Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"History is full of people who, out of fear, or ignorance, or lust for power have destroyed knowledge of immeasurable value, which truly belongs to us all. We must not let that happen again."

– Carl Sagan

"The chief cause of human errors is to be found in the prejudices picked up in childhood."

– Rene Descartes

"Education is conceived more in terms of indoctrination by most school officials than in terms of enlightenment. My own belief is that education must be subversive if it is to be meaningful. By this, I mean that it must challenge all the things we take for granted, examine all accepted assumptions, tamper with every sacred cow, and it's still a desire to question and doubt. Without this the mere instruction to memorize data is empty. The attempt to enforce conventional mediocrity on the young is criminal."

– Bertrand Russell

1. Trump to Sign Order Calling Pentagon the Department of War

2. ‘Unrestrained’ Chinese Cyberattackers May Have Stolen Data From Almost Every American

3. How China’s New Naval and Air Sites Would Aid an Attack on Taiwan

4. Did a Boat Strike in Caribbean Exceed Trump’s Authority to Use Military Force?

5. How a Top Secret SEAL Team 6 Mission Into North Korea Fell Apart

6. Ukraine’s Drones Hit Rosneft’s Ryazan Refinery, Knocking Out 5% of Russia’s Oil Output

7. Integrated yet Autonomous: How Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces Have Mastered Cooperation with Conventional Forces

8. Stove-Piped and Surveilled: The Erosion of Sahelian Intelligence Networks in an Era of Great Power Competition

9. Integrate or Die

10. The North Korean Way of Proliferation

11. Analysis-Diplomatic tour de force: China's Xi shows he's 'totally in charge'

12. Exclusive: Trump to reinterpret 1987 missile treaty to sell heavy attack drones abroad

13. Taiwan’s Will to Fight Isn’t the Problem

14. US Special Forces Officer Dies In Dhaka; India Perks Up Ears

15. Xi is getting ready to move against Taiwan – this is how it will happen

16. Ungoverning America – The Logic Behind Trump’s Assault on the Administrative State

17. Another Reason Not to Trust the ‘Experts’

18. Where Do You Get Your Information?*

19. Navy reverses demotion of Rep. Ronny Jackson, ex-White House doctor

20. We Need to Know History, Especially Now

1. Trump to Sign Order Calling Pentagon the Department of War

I have never heard of a "secondary title,"

Excerpts:

Under the executive order, the Department of War is set to be the agency’s secondary title until Congress approves the new name. The executive order, Trump’s 200th since taking office, will authorize the use of the name Department of War in official correspondence and public communications. It will also direct Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to recommend legislative and executive actions to make the change to Department of War permanent.

Department of War conveys a stronger message of readiness and resolve compared with Department of Defense, which emphasizes only defensive capabilities, according to a White House document describing the order.

Hegseth would be able to use the secondary title of secretary of war, the White House said.

How about these new acronyms? I can see the meems now.

DOW

SOW

sow²

/sou/

noun

noun: sow; plural noun: sows

1.
an adult female pig, especially one which has farrowed.
"there are ten sows and fifty piglets at the farm"

the female of certain other mammals, e.g. the guinea pig.
"the young guinea pigs nurse not only from their mothers, but also from any other lactating sows"

2.
a large block of metal (larger than a “pig”) made by smelting.
"the machine produces aluminum sow ingots in a range of sizes"

"dow" is a word with multiple meanings, including an intransitive verb to be able or thrive, primarily used in Scottish English, and a noun referring to the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The verb "dow" has Old English origins meaning "to be worthy" or "to be able," while the noun "Dow" (capitalized) is a proper noun

Trump to Sign Order Calling Pentagon the Department of War

White House says the name conveys a message of readiness

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-to-sign-order-calling-pentagon-the-department-of-war-f68d88d6

By Meridith McGraw

and Alyssa Lukpat

Sept. 4, 2025 8:19 pm ET

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Photo: Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images

President Trump is expected to sign an executive order Friday to rebrand the Department of Defense as the Department of War, reviving a name that was last used in 1947.

Trump has frequently floated the idea of changing the Department of Defense’s name.

“I don’t want to be defense only. We want defense, but we want offense too,” Trump said during an Oval Office event last week. “As Department of War, we won everything…and I think we’re going to have to go back to that.”

Under the executive order, the Department of War is set to be the agency’s secondary title until Congress approves the new name. The executive order, Trump’s 200th since taking office, will authorize the use of the name Department of War in official correspondence and public communications. It will also direct Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to recommend legislative and executive actions to make the change to Department of War permanent.

Department of War conveys a stronger message of readiness and resolve compared with Department of Defense, which emphasizes only defensive capabilities, according to a White House document describing the order.

Hegseth would be able to use the secondary title of secretary of war, the White House said.

The U.S. created the Department of War in 1789. Separate departments initially ran the different military branches.

After World War II, President Harry Truman merged the armed forces under one organization in 1947 under a bill passed by Congress. The government called the organization the National Military Establishment until renaming it the Department of Defense in 1949.

The Pentagon began crafting legislative proposals to change the name in the second week of Trump’s current term, a former official told The Wall Street Journal last month. The agency considered asking Congress for authority to use the old name during a national emergency.

Write to Meridith McGraw at Meridith.McGraw@WSJ.com and Alyssa Lukpat at alyssa.lukpat@wsj.com

Appeared in the September 5, 2025, print edition as 'Department of War Slated as New Name'.

2. ‘Unrestrained’ Chinese Cyberattackers May Have Stolen Data From Almost Every American

Unrestrained or unrestricted? We may think we are in competition with China. But China certainly thinks it is at war with us. Unrestricted war.

Perhaps the Department of War can help us recognize the war we are in with China. (That is only a half sarcastic comment - we need to head Mao - "War is politics with bloodshed and politics is war without bloodshed" - both are war)

‘Unrestrained’ Chinese Cyberattackers May Have Stolen Data From Almost Every American

Information collected during the yearslong Salt Typhoon attack could allow Beijing’s intelligence services to track targets from the United States and dozens of other countries.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/04/world/asia/china-hack-salt-typhoon.html?

President Trump last week. His phone was among the targets of a sweeping cyberattack last year, during the campaign. Credit...Anna Rose Layden for The New York Times

By Adam Goldman

Reporting from London

Sept. 4, 2025

Updated 4:36 a.m. ET

Leer en español

China has hacked into American power grids and companies for decades, stealing sensitive files and intellectual property such as chip designs as it seeks to gain an edge over the United States.

But a sweeping cyberattack by a group known as Salt Typhoon is China’s most ambitious yet, experts and officials have concluded after a year of investigating it. It targeted more than 80 countries and may have stolen information from nearly every American, officials said. They see it as evidence that China’s capabilities rival those of the United States and its allies.

The Salt Typhoon attack was a yearslong, coordinated assault that infiltrated major telecommunications companies and others, investigators said in a highly unusual joint statement last week. The range of the attack was far greater than originally understood, and security officials warned that the stolen data could allow Chinese intelligence services to exploit global communication networks to track targets including politicians, spies and activists.

Hackers sponsored by the Chinese government “are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks,” the statement said.

British and American officials have described the attack as “unrestrained” and “indiscriminate.” Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan and Spain were also signatories to the statement, which was part of a name-and-shame effort directed at the Chinese government.

“I can’t imagine any American was spared given the breadth of the campaign,” said Cynthia Kaiser, a former top official in the F.B.I.’s cyber division, who oversaw investigations into the hacking.

Image

Cynthia Kaiser oversaw investigations of the Salt Typhoon hack at the F.B.I.Credit...Christina A. Cassidy/Associated Press

It was unclear whether the Salt Typhoon hack was intended to store ordinary people’s data or if that data was incidentally swept up in the attack. But its scope was broader than previous hacks, in which China more narrowly targeted Westerners working on security or other sensitive government issues, Ms. Kaiser said.

The Salt Typhoon hack could signal a new era of Chinese cyber capabilities that will test its strategic rivals, including the United States, security experts said. It highlights China’s ambitions for global influence, which were on display on Wednesday at an elaborate military parade in Beijing that featured fighter jets, tanks and thousands of troops marching across Tiananmen Square.

“In many ways, Salt Typhoon marks a new chapter,” said Jennifer Ewbank, the former C.I.A. deputy director for digital innovation. A decade ago, she noted, Western allies worried about China’s thefts of trade secrets, personal information and government data, which used more rudimentary techniques.

“Today, we see patient, state-backed campaigns burrowed deep into the infrastructure of more than 80 countries, characterized by a high level of technical sophistication, patience and persistence,” she added.

The Chinese Embassy in London did not respond to a message seeking comment.

Image

The Embassy of China in London.Credit...Neil Hall/EPA, via Shutterstock

The statement from Western allies gave the fullest accounting yet of what the F.B.I. has called China’s “cyberespionage campaign.”

Investigators linked the Salt Typhoon attack to at least three China-based technology companies that have been operating since at least 2019, but the operation was uncovered only last year. The joint statement said the companies worked for China’s military and civilian intelligence agencies, which carry out foreign operations.

The hackers’ goal was to give Chinese officials the “capability to identify and track their targets’ communications and movements around the world,” the statement said. Among the targets were phones used by prominent politicians, including President Trump and Vice President JD Vance, during their campaign last year. The effort also took aim at Democrats.

The attackers stole data from telecommunications and internet service companies, penetrating more than a half dozen U.S. telecommunications companies alone. The hackers exploited old vulnerabilities in the networks, the British authorities said. They also hacked into lodging and transportation companies, among other targets.

The hackers were able to listen in on telephone conversations and read unencrypted text messages, Senator Mark Warner of Virginia, the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, has said.

The attack built on China’s earlier hacks, said Jamie MacColl, a senior research fellow in cybersecurity at Royal United Services Institute, an analytical group affiliated with the British military. For years, China has collected large data sets, Mr. MacColl said, intending to one day exploit that information.

“If you’re a cyber power, then it makes sense you would want to compromise the global communications network,” he said.

Chinese operators previously targeted American companies such as Marriott International, health insurers and the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, which keeps government security clearance files. In 2021, the Biden administration accused the Chinese government of breaching widely used Microsoft email systems.

Russian state-sponsored hackers have also carried out successful breaches. The U.S. and British governments and their closest allies also have vast spying capabilities. It is not clear how Western countries responded to Salt Typhoon.

The operation was “more than a one-off intelligence success for China,” Anne Neuberger, a Biden administration cybersecurity official, wrote recently in Foreign Affairs magazine.

“It reflected a deeper, troubling reality,” she wrote, adding, “China is positioning itself to dominate the digital battle space.”

Adam Goldman writes about the F.B.I. and national security for The Times. He has been a journalist for more than two decades.

2. How China’s New Naval and Air Sites Would Aid an Attack on Taiwan

Please go to the link to view the maps/graphics, and interactive site in the proper format.

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-taiwan-military-naval-air-sites-4a02c450?st=MhgxwC&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

How China’s New Naval and Air Sites Would Aid an Attack on Taiwan

Satellite images show major infrastructure expansion, including on the Taiwan Strait

By Niharika Mandhana

and Camille Bressange

Sept. 4, 2025 11:00 pm ET

China is undertaking a large-scale build-out of infrastructure along its eastern coast, including air and naval sites that show its growing readiness for a potential conflict over Taiwan.

Satellite images and other open-source material examined by The Wall Street Journal illustrate how these facilities would strengthen China’s hand if it launched an invasion of the island democracy. Beijing claims Taiwan as its territory and has pledged to take it, by force if necessary.

The sites range from a large new base for amphibious warships to a multibillion-dollar airport that sits around 3 miles from front-line Taiwanese islands. “All of it goes to supporting China’s one military planning scenario, which is a Taiwan scenario,” said Michael Dahm, a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer and senior resident fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies who closely tracks these projects.

Yellow Sea

Pudong

Shanghai

CHINA

Yuhuan

East China Sea

Fuzhou

Xiamen

Taipei

Zhangpu

TAIWAN

South China Sea

The investments boost a sweeping effort under President Xi Jinping for his country to become equipped and capable of taking Taiwan. A cross-strait invasion to seize the territory would be highly complex. Whether Xi intends to carry out such an offensive remains an open question.

U.S. military officials have stepped up warnings in recent months about Beijing’s intentions, saying the country is on a dangerous path. China is modernizing equipment from warheads to warplanes, conducting ever-expanding military exercises—and pouring concrete.

The facility isn’t on the Taiwan Strait, which could be an advantage, said Dahm, because that waterway would likely be a “free-fire zone” in a conflict. Instead of concentrating its warships, China’s invasion fleet could sail for Taiwan from different points along the coast.

That approach would require more planning to ensure forces show up at the right place at the right time. But it would complicate decisions by China’s adversaries on what to target, when and where.

The facility’s size suggests it was built for expanded wartime use, said Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. It could serve, said Koh, as a jumpoff point for part of an invasion fleet heading for northern Taiwan, where the territory’s capital city, Taipei, is located.

Big berths

Closer to Taiwan, a naval facility in Yueqing Bay has a new pier measuring over a mile long, allowing a large number of ships to operate from there. Around 20 vessels were visible on a recent day, including tank transports, ship-to-shore landing craft, tankers and coast-guard cutters—all of which would play a role in a Taiwan contingency.

2018

2025

Yueqing

Bay

1.25 miles

0.3 miles

Air support

CHINA

Heliport

Taipei

150 miles

110 miles

TAIWAN

Penghu

Islands

Directly across from Taiwan in China’s Fujian province sits a new and expanding helicopter base. Army helicopters flying from here—carrying troops to Taiwan or providing supporting fire for landing forces, say—would be well-positioned to reach the southwestern beaches of Taiwan’s main island. A number of those beaches are considered likely landing sites for an amphibious assault.

The helicopter airfield could also support an attack on the Penghu Islands, a significant Taiwanese archipelago in the strait. Seizing the Penghus early in a conflict would give China crucial momentum, allowing it to use the captured territory to sustain attacks on Taiwan’s main island a few dozen miles away.

Chinese drones have used the airfield, said Damien Symon, a researcher at an intelligence consulting firm called the Intel Lab, who studies the facility using satellite images. The base is being expanded further, with recent imagery showing land being cleared in at least two adjacent areas, possibly for more helipads, he said.

December 2019

0.4 miles

June 2025

Civilian spaces

Mega-airports are popping up around China, but at least two are in locations that would make them attractive to Chinese military commanders: right on the Taiwan Strait. If a crisis erupted, Beijing would likely suspend commercial flights to and from these facilities.

With several runways, hangars, abundant fuel, equipment for loading aircraft and a range of other logistics capabilities, these large airfields could quickly be repurposed for military use.

They could serve as forward refueling points or support warplanes whose main airfields have been hit, military analysts said. They could also act as staging areas where troops and war materiel can be brought from other parts of China to be transported to Taiwan, where Chinese forces in battle would need constant resupply of ammunition, spare parts and other items, possibly for months.

CHINA

Xiang’an

Fuzhou Changle

International Airport

Dadeng

Island

2.3 miles

Xiamen Xiang'an

International Airport

KINMEN COUNTY

(TAIWAN)

Taipei

TAIWAN

One of the airports is sprawled across Dadeng island in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese dredgers worked for years to double the island’s size and make land for the Xiamen Xiang’an International Airport. The facility, expected to be operational next year, now sits just 2.3 miles from Kinmen, an outlying Taiwanese archipelago that could be an early Chinese target in a full-scale invasion.

It isn’t just its location that would make the airport valuable for military purposes. In addition to supporting tens of millions of passengers each year, it is designed to be a hub for air-cargo logistics. That means it has robust rail and road connectivity, big warehouses and loads of equipment to move goods rapidly.

Xiamen-Xiang'an International Airport development

2014

'15

'18

'22

'24

'25

In the northern Taiwan Strait, at another civilian airport, a new runway has emerged right on the water. The billion-dollar expansion of the facility, located near the Chinese city of Fuzhou, creates space for a lot more aircraft to park, taxi and operate.

2021

2025

Graphics sources: Maxar (Pudong naval base in 2020 and 2025, Pudong pier close-up, Pudong rail siding, Xiamen Xiang’an International Airport in 2025); Google Earth (Pudong naval base buried tanks, Yuhuan naval base in 2018 and 2025, Zhangpu heliport in 2019, Xiamen Xiang’an International Airport from 2014 to 2024, Fuzhou-Changle airport in 2021 and 2025); PlanetLabs (Zhangpu heliport in 2025)

Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com and Camille Bressange at camille.bressange@wsj.com

Appeared in the September 5, 2025, print edition as 'China Base Buildup Looms Over Taiwan'.

4. Did a Boat Strike in Caribbean Exceed Trump’s Authority to Use Military Force?

What did Thucydides say: "The strong do what they will, the weak suffer what they must?"

I am sure the legal scholars will be debating this for some time. And there are certain political factions who will say such debates among lawyers are what hinders defense and national security and they might consider the proper use of the military.

But it seems obvious there is a larger plan here than simply counterdrug operations.

Did a Boat Strike in Caribbean Exceed Trump’s Authority to Use Military Force?

Legal experts say president exceeded his legal authority by using lethal military force against a target that posed no direct danger to the U.S.

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/did-a-boat-strike-in-caribbean-exceed-trumps-authority-to-use-military-force-828db8c6

By Vera Bergengruen

, Michael R. Gordon

and José de Córdoba

Updated Sept. 4, 2025 10:44 pm ET

President Trump Photo: Mandel Ngan/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—President Trump was operating within his constitutional powers as commander in chief when he ordered the U.S. military to destroy a vessel in the Caribbean, administration officials said, describing the drugs it was allegedly smuggling as an imminent national security threat.

But that claim was sharply disputed by legal experts and some lawmakers, who said that Trump exceeded his legal authority by using lethal military force against a target that posed no direct danger to the U.S. and doing so without congressional authorization.

The disagreement since Trump announced the deadly attack Tuesday underscored how much of a departure it represents from decades of U.S. counternarcotics operations—and raised questions about whether drug smugglers can be treated as legitimate military targets.

“Every boatload of any form of drug that poisons the American people is an imminent threat. And at the DOD, our job is to defeat imminent threats,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told reporters Thursday during a visit to an Army base in Georgia. “A drug cartel is no different than al Qaeda, and they will be treated as such.”

Trump administration officials said Tuesday’s strike, which killed 11 people on the boat, was just the opening salvo in an expanded campaign to dismantle the drug cartels they say pose a major threat to Americans.

But in importing tactics from the post-9/11 war against terrorist groups to use against drug cartels, some former officials said, Trump is trampling on longstanding limits on presidential use of force and asserting legal authorities that don’t exist.

The casualties “weren’t engaged in anything like a direct attack on the United States” and weren’t afforded a trial to determine their guilt, said Frank Kendall, who served as the secretary of the Air Force during the Biden administration and holds a law degree. “Frankly, I can’t see how this can be considered anything other than a nonjudicial killing outside the boundaries of domestic and international law.”

Unlike the interdictions which are usually conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard, the strike was carried out without warning shots, and no effort was made to detain the ship, apprehend its crew, or confirm the drugs on board. “Instead of interdicting it, on the president’s orders they blew it up,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in Mexico City on Wednesday.

Trump Says U.S. Military Struck Drug Vessel From Venezuela

Play video: Trump Says U.S. Military Struck Drug Vessel From Venezuela

The strike came days after the U.S. military deployed warships to the Caribbean to stop the flow of cocaine. President Trump posted on social media that 11 ‘terrorists’ were killed. Photo: Department of Defense/Brian Snyder/Reuters

Trump said U.S. forces “positively identified” the crew before the attack as members of Venezuelan crime syndicate Tren de Aragua, calling them “narcoterrorists.” Tren de Aragua is among the Latin American cartels and gangs that Trump has designated as foreign terrorist organizations since February.

