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Quotes of the Day:
"Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind."
– George Orwell
"Saul Alinsky 101: Accuse your opponent of what only you are doing, as you are doing it, to create confusion, cloud the issue, and inoculate voters against any evidence of your guilt."
– Robert Moon Examiner
"I have learned two lessons in my life: first, there are no sufficient literary, psychological, or historical answers to human tragedy, only moral ones. Second, just as despair can come to one another only from other human beings, hope, too, can be given to one only by other human beings."
– Elie Wiesel
1. The US Army’s chief of staff has ideas on the force of the future
2. The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure by Eliot Cohen and Phillips O'Brien
3. How Did the Experts Get Ukraine So Wrong?
4. Zelensky Visited U.S. to Seek War Boost. His Most-Important Ally Shrugged.
5. Israeli Special Forces Launch Raids Into Lebanon Ahead of Possible Ground Incursion
6. Israel Strikes Targets in Yemen as It Presses Air Campaign Against Hezbollah
7. Welcome Home, Hostages, and Pay Up
8. Facing a Big Test, Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ Flails
9. Ukraine’s artillery is helping boost Scranton’s economy
10. Is the US military learning enough from Ukraine?
11. The Rise and Recession of Military Design Thinking
12. Kamala Harris is Fashioning a Foreign Policy
13. Discussion with the Congressional Commission on the National Defense Strategy
14. Austin believes casualties in all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah could ‘equal or exceed’ those in Gaza
15. US has a whole new deal with Iraq, and won’t talk about it
16. Irregular warfare is everywhere in this new Army video
17. ROTC Scholarships Could Be Slashed This Decade as Army Deals with Glut of Officers
18. Warships from the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, U.S. and Japan Sail in Joint South China Sea Patrol
19. The case for giving Ukraine long-range striking power in Russia
20. The Lies Russia Tells Itself
21. U.S. Troop Withdrawals from Europe Won’t Benefit Its Rivals
22. America Needs a New Strategy to Avert Even Greater Catastrophe in the Middle East
23. Israel’s Deterrence Lesson for Biden
24. The Power Elite
25. In global game of influence, China turns to a cheap and effective tool: fake news
26. Why Delta Force Was Created in the 1970s
1. The US Army’s chief of staff has ideas on the force of the future
The Economist looks at our Army and our CSA.
1988? I feel effing old. :-)
Excerpts:
A much bigger task still lies ahead. The army has two big challenges. One is where to look. America’s national defence strategy is explicit: China is the priority. But any war over Taiwan would involve mainly air and naval forces, and the army maintains a big presence in Europe. “AirLand Battle was intellectually coherent because we had one enemy,” says John Nagl, a professor at the US Army War College in Pennsylvania, “but a China-focused army looks different from a Russia-focused army—plus the Middle East is a mess.”
The other is technology. The war in Ukraine has shown that weapons may work well for a while until the enemy adapts. America’s GPS-guided shells have been blunted by Russian jamming. Drones’ software and sensors need updating every six to 12 weeks to stay effective. “We’re fully aware of how much the world has changed just over the last couple years, with commercial tech,” says General George.
One scheme to tackle both challenges is what the army calls “transforming in contact”. It has picked three brigades—the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division in Kentucky, the Pacific-focused 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division in Alaska and the 3rd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division in Germany—to serve as laboratories for innovation. The trio receive the newest kit and tech. They test it on exercises and give feedback on what works.
United States | Reinventing the army
The US Army’s chief of staff has ideas on the force of the future
But can he scale up his clever experiments?
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2024/09/29/the-us-armys-chief-of-staff-has-ideas-on-the-force-of-the-future
Photograph: Getty Images
Sep 29th 2024
R
ANDY GEORGE joined the US Army in 1988. It had overhauled itself after the trauma of Vietnam. It had written a new doctrine, known as AirLand Battle, to defeat the Soviet Union in a war in Europe. And a few years later it would smash the Iraqi army in the first Gulf war, a conflict in which General George, as he is today, served as a young lieutenant. He is now in charge of that same army, and wants to reinvent it for a new age—not once, but continuously.
General George took over as army chief of staff a year ago. His priority, he tells The Economist, is building “lethal and cohesive” teams. Everything else is secondary. The flab built up during the war on terror is being trimmed. Brigades have turned in up to 700 excess vehicles, he says. The remaining ones are being serviced less often, leaving more time and resources for training. Army ammunition factories are working at full pelt. They produced 40,000 rounds of 155m artillery shells in August, up by one-third from February, and are “nearing” 50,000 per month. That is expected to double in a year’s time. Manpower is improving, too. After years of missing its recruitment targets, the army last month exceeded its goal for the year by 10,000 soldiers.
A much bigger task still lies ahead. The army has two big challenges. One is where to look. America’s national defence strategy is explicit: China is the priority. But any war over Taiwan would involve mainly air and naval forces, and the army maintains a big presence in Europe. “AirLand Battle was intellectually coherent because we had one enemy,” says John Nagl, a professor at the US Army War College in Pennsylvania, “but a China-focused army looks different from a Russia-focused army—plus the Middle East is a mess.”
The other is technology. The war in Ukraine has shown that weapons may work well for a while until the enemy adapts. America’s GPS-guided shells have been blunted by Russian jamming. Drones’ software and sensors need updating every six to 12 weeks to stay effective. “We’re fully aware of how much the world has changed just over the last couple years, with commercial tech,” says General George.
One scheme to tackle both challenges is what the army calls “transforming in contact”. It has picked three brigades—the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division in Kentucky, the Pacific-focused 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division in Alaska and the 3rd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division in Germany—to serve as laboratories for innovation. The trio receive the newest kit and tech. They test it on exercises and give feedback on what works.
In the past, says Alex Miller, the army’s chief technology officer, the army would set “gold-plated” requirements—insisting that a drone be able to survive in freezing and boiling conditions, say—and push this “over-engineered” kit down to every unit over a glacial three to seven years. The experimental brigades can instead quickly buy things that suit their environment. Robots that work well in Louisiana, notes Mr Miller, might struggle in the Pacific. “It’s a big difference to actually do this on the ground, inside formations,” says General George. “We have users, developers and testers that are all there together.”
The days of picking one company—usually one of a handful of arms behemoths—and asking it to produce something for a decade or two are gone, he says. The future is “modular” systems, such as platform whose sensors (cameras, radars or antennae) can be swapped out frequently, with a greater reliance on consumer tech rather than bespoke solutions. A new infantry squad vehicle, a jeep-like contraption, embodies this thinking. Built by General Motors, it is based on the Chevrolet Colorado and 90% of its components are commercially available.
Capability-requirement documents setting out what a new weapon or system has to do have typically been long tomes, page after page of specifications that quickly go out of date. A new one for the army’s next command-and-control system amounts to a bureaucratic revolution: just five pages. General George recalls an instance where the army was told it would take six to eight months to get 20 new coolant-pump covers for Bradley armoured vehicles. It was able to use 3D printers to make all of them in less than an hour—at 16 cents each. That capability is being pushed down to formations as small as brigades.
The scale of the task
Despite all this, army insiders acknowledge that the present system is broken, constrained by suffocating Pentagon rules and rigid legislation. Take the example of first-person-view (FPV) drones, small, short-range attack drones used in massive quantities by both Russia and Ukraine to good effect. Why has the US Army been slow to produce these? Mr Miller notes that American law prohibits the Pentagon from buying components made in China. That has limited the supply of motors, speed controllers, antennae and video transceivers. The army has turned to American and European suppliers—the 82nd Airborne Division is cobbling together FPVs with legally compliant parts—but production is puny. “We’re talking handfuls,” he says. “We are desperately trying to ramp that up.”
But how to ramp up? The army has 59 brigade combat teams; experimenting in a few of them only goes so far. Though the scheme will soon expand, General George accepts that his “ultimate grading” will be whether he can scale the new processes and kit across the whole army. Colonel David Butler, his spokesman, points to the example of 1940 to suggest that a little reform can go a long way. “We shouldn’t forget that Germany only transformed one-third of their army,” he says, “enabling them to take over most of Europe.” ■
2. The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure by Eliot Cohen and Phillips O'Brien
Download the 78 page report here: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-09/240924_Cohen_Russia_Ukraine.pdf?VersionId=1YNnRnwS.6DkrwNcAkdb5Dbsfjclg0JR
The Russia-Ukraine War: A Study in Analytic Failure
csis.org · by Report by Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O'Brien Published September 24, 2024
Photo: ROMAN PILIPEY/AFP via Getty Images
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Surprise occurs in many forms. Many think of it in terms of a surprise attack, but it occurs in other dimensions. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a good example: the attack was foreseen, but the immediate outcomes were astonishing. To use an old Soviet phrase, analysts misunderstood in fundamental ways the “correlation of forces.” Their judgments about Russian and Ukrainian military capacity were not merely off—they were wildly at variance with reality. And even more perplexing, leading and widely acknowledged experts misjudged with a degree of certainty that in retrospect is no less remarkable than the analytic failure itself.
Their misjudgment was not a case of normal error or exaggeration. The expert community grossly overestimated Russian military capabilities, dismissed the chances of Ukraine resisting effectively, and presented the likely outcome of the war as quick and decisive. This analytic failure also had policy implications. Pessimism about Ukraine’s chances restricted military support before February 24, 2022. For years, voices in the analytic community argued publicly against providing crucial military aid for Ukraine precisely because Russia was presumably so strong that a war between the two countries, particularly a conventional one, would be over too quickly for the aid to make a significant difference. Once the war began, some of Ukraine’s most important international friends hesitated to supply advanced weapons, in part out of the mistaken belief that Ukraine would prove unable to use them or would be overrun before it could deploy them effectively. Today, such hesitation remains, with Ukraine still lacking the weapons systems it needs to defeat Russia in its relentless effort to destroy Ukraine as a state. Thorough consideration of why responsible and expert analysts made egregious misjudgments is the best way to avoid a similar outcome in this part of the world or elsewhere. This report documents and explains a large, consequential failure.
This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.
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csis.org · by Report by Eliot A. Cohen and Phillips O'Brien Published September 24, 2024
3. How Did the Experts Get Ukraine So Wrong?
More criticism based on the Eliot Cohen CSIS report.
Excerpts:
Whatever accounts for the systemic errors, the dire assessments have had an abiding influence on American policy. With Vladimir Putin possessing an “undeniable genius,” in the words of one analyst, and the supposedly overwhelming might of Russia’s modernized force pitted against the puny and antiquated Ukrainian military, the outcome of a direct confrontation between the two powers was seen as almost preordained. As Cohen and O’Brien write, “Helping a corrupt and divided Ukraine against such a mighty Russian military was . . . bound to be futile.”
This defeatist mentality had been in place for years even before the 2022 invasion and figured prominently in decisions about whether and how to arm Ukraine in the lower-intensity war that had been raging ever since 2014 when Russia seized Crimea and part of the Donbas. Providing Ukraine with anti-tank weapons or air defense missiles was dismissed by analysts as insufficient to tilt the skewed military balance between the two warring countries, and hence “pointless.”
The same defeatist mindset continues to echo to this day. It is expressed in America’s self-deterrence, the consistently overwrought anxiety over provoking the ten-foot-tall and “genius” Putin into some sort of dangerous aggressive response—possibly nuclear—to our providing Ukraine with more powerful and longer-range weapons. But as the CSIS report makes plain, the fears have been misplaced.
...
In reading through Cohen and O’Brien’s fascinating study, with its meticulous assemblage of faulty analyses constructed out of shoddy methodologies by so many leading specialists, one is left with the distinct impression that rarely have so many got things so wrong with such great certainty and to such damaging effect. With Ukraine’s survival still hanging in the balance, lessons need to be learned—urgently.
How Did the Experts Get Ukraine So Wrong?
Their early errors are still echoing through U.S. policy.
Gabriel Schoenfeld
Sep 30, 2024
thebulwark.com · by Gabriel Schoenfeld
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and former U.S. President Donald Trump shake hands on September 27, 2024 in New York City. (Photo by Alex Kent/Getty Images)
OUT ON THE HUSTINGS OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS, Donald Trump has been speaking about Ukraine and its president, Volodymyr Zelensky. Here are remarks he made at a rally in North Carolina last Wednesday:
I watched this poor guy yesterday at the United Nations. He didn’t know what he was saying. They just don’t know what to do. They’re locked into a situation. It’s sad. They just don’t know what to do. Because Ukraine is gone. It’s not Ukraine anymore. You can never replace those cities and towns. And you can never replace the dead people—so many dead people. Any deal, even the worst deal, would have been better than what we have right now. If they made a bad deal, it would have been much better. They would have given up a little bit, and everybody would be living, and every building would be built, and every tower would be aging for another 2,000 years. . . . And we continue to give billions of dollars to a man who refuses to make a deal, Zelensky. There was no deal that he could have made that wouldn’t have been better than the situation you have right now. You have a country that has been obliterated.
Let’s pull out two sentences from this appalling jumble: “Any deal, even the worst deal, would have been better than what we have right now. If they made a bad deal, it would have been much better.”
As the intrepid Ukraine war reporter Tim Mak put it, “At its core, this is an un-American message. That it is better to live on your knees than to die on your feet. That is better to be alive and oppressed, than to fight for self-determination. To yield to the yoke without a struggle.” Or, in Patrick Henry’s ringing words from two and a half centuries earlier, “Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!”
Trump’s dark outlook for Ukraine’s wartime prospects—“Ukraine is gone”—has not emerged out of thin air. Pessimism about Ukraine’s prospects is a story with a disturbing history, one that involves not only Trump and his minions, but also completely mainstream observers of the war. As we learn from an important new study written by two distinguished students of warfare, Eliot Cohen1 and Phillips O’Brien, and published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a deep and unwarranted pessimism about Ukraine’s future has long been thoroughly entrenched in the analytic community, with consequences that have ill served the cause of peace and freedom.
As Russia was amassing its forces on Ukraine’s frontier over the course of 2021 and early 2022, there was a widespread conviction among close observers that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be a cakewalk.
Here is a “Russian military expert” quoted in the New York Times in December 2021, just two months before the February 24, 2022 invasion: “If Russia really wants to unleash its conventional capabilities, they could inflict massive damage in a very short period of time. . . . They can devastate the Ukrainian military in the east really quickly, within the first 30–40 minutes” (emphasis added, here and in the examples below).
And here is an article by CSIS scholars, published in November 2021: “Russian military forces—including elements of the 41st Combined Field Army and 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division . . . would likely outmatch Ukrainian conventional forces and overrun Kiev in a matter of hours if they invaded.”
And here is the Economist on January 29, 2022, just weeks before the Russian invasion: “Ukraine’s paucity of air defences and the weakness of its armed forces means that Russia could drive to Kyiv perhaps as easily as American forces reached Baghdad in the Iraq war of 2003.” That battle lasted just six days.
Cohen and O’Brien adduce many more examples. And as they record, “such assessments were believed at the top of the United States government and military. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was reported only two weeks before the invasion as saying that Kyiv could fall in 72 hours and having reported as much to members of Congress.”
But, of course, the predictions of instantaneous catastrophe all proved wildly wrong. Two and half years later, Ukraine is still fully in the fight and has managed to inflict huge casualties on Russia, more than it has suffered itself, and even, lately, to mount a counterattack and seize a chunk of Russian territory. Indeed, as Cohen and O’Brien point out, “since the summer of 2022, Ukraine has liberated far more of its territory than Russia has been able to seize in the opening months of the war.”
What accounts for the widespread misjudgment? Cohen and O’Brien identify a variety of factors, including an intense focus by analysts on the sheer numerical disparity in the size of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries. This crude approach ignored other more important qualitative indicators, like the massive corruption within the supposedly modernized Russian military and the superior morale and intense motivation of Ukrainian soldiers fighting for the survival of their homeland against unprovoked aggression.
Whatever accounts for the systemic errors, the dire assessments have had an abiding influence on American policy. With Vladimir Putin possessing an “undeniable genius,” in the words of one analyst, and the supposedly overwhelming might of Russia’s modernized force pitted against the puny and antiquated Ukrainian military, the outcome of a direct confrontation between the two powers was seen as almost preordained. As Cohen and O’Brien write, “Helping a corrupt and divided Ukraine against such a mighty Russian military was . . . bound to be futile.”
This defeatist mentality had been in place for years even before the 2022 invasion and figured prominently in decisions about whether and how to arm Ukraine in the lower-intensity war that had been raging ever since 2014 when Russia seized Crimea and part of the Donbas. Providing Ukraine with anti-tank weapons or air defense missiles was dismissed by analysts as insufficient to tilt the skewed military balance between the two warring countries, and hence “pointless.”
The same defeatist mindset continues to echo to this day. It is expressed in America’s self-deterrence, the consistently overwrought anxiety over provoking the ten-foot-tall and “genius” Putin into some sort of dangerous aggressive response—possibly nuclear—to our providing Ukraine with more powerful and longer-range weapons. But as the CSIS report makes plain, the fears have been misplaced.
In reality, Putin was unlikely to escalate the war in Ukraine to the nuclear level precisely because that could have provoked NATO to intervene. Russia would have lacked the strength to match NATO in a conventional conflict if that happened. The possibility of “vertical escalation” was further reduced by China’s warning to Russia that it would not tolerate the use of nuclear weapons, an approach fully consonant with China’s own policy of no first use.
President Joe Biden has been masterful in marshaling a great coalition of countries to aid Ukraine, but he has proved far less masterful—in fact, delinquent—in providing Ukraine with effective armaments in a timely fashion. Trump, of course, presents another category of failure entirely. If he is re-elected president, his predictions of Ukrainian doom will, thanks to his pro-Putin tilt, rapidly become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In reading through Cohen and O’Brien’s fascinating study, with its meticulous assemblage of faulty analyses constructed out of shoddy methodologies by so many leading specialists, one is left with the distinct impression that rarely have so many got things so wrong with such great certainty and to such damaging effect. With Ukraine’s survival still hanging in the balance, lessons need to be learned—urgently.
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Full disclosure: Eliot Cohen is also a cohost of “Shield of the Republic,” a Bulwark podcast.
thebulwark.com · by Gabriel Schoenfeld
4. Zelensky Visited U.S. to Seek War Boost. His Most-Important Ally Shrugged.
Excerpts:
Republicans typically supportive of Ukraine appear to be maneuvering to reflect Trump’s language.
“The reality of it is that the way the war in Ukraine is going to end is with a negotiated settlement,” Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.), the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee and a former vice presidential hopeful, said Sunday on NBC News’s “Meet the Press” program.
Putin, meanwhile, has shown no interest in peace negotiations other than to impose conditions on Ukraine that would strip it of territory and reduce it to a vassal of Moscow.
Back in Ukraine, Zelensky on Sunday said 14 people were injured in a Russian airstrike on the southern city of Zaporizhzhia. He said Russia is dropping around 100 massive glide bombs every day, which he called “a daily Russian terror.”
“This is a constant reminder to all our partners who can help that we need more long-range capabilities for Ukraine, we need more air defense for Ukraine, we need more sanctions against Russia,” he said.
Zelensky Visited U.S. to Seek War Boost. His Most-Important Ally Shrugged.
Ukrainian troops are slowly losing ground, and officials say more support is needed to hold back Russia back
https://www.wsj.com/world/zelensky-visited-u-s-to-seek-war-boost-his-most-important-ally-shrugged-d7ba76e7?mod=hp_lead_pos10
By James Marson
Follow, Alexander Ward
Follow and Lara Seligman
Follow
Sept. 29, 2024 9:26 pm ET
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the U.S. Capitol last week. Photo: Tom Brenner/Getty Images
NEW YORK—The tepid reception of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the U.S. this week exposed the narrowing options he faces after 2½ years of war.
Zelensky touted his so-called “victory plan,” an effort to win more weapons and security guarantees from the U.S. and its allies to gain some leverage over Russia, in a flurry of meetings as he shuttled between New York and Washington.
But Biden administration officials, long wary of making moves that Moscow could perceive as escalation, expressed skepticism and said they wanted more details. President Biden released a fresh tranche of already-approved military aid, but didn’t grant Zelensky’s main request: Permission to strike into Russia with longer-range missiles.
Former President Donald Trump, meanwhile, reiterated after meeting Zelensky on Friday that his priority was to seek a quick end to the war with “a fair deal for both sides,” without detailing how it could be achieved. Trump, who has declined to say whether he wants Kyiv to win the war, said he had a “very good relationship” with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” as well as Ukraine’s visiting leader.
“I hope we have more good relations,” Zelensky interjected.
Zelensky’s struggles to garner a significant boost in U.S. support, his country’s most important foreign backer, points to a perilous road ahead.
His country’s troops are facing their most serious situation in months on the main battlefield in the east, where they find themselves outgunned and outnumbered against relentless Russian attacks. Russian troops are jabbing forward at several points along the 800-mile front line, including a dangerous push for the key Ukrainian logistics hub of Pokrovsk. That would advance Russia’s main current goal of seizing all of the eastern Donetsk region, which the Kremlin has already declared part of Russia.
President Biden pledged continued support to Ukraine as he released a fresh package of military aid worth nearly $8 billion. Photo: Al Drago — Pool via CNP/Zuma Press
Ukrainian troops are inflicting heavy losses on advancing Russians, but are struggling to hold back forces from a country with a population four times larger. Zelensky says Ukraine needs permission to use longer-range missiles supplied by the U.S. and Europe to strike inside Russia to relieve the pressure on the front lines.
Biden has declined to lift restrictions, despite open calls to do so from Kyiv and European allies, as well as some members of Congress, fearing such a move could escalate the conflict with Russia.
Biden pledged continued support to Ukraine as he released a fresh package of military aid worth nearly $8 billion. Vice President Kamala Harris, who met Zelensky separately at the White House, also vowed further support.
In a sign of increasing concern about the situation, some European allies urged bolder action from the U.S.
Alexander Stubb, Finland’s president, and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis said in interviews that Putin’s threats to escalate had proven largely empty, and that there was little indication that would change if the U.S. allowed Ukraine to strike Russia with longer-range missiles.
Even if Moscow escalated the conflict, Landsbergis said, that would be a necessary risk to take as “there’s a war to win.” The worst consequences out of all the possibilities, he said, would be if Ukraine lost the war.
Some NATO members acknowledge that Ukraine will need significantly more weapons as well as the kind of security guarantees that only NATO can provide to halt Russia’s quest to dominate its neighbor.
“I think it is clear now, after two and a half years with war in Europe, that this is not primarily a question about Ukraine. This is primarily a question about Russia and their imperial dreams,” Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in an interview.
Without a major surge in the quantity and power of weapons flowing into Ukraine, Zelensky’s stated goal of returning all occupied territory, about one-fifth of the country, appears distant. In recent months he has tweaked his rhetoric to focus on the need for Ukraine to receive enough support to “force Russia into peace,” as he told the United Nations on Tuesday. His troops launched a surprise invasion into Russia’s Kursk region, the first major incursion since World War II, to increase Kyiv’s leverage.
After meeting Trump on Friday, Zelensky said they had found some common ground. “We have a common view that the war in Ukraine must be stopped. Putin cannot win. Ukraine must win,” he said.
Trump suggested that both sides wanted the war to stop, and reiterated that he thought he could negotiate a rapid deal. Officials in Ukraine and Europe worry that could result in a rapid withdrawal of support for Ukraine to try to force it to make a deal with Russia, however unfavorable.
Republicans typically supportive of Ukraine appear to be maneuvering to reflect Trump’s language.
“The reality of it is that the way the war in Ukraine is going to end is with a negotiated settlement,” Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.), the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee and a former vice presidential hopeful, said Sunday on NBC News’s “Meet the Press” program.
