Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Reflect upon your present blessings — of which every man has many — not on your past misfortunes, of which all men have some.”

– Charles Dickens

"We must be willing to get rid of the life we’ve planned so as to have the life that is waiting for us. The old skin has to be shed before the new one can come.”

– Joseph Campbell

“I hope that in this year to come, you make mistakes. Because if you are making mistakes, then you are making new things, trying new things, learning, living, pushing yourself, changing yourself, changing your world. You're doing things you've never done before, and more importantly, you're Doing Something. So that's my wish for you, and all of us, and my wish for myself. Make New Mistakes. Make glorious, amazing mistakes. Make mistakes nobody's ever made before. Don't freeze, don't stop, don't worry that it isn't good enough, or it isn't perfect, whatever it is: art, or love, or work or family or life. Whatever it is you're scared of doing, Do it. Make your mistakes, next year and forever.”

– Neil Gaiman

1. At Least 10 Killed in New Orleans in What FBI Calls Terrorist Attack

2. How to respond to Russia’s hybrid war on the West? Hybrid counterattack.

3. OSS founder Gen. William “Wild Bill” Donovan was born OTD 1883

4. Ukraine Advances Killer Robot Drones With More Automation, Efficiency

5. Narrative Intelligence in Internet-Based Military Information Support Operations: A Cyberpsychology Perspective Under the Irregular Warfare Construct

6. Drinking conviction against 2 members of ‘MARSOC 3’ overturned, ending yearslong case

7. Israel’s Spike Firefly Drone is a Master of Urban Warfare

8. NATO gets tougher on hybrid warfare

9. Finland’s seizure of a tanker shows how to fight Russian sabotage

10. Xi Jinping has much to worry about in 2025

11. Syria's U.S.-trained opposition fighters wait to learn of their role in a new Syria

12. China stirred the Pacific pot, Japan powered up and Aussie AUKUS anxiety emerged: 2024 in review

13. Experts warn Trump’s plan to name cartels ‘terrorists’ could open door to military operations in Mexico

14. When the War on Drugs Goes Too Far: The Cartel Terrorism Fallacy

15. New special trial counsels take over prosecution of major sexual harassment cases from commanding officers

16. The Dogs of (Urban) War: Lessons from Oketz, the Israel Defense Forces’ Specialized Canine Unit

17. The Man Who Almost Changed China

18. Elon Musk has done it: iPhones and Android smartphones can now use his satellites to make calls anywhere on Earth

1. At Least 10 Killed in New Orleans in What FBI Calls Terrorist Attack

What a terrible way to begin the new year.

We do not need this reminder that terrorism is still a threat. I just heard the spokesman on TV say that he had a ISIS flag.

Excerpts:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation identified him as 42-year-old Shamsud-Din Jabbar, a U.S. citizen from Texas. Investigators said they found the flag, weapons and a potential explosive device inside the rented Ford pickup and were working to learn more about the driver’s potential ties to terrorist organizations. The bureau said it was running down leads to identify any possible associates of Jabbar.

A social-media account associated with Jabbar describes him as a veteran. U.S. Army officials are trying to determine whether he served either in active duty, Army National Guard or reserves, a defense official said.

At Least 10 Killed in New Orleans in What FBI Calls Terrorist Attack

Officials identify suspect as 42-year-old Shamsud-Din Jabbar

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/ten-killed-in-new-orleans-as-vehicle-hits-crowd-55782681?st=TbxeHc&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Sadie Gurman

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Updated Jan. 1, 2025 1:48 pm ET

How to respond to Russia’s hybrid war on the West? Hybrid counterattack.

Russia is suspected in a wide range of indirect attacks in Europe, including cutting undersea cables.

December 31, 2024 at 4:46 p.m. ESTYesterday at 4:46 p.m. EST

6 min

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Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks in Moscow on Dec. 19. (Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP)

On Christmas Day, a cable carrying electricity from Finland to Estonia was severed in the Baltic Sea, while four other submarine cables carrying data were damaged. Finnish authorities found an anchor drag mark on the seabed and seized a tanker that is believed to be part of the “shadow fleet” that Russia uses to export oil and gas in violation of Western sanctions.

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This is only the latest act of sabotage in Europe attributed to the Kremlin. Just a month ago, a Chinese ship was believed to have cut two other data cables in Swedish waters at Moscow’s behest. In the past year, Russian operatives are also suspected of trying to plant incendiary devices on a cargo plane in Germany; plotting to kill the head of a major German company manufacturing weapons for Ukraine; committing arson attacks in Poland, Britain and Germany; and interfering in elections in Romania and Moldova, among other countries.

Russia is conducting “an intensifying campaign of hybrid attacks across our allied territories, interfering directly in our democracies, sabotaging industry and committing violence,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said in November. But what exactly is a “hybrid war,” and what should the West do about it?

Opinions on the war in Ukraine

Opinion

Marc Thiessen

Does Trump want Putin to get Ukraine’s $26 trillion in gas and minerals?

Opinion

Marc Thiessen

How Trump can end the war in Ukraine for good

Opinion

Editorial Board

Trump wants a deal on Ukraine. But a bad deal is worse than none.

Opinion

Edward Fishman

Biden’s gloves can finally come off to help Trump end the Ukraine war

Opinion

Josh Rogin

Trump’s MAGA advisers are setting him up for failure in Ukraine

Opinion

David Ignatius

The right way for Trump to play peacemaker

Opinion

Lee Hockstader

Biden has a 76-day window after the election to get Ukraine right

Opinion

Josh Rogin

Ukrainians in Pennsylvania are split on Harris and Trump. How can that be?

Opinion

Letters to the Editor

I’m a peace worker. But this is what Ukraine needs to win its war.

Opinion

David Ignatius

Don’t underestimate the risks of escalation over Ukraine

Opinion

George F. Will

As Putin’s military barbarism continues, U.S. credibility is at stake

Opinion

Editorial Board

Ukraine needs long-range missiles before winter’s onset

Opinion

David Ignatius

Ukraine is bleeding out. It cannot fight forever.

Opinion

Fareed Zakaria

In tense Kyiv, Ukrainians fear the war could be decided within months

Opinion

Lee Hockstader

Germany is wobbling on Ukraine — and the rest of Europe is watching

Opinion

Max Boot

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive isn’t just a raid. It’s upending assumptions.

Opinion

Serhii Plokhy

When a 12-hour shift turned into three weeks at Chernobyl

Opinion

Editorial Board

How an emboldened Ukraine caught Russia flat-footed

Opinion

Lee Hockstader

‘B-girl Kate,’ an Olympic emblem of Ukraine’s survival

Opinion

Max Boot

Surprise Ukraine offensive pokes Russia’s soft underbelly

Coinage of the term “hybrid war” is sometimes credited to retired Marine Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman, in 2007, but Hoffman tells me that it originated with Jim Mattis, the now-retired Marine general and former defense secretary. Mattis gave a speech on the subject in 2005, and Mattis and Hoffman co-authored a prescient article that year in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine entitled “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.”

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Their article warned that in future “hybrid wars” the United States could find itself dealing “with the fall out of a failed state” that “lost control of some biological agents or missiles”; “acts of violence” by “non-state actors against our critical infrastructure”; or “other forms of economic war” or “computer network attacks against military or financial targets.”

Mattis tells me that he adopted the term “hybrid war” to “break out” of the conventional mindset that America is at peace unless U.S. military forces are engaged in a shooting war. This binary logic doesn’t cover lower-level threats such as cyberattacks on the U.S. homeland — or cables cut in the Baltic Sea. “If we’re waiting for the ‘real’ war per our past time’s definition, we may not recognize the enemy is fighting war against us now,” Mattis wrote in an email last week. “The ‘hybrid’ term was used as a nudge to a broader view of warfare.”

It is imperative that the United States adopt a more expansive view of conflict, because that is how our adversaries think. Indeed, two People’s Liberation Army colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published an influential book called “Unrestricted Warfare” in 1999 that laid out a vision of what might be called hybrid warfare with Chinese characteristics.

These Chinese officers were reacting to the mastery displayed by the U.S. military in the 1991 Gulf War. Realizing that weaker nations such as China could not compete in conventional military terms in the short term, they argued for widening the concept of conflict to include such covert measures as buying off an opponent’s legislators and media outlets, assassinating financial executives, fomenting environmental disasters and launching computer network attacks. “The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden,” they wrote.

Fourteen years later, a U.S. Defense Department report in 2013 identified the “three warfares” strategy in Chinese military doctrine — psychological warfare (“to influence and/or disrupt an opponent’s decision-making capability”), media warfare (“aimed at long-term influence”) and lawfare (which “exploits the legal system to achieve political or commercial objectives”). China has used the “three warfares” approach to unlawfully assert control over the South China Sea by, among other measures, concocting spurious historical arguments (about a “nine-dash line”), building artificial reefs, and sending armed “fishing boats” to harass and chase away mariners from other nations.

Iran is another country that has made a heavy investment in hybrid warfare in recent decades. It has sought to assert its control across the “Shiite crescent” in the Middle East by backing proxy militias including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, while also interfering in U.S. elections and hiring criminals to assassinate regime foes abroad.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria is a major setback for Iran (and Russia), but Tehran is likely to simply double down on its hybrid strategy. Even the “hermit kingdom” of North Korea is engaged in hybrid warfare, including cyberattacks and supplying munitions and troops for Russia’s use in Ukraine.

Russia, though, remains the preeminent practitioner of hybrid warfare. Its tactics range from conventional combat operations in Ukraine to sabotage and political influence operations in Europe to the dispatch of mercenaries to Africa and the Middle East to plunder resources and prop up warlords. All of it is designed to regain the power Russia lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

How should the West respond? The Center for European Policy Analysis recently published a useful article on “Making Russia Pay for Hybrid Attacks.” The author, Lithuanian diplomat Eitvydas Bajarunas, argued that the West must wage its own hybrid warfare that is “sufficiently devastating to make Russian eyes water and deter future misbehavior.”

His recommendations included increasing economic sanctions on “Russian decision-makers”; pursuing legal actions against individuals “involved in hybrid actions”; using cyberattacks to disable “Russian-controlled” botnets and servers; removing social media accounts that “spread false information”; and stepping up military efforts to counter Russian sabotage. One could add other ideas, such as efforts to bypass Russian censorship and sabotage Russia’s oil-tanker shadow fleet — operations that Western intelligence agencies could undertake.

Mattis tells me he agrees that the United States needs to actively wage hybrid warfare. He suggests the need for a classified presidential decision memorandum, completed after consultation with leading members of Congress, to “frame the actions.” The retired general advocates a strategy to “widen the competitive space,” with a “commitment to make it hurt,” adding that the “indirect approach would allow us to seize the operational initiative while staying in retaliation mode [versus] escalation mode.”

But, unfortunately, it’s hard to imagine Donald Trump, the most Russia-sympathetic, NATO-skeptical president of modern times, implementing such an agenda once in office again. With the Trump administration taking charge, simply continuing current efforts to counter Russian hybrid operations, much less increasing them, will be a major challenge.

On Dec. 23, congressional Republicans succeeded in shutting down the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, which was set up to monitor and counter disinformation campaigns from Russia, China and other U.S. adversaries. MAGA Republicans falsely accused the center of engaging in censorship. That amounts to an act of unilateral disarmament in the multifront hybrid war that, like it or not, the United States is engaged against a determined (and increasingly allied) axis of adversaries.

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By Max Boot

Max Boot is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Pulitzer Prize finalist in biography, he is the author, most recently, of the New York Times bestseller “Reagan: His Life and Legend," which was named one of the 10 best books of 2024 by the New York Times.

3. OSS founder Gen. William “Wild Bill” Donovan was born OTD 1883

The OSS Society

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8h • Edited •

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/osssociety_oss-founder-gen-william-wild-bill-donovan-activity-7280167656890986496-3lsT?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop

8 hours ago

OSS founder Gen. William “Wild Bill” Donovan was born OTD 1883. He is the only person in our nation’s history who received its four highest decorations, including the Medal of Honor. He is regarded as the founding father of the US intelligence and special operations communities. Allen Dulles said about him: “He traveled widely. He understood people. He had a flair for the dangerous tempered with judgment. In short, he had the qualities to be desired in an intelligence officer.” He recruited what one OSS veteran said was “the greatest collection of people in the history of the world.”

4. Ukraine Advances Killer Robot Drones With More Automation, Efficiency

Ukraine Advances Killer Robot Drones With More Automation, Efficiency

Military-tech companies enhance autonomous craft for front-line fighting

https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-advances-killer-robot-drones-with-more-automation-efficiency-0ab132a6?mod=latest_headlines

By James Marson

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Dec. 31, 2024 9:00 pm ET

LVIV, Ukraine—It was the year of the explosive drone: speedy, agile craft the size of dinner plates that in 2024 became Ukraine’s main defensive weapon against massive Russian ground assaults.

The new year will see the rise of killer robots, as computers take over more functions from human pilots, including flying to the battlefield and striking selected targets.

Automation could help the Ukrainians hold off a giant foe determined to take control of their country no matter the cost in men and machines, even if the new Trump administration slows or halts arms deliveries to Kyiv.

But humans will remain in control. Next-generation drones won’t be swarms of fully automated, computer-controlled slaughterbots that color the dreams of military geeks and the nightmares of moralists. Instead, Ukrainian companies are seeking incremental advances that boost a strike drone’s chances of reaching and hitting its target.

