debated, it is weakened.
Mr Putin’s second objective concerns Ukraine. His summer offensive has failed, so he wants to raise the cost to European countries that support Ukraine’s army. A focus of the grey-zone attacks has been the countries that are its strongest backers. Poland, Estonia and Denmark have suffered drone incursions, GPS jamming and sabotage. Germany has faced cyber-attacks on its defence and logistics firms. Moldova and Romania, as front-line states, have had their elections interfered with—in both cases unsuccessfully, which shows that Mr Putin does not always get his way. His message to voters and politicians is blunt: rather than sending weapons to Ukraine, you should focus on appeasing Russia or defending yourselves.
The third explanation for this campaign is deeper and older. Mr Putin hates classical liberal democracies whose wealth and resilience show up his failures and his repression. They outperform him economically. Russia’s GDP is smaller than Italy’s even though its population is well over twice as large. The more he can sow discord and confusion within the West, the stronger he looks. The more he can discredit centrist governments, the more it will benefit populist nationalists who share his suspicion of a united Europe.
What should the allies do? First, they must expose everything. The temptation is to ignore small provocations or, lacking proof of Russia’s responsibility, hold back from accusations. But to ignore the grey zone is to concede it. And once conceded, it expands. Sabotage, cyber-attacks, election interference: each should be attributed and publicised swiftly, with evidence. That strips Russia of plausible deniability and educates Western voters that they are the targets of a campaign.
NATO and the European Union must also improve their resilience. Grey-zone defence includes spare parts and repair crews for cables and pipelines, rapid cyber-response teams and hardened electoral commissions. It is the tedious but vital business of building in redundancy and preparedness. At the same time, the Europeans must also harden their defences. Patrols in the Baltic Sea must be continuous; more sensors are needed. Europe needs cheap interceptors that can take out the drones Russia is making by the tens of thousands. Scrambling F-35s and using missiles costing millions of dollars against drones costing only thousands will eventually exhaust Europe’s defences, leaving it vulnerable.
Last, the alliance must impose clearer costs. Drones over borders should trigger sanctions on suppliers and shell companies. Cyber-attacks should meet cyber-countermeasures. It is now time to use Russia’s frozen assets to pay for the defence of Ukraine, which is in reality the defence of Europe, too. And yes, that defence may mean shooting down a warplane that poses a threat to life or property. Fainthearts worry about escalation, but declining to act threatens escalation of a different kind. If Russia thinks it can get away with limited acts of aggression, something really dangerous might one day happen—such as Mr Putin grabbing a pocket of land around Narva on the Estonian side of the border, a city filled with Russian-speakers whose rights Russia pretends to champion.
Hit back harder
All this is hard to do even if America’s guarantee is solid. It is harder still when Mr Trump is an uncertain member of the alliance. This year he says he backs NATO, but last year he suggested he would “encourage Russia to do whatever it wants” to members who don’t pay enough. Such words are taken as an invitation to probe and divide. Mr Putin has been listening. ■
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The Economist · Oct 2nd 2025
13. How bad is America’s icebreaker gap with Russia?
Perhaps our plan is just to await for global warming to achieve its effects so we will not need ice breakers any more in the Arctic. (note sarcasm).
How bad is America’s icebreaker gap with Russia?
https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/10/02/how-bad-is-americas-icebreaker-gap-with-russia
The Economist · Oct 2nd 2025
|HELSINKI|4 min read
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IN A BOXY building near the docks of Helsinki, Finnish engineers are testing icebreaker designs. At the rim of a giant ice tank your correspondent shivers. A siren blares. A model ship, three metres long, surges forwards, splitting a sheet of ice with its orange bow.
“Ice is a kind of mystery,” says Jari Hurttia of Aker Arctic, Finland’s leading designer of icebreakers. Yet the Finns have just about solved it. The country’s firms have designed four-fifths and built more than half of the world’s icebreakers. As competition over the Arctic grows, America’s president is taking notice. In June Donald Trump said he was negotiating with Finland to buy 15 of the vessels. He has previously mused about acquiring 40 “big ones”. To counter Russia and China in the high north, America must expand its icebreaker fleet. To do it quickly, it will need Finland’s help.
Photograph: Shutterstock
Necessity bred Finnish expertise. As the only country whose ports can all freeze in winter, Finland needs icebreakers to keep the Baltic Sea open. Since building Sisu, its first diesel-electric icebreaker, in the 1930s, it has developed a domestic supply-chain stretching from design firms to shipyards. Throughout its period of non-alignment during the cold war, Finland honed its industry building icebreakers for Russia. That trade ended in 2022, after the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Finland joined NATO the following year. Now its shipyards want Western buyers.
The country’s industry is tight-knit. That has helped it carve out a niche. Icebreakers need thick hulls, powerful engines and complicated vibration-control and ice-proofing systems to survive extreme conditions. Most are made to order, meaning they are ill-suited to being built in the large production runs common in the giant shipyards of East Asia. Baltika, a rescue ship completed for Russia in 2014, has an asymmetrical hull that lets it sail sideways, carving a 50-metre path through the ice. Other designs serve as bulk carriers, oil tankers or support ships.
The contrast with America is stark. Its coastguard, part of the armed forces, says it needs around ten polar icebreakers. It has three. The last that America’s government had built for the coastguard, Healy, was finished in 1997. A plan to build new ones is delayed and its budget has ballooned. Its first ship, originally due in 2024, will not arrive before 2029 and will cost $1.9bn. Polaris, Finland’s newest icebreaker, was built in three years for €125m ($147m). It is a smaller ship than America wants. Still, it is proof of Finland’s ability to build icebreakers quickly, at low cost.
Photograph: Dreamstime
Talk of America’s “icebreaker gap” with Russia—which has around 50 polar icebreakers, including nuclear-powered behemoths—is overdone. Russia’s long northern coast and over 2m Arctic residents mean it will always need more than America. The real worry is the gap between the capabilities of America’s coastguard and the role it must play in Arctic security. Russia and China are vying for the Arctic, and northern shipping routes are growing busier. “America managed to get by without enough icebreakers because there were so few ships going through the Bering Strait,” says Peter Rybski, a former naval attaché at America’s embassy in Helsinki. “But that is changing fast.” In August two Chinese icebreakers sailed over an area of American-claimed seabed off Alaska. The coastguard sent Healy to monitor them. Such provocations could become more common.
