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Quotes of the Day:
“Everything that needs to be said has already been said. But, since no one was listening, everything must be said again.”
– Andre Gide, (1869-1951)
"Self-education is, I firmly believe, the only kind of education there is. The only function of a school is to make self-education easier; failing that, it does nothing.”
– Isaac Asimov
"You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war."
– Bonaparte
1. Trump and Putin: Sparks of Peace or Seeds of Crisis?
2. Cracks in the Silence: North Korean Workers and the Legacy of Solidarność (A Tale of Labor Resistance from Gdańsk to Helong)
3. What Trump’s improbable bid for ROK land reveals about his North Korea plans
4. Lee returns home after high-stakes summits with Trump, Ishiba
5. S. Korea, U.S., Japan voice serious concerns over N.K. IT workers' malicious cyber activities
6. North Korea may hold key to resuming dialogue after Lee-Trump summit: experts
7. U.S. Treasury Dept. sanctions 2 individuals, 2 entities involved in N.K. IT worker scheme
8. HD Hyundai Heavy, Hyundai Mipo to merge into unified shipbuilder amid S. Korea-U.S. project push
9. Unification minister discusses N.K. issues with Chinese envoy
10. Defense chief inspects front-line unit near western maritime border
11. S. Korea, U.S. hold vice-ministerial nuclear energy talks after Lee-Trump summit
12. S. Korea, U.S. hold combined river-crossing drills
13. Trump’s ‘fascination’ with Kim Jong Un risks giving Pyongyang upper hand: Bolton
14. North Korea slams Lee’s ‘wild dream’ of denuclearization, day after Trump summit
15. North Korea demands UN aviation watchdog investigate ROK drone incursions
1. Trump and Putin: Sparks of Peace or Seeds of Crisis?
This Is from my good friend and CAPS colleague in the UK, Ms. Jihyun Park, who is from north Korea.
This short essay covers a lot of ground: Russia, US, China, Ukraine, north Korea, and South Korea.
Excerpts:
Today’s authoritarianism is not the crude communism of the 20th century. It cleverly absorbs elements of capitalism and hides its brutality behind a polished façade.
Trump fails to see this duplicity. Nor does he recognize that authoritarian forces often cloak themselves in campaigns against homosexuality and abortion, while in reality enforcing brutal practices such as persecuting LGBTQ people or imposing forced abortions.
In his talks with Putin, Trump laments the daily loss of soldiers’ lives—but he misses the deeper truth of the dehumanized system behind Russian society. (It is always important to distinguish between authoritarian regimes and their people.)
The above excerpts are very insightful and important and need to be highlighted because those of us who never experienced authoritarianism find it hard to recognize this. We need voices like Ms. Park's to help us understand.
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Trump and Putin: Sparks of Peace or Seeds of Crisis?
freedom88-
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https://m.blog.naver.com/freedom88-/223985645468
Trump and Putin: Sparks of Peace or Seeds of Crisis?
Russia still refuses to accept a peace agreement with Ukraine.
The Kremlin insists that any deal must guarantee Ukraine’s exclusion from NATO and a ban on the deployment of Western troops.
What’s interesting is that while Moscow has been sending somewhat positive signals toward the United States, it continues to maintain a hostile stance toward Europe.
Just days ago, China sent a congratulatory message to Ukraine—something no other former Soviet republic has done since the USSR’s collapse.
Yet only a few days later, at China’s upcoming Victory Day celebrations, both Putin and prominent South Korean politicians are expected to attend.
So, will global affairs unfold according to Trump’s vision, or are we witnessing the dawn of a new conflict?
Trump claims that meeting Putin will bring an end to the Russia–Ukraine war, and the U.S.–Russia summit has already wrapped up.
But Trump lacks a deeper understanding of totalitarian dictatorships and communism.
Today’s authoritarianism is not the crude communism of the 20th century. It cleverly absorbs elements of capitalism and hides its brutality behind a polished façade.
Trump fails to see this duplicity. Nor does he recognize that authoritarian forces often cloak themselves in campaigns against homosexuality and abortion, while in reality enforcing brutal practices such as persecuting LGBTQ people or imposing forced abortions.
In his talks with Putin, Trump laments the daily loss of soldiers’ lives—but he misses the deeper truth of the dehumanized system behind Russian society. (It is always important to distinguish between authoritarian regimes and their people.)
Trump seems to believe that ending wars is simply a matter of arranging the right sequence of meetings and applying enough pressure.
This is the same mindset with which he met Kim Jong-un three times. Superficially, North Korea paused its missile launches, but in reality, the regime went so far as to declare itself a nuclear state in its constitution—a triumph for Pyongyang while Washington was left empty-handed.
Trump also fails to grasp Putin’s obsession with the legacy of the Soviet Union, or that Ukraine is fighting not for mere territory but for its sovereignty.
That is why he does not hesitate to publicly belittle Ukraine’s president, who is defending his nation’s independence. In any agreement between nations, the most crucial element is not the bargaining chips, but an accurate grasp of reality. Without that, no peace strategy can hold.
Trump threatened that if Putin refused to halt the war, he would face “serious consequences.” But so far, Trump has never followed through on any such warning.
Why, then, should the Kremlin take his words seriously this time?
If anything, Trump frames U.S. involvement in Ukraine less as a defense of freedom and more as an opportunity for arms deals and financial gain.
Putin, a former KGB agent, has clung to power for 25 years. In that time, he has launched multiple wars, crushed domestic dissent, and even assassinated his critics.
He has used chemical weapons on the streets of Britain, compared himself to Peter the Great, and rehabilitated the image of Ivan the Terrible.
Most experts agree that Putin is anything but sentimental. Yet Trump continues to praise him as one of the strongest leaders in the world.
More troubling is the fact that even after the U.S.–Russia talks, Moscow has not stopped bombing Ukrainian cities.
On August 21, Russia even attacked an American factory in western Ukraine. This act alone undermined Trump’s claim that Putin truly seeks peace. Still, Trump remains captivated by him, treating him much the same way he treated Kim Jong-un.
On August 22, Trump even floated the idea of inviting Putin to the 2026 World Cup, telling reporters: “President Putin has always respected me and our country, but he has not respected other nations.” But what does that really mean?
It shows that Trump views international order not through the lens of principles, but through his own political interests and personal relationships.
Putin’s so-called “respect” for Trump and America has nothing to do with democracy or human rights. It is simply about power and mutual convenience. For Trump, peace is not about values—it is just another transaction.
That is why his approach is unlikely to change Putin’s authoritarian nature. Instead, it risks dividing the international community further and prolonging Ukraine’s suffering.
True peace does not stem from the temporary “respect” of authoritarian leaders. It comes only from the shared resolve of the international community to defend sovereignty and human dignity.
This is much like when South Korea claims to “respect” the North Korean regime. On the surface, it looks like dialogue and diplomacy, but in reality, it only conceals the true nature of dictatorship—ultimately weakening democracy and human rights.
In the end, we must face the fact that “respect” can be not a guarantee of peace, but a tool to legitimize authoritarian rule.
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2. Cracks in the Silence: North Korean Workers and the Legacy of Solidarność (A Tale of Labor Resistance from Gdańsk to Helong)
Excellent research and analysis from one of our brilliant young interns at the Committee for Human RIghts in North Korea. This is arguably one of the most important articles on north Korea that I have sent out in a long time.
We need to be concerned with the internal instability indicators in north Korea and the impact on the regime.
We should be paying attention to Robert Collins' seminal works (many of which are published at HRNK - all aspects of social control, leadership and surveillance, state security mechanisms. (www.hrnk.org)) But for internal instability we should read his work here:
Pattern of Collapse in North Korea
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/04/11/pattern-collapse-north-korea/
For some ideas on how to explicit resistance in north Korea consider this essay:
“Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting a Resistance”
https://repo.kinu.or.kr/retrieve/11830?utm
Why is this important? The author tells us in her conclusion. The question is will we help the Korean people in the north? At the very least must we support them with a human rights up front policy. We at least owe that to the 25 millions Koreans suffering in the north.
Concluding remarks
Poland’s Solidarność movement and the Helong strike, separated by over four decades and vastly different regimes, reveal the power and limits of labor resistance under authoritarian rule. Each began with a basic demand for dignity: Polish shipyard workers sought independent unions, and North Korean laborers demanded their earned wages. Both demands challenged regimes that claimed to defend workers while exploiting their labor. Solidarność succeeded by building leadership, underground networks, and securing international support. North Korean workers, by contrast, continue to lack protection, communication channels, and the freedom to organize. The Helong protest nevertheless reflected extraordinary courage under extreme risk. The international community has taken some steps, but its efforts remain insufficient.
Solidarność offers both an inspiration and a warning. It models how organized labor, civic unity, and international backing can challenge repression, but also warns of the risks when a movement lacks sustained support or fractures under pressure.
Grassroots defiance can help topple rigid regimes, but only with unity and outside support. The Helong strike reflected that same spirit in one of the harshest conditions imaginable. These workers risk retaliation against themselves and their families. Their resistance calls for an international response. Repression grows stronger when courage meets silence. Small acts of defiance can become lasting movements only if sustained legal, diplomatic, and material support follows.
