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Quotes of the Day:
"We the people are the rightful masters of both Congress and the courts, not to overthrow the courts, not to overthrow the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution."
– Abraham Lincoln
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– Albert Einstein
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– Martha Gellhorn
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1. N. Korea's Kim expects army's 'outstanding' role in next 5 years on founding anniv. of armed forces
2. N. Korea's Kim visits defense ministry to mark army founding anniv. ahead of key party congress
3. 2 soldiers die after military helicopter crash in Gapyeong County
4. North Korean military will ‘widen fighting front’ this year, Kim Jong Un says
5. Greer said U.S. will raise tariffs if no progress made on non-tariff barriers: FM Cho
6. Hanwha Aerospace posts record operating profit in 2025 on defense business growth
7. South Korea’s Parliament Mounts Rare Bipartisan Effort to Avert US Tariffs
8. Activists plan 'unification vision' broadcasts to North Korea
9. US, South Korea kick off joint air training but scale back number of drills
10. North Korea’s railway bridges: strategic assets linking China, Russia while severing South
11. South Korea opposition protests U.S. subpoena naming President Lee
12. John Bolton: Kim Jong-un Has Little Willingness to Meet Trump
13. L3Harris begins militarizing Bombardier business jets for South Korean AEW&C order
14. Social Media and Sinophobia: South Korea’s New Political Frontier
15. Column: A visit to Washington's Victims of Communism Museum
1. N. Korea's Kim expects army's 'outstanding' role in next 5 years on founding anniv. of armed forces
Summary:
Kim Jong Un visited the Ministry of National Defense on Feb. 8, 2026 to mark the 78th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army, KCNA reported. Ahead of the ninth party congress in late February, he said the next five years will see the army’s “outstanding” role further enhanced and hinted he will unveil a new five-year plan to bolster defense capabilities. Unlike past anniversary remarks, he did not condemn South Korea or the United States, while noting a “tremendous transformation” and a widening “fighting front” requiring greater effort. He praised last year’s “distinguished feats” and sent congratulations to overseas special operations units, referencing troops dispatched to Russia.
Comment: Military first politics. Always.
(2nd LD) N. Korea's Kim expects army's 'outstanding' role in next 5 years on founding anniv. of armed forces | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · February 9, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260209000651315?section=nk/nk
(ATTN: ADDS more details throughout)
By Kim Soo-yeon
SEOUL, Feb. 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has said the country's armed forces will further play an "outstanding" role in the next five years as he visited the defense ministry to mark the 78th founding anniversary of the military ahead of a key party congress, state media reported Monday.
Kim made a congratulatory visit to the Ministry of National Defense the previous day to mark the 78th founding anniversary of the Korean People's Army (KPA), according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
His visit came ahead of the North's ninth party congress set for late February, where Kim is expected to announce his major policies on the military, diplomacy, the economy and other areas for the next five years.
North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un visits the Ministry of National Defense on Feb. 8, 2026, to mark the 78th founding anniversary of the Korean People's Army, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
In a speech Sunday, the North's leader hinted that he would unveil a new five-year plan to bolster defense capabilities at the party congress.
"The coming five years that will be indicated by the Ninth Congress of the Party will be years when our army's outstanding role that no one else can perform will become further enhanced," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.
In the eighth party congress in 2021, North Korea unveiled a list of high-tech weapons that Kim vowed to develop, including military spy satellites, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles and a nuclear-powered submarine.
In this year's speech, Kim did not make any condemnation against South Korea and the United States in an apparent bid to cautiously manage external messages amid the fluid international security situation.
At last year's speech on the army anniversary, Kim reaffirmed the country's policy to strengthen its nuclear forces while accusing the U.S. of standing behind the world's conflicts.
South Korea and the U.S. have expressed their desire to reengage with North Korea, but Pyongyang remains unresponsive to such dialogue overtures as it has been deepening military cooperation with Russia.
Kim assessed the North Korean military underwent "unheard-of dramatic events" and carried out "distinguished feats" last year, according to the KCNA.
"This year is a year of tremendous transformation, when the fighting front of our army will become more widened and which will demand more strenuous efforts," he said.
The North's leader also extended his warm encouragement and congratulations to commanding officers and combatants of overseas special operations units, referring to North Korean troops dispatched to Russia to support Moscow's war against Ukraine.
Kim was accompanied by key defense officials, including Pak Jong-chon, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Defense Minister No Kwang-chol, on his visit to the defense ministry.
On the occasion of the army founding anniversary, No and other ranking military officials paid their respects at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where late state founder Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, father of the incumbent leader, lie in state.
North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un visits the Ministry of National Defense on Feb. 8, 2026, to mark the 78th founding anniversary of the Korean People's Army, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · February 9, 2026
2. N. Korea's Kim visits defense ministry to mark army founding anniv. ahead of key party congress
Summary:
Kim Jong Un visited the defense ministry on Feb. 8 to mark the Korean People’s Army’s 78th anniversary, KCNA said. He framed 2026 as a “tremendous transformation” year with a widened fighting front and tougher demands. Ahead of a late-February party congress, he said the next five years will further enhance the army’s “outstanding” role, when major policy lines are expected.
Comment: Warming up for the party congress.
N. Korea's Kim visits defense ministry to mark army founding anniv. ahead of key party congress | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · February 9, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260209000600315?section=nk/nk
By Kim Soo-yeon
SEOUL, Feb. 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has visited the defense ministry to mark the 78th founding anniversary of the military, saying that the North Korean army will further play an "outstanding" role in the next five years, state media reported Monday.
Kim made a congratulatory visit to the Ministry of National Defense the previous day to mark the 78th founding anniversary of the Korean People's Army (KPA), according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
His visit came ahead of the North's key party congress set for late February, where Kim is expected to announce his major policies on the military, diplomacy, the economy and other areas for the next five years.
In a speech Sunday, the North's leader said the year 2026 will be a year of "tremendous transformation" for the KPA as the front of its fighting will become wider and demand for more strenuous efforts will rise.
"The coming five years that will be indicated by the Ninth Congress of the Party will be years when our army's outstanding role that no one else can perform will become further enhanced," Kim was quoted as saying by the KCNA.
In the eighth party congress in 2021, North Korea unveiled a list of high-tech weapons that Kim vowed to develop, including military spy satellites, solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles and a nuclear-powered submarine.
North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un presides over a politburo meeting of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea on Feb. 7, 2026, in this image captured from footage of the North's state-run TV station. At the meeting, North Korea decided to hold a key party congress in late February. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Soo-yeon · February 9, 2026
3. 2 soldiers die after military helicopter crash in Gapyeong County
Summary:
Two South Korean soldiers died after an Army AH-1S Cobra helicopter, slated for future retirement, crashed in Gapyeong County on Feb. 9 during a training flight. The helicopter took off at 9:45 a.m. and went down at 11:04 a.m. near a stream about 800 meters from its base. Two warrant officers in their 30s and 50s were taken to hospitals in cardiac arrest and later died. Officials said there was no fire or explosion and the aircraft was unarmed. The crash occurred during emergency-landing familiarization training. The Army grounded all AH-1S flights, formed a special investigative committee, and will use onboard recording equipment to help determine the cause.
Comment: Sadly, we must never forget that all military training is dangerous.
(5th LD) 2 soldiers die after military helicopter crash in Gapyeong County | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · February 9, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260209005657315?section=national/national
(ATTN: REWRITES lead; ADDS details throughout)
GAPYEONG, South Korea/SEOUL, Feb. 9 (Yonhap) -- Two soldiers died after a military helicopter that was set to retire crashed in a northern county Monday following a takeoff for training, military officials said.
The AH-1S Cobra helicopter of an Army aviation unit based in Gapyeong, about 55 kilometers northeast of Seoul, went down at 11:04 a.m. at a stream located some 800 meters near its base post. The helicopter had taken off for flight training at 9:45 a.m.
The two warrant officers on board -- in their 30s and 50s -- had been transported to hospitals in a state of cardiac arrest but succumbed to their injuries. No civilian damage has been reported so far.
Authorities said the incident did not involve any fires or explosions and that the chopper was unarmed at the time of the accident.
The accident occurred during flight training aimed at familiarizing emergency landing procedures for crew members.