“We have been trying to make autonomous cars for years but still have drivers,” says Andriy Zvirko, chief strategy officer for Sine.Engineering, a Ukrainian drone-technology developer.

Rather than replace drone pilots, Sine aims to help them by lowering the skill level needed to operate a drone, Zvirko says.

Andriy Zvirko, chief strategy officer at Sine.Engineering; drone samples at Sine's western Ukraine office.

Augmenting human work with automation is increasingly common across industries. Boeing and Airbus for decades have offered pilots a growing list of options to let onboard computers handle tasks ranging from flying a plane in cruise to landing in dense fog. Companies in sectors from car-making to e-commerce, from Toyota to Amazon.com, have found that a mix of human labor and automation is often most effective.

Industrial robots are usually assigned the tasks they perform better or faster than humans. The same is happening with Ukraine’s drones.

Ukrainian defense planners plot their progression toward full automation on a 10-level ladder of advancement, with fully independent drone swarms near the top. Drones are already in use employing computer-vision for autonomous targeting, and they rank around four on the scale, says Max Makarchuk, head of artificial intelligence at Brave1, a Ukrainian government platform for defense-tech coordination.

“We move gradually, depending on the readiness and effectiveness of each type of development, and adapt them for serial or mass production only when they demonstrate practical benefits for the military,” Makarchuk says.

Ukraine produced well over one million small, explosive aerial craft in 2024, and they are now responsible for most front-line strikes, officials say. Most are first-person view drones, or FPVs, controlled by a pilot who wears goggles that stream a live feed from a camera on the machine. Generally less than 10 inches across, they can carry about 9 pounds of explosives over roughly 12 miles and detonate when the drone hits a target.

With artillery shells in short supply for much of 2024, in part because of political delays in fresh U.S. supplies, Ukraine has relied on drones to halt column after column of armored vehicles and kill thousands of Russian infantrymen. But Russia has still advanced, and the Kremlin says its goal of taking effective control over Ukraine remains unchanged.

For Ukraine, with a population one-quarter of Russia’s, the best way to stop the invader is to increase Russian losses to an unbearable level while reducing its own costs.

Automating drones can help Ukraine deploy them more effectively. At the moment, efficiency is the main problem, due to the skill and labor needed to deploy drones and to Russian countermeasures, mainly electronic warfare. The result is that, depending on the skill level of pilots, strike rates can be as low as one in 10 craft hitting their target.

A first-person view drone from Ukrainian manufacturing company Wild Hornets.

Instead of seeking one cure-all, Sine is among those companies taking on the challenges piece by piece—seeking the quickest, simplest and most cost-effective solutions to lighten the load on pilots.

The ethos runs counter to the approach of most Western military planners, who generally seek game-changing advances that leapfrog adversaries’ technologies. While those efforts can yield breakthroughs like stealth, GPS and precision-targeting, they can take years to emerge, devour vast sums and end up as expensive failures. Ukraine’s wartime approach aims to keep development time and budgets at minimum for maximum results.

“You can create the best thing in the world, but it can cost a lot and you can’t produce a lot in a short period of time,” says Andriy Chulyk, co-founder and chief executive of Sine. “But we are fighting now.”

Russian electronic-warfare equipment is the main impediment to successful strikes. Russian jammers seek to overload the frequencies used to send signals from the pilot’s controller to the drone, causing it to crash. Ukrainian drones also need to avoid friendly jammers used to stop Russian craft. That means a skilled pilot needs to steer a careful path and avoid all electronic-warfare equipment to reach the target.

Sine was founded in 2022 and got its start providing its own jammers that counter Russian surveillance drones. After realizing that most drone manufacturers used cheap commercial communications units on their craft, Sine created a replacement command-and-control module that works across many bandwidths simultaneously, allowing it to avoid jammers focused on specific frequencies.

“Usually a pilot has to find a way to reach the battlefield and avoid all that jamming. Our module does this automatically,” Chulyk says.

No device is unjammable, Chulyk acknowledges, but the aim is to create an affordable solution that can’t be reasonably countered in a front-line trench system, given the cost and power demands of fielding many jammers.

Drone warfare is becoming more automated, with software on a mobile phone and first-person view drone samples; Sine.Engineering CEO and co-founder Andriy Chulyk.

Sine produces thousands of the modules a month and sells them at an affordable price, to make a thin profit to reinvest into further research and production.

It is one of dozens of startups in Ukraine tackling various aspects of drone warfare and automation. Many both compete and cooperate, coordinating through Brave1.

“We cooperate with everyone who has promising solutions, both in Ukraine and abroad,” says Makarchuk at Brave1.

Next up, Sine sought to address the lack of GPS on the front lines. Russian electronic warfare equipment knocks out GPS signals or sends false readings. Ukrainian pilots must rely on instructions from a navigator comparing the feed from a camera with a map in order to direct the drone to the target.

By adding software to the module, which is smaller than a playing card, and deploying a ground station and two beacons, Sine allows the pilot to pinpoint the location of a drone down to as little as 20 yards. Zvirko says it’s similar to technology used to track planes before GPS was deployed.

Using the positioning system, Sine is close to delivering a solution that enables the drones to fly themselves to the battlefield.

Currently, a drone pilot requires several weeks of training and can deploy one FPV at a time as part of a three-person team also including an assistant and a technician. Flying the drone to the target can be difficult: Russia deploys jammers that target analog video frequencies, cutting the feed to the pilot and making it impossible to fly.

Sine’s system, which is in final testing before battlefield deployment in coming weeks, can deliver a conveyor belt of drones for a pilot to take over and strike with.

Specialists running tests on drones before they are sent to the front line, in eastern Ukraine in November.

An operator uses an app created by Sine to control as many as 10 drones and select a point on a map that they will fly to. That allows a pilot to concentrate on his main role: Striking targets. Zvirko described it as like playing on a computer game with a cheat code for unlimited ammunition.

Sine is working with partners including Ukrainian startup Vyriy Drone on integrating the delivery system with so-called terminal guidance, a form of autopilot that allows operators to select a target for the drone to direct itself to, evading jamming aimed at overloading the link between pilot and craft. That could allow a single operator to direct several drones from launch to target, potentially in a location far from the battlefront where they will face fewer risks.

“With all the homing and the guidance, they could be in New York,” Zvirko says.

Enhanced technology will allow tactics to evolve. If one unit is sending the drones to the battlefield, three different teams could be picking them up and piloting them, hitting Russian positions from three different sides at the same time.

“Everything we are doing here, we are trying to lower the expertise of the guys who will use it,” says Chulyk. “For them, it will be like a computer game.”

Narrative Intelligence in Internet-Based Military Information Support Operations:

A Cyberpsychology Perspective Under the Irregular Warfare Construct

Abstract

In the digital age, misinformation has become a pervasive challenge, particularly in the

context of military information support operations (MISO). Conceptualizing narrative

intelligence as a critical tool in countering misinformation within the irregular warfare

construct—and examining the role of cyberpsychology in shaping narrative strategies—

allows for insight into the effective deployment of narrative intelligence in internet-based

MISO. This study highlights the advantages of narrative in misinformation operations,

including emotional connection, memorability, contextualization, counternarratives,

community building, and adaptability. Drawing on empirical evidence from psychology,

communication studies, and information warfare research, case studies demonstrate the

efficacy of narrative-based approaches in influencing beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors in

digital environments. Meta-analyses of narrative persuasion and studies on countering

violent extremism provide robust support for the strategic use of narratives in MISO. The

integration of cyberpsychology principles offers a deeper understanding of online behavior

and information consumption patterns, enhancing the effectiveness of narrative intelligence strategies. Findings indicate that by harnessing the power of narrative intelligence and leveraging cyberpsychology insights, MISO forces can effectively combat misinformation and promote accurate, evidence-based information in the digital battlespace. Continual adaptation in narrative intelligence approaches to meet the evolving challenges of the 21st- century information environment is necessary. This research contributes to the growing body of knowledge on information warfare tactics and provides practical implications for MISO practitioners in navigating the complex landscape of digital influence operations.

Introduction

The rapid proliferation of the internet and social media has transformed the landscape of

information warfare, presenting new challenges and opportunities for MISO. In this digital

age, misinformation has emerged as a significant threat, undermining the integrity of

information and eroding trust in institutions. As irregular warfare (IW) increasingly moves

into the cyber domain, the need for effective strategies to counter misinformation has

become paramount. Therefore, the conceptualization of narrative intelligence as a critical

tool in internet-based MISO will be explored by drawing upon the principles of

cyberpsychology to inform narrative strategies (1). Information warfare, broadly defined, is

the use and management of information to gain a competitive advantage over an adversary.

It differs from traditional warfare, which primarily involves physical confrontation, by

focusing on the cognitive and psychological aspects of conflict (2). Unlike hybrid warfare,

which blends conventional and unconventional methods, information warfare in the context

of IW emphasizes the manipulation of information flows and perceptions to achieve

strategic objectives (3). This approach is particularly relevant in the digital age, where the

battlespace extends beyond physical territories into the realm of social media, online

communities, and digital platforms. In this context, narrative intelligence emerges as a

crucial capability for navigating the complex information environment and effectively

countering adversarial narratives (4).

Continue read at the link: https://sway.cloud.microsoft/KsdQDUgArv4bV9ku?ref=Link

6. Drinking conviction against 2 members of ‘MARSOC 3’ overturned, ending yearslong case

No justice for Master Sgt. Rick Rodriguez.

What a bungled case this has been.

Drinking conviction against 2 members of ‘MARSOC 3’ overturned, ending yearslong case

The only felony conviction against Gunnery Sgts. Daniel Draher and Joshua Negron — drinking while deployed — has been overturned, putting a legal end to the case of the death of a former Green Beret six years ago in Iraq.

Jeff Schogol

Posted 4 Hours Ago

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals has overturned a felony conviction against retired Marine Gunnery Sgts. Daniel Draher and Joshua Negron of the “MARSOC 3,” finding that a senior Marine lawyer had illegally interfered in the case.

Negron, Draher, and Chief Petty Officer Eric Gilmet, a Navy corpsman — whom supporters refer to collectively as the “MARSOC 3” — were deployed to Iraq with the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion when they got into a fight with former Green Beret Rick Anthony on Jan. 1, 2019 outside a bar in Erbil.

During the altercation, Negron punched Rodriguez, who fell to the ground. The three men took Rodriguez to his on-base quarters and a co-worker monitored him, but Rodriguez started having difficulty breathing. Gilmet began treating Rodriguez, Draher’s civilian attorney told Task & Purpose in December 2019. Rodriguez was taken to an on-base medical center and eventually medically evacuated to Germany, where he died on Jan. 4, 2019.

In February 2023, a military jury found Negron and Draher not guilty of involuntary manslaughter, negligent homicide, and dereliction of duty in connection with Rodriguez’s death, but jurors found the two men guilty of violating General Order No. 1 for drinking alcohol.

Although the jury decided not to punish Draher and Negron under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, their conviction had been considered a felony by states and the federal system, said civilian attorney Phillip Stackhouse, who represented both Negron and Draher for their appeal

“Gunnery Sergeants Draher and Negon appreciate the thoughtful opinion of the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals,” Stackhouse told Task & Purpose. “Both look forward to correcting the conviction’s collateral damage on their service records and moving forward with their lives — with their legacy intact.”

Unlawful command influence

On Dec. 27, the court found that the deputy director of the Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division had committed unlawful command influence for his November 2021 comments that implied that military attorneys would face reprisal for defending their clients.

“Unlawful command influence” is a term under the Uniform Code of Military Justice that describes any actions commanders take that could be interpreted by subordinates as an order about whether to find an accused service member innocent or guilty.

“This case ably demonstrates why unlawful command influence remains the mortal enemy of military justice,” the court wrote in its decision about Negron. “And if military judges are the last sentinels protecting an accused from such influence, military defense counsel are often the first.”

U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command, or MARSOC, provided Task & Purpose with a statement acknowledging the court’s decision.

“MARSOC is aware that the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals ordered the dismissal with prejudice of the charge and specification in both cases,” the statement says. “As always, MARSOC respects the judicial process.”

Threats against a defense attorney

The prosecution against Draher, Negon, and Gilmet has been plagued by accusations of unlawful command influence since November 2021, when Marine Col. Christopher Shaw, who oversaw the assignments of all Marine judge advocates at the time, as deputy director of the Judge Advocate Division, appeared to threaten one of Gilmet’s attorneys, Marine Capt. Matthew Thomas.

During a meeting at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina that included other judge advocates Shaw said it was a “legal fiction” for military defense attorneys to think that they were protected from outside influences, Thomas later recounted in a written statement to investigators.

“Colonel Shaw then directly squared his shoulders and chair towards me and he did not break eye contact with me for a significant period of time,” Thomas wrote. “During that time, Colonel Shaw specifically stated, ‘Captain Thomas I know who you are and what cases you are on and you are not protected.’ Colonel Shaw followed up by stating, ‘…the [fitness report] process may shield you, but you are not protected. Our community is small and there are promotion boards and the lawyer on the promotion board will know you.’ Colonel Shaw reiterated comments such as ‘shielded but not protected,’ multiple times.”