The White House has provided no further information on the operation against the boat or detailed the legal arguments that it claims support it. Nor have officials disclosed where the strike took place, the identities of the casualties or the weapons used.

Some Trump administration officials suggest that by designating the drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, the Pentagon has the leeway to treat the groups as it would foreign terrorists. As commander in chief, Trump has the power to order military action against imminent threats without congressional authorization, they said.

The strike “was taken in defense of vital U.S. national interests and in the collective self-defense of other nations,” White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly said, adding that the strike occurred in international waters and “was fully consistent with the law of armed conflict.”

But Geoffrey Corn, a retired lieutenant colonel who was the Army’s senior adviser on the law of war, said: “I don’t think there is any way to legitimately characterize a drug ship heading from Venezuela, arguably to Trinidad, as an actual or imminent armed attack against the United States, justifying this military response.”

Corn, a law professor at Texas Tech University, noted that critics have condemned U.S. drone strikes since 2001 against militants in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries as extrajudicial killings, but those strikes were legitimate, he said, because the U.S. was engaged in an armed conflict under the laws of war against al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

Brian Finucane, a former State Department lawyer who is now at the International Crisis Group, said that designation of drug cartels as terrorist groups doesn’t authorize the use of military force against them. Rather it enables the U.S. to levy sanctions and pursue criminal prosecutions against individuals who support the groups.

Nor can military action be justified under the law Congress passed authorizing the use of force against al Qaeda and related terrorist groups following the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, experts said.

For the military to use force, “there needs to be a legitimate claim of self-defense in international waters, an action that is necessary and proportional in response to an armed attack or imminent armed attack,” said Juan Gonzalez, who served as the National Security Council’s senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs during the Biden administration. “That clearly didn’t happen.”

The attack was the U.S. military’s first publicly acknowledged airstrike in Central or South America since the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989. The White House released a grainy black-and-white video that showed the destruction of a small boat, which it celebrated as a blunt warning for drug traffickers throughout the region.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio at a press conference in Mexico City on Wednesday. Photo: Hector Vivas/Getty Images

Trump administration officials have offered conflicting accounts of the episode. On Tuesday, Rubio said the drugs the vessel was carrying “were probably headed to Trinidad or some other country in the Caribbean” and could “contribute to the instability these countries are facing,” differing from Trump’s statement that the vessel was “heading to the United States.” On Wednesday, Rubio suggested that the shipment was “eventually” headed to the U.S.

No state in the region has publicly appealed for the U.S. to take military action against the cartels as an act of collective self-defense, Corn said.

On Thursday, two Venezuelan F-16 jet fighters flew near one of the U.S. Navy warships that have been positioned near the country. The Pentagon criticized the apparent show of force as a “highly provocative move” and warned Venezuela not to interfere with its “counter narco-terror operations.”

In the past, some U.S. counternarcotics strikes have ended in tragedy. In 2001, Peruvian and U.S. counterdrug agents mistook a small plane carrying American missionaries over the Peruvian Amazon as belonging to drug traffickers. The Peruvian Air Force shot down the plane, killing a 35-year-old woman and her infant daughter.

The U.S. has limited intelligence on small drug boats leaving Venezuela, from which the Drug Enforcement Administration was expelled in 2005 under then-President Hugo Chávez, said Mike Vigil, a former DEA director of international operations.

“The United States doesn’t really have the capability to develop good intelligence about these embarkations,” he said. “You don’t just send a missile and destroy a boat. It is the equivalent of a police officer walking up to a drug trafficker on the street and shooting him.”

In Quito, Ecuador, on Thursday, Rubio announced the designation of two more criminal groups—the Ecuadorean Los Choneros and Los Lobos—as foreign terrorist organizations. He said U.S. partners in the region would participate in operations to use lethal force against drug cartels.

A senior Mexican naval officer with decades of service and experience boarding drug vessels said actions like the one taken Tuesday by the U.S. would never be allowed by its Mexican counterpart, which has been trained in interdiction procedures by the U.S. Coast Guard.

“There is never a direct attack unless you are attacked,” he said. “As commander of the ship, I would get into serious trouble. I could be accused of murder.”

Write to Vera Bergengruen at vera.bergengruen@wsj.com, Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and José de Córdoba at jose.decordoba@wsj.com

Appeared in the September 5, 2025, print edition as 'Trump’s Authority in Boat Strike Disputed'.

5. How a Top Secret SEAL Team 6 Mission Into North Korea Fell Apart

The Public Affairs Officers' phones are going to be ringing off the hook for some days to come.

If this is even true I am reminded of LTG Sam WIlsons' 20 Characteristics of Special Operations. If this did happen it is quite amazing that it was not revealed before today.

11. Special Operations Forces have a limited number of DIRECT roles:

Special Operations Forces are trained for specific missions. They are the most highly trained and proficient forces that the US possess but they are not the answer for every small contingency mission that comes along. Many conventional forces are more proficient at conventional type missions than the SOF. Even more specialized units exist and they should not be used outside their primary mission. Just because a select force is in being, does not automatically mean that it is the BEST to use. Politics will play in this decision, the HIGH RISK/HIGH GAIN nature of the specific operation may cause the political leaders to make this choice, even if better alternatives are available, i.e., such as have SEAL TEAM SIX do a routine beach recon.

Excerpts:

Several of those people said they were discussing details about the mission because they were concerned that Special Operations failures are often hidden by government secrecy. If the public and policymakers become aware only of high-profile successes, such as the raid that killed bin Laden in Pakistan, they may underestimate the extreme risks that American forces undertake.

The military operation on North Korean soil, close to American military bases in South Korea and the Pacific region, also risked setting off a broader conflict with a hostile, nuclear-armed and highly militarized adversary.

The New York Times proceeds cautiously when reporting on classified military operations. The Times has withheld some sensitive information on the North Korea mission that could affect future Special Operations and intelligence-gathering missions.

It is unclear how much North Korea was able to discover about the mission. But the SEAL operation is one chapter in a decades-long effort by U.S. administrations to engage North Korea and constrain its nuclear weapons programs. Almost nothing the United States has tried — neither promises of closer relations nor the pressure of sanctions — has worked.

How a Top Secret SEAL Team 6 Mission Into North Korea Fell Apart

The 2019 operation, greenlit by President Trump, sought a strategic edge. It left unarmed North Koreans dead.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/05/us/navy-seal-north-korea-trump-2019.html?unlocked_article_code=1.jk8.fqaH.fYjiDeNXUfnD&smid=url-share

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By Dave Philipps and Matthew Cole

Dave Philipps is a national correspondent for The New York Times, and Matthew Cole is a freelance journalist. Both have covered the military for more than 15 years.

Sept. 5, 2025

A group of Navy SEALs emerged from the ink-black ocean on a winter night in early 2019 and crept to a rocky shore in North Korea. They were on a top secret mission so complex and consequential that everything had to go exactly right.

The objective was to plant an electronic device that would let the United States intercept the communications of North Korea’s reclusive leader, Kim Jong-un, amid high-level nuclear talks with President Trump.

The mission had the potential to provide the United States with a stream of valuable intelligence. But it meant putting American commandos on North Korean soil — a move that, if detected, not only could sink negotiations but also could lead to a hostage crisis or an escalating conflict with a nuclear-armed foe.

It was so risky that it required the president’s direct approval.

For the operation, the military chose SEAL Team 6’s Red Squadron — the same unit that killed Osama bin Laden. The SEALs rehearsed for months, aware that every move needed to be perfect. But when they reached what they thought was a deserted shore that night, wearing black wet suits and night-vision goggles, the mission swiftly unraveled.

A North Korean boat appeared out of the dark. Flashlights from the bow swept over the water. Fearing that they had been spotted, the SEALs opened fire. Within seconds, everyone on the North Korean boat was dead.

The SEALs retreated into the sea without planting the listening device.

The 2019 operation has never been publicly acknowledged, or even hinted at, by the United States or North Korea. The details remain classified and are being reported here for the first time. The Trump administration did not notify key members of Congress who oversee intelligence operations, before or after the mission. The lack of notification may have violated the law.

The White House declined to comment.

This account is based on interviews with two dozen people, including civilian government officials, members of the first Trump administration and current and former military personnel with knowledge of the mission. All of them spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the mission’s classified status.

Several of those people said they were discussing details about the mission because they were concerned that Special Operations failures are often hidden by government secrecy. If the public and policymakers become aware only of high-profile successes, such as the raid that killed bin Laden in Pakistan, they may underestimate the extreme risks that American forces undertake.

The military operation on North Korean soil, close to American military bases in South Korea and the Pacific region, also risked setting off a broader conflict with a hostile, nuclear-armed and highly militarized adversary.

The New York Times proceeds cautiously when reporting on classified military operations. The Times has withheld some sensitive information on the North Korea mission that could affect future Special Operations and intelligence-gathering missions.

It is unclear how much North Korea was able to discover about the mission. But the SEAL operation is one chapter in a decades-long effort by U.S. administrations to engage North Korea and constrain its nuclear weapons programs. Almost nothing the United States has tried — neither promises of closer relations nor the pressure of sanctions — has worked.

In 2019, Mr. Trump was making a personalized overture to Mr. Kim, in search of a breakthrough that had eluded prior presidents. But those talks collapsed, and North Korea’s nuclear program accelerated. The U.S. government estimates that North Korea now has roughly 50 nuclear weapons and missiles that can reach the West Coast. Mr. Kim has pledged to keep expanding his nuclear program “exponentially” to deter what he calls U.S. provocations.

Blind Spots

The SEAL mission was intended to fix a strategic blind spot. For years, U.S. intelligence agencies had found it nearly impossible to recruit human sources and tap communications in North Korea’s insular authoritarian state.

Gaining insight into Mr. Kim’s thinking became a high priority when Mr. Trump first took office. The North Korean leader seemed increasingly unpredictable and dangerous, and his relationship with Mr. Trump had lurched erratically between letters of friendship and public threats of nuclear war.

In 2018, relations seemed to be moving toward peace. North Korea suspended nuclear and missile tests, and the two countries opened negotiations, but the United States still had little insight into Mr. Kim’s intentions.

Amid the uncertainty, U.S. intelligence agencies revealed to the White House that they had a fix for the intelligence problem: a newly developed electronic device that could intercept Mr. Kim’s communications.

The catch was that someone had to sneak in and plant it.

Image

Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim met at the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2019. Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

The job was given to SEAL Team 6 in 2018, military officials said.

Even for Team 6, the mission would be extraordinarily difficult. SEALs who were more used to quick raids in places like Afghanistan and Iraq would have to survive for hours in frigid seas, slip past security forces on land, perform a precise technical installation and then get out undetected.

Getting out undetected was vital. In Mr. Trump’s first term, top leaders in the Pentagon believed that even a small military action against North Korea could provoke catastrophic retaliation from an adversary with roughly 8,000 artillery pieces and rocket launchers aimed at the approximately 28,000 American troops in South Korea, and nuclear-capable missiles that could reach the United States.

But the SEALs believed they could pull off the mission because they had done something like it before.

In 2005, SEALs used a mini-sub to go ashore in North Korea and leave unnoticed, according to people familiar with the mission. The 2005 operation, carried out during the presidency of George W. Bush, has never before been reported publicly.

The SEALs were proposing to do it again. In the fall of 2018, while high-level talks with North Korea were underway, Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees Team 6, received approval from Mr. Trump to start preparing, military officials said. It is unclear whether Mr. Trump’s intent was to gain an immediate advantage during negotiations or if the focus was broader.

Joint Special Operations Command declined to comment.

The plan called for the Navy to sneak a nuclear-powered submarine, nearly two football fields long, into the waters off North Korea and then deploy a small team of SEALs in two mini-subs, each about the size of a killer whale, that would motor silently to the shore.

The mini-subs were wet subs, which meant the SEALs would ride immersed in 40-degree ocean water for about two hours to reach the shore, using scuba gear and heated suits to survive.

Image

A U.S. Ohio-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarine takes part in exercises near Okinawa, Japan, in 2021. A similar submarine transported a Navy SEAL team to waters off North Korea in 2019. Credit...U.S. Marine Corps, via Department of Defense

Near the beach, the mini-subs would release a group of about eight SEALs who would swim to the target, install the device and then slip back into the sea.

But the team faced a serious limitation: It would be going in almost blind.

Typically, Special Operations forces have drones overhead during a mission, streaming high-definition video of the target, which SEALs on the ground and senior leaders in far-off command centers can use to direct the strike in real time. Often, they can even listen in on enemy communications.

But in North Korea, any drone would be spotted. The mission would have to rely on satellites in orbit and high-altitude spy planes in international airspace miles away that could provide only relatively low-definition still images, officials said.

Those images would arrive not in real time, but after a delay of several minutes at best. Even then, they could not be relayed to the mini-subs because a single encrypted transmission might give the mission away. Everything had to be done under a near blackout of communications.

If anything awaited the SEALs on shore, they might not know until it was too late.

The Operation Unravels

SEAL Team 6 practiced for months in U.S. waters and continued preparations into the first weeks of 2019. That February, Mr. Trump announced that he would meet Mr. Kim for a nuclear summit in Vietnam at the end of the month.

For the mission, SEAL Team 6 partnered with the Navy’s premier underwater team, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1, which had been doing mini-sub espionage for years. The SEALs boarded the nuclear-powered submarine and headed for North Korea. When the submarine was in the open ocean, and about to enter a communications blackout, Mr. Trump gave the final go-ahead.

It is unclear what factors Mr. Trump weighed when approving the SEAL mission. Two of his top national security officials at that time — his national security adviser, John Bolton, and the acting defense secretary, Patrick M. Shanahan — declined to comment for this article.

The submarine neared the North Korean coast and launched two mini-subs, which motored to a spot about 100 yards from shore, in clear shallow water.

Mission planners had tried to compensate for having no live overhead video by spending months watching how people came and went in the area. They studied fishing patterns and chose a time when boat traffic would be scant. The intelligence suggested that if SEALs arrived silently in the right location in the dead of night in winter, they would be unlikely to encounter anyone.

Image

The coast of North Korea, pictured in 2018, is frequented by small fishing boats.Credit...Ed Jones/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The night was still and the sea was calm. As the mini-subs glided toward the target, their sensors suggested that the intelligence was correct. The shore appeared to be empty.

The mini-subs reached the spot where they were supposed to park on the sea floor. There, the team made what may have been the first of three small mistakes that seemed inconsequential at the time but may have doomed the mission.

In the darkness, the first mini-sub settled on the sea floor as planned, but the second overshot the mark and had to do a U-turn, officials said.

The plan called for the mini-subs to park facing the same way, but after the second sub doubled back, they were pointing in opposite directions. Time was limited, so the group decided to release the shore team and correct the parking issue later.

Sliding doors on the subs opened, and the SEALs — all gripping untraceable weapons loaded with untraceable ammunition — swam silently underwater to shore with the listening device.

Every few yards, the SEALs peeked above the black water to scan their surroundings. Everything seemed clear.

That might have been a second mistake. Bobbing in the darkness was a small boat. On board was a crew of North Koreans who were easy to miss because the sensors in the SEALs’ night-vision goggles were designed in part to detect heat, and the wet suits the Koreans wore were chilled by the cold seawater.

The SEALs reached shore thinking they were alone, and started to remove their diving gear. The target was only a few hundred yards away.

Back at the mini-subs, the pilots repositioned the sub that was facing the wrong way. With the sliding cockpit doors open for visibility and communication, a pilot revved the electric motor and brought the sub around.

That was probably a third mistake. Some SEALs speculated afterward in briefings that the motor’s wake might have caught the attention of the North Korean boat. And if the boat crew heard a splash and turned to look, they might have seen light from the subs’ open cockpits glowing in the dark water.

The boat started moving toward the mini-subs. The North Koreans were shining flashlights and talking as if they had noticed something.

Some of the mini-sub pilots told officials in debriefings afterward that from their vantage point, looking up through the clear water, the boat still seemed to be a safe distance away and they had doubted that the mini-subs had been spotted. But the SEALs at the shore saw it differently. In the dark, featureless sea, the boat to them seemed to be practically on top of the mini-subs.

Image

A Navy mini-sub, known as a SEAL Delivery Vehicle, during a training exercise in 2007. Similar vehicles were used in the 2019 mission.Credit...U.S. Navy, via Department of Defense

With communications blacked out, there was no way for the shore team to confer with the mini-subs. Lights from the boat swept over the water. The SEALs didn’t know if they were seeing a security patrol on the hunt for them or a simple fishing crew oblivious to the high-stakes mission unfolding around them.

A man from the North Korean boat splashed into the sea.

If the shore team got into trouble, the nuclear-powered sub had a group of SEAL reinforcements standing by with inflatable speedboats. Farther offshore, stealth rotary aircraft were positioned on U.S. Navy ships with even more Special Operations troops, ready to sweep in if needed.

The SEALs faced a critical decision, but there was no way to discuss the next move. The mission commander was miles away on the big submarine. With no drones and a communications blackout, many of the technological advantages that the SEALs normally relied on had been stripped away, leaving a handful of men in wet neoprene, unsure of what to do.

As the shore team watched the North Korean in the water, the senior enlisted SEAL at the shore chose a course of action. He wordlessly centered his rifle and fired. The other SEALs instinctively did the same.

Compromise and Escape

If the SEALs were unsure whether the mission had been compromised before they fired, they had no doubt afterward. The plan required the SEALs to abort immediately if they encountered anyone. North Korean security forces could be coming. There was no time to plant the device.

The shore team swam to the boat to make sure that all of the North Koreans were dead. They found no guns or uniforms. Evidence suggested that the crew, which people briefed on the mission said numbered two or three people, had been civilians diving for shellfish. All were dead, including the man in the water.

Officials familiar with the mission said the SEALs pulled the bodies into the water to hide them from the North Korean authorities. One added that the SEALs punctured the boat crew’s lungs with knives to make sure their bodies would sink.

The SEALs swam back to the mini-subs and sent a distress signal. Believing the SEALs were in imminent danger of capture, the big nuclear submarine maneuvered into shallow water close to the shore, taking a significant risk to pick them up. It then sped toward the open ocean.

All the U.S. military personnel escaped unharmed.

Immediately afterward, U.S. spy satellites detected a surge of North Korean military activity in the area, U.S. officials said. North Korea did not make any public statements about the deaths, and U.S. officials said it was unclear whether the North Koreans ever pieced together what had happened and who was responsible.

The nuclear summit in Vietnam went ahead as planned at the end of February 2019, but the talks quickly ended with no deal.

By May, North Korea had resumed missile tests.

Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim met once more that June in the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea. It made for dramatic television, with Mr. Trump even stepping across into North Korea. But the brief meeting yielded little more than a handshake.

In the months that followed, North Korea fired more missiles than in any previous year, including some capable of reaching the United States. Since then, the United States estimates, North Korea has amassed 50 nuclear warheads and material to produce about 40 more.

Uneven Track Record

The aborted SEAL mission prompted a series of military reviews during Mr. Trump’s first term. They found that the killing of civilians was justified under the rules of engagement, and that the mission was undone by a collision of unfortunate occurrences that could not have been foreseen or avoided. The findings were classified.

The Trump administration never told leaders of key committees in Congress that oversee military and intelligence activities about the operation or the findings, government officials said. In doing so, the Trump administration may have violated federal law, said Matthew Waxman, a law professor at Columbia University who served in national security positions under former President George W. Bush.

Mr. Waxman said the law has gray areas that give presidents some leeway on what they tell Congress. But on more consequential missions, the burden leans more toward notification.