Cracks in the Silence: North Korean Workers and the Legacy of Solidarność (A Tale of Labor Resistance from Gdańsk to Helong)
https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/cracks-in-the-silence-north-korean-workers-and-the-legacy-of-solidarnosca-tale-of-labor-resistance-from-gdansk-to-helong
8/27/2025
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Richie Chan - stock.adobe.com
By Ada Trybuchowska, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca, HRNK Research Associate
Introduction
Far from the public eye, North Korean workers labor in foreign lands under intense surveillance, stripped of freedom, and denied their earnings. Pyongyang sends tens of thousands of North Korean workers to countries like China and Russia to earn foreign currency for the regime, often under conditions amounting to forced labor.[1] They pack seafood, pour concrete, and sew garments, often receiving a fraction of the pay – if any.[2] What followed in Helong, China, was not merely a labor dispute but a rare assertion of human dignity. Echoing the legacy of Poland’s Solidarność – a trade union movement born from the 1980 Gdańsk Shipyard strikes that successfully challenged a communist regime – this piece examines the Helong protest and draws lessons from Solidarność.
A Factory Revolt: The Helong Uprising and Its Roots
On a bitterly cold morning in January 2024, something extraordinary happened in the China-North Korea border city of Helong. That winter, hundreds of North Korean workers rose against their overseers, staging a rare protest to demand unpaid wages and repatriation. The unrest centered around factories in Nanping Town, a key industrial hub for food processing and garment production, which employed North Koreans.[3] Laborers from over ten textile and garment plants across Helong joined the action.[4] For three tense days, nearly 3,000 North Korean migrant workers staged a mass revolt.[5] They locked their Chinese and North Korean supervisors, halted production, and demanded the wages they had been denied for months, totaling approximately $10 million.[6] This was not a typical labor dispute; it directly confronted one of the world’s most repressive systems of labor control, where obedience stems not just from state coercion but from fear for one’s family, future, and life. Tensions climaxed when, amid confrontation, one of the detained North Korean officials (dispatched to monitor the workers) was beaten to death by the protesters.[7] North Korean state security agents agreed to pay several months’ worth of wages directly to the workers on-site, and the protesters ended the strike later that day. This concession temporarily defused the situation. No other known North Korean labor protest abroad had ever reached this scale.[8]
The Helong uprising ruptured Pyongyang’s carefully cultivated fear system. Officially, North Korea had sent young workers abroad under the pretense of patriotism and economic duty. In reality, they formed part of a vast state-run labor export system, which dispatched tens of thousands of North Koreans to factories and construction sites across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.[9] As of 2024, an estimated 100,000 North Koreans continued working in foreign countries.[10] Although some deployments remain nominally legal, they often bypass international labor laws and violate UN Security Council Resolution 2397, which banned North Korean overseas labor and required all such workers to be repatriated by 2019, aiming to cut off the regime’s illicit income for its nuclear program.[11] Due to inconsistent enforcement, many remain abroad, creating a gray economy worth up to US $500 million annually for the North Korean regime.[12]
The Helong protest began after workers discovered that colleagues repatriated to North Korea had never received their promised wages.[13] Pyongyang confiscates up to 70-90% of workers’ earnings, often only paying workers upon returning home, further ensuring their dependence and obedience.[14] This revelation shattered the fragile illusion that obedience might lead to reward. The workers occupied the factory, barricaded the gates, and refused to return to work. This collective defiance stood out for its scale and the immense risk involved.[15]
North Korean overseas workers live under constant surveillance, their passports confiscated upon arrival, housed in cramped dormitories with poor living conditions, enduring shifts up to 16 hours daily, with monitored conversations and banned phones.[16][17] Any sign of dissent leads to punishment, including forced repatriation to North Korea, where imprisonment or execution, along with retribution against one’s family, often follows.[18] Within this brutal context, the Helong protest became a rare and radical assertion of human agency.
By late January, Chinese and North Korean authorities responded. North Korean officials rushed to Helong and paid several months of overdue wages to placate the workers, temporarily defusing the situation.[19] They then quietly dispersed the workers, relocated them to other sites, or returned them home; however, most of them faced consequences.[20] Half of them were forcibly repatriated to North Korea, likely sent to political prison camp; the others were placed under heightened surveillance.[21] This response mirrored a longstanding pattern of punishment; Pyongyang uses overseas labor not only to earn revenue but also to test their loyalty, as many of the workers come from families considered politically loyal.[22]
Chinese and North Korean authorities suppressed the Helong protest. Still, the incident remains essential for exposing the limits of control in even most repressive labor systems. Helong matters as it shows that even tightly controlled workers can resist. It also raises questions about how long Pyongyang can contain such defiance. This case compares to another labor movement where workers challenged a regime claiming to speak for them. That movement began in Poland when shipyard workers launched a strike that changed the country’s future.
Lessons from Gdańsk: When Labor Became a Movement
In the summer of 1980, Polish workers at the Gdańsk Shipyard launched a strike that reshaped the Cold War era and redefined labor resistance under authoritarianism. What began as a local protest over price hikes and deteriorating living conditions quickly became one of postwar Europe’s most consequential social movements. At the center stood an electrician named Lech Wałęsa, who later became Poland’s President and received the Nobel Peace Prize.[23] His leadership helped transform a single workplace dispute into Solidarność (Solidarity), the first independent trade union in the Soviet bloc.[24] Within a year, Solidarność grew into a nationwide force with nearly 10 million members, more than a quarter of Poland’s population at the time.[25]
The movement did not function as an ordinary union. Solidarność became a civic movement that united workers, intellectuals, students, and clergy around a shared vision of rights, dignity, and political reform.[26] Members demanded more than wage increases or better working conditions; they called for freedom of speech, access to independent media, the release of political prisoners, and an end to censorship, demands that directly confronted the communist rule. The August 1980 Gdańsk Accords, signed after mass strikes, granted limited rights to strike and organize independently; that agreement marked a crack in the Iron Curtain, a breach the regime immediately tried to seal.[27]
In December 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law, banned Solidarność, and imprisoned thousands of activists.[28] Nevertheless, underground networks of union members and supporters continued to publish clandestine newspapers, organize covert meetings, and stage sporadic strikes. The Catholic Church offered protection and moral legitimacy, while Western governments and labor unions provided material and symbolic support.[29] Aid arrived through smuggled printing presses, shortwave radio broadcasts, and public campaigns led by foreign trade unionists.[30] These networks served as lifelines and deterred harsher repression by signaling global awareness and solidarity.
Throughout the 1980s, Solidarność challenged the communist establishment with persistent resilience. This effort culminated in 1988 when renewed strikes and an economic crisis forced the regime to negotiate. The 1989 Round Table Talks produced an agreement to hold partially free elections, where Solidarność candidates won by a landslide.[31] By August, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, one of the movement’s advisors, assumed office as the first non-Communist Prime Minister in the Eastern Bloc, initiating Poland’s peaceful democratic transition.[32] Solidarność demonstrated that organized labor backed by broad civic coalitions could successfully confront entrenched authoritarian rule.
Several factors allowed for this transformation. Firstly, the organization was crucial. Solidarność emerged from earlier dissident groups like the Committee for the Defence of Workers (KOR), which provided the intellectual and logistical groundwork for collective resistance.[33] Secondly, pluralism played a key role. Solidarność transcended class and ideology, uniting blue-collar workers, urban professionals, students, and clergy. Thirdly, effective communication sustained momentum. Underground publications, leaflets, and word-of-mouth kept members informed and connected despite martial law.[34] Lastly, international solidarity made a significant difference. Labor unions from Western countries, including the United States and France, contributed funding, training, advocacy platforms, and international visibility.[35] The Vatican also provided moral support, and Western media highlighted the movement’s struggles.[36]
The Polish experience provides valuable insights. Authoritarian regimes often claim to act in the name of workers. However, when workers rise up, they expose the regime’s most profound contradictions. Solidarność revealed how labor activism, fused with broader demands for justice and freedom, can evolve into a powerful national movement capable of influencing history. It proved that authoritarianism can be vulnerable to collective resistance under the right conditions. North Korean workers have already demonstrated immense courage. The crucial question remains whether conditions permit that courage to grow into a similarly impactful movement inside North Korea.
What Connects (and Divides) These Stories
At first glance, Polish shipyard strikers and North Korean workers in China appear to come from opposite ends of history. They operated under different regimes, faced different constraints, and emerged in dramatically different geopolitical contexts. Yet their acts of defiance, separated by over four decades and thousands of miles, reveal parallels.
In both cases, groups of ordinary workers took significant personal risks to protest exploitation. It takes immense bravery for any group of laborers, whether shipbuilders in Gdańsk or factory workers in Helong, to collectively say “no.” In both movements, the youth and a sense of injustice played an important role. In Poland, young workers and students joined Solidarność alongside veteran laborers. Teenagers held hunger strikes, wore Solidarność badges, and debated politics in schoolyards.[37] These acts revealed how deeply the movement captured the imagination of a new generation. Similarly, many of the Helong protesters were young women in their twenties, reportedly former Korean People’s Army (KPA) soldiers dispatched abroad through a trading company under North Korea’s Ministry of Defense.[38] Despite their background, they may have been less influenced by regime propaganda than older generations.