To plug the gap, America is looking to Finland. Mr Trump first floated the idea of buying its ships in his first term. In 2024 the Biden administration signed an agreement with Canada and Finland, named the ICE Pact, to expand capacity. In August the Helsinki shipyard began work on the first ship under the scheme, an icebreaker for Canada named Polar Max. Finnish shipbuilders have drawn up designs for America’s coastguard and are eager for the Trump administration to commission them. Finland’s government is hopeful, too. “We have a lot of capacity to deliver these vessels,” says Pasi Rajala, Finland’s deputy foreign minister. “It is in our interest that our allies have Arctic capabilities.”
Mr Rybski thinks Finnish shipyards could deliver for America this decade. But obstacles loom. One is opposition from American shipyards, which look to the president as their defender. Procurement laws that require military vessels to be built in America are another, though these can be waived for national-security reasons. That Mr Trump seems willing to look past his protectionist instincts suggests he has registered the urgency of expanding the coastguard’s Arctic fleet. ■
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This article appeared in the Europe section of the print edition under the headline “Cracking stuff”
From the October 4th 2025 edition
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14. Putin Warns West as Drones Appear in European Skies
Again, recognize, understand, EXPOSE, and attack Putin's strategies.
Excerpts:
“It’s been a longstanding Soviet and Russian objective to split the U.S. from Europe. As we saw before the invasion and since,” said John Foreman, former U.K. defense attaché to Moscow and Kyiv and an associate fellow at Chatham House.
So far, the appearance of drones and other hybrid measures used by Moscow has only steeled resolve on the continent to counter Russian aggression. Poland and Estonia called for Article 4 consultations within NATO after Russian drones entered Polish skies and Russian jet fighters crossed into Estonian airspace recently. Both countries have warned that they could potentially shoot down Russian aircraft that enter their airspace in the future.
“Deterring Russia should not be beyond our capacity,” said Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum last week. “It is a question of how we organize ourselves for that task.”
Putin Warns West as Drones Appear in European Skies
Russian leader says Moscow is ready to respond if NATO allies deepen support for Ukraine in the war
https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/putin-warns-west-as-drones-appear-in-european-skies-1e8cb3ba?st=ofya3F
By Thomas Grove
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Updated Oct. 3, 2025 3:28 pm ET
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05:02
NATO is being forced to confront its defense readiness. We analyze the bloc’s strategic options. Illustration: Ksenia Shaikhutdinova
Quick Summary
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Drones have appeared in European skies, closing airports and prompting investigations, with Western officials suspecting Russian involvement.View more
WARSAW—For weeks, drones have been mysteriously appearing in European skies, closing airports from Warsaw to Munich. Western officials suspect that Russia is behind the campaign, seeking to sow fear in European capitals, probe NATO weaknesses and raise the stakes over the continent’s support for Ukraine.
The latest sightings came late Thursday, when Germany closed the Munich airport, grounding 17 departing flights and stranding nearly 3,000 passengers during Oktoberfest. Separately, Belgium said on Friday it was investigating overnight drone sightings above a military base in the east of the country.
On Thursday, shortly before the drones were spotted, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a warning: Moscow was ready to respond to efforts by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to boost support for Ukraine in the war.
“You won’t have to wait long for Russia’s response,” Putin said at a foreign-policy think tank discussion. “A response to threats, to put it mildly, will be very convincing.”
Russia has denied it is behind the drones, saying that European leaders are fearmongering in an effort to justify increased military spending.
Police and army in eastern Poland inspected a home destroyed by debris from a downed Russian drone last month. Photo: wojtek radwanski/AFP/Getty Images
But drones have been appearing over Europe as Western allies consider ways to strengthen Ukraine’s hand in the war. President Trump recently gave his approval to U.S. intelligence agencies and the Pentagon to aid Kyiv with missile strikes deep inside Russia, The Wall Street Journal has reported. The U.S. is also weighing providing powerful new weapons, including Tomahawk missiles.
Putin issued a stark warning this week about giving Ukraine Tomahawks, which are one of the most precise U.S. weapons and have a range of around 1,500 miles.
“It’s impossible to use Tomahawks without the direct participation of American troops,” he said on Thursday. “It would mean an absolutely new, qualitatively new phase of escalation, including between Russia and the United States.”
Some Western officials see the drones as the latest phase of Russia’s efforts to threaten and destabilize the West. Since the start of the war, Putin has sought to scare the West to keep it from deepening its support for Ukraine. At one point early in the conflict, he implied he would even consider nuclear retaliation against countries who sought to interfere in the invasion.
Police officers stand guard at the Copenhagen Airport in Denmark, after traffic was halted after drone reports last month. Photo: steven knap/Reuters
Since then, Western officials have accused Russia of carrying out a campaign of sabotage across Europe, including arson and undersea-cable cutting. Authorities have said one plot involved putting incendiary devices on the planes of shipping giant DHL. Another, authorities said last year, sought to kill the chief executive of German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall, which has been producing artillery shells and military vehicles for Ukraine.
Russia appeared to pause its campaign in the early months of the Trump administration, which was seen by some as a way to leave the door open to improved relations with Washington. Trump came into office promising to end the war and improve ties with Moscow.
But Trump has recently signaled growing impatience with Moscow, after a series of meetings between U.S. and Russian leaders failed to yield substantial progress on peace negotiations. His public comments have appeared aimed at raising pressure on Russia.
“Everyone thought Russia would win this war in three days, but it didn’t work out that way. It was supposed to be just a quick little skirmish. It’s not making Russia look good,” Trump said last week.
A mobile radar installation went up near the coast in Dragoer, Denmark, last month after drones were spotted near Copenhagen Airport. Photo: steven knap/epa/shutterstock/Shutterstock
Putin responded to Trump’s comments Thursday. “If we are fighting with the entire NATO bloc and we are moving, moving forward, and we feel confident, and we’re a paper tiger? What does NATO think it is?”
But overall Putin has sought to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its NATO allies, focusing most of his ire on Europe. He tempered his comments toward the U.S. this week by offering more personal praise for Trump.
“It’s been a longstanding Soviet and Russian objective to split the U.S. from Europe. As we saw before the invasion and since,” said John Foreman, former U.K. defense attaché to Moscow and Kyiv and an associate fellow at Chatham House.
