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Quotes of the Day:
"They will never be forgotten, and their courage, service, and sacrifice will always be cherished by our grateful Nation."
–President Joe Biden
"All of humanity's problems stem from man's inability to sit quietly in a room alone."
– Blaise Pascal
"Experience is not what happens to a man; it is what a man does with what happens to him."
– Aldous Huxley
1. A Proclamation on National POW/MIA Recognition Day, 2024
2. Opinion The U.S. military’s true advantage against any adversary
3. Pager and walkie-talkie attacks 'will go down in history of irregular warfare'
4. The Lebanon explosions raise a question: Deep into the smartphone era, who is still using pagers?
5. Israel’s clash with Hezbollah strains U.S. effort to prevent wider war
6. Hezbollah Hunts for Security Gaps, Moles as It Reels From Brutal Week
7. Ukraine's victory plan fully ready, Zelensky says
8. Inside the U.S. Army's Most Secretive Unit: The Story of ISA
9. Oops! Army training mislabeled nonprofits as terror groups for years
10. The exploding device attacks dealt a major but not crippling blow to Hezbollah, analysts say
11. The Most Surprising New Gun Owners Are U.S. Liberals
12. Taiwan questions two in probe into Hezbollah pager blasts
13. Secret Service seeks funding boost to address dangerous ‘new reality’
14. Hezbollah’s Pagers and Walkie-Talkies Explode. Now What?
15. Hack of Hezbollah devices exposes dark corners of Asia supply chains
16. Microsoft deal would reopen Three Mile Island nuclear plant to power AI
17. A New Era in Sabotage: Turning Ordinary Devices Into Grenades, on a Mass Scale
18. Lessons from the Korean War: Sometimes, an imperfect peace is sweeter than victory (An Armistice for Putin's War in Ukraine?)
19. Ukraine’s Lessons for the Pentagon By David Petraeus and Andy Yakulis
20. AC-130J Ghostrider Gunships Will Keep Their 105mm Howitzers, For Now
21. Army embraces Ukraine-style warfare with new all-drone unit
22. Leaving No One Behind: A Commitment That Matters Beyond the Military
23. America’s Crisis of Deterrence
24. Question for the candidates: Has Russia's war in Ukraine changed your view of the role of nuclear weapons?
25. How U.S. Cyber Adversaries Are Trying to Undermine the Election
26. Exclusive: US keeps missile system in Philippines as China tensions rise
1. A Proclamation on National POW/MIA Recognition Day, 2024
A Proclamation on National POW/MIA Recognition Day, 2024 | The White House
whitehouse.gov · by The White House · September 19, 2024
Throughout history, America’s service members have risked everything to keep the light of liberty shining bright. Today, more than 81,000 of these brave men and women remain missing and unaccounted for around the world. They will never be forgotten, and their courage, service, and sacrifice will always be cherished by our grateful Nation. On National POW/MIA Recognition Day, we honor all those missing and unaccounted for. We recommit to bringing them home, no matter how long it takes. And we express our ironclad support for their families.
The POW/MIA flag is displayed in its rightful place above the White House — the People’s House. The flag serves as a reminder to all Americans that we are the fortunate heirs of the legacy that they — our Nation’s unreturned heroes — helped to forge. These service members gave all, risked all, and dared all to protect our freedom. Just as they kept faith in our Nation, we must keep faith with them. My Administration will never forget our obligation to these patriots and their families. We owe them a debt of gratitude we can never fully repay.
For those with family members who are missing and unaccounted for, I know that the not knowing weighs on your hearts, amid the grieving, remembering, and cherishing of your loved ones. My Administration sees you, stands with you, and will never forget our sacred obligation to care for you.
During National POW/MIA Recognition Day, we recognize the absolute bravery of our Nation’s service members who are missing and unaccounted for, and we recommit to bringing them home. We offer our gratitude and steadfast support for their families, who have given so much to our Nation. We also honor the service and sacrifice of former prisoners of war. And we remember that the truest testimonial to their sacrifice is doing our part to ensure that our democracy and the soul of our Nation endure.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim September 20, 2024, as National POW/MIA Recognition Day. Let all who read this know that America remains grateful to our heroes held in the worst imaginable conditions as prisoners of war. Additionally, I encourage my fellow citizens across the Nation to reflect on today and let us not forget those heroes who never returned home from the battlefields around the world or their families who are still waiting for answers. I call upon Federal, State, and local government officials and private organizations to observe this day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this nineteenth day of September, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
whitehouse.gov · by The White House · September 19, 2024
2. Opinion The U.S. military’s true advantage against any adversary
It is great to see our great NCO corps recognized in the mainstream media.
Opinion The U.S. military’s true advantage against any adversary
It’s the NCOs who set the U.S. military apart from the rest of the world.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/09/19/army-navy-airforce-marines-leaders-ncos-pentagon/?utm
5 min
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(Washington Post staff illustration; iStock)
By Garrett M. Graff
September 19, 2024 at 8:07 a.m. EDT
Go anywhere in the world and the officer corps of nearly every nation’s military looks, at first glance, similar to our own — elite, disciplined and well-educated.
But peer for a moment at another country’s enlisted forces, U.S. military leaders say, and you will see by comparison the real source of America’s strength. That’s because the United States trains and empowers its mid- and lower-ranking forces, and particularly its noncommissioned officers, very differently from other countries. The United States invests unusual authority into its NCOs, the enlisted men and women who provide the day-to-day leadership of smaller units across the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Space Corps. “The NCO also remains our true source of competitive advantage against any adversary,” said Michael Weimer, the sergeant major of the Army.
According to Weimer and seven other senior service NCOs I interviewed recently at the Pentagon, America’s noncommissioned officers are a reminder that the top brass in almost any organization must push authority downward to be successful. The eight NCOs all put on their uniforms in the early 1980s or 1990s. Now, in terms of protocol, they stand alongside the chiefs of each of their services, informally outranking even three-star generals or admirals on Pentagon seating charts. Together, the eight have more than 260 years of military service. They’ve all studied leadership up close — on battlefields, on deployments and in the halls of the Pentagon.
The key to success, they say, to an empowered workforce is to assign young recruits crucial tasks from the very start. “We place incredible responsibility on young people,” explains Troy Black, the senior enlisted adviser to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and a former sergeant major of the Marine Corps, “what we require them to do, the method we train them with, the requirements being placed upon them.”
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America’s advantage in noncommissioned leadership is not a new development. Draftees and enlisted men were often able to outmaneuver and outfight far stronger opponents going back to World War II in part because our military empowered enlisted officers to think on their own. When given broad orders to, say, seize an objective, they were often left to decide for themselves how to best get the job done.
That isn’t true everywhere. U.S. commanders have noted how Russia suffered in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine because of the opposite approach — a top-down hierarchy that locates most of the decision-making high on the chain of command, far from the battlefield, often leading to confusion and chaos among the troops.
“The Russians have a system of command-and-control that very micro-controlled,” then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark A. Milley said in an interview last year. “They’ll get attacked — let’s say the battalion commander gets killed or wounded — the others will not know what to do at that point. They’re paralyzed. They have no method of decision-making at that point because they’ve never practiced and trained it. They have no self-initiative.”
Leadership that’s local is often just better. And lately, technology has been working to empower the noncommissioned officers even more. The drone and satellite driven conflict in Ukraine has underscored the extent to which sensors will be feeding intelligence directly to small units on the front line, forcing NCOs to think and work even faster. “We empower people,” says Weimer.
One historic dividing line between America’s commissioned and noncommissioned officers has long been education — noncommissioned personnel typically signed up right out of high school, sometimes with the goal of earning money for college with the GI Bill. Commissioned officers, meanwhile, usually joined after college. During a 30-year military career, commissioned officers typically go on to earn one or more advanced degrees that sharpen their strategic thinking and management skills.
Enlisted NCOs, meanwhile, were educated more informally, passing through specialty schools, training camps and military short courses to learn the ropes of their jobs while working with troopers.
But as the battlefield becomes more digital, the formal education distinction is blurring. Today, higher education is becoming more common among the ranks. Nearly 20 percent of the Space Force’s enlisted personnel have a bachelor’s degree or higher; in the Army, the proportion is about 1 in 10, according to the Pentagon’s latest demographics profile. Overall, more than 100,000 of about 1 million enlisted active-duty personnel now have college degrees — a percentage that has more than doubled since 2010. Heath Jones, the master chief petty officer of the Coast Guard, earned both a bachelor’s and a master’s in organizational management; the Air Force’s chief master sergeant, David Flosi, has a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree as well.
Fostering leadership in a massive organization such as the Army or the Navy holds useful lessons for civilian leaders: empower your workforce, encourage (and subsidize, when possible) education to help the team keep pace with innovation and technology — and keep pushing authority down the chain of command.
“You can’t have an officer make a decision at every single level,” says Tony Whitehead, senior enlisted adviser for the National Guard. “You need to have people out there that have the experience and the confidence who can make those decisions so that the commanders can do things at the strategic level. There’s a lot of trust and confidence — once we teach someone what to do, we give them the authority to do it, and they execute it, and we see the results.”
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Opinion by Garrett M. Graff
Garrett M. Graff, a Post contributing columnist writing about leadership, is a journalist, historian and author of nine books, including "Watergate: A New History," which was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in History.follow on X @vermontgmg
3. Pager and walkie-talkie attacks 'will go down in history of irregular warfare'
Let's look at the new (2023) definition of Irregular Warfare in Joint Publication 1, Warfighting
IW is a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.
Let's consider the Army definition:
Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.
I actually like elements of both definitions.
Now let's delve into the remainder of the IW discussion in Joint Pub 1.
(1) IW. IW is a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. The term “irregular” highlights the character of this form of warfare, which seeks to create dilemmas and increase risk and costs to adversaries to achieve a position of advantage. IW may employ the threat or use of organized armed violence for purposes other than physical domination over an adversary. States and non-state actors may conduct IW when they cannot achieve their strategic objectives by nonmilitary activities or conventional warfare.
(a) States and Non-State Actors. IW occurs between nations, states, or other groups. Other groups include organizations with no state involvement but that have capacity to threaten or use violence. States or other groups conduct IW to impose their will, with complementary methods contributing to the military defeat of an adversary.
(b) Campaign. JFCs plan, conduct, and assess IW within military campaigns as part of a broader, long-term USG effort across relevant instruments of national power to protect and advance US national interests.
1. Integrating military and nonmilitary means is essential to plan and conduct IW, as the military alone is often insufficient to achieve desired strategic objectives. The joint force plans and conducts IW in collaboration with relevant instruments of national power and with allies and partners.
2. The intent of IW is to erode an adversary’s legitimacy and influence over a population and to exhaust its political will—not necessarily to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of friendly political authorities engaged in the struggle against the adversary.
3. JFCs may conduct IW proactively to deny access or create dilemmas for an opponent’s government, economy, or civil society.
4. In armed conflict, JFCs can conduct activities to support IW as an inherent aspect of joint operations.
5. JFCs may conduct IW proactively to undermine an emerging threat and prevent them from becoming an enemy.
(c) Assure or Coerce. IW can assure or coerce within the paradigm of strategic uses of military force. JFCs can assure allies and partners by demonstrating US commitment to their strategic interests. JFCs can employ IW in attempting to coerce opponents, such as deterring their future behavior and compelling them to modify their current behavior. IW operations and activities may have the following effects:
1. Affecting the legitimacy and influence of the principal actors and their partners and opponents.
2. Deterring, delaying, disrupting, or degrading opponents.
3. Countering the coercive and subversive activities of opponents.
4. Diverting, coercing, attriting, or exhausting opponents.
(d) IW Variables. IW employs either indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric military activities to achieve strategic objectives. Not all IW is indirect, non- attributable, and asymmetric, but IW includes one of these essential characteristics.
1. Indirect activities target an adversary or support an ally or partner through one or more intermediaries (e.g., allies, partners, proxies, surrogates).
2. Non-attributable activities target an opponent or support an ally or partner in ways that conceal the source of the activities or their sponsorship.
3. Asymmetric activities target an opponent or support an ally or partner when a gross disparity in relative comprehensive power causes the weaker party to resort to irregular methodologies (e.g., disinformation, terrorism, insurgency, resistance to occupation) to erode or exhaust their opponent’s power, influence, and will. However, a stronger party may target opponents asymmetrically when the risks and cost associated with a direct, symmetric approach are unacceptable.
Joint Force Conduct of IW. IW is a joint force activity not limited to special operations forces activity. Most joint capabilities can be employed in an irregular context. All IW operations and activities require conventional force lead, facilitation, or participation.
Pager and walkie-talkie attacks 'will go down in history of irregular warfare'
https://metro.co.uk/2024/09/19/pager-attacks-will-go-history-irregular-warfare-21633673/?utm
MetroUK · by Josh Layton · September 19, 2024
Two waves of exploding communication devices have caused deaths and injuries across Lebanon and Syria (Picture: Rex/AP/X)
The deadly communication devices blasts across Lebanon and Syria have been described as an ‘astonishing’ Israeli operation in a region which was ‘already on a knife edge’.
The synchronised detonation of pagers and hand-held radios thought to have been obtained by Hezbollah has left at least 20 people dead and 450 injured, according to the country’s Health Ministry.
Some of the walkie-talkies blew up at or near funerals which were being held yesterday for those killed in the first round of blasts on Tuesday.
Alberto Fernandez, vice president of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), described Hezbollah as being ‘brutally exposed’ by the ‘unprecedented’ attack.
‘It was an astonishing operation, one that will go down in the history of irregular warfare and technology in military operations,’ he said.
‘There is no full clarity yet but it seems that the Israelis were able to intercept a shipment intended for Hezbollah operatives, tamper with the pagers, adding some explosives to the device and then remotely detonate them, perhaps by raising the temperature of the lithium battery causing the pager to explode.’
A person is carried outside the American University of Beirut Medical Center after pagers exploded across Lebanon (Picture: Mohamed Azakir/Reuters)
The remains of one of the exploded radio devices is shown inside a house in Baalbek in eastern Lebanon (Picture: AFP)
Thousands of people across Lebanon and Syria were injured in the first explosions affecting pagers, with a leading theory being that Israel somehow intercepted a batch of communications destined for Hezbollah and inserted tiny quantities of explosives.
The walkie-talkies then exploded yesterday across the south of the country, in Beirut’s southern suburbs and the Bekaa Valley in the east.
At least two of yesterday’s dead were children, the ministry said.
Although Jerusalem has not commented, multiple sources have suggested that the attack was conducted by Israel’s Mossad spy agency against Hezbollah fighters.
‘It shows an unprecedented penetration by Israel of Hezbollah security, relying on levels of human and, we assume, signals intelligence that no one expected Israel had,’ Mr Fernandez said.
‘Hezbollah was a terrorist group renowned for its ability and operational security. It has been brutally exposed. That is why the group’s adversaries in the Middle East, especially Sunni Muslim victims of Hezbollah, are having a field day laughing at and mocking them.’
CCTV shows the moment a pager explodes at an indoor vegetable market in Beirut (Picture: Balkis Press/ABACA/Shutterstock)
Mourners carry the coffin of one of the people who died in the pager blasts through a southern suburb in Beirut (Picture: EPA)
Israel has not commented on the explosions. However one theory for the blasts given by the US news websites Axios and Al-Monitor is that they had been part of an initial phase in an ‘all out’ offensive against Hezbollah.
Israel carried out the detonations earlier than planned after growing concerned that their adversary would discover the plan, they reported.
Focus is now shifting to Hezbollah’s response in an already volatile region, with leader Hassan Nasrallah due to give a speech today.
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MEMRI, a non-profit media analysis organisation based in Washington, has monitored the reaction across the region, which has included Telegram channels supporting ISIS and al-Qaeda mocking Hezbollah.
‘Hezbollah faces a real problem now,’ Mr Fernandez said.
‘It, of course, wants to retaliate but also knows that it is clearly outmatched by an IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] mobilized and ready for battle.
‘If it expands the war it decided to wage against Israel on October 8, then Israel is ready to expand the conflict even more.
‘Hezbollah is a tool of Iran and Iran wants to keep it intact as a powerful proxy and for when Iran needs to use it, for example, if or when Iran becomes a nuclear power.
‘So both Iran and Hezbollah face this dilemma of timing, they are committed to the destruction of Israel but not just yet, not right now.
‘The Israelis are, to use a metaphor from poker, calling their bluff.’
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The former US ambassador identified a territorial flashpoint in the wake of the October 8 terror attacks launched by Hamas and allied groups, which left more than 1,100 people dead.
Renewed exchanges of rocket fire on Israel’s border with Lebanon have taken place amid the Israel-Gaza conflict, which has led to more than 41,000 Palestinian deaths, according to the territory’s Hamas-run health ministry.
‘The region is already on a knife edge,’ Mr Fernandez said.
‘Hezbollah, by firing over 8,000 missiles into Israel since October 8 in support of Hamas, caused the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israeli citizens from exposed towns and villages in the country’s north.
‘This is a dilemma that Israel has to resolve one way or another, and urgently. This can be by Hezbollah stopping its attacks and moving its weaponry away from the border, ideally beyond the Litani River, or Israel will do it for them.’
The Lebanese military is taking precautions following the explosion of wireless devices (Picture: Houssam Shbaro/Anadolu via Getty Images)
Rockets fired from southern Lebanon are intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome air defence system on August 9, 2024 (Picture: Jalaa Marey/AFP)
The synchronised explosions mark the deadliest phase in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict since a fresh round of cross-border fighting began a year ago stoked by the Gaza conflict.
Dr Luca Trenta, associate professor, Swansea University, raised questions of ‘proportionality and the effort to distinguish civilians from combatants’ in what he described as a ‘wide-ranging attack’.
Dr Trenta, in commentary for the Royal United Services Institute, said: ‘Israel has increasingly shown a tendency to escalate the fighting, bringing the region to the precipice of a wider war.’
Hezbollah, a proscribed terror organisation in the UK, released several statements picked up by Memri.
In one, the armed group vowed: ‘The criminal and treacherous enemy will certainly receive its just deserts.’
Hashem Safieddine, a senior Hezbollah official, spoke of a ‘new phase’ in the conflict and said that ‘punishment is certainly coming’.
Israeli defence minister Yoav Gallant signalled that ‘the centre of gravity is moving north’ as the military diverted ‘forces, resources and energy’.
Mr Gallant added: ‘We are at the start of a new phase in the war – it requires courage, determination and perseverance.’
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Washington was ‘still gathering information’ about the explosions and emphasised the importance of a Gaza ceasefire in solving the cross-border tensions to the north.
4. The Lebanon explosions raise a question: Deep into the smartphone era, who is still using pagers?
I had assumed pagers were obsolete. Are others vulnerable? Can malign actors replicate what Israel did?
The Lebanon explosions raise a question: Deep into the smartphone era, who is still using pagers?
Doctors and first responders are among those who still use pagers
By LAURIE KELLMAN and SARAH PARVINI
Updated 2:18 AM EDT, September 20, 2024
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AP · by SARAH PARVINI · September 19, 2024
The small plastic box that beeped and flashed numbers was a lifeline to Laurie Dove in 1993. Pregnant with her first baby in a house beyond any town in rural Kansas, Dove used the little black device to keep in touch with her husband as he delivered medical supplies. He carried one too. They had a code.
“If I really needed something I would text ‘9-1-1.’ That meant anything from, ‘I’m going to labor right now’ to ‘I really need to get ahold of you,’” she recalls. “It was our version of texting. I was as nervous as a long-tailed cat in a room full of rockers. It was important.”
Beepers and all they symbolized — connection to each other or, in the 1980s, to drugs — went the way of answering machines decades ago when smartphones wiped them from popular culture. They resurfaced in tragic form Tuesday when thousands of sabotaged pagers exploded simultaneously in Lebanon, killing at least a dozen people and injuring thousands in a mysterious, multi-day attack as Israel declared a new phase of its war on Hezbollah.
In many photos, blood marks the spot where pagers tend to be clipped — to a belt, in a pocket, near a hand — in graphic reminders of just how intimately people still hold those devices and the links — or vulnerability — they enable.
Then as now — albeit in far smaller numbers — pagers are used precisely because they are old school. They run on batteries and radio waves, making them impervious to dead zones without WiFi, basements without cell service, hackings and catastrophic network collapses such as those during the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
Some medical professionals and emergency workers prefer pagers to cell phones or use the devices in combination. They’re handy for workers in remote locations, such as oil rigs and mines. Crowded restaurants use them, too, handing patrons blinking, hockey puck-like contraptions that vibrate when your table is ready.
To those who distrust data collection, pagers are appealing because they have no way to track users.
“A mobile phone at the end of the day is like a computer that you’re carrying around, and a pager has got a fraction of that complexity,” said Bharat Mistry, the UK’s technical director for Trend Micro, a cybersecurity software company. “Nowadays it’s used by people who want to maintain their privacy ... You don’t want to be tracked but you do want to be contactable.”