The diffusion of information played a key role in both cases. The Polish movement benefited from established underground communication channels. Activists spread their message through pamphlets, church sermons, and foreign media broadcasts, allowing the strike to inspire solidarity nationwide. In contrast, North Korean workers lacked independent networks, and news of Helong reached the outside world through South Korean intelligence and defector testimonies.[39] Yet even within these limits, information traveled. Researcher Cho Han-bum and former diplomat Ko Young-hwan publicized the Helong protest through interviews and online commentary,[40] and major outlets soon picked up their accounts. Moreover, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed “various incidents and accidents” involving North Korean workers, attributing them to poor labor conditions.[41] Although the NIS released few details, South Korean experts and former North Korean officials quickly amplified the story. The Helong protest sparked similar incidents among North Korean workers in other Chinese cities, including Dandong.[42] In Dandong, workers refused to return to their jobs and demanded to go home, citing long-term physical and emotional exhaustion. According to reports, some said they would rather die in North Korea than remain in China.[43] Although the Helong protest lacked the coordination and structure of Solidarność, it sparked visible unrest elsewhere, showing that even fragmented acts of resistance can carry influence beyond a single factory gate.
The movements differed not only in scale but also in how they organized and sustained leadership. Solidarność became a formal movement with elected leaders and inter-factory coordination. Dissident advisers supported it, and the movement maintained solidified negotiation channels. The North Korean protests, however, were spontaneous and without a clear leader, and desperation rather than strategy drove them. In Helong, leadership emerged informally and remained anonymous. Authorities later identified around 200 individuals as “leaders” of the unrest and reportedly sent many to prison camps.[44] After the protest, officials increased ideological indoctrination sessions from weekly to daily, seeking to reassert control.[45] These mandatory sessions reinforce loyalty to Kim Jong-un and frame any dissent, even abroad, as betrayal. Workers must attend lectures, recite slogans, and submit written reflections affirming their ideological commitment each day.[46]
These differing structures shaped each movement’s durability. Solidarność maintained pressure for nearly a decade and eventually helped lead Poland’s democratic transition. The Helong uprising lasted only a few days. Although some overdue wages were paid to ease tensions, authorities swiftly punished those held responsible. In Poland, the majority of leaders returned to public life by 1984.[47] The Helong protest exposed cracks in a system built to suppress dissent. Like the Gdańsk strikers who held their ground, Helong’s workers disrupted the illusion of total control. Their actions signaled to Pyongyang that even the most trusted laborers have limits that must be respected. Moreover, unlike Solidarność, which gained rapid international solidarity in the 1980s, the Helong workers count not receive public support from any foreign government. The global response remained limited to intelligence briefings and quiet diplomacy, likely to avoid worsening the risk to those involved. This silence further illustrates the isolation faced by North Korean workers.
The severity of state reprisals also differed. While both regimes used crackdowns, North Korea responded more harshly. Martial law in Poland between 1981 and 1983 led to thousands of arrests but relatively few deaths; many of the prisoners later received amnesty.[48] North Korean authorities classify even non-violent strikes as acts of treason, and the Helong protesters likely understood that their actions could lead to execution or indefinite detention.
North Korea’s system of collective punishment further magnifies these risks. Unlike in Poland, where repression often targeted individual activists, North Korean authorities apply yeon-jwa-je, also known as “guilt by association”.[49] Family members can face punishment for a relative’s perceived disloyalty. This hostage-like leverage discourages many from resisting, forcing them to consider not only their own safety but the fate of their loved ones back home. The regime’s use of collective punishment adds a uniquely cruel dimension to its repression. Workers often comply out of fear for their families and themselves. It stifles not just public voices but even the private thought of resistance.
The Role of International Society and What Comes Next
The international response has not matched the scale of these abuses. No UN resolution or public statement has addressed the Helong protest, likely because China and North Korea concealed the incident, and verifying details remains difficult. The U.S. Treasury sanctioned Chinese and Russian firms in 2020 for violating a UN resolution on overseas labor.[50] These efforts suggest growing concern but limited enforcement. In March 2024, Russia blocked the UN Panel of Experts’ renewal, thus severely diminishing sanctions compliance.[51] Without oversight, violations will likely rise further. Furthermore, in 2024, the UN Human Rights Office described North Korea’s labor export system as state-sponsored forced labor and a potential crime against humanity.[52]
The legacy of Solidarność reminds us that solidarity must cross borders. Since North Korean workers cannot speak freely, others must continue to do so in their place. NGOs, embassies, and legal advocates must help build secure communication channels for workers in danger. Supporting these workers remains both a moral duty and a practical strategy to weaken North Korea’s forced labor economy.
Concluding remarks
Poland’s Solidarność movement and the Helong strike, separated by over four decades and vastly different regimes, reveal the power and limits of labor resistance under authoritarian rule. Each began with a basic demand for dignity: Polish shipyard workers sought independent unions, and North Korean laborers demanded their earned wages. Both demands challenged regimes that claimed to defend workers while exploiting their labor. Solidarność succeeded by building leadership, underground networks, and securing international support. North Korean workers, by contrast, continue to lack protection, communication channels, and the freedom to organize. The Helong protest nevertheless reflected extraordinary courage under extreme risk. The international community has taken some steps, but its efforts remain insufficient.
Solidarność offers both an inspiration and a warning. It models how organized labor, civic unity, and international backing can challenge repression, but also warns of the risks when a movement lacks sustained support or fractures under pressure.
Grassroots defiance can help topple rigid regimes, but only with unity and outside support. The Helong strike reflected that same spirit in one of the harshest conditions imaginable. These workers risk retaliation against themselves and their families. Their resistance calls for an international response. Repression grows stronger when courage meets silence. Small acts of defiance can become lasting movements only if sustained legal, diplomatic, and material support follows.
Ada Trybuchowska is a recent graduate of the Master of Global Affairs program at the University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. She is currently a Research Intern at HRNK, contributing to analysis and communications on North Korean human rights. Her research interests include cybersecurity, human rights advocacy, and the politics of Central and Eastern Europe, with a particular emphasis on populism and digital policy.
[1] Eugene Whong, “100,000 North Koreans Work Abroad, Earning US$500 Million a Year: UN,” Radio Free Asia, March 21, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/workers-03212024162926.html.
[2] Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers Say,” Reuters, February 8, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/signs-rare-unrest-among-north-korean-workers-china-researchers-say-2024-02-08/.
[3] Seulkee Jang, “N. Korean Official’s Death in China Leads to Increased Ideological Reviews of Workers,” Daily NK, March 6, 2024, http://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-officials-death-china-leads-increased-ideological-reviews-workers/.
[4] Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers Say.”.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Tae-jun Kang, “Enraged N Korean Workers in China Beat Factory Manager to Death: Report,” Radio Free Asia, February 19, 2024, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nkorean-workers-kill-manager-02192024003047.html#:~:text=when the hostage management representative,to death by the workers.
[8] Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers Say.”
[9] Philippe Pons, “North Korean Workers Abroad, a Financial Windfall for the Pyongyang Regime,” Le Monde, March 30, 2025, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/03/30/north-korean-workers-abroad-a-financial-windfall-for-the-pyongyang-regime_6739654_4.html.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Min Chao Choy, “Last Year, North Korean Workers Were Banned Abroad. But Some Still Didn’t Leave.,” NK News, December 21, 2020, https://www.nknews.org/2020/12/last-year-north-korean-workers-were-banned-abroad-but-some-still-didnt-leave/.
[12] Chad O’Carroll, “100K North Koreans Still Earning Money for Regime Overseas: UN Report,” NK News, March 21, 2024, https://www.nknews.org/2024/03/100k-north-koreans-still-earning-money-for-regime-overseas-un-report/.
[13] Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers Say.”
[14] U.S. Department of State, 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea, July 1, 2021, https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/north-korea/.
[15] Park Chan-kyong, “Could Reports of a North Korean Workers’ Riot in China ‘Pose Threats’ to the Regime?,” South China Morning Post, January 31, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3250287/could-reports-north-korean-workers-riot-china-pose-threats-regime.
[16] U.S. Department of State, 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea, March 20, 2023, https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/north-korea/.
[17] Greg Scarlatoiu, Raymond Ha, and Hyunseung Lee, North Korean Workers Officially Dispatched to China & Russia: Human Rights Denial, Chain of Command & Control (Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2022), https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Overseas_Workers_0926.pdf.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Tae-jun Kang, “Enraged N Korean Workers in China Beat Factory Manager to Death: Report.”
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Park Chan-kyong, “Could Reports of a North Korean Workers’ Riot in China ‘Pose Threats’ to the Regime?.”
[23] Gdańsk - The Gdańsk Shipyard, the Birthplace of Solidarity,” Zabytek, accessed May 3, 2025, https://zabytek.pl/en/obiekty/gdansk-stocznia-gdanska-miejsce-narodzin-solidarnosci.