So far, the appearance of drones and other hybrid measures used by Moscow has only steeled resolve on the continent to counter Russian aggression. Poland and Estonia called for Article 4 consultations within NATO after Russian drones entered Polish skies and Russian jet fighters crossed into Estonian airspace recently. Both countries have warned that they could potentially shoot down Russian aircraft that enter their airspace in the future.
“Deterring Russia should not be beyond our capacity,” said Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum last week. “It is a question of how we organize ourselves for that task.”
A drone in flight over Kyiv during a large-scale Russian attack across Ukraine last month. Photo: maxym marusenko/epa/shutterstock/Shutterstock
Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com
Appeared in the October 4, 2025, print edition as 'Putin Warns West on Kyiv Support'.
15. 'Mock Taipei': China expands replica of Taiwan’s govt buildings in Mongolia; satellite images show site tripled in size since 2020
Train and rehearse as realistically as possible to ensure success.
'Mock Taipei': China expands replica of Taiwan’s govt buildings in Mongolia; satellite images show site tripled in size since 2020 - The Times of India
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/mock-taipei-china-expands-replica-of-taiwans-govt-buildings-in-mongolia-satellite-images-show-site-tripled-in-size-since-2020/articleshow/124271981.cms
timesofindia.indiatimes.com
China has significantly expanded its mock Taipei government buildings at the Zhurihe Training Base, tripling its size since 2020. This includes replicas of key institutions and a symbolic tunnel, indicating intensified military preparations and urban warfare drills. Experts view this as refining invasion strategies and psychological warfare against Taiwan, demanding heightened vigilance.
ANI image
China has stepped up its military preparations by enlarging a large-scale replica of Taipei’s government buildings at the Zhurihe Training Base in Inner Mongolia.
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Satellite images show that the mock site has expanded to nearly three times its original size since 2020, raising concerns over Beijing’s growing pressure on Taiwan, news agency ANI reported, citing report of the Japanese Institute for National Fundamentals and Taipei Times.
'Unacceptable': Xi Jinping Vows To Confront Separatism In Taiwan, Defend Chinese Sovereignty
The images reveal replicas of major government institutions, including Taiwan’s Presidential Office Building, the Judicial Yuan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and most recently, the Ministry of Defense’s Reserve Command.
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A notable addition is a 280-kilometre tunnel linking the mock Presidential Office Building to the Judicial Yuan, seen as a symbolic message that Taiwan’s leaders could not take refuge underground in the event of an attack.The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been constructing and using such mock facilities for more than a decade. In 2015, Chinese state broadcaster CCTV aired footage of PLA drills at the replica Presidential Office Building.More recent satellite images from 2022 and 2023 show Chinese troops practicing urban warfare, including setting up and dismantling roadblocks and advancing with armoured units.Experts note that these activities are not merely symbolic. They reflect President Xi Jinping’s longstanding emphasis on “realistic combat training.”Since taking charge of the Central Military Commission in 2012, Xi has directed the PLA to improve battlefield simulations, a message reinforced in 2018 when he addressed soldiers in military uniform and urged them to be ready for real combat.Analysts believe the expansion of the “mock Taipei” serves two main purposes: refining China’s military strategy for a possible Taiwan invasion and waging psychological warfare by making these preparations highly visible. For Taiwan, the replica city deep inside Inner Mongolia underlines Beijing’s determination to apply both military and symbolic pressure, underscoring the need for heightened vigilance in the Taiwan Strait.
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16. Is the Ukraine War 'Shapeshifting' Into the Vietnam War?
Is the Ukraine War 'Shapeshifting' Into the Vietnam War?
nationalsecurityjournal.org · Stephen Silver · October 3, 2025
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/is-the-ukraine-war-shapeshifting-into-the-vietnam-war/
Is Ukraine Really “Another Vietnam”?
-Author Stephen Silver examines whether U.S. support for Ukraine risks becoming “another Vietnam.”
Lancet Drone. Image Credit: Russian State Media.
Lancet Drone from Russia. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
-He notes recurring fears after Vietnam and Iraq, but argues key differences matter. Unlike Vietnam and Iraq, no U.S. combat troops are deployed; aid is financial, intelligence, and weapons, reducing domestic costs and polarization.
-He cites Harlan Ullman’s view that Ukraine echoes Vietnam’s guerrilla dynamics—Ukraine’s drones against Russia resemble insurgent tactics—and warns funding cuts could mirror South Vietnam’s collapse. Russia frames the war as America’s “second Vietnam,” while its own Soviet-Afghan defeat is a closer analogy.
-Ultimately, absent U.S. boots on the ground, “another Vietnam” is unlikely domestically.
Why the Vietnam Analogy Falls Short in Ukraine
For a couple of decades after the conclusion of the Vietnam War, a standard question asked of any new U.S. military intervention was whether there was a chance it could turn into another Vietnam. This was asked of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, for which the parallel didn’t end up holding. It would be asked again in the following decade, about the Iraq War, for which the comparison was apt.
After Iraq, the idea that the U.S. should avoid protracted wars in which U.S. lives are being lost for no defined end purpose was powerful enough to be taken up by both Barack Obama and Donald Trump, in their successful runs for the presidency.
Now, the question has been raised as to whether U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine could turn into another Vietnam.
But there are, of course, big differences.
“Whispers of Vietnam”
This week, Harlan Ullman wrote an op-ed for The Hill arguing that, “In Ukraine, the whispers of Vietnam could soon become shouts.” Ullman is UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, as well as a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council.
“What did the U.S. learn from its Vietnam failures that it did not repeat in Afghanistan and Iraq three decades later?” Ullman asks.
The author points out some parallels between the situations of Vietnam and Russia-Ukraine, while noting that “after the 1954 division of French Indo-China into North and South Vietnam, Ukraine could be seen as a representation of either.”
M551 Sheridan Light Tank From U.S. Army. Image Credit: Creative Commons.
After providing a history lesson about U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which began in the early 1960s and ended in the mid-1970s with a U.S. retreat, Ullman notes the imperfect parallels between the situations, stating that, “Interestingly, Ukraine could be seen as either North or South Vietnam.”
“As North Vietnam was attacking the South with its cadre forces using guerrilla tactics until a conventional force could be mobilized,” Ullman writes. “Ukraine is hammering Russia with drone and missile attacks. Indeed, the way that Ukraine has immobilized Russia’s Black Sea Fleet with drones may be akin to guerrilla war at sea.”
