Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

 
 

Quotes of the Day:


"What is the use of living, if it be not to strive for noble causes and to make this muddled world a better place for those who will live in it after we are gone? How else can we put ourselves in harmonious relation with the great verities and consolations of the infinite and the eternal? And I avow my faith that we are marching towards better days. Humanity will not be cast down. We are going on swinging bravely forward along the grand high road and already behind the distant mountains is the promise of the sun." 
– Winston Churchill

"The real art of conversation is not only to say the right thing in the right place but to leave unsaid the wrong thing at the tempting moment." 
– Lady Dorothy Nevill

"It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood." 
– James Madison


On this day: Task Force Ranger, Operation Gothic Serpent, and the Battle of Mogadishu. Lest we never forget.

The U.S. Army in Somalia 1992-1994

https://www.history.army.mil/brochures/somalia/somalia.htm





1. DoD Launches Defense Security Cooperation Service

2. Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen H. Hicks Launching the Defense Security Cooperation Service (DSCS) (As Delivered)

3. WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS? A COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH FOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

4. With a drop of blood, an Army device can diagnose traumatic brain injuries in 15 minutes

5. Military Special Operators, Drones Should Take Out Mexico Fentanyl Networks, GOP Senate Candidate Says

6. A Wider War in the Middle East, From Hamas to Hezbollah and Now Iran

7. Pentagon Wants to Fastrack Buy of Cheap One-Way Drones

8. Chinese Aircraft Carrier Operating Near the Philippines

9. Pentagon taps commercial vendors for low-cost, throwaway drones

10. Time to Move Beyond Cannons

11. What reports got wrong about China’s ‘sunken nuclear submarine’

12. Special Operations Command developing job field focused on latest battlefield technology

13. The fall of Vuhledar is a microcosm of Ukraine's wartime predicament

14. 5 Chinese nationals charged with covering up midnight visit to Michigan military site

15. A New Approach to Defeating an Old Enemy: Army Special Operations Forces in Operation INHERENT RESOLVE

16. Is ‘Secret’ US Order of Decades Old Machine Guns Destined for Ukraine?

17. he CCP's Political Warfare: An existential fight for allies, partners and like-minded nations

18. China and Cognitive Warfare: An Overview

19. North Korea’s Hezbollah Connection

20. The lost art of understanding the enemy

21. Black Hawk Down and the Battle of Mogadishu: An Urban Warfare Project Case Study

22. Israel’s Campaign against Hezbollah and the Fight for Southern Lebanon’s Tunnels

23. Decapitating The Hydra: Iran’s Response Options To Israel’s Offensive





1. DoD Launches Defense Security Cooperation Service


 Is this new infrastructure of the security cooperation organization going to be agile, nimble, and effective in support of strategic competition through the theater commander and chief of mission. Will it improve advisory and assistance operations coordinating with our friends, partners, and allies in support of national strategy? Should we have multiple military elements as part of country teams responding to multiple chains of command? e.g., now DSCS, and traditionally DIA, theater commander (sometimes through the J3 and sometimes J4 and sometimes through the Theater Special Operations Command)?


Excerpts:


DSCS will consolidate the support infrastructure of DoD's critical Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) personnel at U.S. Embassies under DSCA management to ensure the proper organization, staffing, training, and equipping of these vital global organizations.
"Investing in our workforce will build enduring advantages that bolster strength and resilience," said Mike Miller, DSCA Acting Director. "The security cooperation workforce makes up the backbone of DoD's relationship-building mechanism."



DoD Launches Defense Security Cooperation Service

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3923563/dod-launches-defense-security-cooperation-service/

Oct. 2, 2024 |   

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) officially launched the Defense Security Cooperation Service yesterday in a ceremony at the Pentagon.

"The launch of the Defense Security Cooperation Service comes at a pivotal moment for America's security cooperation enterprise, because the assistance you provide our allies and partners is more in-demand than ever before," said Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks in a speech at the launch ceremony. "The ability of our allies and partners to win future wars will be shaped by what our security cooperation community does today to deliver for their warfighters tomorrow."

Both the title 10 U.S. Code Section 384 and the NDS direct the Department of Defense (DoD) to ensure that those who represent the DoD to our Allies and partners are a professionalized force, with the training and support necessary to advance our national security objectives.

In April 2023, Secretary Austin approved a plan to implement a suite of initiatives aimed at improving the security cooperation (SC) workforce as part of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) mission demands. To meet the goals of these initiatives, the FY24 NDAA and the Secretary of Defense authorized the creation of the Defense Security Cooperation Service (DSCS).

DSCS will consolidate the support infrastructure of DoD's critical Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) personnel at U.S. Embassies under DSCA management to ensure the proper organization, staffing, training, and equipping of these vital global organizations.

"Investing in our workforce will build enduring advantages that bolster strength and resilience," said Mike Miller, DSCA Acting Director. "The security cooperation workforce makes up the backbone of DoD's relationship-building mechanism."