Putin, meanwhile, has shown no interest in peace negotiations other than to impose conditions on Ukraine that would strip it of territory and reduce it to a vassal of Moscow.
Back in Ukraine, Zelensky on Sunday said 14 people were injured in a Russian airstrike on the southern city of Zaporizhzhia. He said Russia is dropping around 100 massive glide bombs every day, which he called “a daily Russian terror.”
“This is a constant reminder to all our partners who can help that we need more long-range capabilities for Ukraine, we need more air defense for Ukraine, we need more sanctions against Russia,” he said.
Alex Leary contributed to this article.
Write to James Marson at james.marson@wsj.com, Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com
5. Israeli Special Forces Launch Raids Into Lebanon Ahead of Possible Ground Incursion
Excerpts:
Hezbollah appears so weakened that Israel’s dilemma would actually be how far Israel should go into Lebanon, Avivi said. When and under what terms Israel would leave remain unclear, he said.
A broader ground incursion would be highly provocative in the region and a further blow to a country scarred by previous invasions that ended in 2000 and 2006. Israel’s government is under pressure to create a buffer zone to stop Hezbollah attacks that have forced some 60,000 people from their homes in the north and prevent the sort of cross-border attack that Hamas led against Israel on Oct. 7, which many in the country still fear. Hezbollah has threatened for years to invade parts of northern Israel.
A senior Israeli official said last week that the country hoped to avoid a ground invasion. It has, however, been building up its forces in the north with the shift in focus to the fight with Hezbollah and now has more on that front than anywhere else in the country.
Israel’s military chief told troops last week that airstrikes against Hezbollah were in preparation for a potential ground invasion of Lebanon.
Israeli Special Forces Launch Raids Into Lebanon Ahead of Possible Ground Incursion
The raids are aimed at gathering intelligence and probing Hezbollah’s capabilities
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israeli-special-forces-launch-raids-into-lebanon-ahead-of-possible-ground-incursion-bf2fe94d?mod=hp_lead_pos1
By Dov LieberFollow, Stephen KalinFollow and Anat PeledFollow
Updated Sept. 30, 2024 4:47 am ET
Israeli special forces have been carrying out small, targeted raids into southern Lebanon, gathering intelligence and probing ahead of a possible broader ground incursion that could come as soon as this week, people familiar with the matter said.
The raids, which have included entering Hezbollah’s tunnels located along the border, have occurred recently as well as over the past months, part of the broader effort by Israel to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities along the border dividing Israel and Lebanon, the people said.
The timing of any ground action could change, the people said. Israel is under heavy pressure from the U.S. not to carry out a major invasion. It wasn’t immediately clear how long Israel would aim to hold territory, or whether the incursion would be more like a series of larger raids.
Amir Avivi, a former senior Israeli military official who continues to be briefed by the defense establishment, said a ground incursion by Israel is imminent and that the raids are part of the preparation.
“The IDF has made a lot of preparations for a ground incursion,” Avivi said. “Overall, this always includes special operations. This is part of the process.”
Israeli troops near the border with Lebanon on Sunday. Photo: menahem kahana/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Hezbollah appears so weakened that Israel’s dilemma would actually be how far Israel should go into Lebanon, Avivi said. When and under what terms Israel would leave remain unclear, he said.
A broader ground incursion would be highly provocative in the region and a further blow to a country scarred by previous invasions that ended in 2000 and 2006. Israel’s government is under pressure to create a buffer zone to stop Hezbollah attacks that have forced some 60,000 people from their homes in the north and prevent the sort of cross-border attack that Hamas led against Israel on Oct. 7, which many in the country still fear. Hezbollah has threatened for years to invade parts of northern Israel.
A senior Israeli official said last week that the country hoped to avoid a ground invasion. It has, however, been building up its forces in the north with the shift in focus to the fight with Hezbollah and now has more on that front than anywhere else in the country.
Israel’s military chief told troops last week that airstrikes against Hezbollah were in preparation for a potential ground invasion of Lebanon.
“We are preparing the process of a maneuver, which means your military boots, your maneuvering boots, will enter enemy territory,” the Israeli military chief of staff, Herzi Halevi, said in the comments to Israeli troops at the country’s northern border with Lebanon.
Israel has been conducting its heaviest bombardment of Lebanon in years. Photo: rabih daher/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The U.S. and Arab countries have consistently said they want a diplomatic solution to the crisis, warning of the risk of a regional war.
The U.S. also has beefed up its forces in the region to deter countries such as Iran from getting involved and to be prepared to respond to any escalation.
The Pentagon said Sunday it would keep the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and its accompanying ships near the Red Sea. The Lincoln had been expected to leave when the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group arrived. The Truman will now be operating near the Mediterranean Sea. It is unusual for the U.S. to keep two carriers in the region.
A ground operation would follow two weeks of elaborate intelligence operations, targeted killings and heavy bombardments aimed at degrading the U.S.-designated terrorist group’s command and control and weapons stores. Israel conducted airstrikes on more than 2,000 targets last week, in its heaviest bombardment of Lebanon in years, the military has said.
Israel killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah with a massive airstrike on Beirut’s southern suburbs Friday, flattening part of a neighborhood to eliminate the cleric who led the group for three decades and built it into a fearsome foe.
The week before, thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies carried by Hezbollah members exploded virtually simultaneously, killing 37 people and injuring around 3,000. Shortly afterward, an airstrike in Beirut killed a group of more than a dozen elite military leaders.
Hezbollah began firing across the Lebanon-Israel border shortly after the Hamas-led Oct. 7 attacks on southern Israel that killed 1,200 people and sparked the war in Gaza. The two foes have traded fire almost daily since then, depopulating strips along both sides of the border and raising concerns of escalation into a wider war.
Over that period, more than 11,000 projectiles have been fired from Lebanon into Israel, according to an Israeli official. Israel in turn struck Lebanon more than 8,000 times by air, drone, missile and artillery through Sept. 20, before the latest round of heavy Israeli bombardment, according to the nonprofit Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
Write to Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com, Stephen Kalin at stephen.kalin@wsj.com and Anat Peled at anat.peled@wsj.com
6. Israel Strikes Targets in Yemen as It Presses Air Campaign Against Hezbollah
Israel is mutl-taksing.
Israel Strikes Targets in Yemen as It Presses Air Campaign Against Hezbollah
Lebanon says number of people fleeing homes could reach a million
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-presses-air-campaign-against-shaken-hezbollah-7fe9307e?mod=latest_headlines
An explosion following Israeli airstrikes in Hodeidah, Yemen.
social media/Reuters
By Dov LieberFollow, Jared MalsinFollow, Stephen KalinFollow and Saleh al-Batati
Updated Sept. 29, 2024 8:54 pm ET
TEL AVIV—Israel struck power plants and a sea port in Yemen Sunday after the Houthi rebel group launched two ballistic missiles at Tel Aviv in recent days, as the Israeli military continued an air campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The strikes in Yemen targeted the port city of Hodeidah as well as Ras Issa, the Israeli military said, and relied on dozens of aircraft, including jet fighters and refueling planes to hit the targets over 1,100 miles from Israel’s border. The targets are used by the Houthis to import oil as well as Iranian weapons, the military said.
The Houthis claimed responsibility for firing ballistic missiles at Tel Aviv on Friday and again on Saturday, as part of their support for Lebanese militia Hezbollah and the Palestinian militant group Hamas.
This was Israel’s second direct attack on the Houthis in Yemen, who have been firing drones and missiles at Israel throughout the past year. Israel attacked Hodeidah’s port in July, setting fuel tanks ablaze. Hodeidah also has been used by the Houthis as a key base to launch missile and drone attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
A Houthi official said Israel had targeted fuel tanks at the ports of Hodeidah and Ras Issa, and the group’s official media said two power stations in Hodeidah were also hit. “These are civilian facilities and will not affect our military operations,” the Houthi official said.
Four people were killed and 40 were injured in Sunday’s strikes, according to the Houthi-led Health Ministry in Yemen.
Eyewitnesses in Hodeidah said plumes of smoke rose into the air long after the initial strikes.
Young displaced Lebanese sleep on the ground outdoors in Beirut on Sunday. Photo: Manu Brabo for WSJ
The air raids in Yemen come as Israel continued to strike Hezbollah targets in Lebanon on Sunday, saying it killed a senior official as the Lebanese prime minister warned of a mass-displacement crisis as hundreds of thousands flee from the fighting.
“This is Lebanon’s largest displacement crisis in history,” said Najib Mikati, the country’s caretaker prime minister. “The number of displaced people is much higher than the reported figures; estimates suggest it could reach one million.” More than 200,000 people have been internally displaced, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and 50,000 have crossed from Lebanon into Syria.
The Lebanese Health Ministry said that 105 people were killed and 359 were injured by Israeli strikes across Lebanon on Sunday. Since Sept. 16, more than 1,000 people have been killed in Israeli attacks in Lebanon, 143 of whom were women and children, the ministry said.
Israel’s military said Sunday that it killed senior Hezbollah official Nabil Qaouk a day earlier in an airstrike, the latest in a string of targeted killings of Hezbollah leadership including its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Qaouk led the group’s preventive security unit and was a member of its central council, the military said.
On Friday, Israel killed Nasrallah along with other senior Hezbollah and Iranian officials. The strike hit Hezbollah’s underground headquarters in Beirut as part of an aggressive air campaign aimed at stopping the group from shooting into northern Israel and allowing tens of thousands of displaced Israeli residents to return home. Israel has launched more than 2,000 airstrikes against the U.S.-designated terrorist group in recent days.
Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Killed by Israeli Airstrike
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Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Killed by Israeli Airstrike
Play video: Hezbollah Leader Hassan Nasrallah Killed by Israeli Airstrike
Hezbollah confirmed that its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on Beirut. The death of the cleric, who had led Hezbollah for three decades, is a significant blow to the group and Iran. Photo: Patrick Baz/AFP/Getty Images
Iranian officials on Sunday said Tehran would respond to the killing of Nasrallah.
“Iran’s reaction will take place at the right time and according to Iran’s choice against the crimes of the Zionist regime,” said Javad Zarif, Iran’s vice president for strategic affairs.
The strikes in Yemen were seen in Israel as a message to Iran about Israel’s will and capabilities to strike Iran if it wants to.
“We know how to reach very far, we know how to reach even farther, and we know how to strike there with precision,” said Israel’s top general, Herzi Halevi, after the Yemen strikes. “This is not a message, it is an action. An action that carries a message with it.”
President Biden told reporters Sunday afternoon that he would be speaking with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Asked whether an all-out war can be avoided, he said, “it has to be.”
Meanwhile, the Pentagon said Sunday it would keep the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and its accompanying ships near the Red Sea. The Lincoln had been expected to leave when the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group arrived. The Truman will now be operating near the Mediterranean Sea. It is unusual for the U.S. to keep two carriers in the region.
The U.S. already had beefed up its military presence in the region by deploying the USS Wasp Amphibious Ready Group in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The U.S. also deployed additional fighter and attack squadrons into the region.
Beirut was on edge on Sunday, with normally bustling areas of the center largely empty of people and the few pedestrians outdoors walking past some closed shops and restaurants. Civilians who fled Beirut’s southern suburbs, where the airstrike that killed Nasrallah hit on Friday night, camped along the Mediterranean seafront and in Martyrs’ Square, a vast concrete plaza in the center of the capital. In some predominantly Christian areas of the capital, celebratory gunfire could be heard following the announcement of Nasrallah’s death on Saturday.
Residents who fled Beirut’s embattled southern suburbs gathered Sunday outside a downtown mosque. Photo: Manu Brabo for WSJ
Yousef Geagah, a butcher in his 60s, sat on Beirut’s Ramlet al Baida beach with his large family. He said Hezbollah had called him and told him he should leave his home in the south of the city because it isn’t safe, so he joined his family who had already left the Ain Al Delbeh district after the Nasrallah strike.
“The sea is the safest place,” he said, guessing that the Israelis won’t bomb areas near the coast. He said his family won’t return home until the situation calms down.
The Lebanese army, a key unifying institution in Lebanon’s fractious society, issued a plea for unity following the killing of Nasrallah, reflecting concerns that the attacks on Hezbollah could stir sectarian divisions or otherwise unsettle the complex balance of power in the country, which suffered a devastating civil war in the 1970s and 1980s.
In downtown Beirut’s Martyrs’ Square, a few hundred people displaced from the southern suburbs sat on the ground or atop blocks of plastic foam. Many of them spent the night on the sidewalks or in a nearby parking lot; others arrived in the morning after sleeping on the airport road.
People expressed grief but also defiance. A 25-year-old nurse who fled from southern Beirut said people would support Hezbollah regardless of whether Nasrallah was killed. “He is our national shield,” he said.
A woman reads the Quran at the site of the Israeli strike that killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Photo: Hassan Ammar/Associated Press
The refugees included Syrians who had fled their own country’s civil war and were now living in Beirut. Aida Rabie El Din, a mother of 10, said she slept with her family on an airport road overnight and then took a van to Martyrs’ Square fearing that the road wasn’t safe. She said she can’t go back to Syria because it is even more unsafe for her, since she comes from a rebel area.
Also on Sunday, an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq claimed responsibility for a drone attack that Israel’s navy said was intercepted near the Red Sea port city of Eilat. Iranian-aligned militants in Iraq and Yemen have stepped up attacks against Israel in recent weeks in support of Hezbollah and Hamas, which are also backed by Iran.
Rocket sirens sounded again in northern and southern Israel, with major population centers in northern Israel such as Haifa and Tiberias coming under rocket fire.
The Hezbollah targets struck by the Israeli air force Sunday included rocket launchers, weapons caches and other infrastructure, the Israeli military said.
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Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah’s death left a void at the top of the world’s most heavily armed nonstate militia. WSJ’s Stephen Kalin explains what this means for Hezbollah and its impact on the wider region. Photo: Photo: Aziz Taher/Reuters
Israel has sharply escalated its attacks on Hezbollah in recent weeks, beginning with elaborate intelligence operations that caused thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies carried by the group to explode almost simultaneously over two days and a targeted strike that killed much of the group’s military leadership.
Hezbollah began attacking northern Israel on Oct. 8, a day after Hamas’s attacks on southern Israel that sparked the current war in Gaza, saying it was supporting the Palestinian group.
Nancy A. Youssef contributed to this article.
Write to Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com, Jared Malsin at jared.malsin@wsj.com and Stephen Kalin at stephen.kalin@wsj.com
7. Welcome Home, Hostages, and Pay Up
What the...? Who would have thought? But I guess we would not be surprised by OUR IRS.
The IRS agents' hands are tied by regulation. I wonder if any of them argued to have the regulations changed.
Excerpts:
I’ve met with Mr. Kara-Murza, as well as Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan, two of the more than 70 unjustly held Americans whom the Biden administration has brought home. They told me about the surprises waiting for them on their release: tax penalties, lowered credit scores and decreased Social Security benefits. That’s why I’m taking bipartisan action to ensure that wrongfully detained Americans are better supported when they return home.
Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian was held by Iran for 544 days in 2014-16. When he was freed, the Internal Revenue Service expected him to pay back taxes with interest and levied late penalties totaling thousands of dollars, despite knowing he was unjustly detained overseas. IRS agents said they didn’t have the legal authority to remove the charges.
Welcome Home, Hostages, and Pay Up
The IRS should stop targeting wrongfully detained Americans.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/welcome-home-hostages-and-pay-up-credit-scores-fees-taxes-irs-fee92257?mod=latest_headlines
By Chris Coons
Sept. 29, 2024 3:53 pm ET
Vladimir Kara-Murza in Washington, Sept. 17. Photo: jim lo scalzo/Shutterstock
‘Last month, I was in solitary confinement in Siberia. Today, I’m here. I can’t believe it!”
That’s how Vladimir Kara-Murza began his remarks this month when he met with U.S. senators who fought for his release. A U.S. permanent resident, he was held on sham charges by Russia until August.
I’ve met with Mr. Kara-Murza, as well as Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan, two of the more than 70 unjustly held Americans whom the Biden administration has brought home. They told me about the surprises waiting for them on their release: tax penalties, lowered credit scores and decreased Social Security benefits. That’s why I’m taking bipartisan action to ensure that wrongfully detained Americans are better supported when they return home.
Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian was held by Iran for 544 days in 2014-16. When he was freed, the Internal Revenue Service expected him to pay back taxes with interest and levied late penalties totaling thousands of dollars, despite knowing he was unjustly detained overseas. IRS agents said they didn’t have the legal authority to remove the charges.
Americans held hostage or wrongfully detained shouldn’t be treated like tax cheats. That’s why in March I introduced the Stop Tax Penalties on American Hostages Act with Republican Sen. Mike Rounds of South Dakota. The bill would prevent the IRS from imposing late penalties on former hostages and wrongful detainees.
Just as hostages can’t file with the IRS, they also can’t pay credit cards, auto loans or mortgages. These missed payments can damage their credit scores. If they aren’t receiving a paycheck while imprisoned, they aren’t paying payroll taxes, diminishing the Social Security benefits they receive at retirement.
In June, alongside Republican Sen. Thom Tillis of North Carolina, I introduced the Fair Credit for American Hostages Act, which would prevent credit-rating agencies from considering payments missed due to a wrongful detention or hostage situation. Credit agencies are already required to exempt victims of human trafficking; they should do the same in these situations.
In September, with Republican Sen. Bill Cassidy of Louisiana, I introduced the Retirement Security for American Hostages Act, which would ensure that hostages and wrongful detainees aren’t penalized in the calculation of their Social Security benefits.
These efforts are badly overdue, but we also have to stop the practice of “hostage diplomacy”—whereby Americans are taken captive by bad actors seeking to secure concessions. I’m working on bipartisan legislation to deter hostage diplomacy while the U.S. continues to secure the release of those wrongfully held abroad. This bill would also provide additional support to families of wrongful detainees and additional reintegration assistance when those Americans return home.
I am overjoyed that Messrs. Kara-Murza, Gershkovich and Whelan have returned. Congress needs to honor them by supporting former hostages and wrongful detainees when they come home and deterring our adversaries from seizing more Americans in the future.
Mr. Coons, a Democrat, is a U.S. senator from Delaware.
8. Facing a Big Test, Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ Flails
The Israelis are showing us how to get things done.
I dare to use the "D" word. Are these militias deterred by Israel's actions?
Facing a Big Test, Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ Flails
Iran united militias to take on Israel, but as the Israelis pummel one, Hezbollah, the rest have so far largely failed to come to its aid.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/30/world/middleeast/iran-axis-of-resistance.html
After the killing of the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Tehran has put his image on billboards. But it has not retaliated directly.Credit...Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times
By Ben Hubbard and Alissa J. Rubin
Ben Hubbard reported from Istanbul, and Alissa J. Rubin from Paris.
Sept. 30, 2024, 5:51 a.m. ET
Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Iran and Israel? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.
The idea was simple: When a big war with Israel broke out, all the members of the Iranian-backed network of militias in the Middle East known as the “axis of resistance” would join the fight in a coordinated push toward their shared goal of destroying the Jewish state.
Iran came up with the strategy and invested tremendous resources to build each group’s fighting abilities and connect them to one another.
But the axis’s response as Israel has pummeled Hezbollah in Lebanon in recent weeks — killing many of its commanders and assassinating its leader — has so far been feeble, suggesting that the axis is weaker and more fragmented than many in the region had expected and that Iran feared that widening the war could cause Israel to turn its firepower on Tehran.
“The so-called axis of resistance from its very beginning was more or less a propaganda fiction created to enhance the prestige of the Islamic Republic,” said Ali Alfoneh, a senior fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.
In recent years, Mr. Alfoneh said, the network’s members had chalked up some small military victories, “but when it comes to more serious adversaries, or a state actor like Israel, it is a different game.”
Iran cobbled together the axis out of armed groups that shared antipathy toward Israel and the United States but until then had been fighting more local battles. The United States classifies most of them as terrorist organizations.
Hamas, whose members are predominantly Palestinian refugees or their descendants, had been fighting Israel directly for decades, most recently in Gaza.
In Syria — the only state member of the axis besides Iran — the government of President Bashar al-Assad had maintained an official state of war with Israel but kept their disputed border quiet.
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A building destroyed by an Israeli strike in Baalbeck, Lebanon, last week.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times
Iran also supported anti-Israel militias in Syria and in Iraq, where the Iranians equipped some of the groups that fought the United States after its 2003 invasion and later fought the Islamic State. When those groups gained political power, they gave Iran a stake in Iraq’s domestic politics.
But it is Hezbollah, formed in Lebanon with direct Iranian guidance in the early 1980s, that has long been the axis’s senior member, and its recently assassinated leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was the linchpin who helped hold it all together. Because of its long history and intimate connections to Iran, where many of its commanders have received training, Hezbollah has better tactical battle skills and superior weaponry like guided missiles.
And unlike the Iranians, the Lebanese fighters speak Arabic, allowing Hezbollah to dispatch its experts to share skills with the other groups, enhancing Hamas’s ability to build tunnels, for example, and the Iraqis’ and Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities. Mr. Nasrallah also forged personal ties with the other groups’ leaders, serving as an adviser and role model.
That is why Israel’s swift series of attacks on Hezbollah over the last two weeks — detonating thousands of its pagers and walkie-talkies, killing many of its top commanders and assassinating Mr. Nasrallah with huge bombs south of Beirut — have shaken the other members of the axis so badly. They seemed to have been unprepared for the possibility that Hezbollah could suffer such crippling losses.
It remains unclear why they did not come to Hezbollah’s aid in the weeks when Israel was ramping up its assault or in the days since Mr. Nasrallah was killed, but it appears that there was a deep-seated belief among them that Hezbollah could hold its own against Israel. And Iran’s reticence about directing an immediate response — at least so far — left them unclear about the next military steps.
Image
Hezbollah supporters attending the funeral of a senior Hezbollah commander who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Lebanon.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times
Mr. al-Assad in Syria waited two days after Mr. Nasrallah’s death to issue a statement mourning him, even though Hezbollah had sent thousands of fighters to beat back rebels threatening his government just a few years ago.
Hamas is too degraded from nearly a year of war with Israel in Gaza to do much.
The Houthis in Yemen and militias in Syria and Iraq have launched attacks aimed at Israel or American military bases in the Middle East, but these have largely been repelled.
Updated Sept. 30, 2024, 2:15 a.m. ET4 hours ago
Even Iran itself, the founder of the axis, has so far taken no clear action to save Hezbollah or join the fight. The country’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, told world leaders at the United Nations General Assembly last week that his government wanted to defuse tensions and get along with the West. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, suggested that Hezbollah had to chart its own way forward.
“All of the forces in the resistance stand by Hezbollah,” Mr. Khamenei said. “It will be Hezbollah, at the helm of the resistance forces, that will determine the fate of the region.”
Tehran appears to be torn between a desire to retaliate against Israel and fear that doing so might lead Israel to attack Iran directly.
“They are in a strategic bind, because if they do nothing it will further weaken them and weaken their credibility and their deterrence,” said Kawa Hassan, a nonresident fellow at the Stimson Center’s Middle East and North Africa Program. But if the Iranians respond, he said, that would risk provoking Israel at a time when it appears “really ready to go after them.”
Image
President Masoud Pezeshkian of Iran told world leaders at the U.N. General Assembly last week that his government wanted to defuse tensions.Credit...Graham Dickie/The New York Times
Experts offered various explanations for the weak response — so far at least — from Hezbollah’s regional allies.