Authorities cordon off a site in Gapyeong County, about 55 kilometers northeast of Seoul, where an Army AH-1S Cobra helicopter crashed on Feb. 9, 2026. (Yonhap)
It remains to be investigated whether the accident occurred as the chopper was returning to the base after completing the training or during the training, an Army official said.
"(The helicopter) was fitted with recording equipment so the recovery of the device will be significantly helpful in determining the cause of the accident," the official added.
The Army has grounded all flights of the AH-1S helicopter and launched a special investigative committee to determine the exact cause of the accident.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back, who is visiting Saudi Arabia, has been briefed on the accident and called for swift follow-up measures, the defense ministry said.
"The defense ministry will mobilize all possible resources to respond to the accident and sternly determine the cause," Ahn wrote in a post on Facebook.
The crashed AH-1S helicopter was deployed in 1991. The Army, which first introduced the model in 1988, had planned to begin retiring its fleet of aging Cobra helicopters in 2028 with an aim to complete the process by 2031.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · February 9, 2026
4. North Korean military will ‘widen fighting front’ this year, Kim Jong Un says
Summary:
Kim Jong Un said the DPRK military will “widen” its “fighting front” in 2026, calling it a “grand year of transformation,” during a Feb. 8 visit to the defense ministry for the Korean People’s Army’s 78th anniversary. KCNA reported he also said capabilities will be “further enhanced” over the next five years based on decisions to be announced soon at the Ninth Party Congress, scheduled for the last 10 days of February. Kim praised DPRK troops fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The KCNA coverage emphasized enforcing the military’s absolute obedience to Kim. He staged group photos with commanders, staff, retired generals, and attended a volleyball match, signaling elite unity and continuity.
Comment: When Kim says “fighting front,” he seems to be signaling expanded external operations and possibly intensifying internal ideological mobilization that supports new force-development decisions that may be announced at the party congress.
North Korean military will ‘widen fighting front’ this year, Kim Jong Un says
Leader also praises soldiers fighting Ukraine during celebrations for founding anniversary of Korean People’s Army
Colin Zwirko February 9, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/north-korean-military-will-widen-fighting-front-this-year-kim-jong-un-says/
Kim Jong Un enters the KPA anniversary event flanked by top military officials | Image: KCNA (Feb. 9, 2026)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared that the country’s military will “widen” its “fighting front” this year, speaking during a visit to the defense ministry on the army’s founding anniversary Sunday.
“This year is a grand year of transformation, in which our military’s fighting front must widen further and we must struggle more boldly,” Kim said, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Monday.
The DPRK military’s capabilities will also be “further enhanced … in the coming five years” due to decisions that are “soon” to be announced at the Ninth Party Congress, he reportedly added. State media announced Sunday that the congress will begin on an unspecified date in the last 10 days of this month.
Kim also recognized soldiers still fighting in Russia’s war against Ukraine in his speech at the event, praising them for “carrying out the order of their homeland in combat positions in the faraway alien land.”
Kim Jong Un attends the event at the defense ministry headquarters in Pyongyang on Feb. 8 | Image: KCNA (Feb. 9, 2026)
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North Korean propaganda commonly uses combat terms like “fighting front” (투쟁전선) to refer to ideological goals. But Kim has also vowed to enhance weapons development in the coming years, and he has yet to indicate his intention to draw down forces in Russia, leaving open the possibility of deploying more troops.
The Korean People’s Army (KPA) officially celebrated its 78th founding anniversary on Feb. 8.
A large portion of the KCNA report and Kim’s speech were focused on the importance of maintaining and strengthening the military’s absolute obedience to the leader’s orders.
In addition to delivering a speech, Kim also reportedly took large-scale group photos with Ministry of National Defense (MND) staff and KPA corps commanders, and attended a volleyball game between military sports clubs Ryongaksan and Taesongsan.
He took a group photo with 18 retired generals, KCNA reported, communicating to domestic audiences that Kim has the full support of the old guard of top military officials who supported his succession to become leader in 2011.
Kim met retired KPA generals on Sunday | Image: KCNA (Feb. 9, 2026)
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NK News analysis shows the group included Choe Pu Il, Pak Jae Gyong, Pak Yong Sik, Kim Jong Gak, Pak Su Il, Kim Won Hong and Kim Hyong Ryong.
Kim Jong Un previously visited the defense ministry to celebrate the Feb. 8 anniversary in 2019, 2024 and 2025, and oversaw military parades on the date in 2018 and 2023.
North Korea revived Feb. 8, 1948 as the official KPA foundation day ahead of the 2018 parade.
Pyongyang separately celebrates April 25, 1932 as the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army foundation day, though assertions that this was a direct predecessor to the KPA are not based in fact.
While DPRK authorities held celebratory events across the country in recent days to celebrate the 78th anniversary of the KPA, the events were smaller in scale than those on major anniversary years ending in zero or five.
The military has been conducting large-scale training and preparations for a military parade expected to take place in the capital in the coming weeks following the conclusion of the Ninth Party Congress.
Edited by David Choi
5. Greer said U.S. will raise tariffs if no progress made on non-tariff barriers: FM Cho
Summary:
South Korea’s Foreign Minister Cho Hyun told lawmakers that U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer warned Washington will snap tariffs back to 25 percent if Seoul shows no progress on resolving “non-tariff barriers.” The warning follows POTUS signaling frustration with South Korea’s slow legislative work to implement a trade package tied to a $350 billion investment pledge that helped set a 15 percent rate. Cho said Washington is focused on cutting its bilateral trade deficit and views disputed barriers as including digital platform regulation, farm import quarantine rules, and certification requirements for autos and pharmaceuticals. Cho also said the U.S. confirmed a February visit to discuss expanded civil nuclear fuel-cycle rights.
Comment: Which “non-tariff” concession would Seoul accept first without triggering domestic backlash, digital regulation, agriculture, or auto standards?
Greer said U.S. will raise tariffs if no progress made on non-tariff barriers: FM Cho | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · February 9, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260209011000315?section=national/diplomacy
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Feb. 9 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said Monday that U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer told him the United States will revert reciprocal tariffs to the preagreement level of 25 percent if South Korea makes no progress on addressing non-tariff barriers.
Cho shared details with lawmakers of his meeting with Greer in Washington last week, as Seoul seeks to keep the trade deal with the ally intact following U.S. President Donald Trump's warning of raising the tariff rate from 15 percent, citing South Korea's slow legislative process.
"The U.S. is seeking to raise tariffs on South Korea to reduce its trade deficit if there is no progress in talks with Seoul over non-tariff barriers," Cho said at a National Assembly session.
Seoul has committed to investing US$350 billion in the U.S. in exchange for Washington lowering the duty to 15 percent. But Trump threatened to raise tariffs on South Korea as legislation to implement the trade deal has remained pending in the National Assembly since its introduction in late November.
Non-tariff barriers largely refer to South Korea's regulatory moves concerning digital platform services, like Google Inc., quarantine measures for agricultural imports, and certification requirements for autos, pharmaceuticals and other sectors.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun responds to lawmakers' questions during a hearing at the main hall of the National Assembly in Seoul on Feb. 9, 2026. (Yonhap)
Washington has expressed concerns that Seoul's push to tighten regulations on digital services is discriminatory and has called for easing existing requirements in agriculture and other sectors.
According to Cho, Greer pointed to sluggish progress on the investment pledge and noted that discussions on non-tariff issues have yet to take place despite U.S. calls to move the deal forward.
"(He) told me that the U.S. cannot spend much time on the South Korean market as (the U.S.) has to discuss non-tariff barriers with other countries as well," Cho said.
"(He told me) that South Korea should understand the U.S. is seeking to improve its trade deficit with South Korea through a tariff hike 'without any emotions attached' if no progress is made (in the trade deal)," Cho said, adding that Greer had asked Seoul to resolve the issue quickly.
Cho told lawmakers that the Cabinet members are taking the matter seriously and plan to take steps in a swift manner.
Cho also said Washington had confirmed a U.S. delegation would visit South Korea later this month to negotiate expanding Seoul's rights to civil uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing.