Pagers were the first iteration of ‘always on’
From the start, people have been ambivalent about pagers and the irksome feeling of being summoned when it’s convenient for someone else.
Inventor Al Gross, regarded by some as the “founding father” of wireless communication, patented the pager in 1949 intending to make it available to doctors. But they balked, he said, at the prospect of being on-call 24/7.
“The doctors wanted to have nothing to do with it because it would disturb their golf game or it would disturb the patient,” Gross said in a video made when he received the Lemelson-MIT Lifetime Achievement Award in 2000. “So it wasn’t a success, as I thought it would be when it was first introduced. But that changed later.”
By the 1980s, millions of Americans used pagers, according to reports at the time. The devices were status symbols — belt-clipped signals that a wearer was important enough to be, in effect, on call at a moment’s notice. Doctors, lawyers, movie stars and journalists wore them through the 1990s. In 1989, Sir Mix-a-Lot wrote a song about them, rapping: “Beep diddy beep, will I call you maybe.”
By then, pagers also had become associated with drug dealers and schools were cracking down. More than 50 school districts, from San Diego to Syracuse, New York, banned their use in schools, saying they hampered the fight to control drug abuse among teenagers, The New York Times reported in 1988. Michigan prohibited the devices’ use in schools statewide.
“How can we expect students to ‘just say no to drugs’ when we allow them to wear the most dominant symbol of the drug trade on their belts,″ James Fleming, associate superintendent for the Dade County Public Schools in Florida, was quoted as saying.
By the mid-90s, there were more than 60 million beepers in use, according to Spok, a communications company.
Dove, who went on to serve as the mayor of Valley Center, Kansas, and become an author, says she and her family use cell phones now. But that means accepting the risk of identity theft. In some ways, she fondly recalls the simplicity of pagers.
“I do worry about that,” she says. “But that risk just feels like a part of life now.”
The pager market today is small but persistent
The number of pagers globally is hard to come by. But more than 80% of Spok’s paging business deals with healthcare, with about 750,000 subscribers across large hospital systems, according to Vincent Kelly, CEO of the company.
“When there’s an emergency, their phones don’t always work,” Kelly said, adding that pager signals are often stronger than cell phone signals in hospitals with thick walls or concrete basements. Cell networks are “not engineered to handle every single subscriber trying to call at the same time or send a message at the same time.”
Members of Iran-backed Hezbollah on Israel’s northern border have used pagers to communicate for years. In February, the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, directed Hezbollah members to ditch their cell phones in an effort to dodge what’s believed to be Israel’s sophisticated surveillance on Lebanon’s mobile phone networks.
Tuesday’s attack appeared to be a complex Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah. But the widespread use of pagers in Lebanon meant the detonations cost an enormous number of civilian casualties. They exploded in a moment across the landscape of everyday life — including homes, cars, grocery stores and cafes.
Kelly says first responders and large manufacturers also use pagers. The manufacturers have employees use the devices on factory floors to prevent them from taking photos.
Most medical personnel use combinations of pagers, chat rooms, messaging and other services to communicate with patients without revealing home numbers — an effort to be truly off-duty when they’re not working.
Dr. Christopher Peabody, an emergency physician at San Francisco General Hospital, uses pagers every day — albeit grudgingly. “We’re on a crusade to get rid of pagers, but we’re failing miserably,” said Peabody, who is also director of the UCSF Acute Care Innovation Center.
Peabody said he and others at the hospital tested a new system and “the pager won": The doctors stopped answering the two-way text messages and would only respond to pagers.
In some ways, Peabody understands the resistance. Pagers provide a certain autonomy. In contrast, two-way communication carries the expectation to immediately answer and could provide an avenue for follow-up questions.
The problem, Peabody said, is that paging is one-way communication and providers can’t communicate back and forth through the paging system. The technology, he said, is inefficient. And paging systems are not necessarily secure, a critical issue in an industry that must keep patient information private.
“This has been a culture of medicine for many, many years,” he said, “and the pager is here to stay, most likely.”
____
Parvini reported from Los Angeles.
SARAH PARVINI
Parvini covers artificial intelligence for The Associated Press. She is based in Los Angeles.
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AP · by SARAH PARVINI · September 19, 2024
5. Israel’s clash with Hezbollah strains U.S. effort to prevent wider war
But what if Israel prevented a Hezbaillah attack and what if this action gives Hezbollah pause and contributes to deterring future attacks? Deterrence is not accomplished only by words. Actions speak louder than words. Sometimes you have to take action to create deterrence.
Israel’s clash with Hezbollah strains U.S. effort to prevent wider war
The absence of a full-blown war in Lebanon has been touted as a core achievement, but now Washington’s grip on the crisis appears more tenuous than ever.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/09/19/us-influence-lebanon-israel-hezbollah-attacks/?utm
7 min
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Secretary of State Antony Blinken exits a vehicle as he prepares to leave Egypt on Thursday. (Evelyn Hockstein/Reuters/Pool/AP)
By John Hudson
September 19, 2024 at 8:02 p.m. EDT
The deadly explosion of pagers and walkie-talkies across Lebanon this week dealt another blow to President Joe Biden’s beleaguered efforts to reduce tensions in the Middle East, even as his top diplomats were present in the region reciting calls for calm.
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The absence of a full-blown war between Israel and Hezbollah has been touted by U.S. officials as a core achievement of the past 11 months amid failures to broker a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, and halt the enormous civilian death toll and restrictions on humanitarian aid in the war-ravaged Gaza Strip.
But with Israel moving forces north and flying warplanes over Beirut, Hezbollah calling Israel’s apparent sabotage of electronic devices an “act of war,” and rockets and missiles flying in both directions, Washington’s grip on the crisis appears more tenuous than ever.
The detonation of the communications devices on Tuesday and Wednesday killed at least 37 people in Lebanon, including Hezbollah operatives, children and health-care workers, and coincided with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to Egypt, where he urged “all parties” to avoid any steps that could “further escalate the conflict that we’re trying to resolve.”
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Post national security reporter Shane Harris breaks down the Israeli attacks on thousands of Hezbollah pagers and radios on Sept. 17 and 18. (Video: Shane Harris, Joe Snell/The Washington Post)
Washington’s effort to urge de-escalation has been met with increasingly brazen assaults by its ally Israel and deadly rocket and missile volleys by Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Houthi militants — all of which threaten ongoing efforts to forge a deal to pause the fighting in Gaza and secure the release of hostages taken from Israel a year ago.
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Following
“Secretaries of state should travel to the region in a crisis, but the risk you run is eventually becoming part of the political furniture: You get taken for granted,” said Aaron David Miller, a Middle East expert who has advised both Republican and Democratic administrations. “Unless you husband your currency, the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arab states look at American officials as part of the furniture. They get used to them.
”U.S. diplomats hold little sway over Iran and Hezbollah but wield significant leverage over Israel, the single largest cumulative recipient of American foreign aid. But U.S. officials argue that it is Washington’s unyielding support for Israel that has prevented a full-scale assault on the Jewish state by Iran and its proxy forces amid Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s controversial military campaign in Gaza.
“So far, we have been successful in keeping it from turning into an all-out regional war, and that’s what we’re going to continue to try to pursue,” State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said Thursday.
Some critics say the Biden administration’s logic is backward.
“Promising Netanyahu arms and protection whether or not he de-escalates has, unsurprisingly, not persuaded him to de-escalate,” said Harrison Mann, a former analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency who resigned from the military earlier this year in protest of U.S. policy toward Israel. “Hopefully it’s at least racked up frequent-flier points for the envoy and his team.”
Matthew Miller said no conclusions should be drawn from the frequent travel of U.S. officials to the region and Israeli escalations.
“There are various escalations that happen in this conflict — not on a daily basis, but a pretty regular basis — and there are U.S. officials traveling on a pretty regular basis,” he said. “In college, I was taught correlation is not causation.”
At the crux of the conflict is Israel’s ongoing military campaign in Gaza following Hamas’s Oct. 7 cross-border assault, which killed more than 1,200 people and resulted in the taking of more than 240 hostages. Israel’s ensuing military campaign has killed more than 40,000 Palestinians, according to local health authorities, and brought about famine and polio in parts of the enclave.
In solidarity with Hamas, Hezbollah began firing rockets at Israel on Oct. 8, resulting in routine exchanges of fire between the Lebanese militant group and Israel — and the displacement of tens of thousands of people on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.
On Thursday, Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah said his group would not stop until Israel ended the war in Gaza. He added that detonating explosives in civilian areas — including supermarkets, houses and crowded streets — was a “crime.”
Nasrallah vows ‘a just retribution’ after device explosions
0:51
Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah spoke in Beirut on Sept. 19, after two days of deadly explosions across Lebanon. (Video: Reuters)
Israeli authorities, who rarely discuss operations in other countries, have declined to comment on whether Israel was responsible. U.S. officials have acknowledged that Israel was behind the attack but insist that the Israelis did not inform the United States about its specifics beforehand, only afterward using intelligence channels.
The Israeli government has come under intense pressure to create conditions that would allow displaced Israelis to return safely to their homes, and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on Thursday said the military had entered “a new phase of the war” focused on its northern border.
Some former officials surmised that the exploitation of the communications devices was designed to paralyze Hezbollah communications in the event of an imminent full-scale war — a path Israel has not yet taken.
“My best guess is the potential exposure of the devices by Hezbollah made Israel trigger the attack before they really wanted to,” said Frank Lowenstein, a Middle East adviser to former secretary of state John F. Kerry.
An alternative theory, Aaron David Miller said, is that Hezbollah had not discovered the plot but Netanyahu “approved the operation to boost his own political fortunes.”
Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) said Netanyahu’s actions should not be tolerated. “Time and again, Prime Minister Netanyahu has ignored the Biden Administration’s concerns, taking escalatory action without even conferring with the U.S.,” he said in a statement. “He’s repeatedly demonstrated that his priorities lie in his own political self-interest — not in that of his people, who are calling for a ceasefire and a return of the hostages.”
Whatever transpired, U.S. officials have maintained that they were not told about the operation ahead of time and played no role in it.
“We were not involved in [Tuesday’s] incidents or [Wednesday’s] in any way. And I don’t have anything more to share,” White House spokesman John Kirby told reporters this week. Kirby insisted that U.S. officials continue to believe there is a “diplomatic path forward” to a cease-fire in Gaza and a truce between Hezbollah and Israel.
“We want to see the war end. And everything we’ve been doing since the beginning has been designed to prevent the conflict from escalating,” he said.
But talks between Israel and Hamas have been deadlocked for weeks over Israeli demands for a continued military presence along the Egypt-Gaza border and Hamas demands over the ratio of Palestinian prisoners to be released in exchange for the hostages.
Several weeks ago, U.S. officials said they planned to present a “take it or leave it” proposal to Israel and Hamas that if the two sides fail to accept would mark the end of the American-led negotiations.
That proposal hasn’t been made, said Aaron David Miller, the Middle East expert, because U.S. officials fear that if rejected, it would unleash the “bigger strategic nightmare” of an all-out war.
“Despite the odds of not succeeding,” he said, “keeping this going is critically important.”
Claire Parker in Cairo, Missy Ryan and Abigail Hauslohner contributed to this report.
6. Hezbollah Hunts for Security Gaps, Moles as It Reels From Brutal Week
In addition to possibly preventing an attack and significantly disrupting one part of Hezbollah's command and control capabilities, this action has tremendous psychological operations effects by undermining the confidence in the organization and its security.
Hezbollah Hunts for Security Gaps, Moles as It Reels From Brutal Week
U.S. and regional officials worry a wider conflict looms after three days of Israeli attacks that injured thousands and left the militant group in shock
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-hunts-for-security-gaps-moles-as-it-reels-from-brutal-week-14210631?mod=hp_lead_pos1
By Summer SaidFollow, Adam Chamseddine and Jared MalsinFollow
Sept. 20, 2024 5:27 am ET
Hezbollah was scrambling Friday to recover from a week of blows delivered by Israel, including an unusually heavy series of airstrikes across southern Lebanon and attacks that caused electronic devices carried by thousands of the militant group’s members to explode virtually simultaneously across the country.
The group is trying to determine whether any of its communications networks are safe as it searches for security gaps and hunts down the possibility of moles in the organization, people familiar with the matter said.
It must also contend with the risk of further blows as Israel steps up its efforts to end Hezbollah rocket and drone attacks that have forced the evacuation of more than 50,000 people from northern Israel—including the possibility of a wider war.
Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant warned late Thursday that “the sequence of military actions will continue” as Israel shifts its focus to the north and brings in new troops. Top U.S. military officials are increasingly worried that Israel could launch a ground offensive in Lebanon.
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin canceled plans to travel beginning this weekend to Israel, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Many of Washington’s closest Arab allies and partners in the Middle East fear a possible Israeli invasion of Lebanon, according to Arab officials, who said it could trigger unrest across the region and an opportunity for extremist groups to harness that anger and regroup.
Israeli tanks following a day of training in the Golan Heights. Photo: atef safadi/Shutterstock
People listen to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s speech in a cafe in Beirut. Photo: Hassan Ammar/Associated Press
On Friday, many of Hezbollah’s officials and members couldn’t immediately be reached on their mobile phones. One official said the group was struggling to regroup amid worries about the extent to which its communications infrastructure was compromised by the Israelis.
“There is no doubt that we have been subjected to a major security and humanitarian blow that is unprecedented in the history of the resistance in Lebanon at least and unprecedented in the history of Lebanon,” Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech Thursday addressing the attacks on the group’s pagers and walkie-talkies that left at least 37 dead and nearly 3,000 injured.
The initial attack, which caused Hezbollah pagers to explode on Tuesday, set off a scramble inside the group to re-establish lines of communications and figure out how the attack took place. The arrival of a second wave of explosions targeting walkie-talkies just days later heightened concerns about whether any of the group’s systems could be trusted, people familiar with the matter said.
Israel followed up with airstrikes on what it said were 100 Hezbollah rocket launch sites and other positions in Lebanon. The airstrikes took place as Nasrallah was preparing to deliver his speech Thursday, and then later that night. Israeli jets also flew over Beirut, setting off sonic booms as the jets broke the sound barrier, to punctuate the message.
Thursday’s airstrikes were more extensive than in previous days and came as the Israeli chief of staff, Herzi Halevi, approved battle plans for the country’s northern front against Hezbollah. Israel recently added the return of evacuated residents to their homes in the north to its official war goals.
An Israeli jet fighter emits a flare over Beirut during a televised speech by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Photo: wael hamzeh/Shutterstock
The attack on pagers and walkie-talkies was an embarrassing blow to Hezbollah and an illustration of Israel’s far superior capabilities in intelligence and surveillance. The irony is the vulnerability exploited by the attacks was the group’s decision to switch to the comparatively low-tech devices in an effort to avoid the surveillance risks of smartphones.
Senior officials from the militant group have ordered an investigation into the attack. The early results point to a supply-chain intrusion in which Israel inserted explosives into devices that Hezbollah distributed to its members.
People briefed on the operation said Israel laced the batteries of the devices with explosives. Israel then hacked into the hub of the group’s pager network to simultaneously send a message to thousands of users that triggered the blasts, a senior Lebanese security official said.
One challenge is to restore communications after the extensive damage to devices and apparent penetration of the group’s networks. Among the targeted operatives was the head of Hezbollah’s signals unit, which runs the group’s communications systems, a person familiar with the matter said.
Hezbollah is looking into the possibility that collaborators inside the group may have leaked information about the procurement of pagers used by the group and whether files from the organization were handed over to Israel, officials with the group said.
“What Israel has done is it has delivered a very powerful psychological and tactical blow to Hezbollah, and it’s devastating,” said Fawaz Gerges, a Middle East expert and professor of international relations at the London School of Economics. “How do the rank and file feel now? They feel rattled, they feel shocked. They’re off balance.”
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of a group member killed when in a pager explosion in Beirut. Photo: Manu Brabo for WSJ
A funeral procession in Beirut for a Hezbollah member killed in a pager explosion. Photo: Manu Brabo for WSJ
Penetration of the group’s communications networks has been an internal concern since early in the war. Nasrallah in February urged his rank and file to throw away their smartphones, saying Israel could use them for surveillance or targeting.
Hezbollah members securing a funeral on Wednesday for those killed in the previous day’s blasts could be seen carrying walkie-talkies at the start of the ceremony. After blasts hit the crowd of mourners, the security detail had ditched those devices.
This week’s series of attacks comes as Hezbollah deliberates how to handle the continuing cycle of violence playing out across the Israeli-Lebanese border, which continued in recent days with the group firing antitank missiles into Israel and Israeli warplanes striking in southern Lebanon. It now has to consider whether and how to respond to the extensive attacks on its home turf.
“I’m not going to talk about time or place or type of operation,” Nasrallah said Thursday. “But of course, the punishment will come.”
Hezbollah began firing across the border shortly after the Hamas-led Oct. 7 attacks on southern Israel that left 1,200 dead and sparked the war in the Gaza Strip. Nasrallah reiterated Thursday that the group will continue the barrage until the fighting in Gaza ends.
The near-daily exchanges of fire have largely contained the conflict within unspoken rules of engagement in an effort by both sides to avoid a full-scale war. The rising intensity of violence has U.S. officials and others concerned that the risk of an all-out conflict is rising.
Gerges said this week’s attacks wouldn’t alter the broader strategic calculations between Hezbollah and Israel.
“Anyone who knows Hezbollah quite a bit from the inside out will tell you that these attacks will harden Hezbollah’s stance and will make Hezbollah more determined to resist and continue on its path,” he said.
Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com and Jared Malsin at jared.malsin@wsj.com
7. Ukraine's victory plan fully ready, Zelensky says
Perhaps more than concepts of a plan or only contours? (I could not resist that snarky comment when talking about plans).
Excerpt:
US Ambassador Brink: ‘We have some sense of contours of Zelensky’s victory plan’
Ukraine's victory plan fully ready, Zelensky says
by Martin Fornusek and
The Kyiv Independent news desk
September 18, 2024 8:54 PM
3 min read
kyivindependent.com · by Martin Fornusek · September 18, 2024
All points of Ukraine's victory plan that Kyiv aims to present to Washington have been worked out, President Volodymyr Zelensky said in his evening address on Sept. 18.
Zelensky plans to discuss the plan with U.S. President Joe Biden during his visit to the U.S. later this month.
While not revealing all the details, the president previously said that the plan is composed of four main points and a fifth related to the post-war situation. It focuses on Ukraine's security and geopolitical position, foreign military assistance with the freedom to use it without restrictions, and economic support.
Ukraine's cross-border incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast, which left a chunk of Russian territory under Kyiv's control, is also part of the strategy, Zelensky said.
"The most important thing now is the determination to implement it," the president said in his address.
"There isn't and cannot be any alternative to peace, no freezing of the war or any other manipulations that will simply postpone Russian aggression to a later stage."
‘They attack with quantity:’ With Ukrainian soldiers desperately defending Pokrovsk
Editor’s note: In accordance with the security protocols of the Ukrainian military, soldiers featured in this story are identified by first names and callsigns only. POKROVSK DISTRICT, Donetsk Oblast – Marked by wide plumes of gray smoke on the horizon, the open fields stretching out southeast of t…
The Kyiv IndependentFrancis Farrell
Ukraine is open to suggestions from the U.S. to strengthen the plan, he added. U.S. officials said they had been acquainted with elements of Zelensky's strategy and voiced belief "that (it) can work."
Presidential adviser Mykhailo Podolyak said on Sept. 17 that the plan does not in any way include ceding territory to Russia.
"(Freezing of the conflict) will not lead to the end of the war but will only lead to Russia gaining the opportunity to accumulate additional resources and proceed to the third stage (of the war) with more mass killings of civilians in Ukraine," Podolyak said.
During the evening address, Zelensky also thanked soldiers "who ensure Ukraine's long-range capabilities... for an important outcome last night on Russian territory." The president praised the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Ukraine's military intelligence agency (HUR), and the Special Operations Forces for "inspiring precision."
An SBU source told the Kyiv Independent that Ukrainian drones attacked one of the largest arsenals in Russia overnight on Sept. 18, causing a powerful detonation in the town of Toropets in Russia's Tver Oblast.
US Ambassador Brink: ‘We have some sense of contours of Zelensky’s victory plan’
The Kyiv Independent spoke with the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink on Sept. 19 on the sidelines of the National Media Talk, an annual journalism conference held in Kyiv, and supported by USAID and Internews. The following is the transcript of the interview: The Kyiv Independent: Thank yo…
The Kyiv IndependentOlga Rudenko
kyivindependent.com · by Martin Fornusek · September 18, 2024
8. Inside the U.S. Army's Most Secretive Unit: The Story of ISA
I woke up and found this in one of my news feeds. It is amazing what is on the internet these days. There is even a video at the link. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/inside-us-armys-most-secretive-unit-story-isa-212812
Excerpt:
Throughout its history, the unit has gone by different names that change at regular intervals: Field Operations Group; Intelligence Support Activity; The Activity; Torn Victor; Centra Spike; and Task Force Orange are some of the names the unit has been known with at some point. Some of these names, mainly Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) and Task Force Orange, or simple Orange, have stuck, and people use them to refer to the unit, although its actual designation might be different.
