​Quotes of the Day:

"I am neither especially clever nor especially gifted. I am only very, very curious."

– Albert Einstein

"People don't realize how a man's whole life can be changed by one book."

– Malcolm X

"Forgive yourself for not knowing earlier what only time could teach."

–Unknown

1. Trump Lays Out a Vision of Power Restrained Only by ‘My Own Morality’

2. Column: Unification Ministry drifts from unification policy, author says

3. N. Korea's Kim vows 'permanent' support for Putin's policies

4. Lee's approval rating rebounds to 60 pct: poll

5. Ground component of S. Korea-U.S. joint command becomes standing unit

6. New UNC deputy commander takes office

7. AMCHAM chief says S. Korea-U.S. business ties vital amid AI boom, geopolitics

8. Lee to visit Japan's Nara next week for summit talks with Takaichi

9. S. Korea launches interagency team for U.S. talks on civil uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing

10. Delayed defense payments for 2025 being executed in order

11. U.S. lawmakers voice expectations for Korean Americans' role for alliance, American society

12. U.S. withdraws from S. Korea-headquartered Green Climate Fund

13. Who comes after Trump isn’t the question to ask (for Seoul)

14. Strategic convergence under fire: ROK-Japan cooperation is imperative

15. Hanwha weighs expanding Philadelphia shipyard, acquiring other US yards

16. Japan expert urges deeper U.S.-South Korea-Japan security ties

17. Why disbanding the Counterintelligence Command matters

18. AI robots reshape South Korea factories

19. South Korea’s Nuclear Latency May Be Washington’s Least Bad Option

1. Trump Lays Out a Vision of Power Restrained Only by ‘My Own Morality’

​Summary:

POTUS tells the NYT that his authority as commander in chief is limited only by his “own morality,” not by international law, treaties, or traditional norms. He emphasizes coercive uses of U.S. military and economic power, citing strikes on Iran, regime change in Venezuela, and pressure on Colombia as proof of effectiveness. He treats NATO and alliances as transactional and secondary to U.S. primacy, and views “ownership” (e.g., Greenland) as strategically decisive. He appears relaxed about eroding arms-control regimes and precedent risks for Russia and China, while exploring legal workarounds and domestic deployment of force under emergency authorities.

Comment: POTUS granted this interview in the Oval office with these NY Times reporters.

So if I was teaching a national security class I would ask my students the following questions:

If U.S. power is constrained primarily by one leader’s personal morality rather than law, what happens to strategic predictability, alliance cohesion, and deterrence credibility in a prolonged crisis?

How does normalizing unilateral regime change and territorial “ownership” claims by the United States affect our ability to credibly oppose similar moves by China, Russia, or regional powers in the Asia-Indo-Pacific and beyond?

What institutional safeguards and decision processes are required if emergency authorities, military force, and economic coercion become routine tools of statecraft, rather than exceptional measures bound by law and multilateral consensus?

This article/interview is going to drive narratives from our friends, partners, allies, and adversaries for some time to come. January 9, 2026 (publication date) will be known as a strategic inflection point for the US.

Trump Lays Out a Vision of Power Restrained Only by ‘My Own Morality’

NY Times · Zolan Kanno-Youngs ·

On topic after topic, President Trump made clear that he would be the arbiter of any limits to his authorities, not international law or treaties.

By David E. Sanger, Tyler Pager, Katie Rogers, and Zolan Kanno-Youngs

The reporters are White House correspondents for The Times. They interviewed President Trump in the Oval Office.

• Jan. 8, 2026
• Updated 6:47 p.m. ET

• Jan. 8, 2026Updated 6:47 p.m. ET

Leer en español

President Trump declared on Wednesday evening that his power as commander in chief is constrained only by his “own morality,” brushing aside international law and other checks on his ability to use military might to strike, invade or coerce nations around the world.

Asked in a wide-ranging interview with The New York Times if there were any limits on his global powers, Mr. Trump said: “Yeah, there is one thing. My own morality. My own mind. It’s the only thing that can stop me.”

“I don’t need international law,” he added. “I’m not looking to hurt people.”

When pressed further about whether his administration needed to abide by international law, Mr. Trump said, “I do.” But he made clear he would be the arbiter when such constraints applied to the United States.

“It depends what your definition of international law is,” he said.

Mr. Trump’s assessment of his own freedom to use any instrument of military, economic or political power to cement American supremacy was the most blunt acknowledgment yet of his worldview. At its core is the concept that national strength, rather than laws, treaties and conventions, should be the deciding factor as powers collide.

He did acknowledge some constraints at home, even as he has pursued a maximalist strategy of punishing institutions he dislikes, exacting retribution against political opponents and deploying the National Guard to cities over the objections of state and local officials.

He made clear that he uses his reputation for unpredictability and a willingness to resort quickly to military action, often in service of coercing other nations. During his interview with The Times, he took a lengthy call from President Gustavo Petro of Colombia, who was clearly concerned after repeated threats that Mr. Trump was thinking of an attack on the country similar to the one on Venezuela.

“Well, we are in danger,” Mr. Petro said in an interview with The Times just before the call. “Because the threat is real. It was made by Trump.”

The call between the two leaders, the contents of which were off the record, was an example of coercive diplomacy in action. And it came just hours after Mr. Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio had extracted the United States from dozens of international organizations intended to foster multinational cooperation.

In his conversation with The Times, Mr. Trump sounded more emboldened than ever. He cited the success of his strike on Iran’s nuclear program — he keeps a model of the B-2 bombers used in the mission on his desk; the speed with which he decapitated the Venezuelan government last weekend; and his designs on Greenland, which is controlled by Denmark, a NATO ally.

When asked what was his higher priority, obtaining Greenland or preserving NATO, Mr. Trump declined to answer directly, but acknowledged “it may be a choice.” He made clear that the trans-Atlantic alliance was essentially useless without the United States at its core.

Even as he characterized the norms of the post-World War II order as unnecessary burdens on a superpower, Mr. Trump was dismissive of the idea that the leader of China, Xi Jinping, or President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia could use similar logic to the detriment of the United States. On topic after topic, he made clear that in his mind, U.S. power is the determining factor — and that previous presidents have been too cautious to make use of it for political supremacy or national profit.

The president’s insistence that Greenland must become part of the United States was a prime example of his worldview. It was not enough to exercise the U.S. right, under a 1951 treaty, to reopen long-closed military bases on the huge landmass, which is a strategically important crossroads for U.S., European, Chinese and Russian naval operations.

The president’s insistence that Greenland must become part of the United States was a prime example of his worldview. Credit...Esther Horvath for The New York Times

“Ownership is very important,” Mr. Trump said as he discussed, with a real estate mogul’s eye, the landmass of Greenland — three times the size of Texas but with a population of less than 60,000. He seemed to dismiss the value of having Greenland under the control of a close NATO ally.

When asked why he needed to possess the territory, he said: “Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.”

The conversation made clear that in Mr. Trump’s view, sovereignty and national borders are less important than the singular role the United States plays as the protector of the West.

Trump Says His Only Limit on His Global Powers Is His ‘Own Morality’

President Trump brushed aside international law and repeated his goal for the U.S. to own Greenland.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

He argued that only he — and not two predecessors on whom he heaped scorn, Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Barack Obama — had proved capable of persuading NATO nations to spend 5 percent of the gross domestic product on defense. (About 1.5 percent of that is actually for domestic infrastructure — from power grids to cybersecurity — that can support defense. The target does not kick in until 2035, six years after Mr. Trump leaves office.)

“I want them to shape up,” he said. “I think we’ll always get along with Europe, but I want them to shape up. I’m the one that got them to spend more on the, you know, more G.D.P. on NATO. But if you look at NATO, Russia I can tell you is not at all concerned with any other country but us.”

The president added: “I’ve been very loyal to Europe. I’ve done a good job. If it weren’t for me, Russia would have all of Ukraine right now.”

Ukrainian soldiers firing howitzer weapons at Russian positions in the Donbas region of Ukraine last month.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

He seemed unconcerned that the last major nuclear arms control agreement with Russia was set to expire in four weeks, leaving the world’s two largest nuclear powers free to expand their arsenals without limit, for the first time in half a century.

“If it expires, it expires,” he said. “We’ll just do a better agreement,” he added, insisting that China, which has the fastest-growing arsenal in the world, should be incorporated in any future agreement.

“You probably want to get a couple of other players involved also,” Mr. Trump said.

The president seemed equally sanguine about whether his decision to send Special Operations forces into Caracas to remove Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela would be exploited by China or Russia. In the days since the action in Venezuela, there have been arguments that the U.S. precedent would help justify a Chinese effort to take Taiwan, or Russia’s attempt to seize Ukraine, which Mr. Putin has described as a historical part of the Russian empire, dating back more than a dozen centuries.

Asked whether he had created a precedent that he may later regret, Mr. Trump argued that his view of the threat posed by Mr. Maduro’s Venezuela was quite different than Mr. Xi’s view of Taiwan.

“This was a real threat,” he said of Venezuela. “You didn’t have people pouring into China,” he argued, repeating his oft-made claim that Mr. Maduro dumped gang members into the United States.