“The point is to ensure that Congress isn’t kept in the dark when major stuff is going on,” Mr. Waxman said. “This is exactly the kind of thing that would normally be briefed to the committees and something the committees would expect to be told about.”

Many of the people involved in the mission were later promoted.

But the episode worried some experienced military officials with knowledge of the mission, because the SEALs have an uneven track record that for decades has largely been concealed by secrecy.

Elite Special Operations units are regularly assigned some of the most difficult and dangerous tasks. Over the years, the SEALs have had a number of major successes, including hits on terrorist leaders, high-profile rescues of hostages and the takedown of bin Laden, that have built an almost superhuman public image.

But among some in the military who have worked with them, the SEALs have a reputation for devising overly bold and complex missions that go badly. Team 6’s debut mission, which was part of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, is a case in point.

The plan was to parachute into the sea, race to the coast in speedboats and plant beacons to guide assault forces to the island’s airport. But the SEALs’ plane took off late; they jumped at night and landed in stormy conditions, weighed down by heavy gear. Four SEALs drowned, and the rest swamped their speedboats.

The airfield was later seized by Army Rangers who parachuted directly onto the airfield.

Image

U.S. troops monitoring the Point Salines airfield after the invasion of Grenada in 1983. SEAL Team 6’s debut mission, directed at the island’s main airport, went badly awry.Credit...Associated Press

Since then, SEALs have mounted other complex and daring missions that unraveled, in Panama, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia. During a rescue mission in Afghanistan in 2010, Team 6 SEALs accidentally killed a hostage they were trying to rescue with a grenade and then misled superiors about how she had died.

In part because of this track record, President Barack Obama curtailed Special Operations missions late in his second term and increased oversight, reserving complex commando raids for extraordinary situations like hostage rescues.

The first Trump administration reversed many of those restrictions and cut the amount of high-level deliberation for sensitive missions. A few days after taking office in 2017, Mr. Trump skipped over much of the established deliberative process to greenlight a Team 6 raid on a village in Yemen. That mission left 30 villagers and a SEAL dead and destroyed a $75 million stealth aircraft.

When President Joseph R. Biden Jr. succeeded Mr. Trump, the gravity of the North Korea mission attracted renewed scrutiny. Mr. Biden’s defense secretary, Lloyd J. Austin III, ordered an independent investigation, conducted by the lieutenant general in charge of the Army inspector general’s office.

In 2021, the Biden administration briefed key members of Congress on the findings, a former government official said.

Those findings remain classified.

Julian E. Barnes, Adam Entous and Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.

Dave Philipps writes about war, the military and veterans and covers The Pentagon.

See more on: U.S. Politics, Kim Jong-un , Donald Trump, Navy Seals, United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Department of Defense

6. Ukraine’s Drones Hit Rosneft’s Ryazan Refinery, Knocking Out 5% of Russia’s Oil Output

Bleed Russia to peace talks?

Ukraine’s Drones Hit Rosneft’s Ryazan Refinery, Knocking Out 5% of Russia’s Oil Output

https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraines-drones-hit-rosnefts-ryazan-refinery-knocking-out-5-of-russias-oil-output-11399

Sep 05, 2025 09:34

Updated Sep 05, 2025 11:31

2 min read

Authors

Vlad Litnarovych

News Writer

Aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike on Rosneft’s Ryazan Oil Refining Company, September 5, 2025. (Source: Supernova_plus)

Ukrainian drones struck Rosneft’s Ryazan Oil Refining Company overnight, hitting one of Russia’s four largest refineries, Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, confirmed on September 5.

The strike was carried out by the “Zhalo Ptakhiv ” UAV unit of the 14th UAV Regiment, working together with Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces, military intelligence (HUR), and other branches of the country’s defense forces. Photos and videos of the attack were shared by Telegram channels Supernova+ and Astra.

The refinery strike and a fuel depot in occupied Luhansk also came under attack during the same night, Brovdi wrote.

The target was reportedly the ELOU-AVT-6 unit, a critical installation used for primary crude oil processing. This system removes water and salts from crude to prevent equipment corrosion, followed by atmospheric and vacuum distillation to produce key outputs like gasoline, gasoil, and fuel oil.

With a nominal capacity of 6 million tons per year—and up to 15 million tons after modernization—the system is a central part of the refinery’s operations.

The Ryazan refinery processes around 13.1 million tons of crude annually (~262,000 barrels per day), roughly 5% of Russia’s total refining capacity, according to industry data.

Excerpts:

Conclusion – A Model Proven in War

Ukraine has become a laboratory for 21st-century warfare where the integration of SOF and conventional forces has not only been tested but proven effective under the harshest battlefield conditions. This model is more than an exception; it may represent the future benchmark for combat-proven integration. It is not a theoretical concept or aspirational ideal – it is a living, adaptable system shaped by necessity and refined in combat. Ukraine’s experience shows what effective integration looks like when it becomes part of the operational fabric – tested in war, responsive to change, and grounded in mutual trust.

One sign of this maturity is that Ukrainian SOF have already begun sharing their operational approach during multinational exercises such as RAPID TRIDENT and COMBINED RESOLVE. In these settings, Ukrainian officers did not simply participate – they led multinational tactical groups that included U.S., Lithuanian, and other allied forces. This allowed Ukraine to test its integration model in coalition environments and expose partners to its adaptive command style and combat-proven coordination practices. Crucially, the trust developed during these exercises became a practical asset during the first weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Another indicator of institutional maturity is the growth in Ukrainian SOF staff structures, which has not led to bureaucratization, but rather to greater capacity for intelligence processing, operational planning, and mission execution. Similarly, the expansion of specialized elements – EW, SIGINT, UAV, sniper, and mortar teams – has not “conventionalized” SOF. Instead, it has enhanced their survivability, expanded their tactical autonomy, and enabled them to cover a broader mission set with greater precision and fewer casualties. Ukrainian SOF remain compact in size, but they now possess greater operational depth and functional range than ever before.

At the same time, this success comes with risks. If conventional commanders overload SOF with tasks outside their operational logic, or if integration devolves into micromanagement, the synergy can unravel. Effective integration is not about hierarchy – it is about mutual respect, clearly defined roles, and shared purpose.

Ukraine’s experience is not simply a collection of successful episodes. It is proof that situational awareness, mission flexibility, institutional trust, and horizontal coordination can form the foundation of a model many modern militaries seek but rarely implement. And while the war is far from over, one lesson is already clear: the militaries that will win future wars are not just those with elite SOF capabilities – but those who know how to weave them into a unified, adaptive system of warfighting.

Integrated yet Autonomous: How Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces Have Mastered Cooperation with Conventional Forces

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/05/integrated-yet-autonomous-how-ukraines-special-operations-forces-have-mastered-cooperation-with-conventional-forces/

by Yevhen Kovalchuk

09.05.2025 at 06:00am

General Viktor Khorenko, commander of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SOF), confers with staff during a visit to a command post in the Bakhmut sector (Kyiv Post).

Introduction – The Enduring Gap

For decades, military thinkers have debated how best to integrate Special Operations Forces (SOF) with conventional forces. In the United States and across NATO, joint doctrines, command structures, and staff college curricula have all emphasized interoperability as a cornerstone of modern warfare. Yet when put to the test in real conflicts – namely Iraq and Afghanistan – this integration has repeatedly fallen short. Too often, SOF have operated in parallel rather than in concert with conventional units. Cultural divides, procedural friction, and separate chains of command have made meaningful cooperation the exception rather than the rule. Despite extensive conceptual work, the promise of seamless SOF-conventional forces integration remains largely unfulfilled. Part of the challenge lies in context: most Western SOF have not operated in the conditions of large-scale, high-intensity warfare in decades. Their missions have typically unfolded in counterinsurgency or limited expeditionary campaigns – environments where integration with conventional forces was either unnecessary, underdeveloped, or deprioritized.

Research by institutions such as the RAND Corporation, the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), and historians like Mark Moyar have consistently highlighted enduring gaps in the integration of SOF with conventional military structures. SOF units often operate within distinct chains of command, reducing their responsiveness to broader operational requirements and limiting opportunities for unified planning. As RAND analysts have observed, most special warfare operations are nominally conducted alongside conventional or partner forces, but campaign planning remains fragmented and lacks mechanisms for sustained collaboration. JSOU experts argue that decades of counterterrorism-focused employment have distanced SOF from their traditional warfighting role – eroding their institutional ties with the broader joint force and leaving their contribution to large-scale, high-intensity warfare uncertain. Historian Mark Moyar traces this disconnect back to SOF’s formative years, noting that conventional commanders frequently resisted the development of elite units, fearing that they would drain talent and undermine organizational cohesion. The result has been a persistent lack of trust, doctrinal separation, and isolated planning processes. While joint doctrine emphasizes concepts like interoperability and interdependence, battlefield experience – from Eagle Claw to Grenada to Afghanistan – too often reveals fragmented execution and parallel operations rather than true integration.

Ukraine has changed that. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have demonstrated a form of integration that is not only functional but operationally decisive. What Western militaries have long theorized – combined planning, synchronized execution, and shared battlespace ownership – Ukraine has implemented in some of the most complex and high-pressure combat environments of the 21st century. On the Ukrainian battlefield, integration is not a slogan. It is a necessity, practiced under fire, refined in real time, and proven in war.

Case Studies – When Integration Becomes Decisive

Ukrainian SOF do not posture as untouchable elites. Instead, they operate in close coordination with conventional brigades. Their mission focus – rather than unit prestige – drives cooperation. Whether guiding strikes with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), supporting maneuver elements, or coordinating indirect fire, SOF units have acted not as isolated raiders but as flexible enablers embedded within larger operations.

The importance of this integration is not abstract. It has proven decisive across several major operations, where the collective effectiveness of SOF and conventional forces in unified action led to meaningful tactical and strategic gains. One of the clearest examples came during the Kharkiv counteroffensive in September 2022. Ukrainian SOF played a crucial role in delivering surprise, momentum, and disruption during the early stages of the operation. Operating at the leading edge of advancing formations, small, mobile SOF teams moved beyond the frontline to create operational shock and confusion among Russian forces. Simultaneously, they enabled precision strikes on critical targets by working closely with Ukrainian mechanized brigades. This combination of reconnaissance, stealth pressure, and pinpoint targeting triggered a cascading collapse of Russian defenses, forcing them to abandon dozens of settlements. In this campaign, SOF served as both the “eyes” and the “blade” of the offensive – less a supporting element than a decisive factor in achieving speed and surprise when it mattered most.

The unique contribution of Ukrainian SOF was also evident in the defense of Bakhmut in 2023, particularly through SOF tactical groups from the 3rd and 8th Special Purpose Regiments. When regular units – including mechanized brigades – were on the verge of collapse or withdrawal, the deployment of even a single SOF battalion could transform the situation. These formations acted as an “operational anchor,” stabilizing the line at its most critical points. Within a conventional brigade’s battlespace, SOF tactical groups not only reinforced the defense but seized the initiative – planning and executing their own operations. Their role was deeply multifunctional: conducting frontline engagements, deep reconnaissance, precision strikes, and rear-area disruption. First-person view (FPV) drones, night raids, sniper suppression, and electronic warfare – synchronized with artillery – allowed them to stall numerically superior forces and overload enemy decision-making. Operating autonomously, SOF elements maintained constant pressure using small arms, mortars, automatic grenade launchers (such as the Mk19), and, when needed, their own Brimstone missile system. Additionally, an electronic warfare (EW) detachment successfully disabled the communications of an attacking Russian company, while a signals intelligence (SIGINT) team – leveraging allied equipment with improvised civilian antennas – was able to identify enemy UAV types (like the Orlan-10 and Supercam) and pass data to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) teams that blinded Russian artillery. These compact tactical groups became full-spectrum combat systems – “force multipliers” whose effectiveness rivaled that of entire brigades. Their success stemmed from flexibility, layered capabilities, and the ability to operate in a seamless, continuous cycle – from intelligence acquisition to strike execution.

A Ukrainian Special Forces Soldier operates a remote video device during the defense of Bakhmut.

In the Kursk offensive of 2024-2025, SOF played yet another transformative role – not as a tactical enabler but as a strategic catalyst undermining the enemy from within. Unlike the lightning strikes in Kharkiv, SOF operations in Kursk were prolonged, systematic, and multi-phased. These units were the first to penetrate Russian territory, operating in autonomous tactical groups for weeks without direct support. Their missions included night raids, EW, destruction of command posts, and disruption of logistics and communications nodes. As a result, Russian command coherence steadily eroded. Beyond reconnaissance and strike functions, SOF actively synchronized the movements of advancing Ukrainian brigades – creating what commanders described as “corridors of destabilization.” Their ability to act independently, integrate multiple capabilities, and operate continuously made this possible. In this campaign, it was not shock but sustained breakdown that defined the outcome. By steadily degrading the adversary’s ability to respond, Ukrainian SOF enabled the main forces to advance deeper into Russian territory and secure long-term gains.

Why It Works – Anatomy of the Ukrainian Model

The uniqueness of Ukraine’s approach to SOF-conventional integration lies not in a predesigned structure, but in its ability to adapt to a changing war. This process of adaptation began in 2014 and became existential after the full-scale invasion in 2022. Ukrainian SOF were not placed within a separate or isolated operational architecture; on the contrary, they were embedded within the broader planning and execution system at all levels. At the same time, they retained tactical autonomy – allowing them to operate with initiative and flexibility, guided not only by orders but by the evolving situation on the ground. This model enables decentralized coordination within a unified operational logic, where SOF are not merely supporting assets, but independent combat actors who enhance and multiply the effectiveness of conventional forces.

A further source of effectiveness in the Ukrainian model lies in the multifunctionality and tactical versatility of its special operations forces. Ukrainian SOF units have evolved into full-spectrum combat nodes capable of independently executing the entire tactical cycle – from target acquisition to strike. Reflecting Ukraine’s need for adaptability on a fluid battlefield, its SOF tactical groups integrate cross-functional capabilities and multitasking logic. A single SOF group can simultaneously perform air defense, electronic warfare, counterbattery fire, reconnaissance, fire coordination, and direct engagement. They employ a full range of unmanned systems – from long-range fixed-wing reconnaissance drones and FPV strike platforms to multirotor bombers and micro-UAVs such as the Black Hornet, used for indoor clearing and close-quarters ISR in complex terrain. These tools allow them to maintain uninterrupted pressure across the depth of the battlespace. Complementing this is the use of sniper teams with day-night targeting capability, able to dominate sectors up to three kilometers away – sustaining constant psychological and kinetic pressure. This fusion of capabilities not only enhances unit resilience and autonomy; it also drastically shortens decision-making cycles – an advantage that proves critical in the fluid and rapidly evolving environment of modern war.

In addition to multifunctionality, one of the most critical advantages of Ukrainian SOF is their exceptional situational awareness. Tactical group commanders have access to intelligence from a wide array of sources: Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR), the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) Alpha unit, allied satellite and SIGINT platforms, tactical UAVs, and commercial drones. Recent operational assessments document these capabilities, highlighting the integration of C4 (command, control, communications, and computers), EW, and intelligence assets across echelons. Central to this situational dominance is Ukraine’s Delta system – an open architecture battlefield management platform that fuses real-time data from satellites, drones, radars, and civilian sources into a dynamic common operating picture. Combined with commercial satellite imagery providers like Maxar and Planet, this system supports near-instantaneous targeting, damage assessment, and maneuver planning. This fusion allows SOF commanders to construct a comprehensive, dynamic picture of the battlefield and act proactively, anticipating threats rather than merely responding to them. In many cases, SOF tactical group commanders operate with a level of battlespace awareness comparable to that of brigade or even operational-level headquarters. But the real advantage lies not only in access to information – it’s in their ability to rapidly convert intelligence into action, collapsing the gap between observation and effect to a matter of minutes. Concepts like the “hyper-enabled operator,” developed in allied militaries, describe this compression of time and space as cognitive overmatch – something Ukrainian SOF have operationalized out of necessity.

Underlying this operational agility is a durable horizontal culture of trust between SOF and conventional forces. This is not formal coordination by regulation, but a shared recognition of mutual competence – cultivated through joint training and confirmed in combat. Ukrainian SOF are not an isolated elite; they are an integrated yet autonomous component of the broader warfighting structure. One of the most important innovations in this regard has been the systematic presence of liaison officers at all levels – from frontline units to operational headquarters. These officers do more than relay orders; they create a living information loop between SOF and conventional elements, eliminating friction, accelerating decisions, and ensuring shared understanding. Thanks to them, Ukraine’s model of integration functions not just in doctrine, but amid fire, pressure, and uncertainty – where it matters most.

Conclusion – A Model Proven in War

Ukraine has become a laboratory for 21st-century warfare where the integration of SOF and conventional forces has not only been tested but proven effective under the harshest battlefield conditions. This model is more than an exception; it may represent the future benchmark for combat-proven integration. It is not a theoretical concept or aspirational ideal – it is a living, adaptable system shaped by necessity and refined in combat. Ukraine’s experience shows what effective integration looks like when it becomes part of the operational fabric – tested in war, responsive to change, and grounded in mutual trust.

One sign of this maturity is that Ukrainian SOF have already begun sharing their operational approach during multinational exercises such as RAPID TRIDENT and COMBINED RESOLVE. In these settings, Ukrainian officers did not simply participate – they led multinational tactical groups that included U.S., Lithuanian, and other allied forces. This allowed Ukraine to test its integration model in coalition environments and expose partners to its adaptive command style and combat-proven coordination practices. Crucially, the trust developed during these exercises became a practical asset during the first weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Another indicator of institutional maturity is the growth in Ukrainian SOF staff structures, which has not led to bureaucratization, but rather to greater capacity for intelligence processing, operational planning, and mission execution. Similarly, the expansion of specialized elements – EW, SIGINT, UAV, sniper, and mortar teams – has not “conventionalized” SOF. Instead, it has enhanced their survivability, expanded their tactical autonomy, and enabled them to cover a broader mission set with greater precision and fewer casualties. Ukrainian SOF remain compact in size, but they now possess greater operational depth and functional range than ever before.

At the same time, this success comes with risks. If conventional commanders overload SOF with tasks outside their operational logic, or if integration devolves into micromanagement, the synergy can unravel. Effective integration is not about hierarchy – it is about mutual respect, clearly defined roles, and shared purpose.

Ukraine’s experience is not simply a collection of successful episodes. It is proof that situational awareness, mission flexibility, institutional trust, and horizontal coordination can form the foundation of a model many modern militaries seek but rarely implement. And while the war is far from over, one lesson is already clear: the militaries that will win future wars are not just those with elite SOF capabilities – but those who know how to weave them into a unified, adaptive system of warfighting.

Note: The author is currently engaged in graduate-level research on special operations and modern warfare. The article reflects insights from both extensive source analysis and direct operational experience.

Tags: interoperability, NATO, Russo-Ukrainian War, Special Forces, Special Operations

About The Author

Yevhen Kovalchuk
Yevhen Kovalchuk is a Ukrainian military officer and graduate student at the Naval Postgraduate School. His research focuses on information operations, gray-zone conflict, and strategic influence in modern warfare.

8. Stove-Piped and Surveilled: The Erosion of Sahelian Intelligence Networks in an Era of Great Power Competition

Excerpts:

Conclusion: How Fragmentation Fuels Extremist Expansion

The erosion of intelligence capabilities and the rise of alternative security providers have created a permissive environment for jihadist expansion. Groups like ISWAP and JNIM now operate with greater freedom in border regions, while national forces struggle with diminished ISR coverage and degraded HUMINT and SIGINT networks. Arrest operations and kinetic strikes occur less frequently and are more likely to fail. Strategically, fragmented politics and misaligned partnerships erode cohesion and complicate international support. Without a unified counterterrorism architecture, external assistance risks dispersing efforts rather than reinforcing regional capacity.