Inside the U.S. Army's Most Secretive Unit: The Story of ISA
The National Interest · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · September 19, 2024
Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), established in 1981, emerged from the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the mission to rescue American hostages in Tehran. Recognizing a gap in actionable intelligence, the Pentagon created the ISA to provide vital human and signals intelligence.
-This secretive unit, known by various names like Task Force Orange, operates in the shadows, gathering intelligence for elite military units such as Delta Force and SEAL Team 6.
-With highly specialized training, ISA continues to support critical operations, blending military and intelligence capabilities with extreme secrecy.
How a Failed Mission Led to the Creation of the U.S. Army’s Shadowy ISA
Established in 1981, the U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity was created in the wake of the failed attempt to rescue the American hostages from Tehran. Very likely, this is the first time you hear about this unit – and for good reason.
A combination of a special operations and an intelligence-gathering outfit, Intelligence Support Activity operates in the shadows. For over 40 years, the unit has been paving the way for other secretive special missions units, such as the Army Delta Force and Navy’s SEAL Team 6. ISA is one of JSOC’s Tier 1 units, along with Delta Force, SEAL Team 6, and the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron.
As to how the unit came to be, much like the rest of the U.S. special operations community, it arose from disaster and the ashes of defeat.
This is how an emergency created one of the military’s most secretive units.
The origin of the Intelligence Support Activity
Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iranian students, encouraged by the new regime, stormed the American embassy in Tehran and took hostage 66 American diplomats, intelligence officers, Marines, and citizens.
While the White House engaged in intense negotiations with the Iranian revolutionaries and third-party mediators, the U.S. military created a special operations task force with different units, including the newly found Delta Force, and started training for a potential hostage rescue. Eventually, Operation Eagle Claw failed in April 1980, and eight American troops were killed without any fighting with the Iranians.
One of the reasons for the failure of the operation was the lack of timely, actionable intelligence. The CIA’s human resources had taken a heavy blow following the Islamic Revolution, and the Agency struggled to provide actionable intelligence to the Army.
Following the revelation that the U.S. had tried to rescue the hostages by force, negotiations collapsed. The Pentagon prepared for another rescue attempt. This time around, the Army created an ad hoc intelligence-gathering unit to ensure that the task force had the intelligence to succeed. Named the Field Operations Group and led by Special Forces Colonel Jerry King, the unit was comprised of about 50 hand-selected personnel trained in intelligence gathering and reported directly to the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
The vast majority of the operators assigned to the unit had special operations backgrounds and a good portion had diverse cultural backgrounds that could help them blend into foreign environments without raising alarm. Very quickly, the small unit was providing key intelligence to the military planners from within Iran. But negotiations between Washington and Tehran worked, and the hostage crisis ended peacefully.
Although the Pentagon disbanded the special operations task force, the Field Operations Group which had supported it survived because the Army realized that it had a capability gap.
In December 1980, Lt. Gen. Philip C. Gast, the Joint Staff’s Director for Operations, wrote to the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) acknowledging that capability gap, “A review of the intelligence collected during the past year to support Iranian contingency planning revealed a serious and persistent information deficiency,” the senior Army officer wrote to his colleague. “This deficiency revolves around the need of military planners to have accurate and timely situation-oriented operational and environmental data,” he added.
“The current DOD/Service HUMINT [human intelligence] structure is not organized to satisfy these requirements. Recommend consideration to be given to developing, within DOD,” Gast concluded.
So, the U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity was born.
Truth conquers all chains
Established in March 1981, the Intelligence Support Activity was tasked with collecting human and signal intelligence for the military, thus filling that capability gap that played a significant part in the tragedy of Operation Eagle Claw.
The 50 operators, who had already been picked for the unit, quickly exceeded 100, and money started pouring in as the Pentagon understood the value of the organization. The unit maintained a close relationship with the CIA and operated on the gray fringe that divides military and intelligence operations. Its members never wore uniforms; they sported beards and wore civilian clothes.
As the 1980s moved on, so did the unit, evolving with the times but always striving to remain in the shadows.
Few details are known about its recruitment process or the training its members undergo. ISA operators primarily come from the Green Berets. Their training focuses on HUMINT and SIGINT collection, infiltration techniques, and other skills.
The number of names used to describe the unit is a reflection of its extremely secretive nature.
Throughout its history, the unit has gone by different names that change at regular intervals: Field Operations Group; Intelligence Support Activity; The Activity; Torn Victor; Centra Spike; and Task Force Orange are some of the names the unit has been known with at some point. Some of these names, mainly Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) and Task Force Orange, or simple Orange, have stuck, and people use them to refer to the unit, although its actual designation might be different.
About the Author:
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a Greek Army veteran (National service with 575th Marines Battalion and Army HQ). Johns Hopkins University. You will usually find him on the top of a mountain admiring the view and wondering how he got there.
This article was first published by Sandboxx News.
The National Interest · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · September 19, 2024
9. Oops! Army training mislabeled nonprofits as terror groups for years
This is not an excuse, but did we contract out this training or the development of the "training package?"
I wonder how many of these groups are also listed on the Combined Federal Campaign list for donating to charities?
Oops! Army training mislabeled nonprofits as terror groups for years
militarytimes.com · by Nikki Wentling · September 19, 2024
At Fort Liberty, thousands of soldiers who were trained on the Army’s antiterrorism policy saw slides that labeled several legitimate nonprofits as terrorist organizations – a blunder that went on for seven years before photos of the slides were posted to social media this summer, prompting outrage.
After the training became public, the Army pulled the slides and began an investigation, said Lt. Gen. Patrick Matlock, the Army deputy chief of staff.
Matlock and Agnes Gereben Schaefer, the assistant secretary of the Army, testified about the investigation results Thursday in front of members of the House Armed Services Committee.
Nonprofits that were incorrectly labeled as terrorist groups included People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, known as PETA, as well as the anti-abortion groups Operation Rescue and National Right to Life. The advocacy groups Earth First, Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front were also listed.
“Incorrectly labeling legitimate organizations as terrorist groups not only undermines the credibility of the training, but also puts service members at risk of being unfairly scrutinized or penalized based on their associations or memberships,” said Rep. Andy Kim, D-NJ. “We must be cautious and purposeful in how we define and identify threats to our national security.”
The slides had been used in trainings since 2017 and had not been reviewed or approved at any level, Schaefer said. About 9,100 soldiers saw the slides over the past seven years.
“The training materials were very poorly developed, and we fully acknowledge that failure,” Matlock said. “That length of time is almost unexplainable.”
Dr. Agnes Schaefer speaks during the Army People Sync Conference in February. (Jean Wines/DVIDS) [U.S. Army Photo by Jean Wines]
The soldier who created the slides was an employee of the local garrison and added the nonprofits based on open-source research, Schaefer said. The Army didn’t find any evidence that the soldier sought to subvert Defense Department policy or to further a personal political viewpoint.
Republicans and Democrats criticized Matlock on Thursday after he refused to reveal what disciplinary measures the soldier faced. Matlock said only that the soldier was re-trained, and the chain of command took action. He cited privacy and safety concerns as the reason he wouldn’t give more details.
Almost every congressperson who questioned Matlock took issue with him not divulging the punishment. Rep. Steven Horsford, D-Nev., described his reticence as a lack of transparency, and Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-Fla., said he was “playing games.” Rep. Cory Mills, R-Fla., accused Matlock of not being deserving of the rank of a four-star general.
Rep. Jim Banks, R-Ind., the chairman of the House’s military personnel subcommittee, said repeatedly that Matlock’s silence on the issue was an embarrassment.
“I respect you, but your inability to discuss accountability with us today greatly undermines your position, your authority, your leadership,” Banks said to conclude the hearing. “I think it’s embarrassing to the US Army.”
Members of Congress first became aware of Fort Liberty’s antiterrorism training this summer, when photos of slides used during a July 10 training were shared online. In a statement at the time, Fort Liberty officials said the slides were not vetted appropriately and would no longer be used.
National Right to Life issued a news release calling the situation “deeply offensive to all pro-life Americans,” and PETA told Military Times the Army made the correct decision to get rid of the “counterfactual presentation.”
The Army is doing a service-wide review of its training materials to make certain they reflect the Defense Department’s antiterrorism policies and don’t contain information similar to what was shared at Fort Liberty.
“We fully acknowledge that this incident has revealed a gap in our processes at the command level that has existed since these slides were first developed in 2017 and that we need to alleviate the potential for individuals to develop training materials without appropriate supervisory review,” Schaefer said. “The recently directed Army-wide review is intended to close that gap.”
That review began a couple of weeks ago and would last until early next year, Matlock said. As of Thursday, no other problems had been found.
This story was produced in partnership with Military Veterans in Journalism. Please send tips to MVJ-Tips@militarytimes.com.
About Nikki Wentling
Nikki Wentling covers disinformation and extremism for Military Times. She's reported on veterans and military communities for eight years and has also covered technology, politics, health care and crime. Her work has earned multiple honors from the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, the Arkansas Associated Press Managing Editors and others.
10. The exploding device attacks dealt a major but not crippling blow to Hezbollah, analysts say
True. But the lingering psychological effects may become debilitating especially if Israel follows up with an effective psychological operations campaign (that also includes additional actions).
The exploding device attacks dealt a major but not crippling blow to Hezbollah, analysts say
By ABBY SEWELL and BASSEM MROUE
Updated 11:34 AM EDT, September 19, 2024
AP · by ABBY SEWELL · September 19, 2024
BASSEM MROUE
ABBY SEWELL
Sewell is the Associated Press news director for Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. She joined the AP in 2022 but has been based in the region since 2016, reporting and guiding coverage on some of its most significant news stories.
twittermailto
AP · by ABBY SEWELL · September 19, 2024
11. The Most Surprising New Gun Owners Are U.S. Liberals
I was surprised to hear Vice President Harrias say she was a gun owner (I was not surprised that Gov Walt is a gun owner).
Excerpts:
American gun culture has long been dominated by conservative, white men. Now, in a marked change, a burgeoning number of liberals are buying firearms, according to surveys and fast-growing gun groups drawing minorities and progressives.
“It’s a group of people who five years ago would never have considered buying a gun,” says Jennifer Hubbert, an anthropology professor at Lewis & Clark College in Portland, Ore., who has researched liberal gun owners.
Historically, it wasn’t unusual for Democrats to own guns, with many more of them living in rural areas. Also, hunting was much more popular. But starting in the early ’90s, gun ownership among Democrats dropped significantly. Increasingly divisive political battles over the role of firearms in American society led the Democratic Party to become an advocate for gun regulation. Republicans became the party of gun rights.
Now, today’s Democrats are rediscovering guns.
The Most Surprising New Gun Owners Are U.S. Liberals
After decades of decline, gun ownership is rising among Democrats
https://www.wsj.com/us-news/liberal-gun-ownership-growth-2a20af81?mod=hp_lead_pos8
By Cameron McWhirterFollow and Zusha ElinsonFollow
Sept. 19, 2024 9:22 pm ET
Michael Ciemnoczolowski, a lifelong Democrat, supports stricter gun laws and contributes to Sandy Hook Promise, a gun-violence-prevention nonprofit.
But this summer, the liquor store clerk in Iowa City, Iowa, for the first time in his life bought a gun. Apprehension about street crime, armed right-wing extremists, and “whatever else the world could possibly throw at us,” drove his decision.
“Domestic politics have grown increasingly acrimonious,” says Ciemnoczolowski, 43.
Michael Ciemnoczolowski, a Democrat, at his home in Iowa City, Iowa. Photo: Danny Wilcox Frazier/VII for WSJ
Ciemnoczolowski purchased a gun for the first time in 2024. Photo: Danny Wilcox Frazier/VII for WSJ
American gun culture has long been dominated by conservative, white men. Now, in a marked change, a burgeoning number of liberals are buying firearms, according to surveys and fast-growing gun groups drawing minorities and progressives.
“It’s a group of people who five years ago would never have considered buying a gun,” says Jennifer Hubbert, an anthropology professor at Lewis & Clark College in Portland, Ore., who has researched liberal gun owners.
Historically, it wasn’t unusual for Democrats to own guns, with many more of them living in rural areas. Also, hunting was much more popular. But starting in the early ’90s, gun ownership among Democrats dropped significantly. Increasingly divisive political battles over the role of firearms in American society led the Democratic Party to become an advocate for gun regulation. Republicans became the party of gun rights.
Now, today’s Democrats are rediscovering guns.
A turbulent landscape
Researchers, gun merchants and owners attribute the shift to factors including rising concerns about personal safety and a volatile political climate: GOP presidential candidate and former President Donald Trump warning of “potential death and destruction” if he is charged with crimes, Democrats warning of the potential end of democracy, and two assassination plots against Trump.
Neo-Nazi groups have recently been more active nationwide, according to the Anti-Defamation League. Violent threats aren’t limited to progressives or minorities; conservative and pro-gun rallies have also been targeted.
Twenty-nine percent of Democrats or those leaning Democrat said they had a gun at home in 2022, up from a four-decade low of 22% in 2010, according to a long-running survey by NORC at the University of Chicago, a nonpartisan research organization. In 2022, 55% of Republicans had a gun in their home, up 3 percentage points since 2010, the survey of about 3,500 adults found.
In a nationally representative 2023 survey of about 3,000 people by the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Solutions, about 11% of respondents had purchased a gun since 2020. Among Democratic gun buyers since 2020, more than half were first-time owners, compared with less than a quarter of Republicans, according to researchers who analyzed the data.
And this might be the first presidential campaign where the Democratic candidates are the literal face of gun owners. Vice President and Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris surprised many during the Sept. 10 debate when she noted, “Tim Walz and I are both gun owners.” (Harris, a former prosecutor, owns a handgun, while Walz, the Democratic vice presidential nominee, is an avid hunter.) Trump, convicted of a felony, faces the prospect of losing his right to possess a gun. He is scheduled to be sentenced in November.
Democratic vice presidential nominee Tim Walz at a sporting clay course in 2018. Photo: Anthony Souffle/Star Tribune/Getty Images
Four decades ago, Democratic gun owners were typically white men, including auto or steel union workers who grew up hunting. Today’s liberal gun owners are much more diverse. Gun dealers saw the largest increase in Black Americans buying guns compared with any other racial group in 2023, according to the National Shooting Sports Foundation, an industry group. Women accounted for nearly half of new gun buyers from 2019 to 2021, according to the 2021 National Firearms Survey of 19,000 adults, designed by professors at Harvard and Northeastern universities.
Hubbert, the anthropology professor, who received a federal National Endowment for the Humanities grant last year to research liberal gun owners, found that gay and transgender gun owners worried about rising hate crimes and Jewish people feared potential violence from pro-Palestinian groups or individuals. Black gun owners shared similar anxieties, along with mistrust of police in some areas and concerns about crime.
A hidden pursuit
With guns still taboo among many on the left, some new liberal firearm owners say they don’t tell their friends—or even relatives. And they say they don’t want to join, and feel unwelcome in, gun stalwarts such as the National Rifle Association, or online message boards like AR15.com. “We have to have harbors and havens,” said Randy Miyan, who runs Liberal Gun Owners, a 5,000-member group.
In Los Angeles, Tom Nguyen, 54, founded L.A. Progressive Shooters in 2020 as a Facebook group. That year’s social unrest, pandemic and election motivated him to create a place for people to learn about firearms for protection, he said.
Now a certified firearms instructor, he trains 300 people yearly and said his beginner group classes are booked through 2025. “People were hungering for a space that was not this hyperaggressive, male-dominated, toxic gun world.”
Nguyen, who provides firearms training for 300 people a year, says he wanted to provide a place for other liberals to learn about firearm safety.
Philip Cheung for WSJ
Alejandra Mendez, 32, said she decided to take gun classes with Nguyen in 2019 after moving to a new neighborhood. Mendez, who is married to a woman, worries about antigay violence, and crime in general, she said.
She had initial trepidation about visiting gun ranges dominated by mostly older, white men, but found most people there welcoming. Today Mendez, a healthcare worker, owns four guns—three handguns and an AR-15—and completed training for a concealed-carry permit.
Most criticism, she said, comes from some progressives asking why she would ever own a gun. She finds it hypocritical that those critics assert their constitutional right to free speech, but reject the constitutional right to own firearms.
“I don’t understand that rhetoric of ‘protect my right’ and not protect the rights of other people,” she said.
Black gun groups, spanning the political spectrum, are thriving.
A firearm training class in Upper Marlboro, Md. Photo: andrew caballero-reynolds/AFP/Getty Images
The nonpartisan National African American Gun Association has grown to about 48,000 members since launching in 2015. Founder Philip Smith said police incidents and clashes between white nationalists and their opponents in Charlottesville, Va., boosted membership.
Yet Smith, 65, said he has had “heated arguments” in the Black community, where leaders and pastors argue that guns harm their communities.
“They believe the devil’s hand is in all this,” he said. “I respect that. But you have to respect my view as well.”
Jason Carter, 49, who spoke at this year’s Democratic convention, hunts and uses firearms, in the tradition of his grandfather, former President Jimmy Carter. He hopes the influx of diverse gun owners might break America’s calcified gun debate.
“There are more people saying, ‘Let’s look for middle ground,” said Carter, a lawyer and former Georgia state senator. “Let’s work to respect Second Amendment rights, but let’s figure out ways to make us safer.”
Ciemnoczolowski said he mostly talks about guns with other progressive gun owners. Photo: Danny Wilcox Frazier/VII for WSJ
A pile of casings at a shooting range. Photo: Reed Mattison for WSJ
Ciemnoczolowski, in Iowa, said he mostly talks about guns with other liberal or progressive gun owners, many of whom welcome gun restrictions. He sees no reason to own a military-style, semiautomatic rifle like the AR-15, and supports universal background checks.
But the country’s sharp partisan divide renders compromise on guns extremely unlikely, he believes.
He visits the range to practice with his Springfield 1911, arriving early, he said, “before the yahoos show up.”
His $600 handgun serves one chief purpose: “Personal safety.”
Write to Cameron McWhirter at Cameron.McWhirter@wsj.com and Zusha Elinson at zusha.elinson@wsj.com
12. Taiwan questions two in probe into Hezbollah pager blasts
Taiwan questions two in probe into Hezbollah pager blasts
20 Sep 2024 02:15PM
channelnewsasia.com
TAIPEI: Two people from Taiwan companies were questioned as part of a probe into pagers that exploded while being used by Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon, investigators said on Friday (Sep 20), as top officials insisted the devices were not from the island.
Questions and speculation have swirled over where the devices came from and how they were supplied to the militant group after hundreds of pagers and walkie-talkies detonated across Lebanon on Tuesday and Wednesday, killing at least 37 people and wounding nearly 3,000.
The New York Times reported this week that Israel had inserted explosive material into a shipment of pagers from Taiwan's Gold Apollo, citing American and other anonymous officials.
But Gold Apollo head Hsu Ching-kuang denied producing the devices, pointing the finger instead at Hungary-based partner BAC Consulting KFT, which Gold Apollo had allowed to use its trademark.
Local media reported that the second person questioned was Wu Yu-jen, a representative connected to BAC Consulting KFT, who had set up a company based in Taipei called "Apollo Systems".
"Our country takes the case very seriously," said the prosecutors' office in Taipei's Shilin district in a statement on Friday.
"We instructed the Investigation Bureau's national security station to further interview two people from Taiwanese companies as witnesses yesterday."
The two witnesses were allowed to leave after multiple rounds of questioning.
"We will clarify the facts as soon as possible such as whether Taiwanese companies are involved or not," the office said.
It also said investigators had searched four locations, including in New Taipei City's Xizhi district, where Gold Apollo is located, and in Taipei's Neihu district.
Neihu district is the listed address of Apollo Systems, according to a company registry website, which showed that the firm was established in April this year.
Wu did not speak to reporters when she was brought in for questioning Thursday, according to local TV footage.
Economic Minister Kuo Jyh-huei told reporters Friday that Gold Apollo's made-in-Taiwan pagers consisted of components that were "low-end IC (integrated circuits) and batteries".
"These things would not explode," he said, adding that Gold Apollo had exported 260,000 pagers in the past two years and "there has never been an explosion".
When pressed on the pagers in Lebanon used by Hezbollah operatives, he said: "We can be certain that they are not produced in Taiwan."
Premier Cho Jung-tai also reiterated Friday that "the company and Taiwan did not directly export pagers to Lebanon".
Earlier this week, Gold Apollo said the pager model mentioned in media reports "is produced and sold by BAC".