Mr. Trump added: “You didn’t have drugs pouring into China. You didn’t have all of the bad things that we’ve had. You didn’t have the jails of Taiwan opened up and the people pouring into China,” or, he said later, criminals and others “pouring into Russia.”

When a reporter noted that Mr. Xi regarded Taiwan as a separatist threat to China, Mr. Trump said: “That’s up to him, what he’s going to be doing. But, you know, I’ve expressed to him that I would be very unhappy if he did that, and I don’t think he’ll do that. I hope he doesn’t.”

Then, asked whether Mr. Xi might seize on recent events to attack or choke off Taiwan, he suggested that the Chinese leader would not dare to take that step while Mr. Trump was in office. “He may do it after we have a different president, but I don’t think he’s going to do it with me as president,” he said.

Trump Says ‘It’s Up To’ Xi Jinping What China Does In Taiwan

President Trump said that his actions in Venezuela did not set a precedent for other countries like Russia and China because he claimed he was responding to a “real threat.”Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

On Thursday, in a rare assertion of congressional authority over the president’s war powers, the Senate agreed to debate a resolution aimed at curbing Mr. Trump’s use of military force in Venezuela. Senator Rand Paul, Republican of Kentucky, said one factor that may have tipped the vote was the president’s comment during Wednesday’s interview that the United States might remain involved in Venezuela for years.

On the domestic front, Mr. Trump suggested that judges only have power to restrict his domestic policy agenda — from the deployment of the National Guard to the imposition of tariffs — “under certain circumstances.”

But he was already considering workarounds. He raised the possibility that if his tariffs issued under emergency authorities were struck down by the Supreme Court, he could repackage them as licensing fees. And Mr. Trump, who said he was elected to restore law and order, reiterated that he was willing to invoke the Insurrection Act and deploy the military inside the United States and federalize some National Guard units if he felt it was important to do so.

So far, he said, “I haven’t really felt the need to do it.”

David E. Sanger covers the Trump administration and a range of national security issues. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written four books on foreign policy and national security challenges.

Tyler Pager is a White House correspondent for The Times, covering President Trump and his administration.

Katie Rogers is a White House correspondent for The Times, reporting on President Trump.

Zolan Kanno-Youngs is a White House correspondent for The Times, covering President Trump and his administration.

A version of this article appears in print on Jan. 9, 2026, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Trump Asserts His Global Power Has One Limit: Himself

Add the Sunday Times in print to your subscription. 50% off the first year. Learn more.

NY Times · Zolan Kanno-Youngs ·

2. Column: Unification Ministry drifts from unification policy, author says

​Summary:

Cho Young-ki argues Seoul’s unification policy has lost its compass just as north Korea moves toward a fourth-generation hereditary succession centered on Kim Ju-ae. He reads Kim Jong Un’s New Year visit with Ju-ae to the Kumsusan Palace as a deliberate step to legitimize her as heir and deepen the North’s “extractive institutions,” locking in poverty and repression and further obstructing unification. Cho criticizes the Ministry of Unification for drifting toward engagement he calls appeasement, weakening focus on human rights and accepting a “two-state” frame. He urges a renewed, self-directed unification strategy built on information penetration and support for northern residents.

Comment: Let me offer the Minister of Unification some focus:

Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.

Remember that peaceful co-existence and acceptance of a "two-state" framework is morally bankrupt as it sentences 26 million Koreans to a life of suffering, torture, and death.

Stay in your lane: focus on number 5 and number 5 follow from 1,2,3.

The “Big 5” for the Korean Peninsula

   1. War - must deter, and if attacked defend, fight, and defeat the nKPA.

   2. Regime Collapse - must prepare for the real possibility and understand it could lead to war and both war and regime collapse could result in resistance within the north.

   3. Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity - (gulags, external forced labor, etc) must focus on as it is a threat to the Kim Family Regime and undermines domestic legitimacy - it is a moral imperative and a national security issue. KJU denies human rights to remain in power.

   4. Asymmetric threats (provocations, proliferation, nuclear program, missile, cyber, and SOF) subversion of ROK, and global illicit activities.

   5. Unification - the biggest challenge and the solution.

We should never forget that north Korea is master of denial and deception in all that it does from military operations to strategy to diplomatic negotiations

Think about these questions:

Key Questions 

1. Has the regime abandoned its strategy of the use of subversion, coercion, extortion, and force to unify Korea under northern domination to ensure regime survival?
2. Has the regime abandoned its objective to split the ROK/US Alliance to support its strategy?
3. Who does Kim fear more: US or Korean people?
4. What do we want to achieve in Korea? 
5. What is the acceptable durable political arrangement on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia that will serve and protect US and Alliance interests?

Please understand these 3 key points::

Subversion

• The undermining of the power and authority of an established system or institution.
• As in: "the ruthless subversion of democracy"
• Ideological War – a choice for ALL Korean people between:
• Shared ROK/US Values
• Freedom and individual liberty, liberal democracy, free market economy, rule of law, and human rights
• Kim family regime (KFR) “values”
• Juche/Kimilsungism/now "KIMJONGUNISM," Socialist Workers Paradise, Songun, Songbun, Byungjin, and denial of human rights to sustain KFR power
• nK engages in political warfare and active subversion of the ROK

Dear Leader Absolutism

“The fundamental reason for human rights being trampled in North Korea lies in the ‘Dear Leader Absolutism’ dictatorship. There can be no human rights for the people in North Korea where the greatest morality and absolute law is giving one’s mind and body to the Dear Leader; and living as a slave who obeys completely and unconditionally the Dear Leader - it is the only life permitted the North Korean People.”

                                               Hwang Jang Yop, 2 DEC 99

The Guerilla Mindset

“In the course of this struggle against factional opponents, for the first time Kim began to emphasize nationalism as a means of rallying the population to the enormous sacrifices needed for post-war recovery.  This was a nationalism that first took shape in the environment of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement and developed into a creed through the destruction of both the non-Communist nationalist forces and much of the leftist intellectual tradition of the domestic Communists.  Kim’s nationalism did not draw inspiration from Korean history, nor did it dwell on past cultural achievements, for the serious study of history and traditional culture soon effectively ceased in the DPRK.  Rather, DPRK nationalism drew inspiration from the Spartan outlook of the former Manchurian guerrillas.  It was a harsh nationalism that dwelt on past wrongs and promises of retribution for “national traitors” and their foreign backers.  DPRK nationalism stressed the “purity” of all things Korean against the “contamination” of foreign ideas, and inculcated in the population a sense of fear and animosity toward the outside world.  Above all, DPRK nationalism stressed that the guerrilla ethos was not only the supreme, but also the only legitimate basis on which to reconstitute a reunified Korea.” (p. 27) (Guerrilla Dynasty, by Adrian Buzo)

The bottomline:

Bottom Line

The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK). (You Rock)

Although denuclearization of the north remains a worthy goal, it must be viewed as aspirational as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. The conventional wisdom has always been that denuclearization must come first and then unification will follow and that there should be no discussion of human rights out of fear that it would prevent Kim Jong Un from making a denuclearization agreement. Today even a blind man can read the tea leaves and know that Kim Jong Un will not denuclearize despite the fact that his policies have been an abject failure. His political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies completely failed in 2022/2023 because the ROK and US administrations, like their predecessors, refused to make the political and economic concessions he demanded just to come to the negotiating table: namely to remove sanctions. It is time for the U.S and the ROK/U.S. alliance to execute a political warfare strategy that flips the conventional wisdom and seeks regime transition and unification first and then denuclearization. Everyone must come to the understanding that the only way to end the nuclear program and the human rights abuses is through unification of the Korean peninsula. The ROK and U.S. must continue to maintain the highest state of military readiness to deter war and then adopt a human rights upfront approach, a comprehensive and sophisticated information and influence activities campaign, and focus all efforts on the pursuit of a free and unified Korea- ultimately a United Republic of Korea (UROK).

World News Jan. 9, 2026 / 1:30 AM / Updated at 1:30 AM

Column: Unification Ministry drifts from unification policy, author says

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/09/unification-ministry-drifts-from-unification-policy-column-says/9551767939695/

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks during a debate at Camp Greaves, a former U.S. military camp near the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas, in Paju, South Korea, 19 September 2025, to mark the seventh anniversary of the issuance in Pyongyang of a joint inter-Korean declaration in 2018 that called for the reduction of tensions and the prevention of accidental armed clashes, among other things. File Photo by YONHAP/EPA

Jan. 8 (Asia Today) -- Cho Young-ki, secretary general of the Korea Foundation for the Advancement of the Korean Peninsula and a former Korea University professor, argues South Korea's unification policy is losing direction as North Korea moves toward what he describes as a fourth-generation hereditary succession.

Cho points to recent North Korean state media coverage of Kim Jong Un's daughter, Ju-ae, saying her prominent positioning during New Year events and a visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun appeared deliberate and politically significant.

He notes the palace houses the bodies of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and is treated as a symbol of regime legitimacy. Cho writes that Kim's return there with Ju-ae on New Year's Day, after not visiting since the end of 2023, suggests a move to elevate her status ahead of a future party congress.