This emerging security order carries grave risks. If current trajectories continue, the Sahel may become a testing ground for surveillance-driven, regime-centric models that sacrifice long-term stability. Counterterrorism becomes performative, with intelligence systems consolidating elite power instead of addressing shared threats. Jihadist actors exploit these gaps, embedding them in ungoverned spaces and further weakening fragile states.

To reverse this trend, Western and regional actors must rethink intelligence cooperation. Rather than multilateral frameworks, international partners should support adaptable, sovereignty-conscious models that strengthen localized capabilities while incentivizing transparency and interoperability. Sustained investment not only in matériel, but in training, liaison networks, and analytical infrastructure, is essential to restoring early warning and deterring extremist expansion. The longer the region remains fragmented, the harder it will be to reclaim ground lost to authoritarian influence and transnational militancy.

Stove-Piped and Surveilled: The Erosion of Sahelian Intelligence Networks in an Era of Great Power Competition

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/09/05/stove-piped-and-surveilled-the-erosion/

by David Heiner, by Rosa Huffman

09.05.2025 at 06:00am

Photo by Staff Sgt. Edward Braly, USAF / DVIDS

A wave of military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has triggered a broad regional realignment away from Western-backed security frameworks like the G-5 Sahel and Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Disillusionment with ECOWAS over its perceived emphasis on political conformity rather than tailored security responses escalated in July 2023 when ECOWAS issued a formal ultimatum to Niger, demanding the reinstatement of President Mohamed Bazoum and threatening military intervention. In response, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023 and formally withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2024. In contrast to multilateral efforts, security partnerships with Russia and China offer these regimes rapid material support, elite protection, and non-interference, an appealing alternative for leaders facing internal unrest and legitimacy crises.

In contrast to multilateral efforts, security partnerships with Russia and China offer rapid material support, elite protection, and non-interference—appealing to leaders facing unrest. This realignment reflects a broader shift in intelligence norms and diplomatic alignments that encourage instability.

The region’s break from Western security frameworks has triggered a broader reconfiguration of intelligence norms, one that prioritizes regime survival over integrated counterterrorism and enables the expansion of jihadist networks. By tracing the collapse of multilateral intelligence-sharing platforms and the rise of bilateral partnerships with Russia and China, we demonstrate how fragmentation undermines collective threat response and accelerates instability across the region. The erosion of coordinated ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), SIGINT (signals intelligence), and HUMINT (human intelligence) platforms has left security forces blind to fast-moving extremist threats, while new partners impose surveillance models designed to entrench authoritarian control rather than foster regional cooperation.

The G5 Sahel and MNJTF: Pillars of a Collapsing Architecture

The G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) and the MNJTF served as the region’s primary institutional platforms for intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation. Established in 2017 from an earlier intergovernmental framework, the FC-G5S included Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. It was structured around five operational sectors with joint command and was tasked with cross-border counterterrorism missions, combating organized crime, and restoring state control in insecure zones. Despite limited funding and operational constraints, the force facilitated basic intelligence fusion through sector-level hubs and coordination with Western actors. INTERPOL supported the FC-G5S Police Component, integrating biometric and explosives data into battlefield assessments and enabling limited connectivity to the I-24/7 global database. These capabilities, while far from comprehensive, represented the backbone of early warning systems and actionable threat alerts. AES member states’ withdrawal collapsed this architecture, and with it, the limited but functional systems for cross-border intelligence cooperation.

The MNJTF, created in 2014 under African Union authorization, brought together Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin with headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, and sector commands across the Lake Chad region. As with the G5 Sahel, these efforts were made possible through donor support and technical assistance from Western partners. However, the task force struggled with uneven capabilities, inconsistent rules of engagement, and limited interoperability among national forces. Intelligence integration remained shallow, and long-term strategic gains proved elusive. However, the MNJTF achieved tactical successes, including retaking territory, dismantling insurgent camps, and rescuing hostages during operations like Operation Yancin Tafki in 2019 and Operation Lake Sanity in 2022. These victories demonstrated the force’s potential when coordination and resources were available. With the withdrawal of Niger and Burkina Faso, the MNJTF’s operational reach and political cohesion have been severely undermined, further reducing the region’s already limited ability to conduct integrated threat tracking.

Operational Gaps: The Degradation of ISR, SIGINT, and HUMINT

The withdrawal of key international partners from the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin has significantly degraded intelligence capabilities across multiple domains. The Sahel has few formal intelligence fusion centers, but de facto platforms once played key roles in integrating intelligence disciplines such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); signals intelligence (SIGINT); human intelligence (HUMINT); and open-source intelligence (OSINT). These included EUCAP support cells, French military intelligence nodes, and ad hoc operations centers linked to the G5 Sahel and MNJTF. Their dismantling has resulted in the stove piping of information, limited dissemination, and slower analytical processing. France’s drawdown of Operation Barkhane and the closure of US and French drone bases in Niamey have removed essential aerial surveillance platforms, including fixed-wing aircraft and Reaper drones. These platforms once enabled persistent coverage of jihadist transit corridors and supported joint targeting operations. With the dissolution of joint operations centers, real-time technical feeds are no longer integrated across sectors, and situational awareness has deteriorated in areas where violent extremist groups remain highly mobile and technologically adaptive.

Human intelligence collection in the Sahel region has also suffered significant setbacks due to the physical withdrawal of international advisors and the gradual attrition of local informant networks. Many of these human sources were developed over years of embedded cooperation within French military operations in the Sahel and the European Union Capacity Building Mission in the Sahel (EUCAP Sahel), which played critical roles in training, mentoring, and facilitating The departure of foreign personnel has disrupted these established channels, leading to the loss, compromise, or silencing of informants who were vital for providing timely early warning of ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and insurgent troop movements. Without them, national forces lack real-time situational awareness, reducing the effectiveness of kinetic operations and increasing the likelihood of delayed or failed interdictions. Coordination mechanisms for deconfliction and strike prioritization have also been lost, impairing both precision and force protection.

Emergence of Alternative Security Providers: Russia’s Wagner, to the Africa Corps Group Model

Russia’s growing role in the Sahel reflects a pivot from multilateral security cooperation toward regime-centric partnerships that fragment regional counterterrorism efforts. As Western counterterrorism partnerships erode, Russia has moved to fill the strategic vacuum in the Sahel by expanding the footprint of the Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked private military company. Wagner initially entered Mali in late 2021 under a bilateral agreement with the transitional government led by Assimi Goïta, reportedly in exchange for mining concessions and political support. While Russian officials claim Wagner operatives—now operating as Africa Corps under the Russian Ministry of Defense—provide counterterrorism assistance, the group’s activities focus overwhelmingly on regime protection, elite security, and suppression of dissent. Units have been linked to extrajudicial killings, particularly in central Mali, where Wagner fighters alongside the Malian army perpetrated the March 2022 Moura massacre, resulting in over 500 civilian deaths.

By embedding closed security structures within host regimes, Russia has sidelined regional cooperation mechanisms and diminished multilateral oversight. Despite claims of Russian withdrawal in early 2024 following internal leadership turmoil and the death of Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, the group has not fully vacated the Sahel. Elements rebranded under the Russian Ministry of Defense or affiliated contractors remain active. In Burkina Faso, Wagner personnel have reportedly trained presidential guard units and deployed to protect key mining and infrastructure sites. Similar reports suggest a limited advisory presence in Niger, where Russia has sought diplomatic overtures to the junta.

Wagner’s intelligence model is designed to prioritize secrecy and unilateral control, undermining early warning systems and joint threat analysis, reflecting a broader Russian tendency to prioritize operational secrecy and unilateral control over multilateral coordination. There is no established mechanism for sharing intelligence with regional partners or multilateral bodies such as the African Union or INTERPOL. Instead, tactical information collected via drone surveillance, reconnaissance patrols, or local informant networks is typically retained within closed circuits, accessible to host governments and Russian handlers. Wagner has flown Orlan-10 surveillance drones in Mali since 2020, allowing them to draw on imagery to guide both regime protection and resource extraction efforts. Wagner also purchased two commercial satellites from the Chinese firm Beijing Yunze Technology Co. Ltd. to aid intelligence operations. Russia’s broader approach to security partnerships in Africa operates without a coherent public strategy and instead with plausible deniability, regime survival, and the consolidation of influence rather than collective threat mitigation.

Russia’s intelligence doctrine is built on strategic manipulation rather than cooperative security, weakening its reliability as a counterterrorism partner. For Russia, intelligence serves to project and retain power. Intelligence sharing, particularly for counter-terrorism purposes, has historically been used to gain a strategic advantage and undermine the West. Rather than gathering robust intelligence, the Russian FSB frequently relies on limited information, leading to broad, indiscriminate targeting rather than the precise identification of extremists. During its intervention in the Syrian civil war from 2015 to 2025, Russia leveraged intelligence sharing with the United States under the guise of joint counterterrorism and collective security operations to gain greater monitoring capabilities of the US and territorial advantage in Syria. Russia’s intelligence approach prioritizes political relevance over collaboration. It forms bilateral partnerships focused on regime stability, viewing those misaligned with internal interests as unproductive, highlighting the risks of relying on Russian intelligence in the Sahel.

Russia’s intelligence posture in the Sahel reflects a broader shift away from collective security and toward transactional, regime-centric partnerships that fragment regional coordination. By treating intelligence as a tool of political leverage rather than shared security, Russia degrades early warning systems, obstructs multilateral threat tracking, and erodes trust between states. Its presence entrenches a model in which authoritarian stability is prioritized over long-term counterterrorism effectiveness, accelerating the region’s descent into disjointed and opaque security governance.

China’s Security Offer: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Strategic Access

China’s expanding security role in Africa reflects a model of influence that emphasizes surveillance and regime preservation over shared regional threat mitigation. China has steadily increased its security footprint in Africa through its Global Security Initiative (GSI), a diplomatic and defense strategy unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2022 to reshape international security norms around the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and regime preservation. Through collective stability initiatives, China’s GSI seeks to bridge gaps between security frameworks, particularly following the recent fragmentation with the formation of AES. While China has avoided deploying military personnel in the Sahel, it has pursued bilateral security agreements that emphasize technological capacity-building and surveillance-driven governance.

By promoting surveillance-driven governance tools over interoperable intelligence platforms, China substitutes internal control for regional coordination. Central to China’s security model in Africa is the export of integrated surveillance systems, primarily through state-owned enterprises such as Huawei and the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC). These platforms are most prominently exemplified by the Safe Cities initiative, which deploys facial recognition cameras, license plate readers, AI-assisted video analytics, and centralized command centers for real-time policing. In Burkina Faso, the “Smart Burkina” project will deploy 900 surveillance cameras across Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, supported by a national fiber-optic network, centralized command centers, and hundreds of mobile and vehicle-mounted terminals. In Nigeria, Kaduna State signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Huawei Technologies in May 2024 to advance a Smart City Project aimed at enhancing security, efficiency, and digital governance. These systems significantly enhance domestic intelligence collection and urban threat monitoring capabilities. Huawei and CETC platforms also provide the Chinese government with potential access to vast surveillance networks, enabling offensive monitoring of population behavior and control over key sectors such as mining, manufacturing, education, and logistics. Rather than facilitating intelligence-sharing, these technologies reflect broader Chinese goals of regime support, strategic access, and long-term economic entrenchment under the banner of digital sovereignty.

China has also provided training programs for cybersecurity officers, biometric data technicians, and digital forensics teams. Partnerships with institutions like the Chinese People’s Public Security University facilitate training exchanges, while joint initiatives with Chinese telecommunications providers have established encrypted data storage hubs under national jurisdiction. These efforts reinforce data sovereignty and ensure that intelligence gathered through Chinese platforms remains outside Western or multilateral access. At the 2024 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit, Beijing pledged $140 million in security assistance to the continent. Over the following three years, China committed to training 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 law enforcement officers, including joint exercises, expanded Chinese defense attaché presence, and the hosting of African officers in Chinese cities.

These initiatives underscore China’s growing role in shaping Africa’s security environment, enhancing regime surveillance while offering little utility for regional counterterrorism coordination due to data sovereignty and unilateral intelligence collection. Chinese systems are not interoperable with NATO-standard ISR platforms or Western geospatial intelligence feeds, and information is unlikely to be shared amidst increasing animosity with the United States and partner nations. Moreover, the terms of engagement often include data exclusivity clauses, preventing even friendly governments from sharing collected intelligence externally. The Global Data Security Initiative emphasizes “cyber sovereignty” and autonomy for individual nations. China’s rhetoric surrounding non-interference discourages cooperation on shared security goals. Sahelian states aligned with China gain tools for internal control but lose capacity for integrated regional threat assessment and response.

Shifting Norms: The Decline of Western-Led Security Governance

The security models offered by Russia and China reflect a clear departure from the multilateral, transparency-based frameworks once promoted by Western actors. The Wagner and GSI models emphasize regime security, bilateral control, and non-interference, in contrast to Western priorities of interoperability, civilian oversight, and regional coordination. As a result, intelligence sharing becomes transactional and asymmetrical. Platforms such as AFRICOM’s ISR sharing networks, INTERPOL’s I-24/7 system, and EU-supported security-sector reform programs are sidelined, and cross-border coordination is replaced by fragmented national silos. This divergence has undermined regional early warning systems and reduced the frequency, precision, and effectiveness of joint counterterrorism responses.

Conclusion: How Fragmentation Fuels Extremist Expansion

The erosion of intelligence capabilities and the rise of alternative security providers have created a permissive environment for jihadist expansion. Groups like ISWAP and JNIM now operate with greater freedom in border regions, while national forces struggle with diminished ISR coverage and degraded HUMINT and SIGINT networks. Arrest operations and kinetic strikes occur less frequently and are more likely to fail. Strategically, fragmented politics and misaligned partnerships erode cohesion and complicate international support. Without a unified counterterrorism architecture, external assistance risks dispersing efforts rather than reinforcing regional capacity.

This emerging security order carries grave risks. If current trajectories continue, the Sahel may become a testing ground for surveillance-driven, regime-centric models that sacrifice long-term stability. Counterterrorism becomes performative, with intelligence systems consolidating elite power instead of addressing shared threats. Jihadist actors exploit these gaps, embedding them in ungoverned spaces and further weakening fragile states.

To reverse this trend, Western and regional actors must rethink intelligence cooperation. Rather than multilateral frameworks, international partners should support adaptable, sovereignty-conscious models that strengthen localized capabilities while incentivizing transparency and interoperability. Sustained investment not only in matériel, but in training, liaison networks, and analytical infrastructure, is essential to restoring early warning and deterring extremist expansion. The longer the region remains fragmented, the harder it will be to reclaim ground lost to authoritarian influence and transnational militancy.

Tags: Burkina Faso, China, counterterrorism, G5 Sahel, HUMINT, ISR, Mali, Niger, Russia, Sahel, SIGINT, Wagner Group

About The Authors

David Heiner
David Heiner is a recent graduate of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver, where he earned an MA in International Security and a certificate in Strategic Intelligence.
View all posts
Rosa Huffman
Rosa Huffman is a research intern at the U.S. Army War College. She is a junior at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, where she studies International Politics with a concentration in International Security and a minor in Arabic.

9. Integrate or Die

The natural and modern successor to "march or die?"

Excerpt:

“Integration is the decision. Sovereignty is the filter. Value for money is the measure. Counter-drone is the test. And the future of the joint force depends on passing all four.”

The PDF of the 2 page article can be accessed here: https://securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Langford-Files-DTR-September-2025.pdf

Integrate or Die

by Ian Langford

4 September 2025

https://securityanddefenceplus.plusalliance.org/integrate-or-die/

In a new article for Defence Technology Review, Security & Defence PLuS Executive Director Dr Ian Langford argues that Australia’s future joint force “will live or die on systems integration.”

Not rhetoric or glossy labels, he writes, but real, tangible integration “between sensors, decision-maker and shooters from undersea to outer space.” Langford highlights three near-term programs as critical tests: Air 6500, Land 8113 Phase 2, and Land 156’s Systems Integration Partner (SIP). He argues:

“[These] decisions… will either be hardwired into the force, or consign us to another cycle of promise without effect.”

Air 6500 is positioned as the brain stem of integrated air and missile defence, while Land 8113 is the hinge for long-range fires as a true system-of-systems. But it is Land 156, Langford stresses, that represents the crucible for Defence to prove it can absorb and operationalise disruptive technology at speed.

“The old model, which locks in a capability system for 25 years, is unfit for an environment where cheap drones and electronic attacks proliferate overnight,” he cautions. Success will hinge on whether Defence can integrate rapid, sovereign innovation into the layered defence ecosystem.

“Integration is the decision. Sovereignty is the filter. Value for money is the measure. Counter-drone is the test. And the future of the joint force depends on passing all four.”

Read the full article in Defence Technology Review or access the PDF: Integrate or Die.

10. The North Korean Way of Proliferation

Wishful thinking?

Note the comment about Kim Jong Il and the US system.

This is not just about north Korea.

Excerpts:

U.S. policymakers can still discourage would-be proliferators from pursuing a bomb. Important pillars of American nonproliferation policy have stood the test of time through even the most challenging days of the Cold War and after. Remaining committed to, and enhancing, the United States’ extended deterrence architecture can reassure U.S. allies and partners in Europe and Asia so they do not seek the security blanket of their own nuclear bomb—and invite dangerous attacks on themselves by trying. U.S. officials should emphasize and clarify the costs of pursuing a nuclear weapon to any would-be proliferator, including by cutting off military aid, ceasing nuclear-related trade, levying sanctions and threatening military action. And most important, senior leaders should acknowledge and respect the impressive record of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime: that only nine states possess nuclear weapons, not the 25 that U.S. President John F. Kennedy once predicted, is not the result of blind luck. It is the product of decades of presidential-level attention during the Cold War, when nuclear policy was a matter of grand strategy and not an area of specialization, and strong and consistent nonproliferation diplomacy was prioritized in the U.S. foreign policy machine.

But a United States threatening to upend 80 years of largely successful nonproliferation policy practice and experience is creating incentives for allies and adversaries alike to look for their own nuclear insurance policies. The 12-day war will do nothing to disabuse them of that notion. For future would-be proliferators, relying on the United States to deliver on the promise of a deal like the one it signed with Iran in 2015 looks like a bad bet. Kim Jong Il eventually concluded that the risks of dealing with the United States, and the chaotic U.S. system, was not worth the benefit. His son doubled down on this view. Iranian officials may have assumed that Trump would pursue diplomacy more aggressively during his second term, as his administration’s approach to Iran in the spring of 2025 seemed to indicate. But that hope ended abruptly in June, with the destruction of the core facilities that had brought Iran closer than ever to the weapons threshold.

Even after this severe setback, Iran’s technical advances and knowledge base, and the substantial amounts of nuclear material it had previously amassed, probably remain. Tehran may yet find itself with an opportunity for a do-over, and if it does, it may well take the North Korean approach and not stop until it gets to a bomb. In doing so, it may find its own path to an insurance policy for a new, chaotic nuclear age. Paradoxically Washington’s military action against Iran’s nuclear program may have hastened, hardened, and hidden the march of would-be proliferators toward the bomb.

The North Korean Way of Proliferation

Foreign Affairs · More by Vipin Narang · September 5, 2025

Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi

What Aspiring Nuclear Powers Learned From Israel’s Strikes on Iran

September 5, 2025

An Iranian missile system in an undisclosed location in Iran, August 2025 Iranian Army / West Asia News Agency / Reuters

VIPIN NARANG is Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science and Director of the Center for Nuclear Security Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. From 2022 to 2024, he served as U.S. Principal Deputy and then Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.