And yes, Trump came back into office vowing to end the Ukraine war quickly and then not doing so and even escalating the conflict, much like Richard Nixon did in his first term.
In addition, South Vietnam fell in part because Congress stopped funding the war. The same thing could happen to Ukraine, should the U.S. turn off the funding spigot.
Another Vietnam, or Another Afghanistan?
Russia itself made the analogy, with officials saying in late 2023 that Ukraine would be America’s “second Vietnam.” The Kremlin’s spy chief, Sergei Naryshkin, stated that explicitly, predicting that “Ukraine will turn into a ‘black hole’ absorbing more and more resources and people.”
Russia’s equivalent, of course, is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which also dragged on for years, and led to defeat, and ultimately the end of the Soviet Union. This analogy has been frequently raised as well, through Russia’s war in Ukraine.
There is, however, one big weakness in the Vietnam/Ukraine parallel.
No Boots
The U.S. interventions in Vietnam and Iraq shared a fundamental similarity: The U.S. had troops on the ground in those wars, and many of them were wounded or killed. The U.S. has not committed troops to Ukraine, nor is it likely that it will, with Trump ruling out the idea.
“You have my assurance, and I am president. I am just trying to stop people from being killed,” Trump said in August.
Sure, there is some fatigue among some Americans about money and weapons going to Ukraine. But that’s nothing compared to the social fissures and disruption that took place when American soldiers were fighting and dying daily in Vietnam.
That, itself, makes it unlikely Ukraine will go down as “another Vietnam,” or even another Iraq, for the United States.
About the Author: Stephen Silver
Stephen Silver is an award-winning journalist, essayist, and film critic, and contributor to the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Broad Street Review, and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. For over a decade, Stephen has authored thousands of articles that focus on politics, national security, technology, and the economy. Follow him on X (formerly Twitter) at @StephenSilver, and subscribe to his Substack newsletter.
17. Shutdown Lays Bare America’s Latest Crisis: A Total Breakdown in Trust
I am so tired of all the complaints about and the vilification of our government. Our political leaders on both sides of the political spectrum have caused this. The fact is we cannot survive as Americans without our government. Sure there are many problems that we must work on (it is the great American experiment) but there is still no better government than our federal democratic republic as set forth in our Constitution with the ideals outlined in our Declaration of Independence and the political philosophy detailed in the Federalist Papers. Prove me wrong. Tell me what is better.
Shutdown Lays Bare America’s Latest Crisis: A Total Breakdown in Trust
Past shutdowns have been about one thing. This one feels like it is about everything.
https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/government-shutdown-us-trust-e287f87c
By Damian Paletta
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Oct. 3, 2025 9:00 pm ET
WSJ
Between 2013 and 2019, three government shutdowns were caused by Sen. Ted Cruz’s stand against the Affordable Care Act, Sen. Chuck Schumer’s push on children of immigrants and President Trump’s demand for border wall money.
The 2025 shutdown is about something deeper: a complete breakdown in trust.
Democrats don’t trust that the White House will take any spending agreement and adhere to it. The White House has for months routinely ignored congressional appropriations, keeping government funds from flowing as directed by Congress.
Trump, twice-impeached by Democrats during his first term and having survived two assassination attempts while out of office, doesn’t appear to trust the minority party on virtually anything. He has run his second term by uniparty rule, through narrowly passed Republican legislation and a record-shattering number of executive orders.
That’s left little hope for the trust needed to negotiate a deal. Office of Management and Budget Director Russell Vought has already moved to cancel billions of dollars in congressionally appropriated money (Vought said he was freezing $2.1 billion in Chicago funds on Friday).
“I was just trying to figure out a process we could create that will first create trust,” Sen. Ruben Gallego (D., Ariz.) said of a failed attempt to broker talks.
Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R., S.D.), meanwhile, suggested that trust had eroded so much with Democrats that he suspected the other party of staging publicity stunts instead of having serious talks.
“If the meeting is focused around just a photo op along the lines of what they tried to get out of [a recent] White House meeting, I’m not sure there’s a lot of purpose in that,” Thune said of an attempt by Senate Democrats to sit down with him during the week.
Reporters trailed Senate Majority Leader John Thune as he walked to his office on Thursday. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
Washington’s current dysfunction is a reflection of a broader, nationwide revulsion against America’s political system. Nearly two-thirds of voters believe the nation is too divided to address its problems, a recent New York Times poll found. Nearly 80% in a Quinnipiac University survey agreed with the statement that the nation is in a political crisis.
In the first eight months of Trump’s second term, the parties have operated in almost parallel universes. Major bipartisan legislation is rare.
Both parties are going through a metamorphosis. Like his remodeling of the Oval Office, Trump has completely taken over and refashioned the Republican Party in his image. There are fewer people in his cabinet attempting to stop him than in his first term, and he’s mowing through much of his agenda with ease. For Trump, Democrats are a political foil, nothing more.
“These people are crazy, the Democrats,” Trump said last week. “So if it has to be shut down, it’ll have to be shut down. But they’re the ones that are shutting down the government.”
Commuters near the Federal Triangle Metro station in Washington, D.C., on Thursday. Photo: Kent Nishimura/Bloomberg News
Democrats, meanwhile, are still dazed from their defeat in the 2024 elections. Their base has grown impatient (polls show the Democratic “brand” has never been less appealing) and the party’s leaders have picked this moment to try to fight. Among other things, Democrats want assurances that Congress will address expiring healthcare tax credits. And they want assurances Vought will spend the money Congress authorizes. The White House has said reopen the government first, and then talks can begin.
“There is no trust that they will make good on any promise,” Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D., Conn.) said.
And, Democrats may be unified on the shutdown for now, but distrust runs deep within the party. After their drubbing in November, Democrats can’t agree on where to go from here. They were stumped by Trump’s ability to shatter their coalitions of younger voters, union voters, and minority voters. But they are also being pulled to the left by very liberal but popular politicians like Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York, and New York mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani. It isn’t just that Democrats don’t trust Republicans, it is also that Democratic voters don’t trust Democratic leaders.
Zohran Mamdani, the Democratic nominee for New York City mayor, and House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries. Bloomberg News; AP
The crisis of faith in democracy isn’t limited to Congress and the president. Only 27% of Americans this year said they had “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the Supreme Court, compared with 40% in 2020, Gallup polling found. Only 17% said they had high levels of confidence in the criminal justice system, about 10 points lower than in 2012 and 2013.