"I received confirmation from U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio during our talks that an interagency U.S. team would visit (South Korea) in February," Cho said.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · February 9, 2026
6. Hanwha Aerospace posts record operating profit in 2025 on defense business growth
Summary:
Hanwha Aerospace reported record 2025 operating profit as defense demand and exports surged. The company said operating profit rose 75 percent year on year to 3.03 trillion won, up from 1.73 trillion won in 2024, while annual sales more than doubled to 26.6 trillion won. Net profit fell 15.7 percent to 2.14 trillion won. Ground defense drove results, with division profit hitting a record 2.01 trillion won, supported by K9 howitzer exports to Norway and Chunmoo rocket system exports to Estonia. Aerospace sales climbed to 2.51 trillion won and returned to operating profit.
Comment: Partner in the Arsenal of Democracies.
(LEAD) Hanwha Aerospace posts record operating profit in 2025 on defense business growth | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · February 9, 2026
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260209007851320
(ATTN: ADDS more details throughout, photo; RECASTS headline; COMBINES story slugged Hanwha Aerospace-Q4 earnings)
SEOUL, Feb. 9 (Yonhap) -- Hanwha Aerospace Co., South Korea's leading defense company, said Monday its annual operating profit in 2025 jumped 75 percent on-year driven by robust growth in its ground defense and aerospace businesses.
The company said in a regulatory filing that operating profit for last year totaled 3.03 trillion won (USS$2.08 billion), compared with 1.73 trillion won in 2024.
Annual sales also more than doubled to 26.6 trillion won. Net profit, however, shed 15.7 percent on-year to 2.14 trillion won.
Last year's operating profit marked Hanwha Aerospace's third consecutive year of achieving record-high operating performance.
The company's ground defense business led the overall operating profit growth, with the division's profit reaching a record 2.01 trillion won, supported by exports such as K9 self-propelled howitzers to Norway and the Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher system to Estonia.
The aerospace division continued its growth also for a third straight year, with its sales rising to 2.51 trillion won. A sharp increase in military orders helped the division swing to an operating profit of 23 billion won, marking a return to profitability from a net loss incurred in 2024.
A company official said 2025 marked the first year of Hanwha Aerospace's transformation into an integrated defense and shipbuilding group following the consolidation of Hanwha Ocean Co.
Hanwha Aerospace aims to pursue sustainable growth, expand its global footprint and strengthen its contribution to South Korea's national security, the official said.
This photo, provided by Hanwha Aerospace Co., shows the South Korean arms maker's Chunmoo multiple launch rocket system. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · February 9, 2026
7. South Korea’s Parliament Mounts Rare Bipartisan Effort to Avert US Tariffs
Summary:
Seoul’s ruling and opposition parties, usually locked in trench warfare, formed a special committee to pass a bill enabling a $350 billion U.S. investment pledge and blunt POTUS’s threat to restore 25 percent tariffs. Speaker Woo mediated; the panel launches Feb. 9 and aims to pass the act by March 9, sidestepping a ratification fight over whether the tariff fact sheet is a nonbinding MOU. Ministers shuttle to Washington with few returns, heightening urgency at home. Inference: U.S. leverage now reaches into Korean legislative tempo, reshaping alliance politics. Question: What U.S. concession will Seoul demand in exchange for speed?
South Korea’s Parliament Mounts Rare Bipartisan Effort to Avert US Tariffs
Both President Lee Jae-myung and the National Assembly want to send a clear message to Trump that they are working to expedite implementation of the trade deal.
By Yoonki Lee
February 07, 2026
https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/south-koreas-parliament-mounts-rare-bipartisan-effort-to-avert-us-tariffs/
Credit: ID 99712979 © Studioclover | Dreamstime.com
The South Korean government and rival parties in the National Assembly are mounting a rare, concerted effort to avert U.S. tariffs. In an astonishing act of solidarity, the ruling Democratic Party (DP) and the main opposition People Power Party (PPP) agreed to form a special committee to draft and finalize a special bill aimed at fulfilling South Korea’s $350 billion investment pledge to the United States.
Despite persistent gridlock and an ongoing standoff between the two opposing parties, the fact that people’s livelihoods and the national interest are at stake has prompted them to rise above their political differences and join hands in a compromise to fast-track the special bill. This move follows U.S. President Donald Trump’s announcement on January 26, in which he threatened to raise reciprocal tariffs on South Korea from 15 percent to 25 percent, citing delays in the National Assembly’s legislative process to implement the trade deal struck last November.
Given the urgency of the matter, it is evident that both President Lee Jae-myung and the National Assembly are seeking to send a clear message to Washington that they are doing everything at their disposal to expedite the implementation of the trade deal. Furthermore, this bipartisan surprise agreement serves as a testament to the South Korean public that the National Assembly is willing to set aside its differences and cooperate in times of crisis.
Although Lee is not necessarily back to square one on the bilateral trade deal, his pragmatic diplomacy will once again come under scrutiny as he seeks to balance between accommodating Washington’s demands and safeguarding South Korea’s sovereignty.
The ruling and opposition parties have been at odds over whether the Korea-U.S. joint fact sheet on tariffs requires ratification by the National Assembly. The Lee administration and the DP have maintained that, since the document is a non-binding memorandum of understanding (MOU) rather than a treaty, it does not require ratification. They asserted that ratification is unnecessary and could potentially tie South Korea’s hands by binding Seoul to unfavorable clauses.
Speaking at a parliamentary committee on November 17, Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan warned, “There are concerns that [ratification] could become a shackle while negotiations are continuing.”
The PPP, however, has strongly objected, asserting that a trade deal of this magnitude requires formal ratification and parliamentary consent. Dismissing the PPP’s call, the DP instead proposed a special bill to support outbound investment and swiftly fulfill the pledge.
Amid this political stalemate over the implementation of the trade deal, South Korea was caught off guard by Trump’s sudden announcement to reimpose tariffs. Washington is reportedly wary that Seoul will backtrack on its investment pledge, as the DP has failed to pass the special act despite holding a majority of seats in parliament.
Against this backdrop, National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik’s behind-the-scenes mediation played a pivotal role in brokering an agreement between the DP and the PPP. Thanks to Woo’s mediation, DP floor leader Han Byung-do and PPP floor leader Song Eon-seok met on February 4 and agreed to form a special committee to review the “Special Act on Investment in the United States.”
Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the PPP decided to step back from its previous stance of demanding legislative ratification of the trade deal and instead pledged to cooperate with the DP in passing the special bill. Both parties agreed to launch the “Special Committee for the Handling of the Special Act on Investment in the United States” on February 9 and to pass the special bill no later than March 9.
The two floor leaders announced that the special committee will be chaired by the PPP and consist of a total of 16 members: eight from the DP, seven from the PPP, and one from a non-negotiating group. Moreover, both sides decided to include at least one member from each party from the Strategy and Finance Committee, the Political Affairs Committee, and the Trade, Industry, Energy, SMEs and Startups Committee.
Regarding the PPP’s concessions, Song stated, “We made this decision based on national interest considerations following President Trump’s message of tariff hikes.” In tandem, Han said, “By specifying that the Special Act on Investment in the United States will be handled by early March, we have increased predictability.”
Since the reimposition of U.S. tariffs would negatively impact the Korean economy by imposing an additional 4 trillion won ($2.8 billion) annual burden on the auto industry alone, both parties were quick to strike a compromise.
Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo welcomed the move, noting, “I believe the National Assembly’s commitment to moving forward with the legislative process through the rival parties’ agreement will definitely be helpful as Washington has cited the delay in the legislation of the U.S. investment bill as the biggest reason for its tariff hike plan.”
Concurrently, the South Korean government has repeatedly dispatched high-ranking officials to Washington to resolve the ongoing trade tensions, albeit to little avail. Yeo flew to Washington last week in hopes of assuaging U.S. concerns but was unable to meet his counterpart, U.S. Trade Representative Jamison Greer. Instead, he met with Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Rick Switzer, held private meetings with 20 members of Congress, and also met with representatives from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Further, from January 29 to 30, Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan held a two-day meeting with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick but failed to reach a conclusion on the tariff issue.
On February 2, Foreign Minister Cho Hyun met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington to reiterate Seoul’s commitment to fulfilling its investment pledges. The South Korean Foreign Ministry stated in a subsequent press release, “To ensure smooth discussions between the two countries’ trade authorities, they agreed to continued cooperation between their diplomatic agencies.” However, the U.S. Department of State’s press release did not mention whether the tariff issue was discussed. Hence, concerns are rising in Seoul as its top negotiators have returned home empty-handed, with no tangible results emerging from any of the high-level meetings regarding the U.S. tariff hike.