[24] Maciej Bartkowski, “Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989),” International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, December 2009, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/polands-solidarity-movement-1980-1989/.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Mikołaj Gliński, “The Solidarity Movement: Anti-Communist, Or Most Communist Thing Ever?,” Culture, August 9, 2016, https://culture.pl/en/article/the-solidarity-movement-anti-communist-or-most-communist-thing-ever.
[27] Sebastian Ligarski, “Not Just Gdańsk. the August 1980 Accords,” Polish History, accessed May 3, 2025, https://polishhistory.pl/not-just-gdansk-the-august-1980-accords/.
[28] Wojciech Polak, “Different Faces of Martial Law,” Polonia Institute, June 17, 2024, https://poloniainstitute.net/current-events/different-faces-of-martial-law/.
[29] Rafał Łatka: Kościół Katolicki a Solidarność (1980–1981),” Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, April 15, 2024, https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/historia-z-ipn/archiwum/162937%2CRafal-Latka-Kosciol-katolicki-a-Solidarnosc-19801981.html#:~:text=Wpływ na etos .
[30] Tomasz Kozłowski, “Solidarity: A Trade Union as a Cold War Actor (1980–1993),” in The Palgrave Handbook of Non-State Actors in East-West Relations, ed. Péter Marton, Gitte Thomasen, Csaba Békés, and András Rácz (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05750-2_57-1, p. 3-4.
[31] Ibid., p. 10.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Colin Barker, “The Rise of Solidarnosc,” International Socialism, October 17, 2005, https://isj.org.uk/the-rise-of-solidarnosc/.
[34] Evans, Kristi S. “The Argument of Images: Historical Representation in Solidarity Underground Postage, 1981-87.” American Ethnologist 19, no. 4 (1992): 749–67. http://www.jstor.org/stable/644917.
[35] Arch Puddington, “Surviving the Underground,” American Educator, 2005, https://www.aft.org/ae/summer2005/puddington.
[36] Maciej Bartkowski, “Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989).”
[37] Kristi S. Evans, “The Argument of Images: Historical Representation in Solidarity Underground Postage, 1981–87.”
[38] Tae-jun Kang, “Enraged N Korean Workers in China Beat Factory Manager to Death: Report.”
[39] Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers Say.”
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Kim Soo-yeon, “N. Korean Workers Refuse to Go to Work in Dandong: Seoul Expert,” Yonhap, February 29, 2024, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240229008500315.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Tae-jun Kang, “Enraged N Korean Workers in China Beat Factory Manager to Death: Report.”.
[45] Seulkee Jang, “N. Korean Official’s Death in China Leads to Increased Ideological Reviews of Workers.”
[46] Ibid.
[47] Maciej Bartkowski, “Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989).”
[48] Benedek Pál, “‘All the Telephone and Telex Lines Are Disconnected’ – RFE and the 1981 Martial Law in Poland,” Blinken OSA Archivum, December 13, 2021, https://www.archivum.org/entries/blog/all-the-telephone-and-telex-lines-are-disconnected---rfe-and-the-1981-martial-law-in-poland.
[49] David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: The Lives and Voices of “Those Who Are Sent to the Mountains”, 2nd ed.,Washington, DC: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012, https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/eng/HRNK_HiddenGulag2_Web_5-18.pdf, p. 29.
[50] Mathew Ha, “Treasury Sanctions Companies Exporting North Korean Labor to Russia,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, November 23, 2020, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/11/23/treasury-sanctions-north-korean-labor-russia/.
[51] Edith M. Lederer, “Russian Veto Brings an End to the UN Panel That Monitors North Korea Nuclear Sanctions,” AP News, March 28, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/un-us-north-korea-russia-sanctions-monitoring-72f8cbac116dea7c795d9a3357fc45f3.
[52] Tae-jun Kang, “Enraged N Korean Workers in China Beat Factory Manager to Death: Report.”.
3. What Trump’s improbable bid for ROK land reveals about his North Korea plans
Interesting analysis.
My fear (somewhat tongue in cheek) is that Mr. Trump (acting in his personal capacity as a real estate expert) will become the landlord of Camp Humphreys and then evict the current tenants so the property can be sold for a profit.
Excerpts:
Suon Choi, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, told NK News that South Koreans would likely have mixed reactions.
“On one hand, the government and many in the public could take it as a reassuring signal that President Trump intends to keep U.S. troops in Korea,” she said.
“On the other hand, framing the issue in terms of ownership and property might raise concerns about how he views the alliance — as a transactional relationship rather than a strategic partnership.”
What Trump’s improbable bid for ROK land reveals about his North Korea plans
Talk of owning land for bases suggests commitment to US military presence, but experts say proposal hasn’t a prayer
https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/what-trumps-improbable-bid-for-rok-land-reveals-about-his-north-korea-plans/
Jooheon Kim | Shreyas Reddy August 26, 2025
U.S. President Donald Trump and a USFK soldier throwing a practice grenade | Images: The White House via Flickr (Aug. 20, 2025) and U.S. Forces Korea via Facebook (April 14, 2025), edited by NK News
U.S. President Donald Trump raised eyebrows on Monday with an unusual bid for ownership of the South Korean land that hosts American bases, a proposal that, while highly unlikely to come to fruition, may signal a willingness to commit to a long-term military presence with implications for North Korea deterrence.
During a summit with his South Korean counterpart Lee Jae-myung, Trump pushed for Seoul to transfer control of land allotted to U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), justifying his demands by citing American investment in ROK-based facilities.
“We spent a lot of money building a fort, and there was a contribution made by South Korea,” he told reporters. “I would like to see if we could get rid of the lease and get ownership of the land where we have a massive military base.”
The proposal shows Trump remains interested in retaining a strong presence on the Korean Peninsula after months of speculation to the contrary, but possibly with the ultimate goal of shifting USFK’s focus away from North Korea and toward other regional threats such as China.
However, it may also exacerbate existing concerns in Seoul that Trump views the alliance as purely “transactional,” casting doubt on joint deterrence efforts under a president who has long been skeptical about U.S. military support for South Korea.
COMMITTING TROOPS TO PENINSULA
Trump raised the land ownership topic while deflecting reporters’ questions about Washington’s speculated plans to withdraw USFK troops or seek greater “strategic flexibility” for American troops beyond the peninsula.
By demanding ownership of USFK land, however, Trump appeared to prioritize a long-term U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula, which could alleviate fears in Seoul that he plans to shift the focus away from North Korea.
Min Jeong-hun, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, told NK News that some of South Korea’s concerns have likely eased due to Trump’s apparent lack of interest in strategic flexibility.
“If you look at Trump saying things like he doesn’t want to talk about troop reductions because South Korea is a friend, then it doesn’t really seem that President Trump himself has the will to push for a reduction of U.S. troops in Korea,” he said.
“When you see him talking about ownership of U.S. bases in Korea, I take that as a sign that he places considerable value on USFK,” he added.
U.S. and ROK troops taking part in the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) joint exercises in 2022 | Image: 2nd Infantry Division via X (Aug. 26, 2022)
Although Trump sidestepped the strategic flexibility issue, ownership of bases may actually allow the U.S. “greater latitude” in pursuing more varied objectives, according to James Minnich, a professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu.
“The concern with strategic flexibility is that in executing it or in implementing it, South Korea could reject it and say you can’t do whatever operation it is from that base,” he told NK News. “Were land to actually be transferred, then it would be sovereign land and therefore Korea could no longer interject.”
The talk of strategic flexibility has raised concerns in South Korea that dividing American forces’ attention between different threats will dilute joint deterrence against North Korean aggression, but Minnich stressed that this is a natural evolution of the USFK’s role.
“The only place that the United States has single-threat focused forces is on the Korean Peninsula,” he said. “As the security environment evolves, it becomes less and less tenable that forces only do one thing.”
BALANCING US-ROK TIES
Trump’s demand for ownership of the land used by American bases appears to pave the way for more direct control of U.S. military operations on the Korean Peninsula, but the feasibility of such a proposal remains in doubt.
Under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which governs the legal status of ROK-based U.S. forces, South Korea grants USFK “the use of facilities and areas” to perform its duties, and when such sites are no longer in use, they return to the host nation’s control.
During a post-summit briefing, South Korean National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac explained that this land is provided for the USFK’s use, but he added this land is “shared” rather than leased or owned, despite Trump’s claims.
Daniel Pinkston, a Seoul-based lecturer at Troy University, questioned why a “real estate swindler” like Trump would even want ownership of the land when U.S. troops already have access to the bases.
“It’s just a nonsensical statement,” he told NK News. “This shows how unserious Trump is and how unaware and ignorant he is. “
Furthermore, the U.S. maintains similar SOFA pacts with dozens of countries around the world, and Minnich said there doesn’t appear to be any mechanism supporting Trump’s proposal.
“It sounds more like creating a construct that is analogous to embassies in different parts of the world,” he said. “It’s sovereign land and when countries allow embassies to be constructed, they no longer have latitude on that land.”
A U.S. airman high-fives students of a local school in Pyeongtaek, South Korea | Image: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Jason W. Cochran (March 31, 2025)
Attempting to turn these bases into U.S. territory would be “destabilizing and deeply counterproductive to the alliance,” according to retired Army officer Steve Tharp, who previously headed USFK’s Good Neighbor Program aimed at improving relations between American troops and South Koreans.