The alliance was always loose, with Iran largely leaving axis members free to make their own decisions, even when that meant starting battles that gave Iran headaches. The Houthis went against Iran’s advice and tried to take over all of Yemen, and Hamas did not coordinate with Iran before launching the Oct. 7 assault on Israel that started the Gaza war.
Since Mr. Nasrallah’s death on Friday, the commanders of two armed groups in Iraq have told The New York Times that they had received no instructions from Iran on how to respond. Speaking on the condition of anonymity so as not to anger their patron, one said that everyone was still in shock at Mr. Nasrallah’s killing.
Thomas Juneau, who teaches public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa, said that as long as the violence between Israel and its foes was low-level, Iran could maintain the “perception that the axis of resistance was, if not winning, at least scoring important points.”
But once Israel brought the full weight of its military and technological superiority to bear, it overwhelmed Hezbollah. “We are in conventional warfare, and Israel’s significant and clear domination now is manifest,” Mr. Juneau said.
Experts warned, however, that the network’s members remained important regional players. Even if its members have struggled in recent months to inflict grave harm on Israel, Iranian patronage has significantly enhanced their military know-how, increasing their ability to exercise power in Israel’s neighborhood.
The most dramatic example is the Houthis, who transformed from a ragtag militia into a force that is able to disrupt maritime traffic in the Red Sea and that terrorized Saudi Arabia for years with its missiles, even though the kingdom had spent billions of dollars on American weapons.
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A rally in support of Hamas and Hezbollah in Sana, Yemen’s Houthi-controlled capital, in August.Credit...Abdallah Adel/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Moreover, while Israel has struck deep blows against Hezbollah, the region’s history is rife with examples of such groups roaring back in ferocious ways, as Hezbollah did after its last war with Israel, in 2006, and Hamas did when it stunned Israel with its Oct. 7 attack.
And Israel’s military operations in Gaza, the West Bank and now Lebanon are likely only to fuel the anger that drives people to join these groups, said Dalia Dassa Kaye, a senior fellow at the University of California Los Angeles Burkle Center for International Relations.
“There will be plenty to attract continued support and recruits for the resistance,” she said.
Ben Hubbard is the Istanbul bureau chief, covering Turkey and the surrounding region. More about Ben Hubbard
Alissa J. Rubin reports on stories across the Middle East, including ongoing conflicts and long-term problems such as climate change. She is based in Paris. More about Alissa J. Rubin
9. Ukraine’s artillery is helping boost Scranton’s economy
A snapshot look at one element of our defense industrial base. See the photos at the link.
Economic Policy
Ukraine’s artillery is helping boost Scranton’s economy
In one community churning out materiel for Kyiv’s defense, jobs and investment are flowing.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/09/29/ukraine-war-scranton-defense-manufacturing/
Unfinished artillery shells in storage last month at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Pennsylvania. (KT Kanazawich for The Washington Post)
9 min
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By Jacob Bogage
September 29, 2024 at 6:00 a.m. EDT
SCRANTON, Pa. — Before the artillery shells reach Ukrainian troops on the front lines of their war with Russia, they’re an economic boon in northeastern Pennsylvania.
Since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the federal government has allocated nearly $175 billion in emergency assistance for the conflict. But much of that money remains in the United States: It powers plants like the Army’s factory in Scranton, which makes 155-millimeter artillery rounds, and others in Alabama, which make armored personnel carriers, and Texas, where mobile artillery rocket systems are built.
General Dynamics, the contractor that runs the 116-year-old Scranton Army Ammunition Plant, has added more than 200 jobs in this region since 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine. Artillery production more than doubled, and the General Dynamics facilities in the region produce more than a third of the 155mm rounds the United States aims to send to the front lines each month.
Gentex, a military contractor in nearby Carbondale, Pa., increased staffing by 10 percent over the past year, officials say. German glass firm Schott, which makes high-tech optical products for civilian and military uses in Duryea, Pa., boosted employment by dozens of jobs over the past five years.
Those jobs are helping to reverse the area’s economic slide.
Train tracks cut through downtown Scranton, Pa. (KT Kanazawich for The Washington Post)
An American flag painted by workers between 1950 and 1960 remains preserved on the wall at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Pennsylvania. (KT Kanazawich for The Washington Post)
For decades after coal mines and textile mills closed down, the unemployment rate here was at least two percentage points higher than the national average, said Satyajit Ghosh, a professor at the University of Scranton who studies the regional economy. Now it’s often better than the national metrics, as the region has diversified into health care, education and logistics — and begins what locals hope will be a manufacturing resurgence.
“This is not a fluke,” Ghosh said. “If you use unemployment rate as the marker, this would be the best I have seen, or that anyone has seen.”
Rounds made in Scranton go next to Iowa, where they are fitted with explosives and fuses, before they’re ready for Ukraine or NATO allies.
Conservative opposition is mounting in Washington to additional Ukraine aid, and GOP rebels in the House nearly spiked the last emergency package lawmakers approved in April.
House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) demanded that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky fire the country’s ambassador to Washington after he visited the Scranton plant last week to thank production line workers.
Sen. JD Vance (Ohio), the Republican vice-presidential nominee, has said Ukraine should consider surrendering territory to Russia to end the war.
But Biden and the Senate Republican leader, Mitch McConnell (Ky.), have countered that spending for Ukraine’s defense is in both the security and economic interests of the United States.
Rep. Matt Cartwright (D), one of Washington’s strongest Ukraine supporters, who is locked in a tight reelection race to represent Scranton and surrounding counties, said he expects Ukraine may need more funding soon, during Congress’s lame-duck session after November’s elections.
Northeastern Pennsylvania hopes to prove the premise that aid for Ukraine matters just as much to the local economies that manufacture the materiel, said Scranton Mayor Paige Gebhardt Cognetti, a Democrat elected in 2019.
(Video: Hadley Green/The Washington Post)
Workers at the Army plant in Scranton make ammunition shells in August. (KT Kanazawich for The Washington Post)
(Video: Hadley Green/The Washington Post)
Job openings are drawing people to Scranton. With a population of around 77,000, it anchors a growing region of more than 500,000 people. The city is desperate for nurses, said Bob Durkin, president of the local Chamber of Commerce. With the rapid expansion of the universities and hospitals, electrical workers are in demand to wire the buildings. Plenty of retail jobs need filling, Ghosh said.
What northeastern Pennsylvania lacks, officials say, are highly skilled professional workers who can teach at the universities or the new medical college, engineer new glass products or write the software that integrates military helmets and armored vehicles.
Part of the solution is attracting workers from big cities, officials say. Michael Turek, Gentex’s chief operating officer, commutes to Carbondale a few days a week from a Philadelphia suburb.
But officials hope even more that the opportunities can persuade young professionals and new college graduates to stay in Scranton or come back to the region, Lackawanna County Commissioner Matt McGloin said.
Housing is far cheaper than in the big cities nearby. A food scene is slowly emerging. Scranton is in line to get an Amtrak station that will connect it to New York.
Signs of the city’s turnaround are mixed, though. Are the unoccupied retail spaces in the heart of Scranton — on the newly named Biden Street — signs of healthy churn or the prohibitive cost of running a business? Some of the jobs that have replaced those in the long-gone coal mines and factories don’t truly provide a living wage, locals says.
The region has tiers of work: The abundant and cheap retail gigs, the proliferating warehousing jobs, the careers on factory floors — then a gap. Workers who want more can get stuck attempting the leap from production lines to Gentex’s design lab or Schott’s brightly lit front office.
Fixing that is part of Scranton’s new aim, Cognetti said. Investment in the area will yield more competition for workers, a narrower skills gap and more opportunities.
“There is nothing stopping somebody who is from a long line of generational miners and now manufacturing workers — there’s nothing stopping them from getting a job in any other industry,” Cognetti said.
Defense manufacturing has been a major part of the Scranton area’s economy for generations. The ammunition plant began as a train-building and maintenance facility in 1908 and was one of the largest employers in Scranton — then a much larger city of more than 100,000 people. The Army converted it into a plant in 1953.
Gentex began as a silk producer in New York in the 1890s, then moved to Carbondale after a fire and began making military parachutes, then helmets during the world wars. Some of its first employees were the wives of coal miners.
A robotic arm handles a hot billet at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant. (KT Kanazawich for The Washington Post)
A worker on the 155mm projectile production line at the Scranton ammunition plant in August. (KT Kanazawich for The Washington Post)
(Video: Hadley Green/The Washington Post)
Inside each facility, local leaders say, is a glimpse of what northeastern Pennsylvania was, and what it could be.
Visitors enter the ammunition plant to a stark warning: Everything you touch will either severely burn you or cut you — or, at the very least, ruin your clothes. The factory is dark. Its floors are sticky. It smells like tar and sweat and chemical cleaning products. In the summer, the only relief from the heat of the metal furnaces is a series of tunnels that double as break rooms. In the winter, machine operators can report to their stations in short sleeves.
The Army has invested nearly $420 million to modernize the place. It captures thousands of gallons of rainwater to cool the machines. On a recent visit, technicians were replacing decades-old production lines with faster, quieter, energy-efficient machines.
At Gentex, workers manufacture helmets on the same wooden floors where silk-spinning machines once stood. One level above them, a sprawling atrium displays nearly a dozen generations of the firm’s helmets — for tank gunners, ground forces, and Navy and Air Force pilots. A highlight reel that could have been spliced from an action movie shows GIs soaring on fighter jets, then breaching doorways and clearing buildings.
(Video: Hadley Green/The Washington Post)
Unfinished artillery shells cool. (KT Kanazawich for The Washington Post)
“When you look at a site like this, what people don’t always realize is, they think, manufacturing. We think high-tech,” said Christopher Cassidy, president of Schott’s North American operations.
For Biden, who lived in Scranton until he was 10 years old, defense manufacturing is both a boon for Ukraine and a balm for long-ago economic decay.
“Think what happens when that factory closes in Scranton or anywhere around the country, when the school is underfunded, when inequity grows larger and larger. It puts the middle class further out of reach and rips the dignity and pride and hope out of communities all across the country, including right here in Pennsylvania,” the president said during a speech in the area in April.
But that view, some locals say, is based on a Scranton that hasn’t existed in decades. Industries have changed: The region now prides itself first on its “eds and meds” rather than its goods-producing heritage. The people have changed: The city is far more diverse than it was two generations ago. Scranton’s Hispanic population has increased dramatically, from just over 1,000 in 1970 to 12,000 — more than 15 percent of the population — in 2020, according to Census Bureau data.
Many of those changes are positive, local officials say. Quality of living is better. For years, small fires burned below ground in old coal mines. Durkin, from the Chamber of Commerce, grew up playing in his neighborhood at the foot of a slag heap, a mountain of discarded stones and soil from dug-out mines. Those dangers are gone now. The jobs are mostly safer.
Still, decades of deindustrialization here and throughout what Cognetti, the mayor, calls “legacy cities” — she despises the term “Rust Belt” — have an enduring legacy. Is more manufacturing, a throwback to Scranton’s past, an effective salve?
“To the extent that we can still have things made in America, made in northeastern Pennsylvania, made in Scranton, people want that. People want those jobs. They want that ability to make something with their hands,” she said. “There’s a sense that it’s a career opportunity. It’s an economic opportunity. It’s also a source of pride for us here.”
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By Jacob Bogage
Jacob Bogage covers economic policy in Congress for The Washington Post, where he's worked since 2015. He previously covered business and technology and wrote for the Sports section.follow on X @jacobbogage
10. Is the US military learning enough from Ukraine?
One part of the equation is whether we have anyone present on the ground who could collect lessons learned. I am not sure the "remote advising relationships" we have are as effective as they should or could be .
We should learn some lessons from American observers (military and private citizens) in the Crimean War. Who is leading our "Delafield Commission?" Notice the ranks of the officers involved.
I think we should try to deploy military observers to conflicts around the world to learn from them.
Americans in the Crimean War
https://americansinthecrimeanwar.com/
The Delafield Commission
On April 11, 1855, Major Richard Delafield, Alfred Mordecai, and George McClellan set sail for Europe from Boston to research armies and battlefields of Europe. All three men graduated from West Point and had long histories of military service. As head of the commission, Major Richard Delafield had spent a career as an army engineer involved with overseeing the construction of many key American fortifications. With expertise in science and chemistry and a career built around studying artillery, Major Alfred Mordecai’s gathered intelligence on European artillery while traveling with the commission. Finally, George McClellan, then captain of the cavalry, joined the commission as the youngest member with the only combat experience. The intelligence they gathered had a lasting impact on American military forces through the Civil War and beyond.
Is the US military learning enough from Ukraine?
Relatively few analysts at the services’ doctrine organizations are working full-time to glean lessons from the war.
By Sam Skove
Staff Writer
September 29, 2024 08:00 AM ET
defenseone.com · by Sam Skove
The U.S. military speaks frequently about the lessons they’re learning from the war in Ukraine.
The Air Force has sought to evaluate the Ukrainian military’s methods for detecting drones, while the Army has revamped training, fielded new drones, and re-evaluated its artillery stockpiles based on observations of the nearly three-year-old hot war there. The Army’s various analytic outlets have produced report after report by officers, intelligence analysts, and academics on the conflict.
But at some of the military’s key centers for studying warfare, the services appear to treat the grinding yet tech-forward war with NATO’s top potential adversary as just one topic among many. Few analysts are tasked to study the war full-time, according to a Defense One review of service staffing.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Lessons Learned Division, which helps spread findings among the services, has no “working groups or individuals” who focus solely on Ukraine, a spokesman said.
At the Army’s Center for Lessons Learned, or CALL, four analysts on two teams focus on Ukraine, a spokesperson said in July. That’s out of the roughly 45 analysts the center employs.
A review of the reports on CALL’s public-facing website showed few that exclusively cover lessons from Ukraine. At least one report focused on lessons from the command posts gleaned from a Ukrainian military manual. The spokesperson said CALL also interviews Ukrainian soldiers and commanders.
Other services appear to devote fewer resources to gleaning lessons from the Ukraine war.
The Air Force’s Curtis E. LeMay Center, which develops air doctrine, has no single analyst dedicated to Ukraine, a spokesperson said in August. A spokesperson for the center said that “every member of our organization” has worked on assessing lessons from Ukraine, and said the center had worked with other organizations on more than five efforts focused on Ukraine.
The Marine Corps likewise does not have a central body for exclusively evaluating lessons learned from Ukraine, a spokesperson said, although there are groups that study the war alongside other topics. The Corps has conducted four research efforts that sought to collect lessons learned from the war and will hold a follow-on study in fiscal year 2025.
The spokesperson said that the Corps has not directly interviewed Ukrainian military personnel, relying instead on other services and U.S. allies and partners to gather first-hand information.
The picture from the Navy is hazier. The service was not able to describe their approach after queries were sent in July and September. Public affairs officers were not able to provide updates by the time of publication.
Answers may yet be forthcoming. In April, the Defense Department’s Inspector General announced it would audit the Defense Department’s success in studying and applying lessons from the war to “doctrine, planning, training, and equipping.” The announcement of a study is not necessarily evidence that the Defense Department has made a misstep. The Inspector General has not yet released its report.
Some Army officers have argued that observations from the war, while useful, are not always relevant to the U.S. military, which expects to fight with multi-service operations backed by highly trained soldiers funded by a military budget many times Ukraine’s gross domestic product.
“If you look at the fight that's going on in Ukraine, you've got a large Soviet army fighting a small Soviet army, right? That is defensive-oriented, [artillery]-oriented.” said 101st Airborne Division commander Maj. Gen. Brett Sylvia in an August interview. “That's not our fight.”
Anthony Tingle, formerly a program director at the Air Force Academy’s the Institute for Future Conflict and now an independent researcher who has spent time in Ukraine, said he could not say whether the Army’s four analysts were sufficient. CALL could be working with other academic institutions to analyze the war, he said.
However, any U.S. observations of the war are ultimately limited by the U.S. military’s minimal presence in Ukraine, said Tingle.
“How many U.S. government employees have been to Donbass recording the electromagnetic spectrum or sitting down with the drone operators to say, ‘Well, okay, how do they frequency-hop? How do they try to thwart our drones?” said Tingle. “This is all stuff we're gonna have to relearn the first week of a war with anybody.”
The U.S. has repeatedly said it will not send military advisors to Ukraine, and maintains an even smaller presence in Kyiv than before the war. The Defense Department also maintains travel restrictions within Ukraine that prevent at least some staff from getting within a certain distance of the front line, according to a January report from the Inspector General.
The academic community is similarly limited in the analysis it can provide, Tingle added, saying the number of academics with experience on the frontline was in the single digits.
Tingle believes the military branches are at least partially writing off the conflict based on assumptions that the U.S. would not struggle with the same types of problems as Ukraine, such as establishing air dominance over Russia.
Those assumptions may be true, Tingle said, but that doesn’t mean the war has nothing to teach.
“There are lessons about modern warfare in general that we are not getting because of that attitude.”
defenseone.com · by Sam Skove
11. The Rise and Recession of Military Design Thinking
Appreciate the Context. Understand the Problem. Develop an Approach. Sounds so simple but even the simplest things are hard (per CvC).
Conclusion:
The evolution of military design thinking from a promising alternative to traditional military planning into a marginalized methodology highlights the ongoing tension between conventional warfighting paradigms and the need for adaptive, strategic solutions in a complex world. Yet, despite early successes, such as the U.S. military’s adaptation in Iraq and the Israeli Defense Forces’ use of Systemic Operational Design, the broader military community has struggled to fully embrace design thinking.
The resurgence of conventional warfighting paradigms, driven by great power competition and a renewed focus on state-on-state conflict, has caused the U.S. military to deprioritize the innovative potential of design. This shift has resulted in missed strategic opportunities, particularly in non-traditional domains like cyber warfare, information operations, and gray zone conflicts, where adversaries leverage complexity and ambiguity to achieve their goals.
For militaries to remain effective in the face of modern challenges, there must be a re-integration of military design thinking into their planning processes. By fostering a broader, more adaptive approach that incorporates the lessons of design, military organizations can better navigate the multifaceted, interconnected threats of the 21st century. Through organizations like the Archipelago of Design, the potential remains for military design to regain its momentum and reshape the way militaries think about strategy, operations, and long-term success in an increasingly uncertain world.
The Rise and Recession of Military Design Thinking
By Jeremiah Monk
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/the-rise-and-recession-of-military-design-thinking?postId=c340fb4e-9f8e-4240-99b0-b13b11ec2f69&utm
INTRODUCTION
The military design thinking movement represented a novel and adaptive approach to strategic problem-solving that rose to prominence in the 2010s as Western militaries grappled with the complexities of global counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. Design thinking promised to revolutionize how military organizations approached complex, dynamic, and uncertain environments, helping them become more agile and effective. However, despite its early successes, the military design movement within the United States military has lost momentum as conventional warfare paradigms have reasserted dominance, especially following the war in Ukraine in the 2020s. As a result, strategic opportunities that might have been realized through a more design-centric lens are now routinely missed by the US Department of Defense. This article traces the rapid rise and decline of military design thinking in the United States and examines how the contemporary focus on conventional warfighting has caused military organizations to sideline the design movement at the expense of strategic flexibility.
The Emergence of Military Design Thinking
The roots of military design thinking can be traced to the broader movement of design thinking within civilian sectors, where it was employed as an approach to solving complex, ill-defined problems. Military design adapted this thinking to its own specific needs, particularly in the realm of strategy, operational planning, and decision-making, and connected design to the concept of Operational Art. The military version of design thinking, as it emerged in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, borrowed from several fields, including systems theory, organizational learning, and creative problem-solving frameworks.
The U.S. Army, for example, began exploring design thinking in earnest in the 2000s. This interest was driven by the recognition that traditional military planning models, which were linear and prescriptive, were insufficient to address the complexity of modern conflicts. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrated that conventional approaches to warfighting did not adequately prepare military forces for the unpredictable and adaptive nature of counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, traditional military frameworks were designed for state-on-state conflict, leaving gaps in the ability to respond to the decentralized, asymmetric challenges posed by non-state actors, insurgencies, and transnational threats.
Military design thinking offered an alternative. It emphasized critical thinking, iteration, and the ability to define problems from multiple perspectives. It promoted a holistic understanding of the environment, the adversary, and the relationships among various stakeholders. It was about recognizing that modern conflicts often presented not just a “military problem,” but a web of interconnected social, political, economic, and cultural issues that demanded innovative solutions.
Early Military Design Models
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) became a pioneer of military design thinking, especially after their experiences in the first intifada in the 1990s. The IDF recognized that traditional operational art had failed to address the complexities of non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah and later, ISIS. The IDF embraced design thinking under the leadership of officers such as Brigadier General Shimon Naveh, who introduced Systemic Operational Design (SOD). SOD offered a way to manage complexity by understanding the entire system in which military forces operated, including the cognitive and cultural dimensions of both friend and foe.
One of the early models to emerge within the U.S. military was the Army Design Methodology (ADM), introduced around 2010. The ADM sought to integrate design thinking into the planning process by focusing on understanding the “operational environment” before developing courses of action. The ADM encouraged planners to consider not only the immediate military problem but also the wider context in which it existed. This broader perspective allowed for the identification of opportunities and risks that might otherwise be overlooked in traditional, linear planning models.
Successful Applications of Military Design
One of the most notable examples of the successful application of military design thinking was during the U.S. Army’s operations in Iraq, particularly during the surge in 2007-2008. As the situation deteriorated into a sectarian civil war, traditional military tactics were proving ineffective. The U.S. military needed a new approach to stabilize the country.
Military design thinking, through the lens of the ADM, played a crucial role in reshaping the U.S. strategy. General David Petraeus and his team, influenced by design thinking principles as found in chapter 4 of the counterinsurgency doctrine at the time (FM 3.24), re-examined the operational environment in Iraq. They realized that the traditional approach of eliminating insurgents was only part of the problem. The broader challenge involved restoring legitimacy to the Iraqi government, protecting the population, and promoting political reconciliation. By framing the problem in a more holistic manner, the U.S. military was able to devise a strategy that integrated both military and non-military elements, including political engagement and infrastructure development. The success of the surge was not solely due to design thinking, but the incorporation of its principles into operational planning allowed for a more nuanced approach to the conflict, which ultimately contributed to a temporary stabilization of Iraq.
Another example of successful military design application was during the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield, conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the Second Intifada. This large-scale operation targeted Palestinian militant infrastructure and was instrumental in toppling Yasser Arafat’s regime in the Palestinian Authority, which had been implicated in the orchestration of numerous attacks against Israel. The IDF employed design thinking principles to understand and dismantle the complex system of militant networks and governance structures that had taken root under Arafat’s regime.
By applying Systemic Operational Design (SOD), the IDF analyzed the intricate web of militant groups, their social support networks, and their connections to the Palestinian Authority. The approach went beyond the conventional tactics of engaging in direct combat; it sought to reshape the environment by targeting key nodes of power and influence within the Palestinian territories. This holistic understanding enabled the IDF to conduct a coordinated and effective military campaign that not only neutralized militant capabilities but also fundamentally disrupted the governance framework that had provided support to these groups. The use of military design thinking allowed the IDF to effectively alter the operational environment, reducing the wave of terror attacks and dismantling the organizational structure of Arafat’s regime, making it a successful application of design principles in a highly complex and volatile situation.
The Decline of Military Design Thinking
Unfortunately, military design thinking in the United States has lost momentum in recent years. After the Iraq surge, U.S. military strategy reverted to more linear, force-on-force tactics, especially as the focus shifted toward troop withdrawal and the transfer of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. This more traditional approach underestimated the fragility of the Iraqi political system and the evolving nature of insurgent groups. The U.S. withdrawal in 2011 created a power vacuum that was filled by extremist factions, culminating in the rise of ISIS by 2014. ISIS exploited the weaknesses of both the Iraqi government and its security forces, which had not been adequately addressed through a broader design-thinking approach. A more sustained application of design methodologies, with an emphasis on political reconciliation, economic rebuilding, and regional power dynamics, might have helped mitigate these vulnerabilities.