Faith has collapsed in other mechanisms of democracy. Only 11% said they had high confidence in television news, Gallup found this year, tying a record low in surveys that date back more than two decades. Only 17% had high confidence in newspapers, close to a record low.
The impact of this shutdown has been relatively minor after just a few days. The U.S. Navy Blue Angels backed out of an airshow in California this weekend. The Smithsonian could close its museums in a week. But shutdowns squeeze like a vise, gently at first until something cracks.
The U.S. government is a $7 trillion colossus tucked inside a $30 trillion economy, however. Shutting large parts of it down eventually takes a tremendous toll.
On Friday, the typically busy area surrounding Washington’s Union Station was quiet. Photo: Graeme Sloan/Bloomberg News
The first heavy blow could come in mid-October, when hundreds of thousands of federal workers and contractors miss their first paychecks. Two weeks later, they could miss another right as rent and mortgages are due. A few weeks into the 2018-19 shutdown, Coast Guard families were advised to consider having garage sales to help with groceries and rent.
Past impasses have been resolved behind closed doors between seasoned and wily leaders like Sen. Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.) and Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D., Calif.). Both are effectively backbenchers now.
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If anything, the distrust has only grown in the past few days. Trump has unleashed a steady stream of artificial-intelligence videos taunting Democrats and vulnerable federal workers, and the White House sees a moment to splinter Democrats once and for all.
Democrats backed down after just a few days during the shutdown Schumer led in January 2018. They are now trying to cobble their party back together, acting more strident and determined, cognizant of voices within their party who have complained they seem weak.
Now these forces have collided. Something has to give. But until then, the shutdown could endure. Asked Friday about the lack of trust between the two parties, Sen. Rick Scott (R., Fla.) responded, “it is hard right now.”
The wide-ranging toll of the shutdown will become more apparent as it drags on. Zuma Press (2)
The wide-ranging toll of the shutdown will become more apparent as it drags on. Zuma Press (2)
Write to Damian Paletta at Damian.Paletta@wsj.com
WSJ
18. New Report Warns U.S. Shipbuilding Collapse Threatens National Security
New Report Warns U.S. Shipbuilding Collapse Threatens National Security
https://gcaptain.com/new-report-warns-u-s-shipbuilding-collapse-threatens-national-security/
gcaptain.com · Mike Schuler · October 1, 2025
FILE PHOTO: Sections of the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) are moved into position at Huntington Ingalls Newport News Shipbuilding. U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Newport News Shipbuilding
Mike Schuler
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October 1, 2025
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The Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA) has released a new economic report detailing how America’s capacity has dramatically declined as China’s state-funded maritime industry has overtaken global shipbuilding.
The report, “How to Solve America’s Shipbuilding Crisis,” reveals that decades of free-market policies have transformed the United States from the world’s leading shipbuilder in 1975 to its 19th largest today. The stark contrast in production capacity is alarming – the U.S. now produces fewer than five large commercial vessels annually, while China builds over 1,700, according to a recent Biden-era report from the U.S. Trade Representative.
“Shipbuilding must be a cornerstone of U.S. industrial policy,” said CPA senior economist Mihir Torsekar, the report’s author. “Every one shipbuilding job supports almost five additional jobs elsewhere in the economy. It’s time to correct the misguided policies of the past that surrendered our global leadership of this critical industry to China.”
The report highlights how China has methodically expanded its maritime dominance through industrial policies, massive subsidies, and strategic investments, growing from roughly 5% of global shipbuilding market share in 2000 to over 50% today. This expansion extends beyond commercial shipbuilding into global port infrastructure, creating serious national security implications.
According to the CPA, China’s military-civil fusion strategy has successfully integrated commercial and military shipbuilding, making China both the world’s top commercial shipbuilder and its largest and fastest-growing naval power.
Jon Toomey, President of the CPA, explained that “The erosion of America’s shipbuilding industry began in the 1980s, driven by free-market economic policies that withdrew critical government support. And when the administration terminated federal shipbuilding subsidies, that decision caused the U.S. commercial shipbuilding market to collapse virtually overnight.”
To address these challenges, the CPA proposes several solutions, including strengthening the Jones Act, establishing a shipbuilding industrial fund, implementing tax incentives, investing in domestic shipyards, imposing strategic fees on Chinese maritime assets, expanding U.S.-flagged fleets through cargo preference laws, and coordinating with allies against unfair practices.
The report highlights that rebuilding America’s shipbuilding capacity is not just an economic imperative but a national security necessity. The Arctic region is becoming increasingly important as environmental changes unlock new shipping routes and access to critical minerals needed for advanced technology.
The CPA concludes that by countering unfair competition and rebuilding domestic capacity, the United States can regain its shipbuilding prowess while creating thousands of skilled jobs and ensuring America’s influence in global maritime affairs.
19. The Quantico Speeches: A Dangerous Reframing of the Military’s Mission
A heartfelt analysis from an American patriot.
Excerpts:
Hegseth’s speech was never really about strategy, readiness, modernization, deterrence, or even warfighting. By focusing inward and framing the problem as discipline, grooming, and toughness, he left the true challenges of the strategic environment untouched. What he offered instead was a setup—a series of questions designed to generate affirmation and momentum—so that when the President followed with talk of “domestic enemies” and using American cities as training grounds, the stage was already set. It was less about external defense than about establishing the conditions for loyalty tests still to come.
Those tests will not be about lethality or force design; they will be about obedience. They will come when generals and admirals are asked to choose between the Constitution and the man who claims to embody it, between the harder right and the easier—but far more dangerous—wrong. The danger of Quantico is not what was said that day, but what it prepares the ground for tomorrow.
Postscript:
A former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs once challenged me to string together three allusions in a single sentence—a Hobson’s choice, a Sisyphean task, and the Sword of Damocles. He said, “If you can do that, people will think you’re brilliant”. So, Admiral M, this one’s for you…
Looking back at Quantico, that’s exactly what our senior leaders now face: a Hobson’s choice between loyalty and duty, a Sisyphean task of defending constitutional norms against political corrosion, all while the Sword of Damocles hangs above them, waiting for the next test.