Cho argues such a succession would further entrench what he calls "extractive institutions" in North Korea, worsening poverty and repression and creating another long-term obstacle to unification. He contrasts extractive systems with "inclusive institutions" and says South Korea's unification strategy should focus on encouraging inclusive political and economic structures in the North.

He criticizes the Ministry of Unification's recent direction, saying the ministry has shifted from unification strategy toward engagement that he characterizes as appeasement. Cho cites the ministry's past work report describing the scrapping of a "North Korean Human Rights Center" and a move to reframe "North Korean human rights" as "inter-Korean human rights cooperation." He argues the wording risks implying the two Koreas' rights conditions are comparable and downplays abuses he says are normalized in North Korea.

Cho also argues the ministry's approach effectively accommodates North Korea's "two-state" framing, which he links to Kim's 2023 stance. He warns that North Korea's continued emphasis on strengthening nuclear capabilities signals it has not abandoned coercive goals, and he rejects what he calls complacent assumptions that Pyongyang would not use nuclear weapons.

Cho writes that even if public skepticism about unification is growing, the ministry should continue making the case for unification and pursue what he calls a self-directed strategy that preserves South Korea's rights and security while supporting North Korean residents.

As a policy tool, he highlights the power of information access in North Korea, pointing to Pyongyang's efforts to block outside information as evidence of its impact. He calls for an urgent shift in the government's unification policy framework.

The views expressed in this column are those of the author.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

3. N. Korea's Kim vows 'permanent' support for Putin's policies

​Comment: No cracks in this corner of the CRInK.

N. Korea's Kim vows 'permanent' support for Putin's policies | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 9, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260109000600315?section=nk/nk

By Park Boram

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has pledged "permanent" support for policies by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the North's state media reported Friday, as Pyongyang and Moscow have reinforced their military cooperation.

"I will unconditionally respect and unconditionally support all your policies and decisions and I have a willingness to be always with you for the sake of you and your Russia," Kim told Putin in a letter sent to the Russian leader, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"This choice will be constant and permanent," Kim was quoted as saying.

"I have come to feel once again the true comradely relations between us and availing myself of this opportunity, I'd like to emphasize that I regard the friendly relations with you as the most precious ones and (a source of) pride," Kim said, according to the KCNA.

Kim sent the letter to Putin the previous day in reply to the Russian leader's congratulatory letter, the KCNA said.

The KCNA did not say when or on what occasion Putin delivered the letter to Kim, although it is likely that the Russian president sent it on Kim's birthday, which is known to be Jan. 8.

Kim noted that Putin's letter was an expression of his friendship and trust in him and the North Korean people, voicing thanks and wishing greater success in all of Putin's important undertakings.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands during their summit talks in Beijing, China, on Sept. 3, 2025, in this file photo from the Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · January 9, 2026

4. Lee's approval rating rebounds to 60 pct: poll

Comment: POTROK must be the envy of democratic leaders with approval ratings like this.

Lee's approval rating rebounds to 60 pct: poll | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · January 9, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260109005000315

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung's approval rating rose to 60 percent this week amid positive public sentiment over his diplomacy, a poll showed Friday.

The survey by Gallup Korea, conducted Tuesday through Thursday on 1,000 respondents aged 18 and over, showed that the positive assessment of Lee's overall performance climbed 5 percentage points from the previous poll in mid-December.

Thirty-three percent gave a negative view, down from the previous survey's 36 percent, while 7 percent withheld their evaluation.

Diplomacy topped all other areas of state affairs among the reasons cited for positive assessments, accounting for 30 percent, followed by 14 percent who pointed to his leadership in managing the economy and livelihood issues.

Negative assessments were mostly driven by views critical of his performance on the economy and livelihood matters.

The pollster assessed that Lee's recent state visit to China appears to have brought his diplomacy back to the center of attention, which drove positive assessments.

Lee recently came back from a four-day state visit to China, where he held summit talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping to enhance economic ties and coordination on peace efforts regarding North Korea.

The two sides also addressed sensitive issues, including China's steel structures in overlapping waters of the Yellow Sea, which Seoul views as potential groundwork for territorial claims.

The approval rating for the ruling Democratic Party came to 45 percent, while that of the main opposition People Power Party stood at 26 percent.

The survey had a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level.

President Lee Jae Myung salutes a flag during a meeting with his senior secretaries at the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Jan. 8, 2026. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · January 9, 2026

5. Ground component of S. Korea-U.S. joint command becomes standing unit

​Summary:

South Korea and the U.S. have upgraded the Combined Ground Component Command (CGCC) under the Combined Forces Command into a standing unit, operating continuously rather than only in contingencies. Approved in an October Permanent Military Committee meeting, it became operational last month. U.S. personnel will now serve routinely in the combined ground staff, co-developing war plans and major exercises such as Freedom Shield. Seoul views this as a concrete step toward conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control by 2030 and full operational capability for the Future CFC. Four of six component commands are now standing, with SOF and intel support to follow.

Excerpts:

"The ROK-U.S. Alliance continues to make steady progress in strengthening its combined defense posture as part of the conditions-based transition of wartime operational control. These efforts reflect long-standing coordination and joint assessments between the two nations," the CFC said in a statement. ROK is short for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.

Comment: Strengthening combined readiness and capability. Demonstrating commitment and strategic reassurance and strategic resolve. The buried lede for all my former CUWTF brothers - a standing SOF command in Korea. This is historic.

Note that statements are coming eh ROK/US Combined Forces Command, the bilateral command that is shared and equally "co-owned" by both nations which will continue before and after OPCON transition. 

Ground component of S. Korea-U.S. joint command becomes standing unit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 9, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260109003300315?section=national/defense

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- The ground component command of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) has been turned into a standing unit, military officials said Friday, marking a step forward in Seoul's push to retake wartime operational control from Washington.

The transition of the Combined Ground Component Command (CGCC) into a standing component command was approved in a bilateral Permanent Military Committee meeting held in late October, and the unit went into operation last month, according to the officials.

The move for the component command, previously only activated during contingency operations, allows American troops to be regularly assigned as members of a combined combat staff to jointly establish combined operation plans and plans for large-scale drills like the springtime Freedom Shield exercise.

The transition comes as South Korea has been seeking to achieve the conditions-based handover of wartime operational control from Washington to Seoul within President Lee Jae Myung's five-year term ending in 2030.

South Korean and U.S. troops conduct combined river-crossing drills in Yeoju, Gyeonggi Province, in this Nov. 20, 2025, file photo. (Yonhap)

As part of such efforts, Seoul and Washington have agreed to seek the certification of full operational capability (FOC) of the Future CFC headquarters this year. FOC is the second part of a three-stage program aimed at vetting Seoul's capabilities to lead the allies' combined forces.

"(The move) not only strengthens the South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture but marks a step closer to the conditions-based handover of wartime operational control," a Joint Chiefs of Staff official said.

With the recent transition, four of the six component commands, including the air, ground and naval components, have completed their transition as standing component commands within the CFC structure.

Efforts are also under way to turn the two other commands over special operations and military intelligence support operations into permanent units.

"The ROK-U.S. Alliance continues to make steady progress in strengthening its combined defense posture as part of the conditions-based transition of wartime operational control. These efforts reflect long-standing coordination and joint assessments between the two nations," the CFC said in a statement. ROK is short for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · January 9, 2026

6. New UNC deputy commander takes office

​Comment: Multinational, coalition support for freedom and peace on the Korean peninsula. The free world supports freedom in Korea. This is probably the most important value that the UNC represents.

New UNC deputy commander takes office | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · January 9, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260109009900315

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- Lt. Gen. Scott A. Winter of Australia took office as the new deputy commander of the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) on Friday.

Winter was inaugurated, replacing Lt. Gen. Derek Macaulay, in the ceremony at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, some 60 kilometers south of Seoul.

He is the second Australian general officer to hold the post since the UNC was established 75 years ago.

The event was attended by Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who also doubles as commander of the UNC, along with dignitaries from the member states.

This photo shows Lt. Gen. Scott A. Winter, new deputy commander of the United Nations Command, giving his remarks during a transfer of responsibility ceremony on Jan. 9, 2026, in this photo uploaded on the Pentagon's Defense Visual Information Distribution Service. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · January 9, 2026

7. AMCHAM chief says S. Korea-U.S. business ties vital amid AI boom, geopolitics

​Comment: Economic security of both nations is vital to national security. And the ROK and US can lead the way in AI because AI will be vital to both economic and national security.

AMCHAM chief says S. Korea-U.S. business ties vital amid AI boom, geopolitics | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · January 9, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260109006600320

By Kang Yoon-seung

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- Cooperation with South Korea is "vital" for U.S. businesses to achieve sustainable growth amid growing uncertainties driven by the boom in the artificial intelligence (AI) sector and geopolitical issues, the head of a U.S. business lobby said Friday.

James Kim, chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM), made such a remark during his meeting with Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan, where the two sides discussed ways to bolster bilateral economic cooperation and improve the business environment here.

"At a time when rapid advances in AI and shifting geopolitical dynamics are reshaping the global landscape, the U.S.-Korea partnership remains vital in supporting economic security and sustainable growth," the AMCHAM chief was quoted as saying by the organization.