Similarly, in the years following the 2014 conflict, Israel shifted back to more conventional military tactics aimed at containing Hamas, primarily through airstrikes and border security measures. This linear approach, focused on reactive defense rather than systemic engagement with the underlying political and social drivers of the conflict, left many root causes of unrest unaddressed. Over time, this allowed Hamas to rebuild its capabilities and maintain its political influence, ultimately leading to the surprise attack on October 7, 2023. Hamas exploited gaps in Israeli security planning and intelligence, which had become more focused on conventional deterrence and less on addressing the deeper structural issues that empowered groups like Hamas in Gaza.
The decline of military design in the U.S. military can be attributed to several factors, including institutional inertia, a preference for conventional warfighting paradigms, and the growing complexity of integrating design methodologies into military cultures that value hierarchy and certainty.
The re-emergence of great power competition, particularly with the rise of China and the resurgence of a militaristic Russia, has caused many military organizations to refocus on conventional warfighting models – the comfortable hypothetical paradigm that provides justification for both the military resource planning process and the defense industrial complex. As militaries prepare for high-intensity conflicts with peer or near-peer adversaries, they are largely failing to develop forces and approaches that are flexible and agile enough to compete for national interests while avoiding the need to fight wars. Unfortunately, the allure of traditional force-on-force engagements has overshadowed the broader, more nuanced approaches championed by military design thinking à la Sun Tzu.
In many U.S. military circles, there remains a preference for linear, kinetic solutions to problems. This is particularly evident in military exercises and war games, which often prioritize conventional scenarios such as amphibious assaults, tank battles, and air superiority campaigns, yet do not evaluate the effectiveness of deterrent posture, non-military approaches, or unconventional strategies. Modern wargames also often fail to account for the complexity of modern warfare, which includes cyber threats, economic measures, logistic constraints, information warfare, hybrid actors, and political instability. Military design thinking, with its emphasis on system-wide analysis and problem reframing, could offer significant value in these areas, but its application has been limited as its products tend to be heretical to the predisposition to warfighting.
Missed Strategic Opportunities
The sidelining of military design thinking is resulting in countless missed strategic opportunities. As military organizations focus on preparing for traditional, high-intensity warfare, they often overlook the subtler, non-kinetic challenges that can shape the strategic landscape. This is particularly evident in areas such as information operations, political warfare, and gray zone conflicts, where adversaries are increasingly using non-military means to achieve strategic objectives.
For example, in the South China Sea, China has employed a range of non-military tactics—such as island building, economic coercion, and diplomatic manipulation—to assert its territorial claims. These actions occur in a space that falls below the threshold of conventional warfare, making it difficult for traditional military planning models to respond effectively. Military design thinking, with its ability to integrate diverse factors into a comprehensive operational picture, could provide a more adaptive and creative approach to addressing these challenges. However, because the focus remains on preparing for potential large-scale conflict with China, opportunities to counter China’s gray zone tactics have been underexploited.
Similarly, in the cyber domain, military design thinking could offer a way to better understand the complex and evolving nature of digital warfare. Cyber threats often exist in a space where military, civilian, and private-sector interests overlap, creating a complex system that traditional military planning struggles to navigate. Design thinking, with its emphasis on understanding systems and relationships, could help military planners develop more effective strategies for both defense and deterrence. Yet, the emphasis on kinetic, conventional warfare has limited the extent to which these ideas have been integrated into military cyber strategies.
The Archipelago of Design: Expanding Design Across NATO
The good news is military design thinking isn’t dead yet. Nor has the complexity of the environment lessened, despite the blinders donned by most Western militaries. Private organizations are carrying the torch of the military design movement, and are working to spread and institutionalize military design thinking on a broader scale. Strategy Central is proud to count itself among these organizations. Another is the Archipelago of Design (AoD), a non-profit network of security practitioners, educators, and researchers seeking to empower leaders to change mindsets with design methodologies across NATO members and partner nations.
Founded to support the spread of military design thinking and promote its integration into broader security frameworks, the AoD has sought to elevate design from a niche set of practices to a central component of military and security planning. Through workshops, training programs including serious games, and research, the Archipelago of Design has been instrumental in helping NATO members and partners explore the potential of design methodologies. The organization works to ensure that military planners and security professionals are equipped not just to respond to conventional military threats, but also to navigate the complex, multifaceted challenges that characterize modern security environments (see for example, AoD’s latest manual on Foresight: https://aodnetwork.ca/safeguarding-the-future/)
The AoD represents a key node in the global effort to integrate military design into the mainstream of defense and security thinking. Despite this, design thinking has struggled to fully embed itself within the day-to-day practices of many military organizations, as conventional warfare paradigms often remain the preferred approach. The tension between these paradigms—conventional warfighting on one hand and design thinking on the other—continues to shape the evolution of military planning in the 21st century.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of military design thinking from a promising alternative to traditional military planning into a marginalized methodology highlights the ongoing tension between conventional warfighting paradigms and the need for adaptive, strategic solutions in a complex world. Yet, despite early successes, such as the U.S. military’s adaptation in Iraq and the Israeli Defense Forces’ use of Systemic Operational Design, the broader military community has struggled to fully embrace design thinking.
The resurgence of conventional warfighting paradigms, driven by great power competition and a renewed focus on state-on-state conflict, has caused the U.S. military to deprioritize the innovative potential of design. This shift has resulted in missed strategic opportunities, particularly in non-traditional domains like cyber warfare, information operations, and gray zone conflicts, where adversaries leverage complexity and ambiguity to achieve their goals.
For militaries to remain effective in the face of modern challenges, there must be a re-integration of military design thinking into their planning processes. By fostering a broader, more adaptive approach that incorporates the lessons of design, military organizations can better navigate the multifaceted, interconnected threats of the 21st century. Through organizations like the Archipelago of Design, the potential remains for military design to regain its momentum and reshape the way militaries think about strategy, operations, and long-term success in an increasingly uncertain world.
12. Kamala Harris is Fashioning a Foreign Policy
No mention of north Korea. (South Korea mentioned in the context of alliances only - yes my bias is showing - but there are a number of projects ongoing to recommend a new comprehensive approach to the Korea problem (or the "Korea question" - per Para. 60 of the Armistice, IYKYK). But I digress.
I wonder if they will do an analysis for Trump. The subtitle question will be the same as below.
Kamala Harris is Fashioning a Foreign Policy
Something New Or More Of the Same?
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/kamala-harris-is-fashioning-a-foreign-policy
By and For Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth - September 29, 2024
Introduction
As Vice President Kamala Harris looks to ascend to the presidency, her foreign policy will face a world shaped by immense complexities. Global affairs are dominated by climate change, the rise of authoritarianism, and growing geopolitical competition between major powers like the United States, China, and Russia. The article "Foreign Policy for the World as It Is" provides a sobering assessment of the current global order, outlining how U.S. dominance has waned and how the old rules-based system is under strain due to challenges from both allies and adversaries. Harris will inherit this fragmented landscape and must chart a foreign policy that addresses these challenges while distinguishing her leadership from her predecessors.
Navigating a Fragmented World Order
President Joe Biden’s foreign policy was driven by the idea of restoring America’s global leadership, rallying allies to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine and managing competition with China. Yet, as the world grapples with the growing influence of regional powers like India, Brazil, and Turkey, it is clear that U.S. primacy is no longer a given. This reality sets the stage for Harris to craft a foreign policy that accepts a more multipolar world while seeking to maintain U.S. influence. More importantly, three central problems define America’s predicament: the failure to restore a cohesive rules-based order, the contradictions within its foreign policy legacy, and if she wins election, the apparent risks of a pro-Trump majority in either the House or Senate failing to appoint critical appointees and sabotaging foreign policy initiatives. Most notably, failing to pass immigration reform.
President Biden’s pledge that “America is back” was intended to restore the United States as a global leader after the chaotic Trump administration. However, returning America to its formerly respected position as global leader was far more complex than simply announcing it. While Biden sought to reposition the U.S. as a stabilizing force, the old rules-based international order has significantly degenerated. Internal divisions paralyze institutions like the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization. Furthermore, Russia and China are actively challenging U.S.-led norms, with Russia undermining international agreements and China building alternative global structures. Even traditional allies and previously hopeful partners are now charting independent paths, exemplified by countries like India, Brazil, and Turkey, which balance between U.S. interests and regional partnerships. Multilateral agreements, such as those that once defined global trade or nuclear diplomacy, seem impossible in a world where Washington’s foreign policy has become erratic and inconsistent.
Second, the U.S. has failed to reckon with the missteps of its post-9/11 foreign policy. The "war on terror" not only drained U.S. resources but also emboldened autocratic regimes, contributing to instability across the Middle East and North Africa. Additionally, the global financial crisis of 2008, exacerbated by free-market policies promoted under the Washington Consensus, has fueled populist backlash worldwide. Washington’s over-reliance on sanctions has created workarounds by adversaries, diminishing the leverage once held by the U.S. dollar in international affairs. This legacy has eroded America’s global standing; its lectures on democracy are increasingly ignored given our won democratic struggles, particularly in the Global South. The recent conflict in Gaza is a stark illustration of this predicament. While the U.S. condemns Russian actions in Ukraine, it simultaneously arms Israel in a war criticized for its heavy toll on Palestinian civilians, casting American foreign policy as hypocritical on the global stage. While the two situations are radically different, many in the global south would not see it that way.
Finally, the looming prospect of a second Trump presidency introduces another layer of risk. Trump's populist, nationalist rhetoric resonates deeply with an American public weary of endless wars and disillusioned with traditional elites. Yet, his tenure sowed chaos, undermining U.S. alliances and credibility. Trump’s erratic policies—from his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal to his embrace of autocratic leaders—created instability in the Middle East, worsened relations with key allies and weakened the U.S. position in global trade. The potential consequences of the Republican party continuing to press for Trump’s policies could further destabilize Europe as Putin attempts to leverage Republican sentiment to press the U.S. to agree to an “end the war” on terms favorable to him. Authoritarians in Europe and especially in China and Iran will be emboldened by a weakened NATO if Congress becomes its chief critic instead of cheerleader. American deterrence, already weakened, could see Congressional support for authoritarians increase the likelihood of conflict in Asia as China will spread if U.S. isolationist-nationalist contraction significantly degrades the U.S. deterrent effect. China will capitalize on American isolationism to assert control over Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific. If Harris wins, she must reconcile the national isolationist mood with the realities of what it will take to remain the leading world power. (See SC article on Deterring China in end notes)
The future of U.S. foreign policy is at a critical juncture. As Harris likely sees it, the challenge is to move away from outdated models of American dominance and adopt a more cooperative approach to address modern global challenges, while simultaneously punishing those who come close to or surpass U.S. redlines. Putting teeth back into deterrence is likely a top priority. Kamala Harris's presidency is likely to emphasize modern global issues such as AI, climate change, and food security, with a focus on the Global South, women’s rights, and human rights.
Building a Foreign Policy Team
Harris’s choice of foreign policy advisors will be instrumental in shaping her approach to international affairs. Philip Gordon, her current National Security Advisor, is expected to remain a central figure in her administration. Gordon brings extensive experience, having served in the Clinton and Obama administrations and played a critical role in U.S. policy toward Europe and the Middle East. He has been a strong advocate for supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression and has emphasized the importance of NATO’s European partners taking greater responsibility for their defense. His views align with a pragmatic foreign policy that emphasizes U.S. engagement but with more shared responsibility from allies.
Another key figure in Harris’s foreign policy team is Rebecca Lissner, her deputy national security advisor. Lissner’s views reflect a desire to move away from U.S. efforts to remake the world in its image and instead maintain an open international system. Her pragmatic liberal internationalism could serve as a moderating force in Harris’s foreign policy, balancing progressive and traditional Democratic currents. Lissner’s work on U.S. grand strategy and her role in shaping Biden’s National Security Strategy provide insights into how she might influence a Harris presidency—focusing on maintaining alliances and protecting U.S. interests without overreach.
Additionally, Harris is expected to face pressure from progressives within the Democratic Party who seek to steer U.S. foreign policy away from militarization and toward greater diplomacy and human rights consistency. While Harris’s foreign policy has largely aligned with Biden’s, her presidency could see a shift, particularly as progressives push for new voices in national security roles.
Harris's Foreign Policy Positions
Harris’s foreign policy positions reflect her support for many of Biden’s initiatives but with subtle distinctions. She has supported continued U.S. assistance to Ukraine and emphasized the importance of NATO. Still, she has also taken a more vocal stance on humanitarian issues in conflicts such as the Israel-Palestine crisis. While Harris has affirmed Israel’s right to defend itself, she has also been one of the administration’s loudest voices in expressing concern for Palestinian suffering. This position highlights her commitment to human rights.
Here is a summary of Kamala Harris's key foreign policy positions based on her track record:
Artificial Intelligence and Technology:
· Harris has been a leader in developing policies for AI governance. She helped formulate an executive order on AI safety, advocated for voluntary commitments from AI firms, and played a key role in the CHIPS and Science Act, which directed $280 billion toward domestic advanced technology production. She emphasized AI's potential for innovation but stressed the importance of protecting against its risks.
China:
· Harris views China as the primary competitor to the U.S. in the 21st century. She has supported stringent export restrictions on critical technologies and advocated for "de-risking" from China instead of full decoupling. Harris also supports continued U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific, particularly through alliances with countries like Japan and South Korea, and emphasizes protecting Taiwan under the long-standing U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity.”
Climate Change:
· Harris sees climate change as an existential threat and was instrumental in the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, which allocated $370 billion toward clean energy investments. She has backed Biden’s return to the Paris Agreement and advocated for international cooperation on climate change, including a $3 billion pledge to the UN Green Climate Fund.
Defense and NATO:
· Harris supports a strong U.S. military presence and reinforces America's commitment to NATO, calling it the greatest military alliance ever. She has backed NATO's expansion with the inclusion of Finland and Sweden and has advocated for greater U.S. involvement in Africa, particularly through military and security assistance.
Israel, Gaza, and the Middle East:
· Harris supports Israel's right to defend itself but has also emphasized the need for a cease-fire and humanitarian assistance in Gaza. She continues to support a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and advocates for holding extremist settlers accountable for violence against Palestinians.
Russia–Ukraine:
· Harris has condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine and advocated for continued U.S. support for Ukraine, including military and financial aid. She argues that failing to counter Russia would embolden other authoritarian nations. Harris has supported sanctions against Russia and has worked closely with allies to isolate the country.
Immigration:
· Harris supports comprehensive immigration reform, including a pathway to citizenship for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients. She led U.S. diplomatic efforts to address migration from Central America, focusing on economic development and reducing violence in the region. President Biden’s new immigration plan, introduced in June 2024, aims to curb illegal crossings by implementing stricter asylum restrictions at the southern border. A key aspect is the use of a presidential proclamation and an interim final rule, which limit asylum eligibility for those crossing the border irregularly. As a result, illegal crossings have decreased significantly, with a 29% drop in U.S. Border Patrol encounters from May to June 2024. The administration has also increased deportations, returning more than 70,000 individuals to over 170 countries since the plan's implementation. Harris will likely continue these programs and attempt to pass the bipartisan border bill killed in Congress earlier this year.
These positions reflect Harris’s focus on maintaining U.S. global leadership while addressing critical 21st-century challenges, such as technological innovation, climate change, and geopolitical competition with major powers like China and Russia.
What Are The National Security Objectives For This New Foreign Policy?
Kamala Harris’s national security objectives focus on maintaining U.S. military superiority, strengthening global alliances, and addressing emerging threats like cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. She is committed to reinforcing NATO and deepening partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to counter the influence of China and Russia, while providing continued support for Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression. Harris views climate change as a critical national security issue, advocating for U.S. leadership in renewable energy and global emissions reduction. She also prioritizes stabilizing the Middle East by supporting Israel’s security while seeking a two-state solution with the Palestinians and re-engaging diplomatically with Iran to prevent nuclear proliferation. Her broader strategy emphasizes a combination of military strength, multilateral diplomacy, and technological innovation to safeguard U.S. interests in a complex, multipolar world.
Given the policy positions we know Kamala Harris has asserted, we can extrapolate what her national security objectives will likely be:
· Maintaining U.S. Military Strength: Harris advocates for ensuring the United States continues to have the most powerful military in the world, supporting defense modernization and readiness.
· Strengthening NATO and Global Alliances: Maintaining and strengthening NATO and U.S. alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, advocating for deeper cooperation with allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia to counter threats from Russia and China will be the bedrock approach to national security.
· Immigration. Harris’s policy would seek to bolster border security by increasing funding for agencies like U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). It includes provisions for hiring additional asylum officers and increasing detention capacity by 47%. It also includes asylum criteria with a more stringent threshold for asylum claims and shortening the time migrants have to prepare evidence. Controversially, it will include a mechanism allowing summary deportation during periods when the border is deemed overwhelmed. More border wall enhancements are likely.
· Countering Chinese Influence: Harris supports a strategy of "de-risking" rather than decoupling from China, aiming to reduce reliance on Chinese manufacturing and technology while maintaining strategic economic ties. Additionally, it will continue to contain China within the First Island Chain and lessen Chinese influence by being a more attractive military, diplomatic, and economic partner.
· Supporting Ukraine Against Russian Aggression: A Harris administration will be committed to providing financial, military, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while imposing sanctions and isolating Russia from the global economy.
· Artificial Intelligence and Cybersecurity: The U.S. government must step up governing AI development and cybersecurity, ensuring that the U.S. maintains technological leadership and is protected against cyberattacks, while establishing global norms for AI safety.
· Climate Change as a National Security Issue: Recognizing climate change as a critical threat, Harris will aim to strengthen U.S. resilience and global leadership in renewable energy and emissions reduction. This must be pursued simultaneously with U.S.-based carbon fuel efficiency technology.
· Middle East Stability: Support Israel’s right to self-defense while advocating for humanitarian protections in Gaza and pursuing a two-state solution or some form of partition. Seek diplomatic re-engagement with Iran to prevent nuclear proliferation while pressing to conclude the Abraham Accords, deny Chinese and Russian regional influence, and maintain stable oil prices. Where possible, degrade Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.
· Combating Terrorism and Extremism: Combat terrorism and extremism globally, particularly through intelligence cooperation and military operations when necessary. Seek a permanent resolution for displaced persons from the war with ISIS and a permanent and well-run prison for ISIS fighters.
· Expanding Diplomatic and Economic Engagement: Expand and improve on U.S. diplomatic capabilities and engagement to resolve conflicts and address global issues. This includes expanding U.S. engagement with African and South American nations (and other developing regions) to counter authoritarian influence.
Diverging from Biden’s Legacy
While Harris’s foreign policy is expected to align with Biden’s in many respects, there will be key differences. Biden’s presidency has been characterized by a return to traditional alliances, particularly in Europe, and a focus on countering Russia and China. Harris will likely continue these policies but with a greater emphasis on diplomatic solutions and reducing military engagements. Her foreign policy could be less hawkish, reflecting her generation’s skepticism toward endless military interventions.
Furthermore, Harris may emphasize global cooperation to address climate change, food security, and technological governance, areas where Biden has made significant strides, but more must be done. Harris’s presidency could see the U.S. play a leading role in shaping international norms around AI and other emerging technologies and pushing for greater global action on climate change.
Conclusion: Meeting Global Challenges
The challenges for the next President are significant and include:
- The old rules-based international order has significantly degenerated.
- The U.S. failed to address the flaws in its post-9/11 foreign policy. The "war on terror" drained resources and empowered autocratic regimes, leading to instability in the Middle East and North Africa.
- The 2008 global financial crisis, worsened by free-market policies, triggered a global populist backlash. Over-reliance on sanctions allowed adversaries to find loopholes, reducing the influence of the U.S. dollar in international affairs.
- Many war-wary Americans advocate a nationalist approach. Of those, many don’t agree that Trump’s tenure created chaos, damaged alliances, and weakened the US globally. If Harris wins, she will have to win over Trump acolytes in Congress, who likely push for policies that further destabilize Europe, embolden authoritarians, and increase conflict in Asia as China takes advantage of US isolationism.
The next President needs to address our weakening deterrence and military capabilities. The 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy report criticized the slow response of the Pentagon, partisan politics in Congress, and the complacency of multiple administrations towards threats from China, Russia, and the Middle East. The report emphasized the need for a comprehensive approach to national defense involving all elements of national power, including the Department of Defense, the executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners. The report also highlighted the need for fundamental changes in how the Department of Defense functions in response to evolving threats and technology, a new force-sizing construct, increased industrial production, improved readiness of the Joint Force, and better alignment with other parts of the interagency for coordinated military tools and national power.
These challenges will shape Kamala Harris’s foreign policy. Geopolitical competition, economic growth, climate, the declined rules-based system, and the rise of new technologies create conditions that cannot be ignored. Her focus on human rights, the Global South, and modern global challenges marks a shift from previous administrations' Cold War-oriented foreign policy. Still, it is more the “nice things to do” and not the priority.
While her presidency will build on Biden’s achievements, Harris will seek to carve out her legacy, emphasizing diplomacy, multilateralism, and a forward-looking approach to international relations while seeking legitimate solutions to the pressing and longstanding challenges mentioned above. Harris’s foreign policy must be adaptable, pragmatic, and focused on reality in an increasingly fragmented world. If she wins the November election, her success in navigating these challenges will determine whether the U.S.’s role in the world declines or ascends to greater heights.
Endnotes
1. Ben Rhodes, “A Foreign Policy for the World as It Is: Biden and the Search for a New American Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, June 18, 2024.
2. Tracy Wilkinson, “The Next-Generation Foreign Policy of Kamala Harris,” Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2024.
3. Rebecca Lissner and Micah Zenko, An Open World: How America Can Win the Contest for Twenty-First-Century Order, (New York: Yale University Press, 2020).
4. Samuel Dempsey, “Who is Philip Gordon, Harris’s National Security Advisor?” CEPA, August 21, 2024.
5. Nahal Toosi, Phelim Kine, and Joseph Gedeon, “Progressives Scramble for Foreign Policy Jobs Under Kamala Harris,” Politico, August 13, 2024.
6. Asma Khalid, “What is Kamala Harris’ Foreign Policy?” NPR, September 7, 2024.
7. U.S. Customs and Border Protection. "CBP Releases June 2024 Monthly Update." June 2024. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-june-2024-monthly-update.
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Integrated Deterrence And China's Strategic Insights. https://www.strategycentral.io/post/integrated-deterrence-and-china-s-strategic-insights
13. Discussion with the Congressional Commission on the National Defense Strategy
The transcript of the entire discussion can be accessed at this link.
https://nationalsecuritymedia.gwu.edu/files/2024/09/DWG-Harman-Edelman.pdf
Jane Harman, Chair
Eric Edelman, Vice Chair David Grannis, Executive Director
Congressional Commission on the National Defense Strategy
Defense Writers Group
Project for Media and National Security George Washington School of Media and Public Affairs
17 September 2024
Moderator: Good morning everyone, and welcome to a truly special edition of this Defense Writers Group. We have as our guests two people -- since I’m no longer a New York Times correspondent I can express opinions. I think we have with us today two of the most important public officials I’ve ever met in my entire career that are dedicated to service and keeping our nation safe.
Jane Harman is Chair, and Eric Edelman is Vice Chair of the Congressional Commission on the National Defense Strategy.