But a Hungarian government spokesman said BAC Consulting KFT was "a trading intermediary, with no manufacturing or operational site in Hungary".
Source: AFP/nc
channelnewsasia.com
13. Secret Service seeks funding boost to address dangerous ‘new reality’
If given more resources for personnel could the Secret Service increase in size? What is recruiting like for the Secret Service? Can they find sufficient volunteers? How does Secret Service recruiting compare to military recruiting?
Excerpt:
“We are running our people at levels that we have not seen in our protective operations,” Rowe said this week. “We are burning everything hot right now.”
The agency operates with a $3 billion yearly budget and more than 7,000 employees, including the elite protective details.
...
The agency’s strain remains similar to 10 years ago — more than 40 people it must protect, caps on hiring and budget, high attrition, and staff forced to work excessive overtime. “The agents themselves have done an extraordinary job” given the limited resources, he said. “They’ve been under a lot of pressure for a long time.
Secret Service seeks funding boost to address dangerous ‘new reality’
Acting Secret Service director Ronald L. Rowe Jr. is urging Congress to invest in the agency after two apparent assassination attempts against former president Donald Trump.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/09/19/secret-service-acting-director-ronald-rowe-jr/
Ronald L. Rowe Jr., the acting director of the Secret Service, speaks during a news conference, at the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office in West Palm Beach, Fla., on Monday. (Wilfredo Lee/AP)
By Maria Sacchetti, Carol D. Leonnig, Jacqueline Alemany and Josh Dawsey
September 19, 2024 at 8:03 p.m. EDT
Acting Secret Service director Ronald L. Rowe Jr. is urging Congress to heavily invest in the protective agency after two apparent assassination attempts against former president Donald Trump, saying the service must confront its shortcomings and better position itself to handle a dangerous “new reality.”
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Rowe, in a wide-ranging interview with The Post, said the guardians of U.S. presidents, former presidents and other top officials are desperate for more counter-snipers and investigators, upgraded armored limousines for motorcades, and a greater supply of ballistic glass.
He said that the agency’s aging Maryland training center lacks studios to train agents for real-world attacks and that agents are working more hours in a state of hypervigilance than anyone should.
“We are running our people at levels that we have not seen in our protective operations,” Rowe said this week. “We are burning everything hot right now.”
The agency operates with a $3 billion yearly budget and more than 7,000 employees, including the elite protective details.
Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said in a separate interview that the Secret Service is asking Congress for a “significant” budget increase for staff, transportation and technology, though he and Rowe separately declined to provide specific numbers. The agency is part of DHS.
The acting director’s ambitions are colliding with skeptical members of Congress who have watched with growing alarm as solo gunmen appear to have targeted the Republican nominee for president twice in a 10-week span.
On July 13, an armed man scaled an unsecured roof and fired multiple shots at a Trump campaign rally in Butler, Pa., killing an attendee and injuring Trump and others in the crowd.
On Sunday, a Secret Service agent spotted an armed man on the perimeter of the Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach and opened fire. No one was injured, and the suspect was taken into custody.
The July attack was the first direct hit on a U.S. leader since the 1981 shooting of President Ronald Reagan (R) in Washington. Secret Service Director Kimberly Cheatle resigned days after the Butler shooting, after bipartisan complaints that she failed to provide sufficient protection to Trump or answer lawmakers’ questions about the security breach. The Secret Service plans to give an update Friday on its investigation of the incident.
Rowe, a 25-year agency veteran who became acting director on July 23, is attempting to expand the service amid multiple investigations into the suspected attempts on Trump’s life and complaints that the agency has failed to implement policy recommendations as far back as the Bush and Obama administrations.
The agency has suffered multiple security lapses, including an embarrassing incident in September 2014 when a man carrying a knife jumped the perimeter fence around the White House and entered through the front door.
Rowe has received cautious praise from lawmakers for his candor at congressional hearings and for his impassioned defense of agents who risk their lives to guard more than 40 top U.S. and foreign officials and their families.
The day after being named acting director, Rowe visited the Pennsylvania scene and has stated publicly that the security breach was not due to budget limitations but to a “failure of imagination” to properly prepare for and prevent the threat.
But, he said, the agency has insufficient resources to run at its breakneck pace in its “new norm” — a rapidly rising number of violent threats against the country’s political leaders.
On Sept. 5, Rowe wrote members of the Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Committee that the agency’s protection details needed a dramatic upgrade and an influx of cash, making him the first agency head in decades to publicly admit the protective details had shortcomings.
The last time a Secret Service leader was so clear about the agency’s vulnerabilities was when Director James Rowley demanded more agents and an overhaul in training in 1963, after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The agency’s Maryland training center is named in his honor.
Rowe said in the Post interview that the Secret Service is guarding against an increasing array of unpredictable threats, from foreign adversaries and domestic extremists to lone wolves with access to weapons in a politically polarized nation.
Since taking the leadership role, he added an applied-technology division to research and leverage the best technologies, including from the Defense Department.
But Rowe said he must add many more law enforcement agents and officers to the rolls to properly safeguard all the leaders under the Secret Service’s protection.
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“You can have all the whiz-bang technology,” he said. “But at the end of the day, it comes down to people doing their jobs.”
He said the Secret Service is on schedule to hire 400 agents by the end of this year, rebutting claims that the agency is lagging in replacing those who resign or retire.
But, he said, “I can’t work them to death.”
After the golf course incident, Trump and his team have said they want more agents and protection, though Rowe said Trump already has one of the highest levels of detail the agency can provide.
Joe Hagin, who served on a bipartisan blue-ribbon panel that recommended numerous Secret Service reforms following several security failures during the Obama administration, said he was disappointed that many of the recommendations did not bring change.
The agency’s strain remains similar to 10 years ago — more than 40 people it must protect, caps on hiring and budget, high attrition, and staff forced to work excessive overtime. “The agents themselves have done an extraordinary job” given the limited resources, he said. “They’ve been under a lot of pressure for a long time.
While President Joe Biden and Senate leaders have expressed support for increasing the agency’s budget, many remain worried that management also needs an overhaul.
“They are saying Trump is getting the highest level of protection?” Rep. Jared Moskowitz, a Democrat from Florida, said Monday on CNN. “Well, if this is the highest level, then we need to see several higher levels that they need to create for the level of protection.”
Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), who received the service’s protection in 2016 when he was presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s pick for vice president, weighed in during a Spanish-language news conference Wednesday. “We’re going to have the debate over resources. That’s easy. We’re going to increase the service’s resources,” he said. “But we need to work more to understand if it’s necessary to change the direction of the agency.”
Current and former colleagues say Rowe, 52, is the right person to lead the agency, a straight-talking, towering figure with a buzz cut who guarded president George W. Bush during his second term, after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
“He is very well suited for this moment,” Mayorkas said in an interview. “He is unflappable and decisive and commanding.”
“If you say to yourself what does a Secret Service agent look like, he’s the prototype,” said Palm Beach County Sheriff Ric Bradshaw, who was the police chief of the West Palm Beach Police Department when Rowe served there. Bradshaw works often with the Secret Service now to protect Trump when he is in town.
Rowe was a 9-year-old growing up in Maryland when he attended Reagan’s inauguration parade and remembered Reagan being wounded by a gunman near the White House weeks later. That episode inspired him to join the agency years later, friends and colleagues said.
In the interview, he compared the changes the Secret Service put in place after the 1981 assassination attempt with his effort to help the agency evolve to meet a new threat level.
Rowe joined the agency in 1999 after serving four years as a police officer in West Palm Beach, where he won commendations for saving lives and served on highly trained teams combating drug dealers during the crack epidemic.
As a police officer in September 1997, Rowe disarmed a man with a gun who showed up at a hospital emergency room demanding drugs. Rowe, who was at close range, could have shot him, said Tony Spatara, the assistant police chief in West Palm Beach who worked with Rowe. Instead, Rowe grabbed the gun and subdued him, he said.
Spatara said that and other incidents illustrate that Rowe understands viscerally what agents need: staff, equipment and, most importantly, training.
“He knows what it takes to put yourself literally in the line of danger on a daily basis,” Spatara said.
In the interview, Rowe said he is hoping to build an agency that will be prepared for years beyond the November elections. He is planning for Inauguration Day. For the 2028 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. For future international gatherings and still unknown threats.
“It’s easy to say, well, the Secret Service has mismanaged or that the Secret Service has not done a great job. That may be the case and look, if that’s the perception of [Congress] members, I respect that,” he said. “This isn’t just about getting us through November 5.
“This is about setting the Secret Service up for success and sustaining them with the capabilities and resources they need for future years.”
Mariana Alfaro and Liz Goodwin contributed to this report.
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By Maria Sacchetti, Carol D. Leonnig, Jacqueline Alemany and Josh Dawsey
14. Hezbollah’s Pagers and Walkie-Talkies Explode. Now What?
Reinforce success. Sustain a follow-up psychological operations campaign to undermine Hezbollah legitimacy and create internal dissent and discord.
An interesting excerpt:
MM: Last year I was up in northern Israel and I went into one of these tunnels that had been discovered. I don’t think people understand when talking about Gaza or Lebanon. The Israelis can do some amazing stuff and blow things up in your pocket, but their enemies are really sophisticated too in this way. These aren’t easy wars to win.
DF: No, they aren’t. God, I went into a Hezbollah bunker about 10 years ago, and it had been abandoned after the 2006 war. It was about a half mile from the Israeli border. And the Hezbollah guy gave me the GPS coordinates and said, “Just go here, you’ll find it. Go inside and take a look at it.” I went there using coordinates and stood on top of the bunker. I couldn’t find it, it was so well hidden. It took me 20 minutes to find the door. When I did, I went inside and it was just extraordinary. It was 300 feet under the rock, going straight down. There was an elevator shaft, there were beds, there were storehouses, there was a cafeteria. It was an underground city and it was a half mile from the Israeli border. And I don’t think they knew it was there. That was just one. I think there’s many of those. It’s really terrifying. Look at Hamas. It’s like, where’d all that money go that the Qataris gave them? It went to the tunnel network. And I think the same is true for Hezbollah. They’re incredibly committed, to a frightening degree. This is where they spend their money and their energy.
Hezbollah’s Pagers and Walkie-Talkies Explode. Now What?
Dexter Filkins, who covered wars in the Middle East for decades, weighs in on Hezbollah, Iran, and what America should do about the brewing conflicts in the region.
By The Free Press
September 19, 2024
https://www.thefp.com/p/hezbollahs-pagers-and-walkie-talkies
Yesterday, hundreds of pagers in Lebanon and Syria began exploding at the same time. Lebanon’s health minister said Tuesday that at least nine people have been killed and 2,800 were injured. The tiny country’s hospitals were overwhelmed with patients suffering from burn wounds, blown-up hands, and groin injuries. The pagers belonged to members of the Iran-backed terrorist group Hezbollah.
Then, today, less than 24 hours later, there was a second wave of simultaneous explosions in Lebanon: This time it wasn’t only pagers, but also walkie-talkies, all belonging to Hezbollah terrorists.
It was the stuff of spy movies—a sophisticated and precise operation unlike anything we’ve seen before. And while Israel has not officially taken responsibility, this kind of imaginative sabotage has Mossad written all over it. Hezbollah has vowed to retaliate against Israel.
The pager attacks come after almost a year of Hezbollah firing rockets into northern Israel. Since October 7, the constant barrage of attacks has forced some 70,000 Israelis to flee their homes on Israel’s northern border. Nearly a year later, they still cannot return.
Today on Honestly, Michael Moynihan sat down with Dexter Filkins, a journalist and Pulitzer Prize finalist, to talk about the ongoing “shadow war” between Israel and Iran’s proxies across the region. Dexter has been covering wars in the Middle East for decades for The New York Times and The New Yorker, and has been called “the premier combat journalist of his generation.”
To listen to the conversation, click below, or scroll down for an edited transcript:
On the “Shadow War” with Iranian proxies:
Michael Moynihan: Given Israel’s targeted attacks on Hezbollah over the past few days, are we looking at what’s going to become a hot war like we saw in 2006 or in the early ’80s?
Dexter Filkins: I don’t think either side wants a war. They’ve been very clear about that. Israelis don’t want it, and Hezbollah doesn’t want it. Hezbollah knows Lebanon would be destroyed in any kind of war like this. So they don’t want a war, but here we are. In that way, it feels like 1914. Nobody wants to go to war, but everybody’s getting closer and closer to the edge. As one side or the other ticks up the intensity of the firing, we just get closer to a full-on shooting match, which would be, I think it’s fair to say, apocalyptic for both countries.
MM: This is effectively a proxy war with Iran like the war in Gaza is, but it has a lot of local elements too. Hezbollah is essentially a creation of Iran, isn’t it?
DF: It really is. I think the best way to imagine Hezbollah is that it’s an Iranian aircraft carrier sitting off the coast of Israel. It’s created by Iran in the 1980s, paid for, trained, armed, equipped, directed, everything. When I was in Lebanon and I spent some time with guys in Hezbollah, they were completely clear about that. One of them, a senior commander in the field, said to me, “Iran controls every bullet we have.” He’d been to Iran several times. So that’s the best way to look at it, but you can see that when you look at it that way, it makes things much more complicated and much more dangerous.
MM: Why is there no direct engagement by Iran with Israel?
DF: We finally got that in April with the missiles. But, first of all, they’re far away from each other. And I think there is a respect on each side for how terrible a conflict like that would be, and I think they’re both trying to avoid it. What you have instead is this kind of shadow war. On the Iranian side, it’s Hezbollah, it’s Hamas, it’s everything they’re building in Syria. It’s the Houthis sinking ships. On the Israeli side, it’s air strikes every day in Syria, which you don’t read about very much, but they’ve been bombing the hell out of Syria for years. You’ve got the Mossad operations inside Iran, which are often extraordinary, like the exploding pagers. That’s how this war is unfolding. I think in part, or largely, it’s because a direct engagement would be, potentially, Armageddon.
On the political situation in Lebanon:
MM: Lebanon has not had a prime minister since 2022. It’s a dysfunctional state in a lot of ways. How much influence does Hezbollah have in the country as a whole rather than just some areas in the south that they control? If you take a look at Lebanon and its confessional groups, you have Christians, Druze, and different denominations of Islam. Hezbollah is just one faction here.
DF: The reason why Lebanon doesn’t have a president is because Hezbollah wants a particular person and the rest of the country doesn’t want it, so they’ve thrown sand in the gears of the whole thing. Hezbollah is such a strange entity because it’s basically a giant militia that’s separate from the state, but it’s more powerful than the state. And over time, they’ve taken over the state. Now they have members of parliament, they have ministers in the government. It’s this thing that began as a private army, and increasingly it has taken over. It’s very strange, nothing like it in the world.
MM: In your piece about your trip to Lebanon, you discuss going from one village to the next, and you have a village of Christians who say, “We have to leave because Hezbollah comes and sets up Katyusha rocket batteries, and then the Israelis respond here.” Those Christians intimated to you that they sometimes want Israel to succeed, right?
DF: Yeah, it was very strange. Lebanon’s a very divided country and the main groups are the Shi’ite Muslims who make up Hezbollah, but then you have a very large population of Christians who are very uncomfortable with Hezbollah. I think their feeling is, “My God, you’re going to drag us into another war. You’re going to get the country destroyed like you did in 2006.” It’s dangerous to say that out loud, but I think that’s a pretty good summation of how many of them feel. I was at a dinner party in Beirut. There were a lot of Lebanese Christians there, and one of them said, in an unguarded moment, “You know, if the Israelis came in here and just hammered Hezbollah, I think a lot of the country would cheer.”
MM: Americans are often very confused by the goings-on in the Middle East, as one could imagine. For example, in Syria, Hezbollah is fighting members of various Palestinian groups, whether it’s Islamic Jihad or Hamas. But now, in the war in Gaza, they’re on the same side. It’s just baffling to see how everyone will line up together to fight Israel but if left to their own devices, they’ll probably kill each other.
DF: It’s true. It’s like pickup basketball until the Israelis show up. I was talking to this Hezbollah commander in southern Lebanon, and he said, “Look, we’re kind of doing this because the Iranians want us to do it.” He had a big scar. He said, “I fought in Syria. And we fought against Hamas. We killed Hamas guys, they killed our guys.” He’s like, “And here we are.” He seemed almost as confused as I was.
On Hezbollah’s investment in tunnels:
MM: Last year I was up in northern Israel and I went into one of these tunnels that had been discovered. I don’t think people understand when talking about Gaza or Lebanon. The Israelis can do some amazing stuff and blow things up in your pocket, but their enemies are really sophisticated too in this way. These aren’t easy wars to win.
DF: No, they aren’t. God, I went into a Hezbollah bunker about 10 years ago, and it had been abandoned after the 2006 war. It was about a half mile from the Israeli border. And the Hezbollah guy gave me the GPS coordinates and said, “Just go here, you’ll find it. Go inside and take a look at it.” I went there using coordinates and stood on top of the bunker. I couldn’t find it, it was so well hidden. It took me 20 minutes to find the door. When I did, I went inside and it was just extraordinary. It was 300 feet under the rock, going straight down. There was an elevator shaft, there were beds, there were storehouses, there was a cafeteria. It was an underground city and it was a half mile from the Israeli border. And I don’t think they knew it was there. That was just one. I think there’s many of those. It’s really terrifying. Look at Hamas. It’s like, where’d all that money go that the Qataris gave them? It went to the tunnel network. And I think the same is true for Hezbollah. They’re incredibly committed, to a frightening degree. This is where they spend their money and their energy.
On the Iran nuclear deal:
DF: When the sanctions on Iran were lifted by the Biden administration over the nuclear agreement, that just freed up enormous amounts of money for the Iranian regime to kind of more easily fund its proxies. And so they were able to kind of—they all got a big shot in the arm—that actually during—and I’m not trying to make a campaign speech for President Trump—but during the Trump years and the period of maximum pressure. . . . This former intelligence official told me yesterday—you know Hezbollah guys weren’t getting paid—you know they were like, maybe they weren’t running out of money but they were hurting! And so I think as long as the Iranians have lots of cash—and as long as they’re selling oil—and God knows they’re selling all their oil to China now—that’s where it’s all going—they’re going to keep funding this stuff.
MM: The JCPOA—the Iran nuclear deal—which was finalized in 2015 under the Obama administration—we know that there was an infusion of cash. Were there any benefits—the upsides—that the Americans saw at the time retarding the advancement of the nuclear program?
DF: I think they’ve enriched it to 60 percent purity—enough uranium to make—you know—like three bombs—I think is my understanding—but you need to go to 90 percent purity to make the bomb! And I think that doesn’t take very long. And then you’ve got to weaponize the device. I think it’s just a question of whether they decide to do it now. And once they decide to do it—I think they can move pretty quickly. The breakout time used to be estimated at something like six months—I don’t know that it’s six months anymore. I mean—I think increasingly people are saying that the United States might not even know if the Iranians weaponize a nuclear device. So I think it’s free sailing right now for them.
On Hezbollah fighters:
MM: You talked to a commander about one of his friends that had been killed by an Israeli strike and he said something like “There’s a million martyrs to take his place.” Is that bluster? Or, if it’s true, is this the best policy from Israel?
DF: That’s the most interesting thing to me. Hezbollah, to me, is really a scary organization. I went to a Hezbollah funeral once. There are 12-year-old members of Hezbollah. I think it’s fair to say it resembles a religious cult. You’re in it for life, and they get you when they’re young, and they indoctrinate you. It’s the only thing they know, so I think when the Israelis kill a member of the Hezbollah leadership, it’s true, the next guy’s ready, and he steps right up right away. The organization can continue and carry on. So, it’s a professional army, but when your senior leadership starts to thin out in the way that Hezbollah’s is, I think it’s degrading them pretty seriously. I think we’re going to see signs of it because the Israeli campaign has been very precise as far as I can tell and extremely ruthless.
I met with the Hezbollah leadership. I met the number two, Nasrallah’s deputy. They’re pretty rational and they’re pretty reasonable and they’re pretty clear about saying, “Look, we don’t want a war. We hope this stays controlled.” But then I met the rank and file guys, the second- or third-tier leaders, and they want to fight. That’s like what they’re trained in their whole lives for. I said to one of the guys, as we’re standing a mile from the Israeli border: “Are you prepared to pack up? To avoid war, are you prepared to pack up and take your stuff and move back 10 miles?” He laughed. He said, “There’s only one direction I’m going in and it’s that way,” and he pointed to Israel. They want to go in.
On why the U.S. cannot realistically pull out of Middle East conflicts:
MM: You were on the ground in Iraq for four years or so. People tend to forget or want to forget about it now, but the effect the Iraq War had on the Middle East policy is still reverberating.