"AMCHAM stands ready to work closely with the Korean government and our member companies to help unlock Korea's full potential as a regional hub," he added.

In response, Kim vowed to foster a "more predictable and stable environment" for foreign businesses operating in South Korea, expressing gratitude for record-high U.S. investment pledges made in Asia's No. 4 economy last year.

According to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources, new investment plans announced by U.S. companies in South Korea spiked 86.6 percent on-year to $9.77 billion in 2025, mainly led by the metals, distribution and IT sectors.

The minister also highlighted the importance of expanding investment ties in future-oriented industries, encouraging U.S. businesses to continue efforts to expand investment here, according to AMCHAM.

This file photo taken on Dec. 15, 2025, shows James Kim, chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, speaking during an event held in Seoul. (Yonhap)

colin@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kang Yoon-seung · January 9, 2026

8. Lee to visit Japan's Nara next week for summit talks with Takaichi

​Comment: Excellent. Good bilateral relations leads to good trilateral cooperation which is in the national security interests of all three of our nations.

(LEAD) Lee to visit Japan's Nara next week for summit talks with Takaichi | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · January 9, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260109003151315?section=national/politics

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with statement, details; ADDS photo)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung will make a two-day visit to Japan's Nara prefecture early next week for summit talks with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to discuss ways to strengthen bilateral ties, Cheong Wa Dae said Friday.

Lee is scheduled to depart for Japan next Tuesday for the summit talks, which will be held in the Japanese prefecture of Nara, Takaichi's hometown, Cheong Wa Dae said.

The two leaders are expected to discuss a wide range of regional and global issues, as well as the economy, society and culture, Cheong Wa Dae said in a statement.

Lee and Takaichi last held summit talks on Oct. 30 on the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Gyeongju and briefly met on the margins of the Group of 20 leaders' gathering in South Africa in November.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (R) poses for a photo with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi ahead of their pull-aside meeting held on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in this Nov. 23, 2025, file photo. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Lee will attend a friendship event with Takaichi next Wednesday and meet with ethnic Koreans in Japan before returning home that day.

The trip will mark Lee's second visit to the neighboring country after he visited Tokyo in August and held summit talks with Takaichi's predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba.

The upcoming visit is expected to help strengthen the future-oriented momentum of bilateral ties through "shuttle diplomacy," or reciprocal visits, according to Cheong Wa Dae.

Lee has said he intends to advance ties with Japan in a future-oriented manner, while not overlooking longstanding wartime history issues stemming from the time when Korea was under Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule.

The planned summit between Lee and Takaichi comes as tensions between Tokyo and Beijing remained heightened over the Japanese prime minister's remarks about Taiwan.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (R) shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi ahead of their talks in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, southeastern South Korea, in this Oct. 30, 2025, file photo. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

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en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · January 9, 2026

9. S. Korea launches interagency team for U.S. talks on civil uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing

​Comment: This will likely be a contentious alliance issue for some time to come affecting economic, energy, and national security.

S. Korea launches interagency team for U.S. talks on civil uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · January 9, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260109002600315?section=national/diplomacy

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea launched an interagency team Friday to coordinate efforts ahead of anticipated negotiations with the United States on its bid to secure uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities for peaceful use, officials said.

The pangovernment consultative group comes as Washington has given Seoul the green light to pursue uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing for peaceful purposes following the October summit talks between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump in Gyeongju.

In the joint fact sheet outlining the summit agreements, the U.S. committed to supporting South Korea for the process that will lead to civil uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing for civil uses.

In this file photo, President Lee Jae Myung (R) poses with U.S. President Donald Trump ahead of their summit talks on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation gathering in South Korea's Gyeongju, on Oct. 29, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Rim Kap-soo, government representative for South Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation at the foreign ministry, led the inaugural closed-door meeting, joined by officials from the Ministry of Science and ICT, the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment, and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.

Also participating in the meeting were officials from the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control.

South Korea is seeking to amend its bilateral nuclear energy pact with the U.S. to obtain standing prior approval for low-level uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, aiming to secure a stable fuel supply for commercial nuclear power plants.

Under the existing 123 Agreement, South Korea may enrich uranium only to below 20 percent with written U.S. consent. Reprocessing spent fuel likewise requires U.S. approval, meaning Seoul cannot carry out these activities independently.

Based on the interagency coordination, South Korea is expected to begin negotiations with the U.S. on a potential revision of the agreement. A foreign ministry official said the two sides are in talks to hold the first round of negotiations, with details yet to be decided.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · January 9, 2026

10. Delayed defense payments for 2025 being executed in order

​Comment: 2025 was a complex and difficult year for the ROK MND.

Delayed defense payments for 2025 being executed in order | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · January 9, 2026

SEOUL, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- The defense ministry said Friday delayed defense payments that were supposed to be carried out by the end of 2025 are being executed in order.

Controversy erupted over the ministry's failure to pay about 1.2 trillion won (US$25 million) in defense-related expenditures to military units and defense contractors by the end of last year.

The undisbursed funds comprised around 500 billion won due for the defense ministry, and 700 billion won for the Defense Acquisition Program Administration.

"The (unpaid) funds are being executed as of 9 a.m., and they are being allocated to each military and institution," ministry spokesperson Chung Binna said at a press briefing.

The ministry earlier said it had requested the finance ministry for the budget on time, but the payment process was delayed due to a temporary shortage of funds as demand for spending by government ministries was concentrated at the year-end.

The finance ministry has said funds for the payments of the 2025 defense expenditures will be provided as quickly as possible within this week.

Defense ministry spokesperson Chung Binna speaks during a press briefing on Dec. 16, 2025. (Yonhap)

sookim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · January 9, 2026

11. U.S. lawmakers voice expectations for Korean Americans' role for alliance, American society

​Summary:

At a U.S. Capitol event marking Korean American Day, lawmakers highlighted Korean Americans’ growing political influence and their role in strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance. Sen. Andy Kim emphasized that “Koreanness” and Americanness are mutually reinforcing, calling the coming decade especially dynamic for Korean and Asian Americans. Rep. Young Kim stressed bolstering the alliance and people-to-people ties, framing Korean American, Asian American, and American values as one and the same: family, faith, and hard work. Rep. Ed Case called Korean Americans “critical” to sustaining one of America’s most important global partnerships. Korean American students and a children’s choir also participated.

Comment: The ROK/US alliance (along with human rights in north Korea) has long had strong bi-partisan support. I hope that can continue.

U.S. lawmakers voice expectations for Korean Americans' role for alliance, American society | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · January 9, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260109000400315

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9 (Yonhap) -- U.S. lawmakers expressed hope Thursday for Korean Americans to play a crucial role in strengthening the alliance with South Korea and continuously contribute to American society, as they attended an event at the Capitol in Washington to celebrate Korean American Day.

Korean American lawmakers, including Sen. Andy Kim (D-NJ) and Rep. Young Kim (R-CA), and other members of Congress joined the annual event, five days ahead of the special day that marks the arrival of the first Korean immigrants to the United States on Jan. 13, 1903.

In 2005, both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions to commemorate the day. The celebration takes place annually, with the attendance of Korean American lawmakers, students and entrepreneurs, as well as their supporters.

Sen. Kim, the first Korean American member of the Senate, said that the next decade will be the "most exciting and dynamic" decade for Korean Americans and Asian Americans, noting that "we are at an inflection point," as he pointed out advances that they have made in American politics and other sectors.

"We belong here. This is our country, and this is our culture to be able to contribute to," he said.

He also said that he has come to a deep understanding that "my Koreanness does not dilute my Americanness" as he emphasized his pride in being Korean American.

"Being Korean American does not mean that I am in anyway the lesser of an American," he said. "In fact ... it is truly something that I am proud of."

Sen. Andy Kim (D-NJ) speaks during a reception to mark Korean American Day at the Capitol in Washington on Jan. 8, 2026. (Yonhap)

Rep. Kim, who chairs the subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific affairs under the House Foreign Affairs Committee, underscored her priority of strengthening the Seoul-Washington alliance and people-to-people ties between the two countries.

"That's what makes our bilateral relationship very strong, and each of us in this room are the ambassadors to make that relationship even stronger," she said.

Rep. Young Kim (R-CA) speaks during a reception to mark Korean American Day at the Capitol in Washington on Jan. 8, 2026. (Yonhap)

She also highlighted Korean Americans' role in contributing to the enrichment of American diversity.

"As Korean Americans, we should be very proud of our heritage, our traditions and the strong values that we hold dear, which are American values," he said.

"Remember that Korean American values, Asian American values are American values. We honor the family, faith and heart that have been handed to us by our parents, grandparents and our previous generations."

Also among the participants was Rep. Ed Case (D-HI) who stressed Korean Americans' "critical" role in advancing the relationship between South Korea and the U.S., which he said is one of the "most important" partnerships for the U.S. in the world.

"The Korean American community throughout our country ... you have a critical role in this to maintain that relationship, to advocate for the relationship and to reinforce the relationship wherever you possibly can, whether it be educational exchange or cultural exchange," he said.