Thomas wrote that Shaw also said defense attorneys who had represented the eight Marines accused of killing 24 Iraqi civilians in Haditha, Iraq, in November 2005 were not promoted. One of those attorneys, Colby Vokey, also represented Gilmet.

In a statement to investigators, Shaw wrote that he was not threatening Thomas. Instead, he was trying to explain that Marine defense attorneys cannot be protected by their chain of command from media and political scrutiny.

“I recall that I did state something to the effect that it is a ‘legal fiction’ to believe that the separate defense counsel chain of command precludes [judge advocate] leaders from knowing how [defense counsels] do their job, but this comment was intended merely to impart that [judge advocate] leaders recognize the tough work [defense counsels] do rather than to instill a fear of retribution; far from it,” Shaw wrote.

Ultimately, the investigation did not determine whether Shaw had committed unlawful command influence.

In February 2022, a military judge dismissed all charges against Gilmet, determining that Shaw’s comments to Thomas constituted “actual and apparent [Unlawful Command Influence].” But an appeals court reinstated the charges against Gilmet six months later, finding that Shaw’s remarks “will not otherwise affect the proceedings.”

In August 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces dismissed charges against Gilmet for the final time, ruling that the “Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Unlawful Command Influence] would not affect the proceedings.”

Most recently, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals wrote in its Dec. 27 opinion about Negron that Shaw’s comments about military attorneys who represented Marines in the Hadtiha case not getting prompted were particularly egregious.

“Colonel Shaw offered these specific cases to buttress his point that defense attorneys ‘may think they are shielded [from outside influence], but they are not protected,’” the court found. “Put another way, he had the receipts.”

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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

7. Israel’s Spike Firefly Drone is a Master of Urban Warfare

Israel’s Spike Firefly Drone is a Master of Urban Warfare

Israel has been at the forefront of understanding the often-radical changes in warfare over the last thirty years. The Spike Firefly drone is a testament to this.

The National Interest · by Brandon J. Weichert · December 31, 2024

While the Israelis failed to get back most of the hostages that Hamas took on that fateful day, they sapped Hamas’ capacity to wage war.

A key reason why the IDF was so brutally effective in breaking the martial prowess of Hamas was due to the deployment of radical, dare I say even exotic, technologies. One of those rare weapons the IDF used with such effectiveness was the Israeli Maoz (aka, Spike Firefly) kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

A Sky Monster

This sky monster is described as a “coaxial rotor loitering munition drone” that was specifically designed for urban warfare. If I saw this thing at night or sundown, it might be easy to believe that little gray men from Zeta Reticuli were attacking rather than the IDF—that’s how bizarre this vertical, twin-bladed sky machine looks.

When the Israelis chose to move in force into the Gaza Strip, the overpopulated southern strip of territory along the Eastern Mediterranean Sea between the Sinai Peninsula and southern Israel, they ran smack dab into the dread of most modern militaries: urban warfare.

Built up and overflowing with people in varying states of poverty (and anger toward Israel), the IDF risked kicking over a veritable hornet’s nest going in there. But the Israelis persevered. And that was in large part due to the innovative tactics and technologies that the IDF employed against Hamas.

There is some dispute as to whether the Israelis did, in fact, deploy the Spike Firefly loitering munitions drone in Gaza. Although, one can assume that the system was used in the horrible fighting against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. What is known is that the drone has been spotted engaging in operations in another terrorist hotspot where Israel is often conducting military operations, the West Bank city of Jenin.

Israel’s Spike Firefly drone is part of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems’ SPIKE family of precision-guided munitions. With their Spike Firefly, the Israelis are again offering the world a masterclass in what the next round of major wars will look like.

Indeed, the Spike Firefly is a model for the kind of network-centric warfare that will undoubtedly define the next great power conflict. That’s because the Spike Firefly shares real-time intelligence it gathers with other IDF elements, giving greater situational awareness to those advancing IDF elements.

The Specs

Spike Firefly carries a SPIKE NLOS (non-line-of-sight) missile and has a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capability. In terms of surveillance capacity, it offers its users “beyond-line-of-sight” (BLOS) attack modes. In other words, this thing can kill you up close or far away. Spike Firefly can get you by seeing you or simply detecting you with sensors. What’s more, it is a semi-autonomous system. Spike Firefly can operate on its own or with a human operator in control.

As for some of its more advanced surveillance systems, it has dual infrared and electro-optical (EO) sensors. Again, its unique shape and relatively small size allow for it to not just loiter above buildings—the drone can pursue an enemy target into a building. This is the stuff of nightmares. Think of the opening scene from the original Terminator film, when the hero fighting the machines in the future is chased by a tiny flying machine that is utterly relentless in its quest to end his life.

Weighing in at 6.6 pounds and built for silent killing, there is a compartment that can carry a .77-pound bomb or an extra battery. In fact, that’s the only likely weakness of this drone: It has a limited battery life of around fifteen minutes. But the extra battery can be used to extend operational life to around thirty minutes (for reconnaissance missions).

Rafael says that the Spike Firefly has a topflight speed of 37 miles per hour and a diving speed of 43 mph, meaning this thing can come up on you fast. Further, its small size and silent running means you would be unlikely to even know it was over you until it was too late.

Israel has been at the forefront of understanding the often-radical changes in warfare over the last thirty years. The Spike Firefly drone is a testament to this. It is one of the most promising systems in the world and should be embraced not only more widely by the IDF but also by the United States and its allies.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Brandon J. Weichert · December 31, 2024

8. NATO gets tougher on hybrid warfare

NATO gets tougher on hybrid warfare

Russian-linked attacks on undersea infrastructure are rising

https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/12/31/finland-seizes-a-tanker-getting-tough-on-hybrid-warfare

Photograph: AFP

Dec 31st 2024|Tallinn

inland’s seizure on December 26th of the Eagle S, a Russian-linked sanctions-busting “dark fleet” tanker, could mark a turning-point in Europe’s response to the Kremlin’s hybrid-warfare campaign. The ship had been dragging its anchor along the seabed, trying to damage the 170km (106-mile) Estlink 2 power cable, which links Finland and Estonia. The shutdown of the cable led to a sudden drop in electricity supply to Estonia. Suspecting sabotage, the Finns sent coastguards to board the almost 20-year-old vessel, registered in the Cook Islands, and sailed it to Finnish waters for investigation.

A few days later Finland’s Bureau of Investigation confirmed that the dragging track was “dozens of kilometres” in length. The anchor has not been found. The damage to Estlink 2 will take months to repair. It is the first time a government has impounded a commercial ship for undersea-cable damage. There have been at least two similar incidents in recent months. Finland’s move represents a growing mood in favour of a tougher approach.

Map: The Economist

In mid-November the Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-flagged bulk carrier, was suspected of severing two undersea fibre-optic cables in Sweden’s exclusive economic zone. Swedish police boarded the vessel, but were only allowed to observe a lacklustre investigation by Chinese officials. After lying at anchor between Sweden and Denmark for a month the ship was allowed to continue its voyage. Germany’s defence minister, Boris Pistorius, had no doubt it was sabotage: “Nobody believes that these cables were accidentally severed.” Another Chinese ship, the Newnew Polar Bear, damaged the Balticonnector gas pipeline in October. Chinese authorities claimed this too was an accident.

Besides the acute threat of damage to infrastructure from such ships, there is also evidence of espionage. Eagle S and Swiftsea Rider, another dark-fleet tanker used by Russia to evade sanctions, share the same ship managers and have a similarly opaque ownership structure. Both were kitted out as “spy ships”, according to an investigation by Lloyd’s List Intelligence, a shipping information service. They were crammed with high-tech intelligence-gathering equipment used to monitor NATO ships and aircraft. It is not clear who would have operated the equipment on the Eagle S, but it is unlikely to have been the Georgian and Indian seafarers who made up most of its crew.

On December 30th NATO held a hastily convened meeting at its Brussels headquarters to discuss ways of countering the threat in the Baltic. In a statement the alliance said it would enhance its military presence “to maintain vigilance, increase situational awareness, and deter future incidents”. Other measures are under consideration too. In May NATO established a new Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure.

The tough response of Finland and Estonia was welcomed by other Baltic allies and by NATO’s new secretary-general, Mark Rutte, who are frustrated that not enough has been done until now to deter Russian sabotage. The Latvian prime minister, Evika Siliņa, told the BBC on December 29th that “we should stop them [dark-fleet tankers] going through the Baltic Sea…Our government has the power to seize those ships which do not obey international law and impose threats to our critical infrastructure.” In an interview with The Economist on December 16th the prime minister of Estonia, Kristen Michal, called Russian hybrid attacks “the first and utmost security threat in this region”. The challenge, he said, is “to catch those carrying out attacks and then to call Russia out”.

The seizure of the Eagle S sets an important precedent, says Charlie Edwards of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank. “In the past we have been too cautious. NATO hasn’t really had a strategy which has had any deterrent impact on the dark fleet.” Some 70% of Russia’s oil is shipped through the Baltic and Black Sea, he notes, and up to 12 dark-fleet tankers pass through the English Channel every day. NATO navies track them but do nothing to impede them. The Eagle S has also been accused of dropping “sensor-type devices” while transiting the Channel.

Mr Edwards believes that part of the excessive caution stems from an overgenerous interpretation of the protection to freedom of navigation provided by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, that freedom is based on the concept of “innocent passage”. If a ship threatens peace, good order and security, it forfeits that right. Dark-fleet ships that are likely to have inadequate insurance against environmental or other damage, which are believed to have conducted sabotage and which are packed with illegal spying gear seem hardly innocent.

Keir Giles, a Russia expert at Chatham House, another London-based think-tank, says it is vital that Russia’s expanding hybrid war against Europe be exposed. In the past year there have been mysterious fires at defence-industry facilities, packages exploding in delivery warehouses and even a plot to kill the boss of Germany’s biggest arms firm, Rheinmetall. With attacks on undersea infrastructure, he says, it is only through seizure of a vessel that evidence can be gathered and culprits brought before the courts.

That appears to be the approach the Finns are taking. Finnish prosecutors are preparing charges (of aggravated interference with telecommunications and aggravated vandalism) against the operators and owners of the Eagle S.

Until now, Russia has regarded such “grey zone” activities as relatively low-risk, given the difficulties of attribution. The Baltic was complacently described by some as a “NATO lake” after the recent admissions to the alliance of Sweden and Finland. Russia sees it differently. Finland and Estonia have shown how Russia’s strategic calculus could be challenged. Will others follow their example? ■

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9. Finland’s seizure of a tanker shows how to fight Russian sabotage

Excerpts:

How to counter the threat? First, follow the Finns’ lead. Their coastguard arrived so quickly that it seems to have caught the Eagle S red-handed, as the ship’s crew hurriedly retracted its anchor chain. By impounding the tanker, the Finns have imposed significant costs on its owners. And bringing criminal charges under Finnish law against the owners (a company in the United Arab Emirates) for deliberately damaging infrastructure, and investigating suspected crew members, creates a deterrent to further sabotage. Meanwhile, NATO has announced that it is beefing up its patrols in the Baltic.

Next, cast the net wider. European countries should press the likes of China and the UAE to ensure that ships under their flags do not engage in sabotage, if they want their companies to be considered for lucrative contracts on European maritime infrastructure. Coastguards should detain underinsured ships, to help hunt down Russia’s dark fleet. A growing hybrid threat requires a robust hybrid response.

Finland’s seizure of a tanker shows how to fight Russian sabotage

The growing threat to undersea cables demands a robust response

https://www.economist.com/leaders/2025/01/01/finlands-seizure-of-a-tanker-shows-how-to-fight-russian-sabotage

Photograph: Dmitri Fedotkin/ERR

Jan 1st 2025

rey-zone operations, hybrid warfare, slicing the salami: there are many terms for Russia’s use of covert attacks that leave opponents unsure how to respond. The latest theatre seems to be the Baltic Sea. Twice in the past two months, commercial ships with Russian links have been accused of damaging cables by dragging their anchors.

In November, after telecoms cables to Scandinavia were cut, the Danish navy detained the Yi Peng 3, a Chinese freighter coming from a Russian port, for a month. But China refused to co-operate, and the ship eventually sailed on. Then, on Christmas Day, an electric cable between Finland and Estonia was severed, allegedly by the Eagle S, a tanker shipping Russian oil under a Cook Islands flag. Finland took a stronger approach: coastguards boarded the ship and took it to a Finnish harbour. A vast array of Russian spy gear was found on board. Finnish prosecutors are preparing criminal charges.

Underwater infrastructure makes an attractive target for grey-zone attacks, partly because much of it sits, literally, in a legal grey zone. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), countries have full jurisdiction only within 12 nautical miles (22km) of their coasts.

Many pipelines and cables lie in their exclusive economic zones, or EEZs (up to 200 nautical miles from the shore), where foreign ships engaged in “innocent navigation” have a right to free passage. Ships engaging in sabotage enjoy no such right, but proving that they are doing so usually means stopping the ship, a chicken-and-egg problem. Under the treaty, the country responsible outside territorial waters is the flag state, here the Cook Islands. That is a loophole, but UNCLOS’s authors never imagined such problems. Indeed, damage to underwater cables is regulated by a different treaty dating from 1884.