“Any proposal to transform a USFK installation into U.S. territory … would evoke the historical memory of 19th-century extraterritorial arrangements and the so-called ‘unequal treaties’ that infringed upon Korea’s autonomy during that era,” he told NK News.
“Such a step would be widely perceived as a usurpation of ROK sovereignty and would likely trigger the most significant surge of anti-U.S. sentiment since the protests of 2002,” he added.
Suon Choi, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, told NK News that South Koreans would likely have mixed reactions.
“On one hand, the government and many in the public could take it as a reassuring signal that President Trump intends to keep U.S. troops in Korea,” she said.
“On the other hand, framing the issue in terms of ownership and property might raise concerns about how he views the alliance — as a transactional relationship rather than a strategic partnership.”
Edited by Bryan Betts
4. Lee returns home after high-stakes summits with Trump, Ishiba
(LEAD) Lee returns home after high-stakes summits with Trump, Ishiba | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Deok-Hyun Kim · August 28, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS photo)
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Aug. 28 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung returned home Thursday after a six-day trip to the United States and Japan for high-stakes summit talks with U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.
Lee held his first in-person meeting with Trump in Washington on Monday during which they converged on the need to resume diplomacy with North Korea while pledging to work together to revitalize America's shipbuilding industry -- a sector that the Trump administration is keen to shore up amid its intensifying rivalry with China.
President Lee Jae Myung and first lady Kim Hea Kyung arrive at Seoul Airport in Seongnam, south of Seoul, on Aug. 28, 2025. (Yonhap)
Lee voiced support for Trump's pursuit of dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, urging him to play a role as a "peacemaker" on the divided Korean Peninsula while pledging to play his own part as a "pacemaker" in a convincing tone.
Still, sensitive issues, including "alliance modernization" between Seoul and Washington and trade in the rice and beef markets, were not publicly discussed.
This photo, taken on Aug. 25, 2025, shows South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (L) shaking hands with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House in Washington. (Yonhap)
Ahead of his visit to Washington, Lee stopped in Tokyo to hold his first full summit with Ishiba and discussed ways to advance bilateral ties through "shuttle diplomacy" and issued the first Seoul-Tokyo joint summit statement in 17 years.
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said Lee built personal rapport with the leaders in the back-to-back summits, which laid the groundwork for closer ties with Tokyo and advancing trilateral cooperation with Washington.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Deok-Hyun Kim · August 28, 2025
5. S. Korea, U.S., Japan voice serious concerns over N.K. IT workers' malicious cyber activities
The international community must collectively attack and defeat KJU's all purpose sword.
S. Korea, U.S., Japan voice serious concerns over N.K. IT workers' malicious cyber activities | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · August 27, 2025
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korea, the United States and Japan on Wednesday voiced "serious concerns" over evolving malicious cyber activities by North Korean information technology (IT) workers who use artificial intelligence (AI) tools and other means to fund Pyongyang's illicit weapons programs.
The three countries issued the call in a joint statement, reaffirming the shared commitment to continued trilateral coordination to counter the North's unlawful cyber activities that pose serious risks to the international community.
"North Korea continues to dispatch its IT workers around the world to generate revenue, which funds its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions," the statement issued by the foreign ministry showed.
"Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea express serious concerns over the evolving malicious activities of North Korean IT workers," it read.
The statement said that North Korean IT workers use a variety of techniques to disguise themselves as non-North Koreans with false identities and locations, including by "leveraging AI tools as well as cooperating with foreign facilitators."
This photo, released on Oct. 30, 2024. by the Korean Central News Agency, North Korea's state mouthpiece, shows a booth from an information technology exhibition jointly hosted by North Korea and Russia in Pyongyang. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
It said that they take advantage of existing demands for advanced IT skills to obtain freelance employment contracts from across the world, noting that many of them are particularly engaged in blockchain industries.
The three countries warned that hiring and outsourcing work to North Korean IT workers "increasingly pose serious risks," such as intellectual property theft, reputational harm and legal consequences.
In this vein, each of the three countries has taken actions to disrupt these activities by North Korean IT workers, with Japan updating its alert to provide detailed information about their activities and advising the private sector to reduce the risk of inadvertently hiring them or outsourcing work to these groups.
The U.S. is sanctioning four entities and individuals in connection with these schemes overseas, including in Russia, Laos and China. South Korea has also issued advisories to help companies avoid being targeted.
"Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea reaffirm their commitment to enhancing their coordination, and deepening collaboration between the public and private sector to counter malicious cyber activities and illicit revenue generation by North Korea," the statement said.
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · August 27, 2025
6. North Korea may hold key to resuming dialogue after Lee-Trump summit: experts
The question is how much will KJU try to extort from Trump and Lee in return for just talking. We must not engage with KJU until we have a superior alliance political warfare strategy to defeat him.
North Korea may hold key to resuming dialogue after Lee-Trump summit: experts | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 28, 2025
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- After Presidents Lee Jae Myung and Donald Trump signaled their shared desire to reengage with North Korea during their summit this week, the question of when to open the door for dialogue will hinge on Pyongyang's decision, experts said Wednesday.
During their White House summit on Monday, Trump voiced hope to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un this year, while Lee has expressed his intention to reengage with Pyongyang to reduce cross-border tensions and promote peace on the Korean Peninsula.
The leaders showed their willingness for diplomacy with the North amid speculation that Pyongyang's appetite for engagement with either Seoul or Washington has lessened, if not evaporated entirely, given that it now relies on Moscow for food, fuel, military support, technology and other assistance.
"How to open a door with North Korea is going to be a big question ... North Korea will decide when the door is unlocked and open," former U.S. Forces Korea Commander Vincent Brooks said during a podcast hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
"I've found them directly to be easy to work with when they want to be, and impossible to work with, mostly the other time because they choose not to be," he added.
The retired general anticipated that there will be "some door opening" this fall or later.
"It probably won't be any earlier than October (or) November. If then, after the U.N. General Assembly, after a few more pieces fall in international relations," he said.
"And then, North Korea will take stock of what the environment looks like around them and will choose to move at that point in time. I think that's what we ought to look for it."
This photo, taken on Sept. 26, 2023, shows former U.S. Forces Korea Commander Vincent Brooks speaking during a forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. (Yonhap)
Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the CSIS, also said that the North will decide when it wants to resume dialogue.
Touching on the leaders' discussions on North Korea, Cha said that Lee effectively drew Trump into a conversation about the North by "pushing the two buttons," which tapped into Trump's desire to become a "peacemaker" and piqued his interest in real estate development.
"One of them was talking about how Trump is a peacebuilder, and we know that he really does see himself that way," he said. "And then the second is to talk about real estate ... the idea of building a Trump Tower in Pyongyang and of a golf course."
On the trade and investment front, Cha said that "pressure is now on the Seoul government" to reach an agreement with the United States over specifics of an investment fund under last month's bilateral framework trade deal.
Under the broad-brush trade deal, the Trump administration agreed to lower "reciprocal" tariffs to 15 percent from the proposed 25 percent in return for South Korea's commitment to investing US$350 billion in the United States and purchasing $100 billion worth of U.S. energy, among other commitments.
But there are unresolved issues regarding the investment fund, including differences over how to share profits from the fund.
Cha anticipated an agreement on the investment fund between Seoul and Washington could only come after Japan reaches an agreement with the Trump administration on its own investment scheme.
"I don't think it's going to happen until after the Japan deal. They are negotiating the terms of the Japan investment deal, and then maybe at that point, the Koreans will know where they want to go on this," he said.
This photo, taken on Oct. 17, 2024, shows Victor Cha, currently president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, speaking during a forum in Seoul. (Yonhap)
On China, Brooks pointed out that both Lee and Trump talked about approaching China with a "positive" outlook during the summit.
"I hope that China will take from this ... that it was not a threatening meeting as they might have anticipated it could have been if they were the subject of all negative comments," Brooks said. "That was not the case here. So the door is open for constructive dialogue with China."
In the lead-up to the summit, the China issue was expected to pose a major test of Lee's "pragmatic" approach that values the alliance with the U.S. as the "foundation" of Seoul's foreign and security policy, but still leaves open room to maintain stable relations with China, the top geopolitical rival of the U.S.
Cha took note of Lee's CSIS address in which he said that unlike in the past, South Korea is now in a situation where it can no longer embrace an approach under which Seoul prioritizes the United States for security while cherishing close ties with China for economic cooperation.
"(Lee) said that basically, South Korea cannot help, but focus in the direction of the U.S., that the U.S. is the key partner, (that) they have to deal with China issues because of the proximity of China, but on supply chains and security, they are with the U.S.," Cha said.
"If there is something like that in the statement on security, on strategic flexibility, I think that would have been fine for the U.S.," he said.
Strategic flexibility refers to the U.S. move to expand the operational scope of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea to cover not only North Korean threats, but also regional contingencies, including China-related matters, such as a Taiwan contingency.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 28, 2025
7. U.S. Treasury Dept. sanctions 2 individuals, 2 entities involved in N.K. IT worker scheme
Attack to defeat the all purpose sword.