"We cannot lose this relationship. We cannot leave Korea and other friends in the Asia-Pacific to fend for themselves in a very dangerous world."

Rep. Ed Case (D-HI) speaks during a reception to mark Korean American Day at the Capitol in Washington on Jan. 8, 2026. (Yonhap)

He portrayed South Korea as one of the "incredible success stories in the world over the last three generations."

Thursday's event was also attended by dozens of U.S.-based university students of Korean descent -- a group organized by the Korean American Grassroots Conference, a network of Korean American voters.

The event included a performance by the New Jersey Children's Choir of the Korean folk song "Arirang" and "Golden" from the original soundtrack of Netflix's hit animated film "KPop Demon Hunters"

Members of the New Jersey Children's Choir stand to perform during a reception to mark Korean American Day at the Capitol in Washington on Jan. 8, 2026. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · January 9, 2026

12. U.S. withdraws from S. Korea-headquartered Green Climate Fund

​Comment: One of the 66 UN and international organisations we have withdrawn from.

U.S. withdraws from S. Korea-headquartered Green Climate Fund | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · January 9, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260109000200315

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 (Yonhap) -- The United States has withdrawn from a South Korea-based international institution on climate change, the Treasury Department said Thursday, a day after President Donald Trump signed a memorandum to exit dozens of global organizations that he said are "contrary" to U.S. interests.

The department said it has notified the Green Climate Fund (GCF) that the U.S. would withdraw from the fund and step down from its seat on the GCF board, "effective immediately," in line with the Trump administration's decision to leave the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Headquartered in Incheon, west of Seoul, the GCF was formed in 2010 under the UNFCCC to help developing countries with climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts.

"Our nation will no longer fund radical organizations like the GCF whose goals run contrary to the fact that affordable, reliable energy is fundamental to economic growth and poverty reduction," Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent was quoted as saying in a press release.

The department added that continued participation in the GCF was determined to no longer be consistent with the Trump administration's priorities and goals.

The department pointed out that the Trump administration is committed to advancing all affordable and reliable sources of energy, which it said are fundamental to economic growth and poverty reduction.

On Wednesday, Trump signed a memorandum to withdraw the U.S. from 66 international organization, agencies and commissions, which Secretary of State Marco Rubio said were identified as part of the Trump Administration's review of "wasteful," "ineffective" and "harmful" international organizations.

This photo, released by AFP, shows U.S. President Donald Trump delivering remarks on the economy in Mount Pocono, Pennsylvania, on Dec. 9, 2025. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · January 9, 2026

13. Who comes after Trump isn’t the question to ask (for Seoul)

​Summary:

Troy Stangarone argues Koreans are asking the wrong question by focusing on who follows POTUS instead of how America is changing. History suggests Vice President Vance is unlikely to succeed him and that a lower-profile figure may emerge, so personality forecasting is a poor guide. The real issues for Seoul are twofold. First, whether POTUS’ “America First,” tariff-heavy, alliance-skeptical approach becomes a lasting transformation or a temporary aberration. Second, whether U.S. society itself is shifting toward protectionism and authoritarian tendencies. For Korean policymakers, that means planning for structural change in U.S. politics, not just a post-Trump reset.

Who comes after Trump isn’t the question to ask

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By Troy Stangarone

• Published Jan 5, 2026 4:51 pm KST
• Updated Jan 5, 2026 4:57 pm KST

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20260105/who-comes-after-trump-isnt-the-question-to-ask

With U.S. mid-term elections set to take place later this year, attention will begin to turn to Donald Trump’s lame duck period and who will succeed a president that has upended the United States’ relationships with allies and adversaries alike.

For policy makers in Seoul, the question of Trump’s successor touches on whether the United States under a new administration might return to a more traditional role on security and trade policy or whether the changes we’ve seen are more permanent. It also holds implications for whether policy makers will need to continue making concessions to the Trump administration or can take firmer stands as Trump’s term approaches its end.

Despite the inclination to view Vice President JD Vance as a strong contender to succeed Trump, history would suggest he faces a difficult road ahead. The last sitting U.S. vice president to win the presidency was George H.W. Bush in 1988. Prior to Bush, the last sitting vice president to win the presidency was Calvin Coolidge in 1920. The most recent vice president to run while still in office was Al Gore, who lost the 2000 presidential election.

While Dick Chaney and Joe Biden did not run for president when their respective administrations came to an end, other recent politics suggests that the next U.S. president will likely be an unexpected figure. In the 2008 presidential election, Senator Hillary Clinton was expected to be the Democratic nominee and likely presidential winner. Instead, a more junior senator from Illinois by the name of Barack Obama went on to win the nomination and the White House.

When Donald Trump first declared he would run for president in 2015, an NBC/WSJ poll had former Florida governor Jeb Bush at 22 percent, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker at 19 percent and Senator Marco Rubio at 14 percent in the Republican presidential primary. Donald Trump was only polling at 1 percent. Clinton was again seen as the likely winner, only to lose this time to Trump.

While not a presidential race, Zohran Mamdani only garnered 2 percent in initial polls for this past November’s New York mayoral election. He is now the youngest mayor of New York in decades.

None of this means that Vance cannot win the presidency, but history and recent U.S. politics suggests that the eventual winner will likely emerge from a group of lower profile individuals.

This means there are two questions Korean policy makers should be considering. The first is whether Trump will have been a transformative president by the time he leaves office or whether his two terms in office will be an aberration in U.S. policy.

Prior U.S. presidents such as Franklin D. Rosevelt, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan fit this mold. While Republicans have long fought against changes made by the Rosevelt administration such as Social Security, they became a part of the U.S. governmental and political structure that each succeeding administration dealt with. Truman and the later parts of the Rosevelt administration set the foundation for post-World War II U.S. foreign policy and trade policy that both parties have hewed to for more than seven decades, while Reagan set forth a neo-liberal economic policy that both parties accepted.

Trump is trying to largely overturn the legacies set out by both Truman and Reagan. If he is successful in establishing a transformative "America first" approach to U.S. foreign policy and higher tariffs as a tool of economic policy, his successor will be less free to reverse course. This is especially true on trade policy, where if Trump’s use of tariffs is seen by the public as restoring manufacturing jobs, it would be politically difficult for a new administration to reverse course.

The second question is whether there have been fundamental changes in the United States. Polling from YouGov this past November found that 55 percent of Americans believe that trade makes America better off, while only 15 percent support higher tariffs. While the politics of trade may be difficult, especially if Trump is successful in restoring some manufacturing, these figures and those in other polls suggest America’s view of trade overall may not be shifting.

This extends beyond foreign policy and trade. Trump has worked to dismantle much of the opposition to his policies, coupled with a decline in press freedom and democracy under his watch. Polling from multiple outlets suggests that growing numbers of Americans from both political parties support a more authoritarian form of government. If America is transforming into a more authoritarian country, that would have longer-term consequences for how the United States approaches foreign policy and trade.

While the question of who the next US president will be is an important one, focusing on how America is changing is the best approach for considering how Trump’s successor might govern.

Troy Stangarone is the director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy and the deputy director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

​14. Strategic convergence under fire: ROK-Japan cooperation is imperative

​Summary:

Russian and Chinese aircraft entering KADIZ are part of a pattern of joint coercive signaling that targets both the ROK and Japan and probes allied seams. Chun In-bum argues Seoul and Tokyo now face overlapping threats: north Korea’s missiles, Chinese gray-zone pressure around Senkaku and Taiwan, and growing China–Russia military coordination. In this environment, ROK–Japan security cooperation, anchored in trilateral coordination with the United States, has become essential to deterrence. Freedom Edge exercises, real-time missile data sharing, and Japan’s and Korea’s defense buildups are progress. But if historical disputes or hesitation stall cooperation, the result will be greater insecurity, not stability.

Comment: It would be useful to have ROK-Japan cooperation against penetration of the ADIZ by Chinese and Russian aircraft. To create cracks in the CRInK convergence is critical.

Strategic convergence under fire: ROK-Japan cooperation is imperative

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By Chun In-bum

• Published Jan 9, 2026 11:31 am KST

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/columns/columnists/chuninbum/20260109/strategic-convergence-under-fire-rok-japan-cooperation-is-imperative

Chun In-bum

Seven Russian and two Chinese military aircraft entered South Korea’s air defense identification zone (KADIZ) on Dec. 9, remaining for roughly an hour before departing. While the incident did not constitute a violation of sovereign airspace, Seoul lodged a diplomatic protest with both Beijing and Moscow the following day. Japan also responded by scrambling aircraft to implement air defense measures against potential airspace violations.

Air defense identification zones are not territorial airspace, and international law does not prohibit foreign military aircraft from entering them. However, this incident is part of an increasingly assertive pattern in which China and Russia routinely conduct joint military flights into KADIZ without prior notification, citing exercises. These actions are deliberate signals, designed to test responses, normalize coercive behavior and exploit seams between regional actors.