A small note, this is Eric’s fourth visit to the Defense Writers Group and he told me it’s his last, so we better enjoy it.
Edelman: No, it’s not my last Defense Writers Group. It’s the last Defense Commission I’m going to do. I’ve done four of those too. I’m happy to come back here.
Moderator: Thank you.
The ground rules, as always, this is on the record. You can record it for accuracy of quotes, but there’s no rebroadcast of audio or video. Some of you emailed in advance to get on the questioners list. There will be time for others over the hour.
Normally I start with a question, but I think given the importance and the heft of this report I would ask Jane and Eric to take a couple of minutes at the top to tell us your top line takeaways, the most important things to you.
Harman: Thank you, Thom. Now that I know why you spell your name the way you do I’m even more appreciative of how unique you are.
Moderator: One final footnote. Jane is also just back from Ukraine.
14. Austin believes casualties in all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah could ‘equal or exceed’ those in Gaza
I fear his assessment is likely correct.
Austin believes casualties in all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah could ‘equal or exceed’ those in Gaza | CNN Politics
CNN · by Shania Shelton · September 27, 2024
Defense Secretary Austin says an all-out war would be 'devastating' for both Lebanon and Israel
00:53 - Source: CNN
CNN —
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin warned Friday of “devastating” consequences if Israel engages in an all-out war with Hezbollah, telling CNN in an exclusive interview that casualties would “equal or exceed” the number in Gaza.
“An all-out war between Lebanese, Hezbollah and Israel would be devastating for both Lebanon and Israel. And again, we anticipate that we’d see a number of people displaced, casualties that, you know, equal or exceed what we’ve seen in Gaza,” Austin told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer.
The defense secretary, reiterating the US desire for a “diplomatic solution,” also said a possible ground incursion by Israeli forces into Lebanon risks spiraling the situation into a regional conflict.
The US and several prominent allies believed they had achieved a 21-day pause in fighting that would give time for diplomacy and could prevent a full-fledged war from breaking out between Israel and Hezbollah. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said reports of an imminent deal were “incorrect” and vowed to continue to hit the Iran-backed militant group “with all our might.” Netanyahu spoke at the United Nations General Assembly Friday morning, where he vowed to continue Israel’s military efforts and warned that “there is no place in Iran that the long arm of Israel cannot reach.”
US-led efforts to secure a ceasefire appear to have failed, and CNN has reported that the Biden administration has all but paused a push for a ceasefire and hostage deal in the Israel-Hamas conflict. Asked by Blitzer if continued US aid to Israel undermines Washington’s efforts to secure a ceasefire in Lebanon, Austin on Friday reiterated the long-standing alliance.
“We’ve been clear from the very beginning that that we’re going to support Israel in its efforts to defend itself,” Austin said. “We’ve done that from the very beginning, and we’re going to continue to do that going forward.”
Recent hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah began after Israel decided to make returning displaced residents to their homes near the northern border an official goal of its war aims. Tens of thousands of Israelis who live in the area were evacuated shortly after the October 2023 Hamas terrorist attack, when Hezbollah began firing rockets into the region. In recent days, Israel has launched a series of strikes that have targeted Hezbollah’s leadership, and Israel’s military chief said earlier this week that the nation was preparing for a possible ground incursion into Lebanon.
Austin also was asked by Blitzer about US support for Ukraine, whose president, Volodymyr Zelensky, met with President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris on Thursday and is meeting with former President Donald Trump on Friday. Amid ongoing debates in Washington about continued aid to the eastern European nation — especially if Trump, who has been skeptical about such support, is elected — the US is under pressure to allow Ukraine to fire long-range weapons deep into Russia.
Austin said US policy about the use and range of certain weapons has not changed but said the US can’t dictate how Ukraine should use “their” weapons.
“What we’ve seen recently is that Ukraine has the ability to now produce its own weaponry in terms of (unmanned aerial vehicles) that are proving to be very, very effective in that fight,” Austin said. “And some of these UAVs can range out beyond 400 kilometers, which is beyond the range of (US-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems) or Storm Shadow or anything else that we would be able to provide them.”
He also declined to answer a question from Blitzer about whether US policy toward Ukraine has been “irreversibly politicized” in the wake of Republican reluctance to continue arming the US ally.
“Our focus will remain on making sure that we’re giving Ukraine everything that we can provide, that will prove effective in this fight,” he said.
This story has been updated with additional reporting.
CNN · by Shania Shelton · September 27, 2024
15. US has a whole new deal with Iraq, and won’t talk about it
US has a whole new deal with Iraq, and won’t talk about it
U.S. officials could not say how many troops currently in Iraq would leave the country under a new bilateral security agreement.
Jeff Schogol
Posted on Sep 27, 2024 3:15 PM EDT
taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol
The U.S. government’s plan to transition to a new bilateral security agreement with Iraq is about as clear as mud.
Speaking to reporters on Friday, two U.S. officials said that the relationship between U.S. and Iraq is fundamentally shifting but repeatedly refused to say how many of the roughly 2,500 U.S. troops currently in Iraq will withdraw from the country – if any – under the new agreement and where those service members who stay behind will be based. Both officials spoke on condition of anonymity under rules established by the State Department.
“We’re not going to speak to our plans concerning specific base locations or troop numbers,” a senior defense official said. “We have been and will continue to be in active dialogue with the government of Iraq about how our bilateral relationship will evolve, which will certainly include changes to our force posture and troop numbers. For now, that remains in a planning process and under review. Until those decisions are reached, we won’t be providing specific information on numbers and locations regarding something that hasn’t been decided.”
The United States has had a fraught relationship with Iraq for several decades. In 1991, the U.S military led a coalition that ejected the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Then in 2003, a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq to oust its leader Saddam Hussein. The war turned into a bitter insurgency, which American forces had largely defeated when they left the country in December 2011.
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Then in 2014, the Islamic State group conquered large swathes of northern Iraq, prompting the Iraqi government to invite U.S. troops to return. Since then, the United States has led a coalition of countries against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
Although ISIS lost its last territorial enclave in Syria back in 2019, the fight against the terrorist group in both Iraq and Syria continues. Seven U.S. troops were injured during an Aug. 29 operation in Iraq’s Anbar province that resulted in the deaths of four top ISIS commanders.
Still, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani has been under pressure from Iran to end the U.S. military presence in Iraq, according to the Wall Street Journal, which recently reported that the U.S and Iraqi governments had reached a bilateral security agreement, under which most American troops will leave Iraq by 2026, leaving only a small contingent behind.
On Friday, a senior administration official provided reporters with a broad outline for the transition from the current Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, to the bilateral security agreement between Iraq and the United States.
“I would like to emphasize that this is an evolution of the military mission in Iraq,” the senior administration official said. “We are moving toward the type of productive, long-term security relationship the United States has partners around the world.”
The first phase of the plan will run until Sept. 30, 2025, and it involves bringing the U.S.-led coalition’s military mission in Iraq to an end, and “ending the presence of coalition forces in certain locations in Iraq, as mutually determined,” said the senior administration official, who did not elaborate from where coalition troops might withdraw.
However, the United States and Iraq have agreed that the coalition will be able to continue to carry out counter-terrorism mission from Iraq against ISIS in Syria under the second phase of the plan, which lasts until the end of September 2026 – if not longer, said the senior administration official, who added that the timeline for the second phase of the plan could be adjusted by future political leaders in Iraq, the United States, and coalition nations.
The senior administration official stressed that “the United States is not withdrawing from Iraq,” but when a reporter pressed if that meant no U.S. troops were leaving Iraq, the official did not rule out future changes to American force levels in the country.
“As we go through this transition into a bilateral relationship, there could very well be changes in the numbers, changes in the activities that we do, aligning ourselves better with the bilateral interests that we have supporting the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces,” the senior administration official said. “A lot of that is going to be an ongoing discussion, and we will see where that takes us.”
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Senior Pentagon Reporter
Jeff Schogol is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. He reports on both the Defense Department as a whole as well as individual services, covering a variety of topics that include personnel, policy, military justice, deployments, and technology. His apartment in Alexandria, Va., has served as the Task & Purpose Pentagon bureau since the pandemic first struck in March 2020. The dwelling is now known as Forward Operating Base Schogol.
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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol
16. Irregular warfare is everywhere in this new Army video
Access the video at the link: https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-irregular-warfare-clip/
Excerpts:
Irregular warfare, according to the Army’s special warfare school, is several things. Chaotic. Multidimensional. A contest of power and influence. One description that lingers is “strategic competition,” set over images of the Earth from space. The term, the United States’ go-to phrase for its contest for influence with China, comes seconds after a notable shot of the Hong Kong skyline.
In my opinion Irregular warfare is the military contribution to political warfare. Political warfare is strategic competition. But I am an iconoclast when it comes to those who think political warfare is an anachronism and relevant today..
Political Warfare
George Kennan:
“Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP--the Marshall Plan), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.”
http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm
Paul Smith:
"Political warfare is the use of political means to compel an opponent to do one's will, based on hostile intent. The term political describes the calculated interaction between a government and a target audience to include another state's government, military, and/or general population. Governments use a variety of techniques to coerce certain actions, thereby gaining relative advantage over an opponent. The techniques include propaganda and psychological operations (PSYOP), which service national and military objectives respectively. Propaganda has many aspects and a hostile and coercive political purpose. Psychological operations are for strategic and tactical military objectives and may be intended for hostile military and civilian populations." Smith, Paul A., On Political War (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989), p. 3. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233501.pdf
Irregular warfare is everywhere in this new Army video
The Army’s Special Warfare Center & School quietly dropped this new, ominous clip online, showcasing how it’s viewing multidimensional and complex conflict.
Nicholas Slayton
Posted on Sep 29, 2024 4:26 PM EDT
taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton
Share
Irregular warfare is not what you think it is. In fact, to understand it, think bigger. That’s the message in a new video on the topic from the U.S. Army’s special warfare school. It’s a slick, ominous clip, but one that was quietly released onto social media on Thursday, Sept. 26 by the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.
The video, simply titled “irregular warfare clip,” starts simple, with a musician playing on a violin and pastoral shots of a family playing near fields. As a clock ticks in the background, those cut to militant scenes. Aerial reconnaissance of cityscapes, combat footage in urban areas, including night vision shots, plus tanks firing. As the music builds, those idyllic scenes appear only briefly.
Watch for yourself:
Irregular warfare, according to the Army’s special warfare school, is several things. Chaotic. Multidimensional. A contest of power and influence. One description that lingers is “strategic competition,” set over images of the Earth from space. The term, the United States’ go-to phrase for its contest for influence with China, comes seconds after a notable shot of the Hong Kong skyline.
The video also features several bits of footage showing what the Army considers ideological battlefields and places where the U.S. is fighting for influence. There are shots of protests, from people marching in the streets — seemingly from 2020 — to protestors standing on barriers with fire in the background. Instead of soldiers in combat gear, the last half of the video includes suited figures in political offices. There are also several scientific aspects, from rocket engine ignition sequences to items being crafted on 3D printers. As the text next describes irregular warfare as “unity of effort,” footage of a conductor leading a symphony ties together some of the ideas. Irregular warfare is a big picture matter, not limited just to actual combat battlefields.
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It’s not clear what the purpose of the video is, if it’s an internal training tool for soldiers at SWCS or meant for wider release. At just over a minute and half long, it’s a bit lengthy for any television commercial. Notably, it has not been shared by the school on any social media platforms beyond being uploaded to YouTube. It currently has less than 4,000 views. Task & Purpose contacted SWCS about “Irregular Warfare Clip,” but as of press time has not received a response.
There is some overlap with another video uploaded to the school’s YouTube page. That one, “Special Warfare Center Command Video,” released on Sept. 24, is more of a general overview of what the school does. It features rougher footage and is not as heavily produced. But it outlines what kind of training and skills servicemembers learn at the school.
“We have a functional responsibility to integrate the role of irregular warfare in support of the joint force,” the narrator says in that clip.
The video, with its sharp editing and high production value, is similar to the Army’s 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)’s “Ghosts in the Machine” video, released earlier this year as part of a psychological operations recruitment effort. That video relied heavily on montages and striking imagery to showcase the importance of psyops in conflict.
It remains unclear what “Irregular Warfare Clip” is meant for, but it is clear that someone in the Army is paying attention to editing lessons.
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Contributing Editor
Nicholas Slayton is a Contributing Editor for Task & Purpose. In addition to covering breaking news, he writes about history, shipwrecks, and the military’s hunt for unidentified anomalous phenomenon (formerly known as UFOs). He currently runs the Task & Purpose West Coast Bureau from Los Angeles.
taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton
17. ROTC Scholarships Could Be Slashed This Decade as Army Deals with Glut of Officers
Are we going to toss out our seed corn of the future? Is this a decision we will come to regret in a decade or two? I am sure the ORSAs have all the numbers to back this up. But it just does not feel right.
ROTC Scholarships Could Be Slashed This Decade as Army Deals with Glut of Officers
military.com · by Steve Beynon · September 27, 2024
The Army is eyeing a roughly $100 million cut to Reserve Officers' Training Corps scholarships through the rest of the decade as the service aims to correct an oversaturation of officers in the force.
Between 2026 and 2029, Army planners are looking to slash the ROTC program’s annual $315 million budget by $25 million or $30 million, multiple service officials with direct knowledge of the plans told Military.com.
The decision is not final and would ultimately be a part of future budget proposals Congress would have to approve, and service officials are still calculating what impact the cuts may have. However, such reductions could lead to an overall decrease of between 2,500 and 4,000 commissions during the four years. Budgets are also approved annually, which allows the Army to adjust the spigot for commissions if it felt it overcorrected.
The move would have no impact on the other military services' ROTC programs. There would also be no effect on any cadet's scholarship, and anyone's admittance into the program would not be interrupted. Instead, the cuts would only impact the number of new cadets the program can bring in.
The ROTC program gives full-time college students the opportunity to earn a commission as an officer while pursuing a degree at a typical civilian university. The scholarships are awarded to students in the program to cover the cost of college.
Roughly three-fourths of all Army officers commission from ROTC, according to service data. On average, the program commissions about 5,600 cadets per year. Even before the proposed cuts, some Army officials behind the scenes have been nervous about the scholarship budget, and getting less mileage out of it, as college costs have skyrocketed in recent decades, far outpacing inflation.
Some 75,000 active-duty Army officers are currently serving, according to federal data. Captains account for the highest concentration of soldiers in any given officer rank, with nearly 26,000 serving.
In recent years, the service has commissioned about 100 more lieutenants than it has needed, service officials explained. The over-commissioning has led to problems in finding jobs for officers in the force. In January, for example, the Army saw it had far too many armor and infantry lieutenants and asked 250 to voluntarily move into support roles such as signal and finance.
Meanwhile, the Army is working with a relatively flat budget and has had to juggle different spending priorities, such as modernizing weapons programs and ramping up its footprint in the Pacific. After a string of media reports highlighted dilapidated living conditions, it also doubled its budget request to Congress for junior enlisted barracks construction and maintenance to $2 billion.
While it manages an abundance of officers, the service is struggling to court young Americans to join its enlisted ranks.
On Thursday, Army officials announced it recruited 55,300 active-duty troops this year, just barely squeaking by its goal of 55,000.
The service did recruit an additional 11,000 in its delayed entry program, a cohort of enlistees who go to basic training up to a year after they enlist. Sometimes those delayed entry participants have to wait to complete high school, or the Army does not have enough space in basic training units for them yet. The delayed entries are always counted in the following year's recruiting numbers.
It was the first time in two years the service hit its recruiting goals as it faces a more competitive civilian job market; military recruiting efforts historically have been boosted by a poor economy and high unemployment.
Getting young Americans to commission as officers has been less of a struggle for the Army, as ROTC and West Point offering free scholarships and a relatively more comfortable lifestyle has been an easier pitch.
Enlisted ranks also make significantly less money than their commissioned counterparts, and college degrees are starting to become an expectation for promotion, effectively erasing the traditional education gap that has separated the two classes of soldiers.
military.com · by Steve Beynon · September 27, 2024
18. Warships from the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, U.S. and Japan Sail in Joint South China Sea Patrol
The silk web of allies.
Warships from the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, U.S. and Japan Sail in Joint South China Sea Patrol
September 29, 2024 12:17 PM
news.usni.org · by Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · September 29, 2024
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ship JS Sazanami sails behind Royal New Zealand Navy ship HMNZS Aotearoa while conducting a Dual-Replenishment at Sea with HMAS Sydney and USS Howard during a Maritime Cooperative Activity in the South China Sea on Sept. 28, 2024. Royal Australian Navy Photo
MANILA, PHILIPPINES — The Philippines held a joint patrol in the South China Sea that included forces from Japan, Australia, the U.S. and New Zealand on Saturday.
The joint patrol was the fourth multilateral maritime cooperative activity held to date. Participants included BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151) , BRP Emilio Jacinto (PS-35) USS Howard (DDG-83), HMAS Sydney (DDG-42) , JS Sazanami (DD-113) and HMNZS Aotearoa (A-11). Naval aviation, including three helicopters and one Royal Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, also joined the exercise. Activities, which included drills in maritime domain awareness, replenishment at sea and contact reporting, were held near the vicinity of the Philippine exclusive economic zone off Luzon.
The Australian, Japanese, and New Zealander vessels participating in the drills previously sailed through the Taiwan Strait on Wednesday to reach the South China Sea. This was the first time a Japanese ship was announced transiting the 90–mile wide strait separating Taiwan and China.
Armed Forces of the Philippines chief Gen. Romeo Brawner said the patrol was in line with international law and affirmed the right of freedom of navigation and overflight.
Executive Officer HMAS Sydney, Lieutenant Commander Simone Macintosh, RAN takes a bearing as the ship approaches Royal New Zealand Navy ship HMNZS Aotearoa to conduct a Replenishment at Sea on Sept. 28, 2024. RAN Photo
“The conduct of the [patrol] manifests the AFP’s dedication to strengthening partnerships and enhancing collective capabilities with like-minded nations to address emerging maritime security challenges,” reads the Philippine military press release.
On the same day of the Philippines’ joint patrol, China announced its own drills around Scarborough Shoal, which Beijing gained de facto control of following a standoff with Manila in 2012.
This joint patrol comes amid the conclusion of a standoff at Sabina Shoal, which saw Philippine Coast Guard flagship BRP Teresa Magbanua (MRRV-9701) withdraw from the contested maritime feature earlier this month. According to the Philippines, the patrol ship had to depart Sabina due to low supplies, damage from a Chinese ramming incident and bad weather conditions. Despite claims from the Philippine military and Coast Guard that the shoal hasn’t been lost, it is unclear if Manila has managed to get another vessel to maintain the country’s presence at the shoal. AIS data reveals a near constant presence of Chinese forces around and within Sabina.
A brief respite occurred this week when Manila revealed that a resupply mission reached the Marine outpost onboard BRP Sierra Madre (LT-57) at Second Thomas Shoal on Thursday. Philippine forces utilized MV Lapu-Lapu, a civilian boat reinforced against water cannon attacks contracted by the Navy for resupply missions, for the mission. This was the second publicly reported resupply mission since Manila and Beijing hashed out a provisional agreement regarding the resupply and personnel rotation of Philippine forces from the disputed maritime feature following a violent skirmish with Chinese Coastguardmen on June 17.
Related
news.usni.org · by Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · September 29, 2024
19. The case for giving Ukraine long-range striking power in Russia
The case for giving Ukraine long-range striking power in Russia
Defense News · by William Courtney and John Hoehn · September 29, 2024
Ukraine’s innovative drones are damaging forces and war-supporting industry across western and southern Russia. In a visit to the White House on Sept. 26, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked for more help for long-range strikes. He received modest assistance. President Joe Biden said the U.S. would provide the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), an unpowered glide bomb with a range of over 60 miles.
Ukraine had wanted more. It has repeatedly sought permission to use U.S.-built Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles for long-range strikes deep in Russia. They have a range of up to 190 miles and, with their speed, are better able to hit mobile targets. Prior to Zelenskyy’s visit, there were hints the U.S. might provide Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM). Unlike ATACMS missiles, these missiles are abundant in the U.S. arsenal, and their stealth capability make them more effective at hitting defended targets.
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Sentiment in NATO is growing to give Ukraine more scope for action. This month the European Parliament asked European Union members to “immediately” lift deep strike restrictions, and so have top U.S. House Republicans and several leading congressional Democrats. Nonetheless, the U.S. approach remains hesitant.
There may be risks. On Sept. 25, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned an attack on Russia by a state backed by a nuclear power could lead to a nuclear response. He often cries nuclear wolf, but this time, his timing suggested worry that Biden might cave to pressures and unleash Ukraine to conduct more deep attacks.
A Russian nuclear response, however, seems unlikely and would probably bring little, if any, military gain. Russian troops are not trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield, as in the Cold War. Ukraine has few, if any, concentrated, high-value military targets. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have warned Putin not to go nuclear, while Biden has warned of “catastrophic consequences” if he does.
There is also a risk that some JASSMs might miss their targets or not be fully destroyed. Russia — and China — could analyze the debris to try to learn more about their stealth capability and sensitive electronics.
Time and again when Ukrainian forces have surprised or shocked Russia — from destroying or damaging one-third of its Black Sea fleet to seizing territory in Russia’s Kursk region — the Kremlin’s response has been weak. Suffering steep manpower losses and needing arms from Iran and North Korea, Russian forces may face limitations.
To its credit, Ukraine is doing a lot on its own to strike deep inside Russia. On Sept. 18, it carried out a stunning attack in Russia’s Tver region, blowing up a huge weapons depot in a blast akin to an earthquake. To overwhelm air defenses, Ukraine used over 100 slow-flying drones. The depot was 300 miles away from Ukraine, well beyond the 190-mile range of ATACMS missiles.
A welcome surprise has been Ukraine’s high-tech drone innovation. Former CIA Director General David Petraeus called it “unprecedented” in scale and pace. Even more is coming. Last month, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had deployed its first high-speed missile-drone, the Palianytsia.
But Ukraine needs more long-range strike power than its own aviation sector can provide. U.S. arms may be a valuable complement, despite their higher cost.
Last spring the U.S. began sending the long-range variant of ground-to-ground ATACMS missiles to Ukraine for use inside its territory. In occupied Crimea, they have ravaged Russia’s navy and air defenses and supporting infrastructure. ATACMS missiles are responsive and can hit mobile targets that elude drones. In June, the U.S. allowed Ukraine some added flexibility — to strike across the border inside Russia with ATACMS missiles wherever enemy forces were engaged in attacks.
On Sept. 26, Biden also promised to send hundreds more Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). Armed with them, Ukraine’s F-16s could shoot down some Russian combat aircraft in flight before they release devastating glide bombs.
The long-range strike mission is important for Ukraine, but so are other factors. It faces challenges in several areas, including a soldier shortage, inadequate defensive fortifications and uncertainties about future Western aid.
Nonetheless, the U.S. could benefit Ukraine by doing more to help it to conduct long-range strikes in Russia. Neither U.S. weapons nor Ukraine’s, by themselves, are enough. Together, they could raise the cost to Russia of its perfidy and help strengthen European security.
William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND research institution and was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and a U.S.-Soviet commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
John Hoehn is an associate policy researcher at RAND and a former military analyst with the Congressional Research Service.
20. The Lies Russia Tells Itself
Is this an opportunity to exploit?
Recognize the strategy. Understand it. EXPOSE it. And attack it with superior political warfare and information.