Underwater gear is also hard to protect. Cables in the Baltic can be hundreds of kilometres long. Many have underwater sensors to detect damage, but navies must be quick to find the perpetrator. NATO has ample naval resources in the area (every Baltic country save Russia is a member), but these have been mainly deployed against traditional military threats, not to protect civilian infrastructure. And Russia has a secret weapon: its “dark fleet” of tankers and freighters, developed to evade Western sanctions after it attacked Ukraine in 2022. These are often poorly maintained, badly insured and owned (officially) by front companies in Caribbean or Gulf countries. Besides threatening cables, they also menace the environment with potential oil spills.

How to counter the threat? First, follow the Finns’ lead. Their coastguard arrived so quickly that it seems to have caught the Eagle S red-handed, as the ship’s crew hurriedly retracted its anchor chain. By impounding the tanker, the Finns have imposed significant costs on its owners. And bringing criminal charges under Finnish law against the owners (a company in the United Arab Emirates) for deliberately damaging infrastructure, and investigating suspected crew members, creates a deterrent to further sabotage. Meanwhile, NATO has announced that it is beefing up its patrols in the Baltic.

Next, cast the net wider. European countries should press the likes of China and the UAE to ensure that ships under their flags do not engage in sabotage, if they want their companies to be considered for lucrative contracts on European maritime infrastructure. Coastguards should detain underinsured ships, to help hunt down Russia’s dark fleet. A growing hybrid threat requires a robust hybrid response. ■

10. Xi Jinping has much to worry about in 2025

How can we create more dilemmas to capitalize on and increase his worries?

Or per this conclusion should we just watch him deal with his domestic problems?

Excerpt:

China first

With so much bothering him at home, Mr Xi may be disinclined to take big risks abroad. He would probably prefer to stand back while Mr Trump tries to secure peace in Ukraine. The war complicates China’s relations with Europe (which resents China’s supply of tech to Russia’s arms factories), but it helps China by sapping Western resources. When Mr Trump takes over, the question of how to handle Ukraine could cause tensions between European countries and a more isolationist America: the kind of feud that China likes. Mr Xi will keep trying to browbeat Taiwan as well as rival claimants to territory in the South China Sea, though he will probably seek to avoid conflict that could drag in America. Mr Trump boasts of being war-averse, but Mr Xi may not fully trust him to steer clear.

As Mr Xi sees it, risks at home and abroad can become entwined in dangerous ways. “If we do not take preventative measures or address them properly,” he told senior officials in 2016, “they will add up, escalate and evolve, from minor ones to major ones, from regional ones to systemic ones, and from international ones to domestic ones…eventually threatening the party’s governance and state security.” China’s biggest festival, the lunar new year, will start on January 29th. It will be the year of the snake. Mr Xi may want to tread warily.

China | The year ahead in China

Xi Jinping has much to worry about in 2025

A struggling economy, rising social tensions and the return of Donald Trump will test China’s leader

https://www.economist.com/china/2024/12/31/xi-jinping-has-much-to-worry-about-in-2025

Photograph: AP

Dec 31st 2024

OON AFTER he took power in 2012, Xi Jinping urged caution about China’s prospects. “The further our cause advances”, he told fellow leaders, “the more new situations and problems will arise, the more risks and challenges we will face and the more unforeseen events we will encounter.” As China’s economy flounders and social tensions rise—and with Donald Trump preparing to take over in the White House—the coming year will be replete with the kind of difficulties Mr Xi feared. As ever, the country’s murky politics may throw up surprises, too.

The possibility of Trump-induced tumult in the relationship between the world’s two strongest powers is a big and immediate worry. Decisions made by America’s next president and his mostly China-hawkish team will affect matters that Mr Xi regards as critically linked to the Communist Party’s grip on power. First is the economy. Mr Trump has threatened to impose a 60% tariff on imports from China, on top of an immediate 10% hike should China fail to curb exports to America of fentanyl, a potent synthetic opioid that kills tens of thousands of Americans annually. Some analysts say these increases could knock more than two percentage points off China’s economic growth.

There is much uncertainty about how fast the tariffs will be raised and whether Mr Trump is really determined to push them so high. But if imposed as advertised, they could deal a hefty blow to China at a time when the country is struggling to revive the badly battered confidence of households and businesses amid a property-market slump and scarcity of jobs.

Mr Xi would have no easy remedies. He may respond by beefing up the stimulus measures that he began unveiling in September, but the caution that has settled in among consumers and investors suggests that he may struggle to achieve the desired effect. He could allow the yuan to devalue against the dollar in order to make Chinese exports cheaper and keep them competitive despite extra tariffs. But that could further sap the confidence of investors and prompt capital flight. It may also exacerbate tensions with major trade partners—not least in the European Union—who are already nervous of what they see as China’s flooding of their markets with cheap goods.

Another year in the economic doldrums, with policymakers uncertain how to respond as they struggle to interpret signals from Washington, would turn citizens gloomier. In 2024 their stress became more evident. One sign was a rise in random acts of violence against members of the public, dubbed “revenge on society” attacks by China’s state media. These have often involved knifings and the driving of cars into crowds. The party is clearly worried. Officials have called for such cases to be dealt with “severely, strictly and swiftly”: a phrase that often heralds brutal justice with hasty, pro-forma trials that result in long jail terms or executions.

The party’s just getting started

In 2025 expect the term “social work” to feature prominently in party rhetoric. This is not so much about promoting social justice or providing services for people in need. It is mainly about ensuring social order by strengthening the party’s grassroots control. Mr Xi set the tone in November at the first meeting of the Central Social Work Department, which was formed in 2023. He said its functions were “vital to the party’s long-term governance, the country’s enduring peace and stability, social harmony and stability, and the well-being of the people”. The department’s work could entail ramping up efforts to ensure that party committees use their voice in the management of private firms, and that they keep the authorities informed of anything that could trigger unrest. With many firms freezing or cutting wages, or laying people off, to cope with economic challenges, the party wants eyes and ears in every workplace.

State media occasionally admit that troubles are brewing. In December Xinhua, the government’s main news agency, referred to a “complicated and challenging environment of increasing external pressure and growing internal difficulties”. But at the annual session of China’s rubber-stamp parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC), which will begin on March 5th and last for several days, delegates will be under pressure to sound upbeat (and Chinese journalists to avoid any coverage that might suggest pessimism). As Mr Xi recently said: “To do a good job of next year’s economic work, we must first firmly establish confidence in victory.”

Much attention will be focused on the target for economic growth in 2025, which will be announced at the meeting. To bolster confidence, the government may repeat the goal for 2024 of “around 5%”. Officials’ recent calls for “extraordinary” efforts to buoy the economy suggests they are preparing to aim high. One such measure, which may be announced at the session, could be an increase in the headline budget deficit from about 3% of GDP to 4%, according to Reuters, a news agency. This would mean extra government spending of about 1.3trn yuan ($179.4bn), it reckons.

The NPC is likely to gloss over politics. Yet persistent turmoil at the top of the armed forces will be on the minds of many of the nearly 3,000 delegates, about 280 of whom are military personnel. In November Admiral Miao Hua, who ranked fifth in the armed forces’ high command, was placed under investigation for “serious violations of discipline”—a frequent euphemism for corruption. Admiral Miao was believed to be close to Mr Xi. By targeting him, Mr Xi may be trying to show that no one enjoys protection from his war on graft. But it also raises questions about the strength of his control over the People’s Liberation Army.

Admiral Miao is the highest-ranking of more than a dozen senior officers who have been toppled in the past year and a half. Among them are a former deputy commander of the ground forces and a former naval chief of the military region that includes the South China Sea. Their removal from the NPC was announced on December 25th. The purges may continue. The fate of the defence minister, Admiral Dong Jun, will be closely watched. He is believed to be a protégé of Admiral Miao. China has dismissed reports that he is in trouble, too, and he continues to meet foreigners. But he could be on shaky ground. His two predecessors, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, were expelled from the party in June for alleged corruption.

China first

With so much bothering him at home, Mr Xi may be disinclined to take big risks abroad. He would probably prefer to stand back while Mr Trump tries to secure peace in Ukraine. The war complicates China’s relations with Europe (which resents China’s supply of tech to Russia’s arms factories), but it helps China by sapping Western resources. When Mr Trump takes over, the question of how to handle Ukraine could cause tensions between European countries and a more isolationist America: the kind of feud that China likes. Mr Xi will keep trying to browbeat Taiwan as well as rival claimants to territory in the South China Sea, though he will probably seek to avoid conflict that could drag in America. Mr Trump boasts of being war-averse, but Mr Xi may not fully trust him to steer clear.

As Mr Xi sees it, risks at home and abroad can become entwined in dangerous ways. “If we do not take preventative measures or address them properly,” he told senior officials in 2016, “they will add up, escalate and evolve, from minor ones to major ones, from regional ones to systemic ones, and from international ones to domestic ones…eventually threatening the party’s governance and state security.” China’s biggest festival, the lunar new year, will start on January 29th. It will be the year of the snake. Mr Xi may want to tread warily. ■

Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.

11. Syria's U.S.-trained opposition fighters wait to learn of their role in a new Syria

A very complex situation.

Syria's U.S.-trained opposition fighters wait to learn of their role in a new Syria

December 31, 20244:17 PM ET

Jane Arraf

NPR · by By · December 31, 2024

Salim Turki al-Anteri, the commander of the Syrian Free Army, in his office in al-Tanf, Syria, Dec. 14. Manu Brabo for NPR

AL-TANF GARRISON, Syria — When Salim Turki al-Anteri took his opposition forces into battle against regime troops in southern Syria this month, it was against his own former tank unit.

Drawing on his past U.S. military training and his hopes for a united Syria, the commander ordered his forces to fire artillery warning shots, intended to persuade regime soldiers to abandon their tanks and leave the battlefield.

"We didn't want to kill any soldiers," he says of the battle on Dec. 7, a day before Damascus fell.

"We aimed to the left and to the right, and then closer to them," he says. "We didn't follow them because we knew that if we followed them, we would have to kill them."

Sponsor Message

Unlike many military commanders who were regime loyalists, most ordinary soldiers were conscripts who'd been given no choice but to fight for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, he says.

"I consider all the soldiers my sons," he says. And he considered the tanks they fought in equipment to be safeguarded for the country's army — whatever shape it may take in a post-Assad Syria.

Syrian regime tanks sit abandoned on the Damascus-Baghdad highway in Syria, Dec. 13. Most regime soldiers retreated rather than fight opposition forces this month.

Manu Brabo for NPR

Anteri, a colonel and the commander of the Syrian Free Army, a small, U.S.-trained opposition force before the fall of the Syrian regime, spoke with NPR at his base next to a remote U.S. military outpost in southern Syria. He defected from the Syrian army to join the opposition eight years ago.

Now his unit is among dozens of former opposition groups that will have to be knitted together into new Syrian security forces. Anteri, who commands about 600 fighters, says he is waiting to see what role in the new security forces his group will be given by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which led the coalition that drove Assad from power.

The U.S. has had an uneasy role in this key region

Al-Tanf, originally a U.S. special forces base, has played a key role in training Syrian opposition fighters, including Anteri's. It lies about 200 miles from Syria's capital Damascus, on the main Damascus-Baghdad highway. Abandoned regime tanks lie by the side of the road. Nearby are cast-off Syrian army uniforms, tossed aside by fleeing soldiers as Assad fell.

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The Syrian ruler was quickly toppled in a surprise offensive this month by opposition forces, who took back the country with little resistance after more than a decade of civil war. Anteri believes the reason the regime soldiers his forces encountered didn't fight back was because they knew the U.S. military was backing the SFA. Along with a patch bearing the Syrian insignia on his fighters' uniforms, he also instructed soldiers to wear a patch with an American flag.

The American base at al-Tanf is testament to the uneasy U.S. role in a key strategic region. The U.S. has not had diplomatic relations with Syria since 2012, after the start of the Syrian civil war. The bases it established over the past decade in the south and east operate under no Syrian legal authority. They fall under the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition operating in Iraq and Syria, but that coalition is soon being dismantled.

A Syrian Free Army soldier stands at the entrance of a base near the U.S. al-Tanf garrison in southern Syria, Dec. 14. Manu Brabo for NPR

It is a military presence so opaque that Pentagon spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters earlier this month that he himself only recently learned there were more than double the number of U.S. forces in Syria as the 900 figure he had been quoting. Iraqi military sources had reported increased numbers of troops moving from a U.S. base in Irbil, in its Kurdistan region, over the past several months into Kurdish-controlled northeastern Syria.

The U.S. role in Syria will be clarified as new governments in both countries take shape

A senior U.S. military official said expanding the U.S. military role in Syria would require talks with any new Syrian government.

"We don't want to start just tromping around Syria," said the official, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly. "It would be better if we understood how they felt about that and open that discussion with them before we do anything."

Sponsor Message

He said pending those discussions, the U.S. would continue to launch airstrikes against the Islamic State — which it largely defeated five years ago — and to support Syrian forces it trains and advises. Also in question, of course, is what decision the incoming Trump administration will make on maintaining U.S. forces in Syria.

That U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition is being disbanded at the insistence of the Iraqi government, to be replaced by country-to-country agreements. Under the agreement between Iraq and the United States, there will be a U.S. troop presence in federally controlled Iraq by the end of this year, and in Kurdish-controlled Iraq by the end of 2026.