Meanwhile, critical voices are emerging within the National Assembly and political circles over mounting U.S. pressure and Washington’s interference in South Korea’s legislative process through economic statecraft. Speaker Woo expressed regret over Trump citing the legislature’s delay as the reason for the tariff hike, saying, “The National Assembly is proceeding with legislation according to normal procedures.” The ruling party has also defended itself by arguing that the delay in implementing the trade deal was a procedural rather than a political problem.
In a similar vein, Lim Lee-ja, chairperson of the National Assembly’s Strategy and Finance Committee and a PPP lawmaker, asserted, “There was no instance in which the National Assembly delayed the law.”
Minor opposition parties, including the Rebuilding Korea Party and the Jinbo Party, have been critical of U.S. interference in South Korea’s legislative sovereignty.
Nonetheless, the high economic risks at stake have led both the South Korean government and the National Assembly to avoid taking any chances and accommodate U.S. demands.
The larger takeaway from this episode is that Seoul must come to terms with Washington’s transactional diplomacy and remain flexible yet resilient as it navigates growing geopolitical uncertainty. Given that Trump’s tariff hike is not a foregone conclusion, Lee will make every effort to reassure Washington about South Korea’s investment pledge and prevent further escalation. As time is of the essence, the National Assembly’s bipartisan support for a special committee and bill comes at an opportune time for Lee as he leads a concerted effort to alleviate trade tensions with Washington.
Authors
Guest Author
Yoonki Lee
Yoonki Lee is an MPhil student in International Relations at the University of Oxford. He graduated summa cum laude from Yonsei University with a BA in International Studies.
8. Activists plan 'unification vision' broadcasts to North Korea
Summary:
A new civic group, Citizens’ Solidarity for One Korea, launched Feb. 4 and says it will back private broadcasts into north Korea with a “unification vision,” not just entertainment. Leaders Seo In taek and Kenneth Bae argue government loudspeaker efforts have halted and U.S. support for VOA and RFA has stopped, leaving private shortwave as the main remaining channel. Their “Korea Link” fundraising drive drew about 80 million won in pledges to sustain existing broadcasters, improve content, and expand distribution through medium wave, internet pathways, and digital storage devices, with an oversight committee promised. Inference: the information fight is shifting from state policy to civil society capacity.
Comment: We need civil society efforts like this because governments are abdicating their responsibilities to help the oppressed to free themselves. Note that the NDAA has authorized funding for VOA and RFA but we have not seen any plans on how USGMA is going to implement congressional intent.
World News Feb. 8, 2026 / 9:53 PM / Updated Feb. 8, 2026 at 9:53 PM
Activists plan 'unification vision' broadcasts to North Korea
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/08/newly-launched-civic-group-plan-to-support-private-broadcast-nkorea-unification-vision/2581770604918/
1 of 2 | Seo In-taek, co-standing chair, delivers a vision at the launch ceremony of the Citizens’ Solidarity for One Korea on Feb. 4. Photo by the Citizens’ Solidarity for One Korea
Feb. 8 (Asia Today) -- Leaders of a newly launched civic group advocating Korean unification said they plan to support private broadcasts to North Korea that emphasize what they call a "unification vision," arguing that entertainment alone will not change attitudes in the North.
The Citizens' Solidarity for One Korea, inaugurated Feb. 4, is promoting "Korea Link," a global fundraising campaign to support broadcasting and related content distribution. Organizers said participants pledged about 80 million won (about $60,000) at the launch ceremony.
Co-representatives Seo In-taek and Kenneth Bae spoke with Asia Today about why they are pushing the initiative and how they plan to deliver content to North Korean residents.
Q: Why launch a private broadcasting push now?
Seo In-taek: "The government has halted broadcasts to North Korea, and the United States has also stopped funding Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. With balloon launches and maritime information activities also suspended, private broadcasts are effectively the only remaining way to deliver information to North Koreans."
Kenneth Bae: "The immediate priority is to revitalize existing private broadcasts to North Korea. We need to strengthen what is already operating and broaden its reach."
Q: What is 'Korea Link' and what is the core goal?
Seo: "'Korea Link' is not about simply sending outside information or South Korean dramas. The goal is to deliver a 'unification vision' - to present alternatives so North Korean residents can have choices."
Bae: "The fund should first be used to support existing broadcasts, then to develop better content and expand the base so broadcasting becomes sustainable."
Q: What format will the broadcasts take?
Bae: "I plan to appear on Far East Broadcasting to take part in broadcasts aimed at the North. We will start with shortwave radio, but we want to expand to medium-wave and internet-based broadcasting over time."
Seo: "Shortwave is a start, but we should also look at practical ways to deliver content more widely, including digital storage methods."
Q: How would you deliver content if internet access is restricted?
Seo: "There are several ways. Digital storage devices can be effective for information inflow, and we want to use such tools not only to deliver information but also to convey a unification vision. To do this consistently, we need a nationwide fundraising campaign."
Q: How will raised funds be managed?
Seo: "If funds are secured, we plan to establish an operating committee to ensure the money is used transparently and effectively."
Bae: "Funding should be tied to measurable improvements - stronger broadcasts, better content and broader distribution."
Q: What kind of content do you want to send?
Seo: "Simply providing outside information is not enough. A unification vision is needed. South Korean dramas are mostly 'chaebol stories.' That kind of content alone will not change North Korea."
Bae: "We need content that can stimulate interest in unification and keep that message consistent. If we keep producing and sending it, it can help widen support for unification."
Q: Beyond broadcasting, what else do you plan to do?
Bae: "We will also advocate internationally for North Koreans' right to know and right to access information."
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
9. US, South Korea kick off joint air training but scale back number of drills
Summary:
U.S. and South Korean air forces began this year’s Buddy Squadron, a five day “Ssangmae” exercise at Osan Air Base. Seoul says the allies will run the battalion level drills four times this year, down from eight, while increasing participating troops and sorties. Aircraft include South Korean KF-16s, F-35As, and FA-50s, plus U.S. F-16s, with air to air integrated operations training. An ROK official said the change followed consultations. One analyst argues the cut in frequency aligns with Lee’s engagement track and may temper north Korea’s reaction.
Comment: Appeasing Kim Jong Un by reducing exercise frequency is not a path to security or success.
US, South Korea kick off joint air training but scale back number of drills
Expert suggests reduction aims to support diplomacy with North Korea, despite increase in participating troops
Jooheon Kim February 9, 2026
https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/us-south-korea-kick-off-joint-air-training-but-scale-back-number-of-drills/
A Buddy Squadron exercise in 2016 | Image: Republic of Korea Air Force via Facebook (Aug. 2016)
The U.S. and South Korean air forces kicked off an annual series of joint air exercises on Monday, which will be held less frequently this year in a move that some are interpreting as an attempt to avoid provoking North Korea.
The five-day Ssangmae Training, or Buddy Squadron exercise, is taking place at Osan Air Base, roughly 30 miles south of the capital city, Seoul’s Defense Ministry said in a press release.
The battalion-level air exercises held throughout the year began in 1991 to allow ROK and U.S. pilots “to practice the latest tactics, systems and procedures together and to improve their ability to carry out joint operations,” according to the ministry.
This year’s training will include South Korean KF-16s, F-35A Lightning IIs and FA-50 fighters, as well as U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons. Pilots from both countries are expected to conduct air-to-air integrated operations training.
While the allies are reducing the number of Buddy Squadron exercises through this year from eight to four, it will more than double the number of troops used in the exercises and significantly increase the number of sorties, according to the ministry.
Asked if the reduction in drills aimed to limit North Korean backlash to the joint exercise, a ROK air force official told reporters at a news conference that the two allies made the change “through consultations.”
An ROK Defense Ministry official added that “it is not known who made the initial proposal,” responding to a follow-up question about whether South Korea initially suggested the idea.
Choi Gi-il, a military studies professor at Sangji University, said Seoul appears to have made the proposal in line with Lee Jae Myung administration’s pursuit of diplomatic engagement with the DPRK.
“Even if the number of participating aircraft and sorties is increased, reducing the number of training drills by half is unlikely to make the exercise more effective,” he added.