DF: If you remember, President Obama was all about the pivot to Asia. It was about ending the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, then dealing with trade in the Pacific, and dealing more with the main enemy, which is China. Which was smart. That’s clearly what should be the grand strategy of the United States. But the trouble with the Middle East is that it has a vote too, and the Middle East always drags us back in. Whether it’s because of oil or because of Israel or because of a terrorist attack or because of the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons, it always pulls us back in. That’s where we are today. We don’t have American soldiers on the ground there, but God knows we’re sending loads and loads of weapons and money to Israel to help them. That’s the thing; you can’t get away. You can’t pull yourself away from it.
MM: The dominant strain right now on the Republican Party seems to be like a 1950s, ’40s Taftian vision of keeping out of everybody’s business. Let’s stay home. Rand Paul is now normative. The Tucker Carlsons of the world—totally normal. Of course you’ve always had that on the sort of left wing of the Democratic Party. But: Can you get into the White House and say we need to totally, fully disengage from the Middle East? And if you were to do that, what would the consequences be?
DF: I think you stated it correctly. There’s an increasing trend in both parties to just wash our hands, not just the Middle East, but the whole world. To paraphrase our friend Trotsky, you may not be interested in the Middle East, but the Middle East is interested in you. We have tried for years to get out of the Middle East, and we have found ourselves incapable of doing it. It’s hard for me to look at the region right now. It’s imploding. I think it absolutely can get worse, and it will get worse if we walk away from it. That’s just a fact of life that we have to live with.
MM: I mean, that was the Obama administration’s desire—to wind this stuff down, to have the JCPOA and Iran deal and everything will be fine.
DF: And he woke up one morning and he was sending hundreds of American troops back to Iraq.
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15. Hack of Hezbollah devices exposes dark corners of Asia supply chains
This is a supply chain issue. The sophistication of this operation is pretty incredible. Could this only be conducted by a state actor? Is any other state as capable (and as bold) as Israel?
Hack of Hezbollah devices exposes dark corners of Asia supply chains
By Tim Kelly, Casey Hall and Ben Blanchard
September 20, 20246:57 AM EDTUpdated 5 min ago
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/hack-hezbollah-devices-exposes-dark-corners-asia-supply-chains-2024-09-20/?utm
Companies
TOKYO/SHANGHAI/TAIPEI, Sept 20 (Reuters) - The lethal hack of Hezbollah's Asian-branded pagers and walkie-talkies has sparked an intense search for the devices' path, revealing a murky market for older technologies where buyers may have few assurances about what they are getting.
While supply chains and distribution channels for higher-margin and newer products are tightly managed, that's not the case for older electronics from Asia where counterfeiting, surplus inventories and complex contract manufacturing deals can sometimes make it impossible to identify the source of a product, analysts and consultants say.
The response from the companies at the centre of the booby-trapped gadgets that killed 37 people and wounded about 3,000 in Lebanon this week has underlined difficulties in discerning how and when they were weaponised.
Taiwan-based Gold Apollo put the blame on a Europe-based licensee of its pager, sparking investigations in Hungary, Bulgaria, Norway and Romania into the origins of the deadly device. Japan's Icom (6820.T), opens new tab said it could not tell if the walkie-talkies bearing its name were real, in a market awash with fake products.
"If the supply chain was compromised to put explosives inside ... it's incredible engineering to do that. But the actual supply chain compromise is not that hard. Probably the easiest part was the supply chain compromise," said David Fincher, a China-based technologist and consultant.
He said counterfeit products are prevalent, especially in big manufacturing centres like China where fake components can be easily produced, adding that it isn't a big leap to go from fake components to supply chain compromise.
"As the technologist I am, I can tell you getting a little explosive in a radio is not that hard."
Hezbollah acquired the devices around five months ago, according to a security source, who added that the armed group thought it was buying the pagers from Gold Apollo.
The hand-held radios, which the source said were purchased around the same time as the pagers, had labels bearing the name of Osaka-based Icom and the phrase "Made in Japan", images of one exploded device showed.
Both companies have ruled out the possibility that any of the deadly components were made in factories in either of their home locations.
Taiwan's Economy Minister Kuo Jyh-huei has also said the components used in the pagers that detonated in Lebanon were not made in Taiwan.
A preliminary investigation by Lebanese authorities into the devices found that the explosives were implanted before they arrived in the country, according to a letter to the U.N. Security Council by Lebanon's mission to the United Nations.
FAKE GOODS
But, for now, that's about all anyone is certain of. It's not clear how or when the pagers and walkie-talkies were weaponised so they could be remotely detonated.
Joe Simone, partner with Chinese intellectual property firm East IP, said part of the problem is that smaller brands tend to invest less in policing counterfeits, due in large part to costs that could impact their profitability.
"Authorities are happy to deal with low-tech counterfeits but the IP owners need to monitor, investigate and file complaints and that doesn't always happen as much as it might for high-tech and bigger technology brands," he said.
For Icom, one problem is that it stopped making the IC-V82 model in question a decade ago, around the time it started introducing holographic stickers as a protection against counterfeit products, the company said.
The company has long warned about imitation products, especially of its older models.
In fact, more than 7% of firms in Japan reported business losses from counterfeit products in 2020, according to the latest available report by the Japan Patent Office, with around a third of cases linked to China.
Icom has urged that customers only use its official distributor network to ensure they are buying genuine products.
But in China, there are dozens of shops selling Icom-branded walkie-talkies on e-commerce platforms such as Alibaba.com, Taobao, JD.com and Pinduoduo, including in some cases the IC-V82 model, according to Reuters checks.
Among three China-based vendors of Icom products on Alibaba.com, none of which were listed as official suppliers on Icom's website, Guangzhou Minxing Communications Equipment Co and Chengdu Bingxin Technology Co Ltd both said they sell authentic products, while Quanzhou Yitian Trading Co acknowledged selling "Chinese made imitations" in addition to original products.
Icom has said it makes all its products in its factories in Japan. It did not immediately reply to a request for comment on Icom-branded products sold in Chinese online sites.
The discontinued IC-V82 model is also sold in Vietnam on e-commerce platform Shopee, a Reuters check showed, indicating wide availability of such products.
For Gold Apollo, which licensed its brand to Budapest-based BAC, the supply chain devolved into a mysterious production trail that authorities in various countries are now trying to piece together.
"The widespread availability of cheap, second-hand manufacturing equipment meant counterfeiters were increasingly able to go beyond single components and even make full-fledged products," said Diganta Das from the University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Lifecycle Engineering, who studies counterfeit electronics.
"I wouldn't call it counterfeiting anymore, it's like illegal manufacturing," Das said.
Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with the Reuters Econ World newsletter. Sign up here.
Reporting by Tim Kelly, David Dolan and John Geddie in Tokyo, Casey Hall in Shanghai, Ben Blanchard in Taipei, Francesco Guarascio in Hanoi; Writing by John Geddie; Editing by Miyoung Kim and Edmund Klamann
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab
Casey Hall
Thomson Reuters
Casey has reported on China's consumer culture from her base in Shanghai for more than a decade, covering what Chinese consumers are buying, and the broader social and economic trends driving those consumption trends. The Australian-born journalist has lived in China since 2007.
16. Microsoft deal would reopen Three Mile Island nuclear plant to power AI
We do need to return and expand nuclear power to power our economy and way of life.
Microsoft deal would reopen Three Mile Island nuclear plant to power AI
The owner of the shuttered Pennsylvania plant plans to bring it online by 2028, with the tech giant buying all the power it produces.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/09/20/microsoft-three-mile-island-nuclear-constellation/?utm
7 min
0
An employee leaves in his car from the nuclear plant on Three Mile Island in Middletown, Pennsylvania in 2019. (Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP/Getty Images)
By Evan Halper
September 20, 2024 at 7:00 a.m. EDT
Pennsylvania’s dormant Three Mile Island nuclear plant would be brought back to life to feed the voracious energy needs of Microsoft under an unprecedented deal announced Friday in which the tech giant would buy 100 percent of its power for 20 years.
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The restart of Three Mile Island, the site of the worst nuclear accident in U.S. history, would mark a bold advance in the tech industry’s quest to find enough electric power to support its boom in artificial intelligence. The plant, which Pennsylvanians thought had closed for good in 2019 amid financial strain, would come back online by 2028 under the agreement, according to plant owner Constellation Energy.
If approved by regulators, Three Mile Island would provide Microsoft with the energy equivalent it takes to power 800,000 homes, or 835 megawatts. Never before has a U.S. nuclear plant come back into service after being decommissioned, and never before has all of a single commercial nuclear power plant’s output been allocated to a single customer.
But the economics of both the power and computing industries are changing rapidly. Tech companies are scouring the nation for power that is both reliable and helps them meet their pledge to fuel AI development with zero emissions electricity — driving a nuclear power revival.
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“The energy industry cannot be the reason China or Russia beats us in AI,” said Joseph Dominguez, chief executive of Constellation. “This plant never should have been allowed to shut down, ... It will produce as much clean energy as all of the renewables [wind and solar] built in Pennsylvania over the last 30 years.”
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The four-year restart plan would cost Constellation about $1.6 billion, he said, and is dependent on federal subsidies in the form of tax breaks earmarked for nuclear power in the 2022 Inflation Recovery Act.
Constellation will also need to clear steep regulatory hurdles, including intensive safety inspections from the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which has never before authorized the reopening of a plant. The deal also raises thorny questions about the federal tax breaks, as the energy from the plant would all be produced for a single private company rather than a utility serving entire communities.
A partial reactor meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979 sent the nation into a panic and the nuclear industry reeling. The unit that Constellation plans to fire back up sits adjacent to the one that malfunctioned 45 years ago.
Constellation and Microsoft conceived the novel deal to solve a deepening energy problem. The sprawling data centers Microsoft and other digital giants need have become so big and energy-intensive that they are straining existing power supplies across the nation.
Constellation disclosed months ago that it was exploring options for restarting Three Mile Island, which sits along the Susquehanna River. The news was met with mixed reactions. Nuclear safety advocates expressed alarm. But some community leaders welcomed the development, seeing potential to revive an economic anchor in a region beset with financial hardship. A study funded by the Pennsylvania Building & Construction Trades Council says a reopening would create 3,400 jobs at the plant and in businesses serving it and its workers, and generate $3 billion in state and federal taxes.
The tax breaks in the Inflation Reduction Act are crucial to making the deal economically feasible, according to Constellation. They provide a credit for every megawatt hour of nuclear energy produced.
Constellation declined to provide details about its contract with Microsoft or disclose the value of tax credits. Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm has said in the past that federal subsidies could cut the cost of bringing a new plant on line by as much as half.
The announcement of the Microsoft deal follows an agreement Amazon reached with Talen Energy to purchase power produced by the financially troubled Susquehanna nuclear plant for a planned data center campus in Pennsylvania. That arrangement is running into snags with regulators, as regional utilities express concern that their ratepayers will be saddled with the bill for the power grid updates needed.
Amazon’s plan also raised concerns among clean-energy advocates that tech companies are shifting from driving the transition to clean energy to elbowing others out of it by claiming such large amounts of available clean electricity for themselves.
Dominguez argues that the Three Mile Island case is an example of how Silicon Valley’s outside-the-box thinking will help stabilize the power grid for everyone. The power from the plant will not go directly to Microsoft facilities but into the overtaxed regional power grid that serves 65 million people across 13 states and the District of Columbia, called the PJM Interconnection.
Nuclear power is considered “clean” because unlike burning natural gas or coal to produce electricity, it does not create greenhouse gas emissions. The plants are expensive to build or restart, and industry still has no long-term solution for spent but highly radioactive uranium fuel rods.
“This agreement is a major milestone in Microsoft’s efforts to help decarbonize the grid in support of our commitment to become carbon negative,” said a statement from Bobby Hollis, vice president of energy at Microsoft.
Dominguez said other ratepayers on the PJM grid will not be expected to shoulder any of the costs, nor will Constellation be seeking special subsidies from the state of Pennsylvania.
Constellation has already been doing extensive testing at Three Mile Island. It says most of its components are ready to operate again. “The plant is in extraordinary shape,” Dominguez said.
Three Mile Island is not the only nuclear plant the industry is eager to revive. The owners of a plant in Western Michigan called Palisades are also working to bring that dormant facility back. That project was approved for a $1.5 billion federal loan guarantee. The plant owner, Holtec, says it hopes to feed nuclear energy from Palisades into the region’s power grid by late next year.
The Palisades effort came about at the urging of Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmore (D), as her state struggles to both meet its climate goals and generate adequate energy. The plant was destined for permanent closure when Holtec acquired it in 2022. The company had planned to decommission the facility but changed course after conversations with the governor.
On Wednesday, though, that plan was dealt a setback when federal nuclear regulators disclosed “a large number of steam generator tubes” could be faulty and need further inspection. Holtec said the finding does not alter its plans. But some nuclear safety advocates argue the company’s push to quickly reopen the plant puts the public at risk.
The huge cost and regulatory headaches associated with nuclear power are not deterring the tech industry from betting on it. In a remarkable turn of fortune for an industry that just a few years ago was struggling to stay competitive and focused mostly on closing plants, it now finds itself in expansion mode. Beyond seeking contracts for power from existing plants, tech companies are also bullish on next generation nuclear technologies.
Several are investigating the potential of locating their facilities near small modular nuclear reactors that could feed them power directly. Such technology is in its infancy and has not yet been approved by regulators. That isn’t stopping a company chaired by Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates from doubling down on it. The firm, called Terra Power, this year began construction at what it plans to be a small reactor site in site in Wyoming.
Microsoft is also pursuing power from nuclear fusion, a potentially abundant, cheap and clean form of electricity that scientists have been trying to develop for decades — and most say is still a decade or more away from generating electricity. Microsoft has signed a contract to purchase fusion energy from a start-up that claims it can deliver it by 2028.
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By Evan Halper
Evan Halper is a business reporter for The Washington Post, covering the energy transition. His work focuses on the tensions between energy demands and decarbonizing the economy. He came to The Post from the Los Angeles Times, where he spent two decades, most recently covering domestic policy and presidential politics from its Washington bureau.follow on X @evanhalper
17. A New Era in Sabotage: Turning Ordinary Devices Into Grenades, on a Mass Scale
Does this mean the genie is out of the bottle? Will men stop carrying their devices in their front pockets?
Excerpts:
There is reason to fear where this attack on Hezbollah fighters might go next. The history of such sabotage is that once a new threshold is crossed, it becomes available to everyone.
...
Before the Chinese intelligence services wormed into America’s power grid, Russia did the same — and, to deter Moscow, the United States planted code in the Russian grid.
The early evidence, however, suggests that such techniques can bring about a tactical advantage but few strategic effects. Even the American-Israeli cyberattacks on the centrifuges in Iran — a highly classified, expensive operation code-named “Olympic Games” — set the Iranian program back by only a year or 18 months. Eventually it drove the program farther underground.
But attacks like the one on the centrifuges, or on power grids, are directed at big infrastructure, not hand-held devices. And so the attacks in Lebanon may herald a new wrinkle in such sabotage, made to infect hand-held devices.
“Certainly, if Chinese or Russian intelligence could overheat electronic devices to cause fires, it might help keep defenders reeling in the early phases of a crisis,” Mr. Healey said. “But that seems a touch far-fetched, as there have been more than enough examples of going for physical destruction of electrical grids, for example.”
A New Era in Sabotage: Turning Ordinary Devices Into Grenades, on a Mass Scale
The attacks in Lebanon required getting deep into the supply chain, which is difficult to do. But the sabotage contributes to a sense of vulnerability that ordinary devices can become a source of danger.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/19/us/politics/israel-hezbollah-pager-attacks.html
A portable radio with the battery removed during a funeral in Beirut, Lebanon, on Wednesday. The presumed Israeli sabotage of wireless devices used by Hezbollah turned ordinary communication devices into miniature grenades.Credit...Anwar Amro/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
By David E. Sanger
David E. Sanger has covered superpower conflict and cyberconflict for decades. He is the author of the 2018 book “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age.”
Sept. 19, 2024
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When Israel and the United States joined forces 15 years ago to execute the defining cyberattack of a new age of conflict — a deviously ingenious effort to inject malicious code into Iran’s nuclear enrichment plants, sending them spinning out of control — the operation was reviewed by lawyers and policymakers to minimize the risk to ordinary civilians.
They decided to go ahead because the targeted equipment was deep underground. President Barack Obama was assured that the effects could be strictly contained. Even so, there were surprises: The secret computer code got out, and other actors amended the malware and turned it against a variety of targets.
Now, the presumed Israeli sabotage of hundreds or thousands of pagers, walkie-talkies and other wireless devices used by Hezbollah has taken the murky art of electronic sabotage to new and frightening heights. This time the targeted devices were kept in trouser pockets, on belts, in the kitchen. Ordinary communication devices were turned into miniature grenades.
And while the target was Hezbollah fighters, the victims were anyone standing around, including children. Lebanese authorities say 11 people died and more than 2,700 were injured in Tuesday’s attack. On Wednesday, at least 20 more people were killed and 450 injured in a second round of attacks with exploding walkie-talkies.
There is reason to fear where this attack on Hezbollah fighters might go next. The history of such sabotage is that once a new threshold is crossed, it becomes available to everyone.
Of course, there is nothing new about sabotaging phones or planting bombs: Terrorists and spy agencies have done that for decades. What made this different was the mass scale, the implantation of explosives on so many devices at once. Such subterfuge is difficult to pull off, because it requires getting deep into the supply chain. And that, in a way, is the best reason for people not to be afraid of their internet-connected refrigerators and computers.
But our sense of vulnerability about how everyday implements connected to the internet can become deadly weapons may be just beginning.
Image
A funeral in Beirut on Wednesday for people killed by the exploding devices.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times
“This might well be the first and frightening glimpse of a world in which ultimately no electronic device, from our cellphones to thermostats, can ever be fully trusted,” Glenn Gerstell, the general counsel of the National Security Agency for five critical years as the cyberwars heated up, said on Wednesday.
“We’ve already seen Russia and North Korea unleash cyberweapons over which they had no control, which indiscriminately damaged random computers around the globe,” he said. “Could other personal and household devices be next?”
If Mr. Gerstell is right, it raises the question of whether these attacks, widely attributed to Israel’s intelligence services, were worth the price in our shared sense of vulnerability. The explosions had little strategic purpose. As one Western diplomat with long experience dealing with the Middle East said, they were hardly about to force Hezbollah’s leaders to give up a cause they have battled over for four decades.
Updated Sept. 20, 2024, 7:22 a.m. ET7 minutes ago
The chief effect is psychological. Just as pervasive surveillance makes people question who might have access to the phones that now contain details, treasures and secrets of one’s life — pictures, text messages, credit card numbers — the sabotage makes everyone fearful that ordinary devices can become an instant source of injury or death. It gnaws at the psyche.
It also disrupts communications, which led to speculation that the attacks could be the opening act in a broader Israeli offensive. Israel’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, said just before the explosions began to resonate across Lebanon that a “new phase” of military action had begun, moving away from Gaza and to the north. Making Hezbollah fighters and leaders terrified of picking up their wireless devices would provide a tremendous, if temporary, advantage. Yet so far, that broader attack has not materialized.
Still, it is unclear how much cyberrelated ingenuity, if any, was involved in the deadly explosions. The pagers, which Hezbollah turned to because of fear that Israel had cracked its cellphones, seemed attractive to the terrorist group precisely because they were low-tech and did not operate via vulnerable cellphone networks and the internet.
Theories abound about how the explosives were placed in the devices. Under the most probable scenario, Israeli agents laced the batteries with explosives when the devices were manufactured, by a front company in Budapest that licensed the dated pager technology from a Taiwanese company. Others think the devices may have been modified at some point between their manufacturing and their distribution to Hezbollah leaders and fighters.
Image
A piece of a device waiting to be destroyed by Lebanese forces in southern Lebanon on Thursday.Credit...Rabih Daher/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Whatever the means of sabotage, the result was the same: Just a few ounces of explosives, hidden in the pagers and the walkie-talkies, were capable of causing grievous injuries, beyond the kind of damage that could be wrought if the batteries in the devices overheated and caught fire.
It is possible those explosions were triggered just by a message sent, simultaneously, to the pagers. Or it is possible that by exploiting a vulnerability in the basic code that runs the pagers, the attackers were able to overheat the batteries and detonate the explosive charges.
But the Israelis also could have used cyberoperations or signals intercepts simply to figure out how to gain access to the pagers themselves, some experts say.
“The main cyberoperations likely only provided the intelligence that Hezbollah placed a huge order for pagers and where they would be in the supply chain at specific times,” said Jason Healey, a cyberexpert at Columbia University. “At most, some signal was sent which detonated the explosive. Perhaps that actually did use some exploit to overheat the battery causing the detonation.”
Getting into supply chains to sabotage operations is hardly new. More than a decade ago, American officials intercepted the power supplies headed to Iran to make the country’s nuclear centrifuges spin — and thus its ability to produce fuel that could get diverted to weapons projects.