U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria have been a lightning rod for Iran-backed militias. In January, one such militia in Iraq claimed responsibility for a drone attack on Tower 22 — a U.S. support base to al-Tanf in northeastern Jordan. Three U.S. soldiers were killed in the attack.

A Syrian Free Army fighter walks with a resident of the Rukban camp for displaced Syrians near the Jordanian border. Until the Syrian regime fell, 7,000 camp residents, including opposition fighters, were trapped in the remote desert for years.

Manu Brabo for NPR

Since 2003, when the U.S. and its allies toppled Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and left a security vacuum after disbanding the Iraqi army, proliferating Iranian proxy militias have used Syria as a conduit to funnel Iranian arms to Iraq and Lebanon. Assad, a member of the Alawite religious minority, was backed by Iran and, in recent years, by Russia.

Syrian Kurdish forces, who created an autonomous region after breaking their territory away from the Assad regime in 2012, remain a key U.S. security ally, and helped militarily defeat ISIS in its last holdout in Baghuz, Syria, in 2019. The continuing U.S. troop presence in this autonomous region of northeastern Syria also serves to protect oil fields there.

Although ISIS has been hugely diminished since it overtook large parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014, it still retains a presence in Syria, including near historic Palmyra, where SFA commander Anteri is from.

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Meanwhile, former opposition groups wait for guidance on their new role

Now, three weeks after decades of regime control abruptly ended, the victory by disparate groups of Syrian fighters is still sinking in.

In a guest house next to the U.S. base, an SFA officer, Saeed Saif, shows a wide range of equipment found at a Russian military base in Syria after it was abandoned in the fighting in early December.

U.S. officials, including the senior military official, say Russia is expected to offer concessions to the new Syrian government to retain its strategic deep water port in the Syrian coastal city Tartus.

A Syrian Free Army fighter stands a few hundred yards from a sand berm marking the border between Jordan and Syria on the outskirts of Rukban camp in southern Syria, Dec. 14.

Manu Brabo for NPR

From the abandoned Russian military base, there are old gas masks and brand new Kalashnikov rifles — some still stacked in the wooden box they were shipped in. There is a communications device to send encoded messages and documents and files taken from a vault in an underground operations room.

"We don't know what they say," Saif says. "We are waiting for someone to translate them."

More puzzling are what appear to be paperweights — scorpions encased in plastic and mounted on bases.

"They used them for decoration," Saif says.

NPR · by By · December 31, 2024

12. China stirred the Pacific pot, Japan powered up and Aussie AUKUS anxiety emerged: 2024 in review

China stirred the Pacific pot, Japan powered up and Aussie AUKUS anxiety emerged: 2024 in review - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense.com · by Colin Clark · December 31, 2024

https://breakingdefense.com/2024/12/china-stirred-the-pacific-pot-japan-powered-up-and-aussie-aukus-anxiety-emerged-2024-in-review/?utm

A China Coast Guard ship (L) is seen from the Philippine Coast Guard vessel BRP Cabra during a supply mission to Sabina Shoal in disputed waters of the South China Sea on August 26, 2024. (Photo by JAM STA ROSA/AFP via Getty Images)

SYDNEY — Turmoil, violence and reaction. That was the theme of 2024 across the Indo-Pacific, with China’s belligerence and attempts to remake the international order to its liking at its core driving many decisions of the nations in the theater.

In several instances this year Chinese forces engaged in hostile behavior, ramming Philippine ships, allegedly attacking Vietnamese fishermen and threatening Taiwan. But the actions were not without repercussions as they drove China’s neighbors and NATO countries to sign major new agreements, increase exercises, sail more joint Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) and bang the diplomatic drums more loudly and more often.

Japan made among the biggest moves in 2024. Tokyo and Canberra signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), clearing the way for regular deployments of Japanese marines to Australia, similar to the rotational force the US Marines have at what Australians call the Top End. Japan and Britain also signed an RAA. Japan also announced its biggest defense spending increase since World War II in September.

“The international community is facing the greatest post-war trial yet, and has entered a new era of crisis,” the first page of the their defense budget declared.

In the Pacific Islands, scene of much turmoil over the last two years as China pressed to gain advantage in the region, the situation has seemed to stabilize in favor of Australia and its allies.

Nauru, the troubled island that once had the world’s highest GDP per capital and now faces possible ruin from climate change, agreed to accept $64 million USD from Australia in return for a veto of future Chinese activities in the tiny island. Nauru President David Adeang came to Canberra and signed the agreement on Dec. 9. This is similar to a treaty with Tuvalu, the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union, which came into force in late August this year.

In addition, the Pacific Island states agreed to join an Australian initiative to improve the region’s police forces. Australia committed $400 million AUD ($253 million USD) over five years, which included creation of a regional training center in Brisbane, which opened the day after the Nauru treaty was agreed.

The Chinese military itself also wasn’t free of internal turmoil, which came into clear view with the suspension from office of a senior member of the powerful Central Military Commission and the previous disappearance of China’s third defense minister.

All that “does not give a sense of stability within the PLA [People’s Liberation Army],” Meia Nouwens of the International Institute for Strategic Sutfies told Breaking Defense earlier this month when the story broke.

One of the few events largely divorced from China of great import in the region was the remarkable declaration of martial law — and its retraction — by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol. Now that Yoon has avoided immediate impeachment, there may be more regional stability than first expected, but his actions did, analysts said, put the crucial General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan at risk because the opposition is likely to suspend or scrap if should they take power. There is also concern among China watchers that should the opposition take power, they are likely to listen more carefully to Chinese policymakers than did Yoon.

AUKUS Anxiety

Meanwhile, threading through all these events has been the uncertain course of AUKUS, the massive effort by Australia, the UK and the US to help Australia buy at least three Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines and build a small fleet of SSN AUKUS boats over the next 20-plus years at an estimated cost of $368 billion AUD ($237 billion USD).

Australia’s defense budget will not increase in real terms until after the next election — likely to be held by March or April next year — at least. Sir Angus Houston, former chief of the defense force and co-author of the Defense Strategic Review, said in late November that Australia must increase overall defense spending to 3 percent of GDP to avoid cannibalizing the military in order to pay for AUKUS.

The current plan would only boost spending to 2.2 percent of GDP by 2028. And there are signs of concern among senior Australian officials about budget and execution. Australia killed a $5.3 billion AUD satellite contract with Lockheed Martin, which would appear to be very sort of cannibalization Houston worried about. The Australian government claims it has protected the money and will invest in a new approach, but the cut occurred roughly 18 months after the award was announced.

And in a little noticed declaration at a conference in the Indian Ocean focused on AUKUS, an Australian admiral voiced public worry that Australia’s generational effort to buy and deploy nuclear powered submarines was “at risk” if the government does not take quick, decisive action on infrastructure.

The military and government needed to “get going” on crucial work to ready Western Australia for AUKUS submarines or risk falling behind, Rear Adm. Wendy Malcolm said. He added that Australia’s generational effort to buy and deploy nuclear powered submarines is “at risk” if the government does not take quick, decisive action on infrastructure.

breakingdefense.com · by Colin Clark · December 31, 2024

13. Experts warn Trump’s plan to name cartels ‘terrorists’ could open door to military operations in Mexico

Experts warn Trump’s plan to name cartels ‘terrorists’ could open door to military operations in Mexico

https://www.yahoo.com/news/experts-warn-trump-plan-name-182616613.html

Ariana Baio

Tue, December 31, 2024 at 1:26 PM EST3 min read

Experts warn Trump’s plan to name cartels ‘terrorists’ could open door to military operations in Mexico

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Donald Trump’s plan to designate Mexican drug cartels as “foreign terrorist organizations” could provide the legal framework to allow the U.S. to conduct military operations in Mexico, according to experts.

For years, the President-elect has threatened to designate cartels that traffic illicit drugs into the U.S. foreign terrorist organizations. That distinction would allow the government to place additional economic and social sanctions on them.

Doing so also bolsters the president’s authority to carry out military operations on those involved with a terrorist organization, including foreign states suspected of supporting such organizations. The president can also preemptively deploy military force against terrorist organizations.

Undoubtedly, such action would strain the U.S.–Mexico relationship by increasing hostility. Former Mexican ambassador to the U.S., Gerónimo Gutiérrez told El País it would “set the relationship… back three decades.”

Donald Trump has threatened to take aggressive action against drug trafficking and illegal migrant crossings (Getty Images)

In 2019, Trump nearly designated Mexican drug cartels as “terrorists” but backed out after compromising with Mexico.

However, earlier this month, the president-elect pitched the idea again, this time at a conference for Turning Point USA in Arizona.

"I will immediately designate the cartels as foreign terrorist organizations," Trump said. “We’re going to do it immediately and unleash the full power of federal law enforcement, ICE, border patrol.”

Trump campaigned aggressively on combating illegal immigration and drug trafficking, specifically related to fentanyl. He is holding Mexico accountable in the efforts to stop drug influx into the U.S., already promising to enact a 25 percent tariff on Mexican imported goods – despite the country being one of the U.S.’s largest trading partners.

But designating cartels as “terrorists” would be one step further.

“Designating cartels as terrorist organizations would be a strategic error with unpredictable consequences for both countries,” a senior official at the Mexican Embassy told El País.

Trump’s ‘Agenda47’ includes his “action plan to destroy drug cartels.” By labeling them “terrorists,” it would allow military operations on Mexican soil. (Trump campaign)

The purpose of designating an organization as a terrorist organization is primarily to stop the flow of money and allow federal prosecutors to pursue criminal penalties against cartel members and allies. It also provides legal backing for the president to carry out military operations – specifically under the Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001 Act.

The broad act supports the president conducting operations against individuals and organizations linked to those who conducted the September 11 attacks. However, it has been widely interpreted to be applied to other terrorist groups.

For example, under the act, the Biden administration carried out airstrikes in Somalia as part of an effort to defeat Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group.

It does not permit the president to invade or declare war on a country without the approval of Congress.

The senior official at the Mexican Embassy said Trump’s idea “mixes concepts that respond to different dynamics.”

“Organized crime seeks profit, not ideology, and treating it as terrorism only diverts resources and attention from real solutions,” the official said.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum responded Sunday, elevating the need for collaboration between the two countries to fight drug trafficking.

14. When the War on Drugs Goes Too Far: The Cartel Terrorism Fallacy

Excerpts:

The US must also take a hard look at its own policies and their impact on Mexico. The flow of firearms into Mexico must be stopped, and the US should support stricter gun control measures to prevent these weapons from ending up in the hands of criminal groups. Only by addressing both the demand for drugs and the supply of weapons can the US and Mexico hope to make real progress in reducing cartel violence.

A focus on diplomacy, intelligence-led policing, and regional cooperation will be far more effective than labelling cartels as terrorists. Such a designation would only serve to inflame tensions, undermine Mexico’s sovereignty, and encourage further militarisation of the issue. Instead, the US must work collaboratively with Mexico to develop sustainable, long-term solutions that address the systemic issues enabling cartels to thrive.

In conclusion, while the violence and brutality of the Mexican cartels cannot be understated, labelling them as terrorist organisations is not the answer. Instead, the US must take a more nuanced approach, one that recognises the cartels for what they are: criminal enterprises. The US should prioritise cooperation with Mexico, address the flow of weapons, and support long-term solutions that focus on economic development and reducing the demand for illegal drugs.

When the War on Drugs Goes Too Far: The Cartel Terrorism Fallacy

The prospect of Donald Trump’s return to power in January 2025 has ignited heated discussions, especially in relation to his previous stance on Mexico and drug cartels.

Lisdey Espinoza Pedraza

January 1, 2025

moderndiplomacy.eu · by Lisdey Espinoza Pedraza · January 1, 2025

The prospect of Donald Trump’s return to power in January 2025 has ignited heated discussions, especially in relation to his previous stance on Mexico and drug cartels.

In the months following his earlier tenure, Trump made headlines by suggesting that the United States should designate Mexican drug cartels as terrorist organisations.

Trump’s tough rhetoric on immigration, border security, and drug trafficking has made headlines since his first term, and with his re-election, the prospect of his pursuing more aggressive measures against cartels seems increasingly likely. In the aftermath of horrific events, such as the ambush in 2019 that saw nine dual U.S.-Mexican citizens killed by suspected cartel members, Trump issued bold statements calling for a full-scale war on drug cartels and even suggested designating them as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).

This rhetoric has resurfaced, intensifying concerns not only about the future of US-Mexico relations but also about the broader implications of such a policy for the region. However, labelling these cartels as terrorist entities could be a dangerous misstep, one that threatens to exacerbate violence in Mexico and undermine the very security measures that need reform.

In recent years, Mexico has been at the mercy of some of the world’s most violent criminal organisations. The cartels, which dominate the drug trade, control vast portions of territory, exploiting both the poverty-stricken regions and urban centres across the country. Their ruthless tactics – kidnappings, murders, and extortion – have devastated local communities and overwhelmed law enforcement. Yet, these criminal organisations, however brutal, are not terrorists.

Trump’s proposal to designate these groups as FTOs stems from a misplaced analogy. In theory, this move would allow the US to freeze cartel assets, impose travel restrictions, and prosecute cartel members under terrorism laws. But such a designation is more likely to complicate than resolve the situation, with unintended consequences that may destabilise the region further.