(2nd LD) U.S. Treasury Dept. sanctions 2 individuals, 2 entities involved in N.K. IT worker scheme | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 28, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 3, 6-9)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. Treasury Department on Wednesday issued sanctions on two individuals and two entities, including a North Korean citizen and trading firm, for their role in what it called a "fraudulent" North Korean information technology (IT) worker scheme.
The department's Office of Foreign Assets Control announced the sanctions, the latest in a series of actions that Washington has taken in recent months to stop Pyongyang's schemes under which it apparently uses its overseas IT workers as a source of hard currency to bankroll its weapons programs in breach of U.N. and U.S. sanctions.
Those sanctioned are Kim Ung-sun, a North Korean national; and Korea Sinjin Trading Corp., a North Korean trading company; Shenyang Geumpungri Network Technology Co., a China-based firm; and Vitaliy Sergeyevich Andreyev, a Russian national.
"The North Korean regime continues to target American businesses through fraud schemes involving its overseas IT workers, who steal data and demand ransom," Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John Hurley was quoted as saying in a press release.
"Under President Trump, Treasury is committed to protecting Americans from these schemes and holding the guilty accountable," he added.
According to the department, Andreyev facilitated payments to U.S.-designated Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company, a firm linked to North Korea's defense ministry that employs IT workers in Russia and Laos.
Since December 2024, Andreyev has worked with Kim, a Russia-based North Korean economic and trade consular official, to facilitate multiple financial transfers by converting cryptocurrency to cash in U.S. dollars, it said.
Shenyang Geumpungri Network Technology is a Chinese front company for Chinyong, consisting of a delegation of North Korean IT workers, the department said.
Korea Sinjin Trading Corp. operates under the North's already sanctioned General Political Bureau. It has received directives from North Korean officials regarding the IT workers that Chinyong deploys internationally, the department said.
The department pointed out that new sanctions are part of the United States' "whole-of-government" effort to counter Pyongyang's wide-ranging revenue generation schemes, in coordination with allies and partners.
As part of their collaboration, the Department of State, and the foreign ministries of South Korea and Japan have also issued a joint statement on the threats posed by the North's IT workers.
The sanctions announcement came just two days after U.S. President Donald Trump expressed his hope to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un this year, reinforcing speculation that he might seek to rekindle his personal diplomacy with Kim.
Trump and Kim held three in-person meetings during Trump's first term -- the first in Singapore in June 2018, the second in Hanoi in February 2019 and the third in the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjom in June 2019.
This file photo, released by Reuters, shows a sign marking the U.S Treasury Department in Washington on Aug. 6, 2018. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · August 28, 2025
8. HD Hyundai Heavy, Hyundai Mipo to merge into unified shipbuilder amid S. Korea-U.S. project push
MASGA.
(2nd LD) HD Hyundai Heavy, Hyundai Mipo to merge into unified shipbuilder amid S. Korea-U.S. project push | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · August 27, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS background, more info in paras 4, 7-9, 15-16)
SEOUL, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. and HD Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co. plan to merge into a single entity under a restructuring plan approved by their boards Wednesday aimed at strengthening their shipbuilding and defense capability.
The two shipbuilders, both affiliates of HD Hyundai's intermediate holding company, HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering Co. (KSOE), each held board meetings to approve the plan to finalize the merger by December.
The consolidated entity will relaunch as HD Hyundai Heavy Industries within the year. The integrated company has set a defense sales target of 10 trillion won (US$7.2 billion) annually by 2035.
HD Hyundai Heavy and HD Hyundai Mipo are ranked No. 1 and No. 15 in the world by order backlog, respectively, and are considered South Korea's flagship yards. HD Hyundai Heavy is widely regarded as a global leader in high-value liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, while HD Hyundai Mipo is best known for ship repair and midsize vessel construction.
HD KSOE said the restructuring is a strategic move to maximize synergies through expansion, while accelerating the development of cutting-edge technologies to secure a decisive competitive edge in the global market.
The move comes as South Korea has recently announced its plan to enhance its shipbuilding ties with the United States under an initiative dubbed "Make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA)."
This composite file photo shows the shipyards of HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. (above) and HD Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
China and Japan have also recently announced plans to consolidate their top two shipbuilders to enhance their competitiveness.
Some industry watchers see the merger as a strategic step to respond to the launch of the MASGA project.
"This move appears to be aimed at consolidating resources with MASGA in mind," an industry official said. "In particular, the company is expected to actively target the naval ship market."
The integrated HD Hyundai Heavy is expected to leverage its track record in naval shipbuilding, combined with Hyundai Mipo's docks and expertise in warship construction.
British defense journal Janes projects the global naval shipbuilding market will see more than 2,100 new contracts worth about $360 billion over the next decade.
Beyond defense, the unified yard plans to expand into icebreakers and other special-purpose vessels, while pooling research and development, and design resources to lead in eco-friendly vessel technologies.
HD KSOE also plans to establish a Singapore-based investment unit this December to oversee overseas shipyards in Vietnam and the Philippines.
"This business restructuring is the result of strategic deliberation under the goals of 'a broader market' and 'a stronger shipbuilding industry,'" an HD KSOE official said. "With the launch of the integrated entity, we will expand our market presence and secure cutting-edge technologies, ultimately leading the future shipbuilding market."
Founded in 1972, HD Hyundai Heavy first gained global recognition in 1974 by successfully building two oil tankers and went on to construct the Ulsan, Korea's first domestically built naval vessel, in 1980.
HD Hyundai Mipo traces its roots to 1974 as a repair shipyard division within HD Hyundai Heavy, before being spun off as an independent entity in 1975. It later quickly grew into a leading global ship repair yard.
Foreign Minister Cho Hyun (C), acting U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Joseph Yun (5th from R) and other officials pose for a photo while touring HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co.'s shipyard in Ulsan, about 300 kilometers southeast of Seoul, on Aug. 13, 2025, in this file photo provided by the South Korean shipbuilder. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
odissy@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · August 27, 2025
9. Unification minister discusses N.K. issues with Chinese envoy
The Unificaiton Minsiter and the entire MOU need to get out of the spotliight and stop encroaching on the responsbilities of MOFA and the NIS. It needs to be solely focused on planning for unification.
Unification minister discusses N.K. issues with Chinese envoy | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · August 27, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Chung Dong-young met with China's top envoy to Seoul on Wednesday to discuss ways to step up cooperation and address pending issues on the Korean Peninsula, his office said.
During talks with Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Dai Bing, Chung expressed hope that relations between South Korea and China would further mature and develop, particularly in light of the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit to be held in the southeastern city of Gyeongju from Oct. 31 to Nov. 1.
Chung also outlined the Seoul government's policy direction on North Korea and unification, emphasizing the importance of building trust between the two Koreas and fostering peaceful coexistence.
He also called for China's constructive role in resuming dialogue and establishing sustainable peace in the region.
In response, the Chinese envoy congratulated Chung on his appointment and reaffirmed China's commitment to promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
This photo, provided by the unification ministry, shows Unification Minister Chung Dong-young (R) meeting with Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Dai Bing on Aug. 27, 2025, to discuss Korean Peninsula issues and cooperation on North Korea policy. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · August 27, 2025
10. Defense chief inspects front-line unit near western maritime border
Good to see the MINDEF out with the troops. Send the mesage to KJU.
Defense chief inspects front-line unit near western maritime border | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · August 27, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back on Wednesday visited a front-line unit near the western maritime border in the Yellow Sea and inspected the readiness posture, the defense ministry said.
Ahn visited the Marine unit located on the island of Maldo along the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto maritime border, in what marked the first such visit to the border island unit by the country's defense chief.
As part of the itinerary, Ahn also visited a special reconnaissance unit where he received operational updates and encouraged troops, according to the ministry.
During the visit, Ahn called on troops to focus on "realistic" training to gain experience and enhance operational capabilities.
Waters near the NLL have been a flashpoint between the two Koreas, where bloody naval skirmishes have taken place.
North Korea has never recognized the NLL, demanding that it be redrawn further south.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (R) meets Marines during a visit to a special reconnaissance unit on Aug. 27, 2025, in this photo provided by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · August 27, 2025
11. S. Korea, U.S. hold vice-ministerial nuclear energy talks after Lee-Trump summit
S. Korea, U.S. hold vice-ministerial nuclear energy talks after Lee-Trump summit | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · August 27, 2025
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- Senior officials of South Korea and the United States discussed ways to boost cooperation in nuclear energy Wednesday, the foreign ministry said, following investment announcements by South Korean companies during this week's summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump.
Second Vice Foreign Minister Kim Ji-na held the talks with U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy James Danly on the sidelines of a ministerial meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation member economies in the southeastern port city of Busan, the ministry said in a release.
The two sides noted "meaningful" discussions that have taken place regarding nuclear energy cooperation at Monday's summit between Lee and Trump in Washington, and agreed to make efforts to advance the partnership going forward.
"Vice Minister Kim proposed the two countries work to deepen nuclear energy cooperation in a way that will contribute to strengthening the bilateral alliance, with Deputy Secretary Danly reaffirming commitment to enhancing such cooperation," the ministry said.
Noting the brisk business partnerships in the small modular reactor (SMR) sector, the two sides agreed to work closely together for those private sector projects to gain further momentum.