The Quantico Speeches
A Dangerous Reframing of the Military’s Mission
https://vaberet.substack.com/p/the-quantico-speeches?r=280lfd&triedRedirect=true
The Old and Bold
Oct 03, 2025
Preface: Why This Matters to Me
I write this essay not as another reflexive critique of the Trump administration—though some will no doubt dismiss it that way—but from a personal, and frankly painful, place. For more than forty years I’ve shared bonds of service with men and women I respect deeply, people I’ve deployed with, endured hardship alongside, argued strategy with late into the night, and trusted with my life. Yet today, I cannot reconcile their worldview with mine. They see Donald Trump as benign—a leader merely correcting the excesses of “the left.” When I raise concerns, the reply is almost always a whataboutism: What about FDR, Nixon, Clinton, Bush, Obama, Biden? Didn’t they all press the boundaries of presidential power? And on that point, they’re not wrong. Every president has tested the limits.
But this is different. Too many of my friends slide from fair points into false equivalencies. They convince themselves that if they parse the President’s words carefully enough, his meaning will appear acceptable. Yet when Trump talks about “cities in crisis” and “invasions from within,” when he declares the amorphous Antifa a terrorist organization, when he signs an executive order (NSPM-7) that defines “anti-capitalism,” “anti-Christianity,” or deviation from “traditional American values of family, religion, and morality” as domestic terrorism—and then, in the same breath, tells generals and flag officers they must be ready to deploy into those “dangerous cities” to fight “internal enemies”—these are not hypotheticals. They are documented presidential actions and words. His defenders insist he’s only talking about training rotations or rhetorical posturing. They are deluding themselves.
They equate the deployment of federal forces in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina—a response to a real and present disaster—with Trump’s idea of unleashing the military against a “crime emergency” that exists largely in his imagination. These are not the same. They never will be. And deep down, I know that if Barack Obama or Joe Biden had made the same claim, the very people who now parse and rationalize Trump’s words would have rushed to the barricades in fury.
That disconnect gnaws at me. It leaves me asking an uncomfortable question: am I the one out of step? Am I the one who doesn’t see it clearly? In blunt terms—what Reddit users would phrase as “Am I the asshole?”—I have to ask it of myself when I refuse to rationalize what others so easily excuse. This essay is my attempt to answer that question not with slogans, but with the disciplined analysis I was trained to do as a soldier and strategist.
Hegseth’s Stage: A Department of War, Inward Looking
Pete Hegseth, newly christened Secretary of War, set the stage on 30 September at Quantico with what sounded at first like a standard hard-edged address about making the military more lethal. He dusted off the familiar line: we are a Department of War, not a Department of Social Work. But rather than outlining the external threats the nation faces—from a revanchist Russia, to an assertive China, to the persistent challenges of terrorism and cyber warfare—Hegseth turned his gaze inward. His message was not about deterring adversaries abroad, nor about ensuring readiness for multi-domain combat, but about purifying the ranks, enforcing discipline, and reasserting martial toughness.
What was striking was not just what he chose to emphasize, but what he chose to omit. He did not identify, discuss, or even frame the threats that the Department must contend with. That lapse may have been unintentional, reflecting his desire to focus on internal issues and signal toughness within the ranks. But it may also have been calculated—to create a deliberate pause, a moment of suspense, before handing the stage to the President. The unspoken message: we are preparing for war, and the Commander-in-Chief will tell you where that war will be fought.
In doing so, Hegseth reframed the mission. Instead of speaking to the geopolitical landscape, he made the Department’s primary task a kind of internal cultural rectification. The rhetoric landed heavily in the hall, setting the expectation that Trump’s speech would not be about America’s global role—but about the President’s vision of how the military should be wielded at home.
Trump’s Turn: From Grooming Standards to Internal Enemies
President Trump took that stage Hegseth set and drove it further inward. He moved quickly from a perfunctory endorsement of grooming and discipline standards—haircuts, uniforms, physical fitness—to his larger theme: how he intends to employ the U.S. military.
The key line was chilling. He reminded the generals present of their oath: *“to defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” Then he leaned hard on the second half of that phrase, repeating it for emphasis: “domestic enemies.” He warned that the gravest threat to America was not in the Taiwan Strait or on the plains of Eastern Europe, but “the enemy from within.”
Trump then spoke of America’s “broken cities,” suggesting they could serve as live training grounds for the force. He told the assembled officers they would play a role in countering the “invasion” inside U.S. cities—a phrase that left little doubt he was envisioning the military in a domestic security role against American citizens.
This was not a policy speech about readiness or modernization. It was a political speech that conscripted the U.S. military into Trump’s broader war on his domestic opponents.
The Apologists’ Blind Spot
In the aftermath, several colleagues and friends shrugged off my concerns. What are you worried about? they asked. We’ve trained in U.S. cities for decades. 18D medics rotate through inner-city hospitals to practice trauma care. Units rehearse urban combat in abandoned neighborhoods. This is nothing new.
That reaction actually proves the danger. Trump was not talking about benign training rotations or medical internships. He was not speaking of Fort Polk–style urban exercises or humanitarian missions in American cities. His meaning was plain: to deploy military forces against Americans he casts as threats.
What makes this worse is the way apologists twist themselves into knots to excuse it. They take the very words Trump uses—phrases like “enemy from within” or “invasion”—and try to retrofit them into what they wish he had meant. It’s not that they don’t hear what he says; it’s that they can’t allow themselves to believe he actually means it. Because if they admitted he did, they’d have to reckon with the truth: he is endorsing the use of the U.S. military as an internal police force.
Deep down, they know the standard is inconsistent. If Barack Obama or Joe Biden had described American cities as “war zones” that required the galvanization of the military to restore order, they would have been incandescent with rage. They would have flooded the airwaves with accusations of tyranny, federal overreach, and the birth of a police state. But because Trump said it—because their political and emotional capital is invested in him as their hero—they rationalize and reinterpret.
Trump is not joking. He is not winging it. He is deadly serious. And the willingness of his movement to normalize and excuse his language is exactly how democratic protections get stripped away—not with a sudden collapse, but with a thousand quiet rationalizations. That kind of willful blindness is exactly what we once warned ourselves never to do when confronting irrational actors.
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From Rational to Irrational Actors
And that is the point—when leaders or movements show us they are willing to act outside the bounds of reason, pretending otherwise is the most dangerous mistake of all. I saw this firsthand on the Joint Staff, where we built our strategies on the assumption of rational actors—until 9/11 forced us to confront the reality of irrational ones.