American officials intercepted giant Chinese-made power generators during the Trump administration that they believed had been altered to insert a “kill switch” that could be triggered from outside the country. And for more than a year now, American officials have been warning about “Volt Typhoon,” a Chinese intelligence operation to lace U.S. power grids with malware that could turn off the lights and the water supply, especially during a conflict over Taiwan.
Before the Chinese intelligence services wormed into America’s power grid, Russia did the same — and, to deter Moscow, the United States planted code in the Russian grid.
The early evidence, however, suggests that such techniques can bring about a tactical advantage but few strategic effects. Even the American-Israeli cyberattacks on the centrifuges in Iran — a highly classified, expensive operation code-named “Olympic Games” — set the Iranian program back by only a year or 18 months. Eventually it drove the program farther underground.
But attacks like the one on the centrifuges, or on power grids, are directed at big infrastructure, not hand-held devices. And so the attacks in Lebanon may herald a new wrinkle in such sabotage, made to infect hand-held devices.
“Certainly, if Chinese or Russian intelligence could overheat electronic devices to cause fires, it might help keep defenders reeling in the early phases of a crisis,” Mr. Healey said. “But that seems a touch far-fetched, as there have been more than enough examples of going for physical destruction of electrical grids, for example.”
David E. Sanger covers the Biden administration and national security. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written several books on challenges to American national security. More about David E. Sanger
A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 20, 2024, Section A, Page 8 of the New York edition with the headline: New Era in Sabotage as Everyday Items Turn Deadly. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
18. Lessons from the Korean War: Sometimes, an imperfect peace is sweeter than victory (An Armistice for Putin's War in Ukraine?)
Lessons from the Korean War: Sometimes, an imperfect peace is sweeter than victory
by John Kitch, opinion contributor - 09/19/24 9:00 AM ET
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4885833-eisenhower-korean-war-ukraine-peace/
When Dwight Eisenhower assumed the presidency in 1953, he had one immediate policy objective: to end the Korean War.
In July of 1953 the war came to an end, with an uneasy stalemate. That the war did not liberate North Korea from the grips of communism pained Eisenhower, but it did not cloud his strategic vision of the situation.
Speaking to the nation from the White House, late at night on July 26, he put it this way: “Tonight we greet, with prayers of Thanksgiving, the official news that an armistice was signed almost an hour ago in Korea….And so at long last the carnage of war is to cease and the negotiations of the conference table is to begin.”
Eisenhower was not afraid of conflict, yet he weighed the devastation of war alongside the potential good that could come from victory. He surveyed Korea and correctly concluded that a stalemate was the best plausible outcome.
That conviction is what drove him to end the war quickly. Continued fighting was not going to change the strategic outcome, but it would kill more people, deprive more families of seeing their loved ones again, and prevent alleviating the starvation that had set in on parts of the Korean peninsula. To Eisenhower, knowing when to stop a war was as important — both morally and strategically — as fighting a just war to total victory.
There are two lessons Americans ought to absorb from the Korean War when thinking about today’s conflict in Ukraine. The first is that seeing a situation as it truly is, not as we would like it to be, is the foundation of good decision-making. Secondly, there is honor in bringing a war to a close, once you have accomplished the best plausible outcome.
The goal for the U.S. now should be to help Ukraine achieve a lasting, even if imperfect, peace. It won’t feel like victory, but the alternative will be an ongoing disaster that will ensure ongoing suffering for the indefinite future.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is once again requesting permission to use American weapons to strike deep in Russian territory. The argument is that such permission is all that stands between Ukraine and final victory.
Unfortunately, this is bad strategic calculus. As Lloyd Austin said last week: “There’s no one capability that will in and of itself be decisive in this campaign.”
The conflict has arrived at a stalemate. The precise territory each side controls will continue to shift, but the fundamental nature of the war has settled in, with neither side strong enough to win outright or become weak enough to collapse. This war, like many modern conflicts between two well-equipped and determined foes, could drag on for years, without any meaningful strategic change in the balance of power.
What would this mean, in real terms? It would mean skyrocketing civilian deaths, long-term economic decimation, trillions of dollars in military expenses, and a strategic opportunity cost for both Ukraine and the United States.
Ukraine has the opportunity to translate a hard-earned stalemate into a newly robust national identity. Peace for Ukraine can allow the country to focus its attention on rebuilding its economy and on expanding on its already strong civic culture. An imperfect peace in Ukraine would also allow the United States to turn its attention toward the Pacific, which is the most important area for American interests going forward for the next several decades.
The U.S. cannot end the war on its own. It is ultimately a Ukrainian and Russian responsibility to decide what agreement will end the war. The U.S. can, though, use its considerable leverage to persuade both Ukraine and NATO allies that now is the time to push for peace.
The U.S. could provide short-term economic aid to Ukraine but stop formal military aid by the end of the year. Both Russia and Ukraine could withdraw to January 2022 boundaries. The United States would not support Ukraine joining NATO, but would not give up the ability to assist Ukraine again in the case of a future conflict.
This plan would provide Ukraine a stronger level of strategic security than it has had in a decade.
Russia has spent nearly three years, tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars on the war, and suffered an incursion into its own territory. Vladimir Putin will spin a peace agreement as a victory, but it will be a clear strategic defeat. The U.S. would be able to refocus military and diplomatic resources in more pressing areas, while extinguishing the risk that American troops will be deployed to fight in Ukraine.
A return to Korea shows us an example of the kind of peace that is possible in Ukraine. Like in Korea, making peace with Russia would require Ukraine to give up some of its territory.
By late 1952, an imperfect divide was the best plausible outcome in Korea, and it is now the best plausible outcome in Ukraine. Ultimately, Ukraine must make this decision for itself, but the way for America to be a true ally to Ukraine is to use our influence to push for the best deal Ukraine is likely to get.
John Kitch is assistant professor of instruction in the political science department at Texas State University.
19. Ukraine’s Lessons for the Pentagon By David Petraeus and Andy Yakulis
I had similar feelings and made similar statements (though not as elegantly as the General). But then I received a response from a friend in the Army that made me rethink this. I think General Petraeus would benefit from a briefing from the Chief of Staff of the Army.
Let me resend a previous exchange that illustrates the culture change we are seeing in th eArmy when it comes to tech:
FOLLOW-UP of a previous report:
So I made the following comments in a previous message about the Army's upcoming Project Convergence. I received a response below from a friend in the Army who provides a very important response to my half sarcastic comments. I think his response is very important and it gives me great confidence about what the Army is doing. And I guess it shows that I am the real dinosaur.
13. Army’s upcoming Project Convergence billed as early test for ‘C2 Next’ plans
I wonder if anyone has ever just gone to Apple or Google or Microsoft and said design a communications network that is simple, secure, intuitive and user friendly. Use concepts from social media and design a C2 system that can push and pull information in an effective way using techniques that all people are familiar with and bring with them when they enter the military. This may work in about 10 years or so when all the military dinosaurs have reached retirement and all the senior leaders then in charge will have grown up with iphones and social media.
I only ask this half sarcastically.
The most excellent and important response:
General George’s number one transformation priority is fixing the network.
He’s directed that we only buy intuitive, software based products. Instead of having a “box” to fight every warfighting function like we did in the GWOT, we’ll be "application based" on tablets and smaller - connected via small satellite dishes (starlink/starshield) or the cell network or connectivity we create. No more trucks pulling massive satellite dishes, not survivable today.
We agree that intuitive and adaptive is the name of the game – that’s why we have Google, Microsoft, and Amazon helping us suss out what Next Generation C2 should look like in a realistic environment.
Keep in mind, Google is the number #1 owner of Fiber in the world and Apple does not have its own communications infrastructure – we have the luxury of using all of the Fiber when we’re stateside because that’s how industry designed it but we don’t have that luxury in combat all the time.
We have so much agreement and inertia across industry and the hill, the real question is, is our procurement and budget process (inside and outside the pentagon) responsive enough to get the fix funded by FY 25? Dinosaurs? We want to go faster.
We should really be heartened by this response and have confidence that our Army is absolutely striving to do the right thing. And I would add that this is the result of a good propaganda effort (and before you think negative thoughts about propaganda please read Matt Armstrong's important essay at number 8 below).
Ukraine’s Lessons for the Pentagon
To excel with new tech, the U.S. must rethink its doctrine, training, procurement and more.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/the-u-s-can-fight-yesterdays-war-but-not-tomorrows-4b7bca66?mod=hp_opin_pos_3#cxrecs_s
By David Petraeus and Andy Yakulis
Sept. 19, 2024 5:37 pm ET
Illustration: David Gothard
The wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Red Sea have revealed a pressing reality: Innovative and low-cost technologies are changing how nations wage war. The advent of such tech, moreover, highlights the urgency with which the U.S. must overhaul its defense system, from operational concepts, structures, and training to weapons systems, procurement and manufacturing.
This transformation will require the armed services to undertake several new initiatives and launch substantial partnerships with weapons system manufacturers. This is critical to enabling the U.S. to replicate the achievements of Ukraine—a country that has sunk about a third of Russia’s Black Sea fleet without a meaningful Navy and held off major ground assaults despite being outnumbered and outgunned. In each case, cutting-edge technologies, produced rapidly and at enormous scale, have enabled Ukraine’s successes.
Kyiv’s efforts underscore that warfare is at an inflection point. Combat now features cheap, mass-produced, one-way air and maritime drones, as well as innovative ground robotic systems. These advances have democratized highly capable but inexpensive unmanned weapons. Though it is still in its early stages, this tech is producing seismic changes on the battlefield.
Some senior U.S. military officials are paying attention to this new way of war. Adm. Samuel Paparo, head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, intends to turn the Taiwan Strait into a “hellscape” if China attempts to invade the island. The plan reportedly features the mass application of unmanned systems on land, in the air, on and under the sea, and presumably in cyberspace. Some new initiatives can help with these goals, but the vision is still mostly conceptual. The Pentagon will need to rethink its fighting doctrine, force structure, training, and processes for producing, procuring and using weapons fit for such combat.
The status quo won’t suit. Our men and women don’t have the training to operate large numbers of autonomous systems simultaneously. Worse still, there is no procurement process set up to buy enough of the systems needed to make the “hellscape” a reality. Nor is the industrial base currently capable of producing these systems at the scale they’re being produced in Ukraine.
Fortunately, Pentagon and industry leaders have begun to undertake some impressive efforts to capitalize on the private sector’s innovative capabilities. Most notable is the Replicator Initiative, championed by Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks, to provide the military with a mechanism to procure large amounts of cheap drones. But while Replicator is an important step forward, it will likely take years for the initiative to field one of its prized systems: a reportedly more than $100,000 one-time-use loitering munition. This is a long way from the cheaper but equally capable suicide drones that Ukrainian companies are producing and employing in the thousands every day.
The goal of Ukraine’s “People’s Drone initiative,” as we’ve learned in discussions in Ukraine, is to produce one million drones per year that cost between $300 and $1,000 a unit. The mobilization of Ukraine’s domestic war economy is akin to the effort the U.S. pursued during World War II. Ukraine recognizes the imperative of building large quantities of weapons—even at the expense of quality—to hurl at the enemy. If Replicator is any indication, the U.S. still doesn’t understand how speed and volume must take precedence over exquisite capability when it comes to unmanned systems.
Grassroots efforts have taken off among the U.S. military’s special-operations community and in innovative conventional forces. There are also important albeit modest industry initiatives compared with Ukraine’s. Kyiv is constantly updating its military software to contend with Russia’s evolving electronic and air-defense capabilities. U.S. service members, meantime, are using only modest funds to buy drone components and teach themselves to assemble them. Discussions with one of the Navy’s elite special-operations units indicate it spends 80% of the time building drones and 20% learning to fly them.
Our military isn’t providing its soldiers with the concepts, training and weapons to fight effectively. Technology is moving faster than our ability to harness it. The path forward therefore must feature collaboration with private organizations that can equip America and its allies with real-time lessons from the battlefield. Doing so will help us escape the cycle that too often delivers the technology of yesterday to tomorrow’s battlefield.
To succeed, the Pentagon can’t tinker around the edges. It must seriously transform its processes, from military doctrine to weapons acquisition. If it does, we will be well-positioned to win the 21st century. If it doesn’t, the hellscape may well be brought to us.
Mr. Petraeus, a retired U.S. Army general, commanded the surge in Iraq, U.S. Central Command and the coalition forces in Afghanistan. He served as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (2011-12) and is a co-author of “Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine.” He is a partner in KKR, which is invested in defense and technology companies. Mr. Yakulis is CEO and a co-founder of Vector and a former Army special-operations commander.
20. AC-130J Ghostrider Gunships Will Keep Their 105mm Howitzers, For Now
AC-130J Ghostrider Gunships Will Keep Their 105mm Howitzers, For Now
With a pivot to the Pacific and needing to keep the AC-130 relevant, its armament may change, but its Howitzer will stay put for the time being.
Joseph Trevithick
Posted on Sep 19, 2024 1:35 PM EDT
117
twz.com · by Joseph Trevithick
The U.S. Air Force’s top special operations officer says AC-130J Ghostrider gunships will continue being armed with 105mm howitzers for the time being, though this could still change in future. The service had been considering removing these weapons from the AC-130Js amid a growing debate about the relevance of the gunships in future high-end conflicts, such as one in the Pacific against China.
Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Conley, head of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), talked about current and future plans for the AC-130Js with The War Zone and others at a media roundtable yesterday. The gathering came on the last day of the Air & Space Forces Association’s 2024 Air, Space & Cyber Conference just outside Washington, D.C.
An AC-130J Ghostrider. USAF
“The 105[mm howitzer] will continue to be relevant,” Conley said. “The plan is to keep using that in the years to come.”
AFSOC has some 31 AC-130Js in inventory, which are the only AC-130 variants now in service. The Ghostrider’s current armament package includes a 105mm howitzer, as well as a single barrel 30mm GAU-23/A Bushmaster II automatic cannon. The gunships can also employ an array of precision-guided missiles and bombs via Common Launch Tubes (CLT) and underwing racks. You can learn more about how the Air Force AC-130s have evolved since the introduction of the original AC-130A version in the 1960s here and in The War Zone video below.
Operational Ghostriders were initially delivered to AFSOC armed with modified versions of the 105mm M102 howitzer, a weapon that had been found on multiple preceding AC-130 variants dating back to the Vietnam War. The M102 was originally developed during the Cold War as a light towed artillery piece for the U.S. Army, which retired the last of its examples in the early 2000s.
An AC-130J armed with a modified 105mm M102 howitzer. USAF A close-up look at the 105mm howitzer on an AC-130J. USAF
With the M102s becoming increasingly unsupportable, the Air Force, in cooperation with the U.S. Navy, had begun acquiring improved 105mm howitzers for the AC-130J. As of November 2023, 17 Ghostriders had received replacement howitzers, referred to at the time by the interim nomenclature GAU-XX. At that time, however, AFSOC had also confirmed to The War Zone that further integrations had been put on hold “pending the results of the assessment of capabilities of the AC-130J.”
A look at the improved GAU-XX howitzer on an AC-130J at Yokota Air Base in Japan during an exercise in 2022. USAF
Separate plans to arm a Ghostrider with a laser directed energy weapon, which had previously been described as ideally suited for use in counter-terrorism and other lower-intensity operations, were also notably scrapped last year.
The War Zone has now reached back out to AFSOC about whether the GAU-XX integrations have resumed, how many AC-130Js now have the improved howitzers, and for other additional information.
Speaking at the roundtable yesterday, Lt. Gen. Conley did acknowledge that there could be less emphasis on the 105mm howitzers when employing AC-130Js in a future high-end fight.
“As we look through our training portfolios and what we need to do for future fights, it probably involves less of the 105mm,” Conley said. “It’s got munitions that could sink a ship, … not a capital ship, not a carrier, but it could do damage to smaller ships.”
“In a peer fight, I think our spot is probably on the periphery,” he added. “It [AC-130Js] could harass outlying [enemy] forces.”
“What the gunship’s known for, in many cases, with our ground partners, is just the sound of freedom overhead and knowing that someone’s there watching them,” Conley continued.
The AFSOC commander’s comments here followed the rare appearance of an AC-130J at a sinking exercise (SINKEX) in the Pacific in July. The SINKEX in question, where various assets were used to send the ex-USS Dubuque, a decommissioned U.S. Navy Austin class amphibious warfare ship, to the bottom of the ocean was part of the larger biennial Rim Of The Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, which you can read more about here.
At that time, The War Zone highlighted very similar kinds of potential roles and missions for AC-130Js, as well as challenges those aircraft would face, in a future major conflict, writing:
“During a future major conflict, just getting within gun range of a higher-value target like an amphibious warfare ship, likely operating as part of a larger group of warships further supported by air and other assets, would be a very tall order, if not impossible, for Air Force AC-130s. Ghostriders might still be able to leverage their guns against vessels in lower-risk areas or to help finish off severely damaged vessels separated from their companions. Armed overwatch over and around friendly forces on islands and anchorages could be another future maritime mission in a higher-end fight. It is worth noting that even during operations in largely permissive airspace over countries like Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan in the past 20 years or so, AC-130s have almost exclusively operated at night in large part to help reduce their vulnerability to potential threats.”
“We’re looking at options for improved radars [and] other things that a traditional AC-130 would not have been asked to do,” Lt. Gen. Conley noted yesterday.
The Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have a stated interest in adding new active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radars to the Ghostriders. These would give the aircraft important new targeting, threat warning, and potentially even electronic warfare capabilities, along with giving their crews generally improved situational awareness. AC-130Js already have a substantial and still-growing self-protection electronic warfare suite.
Adding smaller and lower-cost cruise missiles to the AC-130J’s arsenal to significantly increase its ability to launch stand-off strikes further away from enemy defenses is also increasingly on the horizon. Lt. Gen. Conley separately highlighted yesterday how AFSOC has been experimenting with using its MC-130 special operations tanker/transports as stand-off strike platforms using the Rapid Dragon palletized munitions system.
AFSOC is looking to increasingly utilize autonomous capabilities, supported by advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning, across all of its aircraft fleets and that could also impact how AC-130Js are employed in the future.
“I’d say [what] we’re looking at in AFSOC … is an incremental approach, where what I am asking industry and my team to get after is, what are the things we can do inside the plane right now that allow the aircrew to focus on mission things and not the mechanics of flying an aircraft,” Lt. Gen. Conley said yesterday. “So how do you fully automate [aircraft] startup and all that stuff where you hit a button and everything does it versus reading the old school checklist back and forth. The next step of that would be, okay, is there a point that we could reduce a crew member?”
“I think there’s also an autonomy piece in our mission side, where … like with our [AC-130] gunship, you know, what can we do, as far as sensors and targeting to use the technology that’s out there and getting better to help us with target identification, and kind of take the human out of the loop and put him or her on the loop,” he added.
The head of AFSOC also repeatedly stressed that, while the U.S. military’s primary focus is shifting to preparing for future high-end conflicts, the special operations community in particular remains heavily engaged in lower-intensity operations globally. Those missions, in turn, mean a need is still seen for the traditional capabilities that the AC-130 offers. This reality is also impacting discussions about plans for the planned fleet of OA-1K light attack aircraft, which are facing the same kinds of questions about future relevance as the Ghostriders.
One of the Air Tractor AT-802U aircraft now being used to train Air Force pilots ahead of the delivery of the first OA-1K aircraft. The OA-1K is a derivative of the AT-802U. U.S. Air National Guard
“From when OA-1K was conceptualized and decided on until now, the world’s changed a little bit. And so we look at some different opportunities with it. I think it still provides a cost-effective close air support platform, which is one of the missions that it was designed for. It’s still going to provide an ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capability,” Conley explained. “But as we move forward, I think there’s opportunity to look at, again, some novel mission sets. …how quick can we get the wings on and off it so we could use it in some sort of crisis response, if we needed to? Where does the role of SIGINT, or ELINT or… some sort of ISR collect [factor in] there. I think there’s opportunity for that. Again, not anything we’ve committed to yet.”
Conley added that AFSOC’s requirement currently remains for a fleet of 75 OA-1Ks despite discussions about potentially truncating those purchases.
All this being said, AFSOC is clearly at a watershed moment in its history, as is the rest of the U.S. special operations community, after spending the bulk of the last two decades focused almost exclusively on counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and other lower-intensity operations. Plans for the AC-130J’s future armament and other capabilities, as well as the gunship’s expected roles and missions, are continuing to evolve as eyes turn to future high-end fights.
In the meantime, at least, the Ghostriders will continue to wield their 105mm howitzers.
Howard Altman contributed to this story.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
Deputy Editor
Joseph has been a member of The War Zone team since early 2017. Prior to that, he was an Associate Editor at War Is Boring, and his byline has appeared in other publications, including Small Arms Review, Small Arms Defense Journal, Reuters, We Are the Mighty, and Task & Purpose.
twz.com · by Joseph Trevithick
21. Army embraces Ukraine-style warfare with new all-drone unit
The new concept of overwatch for maneuver. The battlefield is now truly 360 degrees as well as overhead at the tactical level.