PRANAY VADDI is a Senior Nuclear Fellow at the Center for Nuclear Security Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. From 2022 to 2025, he served as Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation at the National Security Council.

More by Pranay Vaddi

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In the months since Israel and the United States’ 12-day war with Iran in June, analysts and intelligence agencies have widely debated the extent of the damage to the Iranian nuclear program and regime. It is still unclear how much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has survived and how quickly, if at all, it can be reconstituted. On a strategic level, however, the effect of the war is indisputable: it marks the eclipse of a nuclear strategy that the Islamic Republic had pursued, often successfully, since the 1980s.

For decades, Iran was the quintessential nuclear hedger. It sought the know-how and technology to weaponize its nuclear program but stopped short of doing so for political reasons. This threshold strategy was successful, at least for a time. Although both Israel and the United States tried to continually delay the nuclear program through sabotage and targeted assassinations, neither country overtly struck Iran’s nuclear facilities. Then, in 2015, with the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), it seemed as if the regime’s gamble had paid off: Iran received much-needed sanctions relief in exchange for accepting restrictions on its program. The threat created by Iran’s hedging, combined with the second Obama administration’s desire to find a comprehensive diplomatic solution, resulted in successful negotiation of the landmark deal that pushed Iran’s program much further away from a bomb.

But since the 12-day war, that strategy lies in tatters. U.S. and Israeli airstrikes caused substantial damage to key facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan and crippled Iran’s military leadership structure. Iran underestimated Washington’s willingness to support Israeli military action and join the campaign itself. Today, Iran finds itself vulnerable to existential territorial attack and regime change efforts, with a bomb likely far out of reach and its negotiating position with the West weaker than ever before.

The failure of Iran as a threshold nuclear power vindicates the strategy of another U.S. adversary: North Korea. In contrast to Tehran, Pyongyang largely avoided delays in weaponizing its program; it made steady progress toward a bomb, using periodic engagement to test U.S. resolve over possible agreements, routinely relied on feints and stalling tactics, and weathered tremendous diplomatic and economic pressure along the way. When diplomacy broke down, North Korea rapidly advanced its program so its Kim regime was prepared to approach any future engagement from a position of greater strength. As Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempts to regroup in Iran, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with one of the world’s most rapidly expanding and diversifying arsenals and strategic partners in Beijing and Moscow, looms as an example of what could have been. For would-be proliferator states, the lessons are dangerously clear: do not wait to get the bomb, assume major powers will attack, and do not trust that diplomacy is within reach. In other words, be like Kim, not like Khamenei.

MISSED THE MOMENT

As early as the 1970s, Tehran possessed the necessary ambition and expertise to expand its nuclear energy program for potential military purposes. The program had begun two decades earlier under Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi and Iran joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the Islamic Republic began covert exploration of more sensitive technologies, such as uranium enrichment, and continued to gain expertise with the assistance of third countries. Beginning in 1989 the regime formulated the so-called AMAD plan, which established a roadmap for the theoretical and engineering work required to weaponize once the country had enriched enough uranium for a bomb.

But Iran did not cross the weaponization threshold. It stopped short for political, rather than technical, reasons: after Iran’s secret nuclear activities were exposed at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Iranian leaders iced the AMAD plan, preferring to trade away its pursuit of a bomb in exchange for economic and diplomatic relief. They continued to conclude that crossing the threshold as a member of the NPT, despite heightened U.S. military presence and freedom to act in the Middle East, was not in Iran’s security and strategic interests. Nonetheless, Iran retained—at enormous expense—the technical expertise, bureaucratic organs, and industrial infrastructure needed to advance civilian nuclear research, medical isotope production, and electricity generation and repurpose it for military use if it were to ever choose to do so. The regime wagered that this threshold program would serve three geopolitical purposes: it would give Iran the ability to quickly develop a bomb if an existential threat appeared imminent; it would deter a military attack from Israel or the United States by keeping both countries uncertain about how close Tehran was to building a bomb; and it would provide leverage with its antagonists in the West by using limits on the program as a bargaining chip for relief from punishing economic sanctions.

For the nearly two decades since pausing the AMAD plan, Iran voluntarily stopped short of crossing the weapons line. Even as Iran’s nuclear scientists envisioned an initial arsenal of five weapons, Tehran’s political leaders were ambivalent about whether the aim of the country’s program was to achieve a nuclear weapons arsenal or to trade away large chunks of it for economic and political concessions. They were, however, largely convinced that walking just up to the weaponization threshold would safeguard the nation from existential attack. After years of brinkmanship with the George W. Bush and first Obama administrations, they seemed to be proved right with the conclusion of the JCPOA, which allowed Tehran to trade away parts of the program to bolster Iran’s reputation and economy.

But the JCPOA did not mandate that future U.S. administrations adhere to the agreement and under the first Trump administration, the United States withdrew, in 2018. After this perceived betrayal, Iran began stockpiling large quantities of enriched uranium, including at levels of purity much closer to that required for a nuclear bomb. These actions created negotiating leverage for a future deal but also a potential insurance policy against the unpredictable first Trump administration and Israel, which made little secret of its desire to attack Iran. The targeted killing of the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani by the United States in 2020 likely calcified these concerns in the minds of Iran’s leaders.

After inconclusive indirect talks during the Biden administration and Israel’s increasingly offensive regional military actions in the wake of Hamas’s brazen October 7 attacks, Iran, according to some estimates, crept to within days of being able to enrich enough uranium for a bomb. Finally, with President Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, the potential for a U.S.-backed Israeli attack on Iran suddenly became a reality and the flaws of the threshold strategy were laid bare. In June, Tehran paid the price for wavering, and the United States, for the first time in the nuclear era, struck the nuclear facilities of another state. Had Iran crossed the nuclear Rubicon back in 2003, the United States might well have avoided such a direct confrontation, which would have invited all the risks of attacking a nuclear-armed adversary.

NORTH STAR

Here’s where the contrasting case of North Korea becomes instructive. In the 1960s, Pyongyang, facing a conventionally superior U.S. ally South Korea on its border under a condition of armistice, not peace, initiated a program focused on nuclear energy. But throughout the Cold War, it sought support to develop a nuclear weapon from the Soviet Union and China. North Korea sparked a crisis in the early 1990s by refusing to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to address its incomplete declarations regarding its nuclear program, leading to international suspicion that it was conducting illicit weapons-related activities. The United States seriously contemplated striking North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor in 1993, even drawing up military plans to attack the site with penetrating munitions delivered by stealth bombers. But the Clinton administration aborted the idea out of fear that an attack could result in retaliation against South Korea and a broader war, and instead sought a diplomatic solution. The result was the 1994 Agreed Framework, which required that North Korea freeze the construction of nuclear reactors suspected of being used in weapons production and placed the country’s existing plutonium production capabilities under the IAEA inspection regime. In return, the United States and other partners agreed to provide nuclear reactors less capable of use for nuclear weapons work and to supply fuel to address the energy needs cited by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung as the rationale for building nuclear reactors.

But Pyongyang approached the Agreed Framework (and every subsequent nuclear diplomatic initiative) disingenuously, often as a stalling tactic, while successive members of the Kim dynasty prioritized the nuclear weapons program and devoted as many resources as possible to pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Unlike Iran,North Korea showed little interest in trading meaningful chunks of its program for sanctions reliefbefore obtaining a nuclear weapon once the Agreed Framework fell apart in 2003. When foreign intelligence or international monitors would reveal an undeclared activity during the course of nuclear diplomacy, North Korea would ratchet up pressure by testing missiles or provoking Seoul. When the United States and its allies threatened reprisal or attack, as in the Yongbyon episode, or after the United States placed bombers on alert in response to North Korea’s restarting facilities shuttered under the Agreed Framework, its breaching of NPT obligations, and its withdrawal from the treaty in 2003, Kim Il Sung and, later, Kim Jong Il pivoted toward diplomacy, deceitfully promising to halt weapons-related activities and engage in good-faith diplomacy. All the while, North Korea continually advanced its nuclear infrastructure, weapons designs, and missile programs, often accelerating work between high-profile moments of engagement with the United States.

Today, Kim Jong Un is sitting on one of the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenals, with a variety of options for striking South Korea and Japan, including possible tactical nuclear weapons, and long-range missiles to target the United States.With this arsenal, the North Korean leader is more confident in his ability to deter a U.S. or South Korean attack or attempt at regime change. Iran’s situation could not be more different. With his military and nuclear program at least temporarily shattered and his regime fragile, Khamenei has paid the price for failing to secure nuclear insurance. Iran’s hardliners may feel that failing to weaponize and pursuing diplomacy with great powers made Iran vulnerable to the kind of attacks North Korea’s decisive proliferation strategy has helped it avoid.

GOING DARK

As the experience of Iran has shown, a threshold proliferation strategy not only appears to be insufficient to deter counterproliferators; it may instead increase their willingness to preemptively attack the program as they remain in the dark about the actual state of weaponization. Maintaining the technical basis to be able to quickly develop nuclear weapons—what nuclear strategists call latency—does not deter nearly as effectively as actually having nuclear capabilities. On the contrary, a state with a latent nuclear program presents a ripe target for adversaries and counterproliferators seeking to prevent weaponization who may be tempted to act swiftly before the window to do so closes and the state can plausibly threaten nuclear retaliation.

Israel saw such a window in June and took full advantage, executing a strike Netanyahu and the Israeli right had dreamed of for years. For aspiring nuclear powers, the lesson was clear: advertising and brandishing a nuclear program against far stronger military powers, without yet having a nuclear bomb to deter a preventive attack, is a risky game. Would-be proliferators will be unlikely to repeat this mistake. In addition to not postponing weaponization as long as Iran did, potential proliferators such as Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates will likely prioritize higher operational security and will attempt to hide their programs from counterproliferators more effectively than Iran did. Future proliferators will likely seek to weaponize as rapidly as they can and will do so covertly.

Unlike Iran’s program, which could not remain covert over the long hedging period and the on-and-off diplomatic process during which Tehran was forced to be more transparent about its activities, these potential programs may be revealed not in their pre-weaponization stages as a point of diplomatic leverage, but only after a nuclear weapon is announced—or tested. Future proliferators may thus be willing to sacrifice speed for security by driving their program fully underground, repurposing what they can from their civilian nuclear industry and technology. Such an approach may be easier for tightly closed regimes than for democracies. Nevertheless, it is possible even for open democracies to have small, effective covert weapons programs—India, allegedly Israel, and South Africa all undertook covert weaponization efforts. Proliferators, including democracies, may be willing to accept the eventual international opprobrium that comes with violating or withdrawing from nonproliferation accords in the name of national security.

Take the case of Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, as Iran paused the AMAD plan, Syria rushed to build, and nearly completed, a covert nuclear weapons program. But in 2007, Israeli intelligence serendipitously stumbled on evidence of a Syrian nuclear reactor—a miniature replica of North Korea’s Yongbyon facility—that was housed in a nondescript, aboveground complex in the hinterland near the Euphrates River. With the reactor potentially just weeks away from being fueled (after which it would have been environmentally hazardous to attack), Israel leveled it with airstrikes. Still, the episode provided a stark lesson in covert programs. Despite being high on the West’s nuclear proliferation watchlist, Syria was nonetheless able to maintain impressive operational security for an aboveground nuclear reactor. Only a determined intelligence effort—and a lot of good luck—uncovered the nuclear weapons program. Even if they forswear a North Korean rush to the bomb, future nuclear proliferators are more likely to look to the covert Syrian model than to the more transparent Iranian one.

FINAL OFFER

In addition to spelling the end of the threshold nuclear strategy, the 12-day war will likely have another important consequence. It will make diplomacy with future aspiring nuclear weapons states exceptionally difficult. In the case of Iran, hardliners may now have greater power within the regime and more influence with the supreme leader. They can also convincingly portray the United States and Israel, which struck as Tehran was engaged in talks with Washington, as incapable of and unwilling to find a diplomatic path forward. Indeed, Washington and Tehran now face what the scholar James Fearon has characterized as a “commitment problem.” Both parties may prefer a diplomatic outcome but have strong incentives to avoid negotiations, especially since each side has little trust in the other and assumes it will renege on any future deal. In the United States, fierce polarization will continue to stand in the way of a suitable, bipartisan replacement for the JCPOA.

The supreme leader did not emerge from the war trusting the United States or the P5+1—the group of permanent UN Security Council countries party to the 2015 deal. Instead, he may now believe that the only insurance policy that Iran’s adversaries will honor is a nuclear weapon. He will also likely want to pursue any future negotiations from a position of strength. As France, Germany, and the United Kingdom pursue the reimposition of “snapback” UN sanctions in response to Iran’s noncompliance with its nuclear commitments, the Majlis, Iran’s parliament, is considering legislation to recommend withdrawal from the NPT, echoing the crucial step taken by North Korea in its path to a bomb two decades ago.

U.S. policymakers can still discourage would-be proliferators from pursuing a bomb. Important pillars of American nonproliferation policy have stood the test of time through even the most challenging days of the Cold War and after. Remaining committed to, and enhancing, the United States’ extended deterrence architecture can reassure U.S. allies and partners in Europe and Asia so they do not seek the security blanket of their own nuclear bomb—and invite dangerous attacks on themselves by trying. U.S. officials should emphasize and clarify the costs of pursuing a nuclear weapon to any would-be proliferator, including by cutting off military aid, ceasing nuclear-related trade, levying sanctions and threatening military action. And most important, senior leaders should acknowledge and respect the impressive record of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime: that only nine states possess nuclear weapons, not the 25 that U.S. President John F. Kennedy once predicted, is not the result of blind luck. It is the product of decades of presidential-level attention during the Cold War, when nuclear policy was a matter of grand strategy and not an area of specialization, and strong and consistent nonproliferation diplomacy was prioritized in the U.S. foreign policy machine.

But a United States threatening to upend 80 years of largely successful nonproliferation policy practice and experience is creating incentives for allies and adversaries alike to look for their own nuclear insurance policies. The 12-day war will do nothing to disabuse them of that notion. For future would-be proliferators, relying on the United States to deliver on the promise of a deal like the one it signed with Iran in 2015 looks like a bad bet. Kim Jong Il eventually concluded that the risks of dealing with the United States, and the chaotic U.S. system, was not worth the benefit. His son doubled down on this view. Iranian officials may have assumed that Trump would pursue diplomacy more aggressively during his second term, as his administration’s approach to Iran in the spring of 2025 seemed to indicate. But that hope ended abruptly in June, with the destruction of the core facilities that had brought Iran closer than ever to the weapons threshold.

Even after this severe setback, Iran’s technical advances and knowledge base, and the substantial amounts of nuclear material it had previously amassed, probably remain. Tehran may yet find itself with an opportunity for a do-over, and if it does, it may well take the North Korean approach and not stop until it gets to a bomb. In doing so, it may find its own path to an insurance policy for a new, chaotic nuclear age. Paradoxically Washington’s military action against Iran’s nuclear program may have hastened, hardened, and hidden the march of would-be proliferators toward the bomb.

Foreign Affairs · More by Vipin Narang · September 5, 2025

11. Analysis-Diplomatic tour de force: China's Xi shows he's 'totally in charge'

Totally in charge of the CRinK?

How does our national security apparatus see the battlefield of information? How do they assess the perceptions of China's more reliable message?

Excerpts:

"China's message as a more reliable, stable alternative to the United States is resonating with large swathes of the world, particularly across Asia, which sees the United States as an increasingly belligerent force in world affairs," said Eric Olander, editor-in-chief of the China-Global South Project, a research agency.

"A lot of developing countries and middle-power states may still be a bit ambivalent about what China's proposing with its new governance and development initiatives, but at least what China is talking about is forward-looking, which is crucial for economies with large populations of young people looking for better employment opportunities," Olander said.

Xi faces considerable challenges in managing this large and often fractious coalition as he eyes a potential fourth term of office in 2027 to further cement his legacy as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao.

Entrenched Chinese foreign policy positions, including territorial disputes and industrial subsidies that have flooded foreign markets with cheap exports, will likely remain friction points, experts say, while India's deep distrust of China will not dissipate because of one brief meeting.

"It's not necessarily a big-picture shift towards a more China-led international order," said the Asia Society’s Thomas.

Analysis-Diplomatic tour de force: China's Xi shows he's 'totally in charge'

globalsouthworld.com · September 5, 2025

By James Pomfret, Laurie Chen, Mei Mei Chu and Antoni Slodkowski

When Chinese leader Xi Jinping organised his first parade to mark the anniversary of the end of World War Two, in 2015, he placed his two predecessors by his side in a show of respect and continuity of leadership.

Ten years on and having eliminated domestic opposition as he serves an unprecedented third term as president, Xi was flanked on Wednesday at the 80th anniversary parade by Russia's Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un.

Chinese Communist Party leaders were interspersed among overseas guests.

The parade followed Xi's high-profile summit with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a weekend meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin, and the Chinese leader's rare visit to Tibet last month.

This display of diplomatic clout, stamina and geopolitical ambition has helped quell concerns among some China observers about the 72-year-old president's vitality, linked to sporadic absences and - so far unknown - succession plans. It has also helped divert domestic attention from slowing growth, experts say.

Longevity was on the leaders' minds as they walked up to the rostrum at Beijing's Tiananmen Square - Xi and Putin were caught in a hot mic moment discussing organ transplants and the possibility that humans could live to 150 years old.

"This week of triumphant diplomacy for Xi shows that he remains totally in charge of the elite politics of the Communist Party," said Neil Thomas of the Asia Society, a New York-based think tank. Unable to get the same legitimacy from economic growth as his predecessors, Xi has turned toward nationalism "to try and make up for it", Thomas said.

"It's a way to divert attention from economic challenges and to make his citizens proud to be Chinese, even if it's harder to feel that from the day-to-day experiences of unemployment, falling house prices and stagnant wages."

Xi underscored his elder statesman image with fashion choices: a grey suit in the style of those worn by Mao Zedong, matching his greying hair, in contrast to the black suits of his counterparts and his own black attire from a decade earlier.

His number two, Premier Li Qiang, whose role has diminished at home, was charged with relatively minor meetings with leaders of Malaysia and Uzbekistan. High-profile engagements with Kim, Modi, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and several others fell to Cai Qi, who heads the party's Central Secretariat, responsible for its sprawling administration.

In response to a Reuters request for comment, China's foreign ministry referred to news conference transcripts related to the recent diplomatic events, showcasing China's partnerships with developing nations and positioning Beijing as committed to peaceful development and international cooperation.

Many countries that sent their leaders to China in the past week have been hit by U.S. President Donald Trump's trade tariffs this year, including India, which remains a significant buyer of Russian oil, hit by sanctions over Putin's invasion of Ukraine.

In one of the most memorable moments in the flurry of diplomatic encounters, Modi and Putin walked over for a chat with Xi while holding hands, underscoring personal tensions between Trump and Modi, as well as Washington's failure to draw historically non-aligned India in to counter Russia and China.

"Ultimately one of the biggest driving factors of the SCO show of solidarity has been U.S. policy," said Even Pay, a director at strategic advisory firm Trivium China.

Trump, who called the military parade "beautiful" and "very, very impressive", made a barbed post on social media saying China was working with Putin and Kim to "conspire against The United States of America".

The Kremlin responded that they were not conspiring and suggested Trump's remarks were ironic.

HIT BY TRUMP, WELCOMED BY XI

Analysts say Xi's whirlwind of activity underscores China's ambition in presenting itself as a reliable partner to developing nations on the global stage, offering advantages like investment opportunities and even a new development bank - a major step forward for the SCO, which has expanded markedly over past decades to also include India, Pakistan and Iran.