As a strategic planner, I worked on the National Military Strategy, the Chairman’s Joint Risk Assessment, the Secretary’s Net Assessment, and other key documents. In the 1990s, most of those assessments were grounded in the “rational actor model.” We assumed adversaries would respond predictably to deterrence, to pressure, to incentives, to diplomacy backed by force.
9/11 shattered that assumption. Al-Qaeda demonstrated what an “irrational actor” looks like—an adversary who cannot be deterred, cannot be bargained with, and cannot be reliably predicted within our usual framework of cost-benefit logic.
But al-Qaeda was hardly unique. Modern strategic thought often highlights how leaders like Kim Jong Un or Vladimir Putin operate in ways that deliberately blur rationality to gain leverage. They use the irrational facade as a tool—not because they lack strategic sense, but precisely because that ambiguity imposes costs on us in crafting responses.
Kim Jong Un has perfected this. His periodic missile tests, nuclear brinkmanship, and internal purges often appear erratic, even self-destructive. Yet scholars note that much of this is rational irrationality—the deliberate cultivation of unpredictability to deter adversaries or wring concessions. By forcing Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to plan for the worst case every time, Kim multiplies his leverage without ever needing to match the West’s capabilities.
Putin does something similar. On some days, he behaves like a conventional realist, protecting Russian interests. On others, he escalates in Ukraine or rattles the nuclear saber in ways that defy Western assumptions about thresholds or proportionality. RAND analysts have warned that Putin is best understood not as wholly irrational, but as someone who slides along the spectrum—sometimes calculating, sometimes feigning unpredictability, but always in ways that keep the West reactive and hesitant.
As one theorist put it, what looks irrational to us is often simply alien rationality—a mode of thinking shaped by different histories, ideologies, constraints, or strategic culture. For our purposes, the danger is not in dealing with someone wholly irrational (that would be simpler), but in facing actors who selectively deploy irrationality as a lever to impose confusion, force over-planning, and exhaust our decision advantage.
That is precisely what we are seeing with Donald Trump. He is not irrational in the sense of being insane or unaware of consequences. He is irrational in the sense that his goals, motivations, and thresholds are alien to the constitutional order we assume anchors American decision-making. At Quantico, his invocation of “domestic enemies,” his talk of using American cities as training grounds, and his casual suggestion that the military might be deployed against U.S. citizens are not slips of the tongue—they are deliberate signals that redefine the role of the military outside its constitutional framework.
What makes this even more insidious is the way Trump bends the very language of the Framers. He uses the same phrases and concepts that the Founders enshrined—domestic enemies, energetic executive, commander-in-chief authority—so they sound familiar, even legitimate. But then he subtly shifts the intent. Where Hamilton and Madison envisioned an energetic executive to ensure decisive action while still tethered by checks, balances, and competing centers of power, Trump recasts those ideas into an argument for unfettered dominance. The language of focus and responsibility—originally meant to clarify roles and prevent drift—becomes in his hands the justification for erasing tension between branches of government altogether. Instead of balance, he preaches singularity. Instead of shared responsibility, he insists on personal primacy.
What looks reckless to most of us is, within Trump’s personal logic, entirely rational: by normalizing the idea of internal enemies and military deployment at home, he bends institutions toward his will, keeps opponents off balance, and conditions supporters to accept the extraordinary as routine. The words are recognizable, but the meaning has been inverted—the Constitution’s careful architecture of divided power retooled into a blueprint for presidential supremacy.
And that is where the danger crystallizes. Hegseth, by looking inward and speaking only of discipline and lethality, left the strategic vacuum into which Trump poured his vision. What should have been a dialogue about external challenges to American security became instead a redefinition of the military’s mission through the language of the Framers, bent and inverted to suit the purposes of one man. By cloaking his claims in the Constitution’s words while hollowing out their meaning, Trump reframed the oath from a pledge to defend the Republic into a mandate to defend his presidency. It was the moment where omission met distortion—where silence on real threats left room for the President to declare that the greatest threat was “within.”
Conclusion
To be fair, Pete Hegseth’s approach has its own logic. His instinct to go “mano a mano” with his senior leaders—to challenge them directly rather than drown them in platitudes—has a certain power. In a military culture that too often buries itself in sanitized assessments and bureaucratic jargon, a Secretary of War who insists on bluntness might believe he is forcing clarity. But toughness without substance is not strategy. By focusing inward—on grooming standards, discipline, and lethality—Hegseth left unspoken the global challenges that actually require collective thought and interactive dialogue with his commanders. He did not identify, discuss, or frame the external threats the Department must contend with. That omission may have been unintentional, reflecting his narrow focus on internal issues. Or it may have been calculated, setting up the President to step in as the one who would declare where the war would be fought.
It reminded me of a lesson from my time at U.S. Army Recruiting Command in the late 1980s. They sent us to a sales school where one of the techniques was simple: get an applicant nodding “yes” to a string of easy questions—Do you want to travel? Do you want job training? Do you want money for college?—all building momentum toward the final question: So, are you ready to enlist? Once you had them moving in that direction, “yes” often became reflexive. Hegseth employed the same technique. Do you want a fit force? Do you want to be more lethal? Do you want less administrative burden? Do you want to get rid of fat generals? Do you want to be examples of professionalism? The implied answers were all “yes.”
By the time Trump walked in, the generals were already leaning forward. When he delivered his punchline—Do you want to protect the nation against all enemies, foreign and domestic? And remember, the greatest threat is from within—the intent was clear: use momentum to pull the military toward his vision.
I do not believe the senior leaders in that hall bought it—not then, and not wholesale. But that was never really the point. The point was to frame the choice so that resistance looked like disloyalty, and agreement looked like duty. It was less about immediate compliance than about conditioning—slowly shifting the ground so that extraordinary claims sound routine, and the military finds itself pulled, inch by inch, into domestic politics.
Hegseth’s speech was never really about strategy, readiness, modernization, deterrence, or even warfighting. By focusing inward and framing the problem as discipline, grooming, and toughness, he left the true challenges of the strategic environment untouched. What he offered instead was a setup—a series of questions designed to generate affirmation and momentum—so that when the President followed with talk of “domestic enemies” and using American cities as training grounds, the stage was already set. It was less about external defense than about establishing the conditions for loyalty tests still to come.