This pattern reflects a deteriorating regional security environment and underscores that the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan face an increasingly convergent set of security challenges. These include North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile programs, repeated Chinese incursions near Japan’s Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, China’s unilateral deployment of aquaculture cages in the Provisional Measures Zone jointly managed with the ROK, and a series of unsafe and escalatory aerial encounters involving Chinese military aircraft near Japan’s Okinawa islands.

China is also exerting coercive pressure on Taiwan, where under the banner of Justice Mission 2025, Beijing established exclusion zones and conducted long-range live-fire drills in waters surrounding Taiwan. While it framed the exercises as a “serious warning” against “external interference,” the exercises dangerously escalated tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

Japan has consistently raised concerns about China’s behavior, positions that are increasingly shared by the ROK. In response to recent aerial incidents, partners such as Australia and the United States have publicly supported Tokyo and raised concern over Beijing’s actions. The United States, Japan, Australia and the United Kingdom also expressed their concern in response to Justice Mission 2025. These developments highlight a broader reality: The strategic pressures confronting Seoul and Tokyo are no longer parallel but overlapping.

For South Korea, rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait carry significant strategic risks. Any instability could destabilize the Korean Peninsula and disrupt vital sea lanes on which the country’s economy depends.

In the face of regional pressures, and recognizing that stability in the Taiwan Strait is increasingly linked to its own national security, deeper ROK-Japan cooperation, reinforced through close trilateral coordination with the United States, has become essential to sustaining the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. Originally articulated by Japan, which is on the front line of securing this vision, its success now rests on practical cooperation rather than rhetoric alone.

On the bilateral front, diplomatic engagement between the ROK and Japan continues to expand. The two governments are preparing for a leaders’ summit in mid-January as part of a renewed commitment to maintain regular diplomacy. From Tokyo’s perspective, this approach aligns with a broader effort to deepen cooperation with like-minded partners that share democratic values and a commitment to a rules-based international order.

Importantly, President Lee Jae Myung’s agreement to pursue a “two-track approach” toward Japan — separating future-oriented cooperation from unresolved historical and territorial issues — has created critical political space for progress in security coordination. This framework reflects a growing recognition in both capitals that defense and deterrence cannot be held hostage to historical disputes.

Recent defense-focused engagements further demonstrate the deepening operational cooperation between the ROK and Japan. The Freedom Edge 2025 exercise, involving the United States alongside its two key Asian allies, focused on refining ballistic missile defense and improving trilateral interoperability. These drills coincided with major U.S.-Japan exercises designed to strengthen deterrence and operational readiness in the region.

These activities are reinforced by significant defense recalibration in both countries. Recognizing that the regional security environment is the most complex since World War II, Japan has accelerated plans to raise defense spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product and expand capabilities in emerging domains such as unmanned systems and standoff weapons. South Korea has similarly pledged substantial increases in defense spending while continuing to expand its global defense industrial footprint, emphasizing self-defense as a foundation for peace.

Intelligence sharing has also become a central pillar of deterrence credibility. Since December 2023, the ROK, Japan and the United States have been able to share real-time data on North Korean ballistic missiles and other projectiles. This arrangement enhances early warning, improves response coordination and signals collective resolve against coercion or escalation.

Despite this progress, three challenges remain. First, long-term U.S. strategic focus cannot be taken for granted as Washington balances competing global priorities and increasing domestic pressures. Second, deep economic interdependence with China constrains the range of responses available to both Seoul and Tokyo, raising the costs of security action. Finally, Seoul and Tokyo must compartmentalize their historical and territorial disputes to advance pragmatic security cooperation.

Yet these constraints only reinforce the necessity of closer coordination. Neither South Korea nor Japan can manage the growing threats to the rules-based international order alone. The pressures they face today unite them far more than they divide them.

The recent Russian and Chinese incursions into KADIZ serve as a stark reminder that the Indo-Pacific is entering a period of heightened pressure and strategic testing. With China, Russia and North Korea pushing the boundaries of the status quo, the alignment between the South Korea and Japan is critical.

The strategic warning is clear: failure to deepen ROK-Japan cooperation will invite greater insecurity, not stability. In an era where hesitation is interpreted as weakness, sustained alignment between Seoul and Tokyo is no longer optional — it is the price of deterrence.

Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.

​15.  Hanwha weighs expanding Philadelphia shipyard, acquiring other US yards

​Summary:

Hanwha is moving to turn its newly acquired Philly Shipyard into a major US naval and unmanned-vessel hub, weighing both expansion in Philadelphia and buying an additional American yard. CEO Michael Coulter says rising demand for surface, subsurface, and uncrewed ships means Hanwha “needs more space,” with a goal of scaling from one or two vessels a year to as many as 20. The push is tied to a $150 billion, Korea-backed “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” framework and could include building nuclear-powered submarines in either the US or Korea. Hanwha is also teaming with Havok AI on autonomous surface vessels for the US Navy.

Comment: MASGA, yes. And Korea is a full partner in the arsenal of democracies.

Hanwha weighs expanding Philadelphia shipyard, acquiring other US yards

koreaherald.com · Ahn Sung-mi · January 9, 2026

https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10652323

Hanwha Philly Shipyard in Pennsylvania (Hanwha Group)

South Korea’s Hanwha Group is exploring an expansion of its shipyard in Philadelphia and potential acquisitions of other US shipyards, as demand for naval and uncrewed vessels rises, The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday.

Michael Coulter, CEO of Hanwha Defense USA, the US subsidiary of South Korea’s defense-to-shipbuilding conglomerate, told the newspaper in an interview that the company is currently engaged in discussions with the Donald Trump administration about possible deals to build surface, subsurface and uncrewed vessels.

To meet rising demand, Coulter said the company “needs more space.”

Hanwha affiliates Hanwha Ocean and Hanwha Systems acquired the Philly Shipyard in December 2024 for $100 million to enter the US shipbuilding market. Once a major naval shipyard, Philly Shipyard has in recent years been limited to producing one or two vessels annually, operating with two docks, which Coulter said is insufficient to handle increasing volume.

The company, which aims to produce up to 20 ships a year, is in discussions with federal, state and local officials about expanding capacity and securing additional storage property around the Philadelphia region, Coulter said.

Options under consideration include gaining access to unused or underutilized docks in the area, as well as using docks at other shipyards to accommodate Hanwha’s excess orders.

Hanwha is likewise giving serious consideration to purchasing a second US shipyard in a different region over the next few years. “We think there’s a unique time in history right now,” Coulter was quoted as saying.

A Hanwha Group official in Seoul confirmed the report, but said no specific plans have as yet been finalized.

The expansion push reflects Hanwha's efforts to speed up execution of the "Make American Shipbuilding Great Again" project, a South Korea-US shipbuilding cooperation project aimed at revitalizing the American shipbuilding industry. Through a $150 billion South Korean government-backed investment fund formed as part of a broader bilateral trade deal, Hanwha has emerged as a central industrial partner under the initiative.

The Philly Shipyard has been cited as a potential construction site for South Korea’s future nuclear-powered submarines, following agreements reached between Seoul and Washington in October. US President Trump, however, said the submarines should be built at Philly Shipyard, while Seoul has argued for the vessels to be made in Korea.

Coulter said Hanwha has the full capability to manufacture submarines in either the US or South Korea, with the final decision to come from the two governments.

Last month, key US executives of Hanwha Group expressed confidence that the Philly Shipyard is prepared to construct nuclear-powered submarines for the US Navy. They said the groundwork was already underway, including workforce expansion, productivity enhancement, facility investments and technology transfers.

Amid Hanwha's broader US shipbuilding push, affiliates Hanwha Defense USA and Hanwha Systems on Thursday announced they are partnering with Havok AI, a US firm specializing in autonomous maritime systems, to pursue a contract to supply the US Navy with hundreds of autonomous surface vessels. The vessels would be capable of missile launches, cargo transport and surveillance missions.

sahn@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · Ahn Sung-mi · January 9, 2026

​16. Japan expert urges deeper U.S.-South Korea-Japan security ties

Summary:

Japanese defense experts in Tokyo urged sustained U.S.–ROK–Japan security cooperation as China–Japan tensions sharpen over Taiwan. Masayuki Masuda of Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies said deeper trilateral coordination is now a structural necessity, not a one-off response, and must address both Taiwan contingencies and north Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile threats. He noted meaningful progress in recent trilateral defense talks and shared concern over China’s military behavior, while denying Japan is pressuring Seoul to “choose sides” against Beijing. Scholar John Chuan Tiong Lim added that any Chinese move to seize Taiwan by force would fundamentally reshape regional security.​

Comment: We cannot have enough good solid trilateral cooperation to face the myriad mutual threats.

World News Jan. 9, 2026 / 1:10 AM / Updated at 1:10 AM

Japan expert urges deeper U.S.-South Korea-Japan security ties

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/09/japanese-defense-security-experts-meeting/7561767938564/

1 of 3 | Japanese defense and security experts discuss China-Japan tensions over the Taiwan Strait and the direction of U.S.-South Korea-Japan cooperation at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan in Tokyo on Jan. 8, 2026. John Chuan Tiong Lim (L) of the University of Tokyo’s Institute of Advanced Studies on Asia and Masayuki Masuda (R) of Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies. Photo by Asia Today

Jan. 8 (Asia Today) -- Japanese defense and security experts meeting in Tokyo on Thursday called for sustained security cooperation among Japan, the United States and South Korea as tensions between China and Japan sharpen over Taiwan.