Before delving into the potential consequences of designating Mexican cartels as terrorists, it’s important to understand what this designation entails. Under USA law, an organisation must meet specific criteria to be labelled a FTO. This includes engaging in premeditated, politically motivated violence intended to influence a government or a population. The violence must also target noncombatant civilians, and the group must have the capacity to engage in these activities on a large scale.

A terrorist organisation, by definition, is one that seeks to use violence and intimidation to influence a government or political system. While cartels certainly engage in violence, their objective is not to overthrow the Mexican government or replace its political system. Their only aim is profit, specifically from the illegal drug trade. Unlike political insurgencies or terror groups, drug cartels do not seek to change the political landscape but rather to exploit the existing structure for economic gain.

Herein lies the first problem with Trump’s proposal. While cartels like the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation cartels certainly use extreme violence—often targeting civilians, law enforcement, and rival groups—their motivations are not political. Cartels are primarily business entities. Their goal is not to overthrow governments or pursue ideological aims; instead, they are in the business of trafficking illegal drugs, extorting money, and protecting their vast criminal enterprises.

This distinction is crucial. Terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda or ISIS employ violence with the goal of imposing ideological or political change. Cartels, on the other hand, wield violence as a tool to secure profits and control over the drug market. They do not pose an existential threat to the Mexican government or seek to overthrow it. Rather, their violence undermines the state’s ability to function effectively, which in turn benefits the cartels’ operations. Terrorist organisations, by definition, seek to influence political structures, often using violence to make a statement or cause disruption. Cartels, while undeniably violent, do not pursue any grand political vision. Instead, they leverage violence to maintain control over their criminal activities and eliminate rivals. Treating them as terrorists would not only mischaracterise their objectives but could also lead to inappropriate responses, including military intervention, that would do little to address the core issue of drug trafficking.

The Trump administration has consistently called for more aggressive action against Mexican cartels, including the use of US military forces to assist in the fight. This rhetoric harkens back to the disastrous “War on Drugs” policies of the past, which focused on militarising drug enforcement efforts without addressing the systemic issues that drive the cartels’ power. Mexico has already experienced the fallout of militarised anti-cartel operations, particularly during the presidency of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012). While many cartel leaders were arrested or killed, the violence in Mexico escalated dramatically, with cartels splintering and warring over territory, resulting in a surge of civilian deaths.

The suggestion that cartels should be labelled terrorists is not just a political overreach but also a misdiagnosis of the problem. The US’s approach to countering the drug trade has long been focused on militarised tactics, such as border control measures, intelligence operations, and military intervention. However, this has proven ineffective in curbing the cartel’s influence. Drug-related violence continues to escalate, and the cartels continue to operate with impunity. This is not a problem that can be solved by simply designating cartels as terrorists.

While a designation as an FTO would provide the US with some additional legal tools to fight cartels, these tools are not the solution. They would likely lead to a further militarisation of the situation, which has not worked in the past. A key issue in the war on drugs is the way in which the US’s approach directly contributes to the power of the cartels. One of the most glaring examples of this is the flow of firearms into Mexico.

If the US were to directly intervene in Mexico, either militarily or through the further militarisation of the war on drugs, it risks exacerbating the very problem it seeks to solve. A militarised approach often leads to more deaths, more instability, and a deeper entrenchment of cartel power. Cartels are already incredibly well-armed and resourceful, and a US military intervention would likely only result in more violence and greater destruction, particularly for Mexican civilians caught in the crossfire.

Moreover, a focus on military solutions may neglect the broader socio-economic issues that fuel cartel violence. The lack of opportunity, entrenched corruption, and weak rule of law in many parts of Mexico and Central America create fertile ground for cartels to flourish. A military response alone cannot address these underlying causes.

Militarisation is not an effective solution to combat organised crime and drug trafficking because it often exacerbates violence and destabilises the affected regions. The military is not designed to address the complexities of criminal networks, as it lacks the specialised training, investigative expertise, and legal frameworks required to dismantle organised crime. Soldiers are trained for combat, not for nuanced policing tasks such as gathering evidence, handling witnesses, or conducting undercover operations.

Deploying military forces risks escalating conflicts with heavily armed criminal organisations, leading to prolonged violence and increased civilian casualties. Furthermore, militarised approaches tend to focus on short-term objectives, such as capturing or eliminating cartel leaders, which frequently results in the fragmentation of criminal organisations and the emergence of smaller, more violent factions. Mexico already went through this process under Calderón’s War on Drugs. This cyclical violence undermines local governance, erodes public trust in institutions, and displaces communities, further perpetuating the conditions that allow organised crime to thrive. A more effective strategy would prioritise intelligence-led policing, strengthening judicial systems, addressing socio-economic inequalities, and implementing measures to reduce the demand for illicit drugs.

This military-oriented dynamic would create an environment where collaboration between the two countries on counter-drug measures becomes fraught with tension. If the US were to designate Mexican cartels as FTOs, it would risk undermining decades of diplomatic efforts and erode trust between the two countries. As a result, it is not just Mexico that would suffer; the entire region would be destabilised.

One of the most striking aspects of the cartel crisis is the role the US plays in enabling the cartels. The US is not only the largest consumer of illicit drugs but is also the main source of the firearms used by cartels. According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), a significant percentage of weapons used by Mexican cartels originate from US gun shops. These firearms often flow into Mexico through illegal channels, fuelling the violence that makes the cartels so powerful.

These guns are then used by cartels to maintain control over territories, intimidate civilians, and challenge Mexican law enforcement. In fact, the violence that has plagued Mexico in recent decades is largely a result of the illegal trafficking of weapons from the US into the hands of these criminal groups.

While Trump’s policies may be intended to combat the cartels, they fail to address this crucial aspect of the problem: the US’s role in arming the very organisations it aims to combat. Without addressing the illegal flow of firearms, any military or legal action taken against the cartels is destined to fail. The US’s complicity in the supply chain that enables cartel violence cannot be ignored in the conversation about combating the cartels.

Furthermore, labelling cartels as terrorists would not just have domestic consequences for the US but would also have a damaging effect on US-Mexico relations. Mexico has long been a key partner in the US’s efforts to combat drug trafficking, despite its many challenges. A terrorist designation would alienate Mexico, making cooperation on drug-related matters more difficult. Mexico is already struggling with the entrenched power of the cartels, and an external push for military intervention from the US would likely be met with resistance from both the Mexican government and the people.

The path forward requires a rethinking of the US’s approach to the cartels. Rather than resorting to military-style tactics, the US should focus on intelligence-driven law enforcement and diplomatic cooperation with Mexico. The fight against drug cartels must be a collaborative effort, with an emphasis on addressing the root causes of cartel power: poverty, corruption, and the demand for illicit drugs. By supporting economic development and anti-corruption initiatives, the US can help strengthen Mexico’s ability to combat the cartels more effectively.

The US must also take a hard look at its own policies and their impact on Mexico. The flow of firearms into Mexico must be stopped, and the US should support stricter gun control measures to prevent these weapons from ending up in the hands of criminal groups. Only by addressing both the demand for drugs and the supply of weapons can the US and Mexico hope to make real progress in reducing cartel violence.

A focus on diplomacy, intelligence-led policing, and regional cooperation will be far more effective than labelling cartels as terrorists. Such a designation would only serve to inflame tensions, undermine Mexico’s sovereignty, and encourage further militarisation of the issue. Instead, the US must work collaboratively with Mexico to develop sustainable, long-term solutions that address the systemic issues enabling cartels to thrive.

In conclusion, while the violence and brutality of the Mexican cartels cannot be understated, labelling them as terrorist organisations is not the answer. Instead, the US must take a more nuanced approach, one that recognises the cartels for what they are: criminal enterprises. The US should prioritise cooperation with Mexico, address the flow of weapons, and support long-term solutions that focus on economic development and reducing the demand for illegal drugs.

moderndiplomacy.eu · by Lisdey Espinoza Pedraza · January 1, 2025

15. New special trial counsels take over prosecution of major sexual harassment cases from commanding officers

New special trial counsels take over prosecution of major sexual harassment cases from commanding officers

Stars and Stripes · by Gary Warner · December 31, 2024

Legal books line a bookshelf in a courtroom next to the American flag. (Daniel Blackwell/U.S. Air Force)

Military commanders will lose their authority to overturn court-martial findings in the most serious sexual harassment cases as of Jan. 1, the Pentagon said Tuesday.

Under a plan approved by Congress, certain sexual harassment cases under the Uniform Code of Military Justice — the military’s set of laws — will be investigated and prosecuted by the new Offices of Special Trial Counsel in each service branch.

The Defense Department issued a statement Tuesday confirming the special trial counsels of the Army, Air Force, Navy and the Marine Corps will take over Article 134 sexual harassment cases.

Article 134 is the military’s “general article” covering “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial,” according to the U.S. Manual of Courts-Martial.

Article 134 has several subsections dealing with specific violations, including disloyal statements, fraternization, underage drinking, abusing animals, adultery and gambling with subordinates.

Sexual harassment violations under Article 134 are defined as knowingly making sexual advances, demands or requests for sexual favors. The advances must also have been unwelcomed, and a reasonable person would believe submission or rejection to the advances would have an effect on the targeted person’s job, pay, career, benefits or entitlements. It is also defined as severe, repetitive or pervasive, creating a hostile environment and being to the prejudice of good order and discipline, and a discredit on the armed forces.

The maximum penalty for each count of sexual harassment is a dishonorable discharge for enlisted personnel or dismissal from service for officers, total forfeiture of pay and allowances, and confinement for up to two years.

The Navy’s special trial counsel will handle cases involving Coast Guard members, while the Space Force will fall under the Air Force counsel.

Congress has acted to remove commanders from exercising discretionary authority on prosecution and punishment for 14 “covered offenses” of the UCMJ, including nearly all sex crimes, kidnapping, manslaughter and murder.

Some lawmakers said they pushed for reforms after receiving several reports of “command influence” in which charges were not brought against senior officers or findings were overturned following courts-martial.

The special trial counsels were established in late December 2023 and began taking cases immediately.

In past cases, officers were sometimes allowed to accept retirement, with a reduction in rank, with an honorable discharge in lieu of dismissal, the military’s equivalent of a dishonorable discharge for officers.

Lawmakers who supported removing commanders from the decision-making process said they hoped it would create a more professional prosecution and punishment of offenders.

“We’re trying to professionalize how these cases are handled,” Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, D-N.Y., said in May 2021. “We are creating a state-of-the-art [District Attorney’s] office within the military to handle all serious crimes.”

The addition of sexual harassment cases to the slate of crimes handled by special trial counsels was delayed until 2025 to allow the new offices more time to develop reporting methods and standards.

Before Jan. 1, decisions to charge service members with sexual harassment under Article 134 were made by unit commanders. The commanders also reviewed the outcome of cases that went to court-martial and had the unilateral power to vacate sentences or overturn verdicts with which they disagreed.

The new rules mean appeals of courts-martial handled by the special trial counsels can only be reviewed and altered by the secretaries of the service branches.

Conviction for sexual harassment under Article 134 is considered a felony, which could limit the guilty person’s ability to get a job, vote, and buy firearms, among other civilian penalties, once the person has left military service.

However, not all sexual harassment charges will be filed as violations of Article 134, said Michelle McCaskill, spokeswoman for the Army Office of Special Trial Counsel.

“Both Article 93 (cruelty and maltreatment) and Article 92 (failure to obey order or regulation) will remain a separate option to prosecute sexual harassment allegations,” she said. “Allegations of misconduct which violate Articles 92 and 93 but not Article 134 are not covered offenses, therefore OSTC would not be able to exercise authority over those allegations unless the subject is also suspected of committing a separate covered offense.”

Stars and Stripes · by Gary Warner · December 31, 2024

16. The Dogs of (Urban) War: Lessons from Oketz, the Israel Defense Forces’ Specialized Canine Unit

Excerpts:

Just as observers have watched the war in Gaza closely for lessons about the modern battlefield, the US military can—and should—learn from the ways the IDF employs its dogs in urban combat. In Gaza, the IDF has pushed the boundaries of traditional canine operations with advancements that could redefine how US forces approach military working dog programs. Four lessons stand out.

1. Remote Operations and Technology Integration

2. Scaling the Force for High Demand

3. Mental Health Benefits of Group Deployment

4. Attention to Operational Details

The Dogs of (Urban) War: Lessons from Oketz, the Israel Defense Forces’ Specialized Canine Unit - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Spencer · January 1, 2025

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In the middle of the night on a street in one of northern Gaza’s endless urban mazes, an IDF commander faced a dilemma. His unit’s progress was held up by a determined Hamas defense along a single block. The unit had discovered the entrance to a tunnel that appeared to be key to the stubborn delaying defense. Sending his soldiers down the tunnel presented a risk he was unwilling to take. But he had one important advantage—a team from a specialized IDF canine unit was integrated with his soldiers, and he was able to call on a dog and its handler that had been specially trained for underground warfare.

The IDF’s canine unit, the Oketz, has demonstrated how a highly specialized and well-integrated canine force can enhance operational effectiveness, safeguard human lives, and support soldier welfare in high-intensity combat. By examining the way that the IDF has employed this unit in Gaza—from remote canine operations to group deployment to mitigate psychological stress to integration of innovative, dog-specific equipment—the US military can adapt these insights to its own urban warfare capabilities.