SCOs comprise the front line of personnel in the SC workforce. Located in or associated with U.S. diplomatic facilities worldwide, SCOs serve in positions of influence as the foremost points of contact between the Department of Defense and the host nation Ministry of Defense. They are responsible for overseeing and implementing in-country security cooperation, to include security assistance programs, and for facilitating cooperation in research, development, and acquisition with allied and partner nations.

DSCS aims to transform the way personnel performing security cooperation duties in U.S. embassies worldwide are organized and managed.

Combatant commanders will retain control of SCO personnel and benefit from highly-skilled Security Cooperation specialists throughout their area of responsibility.

Adequately resourcing and preparing SCOs is essential to implement NDS and to strengthen allies and partners.

Video of the ceremony is available here: https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Videos/videoid/938594/

2. Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen H. Hicks Launching the Defense Security Cooperation Service (DSCS) (As Delivered)



The question is whether this new DSCS is the right "platform" to ensure the effectiveness of these basic premises. It is certainly is not the only one that is contributing to these premises. WHich begs the question, how are we effectively integrating and orchestrating all the military elements that focus on these "premises? It is not only the DSCS and the DSCS surely is not coordinating or synchronizing the activities and effects of other platforms. Who should?


Are we rearranging the deck chairs?



Excerpt:


Our defense security cooperation enterprise goes back many decades, with foreign military sales and other forms of assistance totaling over $1.2 trillion since 1950. That's not even counting the historic levels provided through the Lend-Lease Act during World War II.
While the enterprise has increasingly formalized over the years — and while the scope of what we consider "security cooperation" has expanded, to include activities like institutional capacity-building and the State Partnership program, not to mention cooperative development, co-production, and co-sustainment efforts — the basic premises have always been clear:
When our allies are stronger, we are stronger.
When our fellow democracies can better defend themselves, we have greater operational flexibility, if we're ever called to fight alongside them.
When regional partners can do more to provide the security and stability that underpins regional and global prosperity, we have greater freedom of maneuver, if for instance, in a crisis, we might need to reprioritize where we allocate forces around the world.
And when our combined forces, platforms, and capabilities can operate together seamlessly, it makes the whole greater than the sum of the parts. So we can accomplish missions that might otherwise be impossible.


Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen H. Hicks Launching the Defense Security Cooperation Service (DSCS) (As Delivered)

https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3922457/remarks-by-deputy-secretary-of-defense-kathleen-h-hicks-launching-the-defense-s/

Oct. 1, 2024

Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks

Hall of Heroes, The Pentagon

  

Good morning everyone, and happy fiscal new year. Thank you for acknowledging that. And we are — we have at least a C[ontinuing] R[esolution], so there you have it. (Laughter.) You can't always guarantee those things.

So, let me first thank Acting Under Secretary Dory, Director Miller, Director Bracero: thank you for your leadership, and for all the former leaders here. And to [Acting] Assistant Secretary Brown, thank you for representing the State Department.

Security cooperation is one of the most impactful missions that our departments do together, and neither of us can succeed at it without the other. So on behalf of Secretary Austin and all of DoD, we're grateful for the close partnership with our friends at Foggy Bottom.

Most importantly, to our security cooperation workforce, past and present, that's joining today — both in person and online, tuning in from embassies around the world — thank you for all that you do every day to contribute to the security and prosperity of America, and especially our allies and partners.

There's no single foreign counterpart engagement that any senior DoD official does where the work of this community is not front and center. I know the work is hard, but the payoff is huge.

Because of you, wherever U.S. forces operate, they do so alongside the world's best trained, best equipped, and most capable allied and partner militaries, from Europe to the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific.

It's a major asymmetric advantage that we have, compared to our strategic competitors. Where we have partners of choice, our competitors are stuck with bedfellows of last resort.

Of course, that's not something we can ever take for granted. And it didn't happen overnight.

Our defense security cooperation enterprise goes back many decades, with foreign military sales and other forms of assistance totaling over $1.2 trillion since 1950. That's not even counting the historic levels provided through the Lend-Lease Act during World War II.

While the enterprise has increasingly formalized over the years — and while the scope of what we consider "security cooperation" has expanded, to include activities like institutional capacity-building and the State Partnership program, not to mention cooperative development, co-production, and co-sustainment efforts — the basic premises have always been clear:

When our allies are stronger, we are stronger.

When our fellow democracies can better defend themselves, we have greater operational flexibility, if we're ever called to fight alongside them.

When regional partners can do more to provide the security and stability that underpins regional and global prosperity, we have greater freedom of maneuver, if for instance, in a crisis, we might need to reprioritize where we allocate forces around the world.

And when our combined forces, platforms, and capabilities can operate together seamlessly, it makes the whole greater than the sum of the parts. So we can accomplish missions that might otherwise be impossible.

It's worth noting that we don't do security cooperation with just anybody. It has to be in our shared interests. And we care about our partners upholding shared values, like respect for human rights, adherence to the law of armed conflict, and protecting civilians from harm, even amid the fog and friction of war.

We expect our friends and allies to aspire to the same high standards that we seek to meet ourselves. Because even in times when we or they miss the mark, that aspiration is part of what makes us better than our foes. We can never lose sight of that.