Excerpts:
The documents therefore raise a crucial question: When does exposure work against adversaries, and when does it work for them? When is sunlight the best disinfectant and when does it help the weeds grow? The disclosed and leaked documents that enabled this analysis are, of course, also a form of exposure, but of a different kind. It could be called upstream exposure. The documents expose not just the outputs of disinformation campaigns but their inputs—the proposals, the internal assessments and evaluations, the tradecraft, the technological methods, the identity of the contractors running the projects, and the funders and politicians behind those contractors.
Publicizing upstream information has a more powerful positive effect. Such upstream exposure may even enable technical takedowns and platform counteraction, for example when a government reveals malicious infrastructure to private sector entities that can then curb the bad actors. To put it bluntly: you can’t brag to the people who give you money that you got their names doxxed, their toy broken, and sanctions imposed on them.
Efforts to expose upstream information about disinformation campaigns have, of the past decade, become an ever more sophisticated component of the counterintelligence actions pursued by the intelligence alliance known as the Five Eyes, comprising Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, U.K., and U.S. intelligence agencies. The U.S. Department of Justice, in particular, has issued a range of criminal indictments against foreign covert operators, with the Treasury often imposing sanctions alongside. The trust of technology firms, journalists, and the wider investigative community is a crucial asset in these efforts, and U.S. spy agencies must continue to refrain from pushing out forged content to any target.
The newly disclosed documents show that reporting on run-of-the-mill influence operations with negligible or no effect—or even exaggerating that effect—simply helps disinformation agents generate more convincing marketing material. Instead, governments, companies, and investigative organizations and media outlets that wish to counter disinformation must focus more sharply on efforts that translate into tangible consequences for the perpetrators: taking down infrastructure and accounts from social media platforms and barring their reentry as well as exposing disinformation entrepreneurs personally, sanctioning them, and indicting them. If the SDA documents were not leaked to the press by Western intelligence agencies, they should have been.
The Lies Russia Tells Itself
The Country’s Propagandists Target the West—but Mislead the Kremlin, Too
September 30, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare · September 30, 2024
In early September, the infamous Russian disinformation project known as Doppelganger hit the news again. Doppelganger—a scheme to disseminate fake articles, videos, and polls about polarizing political and cultural issues in the United States, as well as in France, Germany, and Ukraine—was first exposed in 2022 and widely covered in the Western press. The project cloned entire news organizations’ websites—complete with logos and the bylines of actual journalists—and planted its own fake stories, memes, and cartoons, luring casual Internet users to the sites via social media posts, often automated ones.
Tech companies and research labs had carefully traced, documented, and often removed some of Doppelganger’s online footprints, and even exposed the private Moscow firm mostly responsible for the campaigns: the Social Design Agency (SDA). But the disinformation campaigns persisted, and on September 4, in a move to counter them, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it had seized 32 Internet domains behind the Doppelganger campaign—and published an unprecedented 277-page FBI affidavit that included 190 pages of internal SDA documents likely sourced by American spies. Then, 12 days later, the German daily Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that, in late August, it had received from an anonymous source, large amounts of authentic internal SDA documents. A day before the FBI released its affidavit and the accompanying files—some of which overlapped with the leaked ones—Süddeutsche Zeitung asked me to comment on the leak for its investigation, because I have researched and written about disinformation and political warfare for almost ten years. I inquired if its source might allow me to have the entire 2.4 gigabytes of leaked SDA documents, and the source agreed.
Until these recent disclosures—comprising more than 3,000 individual files—observers could mostly just speculate about the goals, specific methods and tradecraft, and bureaucratic procedures driving contemporary Russian disinformation campaigns. The FBI affidavit and the European media leak offered something unprecedented: a glimpse into the planning of one of the most notorious disinformation efforts in the post–Cold War era. Disinformation operators taking advantage of the Internet to disseminate propaganda to gullible users had been a major concern since at least 2015, when the efforts of a St. Petersburg troll factory known as the Internet Research Agency to inflame latent conflicts was exposed in the press, and Russian military intelligence deployed creative disinformation operations to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential race.
Yet never had so many internal documents leaked from a major disinformation player. The recently disclosed material contains project plans, proposals, budgets, daily output targets, key performance indicators and quotas, progress reports, measures of effectiveness, private emails from disinformation operatives to government officials, the minutes of meetings held by the SDA’s overseers in the Kremlin, hundreds of media monitoring reports from target countries, thousands of archived fake stories, ideas for more fakes, and even a splashy promotional video it prepared for Russia’s Presidential Administration. Crucially, the leak contains not just final documents but works in all stages of progress. The granular operational insight that such documents offer is usually possible only decades after operations conclude, when declassified proposals and memos show up in intelligence archives or when ex-operators write memoirs.
The information revealed not only tactical insights but deeper ones—insights that observers had not expected and that, to date, have not yet been properly understood by intelligence analysts and investigative reporters. A close analysis of the leaked files suggest that although Russia is using new technological methods to disseminate disinformation, many of the country’s core methods and goals remain familiar from the Cold War. They show how the SDA’s efforts to trick Western audiences may well have deceived the company’s own leadership—and the Russian government—about the effectiveness of the Doppelganger campaigns. And perhaps most important, the documents reveal that the biggest boost the Doppelganger campaigners got was from the West’s own anxious coverage of the project. That revelation, in turn, demonstrates that those who wish to fight disinformation—whether it originates from Russia or elsewhere—need to start thinking very differently about how to counter campaigns.
SOCIAL CLIMBER
The SDA’s deception work first surfaced in 2022, likely almost immediately after Doppelganger got off the ground. In April of that year, Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, disclosed in a quarterly report that it had removed from its platforms “a network of about 200 accounts operated from Russia.” By August 2022, German investigative journalists revealed that they had discovered forgeries of about 30 news sites, including many of the country’s biggest media outlets—Frankfurter Allgemeine, Der Spiegel, and Bild—but also Britain’s Daily Mail and France’s 20 Minutes. The sites had deceptive URLs such as www-dailymail-co-uk.dailymail.top. The newly leaked documents show that between mid-May and mid-July 2022, the SDA pushed out, for example, 3,161 social media comments promoting its Bild forgeries and 3,277 links to its Daily Mail fakes.
According to Russia’s Federal Tax Agency, the SDA was incorporated as a company in December 2017, with headquarters a seven-minute walk from the Kremlin. The leaked documents show that, by 2024, it had a staff of over 100, including 18 administrators in the central office, eight writers and editors, a press monitoring staff of 12, a social media monitoring team of 20, seven translators, three meme and cartoon artists, four video producers, and a number of remote workers. For some of the technical work that went into Doppelganger, it collaborated with a sister contractor, Struktura, created by the same founder. On its website, the SDA lists about a dozen government clients including the Russian legislature and Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs—but not the Russian presidential administration, which is likely the firm’s most important sponsor. The Kremlin oversaw the SDA, and Russian President Vladimir Putin was personally briefed on the startup’s work at least once.
After the initiative was exposed—and dubbed Doppelganger by Alexandre Alaphilippe of the EU DisinfoLab, a Europe-focused research organization studying disinformation—it quickly became one of the most extensively covered disinformation efforts in history. Since 2022, newspapers, researchers, and the French, German, and U.S. governments have mounted major efforts to expose fresh details about the covert campaigns. Bavarian intelligence, for instance, gained access to some of the SDA’s internal metrics and found that Doppelganger’s campaigns increased after October 2023.
Just from November 2023 through August of 2024, Doppelganger produced well over 700 fake websites, making the project one of Russia’s largest known disinformation factories. Meta has provided updates on Doppelganger’s efforts to infiltrate its platforms no fewer than eight times. In May 2024, OpenAI kicked Doppelganger off ChatGPT by disabling accounts that it was able to link to the Moscow firm. This summer, lawmakers in the U.S. Congress revealed that they were worried that Russian disinformation operators had successfully injected talking points into statements made by members of Congress.
FAKE AND BAKE
All leaked files should be approached with caution. Whenever stolen or hacked files are leaked, at least a small number of the documents may themselves be fake, although other recent Russian-engineered leaks—such as the 2016 disclosure of Hillary Clinton campaign head John Podesta’s personal emails to WikiLeaks—proved entirely authentic in the end. But all leaks are not created equal. After carefully scrutinizing the newly released documents, today’s FBI counterintelligence investigators, the European journalists who examined the files, and I all agree that they are authentic.
A close read of these leaked documents, as well as of the FBI’s September affidavit, reveals, first, how central forgery is to Russia’s disinformation strategy. Fabrication and misrepresentation—forging documents, counterfeiting letters, making up sources, creating false identities, inventing front organizations, and deceiving audiences—were, for a century, a prominent part of the Soviet Union’s political warfare. The Doppelganger documents reveal the degree to which Russian political actors still rely on tools from Soviet so-called active measures, albeit abetted by new technologies and given new names. The document dump included the SDA’s initial concept plan for Doppelganger. It minced no words: “We need a separate department of fakes—a factory!”
Naturally, a marketing agency would want to invent a snappy term to describe an old idea, so the fakery startup dubbed its product “augmented reality.” The Social Design Agency’s subsequent proposals to potential funders described the “multi-format” “tools” and “creative means” the company would use to misinform target audiences and provoke “emotional reactions.” At the top of the priority list were fake videos and documents, fabrications of telephone conversations, and screenshots of made-up chats formatted in the style of common instant messaging platforms.
The company would also amplify “fake and real” quotes from influencers, as well as “fake interviews and fabricated leaks of audio messages from private chats.” One of the proposals detailed how the SDA would prepare such fakes by screenshotting and altering real documents and correspondence. One Ukraine-focused proposal suggested that such forgeries would be released weekly.
FALSE RETURNS
The documents also reveal that the SDA not only deceived its targets but also deceived itself. Historians of active measures have catalogued how the Soviet Union took advantage of existing frictions, conflicts, and contradictions in the societies they targeted, and the SDA sought to do the same with Doppelganger. The newly disclosed documents illustrate that the SDA begins its influence efforts by surveying the landscape of organic friction points and real frustrations within its target societies. But such a method incorporates a wicked risk for disinformation operators. Because their goal is to accelerate trends that are already advancing, there is no definitive way for them to know just how much their own interventions contributed to driving these trends.
It is therefore easy for disinformation peddlers to convince themselves and their funders that they are more effective than they really are—and the documents show that the SDA did just that. The company kept extensive records to try to prove its impact, logging every Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, or Telegram comment that they posted in response to authentic social media comments—hundreds of thousands of them in spreadsheets that were often tens of thousands of rows long. A systematic tendency to exaggerate its potential and real impact emerges in its client reports. One December 2022 document, for instance, identified ambitious key performance indicators for an SDA disinformation campaign in Germany, including to drive the growth of the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany party, sow “fear of the future” among the German public, and “polarize” German society. A project proposal for the U.S. component of Doppelganger was even more expansive. Its explicitly stated goals were to “secure the victory of a Republican candidate” in the 2024 presidential election, to increase the quantity of U.S. citizens who told pollsters that they believed that the war in Ukraine needed to end as soon as possible by at least ten percent, and to reduce U.S. President Joe Biden’s approval rating by at least ten percent.
The firm did not spell out in detail how such momentous shifts in public opinion could be achieved. But about eighteen months after the SDA prepared its ambitious Germany proposal and escalated its disinformation campaign there, and after far-right parties performed well in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, the SDA took credit for the electoral shifts in an internal report. It claimed that its efforts had racked up “serious successes” in increasing “the number of people voting for the right and traditionalists” and dampened the political appeal of the left. The SDA provided no actual evidence that its own campaigns had driven shifts in its target societies.
The SDA’s top goal was to influence Russian bureaucrats, not citizens in adversary countries.
In reality, according to the investigation by the Bavarian intelligence service, Doppelganger achieved just over 800,000 views of its 700 fake websites across all its campaigns in all its target countries between November 2023 and August 2024. Internet users in France and Germany accounted for more than 60 percent of these views, and the SDA’s fake websites targeting Americans received fewer than 180,000 clicks. My own analysis of the recently leaked documents shows that although they included no less than 24,375 links to fake Bild articles and 7,111 Daily Mail stories, the vast majority of these URLs received little to no engagement. (The leak does not contain comparable data for U.S. media outlets.) The major press coverage that Doppelganger received, especially in Germany and the United States, means that far more people likely read the secondary coverage of the exposed forgery campaigns than ever viewed the primary disinformation.
The SDA’s executives, writers, and artists may not have believed its own internal propaganda, of course. Disinformation operators’ main target audience has always been their funders and their own governments. Thus is the bureaucratic logic of large-scale, long-term disinformation efforts: they tend to eventually persuade even the organizers that aspects of their falsehoods are true, and thus they become a form of institutionalized conspiracy theory.
The SDA’s top goal was not to influence citizens in adversary countries, but to persuade Russian bureaucrats that the company was effective in order to get the next contract or renew a budget. The SDA’s claims, however, were not assessed by sober executives with an eye on the bottom line, nor by panels of evidence-driven peer reviewers. They were read and interpreted by Russian officials and intelligence officers who probably did not understand how public opinion is actually shaped in open societies. Disinformation entrepreneurs and autocratic bureaucrats, at least in Russia, have been reinforcing each other’s conspiratorial worldviews for at least a century.
DOUBLE EXPOSURE
The SDA, however, did have one empirical way to gauge its impact: its own exposure. Throughout its Doppelganger campaigns, the SDA carefully tracked, collected, translated, and summarized the investigations of its work done by foreign governments, media outlets, and social media companies. In an undated internal report reprinted in the FBI’s affidavit, the SDA boasted that “countries in the ‘collective West’ are seriously concerned by the effectiveness of the project.” As evidence, it cited investigations by major technology companies, government departments, and think tanks. In a leaked spreadsheet, it bragged about the number of news articles that Western media outlets wrote about Doppelganger’s “destructive impact on public opinion,” logging 163 such stories. The SDA even produced Russian translations of excerpts of these government and media investigations; it was so proud of the coverage it got in Der Spiegel that it created a Russian-language Spiegel Politics logo to append to the undated report that the FBI disclosed. In fact, the SDA liked being exposed as the Doppelganger supervillain so much that it adopted the name Doppelganger, in English, in its internal documents.
That same report touted that the German Foreign Office and Ministry of the Interior, the French Secretariat-General for Defense and National Security, an unnamed Israeli Security Agency, and the U.S. Department of State had all been “involved in the effort of countering our narratives since September 2022.” This date is relevant. It shows that the SDA was likely touting to its funders that the company had been exposed by name nearly since it launched its flagship project.
A slickly produced internal marketing video starts with boasts that the project had been outed by French intelligence. In a separate October 2023 internal report, the SDA proudly stated that “the project’s work has been noticed in the target countries and recognized as a threat.” The company went on to cite “the publication of a number of journalistic and industry investigations into Russian disinformation campaigns” as Doppelganger’s foremost metric of success, particularly investigations by Meta and The Washington Post.
In short, the SDA did not keep running campaigns and receiving funding despite being repeatedly exposed. It was able to keep running campaigns precisely because its work was exposed by its adversaries.
The recent document disclosures—and particularly the information about how the SDA gauged its own impact—hold potent lessons for how to counter disinformation. Democracies must vigorously counter foreign influence operations, because leaks and fakes can, indeed, deepen divisions and weaken open societies. And the documents do reveal that efforts by social media companies to identify and remove disinformation work. Meta’s vigilant internal intelligence teams and relentless takedowns blunted the project’s overall reach: after Meta kept shutting down Doppelganger-associated accounts on Facebook and Instagram, the SDA appears to have dialed down its efforts to sow disinformation on Meta’s platforms, although some abuse continues. An SDA project proposal disclosed by the FBI argued that X, formerly known as Twitter, had become “the only mass platform that could currently be utilized” in the United States.
For the most part, media outlets have also been prudent in their coverage of disinformation. Compared with the KGB’s masterful Cold War–era active measure units, Moscow’s contemporary disinformation contractors are not investing hard work into tricking journalists into portraying their forged documents as real. Instead, they simply clone media outlets’ entire websites, clumsily, and slip in remarkably badly written fake articles under the bylines of real journalists. This suggests that twenty-first-century Russian disinformation firms recognize that the best they can now do is to fool some social media users, but they can no longer successfully trick rigorous journalists into amplifying their propaganda. Media organizations must continue to be vigilant, as this vigilance hems in disinformation purveyors’ ambitions.
But the newly disclosed documents also suggest a flaw in democracies’ coverage of disinformation campaigns. Even accurate coverage of disinformation, if it becomes too agitated and loud, can drive disinformation companies’ growth by providing them purported evidence of their impact. Exposing digital disinformation products has become its own cottage industry. Dozens of nonprofit and for-profit outfits now focus on hunting for the next influence network to expose with as much fanfare as possible, no matter how insignificant the disinformation projects might be. Reporting on a disinformation campaign’s digital footprints is valuable to journalists, influencers, and of course Internet users. But such surface-level downstream exposure no longer deters adversaries. In fact, it helps them get more funding.
BAD PUBLICITY
The documents therefore raise a crucial question: When does exposure work against adversaries, and when does it work for them? When is sunlight the best disinfectant and when does it help the weeds grow? The disclosed and leaked documents that enabled this analysis are, of course, also a form of exposure, but of a different kind. It could be called upstream exposure. The documents expose not just the outputs of disinformation campaigns but their inputs—the proposals, the internal assessments and evaluations, the tradecraft, the technological methods, the identity of the contractors running the projects, and the funders and politicians behind those contractors.
Publicizing upstream information has a more powerful positive effect. Such upstream exposure may even enable technical takedowns and platform counteraction, for example when a government reveals malicious infrastructure to private sector entities that can then curb the bad actors. To put it bluntly: you can’t brag to the people who give you money that you got their names doxxed, their toy broken, and sanctions imposed on them.
Efforts to expose upstream information about disinformation campaigns have, of the past decade, become an ever more sophisticated component of the counterintelligence actions pursued by the intelligence alliance known as the Five Eyes, comprising Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, U.K., and U.S. intelligence agencies. The U.S. Department of Justice, in particular, has issued a range of criminal indictments against foreign covert operators, with the Treasury often imposing sanctions alongside. The trust of technology firms, journalists, and the wider investigative community is a crucial asset in these efforts, and U.S. spy agencies must continue to refrain from pushing out forged content to any target.
The newly disclosed documents show that reporting on run-of-the-mill influence operations with negligible or no effect—or even exaggerating that effect—simply helps disinformation agents generate more convincing marketing material. Instead, governments, companies, and investigative organizations and media outlets that wish to counter disinformation must focus more sharply on efforts that translate into tangible consequences for the perpetrators: taking down infrastructure and accounts from social media platforms and barring their reentry as well as exposing disinformation entrepreneurs personally, sanctioning them, and indicting them. If the SDA documents were not leaked to the press by Western intelligence agencies, they should have been.
Foreign Affairs · by Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare · September 30, 2024
21. U.S. Troop Withdrawals from Europe Won’t Benefit Its Rivals
Quite an argument from this post-doc fellow.
Excerpts:
From a national security perspective, the United States stands to benefit greatly from a reduced troop presence in Europe. Three benefits in particular are worth highlighting.
First and foremost, a reduced presence in Europe will leave the United States better equipped to deal with the threat of a rising China. Unlike Russia — whose military deficiencies have been on display for two years — China has all the markings of a true peer competitor capable of challenging America’s strategic interests in Asia and beyond. Containing Chinese influence in Asia by strengthening U.S. regional allies and deterring Chinese revisionism will place enormous demands on U.S. resources. No matter how powerful the United States still is today, its resource pool is far from bottomless.
Second, there are distinct advantages for legitimacy to wielding influence over others indirectly rather than directly. The permanent deployment of foreign troops within another state’s territory threatens to alienate the local population and thus risks their continued allegiance. While most Europeans remain in favor of close relations with the United States, opposition to the U.S. military presence has been a key talking point of populist parties across the political spectrum. In Germany, both the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance and the Alternative for Germany have successfully tapped into residual anti-American sentiment among the population.
Last but not least, U.S. leaders will be hard-pressed to argue against a policy that removes U.S. citizens from the threat of physical harm without undermining national security. Although the odds of U.S. servicemembers becoming targets of an attack while stationed in Europe are low, they are not zero. This summer, the U.S. military raised threat levels and security measures across its bases in Europe in response to an ominous “combination of factors,” which many concluded included possible terrorist threats. The episode brought home a point that most had ignored: Any foreign deployment — even in comparatively safe locations such as Western and Central Europe — exposes one’s citizens to serious dangers.
No matter which party wins the presidential elections in November, the odds are that the new administration will be inclined to avoid any major foreign policy changes vis-à-vis Europe. This would be a lost opportunity to challenge the prevailing consensus and embrace a much-reduced troop presence in Europe. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, such retrenchment would not benefit U.S. rivals. It would benefit U.S. national security.
U.S. Troop Withdrawals from Europe Won’t Benefit Its Rivals - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Moritz S. Graefrath · September 30, 2024
The U.S. troop presence in Europe was never meant to be permanent. Overseeing preparations for an Allied landing on the continent to defeat Adolf Hitler’s Germany, President Franklin D. Roosevelt explained in 1944: “the United States will be only too glad to retire all its military forces from Europe as soon as this is feasible.”
Fast forward 80 years, and things turned out very differently than Roosevelt imagined. Europe still hosts around 100,000 U.S. servicemembers and, according to many observers, this number will only increase over the coming years. While support for a significant retrenchment from Europe had gained some momentum prior to Russia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine, the invasion effectively put an indefinite halt on the idea.
The logic behind the consensus view among Washington’s foreign policy elite today is straightforward: U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe would leave a power vacuum inviting further Russian expansionism. This supposed power vacuum would thus critically benefit one of America’s chief geopolitical rivals and undermine U.S. national security.
These fears, however, are vastly overblown. Great powers can, and in the past frequently have, engaged in troop withdrawals without leaving behind power vacuums that their rivals could exploit. As long as the United States continues to exercise dominant influence through its extraordinarily capable and reliable European allies, no meaningful window of opportunity will open for Moscow after a substantial U.S. military departure. Rather than retaining a vast military contingent in Europe — let alone increasing it — for false fears of letting a power vacuum emerge, leaders in Washington should confidently embrace a much-reduced military presence and instead turn their attention to the threat of a rising China in East Asia.
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Concerns About Power Vacuums Have a Long History
Fears of power vacuums and their supposed pernicious consequences have long permeated thinking about great-power politics. Among U.S. foreign policymakers, it has become a truth universally acknowledged that, as President Richard Nixon famously told Mao Zedong, “in international relations there are no good choices,” but “one thing is sure — we can leave no vacuums.” The argument seems straightforward: Whenever a great power withdraws from its commitments abroad, it leaves behind a power vacuum that rivals will swiftly fill.
In principle, these fears are well-founded. History is replete with examples in which one great power’s decline abroad inspired its rivals to intensely compete for control over the spaces it left behind. Think, for instance, of how the end of the British empire in the Middle East inspired both the United States and the Soviet Union to vie for influence over a region both deemed vital to their security.
In Europe, the power vacuum that emerged after Nazi Germany’s collapse in World War II forced U.S. leaders to abandon their initial plan of retrenching from the continent as soon as Hitler was defeated. Fearful of an unhindered influx of Soviet influence into Europe, political and military leaders deemed a substantial troop presence on the continent the only reliable way of preventing Moscow from filling the emerging vacuum.
Against this backdrop, it is understandable that fears of power vacuums are once again on the forefront of decision-makers’ minds. With no end to the Russo-Ukrainian war in sight, and given that President Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions might extend well beyond Ukraine, it seems all too obvious that a military withdrawal from Europe would turn out to be a strategic disaster for Washington.
Do Troop Withdrawals Invite Rival Expansion?