Dogs in the IDF

The IDF’s military dog program was heavily shaped by the guiding influence of Professor Rudolphina Menzel, a pioneer in canine psychology. By the 1980s, the program became formally institutionalized as Oketz (“sting,” in Hebrew). Since then, the unit has played pivotal roles in every major conflict involving the IDF, from the 2006 Lebanon War to ongoing operations in Gaza.

Oketz sources nearly all of its military working dogs—99 percent—from breeders in Europe. The dogs are primarily Belgian Malinois, with some German Shepherds and Labradors. Each year, the IDF procures approximately seventy dogs, ensuring they are one year old to strike the right balance between developmental maturity and training flexibility. Their rigorous and multiphase training lasts up to two years and emphasizes bonding between handlers and dogs for operational cohesion.

Each Oketz dog is trained for a specialized role. Some are used tactically as attack dogs to neutralize threats in combat, while others work in explosive ordnance detection. Still others work to locate survivors or find the remains of fallen soldiers or civilians in disaster or combat scenarios. Among the most innovative ways Oketz employs its dogs is training some specifically for underground warfare to operating in tunnels, a frequent feature of combat in Gaza.

Yet it is not only dogs specially trained for subterranean environments that have proven vital during ongoing combat operations in Gaza. Those working in explosive ordnance detection and attack roles have likewise been critical in the urban environment. Dogs have been instrumental in saving IDF soldiers’ lives, finding hidden explosives, and uncovering Hamas fighters concealed within the dense urban fabric of Gaza. Their heightened senses and ability to navigate narrow or debris-filled spaces make them invaluable assets in areas where traditional methods fall short.

Just as observers have watched the war in Gaza closely for lessons about the modern battlefield, the US military can—and should—learn from the ways the IDF employs its dogs in urban combat. In Gaza, the IDF has pushed the boundaries of traditional canine operations with advancements that could redefine how US forces approach military working dog programs. Four lessons stand out.

1. Remote Operations and Technology Integration

During IDF operations in southern Lebanon in the 1990s, one of the primary threats was the widespread presence of improvised explosive devices planted along key routes by Hezbollah. In response, Oketz developed specialized training and equipment to address these challenges. Dogs were equipped with radio packs—essentially, small receivers and speakers that enabled handlers to transmit commands remotely via radio. This allowed the dogs to operate ahead of their handlers, covering long distances and clearing dangerous routes. This capability was essential in the era before the widespread use of cameras on dogs, and it became a hallmark of the IDF’s dog program.

During operations in Gaza over more than a year, small cameras mounted on dogs have provided real-time intelligence, allowing handlers to assess tunnel systems, detect booby traps, and identify combatants without exposing soldiers to direct risk. This technological leap offers the US military a template for expanding the remote capabilities of its working dogs.

2. Scaling the Force for High Demand

Gaza’s dense urban environment has highlighted the necessity of maintaining a large and flexible canine force. The Oketz unit integrates dog teams across operations, reflecting the value of both redundancy and specialization. After October 7, the IDF accelerated procurement, sending teams to Europe monthly to replenish its canine ranks. This reflects a key lesson: having a scalable program ensures readiness for prolonged or large-scale conflicts.

3. Mental Health Benefits of Group Deployment

The IDF deliberately pairs handlers and dogs within small, cohesive teams—each team with a commander, a deputy, and two handler-dog pairs. This structure is designed to address the psychological challenges of urban warfare, providing mutual support for both handlers and dogs. By prioritizing mental health, the IDF fosters operational resilience, a model the US military could replicate to combat stress among soldiers and dogs.

4. Attention to Operational Details

The IDF’s introduction of protective rubberized booties for dogs exemplifies the type of adaptation required by the unique challenges of urban environments. Dogs’ paws are tough—much better able to handle rough ground than the feet of humans, of course. So allowing dogs to work without any protective covering for their paws is often not a problem. But urban areas present unique dangers, with IDF dogs facing injuries from rubble, glass, and other hazards in Gaza’s war-torn streets. Equipping them with booties, along with ensuring teams carry essential training tools like bite sleeves, underscores the importance of anticipating and addressing operational challenges.

IDF teams and their handler-dog pairs also remain embedded with their assigned units throughout deployments, ensuring close bonds and continuity. This integration, coupled with daily after-action reviews, enables continuous learning and refinement of tactics.

The IDF’s Oketz unit showcases how military working dogs can be invaluable assets in urban warfare. By investing in remote capabilities, expanding the scale of canine units and scope of their operational capabilities, prioritizing mental health, and attending to operational details, the US military can evolve its preparations for urban conflict, ensuring both mission success and the welfare of soldiers and their canine partners.

The IDF’s reliance on military dogs comes at a significant cost. Since October 7, Oketz has lost three soldiers and forty-two military working dogs. These sacrifices highlight the intensity of the missions these teams undertake. But the missions’ intensity is matched by their critical nature. Bring truly prepared for urban warfare means being prepared to fulfill these missions, which in turn, as the IDF experience in Gaza highlights, means having trained and ready canine teams. To ensure that it has this unique capability, the US military should be learning from the IDF’s war in Gaza.

John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. He is also a founding member of the International Working Group on Subterranean Warfare. He served twenty-five years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

*Special thanks to the members of the Oketz unit who provided multiple briefings and facilitated visits to the Oketz training base and teams deployed in Gaza.

Image credit: IDF Spokespersons Unit

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Spencer · January 1, 2025

17. The Man Who Almost Changed China

I previously forwarded a positive review of this book from Dr. Cynthia Watson. https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/unexpected-conscience?utm

Excerpts:

More than four decades after the launch of the reform and opening-up project, China is now at another inflection point. Its economic growth during the reform era was extraordinary, and by 2010 it had become the second-largest economy in the world. That success has many causes, but one of the most important factors is that China in the era of reform and opening enjoyed a long peace; guided by the likes of Hu, it strove to craft amicable relations with the outside world and avoid confrontation, particularly with the United States.

But the other vision of political reform—Hu’s vision—is decidedly unfulfilled. The CCP remains entrenched in Beijing. The prospect of a political system with greater checks and balances seems distant. From Deng’s rule onward, the CCP leadership has taken full advantage of China’s continuous and rapid economic growth to boost its legitimacy and has taken credit for all of China’s economic successes. Legitimacy so defined, however, depends on continued strong performance; China’s rapid economic growth must last forever if the government is to enjoy the legitimacy that accompanies that economic record. The current slowing of the Chinese economy is much more than an economic issue. It represents a serious challenge to the Chinese state. In his time, Hu understood this problem, which is why he wanted China to embrace greater political reform and put mechanisms in place that would satisfy the demands and social, moral, and cultural aspirations of the Chinese people.

Those needs remain unaddressed, a deficit that has periodically inflamed tensions between the Chinese state and society, as well as between China and other countries. Hu saw this coming. Even as he sought to remake China in the world, he understood that the biggest challenges facing China come not from without but from within.

The Man Who Almost Changed China

Foreign Affairs · by More by Chen Jian · January 1, 2025

Review Essay

Hu Yaobang and the Unfinished Business of Reform and Opening

Chen Jian

January/February 2025 Published on January 1, 2025

Protesting after the death of the reformer Hu Yaobang, Beijing, April 1989 Garrige Ho / Reuters

Chen Jian is Director of the Center on Global History, Economy, and Culture at New York University–Shanghai and East China Normal University and a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is the author of Zhou Enlai: A Life.

In This Review

The Conscience of the Party: Hu Yaobang, China’s Communist Reformer
By Robert L. Suettinger
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One of the most consequential events of the twentieth century was China’s historic turn, in the years after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, toward a sweeping program of reform. By relaxing the state’s grip on the economy and its control over society in this period, Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader from 1978 to 1989, helped put in motion the forces that would in mere decades pull hundreds of millions of people out of absolute poverty, transform China into the workshop of the world, and set it up as a great power in the twenty-first century—the only plausible rival to the United States. Although Deng led this process, he was aided at the time by the advice and work of a less heralded leader, Hu Yaobang.

Hu does not enjoy the broad name recognition of Mao, Deng, and the leading Mao-era statesman Zhou Enlai. Even in China, many people who came of age after 1989 know little about him. But as the international relations scholar Robert Suettinger shows in The Conscience of the Party: Hu Yaobang, China’s Communist Reformer, Hu was an essential figure in the grand process of “reform and opening.” Leading up to and during his tenure as chairman (and then general secretary) of the Chinese Communist Party from 1981 to 1987, he worked to shatter the ideological hold that Maoism had over Chinese politics, restoring the rights of millions of people purged during the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, and striving to ensure that the imperatives of reform prevailed in Chinese policymaking. Hu’s commitment to political reform, however, led to his downfall, after a rift with Deng forced him out as CCP general secretary in January 1987. But he was still regarded by ordinary Chinese—as well as intellectuals and young students—as the champion of China’s political democratization.

Hu died suddenly of a heart attack in April 1989, and his passing would spur the fateful occupation of Tiananmen Square in Beijing by pro-democracy protesters and similar demonstrations across the country. After seven weeks, Deng had the protests quashed ruthlessly, in the process foreclosing the political democratization that Hu had hoped for. Hu’s key insight was that economic growth was not enough to power the Chinese state; without the legitimacy afforded by political reform and democratization, China would experience turbulence in its modernization and development. Chinese leaders may believe they have found a way to break that connection, but there is good reason to think that Hu will be proved right—and that ultimately, as they deal with a faltering economy and mounting discontent, they will have no choice but to confront Hu’s warning.

THE IDEALIST

Suettinger’s biography is a pathbreaking account of Hu, prodigiously and thoughtfully exploring what kind of person he was and how he emerged as a leader with reformist aspirations in a world of apparatchiks. It is the first full-dress biography of Hu in English. But Suettinger, a former national intelligence officer in the Clinton administration and a longtime scholar of China, isn’t the first American academic to have attempted such a work. The social scientist Ezra Vogel died, in 2020, before he had finished his own biography of Hu, a volume he intended as a sequel of sorts to Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, his much-acclaimed 2011 biography of Deng. The two leaders are something of a pair; their fortunes rose and fell together during the tumultuous decades of Mao’s rule before they both came to power after Mao’s death. Hu’s legacy would be defined in large part by his eventual rift with Deng, one that embodied their different visions of reform.

To draw a full picture of Hu’s life is no easy task. The most apparent and seemingly insurmountable barrier to any biographer is lack of access to archival and other primary sources, which in Hu’s case remain largely inaccessible to both Chinese and Western researchers. Suettinger spent nearly a decade finding sources and interviewing contemporaries, and in so doing managed to dig deeply into Hu’s life in ways no Western scholar has done before. The result is a remarkably nuanced work that not only depicts Hu as a courageous and thoughtful reformist leader but also illuminates an important turning point in China’s recent history.

Hu was an idealist, an honest, sincere, and candid man, as described by many who knew him and worked with him. He was born in 1915 into a poor but educated peasant family in Hunan Province. With the support of his parents, he received a good early education, albeit in tough circumstances; for several years, he had to walk 12 miles of rugged mountainous trails every day to school. At the age of 14, he joined the Communist Youth League, the youth wing of the CCP, and joined the fight. The fact that he was educated, combined with his dedication to the revolution and enthusiasm for work, helped him rise quickly through the ranks of the Red Army (which would later become the People’s Liberation Army) and the CCP. He survived the harrowing and legendary Long March—the Red Army’s retreat between 1934 and 1935 to the interior of the country—that would only further bolster his Communist credentials. By the time the CCP took over China in 1949, Hu had become the youngest army corps political commissar in the military.

But it wasn’t all smooth sailing. In 1932, as part of a campaign to suppress supposed “reactionaries” in their midst, Mao’s agents accused him of being an enemy agent without any evidence; he escaped the death penalty only through the last-minute intervention of two Youth League inspectors who knew him to be a loyal comrade. In the early 1940s, during a campaign launched by Mao to consolidate his dominance over the party, Hu and other CCP members had to go through the mental torture of endless self-criticism. Such ordeals, as Suettinger points out, sowed in Hu the seed of doubt about Maoism and its propensity for brutally trying to control how people think and behave.

Hu’s key insight was that economic growth was not enough to power China.

Hu nevertheless remained deeply loyal to the CCP after the Communists drove the Nationalists to Taiwan and founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949. He soon had the opportunity to work with Deng. From 1950 to 1952, Hu was the local CCP secretary in northern Sichuan Province, reporting directly to Deng, who was then the CCP’s head in Sichuan. Hu flushed out the remnants of the Nationalist forces in the area, restored order in the wake of the civil war, carried out land reform, and promoted agricultural and industrial production. His outstanding track record and devotion to work won him Deng’s admiration. Their accomplishments also earned them the attention of the grandees in Beijing.

By 1953, together with Deng, Hu was elevated to the national stage and transferred to Beijing to take up the position of secretary and then first secretary of the Communist Youth League. But in that post, Hu was involved in a series of disastrous Maoist endeavors, including the Anti-Rightist Movement, a political campaign that sought to purge alleged dissidents among the ranks of intellectuals; the Great Leap Forward, the economic and social drive beginning in 1958 that resulted in a devastating famine; and the Socialist Education Movement, a campaign of deepening ideological indoctrination in the early to mid-1960s.