"China's message as a more reliable, stable alternative to the United States is resonating with large swathes of the world, particularly across Asia, which sees the United States as an increasingly belligerent force in world affairs," said Eric Olander, editor-in-chief of the China-Global South Project, a research agency.

"A lot of developing countries and middle-power states may still be a bit ambivalent about what China's proposing with its new governance and development initiatives, but at least what China is talking about is forward-looking, which is crucial for economies with large populations of young people looking for better employment opportunities," Olander said.

Xi faces considerable challenges in managing this large and often fractious coalition as he eyes a potential fourth term of office in 2027 to further cement his legacy as the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao.

Entrenched Chinese foreign policy positions, including territorial disputes and industrial subsidies that have flooded foreign markets with cheap exports, will likely remain friction points, experts say, while India's deep distrust of China will not dissipate because of one brief meeting.

"It's not necessarily a big-picture shift towards a more China-led international order," said the Asia Society’s Thomas.

globalsouthworld.com · September 5, 2025

12. Exclusive: Trump to reinterpret 1987 missile treaty to sell heavy attack drones abroad

This is necessary I think.

Excerpts:

Under the current interpretation of the MTCR, the sale of many military drones is subject to a "strong presumption of denial" unless a compelling security reason is given and the buyer agrees to use the weapons in strict accordance with international law.

The MTCR was originally meant to curb the sale of long-range missiles that can deliver weapons of mass destruction. Though drones were invented many years later they were considered within the scope of the MTCR due to their ability to fly long distances and carry weapons.

U.S. drone manufacturers are facing stiff competition overseas, especially from Israeli, Chinese and Turkish rivals who often sell under lighter restrictions.

Neither China or Israel are signatories to the MTCR and have won sales in the Middle East as a result. Turkey signed on to the MTCR in 1997 but has been able to showcase its Bayraktar-TB2 drones against Russian forces in Ukraine because it is shorter-range, lighter and covered under a different standard under the treaty than heavier drones like the Reaper.

Russia has been using both domestic and Iranian drones to attack Ukraine.

The U.S. has not been selling or donating large drones to Kyiv for fear that advanced technologies could fall into enemy hands.

Global competition for market share is white hot because military drones and drones adapted from consumer technology are seen as integral to the modern battlefield.

Exclusive: Trump to reinterpret 1987 missile treaty to sell heavy attack drones abroad

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/trump-reinterpret-1987-missile-treaty-sell-heavy-attack-drones-abroad-2025-09-05/

By Mike Stone

September 5, 20256:12 AM EDTUpdated 52 mins ago

Item 1 of 2 A U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper drone sits in a hanger at Amari Air Base, Estonia, July 1, 2020. REUTERS/Janis Laizans/File Photo

[1/2]A U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper drone sits in a hanger at Amari Air Base, Estonia, July 1, 2020. REUTERS/Janis Laizans/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

SummaryCompanies

The change would allow the potential sale of 100 MQ-9 drones to Saudi ArabiaU.S. drone makers face competition from Israeli, Chinese, and Turkish rivalsThe change to benefit startups building a new generation of heavy attack drones

WASHINGTON, Sept 5 (Reuters) - President Donald Trump is expected to unilaterally reinterpret a 38-year-old arms control treaty to sell sophisticated "Reaper" style and other advanced military drones abroad, according to a U.S. official and four people familiar with the plan.

The new interpretation would unlock the sale of more than 100 MQ-9 drones to Saudi Arabia, which the kingdom requested in the spring of this year and could be part of a $142 billion arms deal announced in May. U.S. allies in the Pacific and Europe have also expressed interest.

Make sense of the latest ESG trends affecting companies and governments with the Reuters Sustainable Switch newsletter. Sign up here.By designating drones as aircraft like the F-16 rather than missile systems, the United States will sidestep the 35-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) agreement it signed in 1987, propelling drone sales to countries like UAE and in Eastern European nations that have struggled to get their hands on America's best unmanned aerial vehicles.

The new policy will allow General Atomics, Kratos (KTOS.O), opens new tab, and Anduril, which manufacture large drones, to have their products treated as "Foreign Military Sales" by the State Department, allowing them to be easily sold internationally, according to a U.S. official speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity.

This effort is the first part of a planned "major" review of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program, the official said.

A U.S. Department of State spokesperson declined to comment.

Under the current interpretation of the MTCR, the sale of many military drones is subject to a "strong presumption of denial" unless a compelling security reason is given and the buyer agrees to use the weapons in strict accordance with international law.

The MTCR was originally meant to curb the sale of long-range missiles that can deliver weapons of mass destruction. Though drones were invented many years later they were considered within the scope of the MTCR due to their ability to fly long distances and carry weapons.

U.S. drone manufacturers are facing stiff competition overseas, especially from Israeli, Chinese and Turkish rivals who often sell under lighter restrictions.

Neither China or Israel are signatories to the MTCR and have won sales in the Middle East as a result. Turkey signed on to the MTCR in 1997 but has been able to showcase its Bayraktar-TB2 drones against Russian forces in Ukraine because it is shorter-range, lighter and covered under a different standard under the treaty than heavier drones like the Reaper.

Russia has been using both domestic and Iranian drones to attack Ukraine.

The U.S. has not been selling or donating large drones to Kyiv for fear that advanced technologies could fall into enemy hands.

Global competition for market share is white hot because military drones and drones adapted from consumer technology are seen as integral to the modern battlefield.

The U.S. official who spoke on condition of anonymity said the new guidelines will allow the U.S. "to become the premier drone provider instead of ceding that space to Turkey and China."

An exact date for the unveiling of the new drone sale guidelines has not been determined. A revamp of the Foreign Military Sales program was expected later this year and the administration is working now on its "roll out," the people said.

The change is being timed to benefit the makers of large advanced jet-engine powered drones who are developing a new generation of drones that can fly alongside piloted fighter jets as wingmen, a promising new market for the technology.

All drone sales would still be subject to the U.S. government's Foreign Military Sales process which examines a customer's regional dynamics, human rights track record, and ability to safeguard a weapons system.

One of the first large sales that may come after the reinterpretation may be to Saudi Arabia. U.S. President Joe Biden had adopted the tougher stance on weapons sales to Saudi Arabia in 2021, citing the kingdom's use of U.S. military equipment in its campaign against the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen, which has inflicted heavy civilian casualties.

But ties between the kingdom and the United States have warmed since then, as Washington has worked more closely with Riyadh in the aftermath of the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel.

The White House is expected to tout the move as part of Trump's broader initiative to create jobs and reduce the U.S. trade deficit. However, human rights and arms control advocates warn it risks fueling violence and instability in regions such as the Middle East and South Asia.

Reporting by Mike Stone in Washington; editing by Chris Sanders and Michael Learmonth

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab

13. Taiwan’s Will to Fight Isn’t the Problem

Excerpts:

In an ideal world, Taiwan would face a trade-off between the marginal benefits of increased societal resilience versus further weapons acquisition. But Taiwan is still awaiting the delivery of the $21.54 billion backlog of U.S.-built weapons that it paid for, but that U.S. defense manufacturers are struggling to produce. Even if that equipment appeared in armories tomorrow, developing and training effective concepts of operations can take months.

Civil defense enhancements can more immediately contribute to Taiwan’s overarching security, with less strain on U.S. production capacity or budgets. U.S. federal and state agencies could share lessons learned in protecting critical infrastructure, maintaining government functions during disasters, and establishing secure communications. During an invasion, destruction of communication networks would cut off civil defense actors from the central government. U.S. military, political, and business leaders could provide training in crisis decision-making to lower-echelon Taiwanese governmental, civil society, and military leaders.

Washington could also facilitate Taiwanese engagement with other countries, who are themselves innovating on civil defense. Finland’s National Defense Training Association, for example, standardizes instruction across civil defense organizations, tracks training by individual, and conducts readiness assessments. The association also serves as the liaison between member groups and the national government. Similarly, Estonia’s Cyber Defence League could serve as a model for cybersecurity cooperation between the government, nonprofits, and private enterprises. Singapore’s Volunteer Corps opens civil defense opportunities to women, as well as structuring medical and cybersecurity training that go beyond the standard conscription.

Although it has a long way to go, Taiwan is making enormous strides in preparing its government, society, and military to face China’s multidimensional challenges. Washington has a critical opportunity to cut through polarization and bolster defense efforts beyond the military to the whole of Taiwanese society.

Taiwan’s Will to Fight Isn’t the Problem

Raymond Kuo and Catherine Kish

September 5, 2025

warontherocks.com · September 5, 2025

China’s increasingly powerful military has bracketed Taiwan with exercises. Its air and naval forces launch daily incursions, and Beijing has erased the unofficial maritime border between them. Yet, many Americans are baffled by a Taiwanese public that is seemingly oblivious, resigned, or apathetic to these threats.

Taiwan’s former cultural minister lamented the absence of a “will to fight” crucial to the island’s defense. Current Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby has criticized Taiwan for “showing an alarming lack of urgency in dramatically strengthening its defenses.” Why should the United States defend Taiwan if Taiwan won’t defend itself?

But a closer look shows that the real problem is political polarization, not will to fight.

BECOME A MEMBER

More Resolve Than You Think

Multiple overlapping indicators demonstrate that a majority — if not a supermajority — of Taiwanese are motivated to defend their country, eager for organization and leadership, and are deeply interested in civil defense training opportunities.

Surveys consistently find that over two-thirds of Taiwanese are willing to fight and defend their country if China invades. Support for conscription is higher in Taiwan than it is in South Korea, even among conscription-age cohorts.

Beyond polls, civil defense training from groups like Kuma Academy and Forward Alliance are fully booked months in advance. Medical doctors have lined up around the block to participate in classes on trauma medicine and treating gunshot wounds, incidents that are extremely rare in Taiwan, but may be common during a crisis.

This seriousness of purpose is reflected in defense policy as well. Although there is still much work to do, Taiwan has increased its military budget by over 10 percent in the past two years, and 76.8 percent since 2016. Defense spending comprised 15 percent of the central government budget in 2024 and 22 percent in 2025 — both a larger proportion than in the United States. Taiwan is expanding its indigenous defense industry, which produces more anti-ship missiles than the United States annually. The Taiwanese government also announced that defense spending will reach 3.32 percent of GDP in 2026, with three percent acting as a floor going forward.

Moreover, this amount does not include spending on “whole of society resilience” — formally coordinated civilian, military, and government preparation for invasion. What many in the United States see as Taiwanese apathy or resignation is, in fact, a lack of direction, leadership, and organization. But this is a monumental task: The United States has not had a coordinated, nationwide civil defense exercise since the end of the Cold War. Civil defense planning in the United States is fragmented across private, local, state, and federal government actors. Current U.S. efforts do not prepare the American public for protracted war or threats to the homeland. Without knowing about and consistently practicing a coherent response plan to a distant but pressing threat, many people might simply go about their lives.

Whole of society resilience provides that response plan, preparing the Taiwanese to organize and outlast a possible Chinese invasion or blockade. The Lai government has increased the realism and comprehensiveness of the annual Han Kuang exercise. It doubled the exercise’s length, simulated a greater range of urban combat scenarios, ran it unscripted, and involved significantly more reserve forces. It added civil defense and infrastructure protection components, including evacuation drills and transporting troops and equipment through the Taipei subway.

The exercise was widely publicized in the news and on social media, including videos produced by Taiwan’s Military News Agency with English subtitles. This drew significant local and international media attention to the exercise, carrying additional benefits. The more Taiwan demonstrates its defensive capabilities and preparations, the more willing Washington is to support it. The more Taiwanese engage in civil defense preparations, the more social pressure fence sitters face, prompting them to participate as well.

The Politics of Paralysis

The real obstacle is political polarization. This stems from a weakness in Taiwan’s political institutions, despite their overall strength. Shielded within local strongholds, parties can appeal to narrow constituencies and ignore broader public opinion. From that platform, politicians have fueled skepticism of U.S. support and lobbed accusations of warmongering against civil defense efforts.

Taiwan’s opposition parties have attacked the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s attempts at defense reform. The Kuomintang has accused President Lai Ching-te of provoking war for personal political gain. In 2024, the Ministry of Education issued a controversial “Youth Service Consent Form” that appeared to be mobilizing high school students for civil defense, causing panic among parents. Though the form was discontinued almost immediately, opposition party members denounced Lai and the Democratic Progressive Party for preparing to send children to die on the battlefield.

Opposition legislators criticized this year’s Han Kuang exercise — which featured a significant civil defense component — as the government attempting to manufacture public fear of impending national destruction. They also proposed amendments to the Civil Defense Act and National Mobilization Act in 2024. These would have prevented civilians from supporting defensive military operations.

A recent RAND report found that political polarization within Taiwan weakens the effectiveness of whole-of-society mobilization. Without cross-party support for civil defense, mobilization planning, resilience-related efforts, and public engagement programs faces significant headwinds. Because opposition parties hold a majority of county and city leadership positions, local-level engagement on whole of society resilience has been fitful. Some politicians have accused a civil defense group of profiting off of cross-Strait tensions and promised investigations.

America Can Help

America’s role is not limited to supplying arms. Washington also has unique leverage to strengthen Taiwan’s civil defense, where even modest U.S. statements, cooperative efforts, and policy shifts can yield outsized effects.

Most importantly, the U.S. government can publicly laud societal resilience efforts. This will cut through Taiwanese polarization, providing political encouragement for cities and counties to join the central government’s preparations. This is a rare instance where public diplomacy on its own can decisively clear partisan obstacles to serious defense efforts.

The Trump administration’s stance towards Taiwan hasn’t been made clear yet. The White House imposed 20 percent tariffs on Taiwanese exports, putting them at a five percentage-point disadvantage to their Japanese and South Korean competitors. Over the summer, the Trump administration also instructed the Lai government to cancel planned stopovers in New York City and Dallas as it sought to keep trade talks and a possible fall summit with Beijing on track.

Civil defense ultimately benefits U.S. interests. The more cohesive and organized Taiwan’s society is, the more effectively it can move and resupply forces at beachheads — bleeding or even defeating invading Chinese military units. The more it stockpiles food, water, and energy, the longer its population can survive a blockade. The longer Taiwan holds out, the more decision-making space that opens for Washington, Tokyo, and others to respond.

In an ideal world, Taiwan would face a trade-off between the marginal benefits of increased societal resilience versus further weapons acquisition. But Taiwan is still awaiting the delivery of the $21.54 billion backlog of U.S.-built weapons that it paid for, but that U.S. defense manufacturers are struggling to produce. Even if that equipment appeared in armories tomorrow, developing and training effective concepts of operations can take months.

Civil defense enhancements can more immediately contribute to Taiwan’s overarching security, with less strain on U.S. production capacity or budgets. U.S. federal and state agencies could share lessons learned in protecting critical infrastructure, maintaining government functions during disasters, and establishing secure communications. During an invasion, destruction of communication networks would cut off civil defense actors from the central government. U.S. military, political, and business leaders could provide training in crisis decision-making to lower-echelon Taiwanese governmental, civil society, and military leaders.

Washington could also facilitate Taiwanese engagement with other countries, who are themselves innovating on civil defense. Finland’s National Defense Training Association, for example, standardizes instruction across civil defense organizations, tracks training by individual, and conducts readiness assessments. The association also serves as the liaison between member groups and the national government. Similarly, Estonia’s Cyber Defence League could serve as a model for cybersecurity cooperation between the government, nonprofits, and private enterprises. Singapore’s Volunteer Corps opens civil defense opportunities to women, as well as structuring medical and cybersecurity training that go beyond the standard conscription.

Although it has a long way to go, Taiwan is making enormous strides in preparing its government, society, and military to face China’s multidimensional challenges. Washington has a critical opportunity to cut through polarization and bolster defense efforts beyond the military to the whole of Taiwanese society.

BECOME A MEMBER

Raymond Kuo is director of RAND’s Taiwan Policy Initiative and a senior political scientist at RAND.

Catherine Kish is a research assistant at RAND.

Image: Taiwan Presidential Office via Flickr

warontherocks.com · September 5, 2025

14. US Special Forces Officer Dies In Dhaka; India Perks Up Ears

May he rest in peace.

But probably not for awhile as the conspiracy theories abound.

What was the 1st SFC IG doing in India? My guess it was likely some mundane investigation of US Army SOF activity and not for conducting "business" as the conspiracy theorists would like to allege.

Excerpts:

Terrence Arvelle Jackson, whose body was found, was no American tourist or businessman. He was the Command Inspector General for the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne).

US Special Forces Officer Dies In Dhaka; India Perks Up Ears

odishabytes.com · OB Bureau · September 3, 2025

New Delhi: India has started maintaining closer watch on the goings-on in Bangladesh after the recovery of the body of a US citizen in a room of the Westin Hotel in Dhaka on August 31.

Terrence Arvelle Jackson, whose body was found, was no American tourist or businessman. He was the Command Inspector General for the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne).

The 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) or 1SFC (A) is a division-level operations forces unit under the United States Army Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The mission of 1SFC (A) is to organise, equip, train and validate forces to conduct full-spectrum special operations in support of USSOCOM, Geographic Combatant Commanders, American ambassadors and other government agencies.

USSOCOM has the ability to rapidly deploy a high-level headquarters to run sustained, unconventional campaigns in foreign theatres.

Jackson’s body has been handed over to the US embassy in Dhaka by the local police without an autopsy. While the US has remained tight-lipped, questions are being raised within intelligence circles regarding his presence in Bangladesh. Authorities in Dhaka have confirmed that he was in Bangladesh ‘on a business trip’ for the last few months.

Whether a serving US Army officer can engage in ‘business’, that too in a foreign country, for months, is not known, but Jackson’s LinkedIn profile reveals that he had no plans to leave the Army for two more years.

The US’ interest in the Rakhine Corridor is well known. In May this year, even as Operation Sindoor was underway along India’s western theatre, an US Air Force team of specialists had reached Dhaka ahead of the landing of a ‘large and sensitive cargo’ by air.

The team was headed by Tara Lynn Alexzandria Stryder, who is the director of logistics, Supply Chain and Planning. She is said to have the US’ highest security clearance, ‘TS/SCI’, or Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalized Intelligence. Stryder is known to be a “Combat mission support commander”.

The team had also put up at the Westin Hotel in Dhaka’s upscale Gulshan.

While Md Yunus, chief advisor of the interim government in Bangladesh is in favour of the Rakhine Corridor that the United Nations (UN) claims would help in sending aid to civilians in northern Rakhine, the proposal has been shot down by the Bangladesh Army. Its chief Gen Waqar-uz-Zaman has made it clear that there will be no such ‘bloody corridor’.

While the US wants to use the UN’s narrative of a supply route to northern Rakhine to maintain a military presence close to Myanmar’s border with China, Gen Zaman doesn’t want the country to end up like Pakistan that allowed the US to operate on its soil against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Both India and China are also against the Rakhine Corridor. For India, it will mean American military presence close to the northeastern states.

odishabytes.com · OB Bureau · September 3, 2025

15. Xi is getting ready to move against Taiwan – this is how it will happen

As an aside we must not look at all the security problems of the Asia-indo-Pacific in a vacuum or as separate discrete problems. They are interconnected and we must approach them from the perspective of that interconnectedness.

Excerpts:

For all their belligerence, Putin and Kim do not have military credentials; Kim was a nepo baby and Putin a civilian KGB operative. Xi does. His father was a commander under Chairman Mao who fought campaigns across north China in the country’s civil war.

Xi’s first job was in uniform as one of three private secretaries to the defence supremo of China. At a young age, he was privy to military secrets. This was a staff post, of course, for no Chinese general has fought a land campaign since 1979.