Masayuki Masuda, director of the China Center at the National Institute for Defense Studies, a research institute affiliated with Japan's Defense Ministry, said the priority is to keep deepening trilateral cooperation.

"What is important now is to continue deepening security cooperation among Japan, the United States and South Korea," Masuda said during a news conference at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan.

His comments came ahead of an expected South Korea-Japan summit in Japan, with Masuda answering a question from Asia Today about the role Seoul should play as Beijing and Tokyo clash more openly over Taiwan.

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Masuda said trilateral cooperation should not be viewed as limited to the Taiwan Strait, pointing instead to a broader security environment that also includes North Korea.

"The situation on the Korean Peninsula, such as the enhancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, must also be considered," he said, describing cooperation as a structural necessity rather than a one-off response aimed at a specific country.

Masuda also said trilateral defense cooperation has already progressed, citing recent discussions among the three countries' defense leaders and what he described as shared concern about China's military behavior.

At the same time, he rejected the idea that Japan is pressing South Korea to make specific choices because of strained China-Japan ties, saying the focus should remain on what is needed within Japan-South Korea relations and cooperation that includes the United States.

John Chuan Tiong Lim, a researcher at the University of Tokyo's Institute of Advanced Studies on Asia, also spoke during the session and pointed to U.S. policy as increasingly centered on Taiwan's defense.

Lim said Washington's public messaging can differ from its policy actions, adding that a Chinese attempt to take Taiwan by force would fundamentally alter the region's security landscape.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

17. Why disbanding the Counterintelligence Command matters

​Summary:

South Korea’s civilian-government-military reform panel has recommended dismantling the Armed Forces Counterintelligence Command after 58 years, citing its repeated abuse of power. Instead of focusing on espionage, the command became entangled in an alleged martial law plot under former President Yoon Suk Yeol, using spy-hunting authorities to target politicians and manufacture “instability” invoking north Korea. Its predecessor, the Defense Security Command, had already been disgraced for election meddling and political surveillance. Functions will be split among a Defense Ministry Investigation Headquarters and two new security bodies. The editorial urges stronger democratic oversight without weakening core counterintelligence capacity.

Why disbanding the Counterintelligence Command matters

Posted January. 09, 2026 09:11,   

Updated January. 09, 2026 09:12

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20260109/6049822/1

The civilian, government and military joint special advisory committee formed to pursue military reform recommended on Jan. 8 that Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back dismantle the Armed Forces Counterintelligence Command. The command currently oversees counterintelligence operations, national security investigations and military security audits. Under the recommendation, investigative functions would be transferred to the Defense Ministry’s Investigation Headquarters, which supervises military police, while counterintelligence duties and security audits would be reassigned to two newly created bodies tentatively named the Defense Security Intelligence Agency and the Central Security Audit Group. If implemented, the move would bring an end to the command 58 years after the establishment of its predecessor, the Army Security Command, in 1968.

This outcome can only be regarded as the command’s own making. Instead of focusing on its core mission of preventing espionage, it became deeply involved in an illegal attempt to impose martial law. Yeo In-hyeong, the former head of the Counterintelligence Command, ordered the arrest of more than 10 politicians, including leaders of both the ruling and opposition parties, on the day martial law was declared. Arrest teams equipped with handcuffs and binding ropes were dispatched to the National Assembly. Before the declaration, Yeo wrote in a memo that an “unstable situation” needed to be created, invoking North Korea. Investigative powers granted to apprehend spies were instead used to pursue political figures targeted by former President Yoon Suk Yeol, revealing an intent that risked plunging the country into a national security crisis.

Former President Yoon sought to turn the Counterintelligence Command into an instrument of personal loyalty. After appointing Yeo, a junior from his alma mater Chungam High School, as commander, Yoon reportedly summoned him frequently to a safe house in Samcheong-dong to discuss martial law plans up until just before its declaration. The command’s predecessor, the Defense Security Command, had long been embroiled in controversy over illegal political involvement, including online comment manipulation during presidential and parliamentary elections under the Lee Myung-bak administration and surveillance of families of the Sewol ferry disaster victims under the Park Geun-hye administration. Although the agency was effectively dismantled as a result, it was revived as the Counterintelligence Command under the Yoon administration. Its increasingly overt collusion with political power ultimately led to its use in an anachronistic, palace-guard-style coup attempt.

Despite wielding immense power by combining intelligence gathering and investigative authority, the Counterintelligence Command operated largely beyond effective oversight. To prevent it from being exploited by political power again, democratic external controls must be strengthened. At the same time, separating intelligence collection from investigative functions must not result in weakened counterintelligence capabilities. Effective safeguards are essential. Counterintelligence capacity should be significantly enhanced to ensure that delayed responses, such as last year’s mishandling of the leak of a list of undercover agents from the Defense Intelligence Agency, are not repeated. The dismantling of the command should serve as an opportunity for counterintelligence bodies to focus strictly on their core mission and to ensure they are never again drawn into politics.

18. AI robots reshape South Korea factories

​Summary:

AI-powered robots are rapidly transforming South Korea’s factories from inspection tools into core production workers. Hyundai plans to deploy its humanoid Atlas at its Georgia Metaplant by 2028, joining Spot quadruped robots already used for quality checks. Korean shipbuilders report AI welding robots boosting productivity by over 20 percent and more than doubling work speed, while Samsung, LG and SK use AI to virtually prototype and eliminate design flaws. Globally, BMW and Chinese firms are pushing AI robotics, and analysts expect “AI factories” to become a $1 trillion market by 2032. Seoul now treats physical AI as a flagship growth sector.

AI robots reshape South Korea factories

Posted January. 09, 2026 09:13,   

Updated January. 09, 2026 09:13

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20260109/6049858/1

“Robots will make workplaces safer, faster and capable of handling a wider range of tasks.”

Hyundai Motor Group underscored that message on Jan. 5 local time when it unveiled its humanoid robot, Atlas. The group plans to deploy the robot in 2028 at Hyundai Motor Group Metaplant America in the U.S. state of Georgia. The facility already uses Spot, a four-legged robot, to carry out quality inspections alongside human workers. Within two years, the company expects to move toward a next-generation factory in which humanoid and quadruped artificial intelligence robots work alongside people to build vehicles.

When Dong-A Ilbo reporters visited major manufacturing sites across South Korea on Jan. 8, they found that AI-powered robots are already transforming production floors. No longer limited to inspection and monitoring, the machines are increasingly being used in assembly and fabrication processes. South Korea has emerged as one of the global front-runners in the push to commercialize AI robotics.

Domestic shipbuilders have already adopted AI-powered welding robots, boosting productivity by more than 20 percent compared with conventional non-AI systems and more than doubling work speed. Major conglomerates such as Samsung, LG and SK are also using AI in product development and manufacturing, allowing them to virtually produce finished goods and identify potential design flaws or defects in advance.

Abroad, Germany’s BMW Group has introduced AI robots that work alongside human employees in vehicle body assembly and the installation of precision components, increasing work speed by as much as 400 percent. China, meanwhile, has entered the phase of mass-producing humanoid robots comparable to Atlas.

This year is widely seen as the start of an era in which AI robots move to the forefront of global industry. The International Federation of Robotics said the number of AI robots deployed at industrial worksites has doubled over the past decade, even as the sector experienced a downturn during the COVID-19 pandemic. IFR President Takayuki Ito said 2026 will usher in a highly dynamic phase for the robotics industry.

Global market research firm Market.us projects that so-called AI factories, where artificial intelligence and robotics converge, will expand into a $1.0215 trillion market by 2032, equivalent to 1,475.7 trillion won. In its economic growth strategy released last year, the South Korean government said physical AI, including AI robots, is poised to emerge as the world’s leading sector, signaling expectations of even faster growth than in AI software, where the national goal is to rank third globally.

For now, manufacturing sites are dominated by factory-type AI robots equipped with arms or wheels. Looking ahead, however, humanoid robots that resemble humans, such as Atlas, are expected to move through AI-driven factories. Global consulting firm Ernst and Young said that as AI robot technology advances rapidly and prices decline, a cost crossover could occur within five years, making the deployment and operation of AI humanoids cheaper than relying on human labor.

Won-Joo Lee takeoff@donga.com

19. South Korea’s Nuclear Latency May Be Washington’s Least Bad Option

​Summary:

The article argues that allowing South Korea to develop “nuclear latency” may be Washington’s least bad option. Trump’s push for ROK nuclear-powered submarines, and a possible workaround under the 123 Agreement, would give Seoul enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that dramatically shorten its breakout time to a bomb, without technically violating the NPT. This carries proliferation risks and double-standard accusations, yet alternatives are worse: an eroding status quo, redeploying U.S. tactical nukes, or a fully nuclear South Korea and potential alliance rupture. Carefully managed latency could calm ROK insecurity, strengthen deterrence, aid Indo-Pacific burden-sharing, and diversify global nuclear fuel away from Russia and China.