Choi said Pyongyang may look more favorably on a reduction in the number of drills.
“North Korea could issue a statement on the matter, but it is not likely to respond with stronger backlash,” he added.
Pyongyang regularly condemns joint U.S.-ROK military drills. In November, it lambasted the Silent Shark anti-submarine exercise and the creation of an F-16 “Super Squadron” at Osan Air Base, calling them “reckless military maneuvers.”
South Korea’s unification minister has advocated for scaling back bilateral exercises. Seoul also postponed some training planned for August following criticism by North Korea, citing “extreme heat.”
Buddy Squadron is a valuable opportunity for Seoul and Washington to “enhance defense capabilities by complementing the two allies’ tactics,” regardless of whether Seoul is mindful of Pyongyang’s sentiment, ROK air force Tech. Sgt. Byun Jung-hwan told NK News.
ROK Capt. Lee Seung-hyun, who is participating in the exercise as a KF-16 pilot, said the exercises will be “an opportunity to enhance interoperability” between the two countries, according to the press release.
Edited by David Choi
10. North Korea’s railway bridges: strategic assets linking China, Russia while severing South
Summary:
Daily NK argues north Korea’s rail network is a strategic instrument, not just transport. The system radiates from Pyongyang to industrial and resource zones, and it still links outward through four rail crossings to China and one to Russia, giving the regime resilient trade and logistics options despite sanctions and politics. Key bridges include the Sinuiju–Dandong Yalu span, plus secondary Yalu crossings, and the Korea Russia Friendship Bridge over the Tumen River, with a parallel road bridge reportedly nearing completion. In contrast, rail and road links to South Korea along the Gyeongui and Donghae corridors have been physically severed since 2024, reinforced with barriers and defenses.
Comment: I am sure our military targeteers have similar views.
North Korea’s railway bridges: strategic assets linking China, Russia while severing South
dailynk.com · February 9, 2026
Analysis of North Korea's railroad system shows maintained connections to China via four crossings and Russia via one bridge, while railways and roads linking North and South Korea have been physically severed
By Bruce Songhak Chung - February 9, 2026
https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-koreas-railway-bridges-strategic-assets-linking-china-russia-while-severing-south/
North Korea’s railway network and border railway bridges are more than just means of transportation — they are a strategic asset closely tied to the national economy, diplomatic relations and structure of foreign trade. North Korea’s railroad network is a standard-gauge railway centered on Pyongyang, connecting the country’s cities and resource zones. North Korea uses it to transport people and cargo and support domestic industries more efficiently.
Analysis of North Korea’s railroad system and its border bridges shows that the country continues to maintain its domestic railway lines and tracks connecting it to China and Russia. Images also clearly confirm that railways and roads connecting North and South Korea have been cut. The blocking of roads and railways between the two Koreas appears to be a measure to intentionally sever connections between North and South and fortify the inter-Korean demilitarized zone.
North Korea’s railway lines and border bridges
North Korea’s railway network, centered on Pyongyang, connects major regions across the country and extends to the outside world through four crossings to China, one to Russia and two to South Korea. (OpenStreetMap)
North Korea’s railway network extends radially from Pyongyang, forming the nation’s railroad infrastructure. The main lines extending from Pyongyang link industrial and resource zones nationwide, forming an optimized network for moving large quantities over long distances. The system also connects to external trade and international railway networks via border crossings with South Korea, China and Russia. We downloaded geographic information system (GIS) data on North Korea’s railway lines from OpenStreetMap.
Four railway crossings to China, one to Russia and two to South Korea can be seen in geographic data from OpenStreetMap and elsewhere. The four railway connections with China, including the Sinuiju-Dandong route, physically connect North Korea with China’s railway network. North Korea’s rail connection to Russia is over the Korea-Russia Friendship Bridge that crosses the Tumen River. The only railway bridge connecting North Korea and Russia, this span is geopolitically and economically significant, providing a transportation route that enables North Korea to engage in international trade via railway links to Russia.
Yalu River Railway Bridge
The two railway bridges over the Yalu River, built during the Japanese colonial era, were destroyed by bombing during the Korean War, but one was restored and is used for border traffic, while the other remains destroyed and is a tourist destination from the Chinese side. (Google Earth)
The Yalu River Railway Bridge is a representative border bridge linking Dandong, Liaoning province, in China, with Sinuiju, North Pyongan province, in North Korea. It carries both railway and road traffic. The bridge, built during the Japanese colonial era, has long served as a hub for material and personal exchanges. Originally, there were two bridges, both of which were bombed by U.N. forces during the Korean War and destroyed; China later restored one of the 950-meter spans for use as the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge. The other was left destroyed and preserved as a war memorial — Chinese tourists can walk along the parts still standing.
The Yalu River Railway Bridge has been plagued by complaints over its structural limitations and age. It was built long ago, carries a single line, and faces width and capacity constraints, complicating the large-scale movement of cargo and traffic. Observers say the bridge cannot handle current logistical demand, let alone future demand.
Chongsu Railway Bridge and Manpo Railway Bridge
Located 58 kilometers northeast of the Yalu River Railway Bridge, the Chongsu Railway Bridge links Sakju County, North Pyongan province in North Korea, with Tonghua, Jilin province in China. The Manpo Railway Bridge is a railway crossing connecting Manpo, Chagang province, with Ji’an, Jilin province in China. (Google Earth)
The Chongsu Bridge is a rail connection across the Yalu River linking Chongsu township in Sakju county, North Korea, with the city of Tonghua in Jilin province, China. It is located about 58 kilometers northeast of the Yalu River Railway Bridge, another major railway crossing linking North Korea and China. The bridge, the nearby marshalling yard, and the Chinese side all have various railway facilities and infrastructure, but they are small in scale. Articles analyzing satellite images rarely report traffic on the bridge. This is to say, it sees little meaningful international cargo or passenger traffic. This suggests that the Chongsu Bridge is not used as a major rail or logistics route between the two countries, but instead plays a limited secondary role. Use of the bridge could increase if the region’s industrial development or infrastructure improves.
The Manpo Railway Bridge is a border bridge over the Yalu River connecting Ji’an, Jilin province, China, with Manpo, Jagang province, North Korea. The single-track, 580-meter span was built during the Japanese colonial era. The bridge is an important piece of border infrastructure linking China’s and North Korea’s railway networks in the middle stretch of the Yalu River, carrying rail cargo and passengers between the two countries.
Namyang Railway Bridge and Tumen Railway Bridge
The Namyang Railway Bridge, located at North Korea’s northernmost point, links the country to the Chinese city of Tumen. It is a cargo transportation route, with trains carrying coal, iron ore and other minerals for export. The Tumen River Railway Bridge is the only railway link between North Korea and Russia, linking North Korea’s Tumangang Station with Russia’s Khasan Station. The bridge serves as a portal for the exchange of people and cargo between the two countries, including weapons. (Google Earth)
The Namyang Railway Bridge crosses the Tumen River, linking Namyang township in Onsong county, North Hamgyong province, with the city of Tumen in China’s Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. The bridge carries mostly freight rather than passenger traffic. The function and role of the bridge could change depending on structural factors, including expanded railway service and trade between North Korea and China, improvements to the border customs system, and the political and sanctions environment.
The Tumen River Railway Bridge — linking Tumangang Station in Rason, North Korea, with Khasan Station in the Russian Far East — is the only railway connection between North Korea and Russia. The bridge was designed to carry mostly rail traffic. However, construction is underway on a new parallel bridge to carry road traffic. The 950 to 1,000-meter road bridge, agreed upon during the 2004 North Korea-Russia summit, is slated for completion around June of this year. When completed, the new bridge will enable large-vehicle and car traffic across the border, potentially diversifying cargo and passenger traffic. The substantive impact of this transformation could depend on outside factors, including international sanctions, global supply chains and the policy directions of the two nations.
Gyeongui and Donghae lines
North Korea carried out physical measures to sever connections between the two Koreas, including the placement of anti-tank barriers and defensive facilities along stretches of the Gyeongui and Donghae lines linking North and South. Railroad ties and rails were removed, and barriers were erected to block connections. (PlanetLabs)
The Gyeongui and Donghae railway lines follow the western and eastern coasts of the Korean Peninsula, linking Seoul with Sinuiju and Wonsan. Before the division of Korea, they were major railway lines linking the Korean Peninsula from north to south. The Gyeongui line was a railway axis that connected Seoul to Kaesong, Pyongyang, Sinuiju and China, while the Donghae line followed the East Sea coast, linking Gangneung with the Kumgang Mountains and the Tumen River.