But throughout his rise up the civilian ranks of the party, Xi took care of the soldiers. While governing on the east coast, facing Taiwan, the record shows that he spent time visiting garrisons, improving conditions for the men, making sure families had good accommodation and boosting morale.

Now he reaps the rewards. Insecure emperors do not parade themselves in front of thousands of armed troops. I doubt that he has ever looked so solid in office.

...

“A combined operation involving an opposed landing [is] one of the most difficult and hazardous operations of war,” as Winston Churchill wrote. Xi knows the quote: his father had read Churchill’s memoir. Putin has shown that he does not have to do it that way.

Chinese tactics against Taiwan could be a hybrid of the Crimea and the dash to Kiev. Perhaps Trump has studied the German strategist Carl von Clausewitz and his theory of the concentration of maximum force at a decisive point. Xi and his generals know it by heart.

In this scenario, China could command the seas by defeating an American force with one kinetic shock, securing control of the strait between Taiwan and the mainland. It could proclaim blockades, maritime quarantines, compulsory shipping lanes and aviation exclusion zones. Its new weapons could shatter American and Allied air and naval supremacy.

Then there is what Chairman Mao called the “magic weapon” of propaganda and appeals to the greater Chinese nation. There is a ceaseless campaign of infiltration and cyberwar to persuade the Taiwanese that resistance is futile and destiny beckons and unity is inevitable. Chinese state outlets push narratives that the US cannot be trusted to defend Taiwan, emphasising economic benefits of closer ties with Beijing. As Xi said at the parade, China is “unstoppable”.

Xi is getting ready to move against Taiwan – this is how it will happen

Flanked by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un, Xi’s statement that China is now ‘unstoppable’ was a gauntlet thrown down to the West. This wasn’t just a display of pride, but of intention – Taiwan is already under attack without a boot on the ground, says Michael Sheridan

Thursday 04 September 2025 15:18 BST

independent.co.uk

Xi is getting ready to move against Taiwan – this is how it will happen | The Independent

Make no mistake, today’s “victory” parade in Beijing was the most significant event since Xi Jinping came to power in China in 2012. It was both triumph and prelude, the triumph of military might and the prelude to using it.

The Chinese leader did not don a uniform. Instead, he favoured a plain outfit of distinctive martial cut, in contrast to most of his suited guests overlooking Tiananmen Square.

This was the new China at its most militant. Nuclear missiles, drones, advanced weapons of all kinds, thousands of regimented troops marching in tight precision. Much has been written about it as a display of pride. It is now time to consider intention.

The honoured guests were the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. With Xi, they made a trio of autocrats, unmistakably identified as the key players of the day by the Chinese media.

All three are hardened survivors. Two of them, Putin and Kim, are steeped in blood. In the Chinese system, there is no longer any need to eliminate opponents physically. But Xi did not hesitate to decimate the military, purging defence ministers, generals and staff officers. The dismissal of his foreign minister in a spy scandal seemed a mere afterthought by contrast.

One wonders whether, over their cups of tea, the Chinese and Russian leaders exchanged ideas about the necessity of purges. For Putin, the spectre of Yevgeny Prigozhin, rebel leader of the Wagner Group, who died in a mid-air explosion, has vanished from his calculations.

As for the ever-smiling Kim Jong Un, he lives with the knowledge that he executed his own uncle, Jang Song-thaek, after a reported tip-off from China that Jang was plotting against him. Kim’s unfortunate relative was tied to a scaffold in front of an audience of cadres and shredded by an anti-aircraft gun.

Nothing in Xi’s biography suggests that he enjoys cruelty or is personally ruthless. But he does wield power in a way that rivals Stalin in purpose. It would now be wise to assume that he is, in fact, going to move against Taiwan.

US intelligence and military officials have testified that Xi Jinping has instructed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to “invade or coerce” Taiwan by 2027 – a date marking the centenary of the PLA’s founding. The date is not very far away. It must be taken seriously, because the autocrats may think there may never be a better time in world politics to strike.

Xi and his comrades have watched as Putin’s war in Ukraine turned from blitzkrieg to stalemate. But there is no higher consideration in the Chinese system than survival. China considers that Putin has won the war merely by avoiding defeat.

Xi walking with Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un before the military parade on Wednesday (Sputnik)

The third of the trio, Kim, is a veteran of two summits with US president Donald Trump, from which he emerged with both his nuclear arsenal and his power intact. If ever a group of leaders radiated confidence, it is these three.

For all their belligerence, Putin and Kim do not have military credentials; Kim was a nepo baby and Putin a civilian KGB operative. Xi does. His father was a commander under Chairman Mao who fought campaigns across north China in the country’s civil war.

Xi’s first job was in uniform as one of three private secretaries to the defence supremo of China. At a young age, he was privy to military secrets. This was a staff post, of course, for no Chinese general has fought a land campaign since 1979.

But throughout his rise up the civilian ranks of the party, Xi took care of the soldiers. While governing on the east coast, facing Taiwan, the record shows that he spent time visiting garrisons, improving conditions for the men, making sure families had good accommodation and boosting morale.

Now he reaps the rewards. Insecure emperors do not parade themselves in front of thousands of armed troops. I doubt that he has ever looked so solid in office.

So where does it go from here? China has absorbed multiple lessons from Russia. It has learned, for one thing, that it does not have to storm the beaches of Taiwan.

Hundreds of women take part in the parade to mark 80 years since victory over Japan (Getty)

“A combined operation involving an opposed landing [is] one of the most difficult and hazardous operations of war,” as Winston Churchill wrote. Xi knows the quote: his father had read Churchill’s memoir. Putin has shown that he does not have to do it that way.

Chinese tactics against Taiwan could be a hybrid of the Crimea and the dash to Kiev. Perhaps Trump has studied the German strategist Carl von Clausewitz and his theory of the concentration of maximum force at a decisive point. Xi and his generals know it by heart.

In this scenario, China could command the seas by defeating an American force with one kinetic shock, securing control of the strait between Taiwan and the mainland. It could proclaim blockades, maritime quarantines, compulsory shipping lanes and aviation exclusion zones. Its new weapons could shatter American and Allied air and naval supremacy.

Then there is what Chairman Mao called the “magic weapon” of propaganda and appeals to the greater Chinese nation. There is a ceaseless campaign of infiltration and cyberwar to persuade the Taiwanese that resistance is futile and destiny beckons and unity is inevitable. Chinese state outlets push narratives that the US cannot be trusted to defend Taiwan, emphasising economic benefits of closer ties with Beijing. As Xi said at the parade, China is “unstoppable”.

Coastal defence systems on Taiwan’s shores with China’s Xiamen city in the background (Getty)

The trio of autocrats see this as part of a new world order to replace the old world made after 1945. They explicitly used the Victory Parade to state an “authentic history” of the time and to promote, of all things, the United Nations as their instrument of change.

The Chinese foreign ministry unveiled three faults in the UN, first, “serious underrepresentation of the Global South”, second, “erosion of authoritativeness” and, third, an “urgent need for greater effectiveness”. All bland, who could possibly object?

Then it added: “Governance gaps exist in new frontiers such as artificial intelligence (AI), cyberspace and outer space.” The solution: “China proposes the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) to promote the building of a more just and equitable global governance system and work together for a community with a shared future for humanity.”

Naturally, it promised “extensive consultation and joint contribution” suitable for China’s role as “a staunch builder of world peace, contributor to global development, (and) defender of the international order.”

Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un may not seem the likeliest people to run a consultation exercise to make the world a kinder place through artificial intelligence and space travel. “Global Governance” on their terms is an offer that nobody is meant to refuse. The gauntlet has been thrown down.

independent.co.uk

16. Ungoverning America – The Logic Behind Trump’s Assault on the Administrative State

I know this borders on partisanship but we have to understand the perceptions of the current state of government and its future from a national security perspective. The current "unpredictableness "of US politics does impact national security.

Excerpts:

American politics was once utterly predictable. Every four years, the country had an election. Each time, either a Democrat or a Republican won. And although Democrats and Republicans had different priorities, American citizens could expect some continuity of governance, especially in foreign policy. Both parties, after all, supported U.S. global leadership. As a result, even when they had sharp disagreements with their predecessors, presidents were careful not to change too much, too quickly. U.S. President Barack Obama, for example, was a longtime critic of the Iraq invasion, but he nonetheless kept his predecessor’s secretary of defense, Robert Gates, for the first two and a half years of his presidency. He did not want to introduce unpredictability and chaos.

Trump has ended that tradition. In his desire to weaken the state and rebuild it around him, he has made chaos the new standard. The range of future possibilities for Washington is thus wide. It is reasonable to wonder if there will even be a regular presidential election in 2028. Trump, after all, has flirted with the idea of seeking a third term; his official store sells “Trump 2028” hats. The worst-case scenarios seem more plausible than ever before.

For some Americans, fed up with the status quo, such destruction may seem exciting. According to a recent Pew survey, 32 percent of U.S. respondents agreed with the idea that rule by a strong leader or the military is a good way of governing. (By contrast, only eight percent of Swedes agreed.) But such voters may quickly develop buyer’s remorse and turn on the president. Ungoverners will not prove capable of managing the economy, of steering policy in a prudent way, or of generally delivering results. To defeat them, however, opponents have to offer more than rejection and condemnation. They have to offer a promise that inspires popular faith in a government that can govern.

Ungoverning America

Foreign Affairs · More by Russell Muirhead · September 5, 2025

The Logic Behind Trump’s Assault on the Administrative State

September 5, 2025

The White House in the lens of a television news camera, Washington, D.C., August 2025 Jonathan Ernst / Reuters

RUSSELL MUIRHEAD is Robert Clements Professor of Democracy and Politics at Dartmouth College.

NANCY L. ROSENBLUM is Senator Joseph Clark Professor of Ethics in Politics and Government Emerita at Harvard University.

They are the authors of Ungoverning: The Attack on the Administrative State and the Politics of Chaos.

More by Nancy L. Rosenblum

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In the first seven months of his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has made unprecedented changes to the way the American government operates. He has launched an extraordinary and erratic tariff scheme, eliminated U.S. foreign aid programs, upended U.S. alliances, and waged war on the administrative state. He has detained and deported scores of foreign students and scholars for their political views; strong-armed universities, law firms, corporations, and media outlets into doing his bidding; and emasculated the government’s regulatory agencies. He has deployed the U.S. National Guard to Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., purportedly to fight disorder and crime, and threatened to send the military to Chicago, New York City, and beyond.

All of this has led some observers to conclude that Trump is seeking a new way of governing in pursuit of a radical and disruptive agenda. In foreign relations, trade, energy, and immigration, a variety of news outlets and think tanks have declared that Trump aims to enact a policy revolution. One Brookings article, for example, declared that the president “has thought big” and staked his administration “on large-scale policy shifts.”

But Trump is not pursuing a governingagenda. He is pursuing “ungoverning”: the comprehensive and intentional destruction of state capacity. As we described in Foreign Affairs in late January, ungoverning is rare in the history of politics. Authoritarians generally want to take over a state so they can use it, not so they can destroy it. They need loyalty and select for it, but they also need competence. Trump, by contrast, shreds regular procedures, shrugs off the expertise needed to bring policies to life, and promotes administrative incompetence in order to eliminate any authority other than himself. None of his decisions are about slashing bureaucratic red tape or privatizing parts of the state. Instead, he issues capricious commands and negotiates deals that serve his whims. From his first days back in the White House, Trump made it clear that he will reward anyone who breaks the law in support of him. It is why he pardoned all the January 6, 2021, insurrectionists, declaring later that “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law.”

The speed at which the Trump administration has pursued ungoverning is astonishing. It gives the impression that a lot is happening and that Trump will let nothing stand in his way. New episodes of the Trump show drop at a dizzying pace: he posted on social media over 2,000 times in the first four months of his second term. The chaos is real, as is the destruction. Trump’s director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was fired after less than a month, for instance, and four other top CDC leaders promptly resigned. But in the end, it is likely to also leave the leader ineffective and breed discontent.

WEAPONIZED INCOMPETENCE

Ungoverning was not the theme of Trump’s campaign. Instead, the president promised—and continues to promise—that he would lead a grand national revival by bringing down costs and limiting immigration. But even in Trump’s first term, one could discern Trump’s philosophy of ungoverning in his attack on expertise and regular process. As we argued in Ungoverning: The Attack on the Administrative State and the Politics of Chaos (October 2024), ungoverning has become the core logic of the Republican Party that Trump now dominates. It is thus not surprising that Trump’s second-term agenda centers on tearing Washington apart.

His appointments provide cases-in-points. It can seem as if the only requirement to gain an appointment in the Trump administration is personal submission. But that is only part of the story. Trump’s appointees are not only required to be submissive; they must also be incompetent. Critical posts, such as director of National Intelligence and director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have gone to people without experience or expertise—in these two cases, Tulsi Gabbard and Kash Patel, respectively. Many of these appointees do not know how to manage large organizations. They do not possess subject-specific knowledge, so they cannot offer good advice. They cannot explain. They cannot effectively implement policy.

For this administration, these deficiencies are not defects. The appointees are chosen precisely because they are patently inappropriate to the position—to shock, to undo, and to make every decision turn on the president’s will. Consider Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Before being tapped for his current role, Hegseth was a Fox News host. His only executive experience was heading a nonprofit, which he ran into the ground. His incompetence shows: in March 2025, Hegseth shared classified information about U.S. military operations in Yemen with his spouse, his brother, and a journalist. This scandal caused the Trump administration some embarrassment. But the violation of national security did not cost Hegseth his job, because Hegseth’s failures are key to his allure. Trump has also stood by Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., a conspiracy theorist, even as Kennedy fired the 17 members of the expert panel that advises the CDC on vaccines.

Prizing incompetence over expertise also explains the sweeping powers Trump gave to the billionaire tech entrepreneur Elon Musk and his Department of Government Efficiency. DOGE was not about cutting $2 trillion from the deficit, as Musk originally promised, or $1 trillion, as he later pledged, or even $150 billion, the amount he finally settled on. Instead, DOGE was the sharp end of a battering ram directed at the so-called deep state, which includes both essential operations, such as tax collection, and apolitical employees, such as the National Weather Service scientists who gather weather data. Its purpose was to hollow out the administration.

L’ÉTAT, C’EST MOI

Along with dismantling the apparatus of the state, ungoverning involves bending or repurposing administrative functions to serve a leader’s will. The coercive power of the state becomes a tool for investigating, prosecuting, and punishing critics. Consider how the Trump loyalist Bill Pulte, who is in charge of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, is using his authority. He has investigated Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook, whom Trump wants to replace, for mortgage fraud. Pulte is also probing Adam Schiff, a Trump opponent and member of Congress. And he is investigating New York Attorney General Letitia James, who previously prosecuted Trump. The investigatory power of the Internal Revenue Service and the Justice Department and the colossal power of the military are also being remade into means for Trump to go after his critics.

Ungoverning also dissolves the branches of government and unifies the separation of powers into a single office—or more accurately, a single person. It is not about creating what some constitutional scholars call a “unitary presidency”: an executive branch that responds to the president’s directives. It is about creating a strongman. This motivation explains Trump’s reliance on executive orders, which signal not only policy shifts but also the necessity of personal command. As Trump once put it, “I alone can fix it.” Through his sweeping executive actions, Trump is showing that he is not a partner with Congress, executing its laws. He is the law. That is why Trump’s executive orders seem designed to humiliate Congress, which is supposed to be the U.S. government’s preeminent branch, as illustrated by the fact that it is established by Article One of the Constitution. By this standard, even if the Supreme Court eventually overturns some of his decisions, such as unilaterally canceling almost $5 billion in U.S. foreign aid funding, Trump will have made his point. He has the power to do what he wants.

To disregard constitutional constraints, Trump has repeatedly cast the United States as under attack. In May, by describing impoverished migrants’ efforts to move to his country as a “predatory incursion,” Trump was able to invoke the 1798 Alien Enemies Act, which gives the president the power to apprehend, restrain, secure, and remove all inhabitants he deems to be subjects of a “hostile nation.” Although this power was ultimately overturned by a federal court, under this pretext, the president sent over 200 Venezuelans to a gulag in El Salvador, beyond the reach of U.S. law. The Trump administration has used the same approach with trade policy. The Constitution vests Congress with the power to impose or withdraw tariffs. But Congress delegated that power to the executive under certain “emergency” conditions. By declaring the trade deficit a “national emergency,” a classic legislative power became Trump’s personal tool. Several courts have now found that Trump’s emergency tariffs are unconstitutional. Yet they have stayed their decisions pending appeal, so the tariffs live on.

Ungoverning dissolves the branches of government.

Ungoverning’s most elemental attack focuses on facts. Facts are stubborn things: they often get in the way of what people want to do. The powerful will thus deny facts, and when they can, erase them. They will fire the economist working as a career civil servant at the Bureau of Labor Statistics when they don’t like the information in the most recent jobs report—as Trump did in August. Or consider the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” that Trump signed into law in July. Although the megabill contained hundreds of separate provisions, including cuts to Medicaid and nutrition support as well increased allocations for border security, at its heart was a raft of tax cuts touching on individual income, business depreciation allowances, charitable giving, overtime pay, and more. This naturally made the cost of the bill a central concern to legislators of both parties. After the Congressional Budget Office, in an analysis required by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, estimated the bill would add $2.4 trillion in deficit spending over a ten year period, the White House disparaged its estimates without offering any analysis of its own—calling the CBO the “Crooked Budget Office.” Effective decision-making requires a grasp of basic relevant facts. Ungoverning destroys the informational infrastructure on which all good decisions depend.

Even among Trump’s critics, there remains a nearly irresistible tendency to normalize the Trump administration by assuming that its goal is to implement policy, however radical. The problem for Trump is that any policy, conservative or liberal, would constrain his power. To govern is to empower policies, after all, not persons. To change policy in an effective and enduring way requires marshaling the tools of an administrative state. But those tools in turn ask for consistency and commitment—in other words, not changing one’s mind constantly—which limit the leader’s will. The wild oscillations in Trump’s tariffs on China are indicative. Since January 2025, he moved the rate to 30.7 percent, then to 40.7 percent, then up to 50.7 percent, and then up to 135.3 percent. Then, he slashed it to 57.6 percent. That is the result of empowering one person’s mood, not a policy.

To be sure, even if it is chaotic, ungoverning has a constituency. The wealthy win tax-cut extensions. Corporations profit from the evisceration of the government’s regulatory power. Republican officials who curry Trump’s favor win reelection. But ungoverning’s most seductive appeal is a claim that often goes unstated and lies just beneath the surface of Trump’s rhetoric. This is a claim about the kind of power the country needs. At this point in its history, the theory goes, the United States requires a willful and largely unaccountable power to impose changes that leaders with more delicate sensibilities and procedural scruples cannot ever accomplish. Only a president who threatens the destruction of NATO can successfully pressure Europe to pay more for its collective defense. Only a powerful will can disrupt the World Trade Organization and impose a trading regime that truly benefits the United States. Ending unauthorized immigration requires a leader unworried about legal formalities. And disrupting the liberal elite consensus on cultural issues demands a president powerful enough to get what he wants. The strongman, in short, promises to do what the slow workings of constitutional government and the conventional policy process cannot.

BREAKING POINT

American politics was once utterly predictable. Every four years, the country had an election. Each time, either a Democrat or a Republican won. And although Democrats and Republicans had different priorities, American citizens could expect some continuity of governance, especially in foreign policy. Both parties, after all, supported U.S. global leadership. As a result, even when they had sharp disagreements with their predecessors, presidents were careful not to change too much, too quickly. U.S. President Barack Obama, for example, was a longtime critic of the Iraq invasion, but he nonetheless kept his predecessor’s secretary of defense, Robert Gates, for the first two and a half years of his presidency. He did not want to introduce unpredictability and chaos.