Hu tried very hard to engage himself in these movements by following and implementing all orders from Beijing as faithfully as he could. But he was alarmed by the way many of his comrades and subordinates were groundlessly labeled “rightists” and by the suffering of everyday people during the Great Leap Forward. Those experiences cultivated in him a deeper suspicion of Mao’s utopian program of “continuous revolution.” At a CCP Central Committee plenum in Lushan in 1959, he was reluctant to follow the general push to criticize Peng Dehuai, the former defense minister whom Mao had identified as the head of an “anti-party clique” for making critical comments about the Great Leap Forward. Not surprisingly, when the Cultural Revolution began, in 1966, Mao singled out Hu and other leaders of the Communist Youth League for severe attack. Hu himself was repeatedly brought to denunciation rallies, where Red Guards would inveigh against him and seek to humiliate him in public. Deng also suffered during the Cultural Revolution, twice purged by Mao and his allies.

In 1969, Mao’s agents at the Youth League Center banished Hu to a farm in Henan Province for “reeducation.” He was forced to perform heavy manual labor almost every day and he suffered greatly in this period. After the death in 1971 of Lin Biao, one of Mao’s key lieutenants, Hu was allowed to return to Beijing but was not fully rehabilitated into the ranks of the party elite. In this period, he read voraciously—including classic Marxist works, Chinese history, books of philosophy and ethics, and even the translated plays of Shakespeare. He became increasingly critical of Maoism in both its theory and practice. When Mao died, in September 1976, and the old order seemed in jeopardy, Hu was ready to advance the radical cause of reform in China.

OPENING THE DOOR

Mao’s death led to a period of uncertainty in which various factions vied for power. Hu aligned himself with Deng, who was emerging from his second period of exile during the Cultural Revolution. Whereas Deng’s principal adversaries, including Mao’s chosen successor and the party chairman Hua Guofeng, claimed to adhere to “the two whatevers”—the slogan that “we will absolutely uphold whatever decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave”—Hu sought a different path. In May 1978, the Guangming Daily, a party ideological organ, published an essay, written by a group of teachers at the Central Party School (Hu was then its executive vice president and reviewed the essay before publication), titled “Practice Is the Sole Criteria to Judge Truth.” They argued that the truth must be tested and proved by practice—an implicit rebuke of the implacability of Maoist dogma and its claims to truth. The essay sent shock waves through the system; it effectively eroded the legitimacy of Hua (as his position as China’s top leader entirely relied on Mao’s designation) and rejected the restrictions that Mao and his ideology had imposed on China. This ideological salvo greatly enhanced Deng’s position in the intraparty struggle with Hua’s faction and helped lead to Deng’s eventually becoming China’s paramount leader in 1978.

As Deng rose, so did Hu, who became the head of the CCP’s Central Organizational Department in December 1977. In this role, Hu sought to correct the injustices of the Cultural Revolution and other Maoist political campaigns. Under Hu’s direction, tens of thousands of CCP cadres, including hundreds of high-ranking ones, were rehabilitated and assigned to official positions. Hu also helped end the ostracization of tens of millions of ordinary citizens who had suffered during Mao’s destructive initiatives and let them live normal lives. These efforts to redress the excesses of the Mao era won Hu much support from within the party and among the wider public. In 1981, Hu replaced Hua as chairman of the CCP Central Committee (the next year, the title of the position would change to general secretary), allowing him to effectively function as Deng’s right-hand man in the launch and promotion of reforms.

Between 1978 and 1982, Deng and Hu advanced a series of policies intended to open China’s economy. These included abandoning the rigid centrally planned economic system borrowed from the Soviet Union, decollectivizing agriculture, embracing some market mechanisms, allowing foreign investment into the country, seeking greater trade with Western countries, and sending Chinese students to study abroad. As a result of these changes, the overall economy ballooned—with annual growth rates of around ten percent throughout the decade—as did productivity. Before the reforms, China’s share of global GDP based on purchasing power parity hovered around two percent; today, it’s around 20 percent.

Curiously, Suettinger focuses on Hu’s domestic contributions in this period, altogether missing how he helped transform China’s orientation to the outside world. During the Mao years, China styled itself as a revolutionary country, bent on challenging the existing international system and its institutions dominated by the United States and other Western capitalist countries. Hu was among the first Chinese leaders to see the need for a less instinctively confrontational, more cooperative, and forward-looking foreign policy. In the early 1980s, he played a central role in a CCP grand strategy review that led to the party’s jettisoning the Maoist notion that another world war was inevitable and reaching the consensus that it was in China’s long-term and fundamental interest to strive for a peaceful external environment. Good relations with the outside world would allow the country to concentrate on economic development and the pursuit of socialist modernity. Hu shaped the trajectory of the change, understanding that opening to the world could speed reforms at home. He was a firm supporter of the normalization of ties with the United States in 1979, championing a friendly relationship between the two countries; he endorsed and even got personally involved in China’s improving cooperative relations with its erstwhile foe Japan (in 1983, for instance, he invited 3,000 Japanese students to visit China); he strove to improve Beijing’s relations with London by visiting the United Kingdom and receiving Queen Elizabeth II during her state visit to Beijing in 1986, which helped make more credible Deng’s promise that China would not alter the special status of Hong Kong until 2047.

EARLY RETIREMENT

With Deng as paramount leader and Hu as general secretary, it seemed that China was on the path to ever-widening reform through much of the 1980s. But it was not to be. By around 1984, Deng, Hu, and several other CCP elders began to have critical disagreements on the way forward. The main point of contention was whether to create more checks and balances in the CCP system, which is what Hu wanted. At first, it seemed that Deng also favored this approach. As he consolidated his own power, however, Deng became increasingly worried that such reforms would result in the embrace of Western-style democracy, threatening the CCP’s one-party domination of the country. Although he was willing to promote economic reforms and open up the economy, he repeatedly called on the party and the country to fight “bourgeois liberalization” and maintain the “four cardinal principles,” adhering to the “socialist road,” proletarian dictatorship, the leadership of the CCP, and Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideological beliefs.

Hu, by contrast, wanted to go further in the direction of political democratization. A fissure opened between the two men. When Deng persistently emphasized the need to resist “bourgeois liberalization,” Hu spoke openly about the need for more democracy, more freedom of speech, and more public participation in politics. Deng grew disappointed with Hu’s forthrightness and began to lose trust in his longtime ally.

Hu at the National People’s Congress in Beijing, March 1987 Gene Del Bianco / Reuters

Events came to a head with Hu’s public call in 1985 for the “youthification” of the aging CCP leadership. He began with himself, stating, “I’m almost 70 years old, and I’m about to retire . . . . Those veteran comrades over the age of 80 even more should step down.” Deng never rejected this suggestion, and even indicated that he might be willing to retire. But that was merely rhetoric. When Hu naively suggested that Deng would set a good example by “taking the lead in retiring,” it was a step too far for the paramount leader. In January 1987, at a “democratic life meeting” attended by top party leaders and presided over by Deng and other elders, Hu was compelled to resign as general secretary. Hu calmly accepted almost all the charges against him as he saw, in Suettinger’s telling, “the need to preserve stability and unity within the leadership.”

But this defenestration was not the end of Hu’s story. Although he was pulled from China’s political stage, he continued to haunt it. Many people in the country referred to him as “the conscience of the party”—the metaphor was not just praise but also implied that the CCP had lost its way without him. In the years following Hu’s resignation, the gap between rapid economic and social change, on the one hand, and political stagnation, on the other, continually produced tensions between the state and the citizenry, as well as within Chinese society. Discontent and anxiety about the sclerotic pace of political reform spread far and wide.

When Hu died, in April 1989, students in Beijing—and then citizens from all walks of life—quickly turned the mourning of him into a powerful public demonstration of their frustration and anger at the lack of political reform and widespread corruption. Protesters flooded Tiananmen Square in Beijing. What followed became a defining moment in China’s history. On June 4, Deng and other CCP elders ordered troops to crack down on students and other demonstrators, resulting in the bloody tragedy that shocked the world.

HU’S WARNING

More than four decades after the launch of the reform and opening-up project, China is now at another inflection point. Its economic growth during the reform era was extraordinary, and by 2010 it had become the second-largest economy in the world. That success has many causes, but one of the most important factors is that China in the era of reform and opening enjoyed a long peace; guided by the likes of Hu, it strove to craft amicable relations with the outside world and avoid confrontation, particularly with the United States.

But the other vision of political reform—Hu’s vision—is decidedly unfulfilled. The CCP remains entrenched in Beijing. The prospect of a political system with greater checks and balances seems distant. From Deng’s rule onward, the CCP leadership has taken full advantage of China’s continuous and rapid economic growth to boost its legitimacy and has taken credit for all of China’s economic successes. Legitimacy so defined, however, depends on continued strong performance; China’s rapid economic growth must last forever if the government is to enjoy the legitimacy that accompanies that economic record. The current slowing of the Chinese economy is much more than an economic issue. It represents a serious challenge to the Chinese state. In his time, Hu understood this problem, which is why he wanted China to embrace greater political reform and put mechanisms in place that would satisfy the demands and social, moral, and cultural aspirations of the Chinese people.

Those needs remain unaddressed, a deficit that has periodically inflamed tensions between the Chinese state and society, as well as between China and other countries. Hu saw this coming. Even as he sought to remake China in the world, he understood that the biggest challenges facing China come not from without but from within.

In This Review

The Conscience of the Party: Hu Yaobang, China’s Communist Reformer
By Robert L. Suettinger
Chen Jian is Director of the Center on Global History, Economy, and Culture at New York University–Shanghai and East China Normal University and a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is the author of Zhou Enlai: A Life.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Chen Jian · January 1, 2025

18. Elon Musk has done it: iPhones and Android smartphones can now use his satellites to make calls anywhere on Earth

If this is accurate then we need to request that he employ his satellites over north Korea so we can connect the Korean people in the north to the outside world.

This could be a game changer for information campaigns for north Korea.

Elon Musk has done it: iPhones and Android smartphones can now use his satellites to make calls anywhere on Earth - Jason Deegan

jasondeegan.com · by Smith Noah · December 30, 2024

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After revolutionizing global internet access, Elon Musk’s Starlink is poised to take smartphone connectivity to the next level. The ambitious satellite service will soon enable users to make calls from virtually anywhere on the planet, all without the need for specialized hardware.

Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell service: what it means

Starlink, a division of SpaceX, has announced its plans to introduce Direct-to-Cell, a groundbreaking feature that uses its vast satellite network to allow voice calls on regular smartphones. What sets this apart is its simplicity—there’s no need for modifications to your device. As long as your phone is LTE-compatible, you’re ready to connect.

This innovation could fundamentally change how we think about mobile communication. Imagine being able to make calls from the remotest corners of the Earth—whether you’re deep in a rainforest, sailing in the middle of the ocean, or trekking across deserts—with no cell towers in sight. Starlink’s satellite system makes this scenario entirely possible.

Read

Which smartphones are compatible?

According to a letter sent by SpaceX to the FCC, the service has already proven successful with devices from major brands like Apple, Samsung, and Google. Tests confirmed smooth communication using the PCS G Block spectrum, across urban and rural areas, indoors and outdoors, and even under tree cover or clear skies.

Crucially, SpaceX emphasizes that any LTE-enabled smartphone will work with this technology—no hardware upgrades required. Even slightly older models like the iPhone 13 or iPhone 14 can benefit from this satellite connectivity, proving that cutting-edge communication doesn’t have to leave older devices behind.

A game-changer for messaging and emergencies

One of the most significant advantages of Starlink’s service is its flexibility. Unlike traditional satellite communication systems that often restrict users to preset messaging options, this new solution allows consumers to send fully customizable messages through their preferred platforms. In emergency situations, this added context could be life-saving, enabling users to clearly communicate their needs.

Read

Whether it’s a text to check in with loved ones or a critical call during an outdoor expedition, this innovation promises seamless, reliable communication where it was previously impossible.

What’s next for Starlink?

Starlink plans to roll out this new satellite phone service as part of a commercial package, with pricing details yet to be revealed. The potential impact is immense—not just for adventurers and emergency responders, but also for everyday users in rural or underserved areas where traditional mobile networks struggle to provide consistent service.

And this is just the beginning. SpaceX’s letter to the FCC hints at future expansions, including support for the Internet of Things (IoT), improved voice communication, and even web browsing through the satellite network. These advancements aim to deliver even greater value for individuals, businesses, and emergency services.

Bridging the global communication gap

While those with access to fast fiber-optic internet may not immediately see the appeal of satellite connectivity, Starlink’s Direct-to-Cell service has the potential to address a critical need. Despite the widespread availability of mobile networks, vast regions of the world still lack reliable coverage. Starlink’s solution could offer a lifeline in such areas, particularly for travelers and outdoor enthusiasts who depend on uninterrupted access for safety and convenience.

Read

By making it possible to stay connected from virtually anywhere, Elon Musk’s Starlink continues to push the boundaries of modern communication. Whether for work, emergencies, or simply keeping in touch, this latest development could redefine what it means to be connected in an increasingly mobile world.

4/5 - (944 votes)

Smith Noah

My name is Noah and I’m a dedicated member of the “Jason Deegan” team. With my passion for technology, I strive to bring you the latest and most exciting news in the world of high-tech.

jasondeegan.com · by Smith Noah · December 30, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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