Since 2024, North Korea has gradually implemented measures to physically sever overland connections between North and South Korea and bolster the closure of the “southern border.” Accordingly, the authorities blew up parts of roads and railways linking the North and South, including the Gyeongui and Donghae lines, and removed traces of the routes. They also fortified the frontier, including the placement of anti-tank barriers and landmines. The stretches of the Gyeongui and Donghae lines that connected the North and South — which served as the basis of cooperation between the two Koreas — have effectively been sealed. This move appears to reflect the state of political and security tensions between the two Koreas, and without changes in inter-Korean relations and the international situation, the railway is unlikely to be restored.
Forecast of North Korea’s border railway operations
Railway connections between North Korea and China were limited after the practical sealing of the border during the COVID-19 pandemic. Since then, small signs of moves to restart bilateral trade have emerged. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, all rail and road connections were severed under North Korea’s “zero COVID” policy, but afterwards, border trade has slowly recovered. Signs emerged in late 2023 and 2024 of freight service restarting on major trade routes, including the Sinuiju-Dandong line, and trade volume recovering.
However, it remains too early to say that rail service between North Korea and China has returned to normal, or that passenger and cargo transport has restarted in earnest. The two nations have yet to officially announce a restart of regular passenger service or the normalization of railway transportation networks. Transportation standards and operational frequency appear to remain in a state of adjustment due to quarantine, customs and policy factors. Activation of logistics and trade based on North Korea-China railways will largely depend on a complex set of factors and variables, including the refurbishment of customs systems, bilateral cooperation and international sanctions.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · February 9, 2026
11. South Korea opposition protests U.S. subpoena naming President Lee
Summary:
South Korea’s People Power Party slammed a U.S. House Judiciary Committee subpoena to Coupang Korea that explicitly names President Lee Jae-myung, calling it a “national embarrassment” and demanding an explanation from the government. The party argues the subpoena elevates domestic regulatory actions into a formal U.S. congressional issue, citing Korean agencies’ investigations, data requests, and references to potential business suspensions, along with Lee’s public remarks urging “strong punishment and massive fines.” PPP says the episode risks reframing a personal data and platform regulation dispute as alleged discrimination against a U.S. firm, at a sensitive moment amid tariff talks and tech regulation friction.
Comment: U.S. congressional pressure is being used as leverage in a broader Korea U.S. economic and regulatory bargaining contest. How will Seoul protect regulatory sovereignty while preventing this dispute from bleeding into tariff negotiations?
World News Feb. 8, 2026 / 9:24 PM / Updated Feb. 8, 2026 at 9:24 PM
South Korea opposition protests U.S. subpoena naming President Lee
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/08/us-congressional-subpoena-issue-to-coupang-korea-unit/8711770602876/
A view of the National Assembly in Seoul. Photo by Asia Today
Feb. 8 (Asia Today) -- South Korea's main opposition party on Saturday criticized a U.S. congressional subpoena issued to Coupang's Korea unit that explicitly names President Lee Jae-myung, calling it a "national embarrassment" and demanding an explanation from the government.
The People Power Party reacted after the U.S. House Judiciary Committee disclosed a subpoena sent to Coupang Korea's interim chief executive that cites actions by South Korean authorities and public remarks by Lee.
Choi Bo-yoon, the party's chief spokesperson, said it was troubling that the president's full name appeared in an official document issued by a foreign legislature.
"The problem is that the public has no way of knowing what the government and the presidential office did - or failed to do - before the president's name appeared in a U.S. congressional subpoena," Choi said. "This is an unprecedented embarrassment for the country."
Related
Choi said the document details actions taken by South Korean government agencies, including the Fair Trade Commission, references to possible business suspensions, large-scale investigations and repeated data requests, as well as the president's public comments.
"This issue goes beyond an individual case involving Coupang," Choi said. "It reflects a situation in which presidential remarks and the government's response have been elevated into a formal issue before the U.S. Congress."
He added that the subpoena quoted Lee's remarks calling for "strong punishment and massive fines," arguing that the matter had shifted from a domestic personal data protection issue into an international dispute framed as discrimination against a U.S. company.
Choi also called for senior officials to provide an explanation, saying the silence of the presidential chief of staff, national security adviser and prime minister was unacceptable given the sensitivity of the situation.
"This comes at a time when tariff negotiations, technology regulation and platform legislation are all moving simultaneously between South Korea and the United States," he said. "The government should have anticipated U.S. concerns and managed them proactively."
The U.S. House Judiciary Committee posted the subpoena on its website Wednesday, alleging that the South Korean government discriminated against Coupang.
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.
Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260209010002883
12. John Bolton: Kim Jong-un Has Little Willingness to Meet Trump
Summary:
John Bolton says Kim Jong-un has little interest in meeting POTUS, arguing Pyongyang prefers to lock in ballistic missile and nuclear leverage before talking. He recalls the 2019 Hanoi summit, claiming north Korea expected front-loaded economic gains while delaying denuclearization, and that Kim was surprised when he did not get the deal he anticipated. Bolton also faults POTUS tariff policy as damaging to partners and the global system. He says POTUS mishandled Greenland as China and Russia push in the Arctic, doubts a near-term Ukraine settlement, and stresses the U.S.–ROK alliance as a pillar of stability across the Asia-Indo-Pacific.
Comment: I have a hard time seeing how Kim Jomg Un will seek a meeting or even agree to a meeting with POTUS unless he believes he can gain a significant advantage to advance his strategic interests.
John Bolton: Kim Jong-un Has Little Willingness to Meet Trump
Bolton highlights North Korea's nuclear focus and US-South Korea alliance's regional stability role
By Kim Myeong-il
Published 2026.02.09. 18:59
https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/02/09/IPBRBR52U5FYXG4E3K45YAYY3M/
Former advisor Bolton watches then-President Trump deliver a speech in the White House Oval Office in Washington, D.C., U.S., in May 2018. /AFP-Yonhap
John Bolton, who served as White House National Security Advisor during President Donald Trump’s first term, analyzed in an interview with a South Korean broadcaster that “North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has little willingness to meet with Trump.”
According to Arirang TV on the 9th, Bolton, who recently appeared on the program, recalled the 2019 Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit and said, “North Korea has long demanded economic benefits first and delayed fulfilling denuclearization pledges. Kim Jong-un entered the talks confident he could deceive the U.S. as in the past, but he seemed surprised when he failed to secure the agreement he expected.”
Bolton, who was deeply involved in the summit, assessed future prospects for a North Korea-U.S. leaders’ meeting, stating, “Kim Jong-un has little intention to meet with Trump,” and added, “North Korea’s indifference to resuming dialogue signals its judgment that securing ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities will give it an advantage in negotiations.”
He expressed concern over the deprioritization of North Korea issues, calling it “surprising that the North Korea issue was rarely mentioned during Trump’s first term.”
Bolton criticized Trump’s tariff strategy, which triggered a trade war, as “a wrong approach to trade that harms the U.S., major trading partners, and the global economic system.”
Regarding the Arctic and Greenland issues, he said, “Trump mishandled the Greenland matter” and noted, “China and Russia are expanding their influence in the Arctic and strategic strongholds.”
On the Russia-Ukraine war, Bolton forecasted, “Diplomatic resolution is pessimistic as Ukraine’s security remains fundamentally unguaranteed.”
Bolton emphasized, “South Korea is now an advanced nation with strong military power and a major economic powerhouse,” and stressed, “Strengthening cooperation in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region aligns not only with South Korea’s national interests but also with the interests of other countries concerned about China’s future actions.”
He positively evaluated last year’s South Korea-U.S. summit, saying, “Considering President Trump’s tendency to prioritize personal relationships with other leaders, trust-building between the U.S. and South Korea appears to have started well,” and underscored that the alliance plays a critical role in deterring potential provocations from North Korea, Russia, and China, and in regional stability.
The interview, in which Bolton diagnosed North Korea’s nuclear issue, the South Korea-U.S. alliance, and international security challenges, will air at 8:30 p.m. on the 11th.