Those tests will not be about lethality or force design; they will be about obedience. They will come when generals and admirals are asked to choose between the Constitution and the man who claims to embody it, between the harder right and the easier—but far more dangerous—wrong. The danger of Quantico is not what was said that day, but what it prepares the ground for tomorrow.
Postscript:
A former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs once challenged me to string together three allusions in a single sentence—a Hobson’s choice, a Sisyphean task, and the Sword of Damocles. He said, “If you can do that, people will think you’re brilliant”. So, Admiral M, this one’s for you…
Looking back at Quantico, that’s exactly what our senior leaders now face: a Hobson’s choice between loyalty and duty, a Sisyphean task of defending constitutional norms against political corrosion, all while the Sword of Damocles hangs above them, waiting for the next test.
20. The Yankees Rookie Who Just Shut Down the Red Sox With a Pitching Display for the Ages
And to end on a somewhat leighter note for this Saturday (thuough George Will keeps us grounded about our dmeocracy).
Great story.
Also worth a minute to reflect on as we head toward the World Series:
George Will on Baseball and Democracy
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/XbEq2LPqHYo
The Yankees Rookie Who Just Shut Down the Red Sox With a Pitching Display for the Ages
Not long ago, Cam Schlittler was a die-hard Red Sox fan with a fastball that barely clocked 90 mph. Now he throws triple digits, wears pinstripes and just sent the Yankees to the ALDS.
https://www.wsj.com/sports/baseball/cam-schlittler-yankees-red-sox-91bd315c
By Jared Diamond
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Oct. 3, 2025 8:00 am ET
Cam Schlittler pitched eight shutout innings with 12 strikeouts in a 4-0 win over the Red Sox. Photo: Ishika Samant/Getty Images
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Cam Schlittler, a New York Yankees rookie, delivered a historic postseason pitching performance against the Boston Red Sox.View more
Cam Schlittler grew up dreaming about one day etching his name into the storied history of baseball’s most famous rivalry.
He just never imagined that he would be wearing pinstripes when it happened.
Schlittler, a 24-year-old rookie for the New York Yankees, hails from Walpole, Mass., a town located less than 20 miles from Fenway Park. His father is the police chief in nearby Needham. He spent his childhood cheering for Dustin Pedroia and David Ortiz alongside a family of die-hard Boston Red Sox fans.
Those days are officially over. From now on, Schlittler will be remembered in his hometown for what he did on Thursday night—not for the Red Sox, but against them.
With their season on the line in a do-or-die playoff game, the Yankees turned to Schlittler, a hard-throwing right-hander who didn’t make his major-league debut until July. He rewarded that faith by delivering what can reasonably be described as one of the greatest pitching performances in recent postseason history.
Schlittler threw eight innings. He racked up 12 strikeouts. He didn’t walk a batter. And most importantly, he didn’t allow a run, powering the Yankees to a 4-0 win that earned them a matchup against the Toronto Blue Jays in the division series, which begins Saturday.
Never before in postseason history had a pitcher gone eight or more shutout innings with at least 12 punch-outs and zero walks. Until Schlittler showed up.
The 120-year blood feud between the Yankees and Red Sox has produced plenty of unlikely heroes: Bucky Dent in 1978. Aaron Boone in 2003. Dave Roberts in 2004.
Now, you can add Cam Schlittler to that list, thanks to his masterpiece on the biggest possible stage.
“A star is born tonight,” Boone, New York’s manager, said on the field afterward. “He’s a special kid, man.”
With their season on the line in a do-or-die playoff game, the Yankees turned to Schlittler. Photo: Al Bello/Getty Images
Coming out of spring training, Schlittler was barely on the Yankees’ radar as a viable option for this season. They selected him out of Boston’s Northeastern University in the seventh round of the draft in 2022. In Schlittler’s first professional season in single-A, his fastball averaged about 90 mph.
But the Yankees believed he had room to grow. Under the tutelage of their player development staff, Schlittler tweaked his mechanics in ways that enabled him to better leverage his lanky 6-foot-6 frame. At the organization’s request, he gained about 20 pounds, upping his weight to a muscular 225. By the time he reached Triple-A last season, Schlittler was routinely reaching 95—and he was just getting started.
Earlier this season, the injury-riddled Yankees found themselves in desperate need of pitching help. They determined Schlittler was their best option and promoted him to the big leagues. He posted a 2.96 ERA in 14 regular-season outings, enough to convince the Yankees he deserved the ball in the most important game of the year.
On Wednesday, Schlittler spoke with another of the Yankees’ October legends, Andy Pettitte, about facing the Red Sox. He told him he “wasn’t going to let them beat me.”
He was right. Eleven of his career-high 107 pitches reached 100 mph, leaving the Red Sox looking utterly overmatched. When the game ended, Red Sox manager Alex Cora said of Schlittler, “We needed to be perfect tonight—because he was perfect.”
The Yankees needed him to be. After dropping Game 1 in their best-of-three set against the Red Sox, their World Series aspirations were left hanging by a thread before the calendar even turned to October. Since the introduction of the wild card series in 2022, no team had ever emerged victorious after falling behind 1-0.
Fans from back home made sure Schlittler knew the odds against him. Some of what he heard from Red Sox Nation bothered him. The jeers only motivated him more.
As a result, Schlittler called beating the Red Sox “personal.” He wanted to be the “silent killer” who would end Boston’s season.
“I woke up and I was locked in,” Schlittler said. “I knew exactly what I needed to do and go out there, especially against my hometown team.”
Schlittler called beating the Red Sox ‘personal.’ Photo: Yuki Iwamura/Associated Press
In the hours leading up to Schlittler’s start on Thursday, the officers his dad leads were torn. The Needham Police Department wrote on Facebook that it was “stuck between ‘Go Sox!’ and ‘Go… wait, did we just say (I can’t) out loud?’”
Earlier in his life, Schlittler might have felt the same way. On the eve of the game that transformed Schlittler into a household name, he insisted, “I take pride in being from Boston.”
Still, something has changed. His relatives don’t root for the Red Sox anymore—at least not when he’s on the mound.
They have become, he says, “full Yankee guys now.”
As they head to the ALDS, the Yankees are grateful for that.
Write to Jared Diamond at jared.diamond@wsj.com
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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