Comment: We still need to continually assess the hard question: What actually deters Kim Jong Un? (and the same for China and Russia).

South Korea’s Nuclear Latency May Be Washington’s Least Bad Option

Foreign Policy · Lami Kim

With U.S. extended deterrence under strain, managing Seoul’s nuclear hedging may be safer than trying to stop it.

By Lami Kim, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

January 7, 2026, 5:37 PM

https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/07/south-korea-us-submarine-nuclear-latency-uranium-enrichment/

U.S. President Donald Trump made headlines last October when he announced he had given South Korea approval to build nuclear-powered submarines. It’s unclear whether the United States will supply the nuclear fuel or permit South Korea to enrich its own, but the latter option would effectively give South Korea the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons quickly—within a matter of months—if it so chooses, a condition known as nuclear latency.

To do this, Trump would theoretically need Congress to revise the bilateral U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation agreement, known as the 123 Agreement. Last updated in 2015, this agreement allows South Korea to enrich uranium up to 20 percent and pursue pyroprocessing for civilian purposes with U.S. consent. However, it explicitly prohibits enriching or reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear materials for military use, a category that includes fuel for nuclear-powered submarines.

U.S. President Donald Trump made headlines last October when he announced he had given South Korea approval to build nuclear-powered submarines. It’s unclear whether the United States will supply the nuclear fuel or permit South Korea to enrich its own, but the latter option would effectively give South Korea the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons quickly—within a matter of months—if it so chooses, a condition known as nuclear latency.

To do this, Trump would theoretically need Congress to revise the bilateral U.S.-Korea nuclear cooperation agreement, known as the 123 Agreement. Last updated in 2015, this agreement allows South Korea to enrich uranium up to 20 percent and pursue pyroprocessing for civilian purposes with U.S. consent. However, it explicitly prohibits enriching or reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear materials for military use, a category that includes fuel for nuclear-powered submarines.

But two weeks after Trump’s initial announcement, the White House released a fact sheet that laid out a way to bypass Congress altogether. “Consistent with the bilateral 123 Agreement and subject to U.S. legal requirements,” it said, “the United States supports the process that will lead to the [Republic of Korea’s] civil uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing for peaceful uses.” Unlike authorizing nuclear-powered submarines, granting South Korea consent for developing those technologies for civilian purposes faces no immediate legal barriers and does not require Congressional approval.

Though plenty of uncertainties remain, if the Trump administration continues down this path, it would pave the way for South Korea’s nuclear latency. The key question, then, is whether Washington should support this development. However provocative this may sound, my answer is “yes”—not because nuclear latency comes without risk, but because all the alternatives may be even worse for U.S. interests.

Although South Korea’s acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing technology would not, in itself, violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), these capabilities are inherently proliferation-prone. They enable a state to produce fissile material, which is the most technically demanding step in building a nuclear weapon. Once mastered, such capabilities dramatically shorten the timeline and lower the political and economic costs of nuclear armament.

For this reason, Washington has long restricted recipients of its civilian nuclear assistance from pursuing enrichment and reprocessing technologies without explicit U.S. consent. This reluctance stems from the potential negative consequences for the global nonproliferation regime. If South Korea acquires these capabilities, other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, may seek to do the same, and U.S. efforts to prevent their pursuit would inevitably provoke accusations of double standards. The wider diffusion of nuclear latency would, in turn, make the global security environment significantly more fragile.

These concerns are legitimate. But the United States’ alternatives are fraught as well.

1. Maintain the Status Quo

The current approach—relying on extended deterrence while restricting South Korea’s nuclear options—is increasingly untenable. South Koreans continue to question the credibility of U.S. security guarantees, and public support for nuclear armament remains high. Even after the 2023 Washington Declaration and the launch of the Nuclear Consultative Group, which demonstrated strong U.S. commitment to defending South Korea, support for an indigenous arsenal dipped only briefly before rebounding to nearly 73 percent by early 2024—and rising to more than 76 percent after Trump returned to office last year.

This suggests that no matter what the United States does to bolster its deterrence, it may not be sufficient to address South Korea’s enduring skepticism over whether the United States would truly risk New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago to defend Seoul. That concern is becoming more acute as North Korea moves closer to possessing a reliable capability to strike the U.S. homeland. Once North Korea can credibly threaten U.S. cities, the costs and risks of defending South Korea could become too high for the United States.

Against this backdrop, Washington’s mantra of strengthening “the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment” is unlikely to assuage South Korea’s sense of insecurity.

2. Deploy Tactical Nuclear Weapons to South Korea

This option offers minimal strategic benefit. Although some in Seoul support the idea, redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is also unlikely to address South Korea’s underlying strategic concerns. While such a move might create the appearance of a stronger U.S. commitment, it would remain squarely within the traditional framework of extended deterrence, with Washington retaining full operational control.

Given the proximity of the two Koreas, Seoul would almost certainly push for shared or even pre-delegated launch authority to account for compressed decision timelines—scenarios in which a response is needed within minutes, rather than hours. Washington, however, is highly unlikely to accept such an arrangement. As a result, South Korea would remain dependent on U.S. decision-making for nuclear use, perpetuating the very vulnerability that drives its interest in nuclear autonomy.

Redeployment risks creating the worst of both worlds: South Korea would become more vulnerable, particularly for North Korean or Chinese strikes on nuclear storage facilities, while still lacking autonomous control over nuclear weapons.

At the same time, this option would impose substantial costs on the United States, both with regards to the logistical and financial burden of nuclear weapon storage and the legal concerns this would raise under Article I of the NPT, which prohibits nuclear-weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states.

3. Support or Abandon a Nuclear South Korea

If Washington fails to address Seoul’s security concerns, South Korea may choose to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Once considered unthinkable, this option could become unavoidable if the perceived costs of lacking an independent deterrent begin to exceed the costs of acquiring one. The United States would then face an unenviable choice: support (or quietly condone) South Korea’s nuclearization, or sever the alliance. Neither outcome would serve U.S. interests.

Supporting a nuclear-armed South Korea would seriously undermine the global nonproliferation regime. Though the regime has arguably weathered North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear ambitions thus far, the damage caused by a law-abiding member openly pursuing nuclear weapons—with at least tacit U.S. support—would be far more profound. If the principal architect and guarantor of the nonproliferation regime were seen as enabling such a move, the entire system’s credibility would be gravely, perhaps irreparably, damaged. The ensuing collapse of this multilateral framework would almost certainly accelerate the spread of nuclear weapons globally.

On the other hand, distancing from or abandoning a nuclear South Korea would impose enormous costs on the United States. Losing a trusted ally with substantial military, economic, technological, and industrial capabilities would significantly weaken its strategic footing in a critical region. As U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson recently noted, the Korean Peninsula’s geostrategic location provides cost-imposition capabilities against both Russian and Chinese forces, making the U.S. military presence there a source of “significant strategic advantage.”

Against these alternatives, permitting South Korea to maintain nuclear latency offers Washington several advantages.

First, nuclear latency could enhance stability on the Korean Peninsula by mitigating South Korea’s security fears and by reducing North Korea’s incentives for limited conventional or tactical nuclear attacks. The credible prospect that South Korea could assemble nuclear weapons within months and retaliate would diminish the appeal of aggression unless North Korea could confidently destroy the entire latent South Korean arsenal—unlikely given its weak intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities—or is willing to risk an all-out war.

Nuclear latency would also give South Korea leverage in future risk-reduction talks with North Korea, which has long dismissed South Korean overtures. Counterintuitive as it may seem, a controlled degree of nuclear latency could contribute greater inter-Korean stability.

Second, supporting South Korea’s nuclear latency could strengthen the United States’ broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Acknowledging its ally’s security concerns would signal trust and respect, reinforcing cohesion within the relationship. And in practical terms, preserving U.S. political support for South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines likely requires framing them as serving a regional security role beyond deterring North Korea, since some argue diesel-electric submarines may suffice for peninsula-focused missions. Cast as contribution to regional burden-sharing, this program, once operational, would ease pressure on U.S. submarine production capacity while strengthening deterrence against China.

Finally, South Korea’s development of enrichment capabilities would help dilute Russia’s and China’s dominance of the international nuclear fuel market. Together, Russia and China currently supply more than 60 percent of the world’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) and almost all high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), essential for next-generation reactors. The United States is stepping up efforts to expand its own nuclear fuel production, but allowing South Korea to produce LEU and HALEU at scale would further bolster energy security for the United States and its partners.

None of the choices facing Washington are without risk. But the question is not whether supporting South Korea’s nuclear latency is ideal. It is whether the alternatives—South Korean nuclear armament and losing South Korea as an ally—would be better. They would not.

Allowing South Korea to develop controlled nuclear latency under strict safeguards and effective oversight may be the most tolerable option: one that strengthens deterrence, preserves the alliance, supports U.S. strategy in Asia, and still gives Washington time to address any potential South Korean breakout before it occurs.

In a world of imperfect options, the least bad choice may also be the most prudent one.

This article is adapted from Everything but the Bomb: South Korea’s Nuclear Hedging Strategy, forthcoming from Stanford University Press.

Foreign Policy · Lami Kim

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com