13. L3Harris begins militarizing Bombardier business jets for South Korean AEW&C order
Summary:
L3Harris has begun converting two Bombardier Global Express 6500 business jets into Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft for South Korea, starting mission system integration work that the company says shows program momentum and AERIS maturity. The full order is for four aircraft for the Republic of Korea Air Force, awarded in September 2025 to a team including L3Harris, Korean Air, Israel’s IAI-Elta, and Bombardier. The jets will use an IAI-Elta AESA radar with modules in the nose, tail, and conformal side panels for 360-degree coverage, with L3Harris leading mission integration.
L3Harris begins militarizing Bombardier business jets for South Korean AEW&C order - Breaking Defense
breakingdefense.com · Mike Yeo · February 5, 2026
“We have already received two aircraft to begin mission system integration work, demonstrating both program momentum and the maturity of the AERIS solution,” L3Harris's Jason Whitford told Breaking Defense.
By Mike Yeo on February 05, 2026 2:10 pm
https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/l3harris-begins-militarizing-bombardier-business-jets-for-south-korean-aewc-order/?utm
SINGAPORE — American defense firm L3Harris has started work to convert two Bombardier business jets into Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft for South Korea, according to a company official.
“We have already received two aircraft to begin mission system integration work, demonstrating both program momentum and the maturity of the AERIS solution,” L3Harris Principal for International Business Development Jason Whitford told Breaking Defense at the Singapore Airshow. AERIS is the name for what L3Harris calls the “next-generation AEW&C family” of systems that go into the militarized jets.
The work will eventually see four Bombardier Global Express 6500 business jets converted in AEW&C aircraft for the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF). The team made up of L3Harris together with Korean Air, Israel’s IAI-Elta and Canada’s Bombardier had won the bid to supply the US ally with the aircraft in September 2025.
The aircraft will be fitted with an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar system from IAI-Elta on board, with radar modules fitted in housings on the aircraft’s nose, tail and conformal side cheek panels on each side of the fuselage to give it all round radar coverage, said Whitford.
L3Harris will be responsible for integration of the mission systems for the program. The company has already had experience in this field, having done similar work for the US Air Force’s EA-37 Compass Call electronic warfare aircraft and Australia’s MC-55A Peregrine Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare platform.
Both L3Harris and IAI-Elta declined to identify the exact radar that will be used, but South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency had previously reported that it was the EL/L2085 dual-band AESA radar.
Whitford told Breaking Defense that the all-round radar coverage capabilities of the conformal radar configuration is one of a number of advantages over the alternatives. The planes can fly faster and higher than turboprop-powered platforms, enabling them to reach their assigned patrol station quicker and see further. They were also cheaper to operate and sustain than more complex solutions, he added.
Whitford also said that he has seen extensive interest from around the world in the AERIS platform, although he declined to reveal who these customers were. However, Taiwan’s Upmedia has reported that the company attended an industry day held by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and also briefed Taiwanese air force personnel on their AEW&C portfolio.
Taiwan is currently seeking to replace six Northrop-Grumman E-2K Hawkeye aircraft.
L3Harris is currently offering the AERIS in two versions: the AERIS-X based on the Global Express 6500 and the AERIS-A based on the Gulfstream G550s. The latter is based on the same airframe modifications to the AEW&C aircraft in service with Israel, Italy and Singapore as well as the US Air Force’s EA-37 Compass Call.
However, the G550 is no longer in production, and Whitford says that the Global Express 6500 the solution is a new-build aircraft with its longer lifespan was required.
breakingdefense.com · Mike Yeo · February 5, 2026
14. Social Media and Sinophobia: South Korea’s New Political Frontier
Summary:
Anti-China sentiment in South Korea has surged from roughly 35 to 45 percent unfavorable in 2004 and 2016 to around 80 percent since 2020, peaking near 85 percent in 2025, and the article argues the key change is the digital pipeline that turns episodic disputes into identity politics. After THAAD and Beijing’s economic coercion, algorithmic platforms rewarded outrage, sped disinformation, and made “China” a domestic political weapon, from kimchi and hanbok flareups to broader claims of interference, narrowing Seoul’s diplomatic room to maneuver.
Comment: Social media is now a strategic terrain shaping South Korea’s China policy as much as statecraft. Who benefits politically from keeping this anger hot? What would credible, democratic “inoculation” look like without censorship?
RUEA
Recognize China's strategy
Understand China's strategy
EXPOSE Chinas strategy
Attack China's strategy with a support political warfare and information campaign.
Social Media and Sinophobia: South Korea’s New Political Frontier
What makes the current wave of Sinophobia in South Korea different is not just its intensity, but the infrastructure through which it circulates.
By Zander Dumas
February 07, 2026
https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/social-media-and-sinophobia-south-koreas-new-political-frontier/
Credit: Depositphotos
Sinophobia is on the rise in South Korea. Cafés have posted signs refusing Chinese customers, protesters regularly take to the streets to denounce the Chinese Communist Party, and comment sections beneath viral videos of misbehaving tourists quickly fill with Chinese flags – often long before anyone knows who the individuals involved actually are.
This sentiment is not confined to a vocal fringe. Since 2020, survey data has consistently shown that roughly 80 percent of South Koreans hold unfavorable views of China, a figure that peaked at approximately 85 percent in 2025. Anti-Chinese sentiment has become firmly mainstream.
At first glance, this hostility may seem unsurprising. South Korea exists in permanent tension with the North, and China’s role in the Korean War, as well as its continued support for the Kim regime, is widely understood. Generations of Koreans have grown up under the shadow of Pyongyang, and the ideological alignment between North Korea and the Chinese Communist Party is often seen as fundamentally incompatible with South Korea’s political system and security interests.
That explanation, however, falls short. If ideological rivalry or war memory were the primary drivers of public hostility, negative views of China would have remained consistently high over time. That’s not true. In both 2004 and 2016, unfavorable views of China hovered between 35 and 45 percent, and China was frequently described as one of South Korea’s closest diplomatic partners. As recently as a decade ago, hostility toward China was roughly half of what it is today.
The scale and speed of this shift point to a change not only in South Korea’s external environment, but in how political attitudes are now formed and reinforced domestically – particularly through social media.
Since diplomatic normalization in 1992, Sino-Korean relations have moved through several distinct phases. The early years are often described as a honeymoon period. Trade expanded rapidly, South Korean firms invested heavily in China’s manufacturing sector, and public opinion largely mirrored this optimism. Unfavorable views of China remained near 35 percent, while Beijing was often portrayed as a key economic and diplomatic partner.
By the early 2000s, this image began to fracture. One flashpoint was the so-called “garlic war,” when South Korea imposed emergency safeguards against a surge of low-priced Chinese garlic imports. Beijing retaliated by threatening restrictions on Korean exports, exposing many Koreans to China’s growing willingness to employ economic coercion through trade retaliation.
Another dispute proved even more destabilizing symbolically. China’s Northeast Project, launched in 2002, reclassified the ancient Goguryeo kingdom– widely regarded in both Koreas as foundational to Korean identity – as a local Chinese ethnic regime. The backlash in South Korea was swift, and elite perceptions of China deteriorated sharply following the Goguryeo controversy.
Despite these tensions, the damage proved reversible. By 2016, unfavorable views of China had fallen back into the 30-percent range, and then-President Park Geun-hye’s attendance at China’s 2015 Victory Day military parade symbolized a renewed, if cautious, diplomatic warmth.
The turning point came after 2016. Following North Korea’s hydrogen bomb test, Seoul agreed to deploy the U.S. THAAD missile defense system on land owned by the Lotte Group. China responded with informal but highly effective economic retaliation. Lotte’s operations in China were shut down through regulatory pressure, inflicting billions of dollars in losses. Restrictions on tourism and cultural exports soon followed.
These measures had a profound impact on public perceptions. In a 2022 survey,67 percent of South Koreans cited economic coercion as the primary source of their negative views toward China. Yet economic retaliation alone does not explain how episodic grievances hardened into a durable, identity-laden hostility that now permeates everyday political discourse.
What makes the current wave of Sinophobia different is not just its intensity, but the infrastructure through which it circulates. Contemporary grievances are filtered and amplified through algorithm-driven platforms that reward outrage, identity signaling, and moral polarization.