Army embraces Ukraine-style warfare with new all-drone unit
The 101st Airborne’s nine-man team is designed to coordinate fire, reconnoiter ahead of vehicles, and strike with loitering munitions.
By Sam Skove
Staff Writer
September 19, 2024 03:55 PM ET
defenseone.com · by Sam Skove
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/09/army-embraces-ukraine-style-warfare-new-all-drone-unit/399679/?oref=d1-homepage-top-story
FORT JOHNSON, Louisiana—Staff Sgt. David Meyer peered intently into the screen of his hand-held drone controller, sweat slowly beading through his face paint in the 100-degree heat.
Somewhere below his quadcopter, an allied unit was under attack by Geronimo, the highly skilled force that plays the enemy in weeks-long wargames at the U.S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center here.
Meyer suspected the Geronimo troops of trying to trick his side into burning through its ammo. Then they’d melt back into the forest to strike again elsewhere. It’s the sort of game that comes naturally to Geronimo, whose home-team status gives them an unmatched knowledge of the training area’s 250,000 acres of pine forest.
This time, they may have underestimated their opponent.
Meyer was part of the new Lethal Unmanned Systems platoon, one of the Army’s first formations dedicated entirely to operating short-range reconnaissance drones. If Meyer’s drones could find Geronimo, they could bring the fire of an attached platoon of 81mm mortars and turn the opposition's raid into a disaster.
All Meyer had to do was find them.
The LUS platoon
In mid-August, Defense One spent an afternoon with LUS soldiers as they fought Geronimo.
The soldiers are members of the 101st Airborne’s second brigade, which had traveled to JRTC to test the Army’s “transforming-in-contact” initiative. Announced earlier this year, the effort is sending new equipment to the 101st's brigade, the 10th Mountain Division’s third brigade, the 25th Infantry Division’s second brigade. Soldiers are responsible for giving feedback and working out on new doctrine in conditions as close as possible to actual war.
The LUS platoon sits within the Multi-Purpose Company, or MPC, itself a new formation launched this April. The MPC’s four platoons—scout, mortar, anti-tank, and LUS—replace the old heavy weapons companies, which were downgraded to platoons in February.
Nine of the LUS platoon’s 21 soldiers fly drones, including Meyer and platoon leader 1st. Lt. Jahmir King. The rest are air defenders who use a mix of anti-aircraft weapons like Stinger missiles and counter-drone weapons, including the Bal Chatri drone detector, Dronebuster jamming rifle, and Modi electronic warfare system.
Just as in Ukraine, their drones are meant primarily to help spot enemy forces, and, if possible, coordinate indirect fire.
But unlike the Ukrainians, the LUS drone operators cannot directly stream their video to other soldiers. Instead, they must rely on an attached fire control officer to radio to the mortar section where they are seeing the rounds land. Similarly, LUS soldiers must upload data to battle-management systems to share it with commanders, in contrast to the banks of live drone video feeds that Ukrainian commanders use to survey the battlefield.
But the operators do have some ability to strike enemies themselves. Some of the drones can be rigged to drop munitions, and soldiers are trained to fly Switchblade loitering munitions systems. The unit was not practicing with the Switchblades at JRTC.
The unit can also use their drones for route reconnaissance, said MPC commander Captain Phil Tateyama. If the unit wants to quickly clear an area, a drone operator will fly a drone just ahead of the moving vehicle.
The platoon also carries a drone-borne electronic detection unit built on an ultracheap Raspberry Pi computer that can sniff for WiFi connections. To operate it, they’d temporarily brought along an Army cyber soldier.
The counter-drone unit, meanwhile, serves as a mobile defense force that can be split out as needed, with some members defending the command post and others assigned to the mortars, according to Tateyama and King.
Drones, lots of drones
The unit’s seven drone operators carry about five extra drones, but King said many more might be required in an actual war. In realistic training operations, such as the one they were on, he expected to have at least one drone down due to mechanical or other failures every other day.
Combat operations would likely increase that rate, he said.
“We’re going to start losing them, and then we’re out of a job,” said King.
The unit operates Parrot, Skydio, and Vesper drones, all small short-range systems with a flight time of under an hour. King said such systems could fly only one to three kilometers out before losing signal in the dense vegetation of Fort Johnson.
That meant the team had to be relatively close to the front line, placing them in easy range of Geronimo’s artillery and even their infantry.
Eventually, King and Tateyama said, they hope to equip the unit with medium-range drones like the C100. Smaller drones would then be assigned to the reconnaissance unit. Tateyama said those drones should most likely be operated by an experienced LUS member detailed to the recon unit.
King said they could move up to operating first-person-view drones — hobbyist racing drones that Ukraine uses for pinpoint strikes—although he added that the weeks of training necessary made it harder to employ such drones.
King said Skydio and Parrot drones performed well, with soldiers favoring the latter for its ability to identify the specific map coordinates of whatever object it looked at, which was useful for artillery coordination. A mechanical problem, however, meant that soldiers had not brought along the Parrot.
Drone soldiers
In contrast to previous Army drone operations, all of the LUS soldiers are infantrymen, rather than specialist operators.
“If you can drive semi-decent in [Grand Theft Auto],” then you can fly, said one soldier. To hone their skills, the unit practices drone operations on a special course back at Fort Campbell, their home base.
Soldiers also receive some training to recognize enemy vehicles, said King. Some features on the drone also help, such the Parrot’s ability to pinpoint the hottest parts of whatever it’s looking at. Using this feature, soldiers can easily identify exhaust pipes, thereby discovering vehicles.
Besides flying and processing drone footage, soldiers are also expected to keep the drones charged. Battery management in particular is a major concern in planning, said King.
“That’s what it’s about: how long can we stay on the objective.” One soldier said he kept extra batteries in the pouch typically used for dumping spent rifle magazines.
On top of all that, soldiers must also pull security. Ideally, King said he’d like to see three to four soldiers assigned to flying, data management, and security, for a maximum of 12 soldiers versus the seven they have now.
Hunting Geronimo
Back at the screen, Mayer soon ran into difficulty. In the sweltering heat of the Lousianna pine forest, the drone’s already limited batteries were eking out just 20 minutes of flight time—including only a few minutes over the objective.
To maximize coverage, the unit kept a fresh drone ready to go when one returned. But flight-safety rules forbid operating two drones at once.
As drone after drone buzzed into the sky, hope started to fade. For a brief moment, Meyer’s screen showed a Geronimo truck driving along the road—but then lost it.
Somewhere out there, Geronimo was still lurking, hidden beneath trees or simply beyond the range of the LUS platoon’s drone. They’d gotten away, if only for the moment.
defenseone.com · by Sam Skove
22. Leaving No One Behind: A Commitment That Matters Beyond the Military
Never forget.
Leaving No One Behind: A Commitment That Matters Beyond the Military
By Tim Gallaudet
September 20, 2024
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/20/leaving_no_one_behind_a_commitment_that_matters_beyond_the_military_1059714.html
This Friday Americans across the country will honor National Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) Recognition Day. A year ago on that day, I attended a wreath-laying ceremony and film screening at the United States Navy Memorial in Washington D.C. to recognize our nation’s POWs and MIAs. Speaking at the event was Commander (ret.) Everett Alvarez, Jr., the first pilot captured and held as a POW in the Vietnam War. He stated that America’s commitment to return all POWs home helped him endure the eight and a half years of imprisonment and torture that he endured while held captive by the North Vietnamese at the infamous prison dubbed the “Hanoi Hilton.”
Major General (ret.) Kelly McKeague, who serves as the director of the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) also attended the event, where he described his mission at DPAA as one aimed at providing the fullest possible accounting for our MIA personnel to their families and the nation — a mission he rightly characterized as “sacred.”
America’s military is exceptional in keeping its obligation to leave no one behind, whether with combat search and rescue or the repatriation of POWs and MIAs. Regarding the latter, nearly 82,000 Americans are still considered missing: 72,598 from World War II, 7,580 from the Korean War, 1,587 from Vietnam, 126 from the Cold War and six from other conflicts since 1991.
Bringing home our fallen service members is no doubt a noble cause, but at a time when confidence in our military is the lowest in over two decades, why should Americans care about returning the remains of someone who fought in, what may be to them, a forgotten war?
The answer to that question is because leaving no one behind matters to more than just the military. First and foremost are the five million family members across four generations whose loved ones did not return. The absence of closure for these Americans is painful and deep, even for descendants who may not have known their MIA relatives directly. Families are the focus of efforts by DPAA and partners like Project Recover to research, find and account for the missing in past conflicts. Since 1995, the DOD has engaged over 17,000 family members face-to-face to keep them informed about the U.S. government's worldwide mission to account for those still missing and to discuss in detail the latest information available about their specific cases.
Leaving no one behind also matters to the nearly 19 million Veterans in the U.S. who swore the same oath as their missing teammates. Those of us who served in the U.S. armed services are united in our values, ethics and standards across all ranks and in all service branches. Our common culture, combined with the fact that our success and survival depended upon taking care of each other, created what the U.S. Army calls the warrior ethos: “I will never leave a fallen comrade.” It is institutionalized in the American military today, and it is the reason that after over two decades of combat in Afghanistan, not a single service member is listed as missing in action. Although no longer on active duty, America’s Veterans continue to embrace the warrior ethos and serve as leaders in advocacy and action to return our MIAs, whether through volunteering with DPAA or supporting nonprofit partners.
Our nation’s commitment to bring everyone back might be most important to the next generation of American service members. The DOD is already experiencing crisis levels of recruitment, and it is occurring at a time when China is undergoing the largest military buildup seen anywhere since World War II. We are unlikely to attract the talent we need — or support from their families — unless we renew our resolve to return POWs and MIAs both today and in the future.
After returning home, Everett Alvarez served as the Deputy Administrator of the Veterans Administration under President Ronald Reagan. During this time, he was in the audience when Reagan gave a speech on National POW/MIA Recognition Day where he said, “Along with us today are some of the relatives and friends of those still missing…They too have shown more than their share of heroism, holding the stand for those who went away and have not yet returned to us, insisting that the world remember and respond.” Reagan then promised them, “We write no last chapters, we close no books, we put away no final memories until your questions are answered…Your sons and fathers and brothers did their duty by this nation, and this nation will do our duty by them.” As our nation stands deeply divided on many issues, let us unite in keeping this promise to leave none of our service members behind.
Rear Admiral (U.S. Navy, ret.) Tim Gallaudet, Ph.D., is the CEO of Ocean STL Consulting, LLC, a member of the advisory board for Project Recover and Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors for the Veterans nonprofit Force Blue. Previously, Gallaudet served as the Acting and Deputy Administrator at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), as well as acting Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Commerce. Prior to NOAA, he served for 32 years as an oceanographer in the Navy.
23. America’s Crisis of Deterrence
Excerpts:
For that to happen, Tehran must be made to understand the repercussions it will face should its actions bring harm to U.S. forces. The United States must clarify its willingness to retaliate through actions rather than words—and small steps are not the way to go. Washington should make plain what risks Iran faces: all-out war and damage to Iran’s vital interests. The Biden administration should inform Tehran that it will intercept any missiles aimed at Israel, that it will avenge the loss of American life, and that Houthi missile attacks in the Red Sea must stop. Before an errant missile strikes a ship, every Houthi antiship missile launch should be matched with a U.S. action against Iran. This could take the form of surveillance inside territorial waters, warning shots on Iranian vessels, or boardings of Iranian commercial vessels that might be smuggling arms. The Pentagon should also think of creative ways to show that Iranian military assets can immediately be damaged, such as through cyberwarfare or special operations. Washington must reinforce the message by sending offensive forces to the Middle East. President Joe Biden’s recent deployment of two aircraft carriers, guided missile destroyers, F-22 fighters, and a guided missile submarine are welcome moves.
Finally, the United States should continue to stand fast in the missile defense of Israel. Doing so demonstrates commitment and limits Iran’s options. Owing to the success of their interceptions of Iranian missiles, the United States and Israel are in a stronger position now to deter Iran.
Of course, if the risks of this approach appear too high and the resources required would distract from other priorities, the United States could back off. It could say nothing about missile strikes on Israel and, to alleviate the risk of accidental escalation, remove its naval presence and discourage commercial traffic from going through the Red Sea. It would not be the first time Israel has endured Hezbollah rocket strikes. Nor would it be the first time that the Red Sea has been closed to commercial traffic. The Suez Canal was closed from 1967 to 1975 amid wars between Egypt and Israel. The United States could accept a similar situation until the Gaza crisis abates. The potential costs of that approach include more attacks on Israel, a reduction in international trade, and a weakened U.S. standing in the Middle East. Yet if the overriding goal is to avoid being bogged down in the Middle East while defending U.S. interests and thwarting aggression in the region, Washington must recognize that deterrence demands accepting uncomfortable risks.
America’s Crisis of Deterrence
How to Adapt an Old Theory to New Realities
September 20, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Carter Malkasian · September 20, 2024
The United States and its allies are facing a crisis of deterrence. China is menacing Philippine vessels in the South China Sea and possibly readying its military for an invasion of Taiwan. Russia shows no sign of giving up its war in Ukraine. In the Middle East, Iran is threatening retaliation against Israel for the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Hezbollah is ramping up its rocket strikes into Israel, and the Houthis continue to attack—and occasionally sink—commercial ships in the Red Sea. The compounding risks of Iranian missiles killing U.S. military personnel, of a Houthi strike on a U.S. Navy vessel, or of another sinking of a shipping vessel grow with time. Any of these events would force Washington to either get involved in a larger war or back down. Either option would reflect a failure of deterrence.
The foundations of deterrence theory lie in the Cold War writings of thinkers such as Thomas Schelling, who sought to formulate a strategy to deter a nuclear strike from the Soviet Union. Its central tenets—the stability produced by mutually assured destruction, the risks of escalation and the role of brinkmanship, and the value of signaling commitment and resolve—have proved useful for deterring nuclear-armed adversaries from conducting both nuclear and conventional attacks on other nuclear powers. They have been less useful for deterring attacks by nonnuclear powers. And when it comes to nonstate actors, deterrence theory has been downright useless.
Nowhere has this been more evident than in the Middle East in recent months, where Iran and its network of proxies have seemed willing to attack U.S. bases and service members, sink commercial ships, launch direct attacks on Israel, and possibly ignite a larger regional war. If Washington wants to keep deterrence in the region from eroding further, it will need to demonstrate a greater willingness to retaliate. Focusing on Hezbollah and the Houthis will not suffice; the only way to restore deterrence is by going after Iran. U.S. forces should retaliate in response to Iranian missile strikes that harm American military and civilian personnel. Washington should signal to Tehran that damage to U.S. ships or other vessels going through the Red Sea will be met with retaliation on Iranian assets or territory. The U.S. military should also position its assets in a manner that would enable it to continue to intercept Iranian air attacks—as it did when Iran fired a barrage of drones and missiles at Israel in April.
If U.S. officials deem pressuring Iran in these ways to be too risky, however, they could try to ride out the storm, wait for the war in the Gaza Strip and the current regional crisis to end, and turn their attention instead to China and Russia and the bigger picture. The Biden administration's National Defense Strategy has made clear, after all, that the U.S. military needs to focus foremost on China. Such a choice would pose problems of its own: continued attacks on Israel, the constriction of international trade, and a diminished U.S. position in the Middle East. By understanding the requirements of deterrence, American leaders will be better positioned to judge if that tradeoff is worth it.
MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION
Before 1945, deterrence was not a major topic in the study of war. Its precepts are hard to find in the writings of thinkers such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Carl von Clausewitz. But beginning in the late 1940s, with the dawn of the nuclear age, strategists such as Schelling, Bernard Brodie, and Albert Wohlstetter began to formulate the bases of deterrence theory.
The foundation of nuclear deterrence is second-strike capability, meaning that either side can launch a devastating second strike in response to an attack from its adversary, a dynamic known as “mutually assured destruction.” China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States possess this capability. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarines, silos, and mobile missile carriers make it impossible for any one of these powers to destroy an adversary without being destroyed itself.
Escalation is a paramount concern when both sides possess nuclear weapons. In his 1966 book, Arms and Influence, Schelling argued that any military action could lead to a series of actions and counteractions that could accidentally result in total disaster. “Just what would happen is a matter of prediction, or guess,” he wrote. “Military resistance tends to develop a momentum of its own.” Both sides bear risk. The United States cannot take an action against China or Russia without bringing upon itself the risk of things sliding out of control. As Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev wrote to U.S. President John F. Kennedy at the height of the Cuban missile crisis:
We and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.
Deterrence under mutually assured destruction thus requires a willingness to bear risk and to demonstrate that willingness. Signals that involve an action or bear a cost can be an indicator of the credibility of a commitment. Talk is cheap. An action signals better than words the stake the United States places in the issue at hand. Because of the risk of escalation, even a small step can be very dangerous and can signal great resolve. The placement of ground forces near an adversary’s forces, an aircraft buzzing a warship, or the passage of naval vessels near an adversary’s waters all bear a risk of escalation. American and Soviet decision-makers paid careful attention to such actions because they were aware of the dangers entailed.
SEND COSTLY SIGNALS
But Schelling and his contemporaries did not develop deterrence theory to explain how to deal with nonnuclear states—and when officials tried to apply it that way, the results were poor. In 1964 and early 1965, the Johnson administration attempted to apply Schelling’s thinking to North Vietnam, carrying out a series of graduated airstrikes to show that much greater damage would come if Hanoi did not back down. But things didn’t work out as Washington hoped. North Vietnam’s top leaders were unconvinced that the United States would overthrow them; they were willing to bear increasing losses to unite their country and continued to wage war in South Vietnam.
When confronting a nonnuclear power, the threat of mutually assured destruction is greatly reduced. A nuclear power faces little danger of nuclear disaster. This does not mean, however, that a nuclear power is free to apply force as it pleases. In some cases, such as in the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the absence of mutually assured destruction allows a nuclear power, such as the United States, to exert high levels of force with little concern about escalation. But in other cases, fear of an all-out conventional war against a nonnuclear state could prompt a nuclear adversary to get involved, as U.S. administrations worried might happen in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. And in some cases, the expenses and casualties of war may prove too high. Deterrence of a nonnuclear power is tricky because a nonnuclear adversary may assume that the United States is unwilling to bear the costs of an all-out conventional war.
The tools to deter China or Russia are unlikely to have the same effect on Iran or another nonnuclear state because in such scenarios the United States faces a much lower risk of nuclear retaliation. A move that would seem high risk if Washington took it against China or Russia would appear to be a cautious move if taken against Iran. Beijing or Moscow would likely perceive a signal such as the deployment of a U.S. Navy vessel near its waters as highly escalatory, an indication that the United States is willing to fight and risk accidents that could lead to shooting and nuclear considerations. But when the same tactic is applied against Iran, the United States faces no risk of nuclear disaster. Tehran, therefore, would likely interpret it as a sign of caution. When dealing with a nonnuclear state, a small step signals that either the costs or the benefits of a full war aren’t worth it; it does not convey resolve.
For this reason, the United States must take bigger steps when confronting nonnuclear opponents such as Iran. Of course, a major step, such as an airstrike against a target vital to a regime or the annihilation of an enemy’s navy, is not guaranteed to deter a nonnuclear power such as Iran. If the nonnuclear power is confident that the United States is not committed to military victory, then a large step could be seen as bluffing or as just another blow in an ongoing war of attrition. And if a large step is perceived as an indication of aggressive intent, such as regime change, a desperate nonnuclear power may, out of concern for its own survival, choose to escalate rather than make concessions. Ukraine would rather fight Russia than make concessions, believing that concessions would only strengthen Moscow’s hand and lead to conquest.
In a game of brinkmanship against a nonnuclear state, the United States must send costly signals that demonstrate commitment and capability, such as retaliatory strikes or the deployment of aircraft carriers and submarines for long periods. For example, the United States can shoot down an adversary’s aircraft or sink its vessels, as it did in Syria in 2017 and in the 1980s “tanker war” in the Persian Gulf. When an adversary launches an attack, the United States can send a strong signal by standing fast and repelling it. The defense of Israel against some 300 Iranian missiles and armed drones in April demonstrated the United States’ commitment to an ally. Israel and the United States intercepted nearly all of Iran’s missiles and drones, revealing Tehran’s capacity for retaliation against U.S. escalation to be weaker than previously thought. For more than a decade, Iran depended on its ballistic missiles to deter U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. As Frank McKenzie, who served as commander of U.S. Central Command from 2019 to 2022, states in his book, The Melting Point, a U.S. or an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities “would undoubtedly trigger a significant response from the Iranians” in “a bloody and violent ‘fires war’ where our bases and the cities of our regional friends will be targets.” The interceptions in April, however, cast doubt on the strength of Iran’s reputed deterrent.