While this line of reasoning is appealing at first sight, it rests on a deeply flawed understanding of great-power politics. Troop withdrawals need not — and in the past frequently have not — created power vacuums inviting rival expansion.
This most certainly holds true for partial troop withdrawals. Consider the Nixon administration’s decision to withdraw around 20,000 troops from the Korean peninsula during the 1970s. Hoping to cut the U.S. defense budget, which following the Vietnam War had risen to new heights, Nixon sought to significantly reduce the U.S. military’s footprint. Especially as he combined the announcement of troop reductions with promises of additional aid, Nixon’s efforts to withdraw troops from South Korea did little to undermine U.S. authority over the southern part of the peninsula. Consequently, Soviet leaders essentially considered the troop reductions a non-issue: South Korea continued to fall squarely under the hegemony of the United States and no meaningful opening emerged for Moscow to compete for control over the area.
Precisely because they need not erode a great power’s authority — that is, their ability to exercise imperative control — even full troop withdrawals frequently do not pave the way for rival gains. As a case in point, consider the Soviet Union’s retrenchment from Romania during the 1950s. In moving to withdraw the Soviet troop presence in its entirety, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev hoped to reach a more sustainable political arrangement that would allow Moscow to exercise influence over Romania without a continued military presence. His efforts to shift from direct to indirect rule without compromising Soviet influence proved remarkably successful. Officials in Washington quickly concluded that, even though the Soviet Union had engaged in a complete military withdrawal from Romania, political circumstances in Eastern Europe remained effectively unchanged. The Soviet Union continued to exercise dominant influence through the Romanian government, which reliably functioned as its proxy. In consequence, no window of opportunity emerged that would have allowed the West to challenge the Soviet Union’s authority over Romania.
Europe Is Capable
There is good reason to believe that U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe today would be similarly successful. America’s partners in Central and Western Europe are the kind of allies that great powers in the past could only dream of. They are extraordinarily capable and reliable proxy actors through which Washington can continue to exercise dominant influence. Consequently, a military departure will not open the continent’s doors to Russian domination.
As the Russo-Ukrainian war has revealed, U.S. troops are not needed to defend Europe against further Russian aggression. Defying the predictions of most pundits, which near-unanimously foresaw a quick Russian victory after the invasion in early 2022, the Ukrainian military has displayed remarkable resilience in its effort to keep Russian forces at bay. Last month, it even went on the offensive by launching a surprise incursion into Kursk Oblast.
While the continued success of Ukraine’s war effort crucially depends on receiving further military aid from the West, there is evidently no military need for the direct involvement of U.S. troops. Without the support of even European troops on the frontlines, Ukraine has been remarkably successful in thwarting Russian offensives. The fact that other European officials appear little inclined to send their troops to Ukraine reveals a crucial truth: If Ukrainian troops alone are able to put up a more-than-decent performance against Russia, there is little reason to be concerned about the military vulnerability of other European states, which have significantly more power at their disposal.
What presently stands in the way of Europe providing more for its own security is the evident lack of willingness among Washington’s European allies to turn their latent power potential — which vastly exceeds that of Russia — into substantially increased military capacity. As Russia invaded Ukraine, the large majority of NATO members fell short of fulfilling their 2 percent of GDP spending pledge, enacted seven years prior, and although NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg presents himself hopeful that a majority of members will meet this target in 2024, opposition to increased defense spending across the alliance remains strong.
In Germany, the governing coalition has been unable to agree on a marked increase in defense spending, causing significant doubts as to whether the turning point (or Zeitenwende) that Chancellor Olaf Scholz famously announced mere days after the Russian invasion will ever materialize. Similarly, under the leadership of Mark Rutte — the incoming NATO secretary-general — the Netherlands consistently failed to meet the 2 percent target. Notably, Rutte’s resolute opposition to approving more defense spending has left many concerned about how his NATO appointment will affect European security policy going forward.
To some, Europe’s enduring reluctance to spend more on defense underscores the importance of maintaining or even increasing the U.S. military presence. Along these lines, a new report by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute argues that Europe’s security still critically depends on American military leadership and capabilities.
Yet, this argument overlooks that a marked reduction in U.S. military presence will almost certainly end Europe’s decade-long reluctance to spend more on defense. The key reason is that it is this large American military presence that has enabled European states to largely disregard concerns about their vulnerability in the first place. Being able to rely on the fact that the United States would immediately come to their rescue whenever needed, there was little reason for them to voluntarily share more of the costs of European defense. “Passing the buck” to the United States was the strategically smart thing to do.
Things will fundamentally change once the United States takes steps towards reducing its military presence. A determined withdrawal of U.S. troops will force Washington’s European allies out of their complacency and provide the much-needed impetus to make Scholz’s Zeitenwende a reality. As soon as U.S. allies become convinced that they can no longer trust in U.S. capabilities to defend them when push comes to shove, they will rush to pick up the slack and work towards growing their own capabilities. It is in this sense that — perhaps counterintuitively — a withdrawal of U.S. forces will create an even stronger, not weaker, Europe.
To be sure, U.S. leaders should be prepared for the possibility that Europe’s unwillingness to provide for its own security might persist, at least initially. Changes in both mindset and policy can take some time to take root, and there is no guarantee that the European community — whose individual members more than once have failed to organize a collective response to issues of common concern — will work together to increase European military capabilities following a U.S. withdrawal.
Still, there are good reasons to be optimistic. First, the conventional security threat Russia poses to the continent today will provide a much more effective unifying impetus than the diffuse, non-military threats involved in the 2015 migration crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic. Tellingly, where previous crises failed to forge European unity, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine quickly elicited an effective collective response. Second, by carefully planning for a phased removal of troops, U.S. leaders can increase the likelihood of a successful withdrawal while simultaneously limiting its risks. A gradual retrenchment that is clearly communicated to U.S. allies in advance will give them time to adjust to their new strategic reality without removing the continent’s defenses overnight. Coincidentally, as it leaves much of the U.S. military infrastructure intact for an extended period, implementing a series of phased withdrawals will also ensure that the United States retains the ability to make a military return if Europe were to fail to respond as predicted.
Last but not least, nuclear weapons will offer strong — albeit not perfect — protection against further Russian expansionism after the withdrawal of conventional U.S. capabilities. Irrespective of who they believe will win the White House in November, few experts foresee the end of extended nuclear deterrence. The U.S. nuclear umbrella will continue to deter Moscow from attacking NATO territory, and France and the United Kingdom still retain national arsenals that, in the future, could come to play a central role in supporting a new European security structure.
Europe Is Reliable
U.S. leaders need worry even less about Europe’s continued pro-Western alignment than its ability to defend itself. Historically speaking, states confronting a common threat in their neighborhood almost never align themselves with it but balance against it. Small states that “bandwagon” with a mightier power give up their strategic freedom, accept subordination, and must trust in the strong state’s continued benevolence. Needless to say, states don’t consider this an enticing prospect.
The origins of the European project are a case in point. Fearful of the Soviet Union’s vast military power and seeking to prepare for the contingency of a U.S. departure from the continent, European states joined forces to balance against the Soviet Union. They could have sought to diffuse the Soviet threat by aligning themselves with Moscow, but rightly concluded that this wager would have been unacceptably risky.
Ultimately, the idea that Europe would respond to U.S. troop withdrawals by turning its back on the United States and looking for a closer relationship with another great power — either Russia or China — not only lacks historical precedent but common sense. Both European state leaders as well as the European public have time and time again described their international goals as “keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away.” Decades of close-knit trans-Atlantic cooperation between the United States and Europe have created tight political, economic, and cultural interconnections that neither side will be willing to give up.
It’s Time to Embrace the Benefits of a Reduced Troop Presence
The United States is well-positioned to engage in substantial troop withdrawals from Europe without risking its dominant influence over the continent. Given how capable and reliable America’s regional allies are, it is all but certain that such a move would not pave the way for future Russian gains on the continent.
From a national security perspective, the United States stands to benefit greatly from a reduced troop presence in Europe. Three benefits in particular are worth highlighting.
First and foremost, a reduced presence in Europe will leave the United States better equipped to deal with the threat of a rising China. Unlike Russia — whose military deficiencies have been on display for two years — China has all the markings of a true peer competitor capable of challenging America’s strategic interests in Asia and beyond. Containing Chinese influence in Asia by strengthening U.S. regional allies and deterring Chinese revisionism will place enormous demands on U.S. resources. No matter how powerful the United States still is today, its resource pool is far from bottomless.
Second, there are distinct advantages for legitimacy to wielding influence over others indirectly rather than directly. The permanent deployment of foreign troops within another state’s territory threatens to alienate the local population and thus risks their continued allegiance. While most Europeans remain in favor of close relations with the United States, opposition to the U.S. military presence has been a key talking point of populist parties across the political spectrum. In Germany, both the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance and the Alternative for Germany have successfully tapped into residual anti-American sentiment among the population.
Last but not least, U.S. leaders will be hard-pressed to argue against a policy that removes U.S. citizens from the threat of physical harm without undermining national security. Although the odds of U.S. servicemembers becoming targets of an attack while stationed in Europe are low, they are not zero. This summer, the U.S. military raised threat levels and security measures across its bases in Europe in response to an ominous “combination of factors,” which many concluded included possible terrorist threats. The episode brought home a point that most had ignored: Any foreign deployment — even in comparatively safe locations such as Western and Central Europe — exposes one’s citizens to serious dangers.
No matter which party wins the presidential elections in November, the odds are that the new administration will be inclined to avoid any major foreign policy changes vis-à-vis Europe. This would be a lost opportunity to challenge the prevailing consensus and embrace a much-reduced troop presence in Europe. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, such retrenchment would not benefit U.S. rivals. It would benefit U.S. national security.
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Moritz S. Graefrath is a postdoctoral fellow in security and foreign policy at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute as well as an affiliate scholar with the Nanovic Institute for European Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He earned his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Notre Dame and previously served as a Max Weber fellow at the European University Institute and as a grand strategy, security, and statecraft fellow with a joint appointment at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and MIT’s Security Studies Program. (Twitter/X: @moritzgraefrath)
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Moritz S. Graefrath · September 30, 2024
22. America Needs a New Strategy to Avert Even Greater Catastrophe in the Middle East
Excerpts:
Since U.S. diplomats don’t interact directly with Hamas leaders, Washington will have to work with Arab mediators to intensify pressure on Sinwar. Many Arab countries have applied pressure on Hamas, but there is much more they can do, especially publicly. By demonstrating a willingness to put pressure on Israel, the administration would be in a stronger position to demand that our other regional partners squeeze Hamas. Critically, the United States, Egypt, and Qatar should insist that Hamas’s leader delegate negotiating authority to someone outside Gaza to facilitate U.S. shuttling.
Empowering a Hamas official located in Doha or Cairo would allow Blinken to secure real-time, authoritative feedback and answers from Hamas through Qatar and Egypt. This is an admittedly complex negotiating format involving U.S. envoys shuttling between Israeli officials and their Egyptian and Qatari counterparts, who are themselves shuttling between Hamas and Israel and the United States. However, it would be no more complicated than Baker’s shuttling between Israel, Jordan, and the PLO (the latter through an unofficial “advisory delegation”) in the early 1990s.
In addition to persuading Arab countries to immediately adopt a more aggressive posture on enforcing sanctions against Hamas, the Biden administration should push them to publicly call out Sinwar’s obstructionist role in the talks. Other Hamas leaders appear more willing to negotiate, and Arab criticism of Sinwar could strengthen their hand. This is particularly important, given that Israel’s killing of Ismail Haniyeh—who, even with his clear culpability for acts of terrorism, was advocating a cease-fire—may have weakened other proponents of negotiation within Hamas. Convincing Arab countries that Hamas members charged for their roles in murdering Americans must be remanded into U.S. custody will be extremely difficult, but the Biden administration has a strategic, legal, and moral obligation to try.
Although Israel and Egypt disagree about how extensive the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt are, it is undeniable that Hamas has smuggled weapons through this route. Closer cooperation between the United States, Egypt, and Israel on shutting down those networks and better policing of Gaza’s Mediterranean coastline must be part of this equation. Egypt should also join Qatar in threatening to deny Hamas officials access to, and expel them from, their territory.
All of this is a heavy lift, and the United States could fail even if this approach is executed perfectly. Given the stakes, however, the administration should use every tool at its disposal. The lives of Israelis, Palestinians, Lebanese, and Americans literally depend on it.
America Needs a New Strategy to Avert Even Greater Catastrophe in the Middle East
Shuttle Diplomacy Must Be Backed by Meaningful Pressure
September 29, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Andrew P. Miller · September 29, 2024
Nearly a year after Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attack, the Israeli government’s ongoing escalation of its conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon has put the Middle East on the precipice of a regional war—one that could all too easily draw in the United States. Although Israeli leaders believe that intensified military action will cause the militant group to back down, this sort of “escalate to de-escalate” strategy seldom achieves the desired results. Hezbollah has consistently tied the cessation of its attacks on Israel to a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip, and that remains unlikely to change in the wake of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s death in an Israeli airstrike on Friday. Even if a 21-day cease-fire were declared between Israel and Hezbollah, as U.S. President Joe Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron have called for, it would not alter the underlying reality: The best way to prevent a larger regional conflagration is a cease-fire in Gaza.
Unfortunately, negotiations between Israel and Hamas over their war in Gaza appear to be at an impasse over three months after Biden outlined a framework for a cease-fire and deal on the return of Israeli hostages. Both parties have moved the goalposts, adding new conditions or demanding new concessions. After weeks of projecting optimism, Biden administration officials reportedly now concede that “no deal is imminent.” And the window for reaching a deal is rapidly closing ahead of the U.S. presidential election in November, at which point Biden’s lame-duck status will diminish his international influence.
Meanwhile, the costs of the war in Gaza continue to mount daily. The probability of securing the safe return of the remaining Israeli hostages only decreases over time. Humanitarian conditions for Palestinian civilians continue to deteriorate day to day amid active conflict, and more of them are being killed or injured in Israeli military operations. The reputational damage to the United States, as well as to Israel, is also steadily building, with negative consequences for other global priorities shared by both countries.
With time being of the essence, Washington must overhaul its diplomatic approach. It needs to undertake a much more proactive shuttle diplomacy aimed at ending the war in the next several weeks. The painstaking, patient diplomacy of the U.S. administration and its fellow mediators, Qatar and Egypt, has failed to push Israel and Hamas, and particularly their recalcitrant leaders, across the finish line. High-profile shuttle diplomacy, though risky, can concentrate and magnify pressure, increasing the likelihood that the parties will feel compelled to take difficult decisions. If accompanied by other sources of pressure, it could prove a game changer. Biden should immediately dispatch Secretary of State Antony Blinken to the region to shuttle between Israel, Egypt, and Qatar for as many days as necessary to close all remaining gaps in the Gaza cease-fire deal. That goal will also require that Washington both intensify its political, diplomatic, and military pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and work with Arab partners to isolate Hamas and further squeeze its political and military leadership.
HIGH RISK, HIGH REWARD
Up to this point, Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns has been presiding over the cease-fire negotiations between Israel and Hamas, which are being conducted in a low-key fashion with as much privacy as is possible. Instead of forcing decisions, the mediators prefer to call recesses and reconvene later to discuss disagreements under what they hope will be better conditions. The theory behind this approach is that by buying time and space for further discussion, the gaps will be whittled down over time and eventually present a zone of agreement. Although these methods have been effective in many contexts, they clearly have not been in this case.
By contrast, shuttle diplomacy, a term coined to describe former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s mediation between Israel and Arab countries after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, is high-stakes and high-profile. It involves a senior U.S. official flying between capitals—“shuttling” between belligerents who do not speak directly to each other—to negotiate directly with the parties until the final gaps are closed, sometimes making multiple stops in each country during a single trip. This form of diplomacy is designed to force the belligerents to choose between making difficult concessions and saying no to a cabinet-level U.S. official, with clear negative consequences.
During shuttles, the mediator seeks to maximize pressure and deprive the parties of time to temporize, defer decisions, or let the mediators down gently. U.S. officials conducting shuttle diplomacy will try to stay on the road and maintain the pressure as long as it takes to finalize an agreement; in one case, Kissinger spent 35 straight days in the Middle East. At other times, American envoys have conducted several rounds of shuttling before getting results.
Washington needs to undertake a much more proactive shuttle diplomacy aimed at ending the war in the next several weeks.
Shuttle diplomacy has been most effective when it is accompanied by clear consequences for noncompliance. The mediator wields the threat of publicly blaming the recalcitrant party or parties for the failure of talks. This is what James Baker, a successful practitioner of shuttle diplomacy as secretary of state in the George H. W. Bush administration, referred to as “leaving the dead cat” on the doorstep of the side at fault. When naming and shaming is complemented by other threats—sanctions, withholding arms shipments, the possibility that one belligerent will expand its operations—it has been possible to alter the calculus of foreign leaders.
Using these methods, Kissinger mediated two disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and one between Israel and Syria from 1974 to 1975. Former President Jimmy Carter later sealed the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt by shuttling between Jerusalem and Cairo, and Baker successfully orchestrated the 1991 Madrid peace conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict over several regional trips.
To be clear, shuttle diplomacy is not a deus ex machina. Shuttles do not always succeed. The administrations of President Ronald Reagan and President Bill Clinton both engaged in shuttle diplomacy of a sort, with decidedly uneven results. The United States also incurs a greater reputational cost when shuttle diplomacy fails.
There is also a risk that a party will be less willing to compromise on a position after it has taken a very public stand in opposition to the United States, making an issue a matter of pride and honor. Nonstate actors, particularly terrorist groups, are often less sensitive to naming and shaming than nation-states are, although Baker’s shuttle diplomacy worked with the Palestine Liberation Organization before it was recognized by Israel as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the Oslo Accords. In the current conflict, the inaccessibility of Hamas’s leader, Yahya Sinwar, who would be the final decision-maker on any agreement, and the limits of direct U.S. influence on Hamas would make this task even more challenging.
A QUESTION OF WILL
Still, shuttle diplomacy represents the best chance for the United States and its regional partners to end the war in Gaza in the near term and thereby provide a pathway to regional de-escalation. The reported sticking points in current talks—the number of Palestinian prisoners to be released and control over the Gazan-Egyptian border—are not insurmountable. Quantitative issues, such as how many Palestinian prisoners are to be freed, are more amenable to compromise than binary choices between two extremes. On the so-called Philadelphia Corridor along the Gazan-Egyptian border, Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant has reportedly challenged Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s contention that the Israel Defense Forces cannot withdraw without endangering Israeli security.
The primary barrier to an agreement between Israel and Hamas is, as Burns has said publicly, “a question of political will,” not the absence of clever formulations to bridge gaps. And the political pressure that Blinken could generate by shuttling between Egypt, Israel, and Qatar is precisely what is needed if the United States is to have any hope of breaking the impasse. With no more elections left to run in, Biden is in a better position to absorb the political costs of failed shuttle diplomacy than either of his potential successors would be.
Shuttle diplomacy is not for the faint of heart. Blinken would have to persuade Netanyahu that he has something to lose by spurning the United States. In this vein, the Biden administration could threaten to publicly label Netanyahu a danger to the U.S.-Israeli partnership or, in a major speech, clearly express a loss of faith in his handling of the war. Although Biden’s popularity in Israel has dipped since the start of 2024, 57 percent of Israelis overall and 66 percent of Jewish Israelis express confidence in the U.S. president, suggesting that a public rebuke of the divisive Netanyahu could influence Israeli officials’ and civilians’ attitudes.
Another option would be to use Executive Order 14115, issued by Biden in February, to sanction extremist ministers in the Israeli government, such as Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, who are stoking instability in the West Bank. U.S. sanctions would likely increase the ministers’ appeal on the far right, but the stigma of being designated by Israel’s closest ally could also generate more pressure on the government.
The administration has already suspended the delivery of 2,000-pound bombs to Israel to protest military operations in the Gazan city of Rafah. If necessary to reach an agreement, Biden and Blinken should threaten to withhold additional weapons systems that have been implicated in civilian casualties in Gaza and deemed unessential to Israel’s security, such as white phosphorous shells. It is possible to strike a balance between meeting Israeli security requirements and making clear that the United States will not indefinitely support a war causing so many civilian casualties and producing diminishing security returns at best. Such threats are not unprecedented in the U.S.-Israeli relationship; in the past, they have been employed regularly. Every U.S. president since Lyndon Johnson, with the exceptions of Clinton and Donald Trump—that is, nine of the last 11 administrations—has threatened to withhold, or actually withheld, weapons systems or other aid in order to influence Israeli policy.
PRESSURE BY PROXY
Since U.S. diplomats don’t interact directly with Hamas leaders, Washington will have to work with Arab mediators to intensify pressure on Sinwar. Many Arab countries have applied pressure on Hamas, but there is much more they can do, especially publicly. By demonstrating a willingness to put pressure on Israel, the administration would be in a stronger position to demand that our other regional partners squeeze Hamas. Critically, the United States, Egypt, and Qatar should insist that Hamas’s leader delegate negotiating authority to someone outside Gaza to facilitate U.S. shuttling.
Empowering a Hamas official located in Doha or Cairo would allow Blinken to secure real-time, authoritative feedback and answers from Hamas through Qatar and Egypt. This is an admittedly complex negotiating format involving U.S. envoys shuttling between Israeli officials and their Egyptian and Qatari counterparts, who are themselves shuttling between Hamas and Israel and the United States. However, it would be no more complicated than Baker’s shuttling between Israel, Jordan, and the PLO (the latter through an unofficial “advisory delegation”) in the early 1990s.
In addition to persuading Arab countries to immediately adopt a more aggressive posture on enforcing sanctions against Hamas, the Biden administration should push them to publicly call out Sinwar’s obstructionist role in the talks. Other Hamas leaders appear more willing to negotiate, and Arab criticism of Sinwar could strengthen their hand. This is particularly important, given that Israel’s killing of Ismail Haniyeh—who, even with his clear culpability for acts of terrorism, was advocating a cease-fire—may have weakened other proponents of negotiation within Hamas. Convincing Arab countries that Hamas members charged for their roles in murdering Americans must be remanded into U.S. custody will be extremely difficult, but the Biden administration has a strategic, legal, and moral obligation to try.
Although Israel and Egypt disagree about how extensive the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt are, it is undeniable that Hamas has smuggled weapons through this route. Closer cooperation between the United States, Egypt, and Israel on shutting down those networks and better policing of Gaza’s Mediterranean coastline must be part of this equation. Egypt should also join Qatar in threatening to deny Hamas officials access to, and expel them from, their territory.
All of this is a heavy lift, and the United States could fail even if this approach is executed perfectly. Given the stakes, however, the administration should use every tool at its disposal. The lives of Israelis, Palestinians, Lebanese, and Americans literally depend on it.
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Foreign Affairs · by Andrew P. Miller · September 29, 2024
23. Israel’s Deterrence Lesson for Biden
But I am always reminded of Sir Lawrence Freedom's warning: "Deterrence works. Until it doesn't."
Israel’s Deterrence Lesson for Biden
By killing Hassan Nasrallah, Prime Minister Netanyahu weakens Hezbollah and Iran.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/israel-hezbollah-nasrallah-strike-lebanon-just-reward-lesson-for-the-west-37c4589e?mod=opinion_lead_pos1
By The Editorial Board
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Updated Sept. 29, 2024 11:14 pm ET
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in 2016. Photo: stringer/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Israel’s strike Friday against Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is a justified defensive act against an enemy backed by Iran and bent on the Jewish state’s destruction. It’s also a lesson for the Biden Administration in how to deter an enemy using military force instead of hopeless pleading for restraint and “de-escalation.”