False narratives alleging Chinese interference in South Korean domestic politics have spread widely online, often amplified by misleading or manipulated content circulating through Korea’s digital media ecosystem as detailed in AFP’s fact-check reporting on anti-China disinformation in South Korea. Research published in the American Journal of Public Health has shown that threat-based elite framing can significantly intensify hostility toward perceived out-groups by linking threat rhetoric to measurable shifts in exclusionary attitudes, particularly when these narratives are reinforced through repetition and engagement-driven amplification on social media platforms.
Earlier cultural skirmishes over kimchi and hanbok illustrate this dynamic clearly. These disputes unfolded almost entirely online, where historical nuance was quickly replaced by symbolic competition and nationalist framing. In this environment, China becomes less a geopolitical actor than a civilizational antagonist – an identity easily mobilized for domestic political gain.
The rise of figures such as Lee Jun-seok, whose confrontational political style resonates strongly with younger male voters, reflects how identity-based China discourse can legitimize more polarizing political alternatives among South Korea’s youth electorate. Social media does not merely reflect these shifts; it actively structures the incentives that sustain them.
The concentration of political discourse within a small number of technology platforms poses growing challenges for democratic governance. Platforms exert disproportionate influence over agenda-setting, yet efforts at regulation are frequently framed as infringements on free speech, while their economic centrality renders meaningful intervention politically costly, according to policy analysts.
Comparative cases suggest that digital mobilization is not inherently nativist. Values-based online mobilization in the United Kingdom under Green Party leadership and anti-establishment campaigning in New York during Zohran Mamdani’s election show that social media can be used without relying on ethnic scapegoating. At the same time, poorly executed digital strategies – such as those seen in parts of British party politics – can exacerbate polarization rather than mitigate it, as critics have noted.
As rhetoric surrounding China hardens, social media has become a central arena in which foreign policy preferences are formed and constrained. If South Korea’s leadership intends to preserve diplomatic flexibility toward Beijing, it can no longer treat public opinion as an external force. Digital platforms have transformed episodic disputes into enduring identity narratives that increasingly shape electoral incentives and policy horizons.
Ignoring this terrain risks locking future administrations into adversarial postures that outlast any single crisis. Managing relations with China in the coming decade will therefore depend not only on diplomacy and deterrence, but on whether South Korea can develop credible strategies for navigating the digital politics of nationalism.
Authors
Guest Author
Zander Dumas
Zander Dumas is a British national currently based in South Korea. He is a master’s student in International Relations and Politics at SOAS, University of London, and is interning with a South Korea-based news outlet. His research interests focus on digital media, public opinion, and the implications of online political mobilization for diplomacy, security, and domestic politics in East Asia.
15. Column: A visit to Washington's Victims of Communism Museum
Summary:
A South Korean columnist visiting Washington returns to unfinished business: the Victims of Communism Museum, a short walk from the White House. Inside, the exhibit is modest but pointed, built as a story of communism’s rise, terror, resistance, and the spread of repression from the Soviet Union across Eastern Europe, China, Cambodia, Cuba, Vietnam, and north Korea. The writer leaves with melancholy and a sharpened resolve to guard judgment and values. The museum stresses the human faces behind mass death claims and shows how language can become a weapon before violence arrives. The author notes bias risk in any curated memory space.
Excerpt:
Leaving the building, I found myself returning to what matters most. Not a "perfect system," but the freedom and institutions to criticize and reform any system, and the dignity of each person.
Comment: Everyone should visit the memorial. We must never forget what communism has done to our world.
World News Feb. 8, 2026 / 10:11 PM / Updated Feb. 8, 2026 at 10:11 PM
Column: A visit to Washington's Victims of Communism Museum
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/08/column-visit-the-victims-of-communism-museum/7561770605644/
U.S. President George W. Bush speaks during the dedication of the Victims of Communism Memorial in Washington on June 12, 2007. Listening (L to R) are Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation Chairman Lee Edwards, Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA). The foundation later opened the Victims of Communism Museum. File. Photo by Martin H. Simon/ UPI | License Photo
Feb. 8 (Asia Today) -- A few years ago, I visited Washington for work related to South Korea's advisory council on democratic and peaceful unification. A former senior official offered a simple suggestion: if you come to Washington, there are two places you should see. One was the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. The other was the Victims of Communism Museum.
At the time, I only had enough time to rush through the Holocaust museum. The other stayed on my mental list as unfinished business.
On this trip, I finally went.
The museum sits not far from the White House in a modest building downtown. The moment I stepped inside, the mood shifted. The exhibition design is not flashy, but it is not bare either. Everything, however, points toward a single question: what happens when an era believes ideology can "save" humanity, then turns human beings into expendable tools.
I left feeling a kind of melancholy. It was not only sadness. It was sharper than that, like a demand that you keep hold of your own judgment and values until the end.
The museum is run by a private nonprofit, not the government. Admission is free, and it operates on donations. The exhibition is organized as a narrative: the rise of communism, rule by terror, resistance and freedom. It begins with the Russian Revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union, then moves quickly into the machinery that crushed individual lives. It ends by tracing how communist rule spread beyond borders and how resistance emerged, linking that history to places where repression continues today.
As you follow the exhibition, a map of country names unfolds: the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China, Cambodia, Cuba, Vietnam. Then comes a name Koreans know all too well: North Korea.
Any system can look clean on paper as theory. But once it becomes a state, power and organization, it often reveals a different face. Revolutions promise liberation. But when the power that enforces liberation refuses to tolerate criticism, promises become orders. At that point, people are no longer the goal. They become the means.
What stayed with me most was not the statistics, but the human faces. The museum foregrounds a sweeping claim that more than 100 million people died under communist regimes. Numbers are powerful, but they cannot fully convey the texture of tragedy. A diary entry, a photograph, an arrest record can linger longer than any total.
The exhibition shows how hunger arrives under the name of "policy," how suspicion hardens into the label of "enemy," how silence is demanded as "loyalty." That is when visitors confront another lesson: violence does not always begin with guns. It can begin with language. Words like "people," "justice," "history" and "enemy" can become knives that divide and judge.
Another section that shifts the tone is testimony from those who fled and rebuilt their lives elsewhere. Leaving a regime is not the end of struggle. It can mean crossing borders at risk, living with guilt over family left behind, surviving in a new society. Their stories make one point unmistakable: freedom is not a destination. It is a starting line.
That is also why the North Korea-related exhibits feel especially immediate. "Human rights" stops being an abstract phrase and becomes a concrete voice. For someone living under severe control, freedom is not a debate. It can be the question of whether you make it through the night.
Still, this is not a national museum. It is a memory space built by a private organization with a clear viewpoint. When complex histories are grouped under a single label, there is always a risk of simplification. Visitors should read not only what is presented, but also the frame that shapes what is emphasized.
Yet even with that caution, the voices of victims demand priority. Before any schematic, a human being comes first.
Of course, capitalism has its own failures: inequality, exclusion, greed and recurring crises. Blind faith in the market can also be dangerous. But criticizing capitalism's defects is not the same as arguing that communism is a better alternative. Communism often presents itself as the promise of a fairer society. But where power concentrates and dissent becomes a crime, the system is driven not by fairness but by fear.
Walking through the museum, one sentence kept returning to my mind: capitalism's imperfections do not make abandoning freedom the answer. The real question is whether a society still has living channels to correct itself.
Washington is filled with places that confront the world's darkest chapters. If the Holocaust museum shows what happens when hatred becomes institutionalized, the Victims of Communism Museum asks how far human dignity can be pushed when ideology becomes the language of power.
Neither place is comfortable. But that discomfort may be the minimum price we pay to avoid crossing the same threshold again.
So I would recommend this museum to visitors. It is not a cheerful stop. But if you can spare 45 minutes to an hour, it can be a meaningful way to repay a debt of thought.
Ideology often leads with beautiful words. The harder question is what happens when those words become reality: whose voices are silenced, whose lives are erased.
Leaving the building, I found myself returning to what matters most. Not a "perfect system," but the freedom and institutions to criticize and reform any system, and the dignity of each person.
Song Won-seo is a professor at Shumei University in Japan. This column reflects the writer's views, which may differ from those of Asia Today.
-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
https://apstrategy.org/
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https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/
Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal
https://smallwarsjournal.com/
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