PRESSURE THE PATRON
Deterrence theory is least helpful when addressing nonstate actors such as Hezbollah and the Houthis. Guerrillas lack the high-value military targets of states. And because guerrilla units are mobile and conceal themselves well, the missile systems they use are difficult to wipe out. Guerrilla leaders also have a high tolerance for personal risk, as many expect or even wish to become martyrs, which renders the threat of being killed in a U.S. airstrike a weak deterrent.
The United States has a history of crushing guerrilla and terrorist organizations through a combination of heavy surveillance, air and drone strikes, special operations, and coordinated raids with partner forces. That is how it defeated the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) and al Qaeda and held off the Taliban for a decade. Hezbollah and the Houthis are vulnerable to the same methods, and since they are close to the sea, the need for the United States to build expensive bases onshore would be reduced. But this approach takes time, requires a great deal of resources, and involves no small degree of destruction.
A more efficient way to deal with such groups would be to pressure their patron, Iran, by conveying that there will be consequences for continued missile and rocket attacks. This course of action is imperfect: Tehran will deny having influence over its proxies and accuse the United States of escalation, and Hezbollah and the Houthis have their own interests and may not listen to their patron. Still, both groups depend on Iranian support, and Tehran’s willingness to go to war on their behalf is far from assured, giving Iran considerable leverage to convince them to stop.
Signals that involve an action or bear a cost can be an indicator of the credibility of a commitment.
For that to happen, Tehran must be made to understand the repercussions it will face should its actions bring harm to U.S. forces. The United States must clarify its willingness to retaliate through actions rather than words—and small steps are not the way to go. Washington should make plain what risks Iran faces: all-out war and damage to Iran’s vital interests. The Biden administration should inform Tehran that it will intercept any missiles aimed at Israel, that it will avenge the loss of American life, and that Houthi missile attacks in the Red Sea must stop. Before an errant missile strikes a ship, every Houthi antiship missile launch should be matched with a U.S. action against Iran. This could take the form of surveillance inside territorial waters, warning shots on Iranian vessels, or boardings of Iranian commercial vessels that might be smuggling arms. The Pentagon should also think of creative ways to show that Iranian military assets can immediately be damaged, such as through cyberwarfare or special operations. Washington must reinforce the message by sending offensive forces to the Middle East. President Joe Biden’s recent deployment of two aircraft carriers, guided missile destroyers, F-22 fighters, and a guided missile submarine are welcome moves.
Finally, the United States should continue to stand fast in the missile defense of Israel. Doing so demonstrates commitment and limits Iran’s options. Owing to the success of their interceptions of Iranian missiles, the United States and Israel are in a stronger position now to deter Iran.
Of course, if the risks of this approach appear too high and the resources required would distract from other priorities, the United States could back off. It could say nothing about missile strikes on Israel and, to alleviate the risk of accidental escalation, remove its naval presence and discourage commercial traffic from going through the Red Sea. It would not be the first time Israel has endured Hezbollah rocket strikes. Nor would it be the first time that the Red Sea has been closed to commercial traffic. The Suez Canal was closed from 1967 to 1975 amid wars between Egypt and Israel. The United States could accept a similar situation until the Gaza crisis abates. The potential costs of that approach include more attacks on Israel, a reduction in international trade, and a weakened U.S. standing in the Middle East. Yet if the overriding goal is to avoid being bogged down in the Middle East while defending U.S. interests and thwarting aggression in the region, Washington must recognize that deterrence demands accepting uncomfortable risks.
- CARTER MALKASIAN is Chair of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Foreign Affairs · by Carter Malkasian · September 20, 2024
24. Question for the candidates: Has Russia's war in Ukraine changed your view of the role of nuclear weapons?
Question for the candidates: Has Russia's war in Ukraine changed your view of the role of nuclear weapons?
By Siegfried S. Hecker | September 19, 2024
thebulletin.org · by François Diaz-Maurin · September 19, 2024
Siegfried S. Hecker
Siegfried S. Hecker is a professor of practice at the Monterey Institute of International Studies at Monterey and at the Department of Nuclear... Read More
Editor’s note: Former Los Alamos lab director Siegfried Hecker proposes a series of nine questions on great power competition, the global nuclear order, proliferation, and the role of nuclear energy that journalists and citizens should ask the 2024 presidential candidates. (This is part of an “experts comment” series of questions for the candidates.)
Great power competition
Background: The threat posed by nuclear weapons during the past eight years is greater than at any time since the end of the cold war. Russia has fielded nuclear weapons with new capabilities and has threatened to use non-strategic nuclear weapons to achieve its goals in the brutal, unjustified invasion of Ukraine. China has abandoned its decades-long policy of minimal nuclear deterrence, apparently to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. This has been accentuated by China’s lack of transparency and unwillingness to engage in nuclear dialogue. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have forged a more muscular US nuclear weapons policy and committed to major modernization of its nuclear arsenal and nuclear complex.
Questions for the candidates:
- How has Russia’s war in Ukraine changed your view of the role of nuclear weapons in Europe and by extension to Northeast Asia?
- How does China’s nuclear buildup shape your view of the requirements for the US nuclear arsenal and for nuclear policy?
North Korea
North Korea has continued its determined march to field a threatening nuclear arsenal. During the Trump administration, it added 20 to 25 nuclear weapons to its arsenal, along with demonstrating intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and testing a hydrogen bomb. During the Biden administration, it continued its pace of adding perhaps as many as seven nuclear weapons per year. It increased the sophistication and variety of its arsenal to include solid-motor ICBMs and tactical nuclear weapons. Kim Jong-un ended the North’s 30-year policy to pursue normalization with Washington, instead linking up tightly with Russia and possibly China. Kim also abandoned peaceful unification with South Korea and expanded the role of nuclear weapons from deterrence to include other existential threats to North Korea.
In addition, North Korea is poised to advance its arsenal to become only the third country in the world, after Russia and China, to threaten the continental United States with nuclear weapons.
- Should North Korea use this nuclear threat to attack South Korea, perhaps to enforce what it sees as its legitimate borders, what will you be prepared to do to either prevent or respond?
- And how would you respond to a South Korean decision to field its own nuclear arsenal?
India and Pakistan
Since India and Pakistan declared themselves to be nuclear powers with a series of nuclear tests in 1998, for the most part Washington has turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s growing nuclear ambitions. Likewise, it sat on the fence while India built its arsenal, until the Bush administration accepted India as a de facto nuclear weapon state in 2005. In recent years, both countries have increased the number and sophistication of their arsenals determined to be able to field all three legs of a nuclear triad. Interstate rivalry continues while Pakistan domestic politics continues to mire it in chaos.
- How will you address the increasing, but largely ignored, nuclear dangers in South Asia?
Iran
Since President Donald Trump withdrew US participation from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2018, Tehran has moved ever closer to be able to field a nuclear weapon. Israel has since revealed intelligence evidence that Tehran had a robust nuclear weapon design effort by the late 1990s and apparently continued a covert effort in that direction even while in the JCPOA, making Iran a threshold nuclear weapons state.
- How would you respond to Iran’s continued nuclear buildup, which has considerably reduced the breakout time required for nuclear weapons, especially considering the escalating dangers resulting from the war in Gaza?
- What would you do to dissuade Saudi Arabia’s crown prince from responding to Iran with his own nuclear weapons program?
The global nuclear order
The current nuclear dangers appear to be eclipsing what has been a relatively positive nuclear order developing for decades—with no nuclear weapon used since 1945, proliferation kept to less than 10 states, no nuclear terrorism, no mushroom cloud, no dirty bomb, and significant clean energy from nuclear power and positive contributions from nuclear medicine and industry. That entire order has been badly, if not fatally, fractured by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine started in February 2022.
How would you attempt to restore the global nuclear order absent a fair termination of the war in Ukraine? Would you be willing to take the political risk of inviting China to join the United States to do so? If you do, how would you get China to the negotiating table?
At the same time, most non-nuclear weapons states joined efforts to pass the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017, largely in frustration over what they consider to be lack of progress on Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which spells out disarmament-related obligations but that Washington has elected not to sign.
- How would you address the concerns over lack of progress on nuclear disarmament?
Nuclear energy
At the December 2023 UN climate summit (COP28) in Dubai, more than 20 countries—including the United States—pledged to triple nuclear energy capacity by 2050, largely to help achieve global net-zero greenhouse gas emissions. President Biden supports that goal. Yet, the US nuclear industry has become non-competitive, making the pledge only an aspirational one: It has commissioned only five reactors in the past 30 years—the two new ones at the Vogtle plant in Georgia were years behind schedule and cost more than twice the original estimate. The current move to small modular reactors looks promising, but the nuclear industry must demonstrate that these can help to revive the industry.
- Do you support the goal of tripling nuclear energy by 2050 and, if you do, what should the next administration do to make the US nuclear industry more competitive?
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thebulletin.org · by François Diaz-Maurin · September 19, 2024
25. How U.S. Cyber Adversaries Are Trying to Undermine the Election
Our adversaries do not support specific candidates>. They only seek to sow division and chaos and undermine the confidence in the US election system.
Excerpt:
New details have emerged of cyberattacks and election interference efforts by China, Russia, and Iran, with U.S. officials and technology executives sounding the alarm about the countries’ intent to sow chaos in the weeks leading up to Election Day on Nov. 5.
Russian cyber groups have pivoted in the last two months to attacking the campaign of Vice President Kamala Harris, according to a new report Microsoft released Tuesday. The groups have spread several fake videos, including one purportedly showing a Harris supporter attacking an attendee at a rally for former President Donald Trump, another (through a fake San Francisco news site) that falsely claimed Harris was involved in a hit-and-run incident, and a third showing a fake billboard in New York City listing false claims about Harris’s policies.
I watching the TV show Scandal. I had never watched it. This episode seems to foreshadow the undermining of the US election system and perhaps describes where we are today.. I can see this idea as a motivator for our adversaries and for those who seek to undermine the legacy of the US election system. This episode aired in 2014. Has it had an influence on our adversaries and certain political actors?
In Scandal, one of the most notable quotes from Cyrus Beene about the U.S. election system is from Season 2, Episode 13 ("Nobody Likes Babies"). In this scene, Cyrus Beene delivers a powerful monologue about the election system being like magic. The quote goes as follows:
"The American public is like a dog in a park. They can only see the ball you throw, so you have to distract them with the ball and they’re happy. But the magic, the magic of democracy is that they believe the ball matters. They believe their vote matters, that the elections are real. But it’s not real. The election process is about power. And people in power protect that process because it keeps them in power."
Cyrus is emphasizing the illusion behind the democratic process and the importance of keeping that illusion alive to maintain control and stability in the political system.
How U.S. Cyber Adversaries Are Trying to Undermine the Election
American companies and officials reveal a flurry of warnings and actions against Russia, China, and Iran.
By Rishi Iyengar
Foreign Policy · by Rishi Iyengar
September 19, 2024, 4:42 PM
Election-harris-trump-2024-functional-tag-2
Stay informed with FP’s news and analysis as the United States prepares to vote.
The U.S. presidential election is less than 50 days away, and this week served up some grim reminders of how high the stakes are—and how intent Washington’s adversaries are on swaying or disrupting the vote.
The U.S. presidential election is less than 50 days away, and this week served up some grim reminders of how high the stakes are—and how intent Washington’s adversaries are on swaying or disrupting the vote.
New details have emerged of cyberattacks and election interference efforts by China, Russia, and Iran, with U.S. officials and technology executives sounding the alarm about the countries’ intent to sow chaos in the weeks leading up to Election Day on Nov. 5.
Russian cyber groups have pivoted in the last two months to attacking the campaign of Vice President Kamala Harris, according to a new report Microsoft released Tuesday. The groups have spread several fake videos, including one purportedly showing a Harris supporter attacking an attendee at a rally for former President Donald Trump, another (through a fake San Francisco news site) that falsely claimed Harris was involved in a hit-and-run incident, and a third showing a fake billboard in New York City listing false claims about Harris’s policies.
“As we inch closer to the election, we should expect Russian actors to continue to use cyber proxies and hacktivist groups to amplify their messages through media websites and social channels geared to spread divisive political content, staged videos, and AI-enhanced propaganda,” Microsoft wrote.
President Joe Biden’s administration has stepped up its efforts to combat Russia’s disinformation and influence operations, imposing a series of sanctions earlier this month on state-run media outlets including Russia Today (RT) for acting on behalf of the Kremlin to “undermine confidence in the United States’ election processes and institutions.” RT has also developed cyber capabilities with direct ties to Russian intelligence services and is involved in a crowdfunding effort to procure military equipment for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters last week while announcing additional sanctions on the network.
“We urge every ally, every partner to start by treating RT’s activities as they do other intelligence activities by Russia within their borders,” Blinken said. Tech companies Meta and Google responded to the sanctions by restricting RT content and accounts from their social media platforms this week.
On Wednesday, FBI Director Christopher Wray announced that the agency had successfully hit back against another formidable cyber adversary: China. FBI teams took down a botnet—a network of compromised computers controlled by hackers who were “working at the direction of the Chinese government,” Wray told an audience at the Aspen Cyber Summit in Washington. Wray said the hackers allegedly took over hundreds of thousands of internet-connected devices, including cameras and storage devices—half of which were in the United States—to conduct espionage and disrupt critical systems. “We think the bad guys finally realized it was the FBI and our partners that they were up against, and with that realization they essentially burned down their new infrastructure and abandoned their botnet,” he added.
The U.S. government takedown of the botnet, allegedly run by a hacking group called Flax Typhoon, is the second such offensive cyber operation against China in less than a year. It follows a December 2023 operation against another group known as Volt Typhoon. Officials expect it won’t be the last.
“We’d like to see more of these and more frequently,” a senior administration official said of the takedown, speaking to reporters on Wednesday evening following Wray’s announcement. “What we’ve really been discussing here from the White House is what can be done to accelerate and do these regularly, so that we make it riskier, costlier, and harder for China to conduct their large-scale cyber operations.”
And then there’s Washington’s third—and increasingly brazen—cyber adversary. On Wednesday, three U.S. agencies issued a joint statement on Iran’s efforts to target Trump’s 2024 campaign. Iranian hackers who breached the Trump campaign in recent months sent “stolen, non-public” material from the campaign via email to individuals associated with Biden’s reelection campaign before he dropped out and was replaced by Harris, according to the statement by the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). “There is currently no information indicating those recipients replied,” the agencies added.
Iran has stepped up its efforts to interfere in the 2024 race amid an escalating proxy conflict with key U.S. ally Israel and has targeted the Trump campaign in particular in what experts see as retaliation for his administration’s 2020 assassination of Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani.
Despite some key public victories this week, the consensus in the cyberdefense community is that the battle is only just beginning—and is only likely to get more intense as Election Day draws closer, with the United States facing three highly capable adversaries who, if not directly working together, share similar goals.
“Arguably, the 2024 election cycle is facing the most complex threat landscape yet,” Cait Conley, a senior advisor for CISA, said at the Politico AI and Tech Summit this week. “We do see a growing and diverse array of foreign actors who are trying to influence our American democratic process. … Regardless of the actor, their objectives are the same—they want to undermine the American people’s confidence in our democratic institutions, and they want to sow partisan discord.”
Senior industry leaders visiting Washington this week echoed that sentiment. “We know that there is a presidential race between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris, but this has also become an election of Iran versus Trump and Russia versus Harris,” Microsoft’s president, Brad Smith, told the Senate Intelligence Committee in a hearing about election threats on Wednesday. “And it is an election where Russia, Iran, and China are united with a common interest in discrediting democracy in the eyes of our own voters and even more so in the eyes of the world.”
Foreign Policy · by Rishi Iyengar
26. Exclusive: US keeps missile system in Philippines as China tensions rise
Missiles are a key warfighting capability in the future.
Exclusive: US keeps missile system in Philippines as China tensions rise
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-keeps-missile-system-philippines-china-tensions-rise-tests-wartime-deployment-2024-09-19/
By Karen Lema and Poppy Mcpherson
September 20, 202412:22 AM EDTUpdated 9 hours ago
Item 1 of 2 A view of the Typhon missile system at Laoag International Airport, in Laoag, Philippines, September 18, 2024, in this satellite image. 2024 Planet Labs Inc./Handout via REUTERS/ File Photo
[1/2]A view of the Typhon missile system at Laoag International Airport, in Laoag, Philippines, September 18, 2024, in this satellite image. 2024 Planet Labs Inc./Handout via REUTERS/ File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab
SummaryCompanies
- No immediate plan to withdraw U.S. missile system, sources saySatellite image shows system in northern PhilippinesTyphon can fire missiles capable of striking ChinaChina, Russia accuse Washington of fuelling arms race
MANILA, Sept 19 (Reuters) - The United States has no immediate plans to withdraw a mid-range missile system deployed in the Philippines, despite Chinese demands, and is testing the feasibility of its use in a regional conflict, sources with knowledge of the matter said.
The Typhon system, which can be equipped with cruise missiles capable of striking Chinese targets, was brought in for joint exercises earlier this year, both countries said at the time, but has remained there.
The Southeast Asian archipelago, Taiwan's neighbour to the South, is an important part of U.S. strategy in Asia and would be an indispensable staging point for the military to aid Taipei in the event of a Chinese attack.
China and Russia have condemned the first deployment of the system to the Indo-Pacific, accusing Washington of fuelling an arms race.
China's foreign ministry said on Thursday it was very concerned about the plan to keep the system in place.
"It seriously threatens the security of regional countries and intensifies geopolitical confrontation," ministry spokesperson Lin Jian told a press briefing.
The deployment, some details of which have not been previously reported, comes as China and U.S. defence treaty ally the Philippines clash over parts of the hotly contested South China Sea. Recent months have brought a series of sea and air confrontations in the strategic waterway.
Philippine officials said Filipino and U.S. forces continued to train with the missile system, which is on the northern island of Luzon, facing the South China Sea and is close to the Taiwan Strait. They said they were not aware of immediate plans to return it, even though the joint exercises end this month.
Locator map of the U.S. Typhon missile system in Laoag, northern Philippines, near the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
A Philippine army spokesman, Colonel Louie Dema-ala, on Wednesday said training was ongoing and it was up to Philippine authorities and the United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) to decide how long the missile system would stay.
"It is up to the higher headquarters to decide on its stay, and most importantly the USARPAC because they own this, it is not our capability," he told Reuters.
A public affairs officer for USARPAC said the Philippine army had said the Typhon could stay beyond September and soldiers trained with it as recently as last week, engaging "in discussions over employing the system, with a focus on integrating host nation support."
A senior Philippine government official and another person familiar with the matter said the U.S. and the Philippines were testing the feasibility of using the system there in the event of a conflict and how well it works in that environment. Both spoke on condition of anonymity.
The government official said the Typhon - which is intended to be mobile and moved as needed - was in the Philippines for a "test on the feasibility of deploying it in country so that when the need arises, it could easily be deployed here."
The office of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr did not respond to a request for comment.
'SLEEPLESS NIGHTS'
The U.S army flew the Typhon, which can launch missiles including SM-6 missiles and Tomahawks with a range exceeding 1,600 km (994 miles), to the Philippines in April in what it called a "historic first" and a "significant step in our partnership with the Philippines".
A satellite image taken on Wednesday by Planet Labs, a commercial satellite firm, and reviewed by Reuters showed the Typhon at the Laoag International Airport, in Ilocos Norte province.
The senior government official who spoke to Reuters said there were no immediate plans to withdraw it.
"If ever it will be pulled out, it is because the objective has been achieved and it may be brought (back) in after all the repairs or the construction would have been done," the official said, adding that there was strategic value for the Philippines in keeping the system to deter China.
"We want to give them sleepless nights."
ANTI-SHIP WEAPONS
The U.S. has been amassing a variety of anti-ship weapons in Asia, as Washington attempts to catch up quickly in an Indo-Pacific missile race in which China has a big lead, Reuters has reported.
Although the U.S. military has declined to say how many will be deployed in the Indo-Pacific region, more than 800 SM-6 missiles are due to be bought in the next five years, according to government documents outlining military purchases. Several thousand Tomahawks are already in U.S. inventories, the documents showed.
China has denounced the deployment of the Typhon several times, including in May when Wu Qian, spokesperson for China's defense ministry, said Manila and Washington had brought “huge risks of war into the region”.
Russian President Vladimir Putin in June cited the deployment when announcing his country would resume production of intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear-capable missiles.
Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo in July assured his Chinese counterpart the presence of the missile system in his country posed no threat to China and would not destabilise the region.
China has fully militarised at least three of several islands it built in the South China Sea, which it mostly claims in full despite a 2016 arbitral ruling that backed the Philippines, arming them with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, the U.S. has said.
China says its military facilities in the Spratly Islands are purely defensive, and that it can do what it likes on its territory.
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Reporting by Karen Lema and Poppy McPherson; Additional reporting by Eleanor Whalley and Mei Mei Chu; Editing by Kim Coghill and Edwina Gibbs
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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