Israel has exhibited remarkable restraint for nearly a year in response to Hezbollah’s thousands of rocket and missile attacks that have made the country’s north uninhabitable. That restraint ended this month, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pointed out it would in the U.S. as well if a terror proxy based in Mexico were firing rockets at El Paso.
Israel has changed its strategy from tit-for-tat responses to a pre-emptive campaign to degrade Hezbollah’s missile stores, launchers and military leadership. These are all justified targets in war. It’s tragic when civilians are also killed, but that is more Hezbollah’s fault. Nasrallah, who knew he was a marked man, located his hideout under residential buildings.
Israel’s campaign has been a remarkable display of intelligence, technological skill, and above all political will. The sabotage of Hezbollah’s pagers and walkie-talkies wounded or killed scores of fighters. Its targeted bombings against Hezbollah’s terror masters showed how much Israeli intelligence has penetrated its communications. It continued to bomb Hezbollah targets on Sunday, including military commanders.
Israel has done this despite the contrary advice of its allies in the U.S. and Europe. “West left powerless as Israel claims its biggest victory yet against Hezbollah,” declared the BBC in a news alert on Saturday. Isn’t Israel part of the West? It eliminated a terrorist whose killers are responsible for the deaths of thousands of Americans and Europeans.
Israel’s government notably ignored the call by President Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron and others for a 21-day cease-fire. Israel would have loved a cease-fire that allowed its 60,000 displaced citizens to return to their homes in the north. But Hezbollah had no such intentions.
The U.S.-French statement mentioned Lebanon and Israel. Yet Lebanon has no functioning government to speak of, certainly not one that could give orders to Nasrallah. The statement didn’t mention Hezbollah or its minders in Tehran. Israel isn’t obliged to follow the dictates of Western politicians and pundits who counsel de-escalation from the safety of Bethesda.
Mr. Biden had the good political sense Saturday to call Nasrallah’s death a “measure of justice.” But he couldn’t resist another plea for his failing diplomacy, through the United Nations of all antisemitic places, to negotiate a cease-fire. A cease-fire is far more likely with Hezbollah and Iran on defense than it was before this month.
No victory is permanent in the Middle East, and Iran’s proxy network will strike back. The Houthis fired a missile at Israel from Yemen on Saturday. But by degrading Iran’s front-line proxy in Lebanon, Israel has substantially weakened its enemies. Instead of begging for restraint, the U.S. could capitalize on Israel’s gains by taking out Houthi sites and leaders after their next attack on U.S. ships.
Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pledged revenge. But that is what he also said after the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in July. Iran’s April missile assault against Israel failed with American help. Perhaps the Ayatollah fears what Israel could do in response. He can’t feel personally secure, even in Tehran, after Israel’s demonstration of military and intelligence prowess in the last month.
Hanging over all of this is Iran’s nuclear program. A regime armed with nuclear missiles would change the deterrence calculus of Israel and the West. This is all the more reason to prevent Iran from gaining the bomb, including with a pre-emptive military strike against its nuclear facilities if necessary.
***
Israel’s experience in the last year is a reminder to the West about the cost of failed deterrence and what is required to restore it. Israel let down its guard against Hamas a year ago and paid a terrible price. It seems determined not to repeat that mistake with Hezbollah.
Mr. Biden has undermined the U.S. ability to deter adversaries because he fears any escalation, ceding the advantage to Iran, Russia and China. Israel can’t afford such indulgence. Its survival is at stake.
WSJ Opinion: Israel and Hezbollah Near Full-Scale War
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WSJ Opinion: Israel and Hezbollah Near Full-Scale War
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The day after U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin called for a diplomatic solution between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the U.N. General Assembly to "set the record straight" regarding some speakers' "lies and slanders." Photo: Lev Radin/Zuma Press/Henry Nicholls/AFP via Getty Images
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Appeared in the September 30, 2024, print edition as 'Israel’s Deterrence Lesson for Biden'.
24. The Power Elite
Quite a critique (or indictment?)
Excerpts:
A properly educated American would know that our Framers feared the extremism of democracy and the extremism of autocracy (see Federalist Papers 10, 14, 26, and 63). A republic was the “golden mean” between the extremes of autocracy and democracy. This understanding helped make America the most unified, peaceful, and prosperous nation in the history of the world, at least until the Progressive Era when Americans drifted from the history of our founding and the power elite pushed for democracy.
In Powell’s defense, Americans are no longer being taught these distinctions because the left controls education (as advanced by Marx and Engels in their 1848 Communist Manifesto), and they push for democracy while celebrating diversity, multiculturalism, and new norms that violate America’s Judeo-Christian tradition; all of which divide our nation. They believe the majority rules, even if it is only perceived thanks to the media’s amplification of a minority voice (as in the summer/fall of 2020 public protesting and rioting we watched on the news). This is the fruit of democracy: mobocracy.
...
The generals and admirals were trained to fight enemies of our Constitutional Republic and American way of life. Yet, they align themselves with the children of darkness who strive to destroy the American way of life. Archbishop Viganò clearly sees this and knows the children of light have truth and prayer for their weapons.
The generals and admirals were likely honorable men at earlier times in their lives. Perhaps there is hope for a return to those times. As Mills pondered, “elite themselves may not see their elite status, ‘often they are uncertain about their roles’ and ‘without conscious effort, they absorb the aspiration to be ... The Onecide.’
The Power Elite
By Ronald J. Scott
September 30, 2024
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/09/30/the_power_elite_1061835.html?mc_cid=f6a21220a4&mc_eid=70bf478f36
On September 22, 2024, an organization named National Security Leaders for America (NSL4A) published a letter, signed by 741 individuals (including 237 retired generals and admirals), pledging support for presidential candidate Kamala Harris. Here is one of its statements: “This election is a choice between serious leadership and vengeful impulsiveness. It is a choice between democracy and authoritarianism. Vice President Harris defends America’s democratic ideals, while former President Donald Trump endangers them.” Yet, the letter provides no specific evidence to support the pejorative claims.
Serious leadership?
Since January 20, 2021, in less than four years, Russia invaded Ukraine; Iran-backed terror groups are attacking U.S. service members and Israel; China has ramped up its aggressive actions toward Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines; and North Korea is launching missiles.
Impulsiveness?
Neo-Marxist DEI personnel and programs flourish after Trump sought to stop them. Trump never violated court injunctions or rulings. Biden ignored them (e.g., student loan debt).
Authoritarian?
In 2021 and beyond, the Biden-Harris Administration discharged over 8,000 men and women for constitutionally refusing to be injected by an experimental vaccine. This Administration has also allowed the Soviet-style weaponization of our legal system to target a political opponent.
Defends America’s democratic ideals?
America is a Constitutional Republic, not a democracy. I’ll touch upon this distinction later in the article.
During my graduate studies, I discovered the writing of C. Wright Mills, a Columbia University sociology professor. One of his books was The Power Elite, published in 1956. According to Mills, the "power elite" are those that occupy prominent positions in the dominant institutions--military, economic, and political. Their decisions have enormous consequences, nationally and globally. The evolving institutions that succeed weaker predecessors, which they head are a triumvirate of groups -- two or three hundred giant corporations, a strong federal political order that "now enters into each and every cranny of the social structure," and the military establishment.
Importantly, Mills explains that the elite themselves may not see their elite status, "often they are uncertain about their roles" and "without conscious effort, they absorb the aspiration to be ... The Onecide" (e.g., on the right side of ideology—not history; thus, they tend to be intolerant of other views and values). Mills sees them as a quasi-hereditary caste, often entering into positions of societal prominence through educations obtained at eastern establishment universities like Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, and to a certain extent the older Service Academies of West Point and Annapolis (Note: examine the resumes or biographies of Cabinet officials, the judiciary, and Congress; you will find Mills’ assessment is on target). In this manner, the mantle of the elite generally passes through families.
According to Mills, the resulting elites can be generally grouped into one of six types (quoted from Wikipedia):
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The "Metropolitan 400": members of historically notable local families in the principal American cities, generally represented on the Social Register
- "Celebrities": prominent entertainers and media personalities
- The "Chief Executives": presidents and CEOs of the most important companies within each industrial sector
- The "Corporate Rich": major landowners and corporate shareholders
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The "Warlords": senior military officers, most importantly the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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The "Political Directorate": "fifty-odd men of the executive branch" of the U.S. federal government, including the senior leadership in the Executive Office of the President, sometimes variously drawn from elected officials of the Democratic and Republican parties but usually professional government bureaucrats
One of the motivations for Mills’ book, The Power Elite, was Franz Leopold Neumann's book Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism in 1942. Neumann explained how a democratic state like Germany provided the conditions for Nazism. Mills claimed that Behemoth had given him the "tools to grasp and analyze the entire total structure and as a warning of what could happen in a modern capitalist democracy." This should explain why America is in turmoil today—the left’s push for democracy has provided similar conditions for the chaos and turmoil preceding socialism (and the violent tension between the communists and fascists) in Germany.
The Power Elite received significant criticism, not surprisingly from members of the various “power elite” institutions. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. said, "I look forward to the time when Mr. Mills hands back his prophet's robes and settles down to being a sociologist again,” cited in a New York Times essay, “The Deciders,” by John H. Summers, May 14, 2006.
Summers went on to say:
The historical value of "The Power Elite" seems assured. It was the first book to offer a serious model of power that accounted for the secretive agencies of national security ...
Much of "The Power Elite" was a tough-talking polemic against the "romantic pluralism" embedded in the prevailing theory of American politics. The separation of powers in the Constitution, the story went, repelled the natural tendency of power to concentrate, while political parties and voluntary societies organized the clash of interests, laying the people's representatives open to the influence of public opinion. This "theory of balance" still applied to the "middle levels of power," Mills wrote. But the society it envisioned had been eclipsed.
The two key points in Summers’ analysis relate to national security institutions and “romantic pluralism.” Already in the 1950s, Mills saw corruption taking place in the national security institutions of America: The National Security Council, the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department, and so forth. This corruption grew to the point that we now face a crisis in which the national security regime attempted to remove a duly elected President of the United States. Comey, Clapper (NSL4A signer), Brennan (NSL4A signer), the generals and admirals singled out below, and a host of other members of the power elite, spied on Trump and his coterie, deceitfully pursued prosecutions, impeached the President for a fabricated crime, distorted Trump’s response to the COVID-19 narrative, induced fear in the public to shut down a booming economy, and now demonstrate the same Behemoth tactics spawned by the George Floyd folklore that are creating the necessary conditions for socialism, as in fascist Germany and a communist Russia.
There are credible reports (Note this link has since been removed by YouTube) that a Floyd-type incident was the basis for planning the type of rioting that took place in Minneapolis (and in other Democrat-controlled metropolitan areas). Floyd was just a pawn in their strategic effort to “fundamentally transform America.” Obama and his Organizing for Action enterprise play a critical role in this effort. They have teamed up with Antifa, Black Lives Matter, and the Communist Party USA (as explicitly announced by CPUSA leader John Bachtell in 2018—see Lesson from midterms: A united people can win – Communist Party USA (cpusa.org).
Mills’ treatment of “romantic pluralism” is what the left calls diversity and multiculturalism. The original understanding of American pluralism was an appreciation and tolerance for different views and values that joined in a common purpose as American citizens. Academic institutions at the time, such as Harvard, Princeton, and Yale were primarily focused on preparing Americans as religious clergymen and public servants. Today, those same institutions have evolved (“succeeded weaker predecessors”) into secular humanistic elite production centers. Their emphasis on diversity and multiculturalism has nothing to do with uniting America—just the opposite. So, to hide this ideological push, the left accuses former President Trump of dividing the nation.
When I first read The Power Elite, I rejected Mills’ arguments that included the military as one of the three “power elite” institutions. After all, as a Service Academy graduate (the USAF Academy), I had ascended to the rank of a senior officer in this institution and considered myself a true public servant. I still do in my role as a private citizen, patriotic to the flag, our republic, and one nation under God.
So, when in June of 2020, I read about retired generals and admirals speaking contemptuously about the President of the United States, I see why Mills wrote what he did. Here are recent examples: generals (Mattis, see here and here; Kelly, see here and here; Allen, see here and here; Powell, here and here; and Honoré, see here) and admirals (Mullen, see here; and McRaven, see here). There are others as well. Do they not see what a dangerous example they set for other members of the armed forces? One of the Articles of the UCMJ prohibits contemptuous language such as theirs. If they gave up their military pension and rank, reverting to a private citizen, then perhaps their sacrifice would justify their impulse—but then they would have no credibility. To use their rank to justify their credibility and message is a gross ethical violation, and potentially a criminal action (see Victor Davis Hansen’s recent article here).
These generals and admirals rebuke a duly elected President with assertions backed by no facts. They also demonstrate their own lack of understanding of what America’s Constitutional Republic is all about. For example, William Cummings in a USA Today article states: “Former Secretary of State Colin Powell says that he will once again not vote for Donald Trump, calling the president's approach to politics ‘dangerous for our democracy’ and asserting that Trump has ‘drifted away" from the Constitution.’”
A properly educated American would know that our Framers feared the extremism of democracy and the extremism of autocracy (see Federalist Papers 10, 14, 26, and 63). A republic was the “golden mean” between the extremes of autocracy and democracy. This understanding helped make America the most unified, peaceful, and prosperous nation in the history of the world, at least until the Progressive Era when Americans drifted from the history of our founding and the power elite pushed for democracy.
In Powell’s defense, Americans are no longer being taught these distinctions because the left controls education (as advanced by Marx and Engels in their 1848 Communist Manifesto), and they push for democracy while celebrating diversity, multiculturalism, and new norms that violate America’s Judeo-Christian tradition; all of which divide our nation. They believe the majority rules, even if it is only perceived thanks to the media’s amplification of a minority voice (as in the summer/fall of 2020 public protesting and rioting we watched on the news). This is the fruit of democracy: mobocracy.
The danger at this critical point in our history is that polling and voting tend to follow public sentiment. Public sentiment is shaped by the media, Hollywood, and academia. Most are far left of center and appear to coordinate/collaborate in messaging (like 1930s Gleichschaltung that thrust Hitler into power).
For over three and a half years, President Trump had been viciously attacked by the left. His political agenda is consistent with the fundamental concept of a republic, which is intended to constrain autocratic and democratic impulses and passions. His agenda is a threat to the left’s design to fundamentally transform America.
Soviet, Chinese, and American communists have been hard at work to influence the ideological leanings of America’s media, Hollywood, and academia. While there is a growing body of literature to confirm this assertion, this interview by Soviet KGB defector, Yuri Semenov, provides an explanation about who is behind the George Floyd riots. The left is working overtime to produce Soviet- and Chinese-style propaganda such as this recent article by Adam Serwer in The Atlantic Magazine. Despite outright falsehoods, Serwer somehow believes it is expected not to be nice (more so hateful) to people who are not part of your ideology.
An Italian Archbishop, Carlo Maria Viganò, who has courageously addressed corruption in the Roman Catholic Church, understands President Trump’s motivations, agenda, and dilemma. He calls out a fellow American Archbishop, who criticized President Trump for his visit to and photo op at the National Shrine of Saint John Paul II. Viganò reminded the archbishop and other clergymen and citizens that we are experiencing a battle between the children of light and children of darkness. See his letter to the President here. Bravo for his courageous letter.
The generals and admirals were trained to fight enemies of our Constitutional Republic and American way of life. Yet, they align themselves with the children of darkness who strive to destroy the American way of life. Archbishop Viganò clearly sees this and knows the children of light have truth and prayer for their weapons.
The generals and admirals were likely honorable men at earlier times in their lives. Perhaps there is hope for a return to those times. As Mills pondered, “elite themselves may not see their elite status, ‘often they are uncertain about their roles’ and ‘without conscious effort, they absorb the aspiration to be ... The Onecide.’
Col. Ronald J. Scott, Jr. (U.S. Air Force, ret.), Ph.D., USAF Academy Class of 1973.
25. In global game of influence, China turns to a cheap and effective tool: fake news
The Associated Press
In global game of influence, China turns to a cheap and effective tool: fake news
https://apnews.com/article/china-disinformation-fake-news-russia-3085f10d6edca36f6415d6410e5ef874
Story by DIDI TANG and DAVID KLEPPER, Associated Press • September 28, 2024 • 4 min read
FILE - Visitors pass the Chinese Communist Party flag at the museum of the Communist Party of China in Beijing, Oct. 19, 2023. (AP Photo/Louise Delmotte, File)
WASHINGTON (AP) — When veteran U.S. diplomat Kurt Campbell traveled to the Solomon Islands to counter Beijing's influence in the South Pacific country, he quickly saw just how far China would go to spread its message.
The Biden administration’s Asia czar woke up one morning in 2022 to a long article in the local press about the U.S. running chemical and biological labs in Ukraine, a claim that Washington calls an outright lie. Started by Russia, the false and incendiary claim was vigorously amplified by China's vast overseas propaganda apparatus.
It was another example of “clearly effective Russian and Chinese disinformation," Campbell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July.
Two years later, the claim still reverberates online, demonstrating China's sprawling effort to reshape global perceptions. The campaign, costing many billions per year, is becoming ever more sophisticated thanks to artificial intelligence. China's operations have caught the attention of intelligence analysts and policymakers in Washington, who vow to combat any actions that could influence the November election or undermine American interests.
The key tactic: networks of websites purporting to be legitimate news outlets, delivering pro-China coverage that often parallels official statements and positions from Beijing.
Shannon Van Sant, an adviser to the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, tracked a network of dozens of sites that posed as news organizations. One site mimicked The New York Times, using a similar font and design in what she called an attempt at legitimacy. The site carried strongly pro-Chinese messages.
Related video: China is Watching Russia’s Failures (24/7 Wall St.)When Van Sant researched the site's reporters she found no information. Their names didn't belong to any known journalists working in China, and their photos bore telltale signs of being created with AI.
“Manipulation of the media is ultimately a manipulation of readers and the audience, and this is damaging to democracy and society,” Van Sant said.
Liu Pengyu, spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in the U.S., said allegations that China uses news websites and social media to spread pro-Beijing information and influence public opinion in the U.S. “are full of malicious speculations against China, which China firmly opposes.”
In addition to its state media, Beijing has turned to foreign players — real or not — to relay messages and lend credibility to narratives favoring the Communist Party, said Xiao Qiang, a research scientist at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley. Xiao also is editor-in-chief of China Digital Times, a bilingual news website that aggregates information from and about China.
Beijing's methods are wide-ranging and links to the government are often difficult to prove, Xiao said. But whether it's journalists with American-sounding names or an Indian influencer, the consistently pro-Beijing messages give them away.
"The implicit message is the same — that the Chinese Communist Party works for its people,” Xiao said.
Analysts at the cybersecurity firm Logically identified 1,200 websites that had carried Russian or Chinese state media stories. The sites often target specific audiences and have names that sound like traditional news organizations or defunct newspapers.
Unlike Russia or Iran, which have displayed clear preferences in the U.S. presidential campaign, Beijing is more cautious and focused on spreading positive content about China.
While the sites aren't owned by China, they run Chinese content. When Logically looked at content specifically about the U.S. election, 20% could be traced back to Chinese or Russian state media.
“There's a decent likelihood that these articles could influence U.S. audiences without them even knowing where it comes from,” said Alex Nelson, Logically's senior manager for strategy and analysis.
According to the Gallup World Poll, more countries surveyed view the U.S. positively, but the share of countries where views of both the U.S. and China are negative overall is higher than 15 years ago, signaling the U.S. doesn’t appear to be making gains over China.
Some U.S. officials want to increase spending to even the playing field. The House of Representatives this month approved a bill that would authorize $325 million annually through 2027 to counter China’s global influence, including its disinformation campaigns. The measure still needs Senate approval.
“We are in a global competition for influence with China, and if you want to win it, then you cannot do it on a middle-power budget,” said Rep. Gregory Meeks, a Democrat from New York.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has demanded a systematic buildup of Chinese narratives that would give his country a global voice “commensurate with” its international stature.
Beijing has invested in state media such as the Xinhua news agency and China Central Television to convey its messages to global audiences in various languages and platforms. Media groups at the local level are creating “international communication centers” to build an overseas presence with websites, news channels and social media accounts.
Beijing also has struck media partnerships worldwide, and the article Campbell read in the Solomon Islands is likely a result of those.
China’s outreach is tied to the global race for economic dominance in electric vehicles, computer chips, AI and quantum computing, said Jaret Riddick, a senior fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology.
“The countries that lead on emerging technologies will be the countries that have a great advantage going forward,” Riddick said.
To tell its story, Beijing has not shied away from using fake personas. A 2023 State Department report detailed the case of a published writer named Yi Fan, originally described as a Chinese foreign ministry analyst. Yi morphed into a journalist, then became an independent analyst.
Yi's details changed, but the message did not. Through published commentaries and writings, Yi trumpeted close ties between China and Africa, praised Beijing’s approach to environmental sustainability and argued that China must counter distorted Western narratives.
Then there was Wilson Edwards, a supposed Swiss virologist quoted in Chinese media as a COVID-19 expert who criticized the U.S. response. But Swiss officials found no evidence he existed.
“If you exist, we would like to meet you!” the Swiss Embassy in Beijing wrote on social media.
___
AP writer Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux contributed from Washington.
26. Why Delta Force Was Created in the 1970s
:-)
Why Delta Force Was Created in the 1970s - Warrior Maven
Delta Force specializes in counterterrorism, direct action, hostage rescue, and reconnaissance. It often tackles high-stakes, classified operations directed by the highest levels of the US government, underscoring
September 30, 2024
warriormaven.com · by SOFREP · September 30, 2024
by SOFREP
The Birth of Delta Force: A Response to Terrorism
In the 1970s, a series of high-profile terrorist incidents convinced the US government to establish a dedicated counterterrorism unit. Colonel Charlie Beckwith, a Special Forces veteran inspired by the British SAS (Special Air Service), championed the creation of such a force.
After years of lobbying and overcoming resistance, the Pentagon and top Army brass finally tasked Beckwith to head the unit. He and his team developed the “Robert Redford Paper,” a document outlining a four-phase selection and training process to justify the time needed to build a fully functional and formidable unit. The Special Forces veteran estimated it would take two years to complete.
Delta Force was officially established on November 19, 1977.
However, to bridge the gap until soldiers completed the rigorous selection process, Colonel Bob “Black Gloves” Mountel of the 5th Special Forces Group was tasked with setting up a temporary unit.
In 1978, Mountel selected volunteers and put them through a six-month course involving land navigation and rucking with heavy loads in rugged, mountainous environments. The purpose was to thoroughly test these candidates physically and mentally.
Delta Force was finally fully stood up in the fall of 1979, just in time for the Iran Hostage Crisis. This event, and the subsequent failed Operation Eagle Claw (1980), highlighted the need for further development of specialized units like the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), also known as The Night Stalkers and SEAL Team Six to support Delta Force and enhance its capabilities.
The name Delta Force, also known as the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D), is synonymous with elite special operations within the United States Army.
Founded in 1977, Delta Force has gone by various names within the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) over the years, including Combat Applications Group (CAG), Army Compartmented Element (ACE), “The Unit,” and Task Force Green. Though organized administratively under the Army, JSOC controls Delta Force.
Delta Force specializes in counterterrorism, direct action, hostage rescue, and reconnaissance. It often tackles high-stakes, classified operations directed by the highest levels of the US government, underscoring the gravity of its work. This elite unit recruits primarily from the Special Forces and the 75th Ranger Regiment.
warriormaven.com · by SOFREP · September 30, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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