On the occasion of the summit, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) and Doosan Enerbility inked a preliminary deal with the U.S.' X-energy and Amazon Web Services for collaboration on SMR design, construction and supply chains.
KHNP signed another project with Fermi on SMR construction, together with Samsung C&T, and a separate joint investment deal with Centrus on a uranium enrichment facility.
Doosan Enerbility clinched an agreement with Fermi to supply nuclear and SMR equipment for an American artificial intelligence project.
Second Vice Foreign Minister Kim Ji-na (L) poses with U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy James Danly ahead of their talks on the margins of the ministerial gathering of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, in Busan, South Korea, on Aug. 27, 2025, in this photo provided by the foreign ministry in Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · August 27, 2025
12. S. Korea, U.S. hold combined river-crossing drills
S. Korea, U.S. hold combined river-crossing drills | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · August 27, 2025
SEOUL, Aug. 27 (Yonhap) -- South Korean and U.S. troops held joint river-crossing drills this week in conjunction with their annual summertime exercise in a bid to enhance a combined defense posture, the South's Army said Wednesday.
The three-day exercise kicked off Monday near the Namhan River in Yeoju, about 65 kilometers southeast of Seoul, involving around 300 troops and some 150 pieces of equipment, including KM3 amphibious bridging vehicles and ribbon bridge systems, according to the Army.
During the drills, the troops from the South's 7th Engineer Brigade and the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division built a 280-meter-long floating bridge before swiftly crossing the river to complete the exercise.
The move came as Seoul and Washington have been staging the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise since Aug. 18 for an 11-day run.
This photo, provided by the Army on Aug. 27, 2025, shows South Korean and U.S. troops taking part in a joint river-crossing exercise near the Namhan River in Yeoju, about 65 kilometers southeast of Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · August 27, 2025
13. Trump’s ‘fascination’ with Kim Jong Un risks giving Pyongyang upper hand: Bolton
Trump’s ‘fascination’ with Kim Jong Un risks giving Pyongyang upper hand: Bolton
Former national security adviser says ‘maximum pressure’ needed to halt North Korea’s nuclear advances, not summits
https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/trumps-fascination-with-kim-jong-un-risks-giving-pyongyang-upper-hand-bolton/
Shreyas Reddy August 27, 2025
John Bolton speaking at the 2015 Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) | Image: Gage Skidmore via Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0) (March 1, 2015)
President Donald Trump’s continued interest in meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un risks undermining denuclearization efforts, former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton has warned, calling for Washington to reverse course in favor of a “maximum pressure” approach to contain the growing threat from Pyongyang.
At a virtual symposium organized by the Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS) on Tuesday, Bolton highlighted Trump’s comments during a summit with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung emphasizing his close personal relationship with Kim as a cause for concern.
“I think the most disturbing thing that came out was Trump’s continued fascination with Kim Jong Un and the desire to have another meeting with him like the three that he had in his first term,” he said.
“I’m worried that if and when that meeting happens, it’s going to happen in Pyongyang,” he added, noting that there are few options left after the two leaders’ previous meetings in Singapore, Hanoi and eventually at the DMZ.
Bolton, who served as Trump’s national security adviser during a period of U.S.-DPRK summits in 2018-19, said Kim’s apparent lack of interest in meeting the U.S. or South Korean presidents “may save us from ourselves,” but expressed concern about Lee and Trump’s pursuit of engagement with the DPRK leader.
“The fact is now we’ve got a president in South Korea who is a descendant of the Sunshine Policy line of analysis, and in Donald Trump now we’ve got somebody who really wants a Nobel Peace Prize,” he said.
Stating that Trump is unlikely to be recognized for his efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war or the U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites, Bolton said the would-be peacemaker is left with limited options, one of which is North Korea.
Bolton also highlighted Trump’s “fascination” with Russian President Vladimir Putin and “his inability to impose sanctions on the Russians” as cause for concern, adding that this may influence his approach toward North Korea as it supplies soldiers and weapons for Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
“If Russia and North Korea play this hand effectively, I think it’s going to make Trump even more eager to see and be conciliatory toward Kim Jong Un,” he warned, noting that Pyongyang’s growing proximity to Moscow also gives it greater maneuvering room in its relationship with China.
Rather than chasing high-profile summits with the North Korean leader, Bolton argued for a strategy that would be “180 degrees the opposite” of Trump’s current policy.
To this end, he advocated a “maximum pressure” approach built on more effective sanctions enforcement, while acknowledging that the existing sanctions regime has done little to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear program.
Another notable concern coming out of the Trump-Lee summit was the apparent lack of focus on the denuclearization of North Korea, with the U.S. president only calling for the elimination of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons.
The absence of denuclearization from Trump’s agenda follows his repeated descriptions of the DPRK as a “nuclear power” since becoming president, although others in his administration maintain that Washington remains committed to dismantling Pyongyang’s nuclear program.
However, Bolton, who was the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. when the DPRK carried out its first nuclear test in 2006, said Trump’s talk of North Korea as a nuclear power is more likely a mistake rather than a shift away from the goal of denuclearization.
“My guess is Trump was not at all briefed on this when he called North Korea a nuclear power,” he said. “I think it was just sort of a phrase that came out of his mouth, wasn’t intended to say we now recognize them.”
Once a core member of Trump’s inner circle, Bolton’s critique of the president’s North Korea policy comes amid an escalating feud between them, particularly after the FBI raided his home and office earlier this week.
MAINTAINING ALLIANCES
The theme of allied cooperation against North Korea was prominent at the ICAS symposium, and Bolton stressed the importance of alliance modernization to counter adversaries, particularly in emerging areas like drone technology.
However, he added that he hopes “isolationists” in the current U.S. administration don’t succeed in convincing the president to withdraw troops from the Korean Peninsula or Japan, which Trump has often threatened to do.
Trump’s expression of interest during his summit with Lee in taking ownership of American military bases in South Korea now appears to signal his commitment to keeping troops in the country, and Bolton said this approach reflects the former real estate developer’s view of the U.S. government as a business he’s running.
The president’s past troop withdrawal threats have also stoked fears in South Korea that the U.S. may leave it to fend for itself in the event of a North Korean attack, setting off increasing calls for Seoul to pursue its own nuclear deterrent.
Bolton said Trump and Lee’s predecessors, Joe Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol, respectively, tried to downplay these concerns by enhancing the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, but observed that the nuclear debate in South Korea remains active.
He added that the U.S. should still be focused on extended deterrence around the world, and particularly in Asia due to China and North Korea’s rapid nuclear expansion.
Amid doubts about Washington’s commitment to its East Asian allies, Bolton stressed the need for South Korea and Japan to build on recent progress in strengthening trilateral coordination against North Korean threats, such as during the weekend summit between Lee and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.
“From the U.S. perspective, the greater the amount of trilateral cooperation, the better,” he said.
“If the two Asian countries can take the lead and present it to Trump, there’s a better chance of making progress than to require him to take the initiative and come up with ideas.”
Edited by Alannah Hill
Updated at 6:25 p.m. KST on Aug. 27 with additional context on worsening relations between Bolton and Trump
14. North Korea slams Lee’s ‘wild dream’ of denuclearization, day after Trump summit
All part of the gambit in KJU's poltical warfare stragey to see how high of aprice he can extort fromt he alaliance just for talking.
North Korea slams Lee’s ‘wild dream’ of denuclearization, day after Trump summit
State media commentary labels South Korean president a ‘confrontation maniac’ but refrains from criticizing US leader
https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korea-slams-lees-wild-dream-of-denuclearization-day-after-trump-summit/
Jeongmin Kim August 27, 2025
Lee Jae-myung at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington | Image: ROK Presidential Office (Aug. 25, 2025)
North Korea has denounced South Korean President Lee Jae-myung for proposing a “realistic” approach to denuclearization during his trip to Washington for a summit with Donald Trump this week, while refraining from criticizing the U.S. president.
A commentary published in the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Wednesday (Korea time) dismissed Lee’s remarks as a “naive dream” that shows his “true colors” as an anti-communist “confrontation maniac.”
The criticism came in response to a speech that Lee delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, shortly after his first meeting with Trump at the White House.
“He said in a speech … that he would modernize the ROK-U.S. alliance in keeping with the change in the security environment and that the two countries would strongly counter someone’s provocation,” according to the commentary, titled “True Colors of Lee Jae-myung as Hypocrite Seized with ‘Denuclearization Paranoia.’”
“He even insulted us as a ‘poor but fierce neighbour’ and then talked about the unreasonable ‘denuclearization.’ It was a crucial occasion and an adequate opportunity to prove why we call ROK the enemy and the [South Koreans] a dirty clan,” it went on.
The commentary then repeated points made in several recent statements by the DPRK leader’s sister Kim Yo Jong, such as dismissing Lee’s push for inter-Korean reconciliation as a daydream.
“The ROK is a dyed-in-the-wool hostile state which set the policy of confrontation with the DPRK as its state policy,” it said. “The ROK Constitution reads ‘the territory of the ROK is the Korean peninsula and its islands.’ And more than ten regimes have been replaced in the ROK, but the anti-DPRK keynote remains unchanged.”