Trump has ended that tradition. In his desire to weaken the state and rebuild it around him, he has made chaos the new standard. The range of future possibilities for Washington is thus wide. It is reasonable to wonder if there will even be a regular presidential election in 2028. Trump, after all, has flirted with the idea of seeking a third term; his official store sells “Trump 2028” hats. The worst-case scenarios seem more plausible than ever before.

For some Americans, fed up with the status quo, such destruction may seem exciting. According to a recent Pew survey, 32 percent of U.S. respondents agreed with the idea that rule by a strong leader or the military is a good way of governing. (By contrast, only eight percent of Swedes agreed.) But such voters may quickly develop buyer’s remorse and turn on the president. Ungoverners will not prove capable of managing the economy, of steering policy in a prudent way, or of generally delivering results. To defeat them, however, opponents have to offer more than rejection and condemnation. They have to offer a promise that inspires popular faith in a government that can govern.

Foreign Affairs · More by Russell Muirhead · September 5, 2025

17. Another Reason Not to Trust the ‘Experts’

Anyone who calls themselves an expert likely is not one.

Excerpts:

Today, professors, journalists, and so-called human rights organizations enlist themselves in an information war to defame the world’s only Jewish state. They conduct their campaign even though it is helping Hamas, the authors of the October 7, 2023 pogrom, survive and continue its reign of terror in Gaza.

No wonder Hamas hailed the IAGS resolution in a statement on Monday evening. An organization whose explicit goal is to commit genocide against Israel and the Jewish people has been recast as the victims of a genocide by the country trying to prevent it.

As the genocide scholar Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt told The Free Press: “These scholars are politicizing the field. . . . Their selective criticism (and failure to condemn the originators of the entire conflagration) speaks volumes.”

Lipstadt is right, and we’ll go a step further: Since there’s such consensus among so-called scholars, IAGS ought to release the names of Israel’s “genocide” accusers.

Another Reason Not to Trust the ‘Experts’

The International Association of Genocide Scholars calls itself a body of experts, but joining requires only a form and a fee. Members include parody accounts like ‘Mo Cookie' and ‘Emperor Palpatine.’

https://www.thefp.com/p/another-reason-not-to-trust-the-experts

By The Editors

09.03.25 —

The Big Read

Palestinians carrying essential belongings flee their houses after Israel issued new evacuation orders in Beit Lahia, Gaza Strip, on November 5, 2024. (Mahmoud ssa/Anadolu via Getty Images)

0:00

One of the great lessons of the past decade is that when you read a variation of “experts say” in a headline, you ought to think twice and for yourself.

This week, the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) voted on a resolution that accused Israel of committing genocide in its war against Hamas. Like moths to a flame, the mainstream press ran wild with the story of the organization’s declaration.

“Israel Is Committing Genocide in Gaza, Leading Scholars’ Association Says,” ran the headline in The Washington Post.

The Guardian quoted the president of the association, Melanie O’Brien, declaring that the resolution represented “a definitive statement from experts in the field of genocide studies that what is going on on the ground in Gaza is genocide.” In another interview with ABC News Australia, O’Brien boasted that the resolution passed with nearly 90 percent support.

The BBC’s headline read: “Israel Committing Genocide in Gaza, World’s Leading Experts Say.”

The problem for these publications is that if you kick the tires—even slightly—it becomes obvious that the resolution is a sham, top to bottom.

Let’s start with the organization itself. According to O’Brien, the members of her organization “mainly consist of people who are academics, so scholarly experts, but our membership is also made up of people who come from different communities within the field of genocide prevention, education, and punishment.”

On Tuesday evening, Salo Aizenberg, a board member of Honest Reporting and contributor to NGO Monitor, tested that proposition. After exploring the IAGS website, he found that he could become a member of the organization with just a $30 contribution. “This organization that purports to be a leading organization of scholars is open to anyone who is interested,” he told The Free Press.

After Aizenberg posted about his new membership to X, others joined in on the fun. Newly minted genocide scholars now include Emperor Palpatine, the villain of the Star Wars franchise; Adolf Hitler of Gaza City; and our favorite, “Mo Cookie,” who turns out to be the Cookie Monster wearing a green scarf with the Hamas logo.

IAGS’s open membership is important because as Aizenberg learned in his research on the website, 80 of the 500 members of IAGS all claim to be based in Iraq—a country not known for universities with robust genocide scholarship. But it’s even worse than that. Only 108 out of the organization’s 500 members actually voted for the resolution. So contra O’Brien, only 21.6 percent of the IAGS supported it, not nearly 90 percent. That figure represents 108 out of the 129 people who bothered voting for the resolution at all.

What’s more: The process appears rigged from the start.

Read

Mistakes at ‘The New York Times’ Only Go in One Direction

One IAGS member, Sara Brown, the author of Gender and Genocide in Rwanda, posted on X that the leadership of the organization prevented members from filing comments criticizing the resolution before the vote. “We were promised a town hall, which is a common practice for controversial resolutions,” she wrote, “but the president of the association reversed that. The association has also refused to disclose who were the authors of the resolution.”

After reading through the resolution, it’s easy to understand why the identities of the authors were shielded from the other members of the group. It’s riddled with inaccuracies and deceptive language. For example, the first paragraph asserts that Israel has killed “59,000 adults and children in Gaza,” without distinguishing between civilians and Hamas fighters.

The resolution makes no mention of how Hamas places weapons caches in homes, schools, and hospitals. Nor does it bother to note that Hamas fighters wear plain clothes. It fails to acknowledge the elaborate and massive tunnel network underneath Gaza, and how the portals to this subterranean city are often situated in residential buildings.

Another source for the resolution is Francesca Albanese, the discredited UN special rapporteur. In December she posted on X that “many Jewish people worldwide, unconditionally in love with Israel, live a lie. Premised upon the invisibilization/erasure of the Palestinians, Israel’s founding ideology (and lie) is now leading to a genocide. What a disgraceful epilogue.”

Whatever one wants to call this, it’s not scholarship. But it’s also—at this point—to be expected. To read a headline with “[Insert Topic], Experts Say” today begs disbelief on the part of the reader, in part because of stories like this one. Activists are dressed up as scholars and subject matter experts, and their words are taken as gospel in news reports.

Read

Matti Friedman: Is Gaza Starving? Searching for the Truth in an Information War.

Today, professors, journalists, and so-called human rights organizations enlist themselves in an information war to defame the world’s only Jewish state. They conduct their campaign even though it is helping Hamas, the authors of the October 7, 2023 pogrom, survive and continue its reign of terror in Gaza.

No wonder Hamas hailed the IAGS resolution in a statement on Monday evening. An organization whose explicit goal is to commit genocide against Israel and the Jewish people has been recast as the victims of a genocide by the country trying to prevent it.

As the genocide scholar Ambassador Deborah Lipstadt told The Free Press: “These scholars are politicizing the field. . . . Their selective criticism (and failure to condemn the originators of the entire conflagration) speaks volumes.”

Lipstadt is right, and we’ll go a step further: Since there’s such consensus among so-called scholars, IAGS ought to release the names of Israel’s “genocide” accusers.

18. Where Do You Get Your Information?*

A chart is at the link.

This is scary.

Where Do You Get Your Information?*

Certainly not the New York Public Library

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/where-do-you-get-your-information?utm

Our Correspondent

Sep 05, 2025

∙ Paid

If you think you’re using AI to do your “original” research into how Basuki Tjahaja Purnama blasphemed the Quran during his Jakarta gubernatorial race, or that the Philippines had 6 million drug addicts when Rodrigo Duterte was running for president, or whether vaccines cause autism, or if Ivermectin works better in treating Covid, likely you aren’t.

Social Media Today recently published a study by Semrush, an online management and content marketing firm, showing that AI gets most of its information from, in order, Reddit, Wikipedia, YouTube, Google, Yelp, and Facebook. (The chart above adds up to more than 100 percent because people use more than one source.)

“Today’s AI models are next to useless when you’re trying to get to an authoritative source. They’re only a tip sheet, and not a very good one,” said Russell Todd, a retired former professor at the University of Texas School of Journalism and Media in Austin and a former copy chief at the Wall Street Journal, in an interview. “You’re better off to pick up the phone and call someone who knows the turf. If you’re using AI as a writing tool, you’re just training it to replace you completely.”

It’s obvious how harmful this can be as exemplified by the infamous Comet Ping Pong restaurant episode when activists prowling the Internet implicated the restaurant, where kids go to play ping pong and eat pizza, and several Democratic bigwigs in a supposed child trafficking ring dubbed "Pizzagate,” impelling one crackpot to fire an AR-15 in the restaurant in 2016, and another to start a fire in it in 2019.

But AI is an increasingly loud siren, available on the keyboard in front of you without moving from your chair. In November of 2023, for instance, it was discovered that the celebrated magazine Sports Illustrated was publishing articles by AI-generated writers, with the head shots the publication used of the authors listed on a site that sells AI-generated portraits. The Arena Group, Sports Illustrated‘s parent company, said the articles in question were licensed content from a third party, AdVon Commerce.

Reporters are obviously tempted by the ease and availability of AI to produce instant facts, but too often the facts aren’t facts. NewsGuard, which rates the reliability of online sources, found that by this May, more than 1,200 AI-generated news and information sites with seemingly legitimate names such as iBusiness Day and Ireland Top News “were publishing in 16 languages, churning out false claims and operating with little to no human oversight,” wrote Susan D’Agostino in the July 14 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. “This represented a more than a 20-fold jump in AI-generated ‘news’ sites in the past two years.”

It gets scarier. In a paper titled “AI Deception: A Survey of Examples, Risks, and Potential Solutions,” for the National Library of Medicine, researchers Peter S. Park, Simon Goldstein, Aidan O’Gara, Michael Chen, Dan Hendrycks write that “a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans,” the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth, “detailing risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI.”

To reduce the risk of AI deception, the authors write, “policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws, which help human users recognize AI systems and outputs. First, companies should be required to disclose whether users are interacting with an AI chatbot in customer-service settings, and chatbots should be required to introduce themselves as AIs rather than as human beings.”

Second, they say, “AI-generated outputs should be clearly flagged as such: images and videos generated by AIs should be shown with an identifying sign, such as a thick red border. These regulations could avoid cases such as (one) where a mental-health provider ran an experiment using GPT-3 to offer counseling without clearly revealing this to users.”

The point is, as everybody should know by now, if it’s on the Internet, it’s not just that you can’t trust it, but the ways of deceiving you into trusting it are growing exponentially as AI takes over. It’s unlikely that a major slice of the human race are going to listen, and Reddit, Wikipedia, Google, and Facebook will remain the primary source of information.

In traditional journalism, reporters have been trained by generations of editors to start out on a story by identifying a couple of credible primary and secondary sources, conducting in-person or phone interviews with sources on both sides of any issue, investigating public records and databases, go to events, prowl government meetings and offices, attend events and fact-check their information before they sit down to write. But independent journalism, the traditional counterweight to falsehood, faces economic decline, shrinking newsrooms, and eroding public trust.

*This article was written partly using information from Google as a source.

19. Navy reverses demotion of Rep. Ronny Jackson, ex-White House doctor

Navy reverses demotion of Rep. Ronny Jackson, ex-White House doctor

Following his 2019 retirement from the Navy, Jackson was retroactively demoted following a yearslong investigation into his behavior when he was a physician to President Donald Trump and former President Barack Obama.

NBC News · The Associated Press · September 4, 2025

WASHINGTON — Rep. Ronny Jackson announced that the Navy has restored his retired rank of rear admiral, overturning a 2022 demotion that followed a scathing investigation that found major issues with his behavior while he was the top White House physician.

The Texas Republican on Wednesday posted a June 13 letter from Navy Secretary John Phelan saying he had reinstated Jackson to the retired rank of a one-star admiral following a "review of all applicable reports and references." The Navy confirmed the move, with a spokesperson for Phelan saying he "greatly appreciates Congressman Jackson's decades of distinguished naval service."

The decision to restore Jackson's rank comes as the Pentagon has become increasingly transparent in offering benefits and consideration to those it sees as personally loyal supporters of President Donald Trump, while those who are seen as unsupportive of Trump have been pushed out of senior roles across the military. Two weeks ago, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kruse, who oversaw the intelligence agency that produced an initial intelligence assessment of U.S. damage to Iranian nuclear sites that angered Trump.

Following his 2019 retirement from the Navy, Jackson was retroactively demoted following a yearslong investigation into his behavior when he was a physician to Trump and former President Barack Obama. An inspector general's report found that he made "sexual and denigrating" comments about a female subordinate, violated the policy on drinking alcohol on a presidential trip and took prescription-strength sleeping medication that prompted worries from his colleagues about his ability to provide proper medical care.

Jackson gained notoriety for his over-the-top pronouncements about Trump's health during his first term. He was elected to Congress in 2020 following a failed effort in the first Trump administration to appoint him the secretary of Veterans Affairs in 2018.

"I was, and still am, a retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral, and Joe Biden is a retired old FOOL," Jackson said on social media, where he has called himself an admiral despite his demotion.

Last week, military officials revealed that Ashli Babbitt, the rioter who was killed by a police officer during the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol, would be offered military funeral honors.

Babbitt was a U.S. Air Force veteran from California who was shot and killed wearing a Trump campaign flag wrapped around her shoulders while trying to climb through the broken window of a barricaded door leading to the Speaker's Lobby inside the Capitol as rioters interrupted the counting of electoral votes certifying Trump's 2020 loss to Biden.

NBC News · The Associated Press · September 4, 2025

20. We Need to Know History, Especially Now

It appears our society is generally ahistorical and anti-intellectual.

Excerpts:

History goes only one way, forward, and the history we’re living won’t be getting less rough with time. Neither will our political manners. Neither will the strains under which we are put as a society and a political culture.

But my generation owes those who follow more than “Here’s some cash,” “Toughen up” and “Get off my lawn.”

It’s hard to think of anything more helpful as the new year begins than reading history, spying out the moments of dignity and grace, seizing them and trying to pull them into the future.

We Need to Know History, Especially Now

A new collection of works by David McCullough helps put our tumultuous times in perspective.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/we-need-to-know-history-especially-now-politics-policy-public-standards-dbb73889

By Peggy Noonan

Sept. 4, 2025 6:15 pm ET

David McCullough at the National Portrait Gallery in Washington, May 13, 2011. Photo: Associated Press

Most of us see autumn as the real new year, involving a return to life and a reignition of things. A good time to step aside the fray and consider what propels you. We’re in a history-rich time, not a thin one, and restating your premises can be reorienting.

Some of what drives this column is a belief that reading history—bothering to know it and reflect on it—is good. Remembering its helpful and even inspiring parts is constructive, not sweet. Seeing and naming various current deteriorations isn’t reactionary or nostalgic and can function as at least an attempt at correction.

This summer I read the historian David McCullough’s 1995 speech accepting the National Book Foundation’s highest honor, the Medal for Distinguished Contribution to American Letters. It constitutes the brief first chapter of “History Matters,” a collection of McCullough’s essays, interviews and speeches, out this month from Simon & Schuster. Collections that include some previously unpublished work (McCullough died in August 2022) can have a barrel-scraping feel but this one doesn’t—its seriousness and simplicity reflect the author and make for beauty. At the time of the address McCullough had written “Mornings on Horseback,” “Truman” and “The Johnstown Flood”; “John Adams,” “1776” and “The Wright Brothers” would follow. There couldn’t have been a worthier recipient.

Why does history matter? “History shows us how to behave,” McCullough begins. “History teaches, reinforces what we believe in, what we stand for, and what we ought to be willing to stand up for.”

It is not only the dry recording of facts, it has a moral quotient. “At their core, the lessons of history are largely lessons in appreciation.” Everything we have, he says, all the great institutions, the arts, our law, exists because those who came before us built them. Why did they do that? What drove them, what obstacles did they face, how are we doing as stewards and creators? “Indifference to history isn’t just ignorant, it’s rude.” This is a wonderful sentence because it is true and bluntly put. Ignorance is a form of ingratitude.

History encourages “a sense of proportion about life,” gives us a sense of scale. “What history teaches, it teaches mainly by example.”

To live in an era of momentous change and huge transitions is to experience great pressure. Knowing history, reading it, imparts “a sense of navigation,” a new realization of what we’ve been through and are made of. Those who came before us were tough: “There’s no one who hasn’t an ancestor who went through some form of hell.”

In the end, knowing history “is an extension of life. It both enlarges and intensifies the experience of being alive.”

McCullough looms large in my life both as professional whose work I could aim my arrow at, and as spur. I would hear from him when a column spoke to him. After one mentioned the importance of great formal ceremonies marking the passing of the famous dead, he wrote to say yes, such things, “remind us of our dignity.” That dignity, which he sensed and portrayed in his work, and which he knew was aligned with and not poised against finding the truth, was important to him.

Here I jump to an aspect of this column, which is the importance of what was.

Earlier this summer I wrote that we now routinely say and do things in our public life that are at odds with our history, that are unlike us. I focused on President Trump’s language and imagery when speaking to the troops at Fort Bragg, N.C., in early June. His remarks were partisan in the extreme, even for him; it was a Trump rally, not a president addressing the troops. Elsewhere, on sending the National Guard into Los Angeles: “When they spit, we hit.” All of it, the rally and what he said, was, I said, the kind of thing we don’t do. And we mustn’t lose sight of what we don’t do.

Soon after I got a note from a veteran political consultant who’d prospered in both the old political world and the new. He wanted me to know he “agreed with every word.” He then explained with some patience and yet a kind of proud shame that things have changed: “Today people like me raise money and put activists on the payroll to pour kerosene on the fires they ignite.” Protests in the previous political era were organic and natural. “They are now a division of political campaign structure.” The young people he works with know no other reality. “I’m saddened that the political world I have in some part helped construct has come to this.”

He was trying to help me: I had perhaps not noticed our politics had become increasingly malevolent. I replied that I knew quite a bit of what he and his colleagues on both sides are up to, and that as I work I often have the young of politics and media in mind. I am trying to tell them something, to give them a template. I said it is our job, in our generation, to bring the sturdier public values of the recent and distant past into the current moment. We have to put forward those ways from the past that helped, that were superior, or no one will know they existed. And no one will be able to imitate or absorb or reflect them.

“I write for those 33-year-old operatives you speak of who have actually never seen grace.” If they don’t know what it looks like they can’t emulate it, they can’t adopt it and give it new life because they don’t know what it was.

What I didn’t say but meant: When you see a decline in public standards that were once fairly high, when you see our public life become rougher and uglier, you can accept it, even go with it, or you can fight, you can push hard against what’s pushing you, as Flannery O’Connor put it.

And what I’m saying is this is our way of pushing hard. McCullough might say it’s ungrateful not to.

You can’t be dreamy about the past and say, “It was nice then.” It was never nice, it was made by human beings. You can’t say, “People were better then.” They weren’t. But in even the recent past the allowable boundaries of public behavior were firmer, and the expectations we held for our leaders higher. And their public behavior (not private, or not necessarily private) was often preferable to the public behavior we see today. So you don’t want to live in the past, but you do want to bring the best of the past into the present.

History goes only one way, forward, and the history we’re living won’t be getting less rough with time. Neither will our political manners. Neither will the strains under which we are put as a society and a political culture.

But my generation owes those who follow more than “Here’s some cash,” “Toughen up” and “Get off my lawn.”

It’s hard to think of anything more helpful as the new year begins than reading history, spying out the moments of dignity and grace, seizing them and trying to pull them into the future.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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