Notably, the commentary made no mention of Trump, who repeatedly spoke fondly of Kim at Monday’s summit and said he’d like to meet him this year. Pyongyang has signaled greater willingness to engage the U.S. than South Korea in recent weeks.
Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un at their first summit in Singapore | Image: Rodong Sinmun (June 13, 2018)
WHAT LEE SAID
Lee made the remarks during a discussion with CSIS President John Hamre, who asked for the South Korean leader’s thoughts on ways forward when North Korea is responding to peace overtures with hostility.
“The Korean Peninsula is a place where hostility is so intense that both sides want to annihilate each other … To deter North Korea, we’ve imposed enormous sanctions — but the result has been continuous development of nuclear weapons and missiles,” Lee said.
“Now, they’ve nearly completed ICBMs that can carry nuclear bombs and reach the U.S., with only reentry technology left to master. They are … now able to produce 10 to 20 nuclear bombs per year. In just three years, the number of nuclear bombs they possess has increased 2.5 times compared to 2022. And their ability to produce fissile material has increased dramatically — this is an objective fact.”
Lee then stressed that utilizing both strong defense to “overwhelm” North Korea while managing risks along the border is important, stating that ROK conventional capabilities and DPRK nuclear weapons create a “balance of terror.” The previous Yoon administration frequently used the same term.
“The situation is getting worse. So while we must respond strongly, we also need specific efforts to keep the situation from deteriorating,” Lee stressed.
“That means — in my view — finding realistic ways to make sure they don’t produce any more nuclear weapons, that they don’t spread them to other countries, and that they stop where they are now with ICBMs, so they don’t become a real threat to the United States,” he added.
“A poor but fierce neighbor … not everything can be solved just by suppressing them. We also need tools to manage them appropriately. I think that might be a safer way.”
Trump watches Lee sign a guest book at the White House | Image: ROK Presidential Office (Aug. 25, 2025)
HOW KCNA INTERPRETED IT
KCNA’s commentary labeled Lee’s thoughts on denuclearization a “genetic disease” that he inherited from his predecessors.
“The ‘denuclearization’ much touted by the ROK had already become extinct theoretically, practically and physically,” it said. “This being a hard reality, [Lee’s] talk about the ‘theory of three-stage denuclearization’ and ‘denuclearization’ is little short of a naive dream like trying to catch a cloud floating in the sky.”
It went on to accuse Lee for “unveiled confrontational intention” and said he “gave irrefutable evidence to prove why his remarks about ‘denuclearization’ are a sheer sophism,” referring to his CSIS discussion.
“Lee Jae-myung’s conduct abroad has shown that the ROK’s confrontational stance toward us will never change and has clearly demonstrated that our perception and judgment — that the ROK, indoctrinated by extreme anti-communist ideology (반공사상) and a mindset aimed at the annihilation of communism (멸공정신), remains an unchanging enemy — were correct,” the KCNA commentary stated.
“We once again remind him of the fact that our position as a nuclear weapons state is an inevitable option that correctly reflects the hostile threat from outside and the change of the structure of the world security dynamics,” it reads. “We remain unchanged in our stand not to abandon the nuclear weapons, the prestige and honor of the state.”
However, the commentary, which was not published in domestic-facing media, added that changing DPRK nuclear policy would require changing the political and military environment on the peninsula, apparently not completely ruling out the possibility of change.
Edited by Bryan Betts
15. North Korea demands UN aviation watchdog investigate ROK drone incursions
KJU wants to milk the drone controvery in the South.
North Korea demands UN aviation watchdog investigate ROK drone incursions
Filings with ICAO accuse watchdog of downplaying DPRK safety concerns by rejecting previous complaint
https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/north-korea-demands-un-aviation-watchdog-investigate-rok-drone-incursions/
Anton Sokolin August 27, 2025
The route of the alleged ROK drone entering North Korean airspace on Oct. 8, 2024; a photo of the alleged drone published by KCNA | Image: ICAO filings submitted by DPRK (July 28, 2025), KCNA (Oct. 19, 2024)
North Korea has once again formally demanded that the U.N. aviation watchdog investigate alleged South Korean drone incursions into its airspace, accusing the organization of double standards after it rejected its last complaint.
Pyongyang has filed at least four working papers with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for the upcoming 42nd Assembly session set for Sept. 23-Oct. 3, records show, urging the watchdog to carry out a “full investigation on the Council meetings related to the DPRK from 2022 to 2025.”
The submissions come after the ICAO dismissed North Korea’s previous complaint in April, which alleged that an ROK military drone scattered leaflets over Pyongyang in Oct. 2024.
The new documents argue that South Korea’s “drone infiltration into the DPRK’s sovereign airspace” breached the Chicago Convention, challenging the ICAO’s claim that the case does not fall within the scope of the convention and that there isn’t “sufficient evidence” that the drone undermined aviation safety.
Calling the decision prejudiced and an example of double standards, Pyongyang reiterated its request for an investigation in a working paper submitted on July 28.
“The ROK committed the infiltration of the military drone into Pyongyang … at night-time in Oct. 2024,” it stated.
The paper included evidence previously published in an Oct. 27 state media report, allegedly based on flight logs from a downed drone. It claims the drone took off from Baengnyeong Island in South Korea’s northwest and crossed Pyongyang from southeast to north, flying over Sunan International Airport.
The route of the alleged ROK drone entering North Korean airspace on Oct. 8, 2024 | Image: ICAO filings submitted by DPRK (July 28, 2025)
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Ed Condit, a retired commercial pilot and aviation expert, called the North’s accusation about ICAO double standards “curious,” pointing to Pyongyang’s own “history of not advising regional governments of ballistic missile launches as well as cruise missiles that present a hazard to civilian aviation.”
“While drones can present a threat to civilian aviation, military drones do not fall under the regulations for state aircraft, which include the military,” he told NK News.
The previous Yoon administration refused to confirm or deny that it sent the drone, and some in South Korea have since raised allegations that the administration deployed the drone in a deliberate attempt to provoke DPRK military action for political ends.
In building its case, the North Korean submissions to the ICAO also accused the South of “continuously dropping such leaflets in its sovereign airspace” using balloons, posing risks to DPRK aircraft, according to a July 28 filing.
South Korean aerostats “conducted infiltration flights carrying various objects which may encounter strike damage to the manned aircraft,” the document states.
It claimed the aerostats scattered “various objects” over densely populated areas, “harming or injuring the human lives and destroying their assets.”
Pyongyang said it has so far recorded 1,325 balloons, including meteorological aerostats, entering its airspace between 2020 and 2025, with 125 sightings this year.
Alleged entries of ROK aerostats into North Korean airspace in 2020-2025 | Image: ICAO filings submitted by DPRK (July 28, 2025)
The document included a log of South Korean balloons interfering with Air Koryo flights from 2024-2025.
While no balloons caused serious incidents, several aircraft had to change course to avoid them, according to the document. In the most recent case in March, an Air Koryo flight spotted a small balloon near the city of Anju, north of Pyongyang.
North Korea has long complained about activist leafleting, blaming the ROK government for the balloon launches.
MISSILES AND JAMMING
In separate filings to the ICAO, North Korea defended its right to missile launches, brushing off the watchdog’s criticism and arguing that military tests are outside the Chicago Convention’s scope.
“There is no evidence of casualties, damages or threats to the civil aviation, and, most importantly, it is a political issue of self-defence measures responding to the anti-DPRK hostile manoeuvre of the U.S. Japan and the ROK.”
The filings also denounced accusations that Pyongyang has endangered civilian aircraft by jamming GPS signals used for navigation.
“It is the habitual farfetched allegation of the ROK to smear the DPRK’s external image on the international arena all the time,” the documents stated, blaming U.S.-ROK military exercises for the jamming.
Condit said the international community has “strong justification to condemn and voice concern about Global Navigation Satellite System interference on the peninsula by the DPRK as this is a threat to civilian aviation.”
He noted that the DPRK itself sent trash balloons to the South last, endangering the country’s denser aviation traffic.
Alleged instances of ROK aerostats interfering with North Korean aviation traffic in 2024-2025 | Image: ICAO filings submitted by DPRK (July 28, 2025)
“So, the actions of the DPRK do indeed represent a double standard, of their own making, not the ROK.”
Seoul has repeatedly accused North Korea of carrying out GPS jamming in border regions and interfering with radio communications in the South, although incidents have declined since President Lee Jae-myung took office in June.
The ICAO decided to censure Pyongyang over the activity in April, accusing the DPRK of endangering over 4,000 civilian aircraft.
On July 30, the ICAO Council also submitted its own working paper reiterating criticism of North Korea’s unannounced missile launches, noting they continued into 2025 and urging the country to stop such actions.
Pyongyang announced its most recent test of surface-to-air missiles over the weekend.
While emphasizing that the ICAO is “not overtly political,” Condit stressed that its council includes both the U.S. and ROK but not North Korea’s ally Russia, leaving Pyongyang to press its own case.
He added that the ICAO has “no regulatory power” but seeks to “advance safety through standards that are adopted by nation-states.”
Jeongmin Kim contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Bryan Betts
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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