Now, the launch of the Defense Security Cooperation Service comes at a pivotal moment for America's security cooperation enterprise. Because the assistance you provide our allies and partners is more in-demand than ever before.

What two decades ago, and for decades prior, was typically a $10-to-15-billion-dollar-a-year endeavor, has grown exponentially since then: adding up to more than $30 billion in fiscal 2014, over $50 billion in fiscal 2020, and now totaling over $100 billion in the fiscal year that ended just yesterday. That's an astounding record.

Why so much demand? It's because like-minded nations and democracies around the world, from Eastern Europe to the western Pacific, are worried about naked aggression in their own backyards, to an extent that they haven't contemplated in a long time. 

Nations of goodwill want to deter such aggression however they can, and effectively defend against it if they must. 

And nations all around the world, and notably across the Global South, want to promote a rules-based international order, protect their coasts, and respond to humanitarian disasters.

So countries come to us for partnership. And every day, you make it possible for America to provide that.

At a time when you must do so at greater speed and scale, I want you to know that the Secretary and I, and everyone that you'll hear from today, are committed to making sure you have what you need to do the job well.

Because of the unprecedented demands on our security cooperation enterprise, we cannot accept more business as usual. In this generational era of strategic competition, we have to up our game, with confidence and urgency.

That's why Secretary Austin directed dozens of actions last June, to improve the effectiveness of our foreign military sales processes and other security cooperation efforts. That followed a rigorous tiger-team review, co-led by our Acquisition & Sustainment and Policy organizations, and leveraging expertise from across DoD. We appreciate everything the Tiger Team did to get us to this point.

And this, creating the Defense Security Cooperation Service, may be one of the most consequential actions from that review, because of the long-term change that a cohesive, deliberate, well-trained and well-resourced professionalized workforce can drive. And it's good to see that Congress agrees, having codified the DSCS in last year's National Defense Authorization Act.

After all, to deliver effective, responsive, and responsible security cooperation, it takes special skillsets, technical knowhow, the ability to forge relationships, and subject-matter familiarity, if not expertise, that spans sectors and fields.

Today is the start of a new chapter for the security cooperation enterprise, one that all of you will write together over the next 12 months, and the years that will follow.

The opportunities to succeed will be endless, just like the demands on your time and resources. Because the ability of our allies and partners to win future wars will be shaped by what our security cooperation community does today to deliver for their warfighters tomorrow.

You and your teams are at the vanguard of that. So we need you at the top of your game. And we know you are more than up to the task.

Thank you, and I look forward to the unveiling.



3. WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS? A COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH FOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION


(comments from my biased perspective, but there is more to this essay than my biased perspective).


Have we ever really developed competitions in irregular warfare at PME (and unconventional warfare or support to political warfare).


Have we ever realized the intent of Congress in developing DOD competencies in "low intensity conflict" as articulated by the Nun-Cohen legislation as part of Goldwater Nichols? It is interest that the (non_American) officers continue to describe "low intensity conflict and irregular warfare" as one of the six groupings of competencies.


I look forward to this series of articles.


Excerpts:


The groups of competencies continued to proliferate. Active Defense, AirLand Battle, and later concepts brought in new competencies, requiring officers to actively contemplate how their actions align with actions in other domains and, later, other instruments of national power. With the return of low-intensity conflict and irregular warfare in the 1990s and 2000s, yet more competencies were added to the list. As MDO and its sister concepts seek to encompass two new domains and an engagement with a wide array of exotic technologies as fundamental competencies, it becomes clear that unless officers are to spend all their time in the classroom, militaries must prioritize which of the many legitimate competencies should be the focus of officer education.
...
The articles that follow will focus on six different ways that countries may reasonably choose to prioritize sets of competencies at the intermediate level of education. These six groupings are snapshots of what future warfighting trends might look like in the future and which corresponding skillsets will be needed to function in that future operational environment. These six snapshots are single-service operations; joint operations; low-intensity conflict and irregular warfare; hybrid warfare; multi-domain operations; and technological innovation. Each of these six trends will shape the future of warfighting, and therefore militaries must understand how to build and extract the necessary competencies to best prepare military officers for the future.


WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS? A COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT APPROACH FOR PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION


 Thomas Crosbie , Holger Lindhardtsen  October 3, 2024

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/competencies-1/




EDITOR’S NOTE: This is the first installment in a multi-part series that examines how professional military education should be designed. This and subsequent articles will look through the lens of the competencies required of officers as the global security environment changes once again. The collection of articles can be found in a collection here once they have been published.

With the fall of Kabul in 2021, the era of countering insurgencies, building and stabilizing states, and countering terror organizations was thought to draw to an ambivalent, unsatisfying end.

The global security environment is undergoing rapid change. For many countries, including the United States and its NATO allies, there has been both a push and a pull effect indicating the need for a new security posture. The push is a movement away from the sorts of conflicts that marked the first two decades of the twenty-first century. With the fall of Kabul in 2021, the era of countering insurgencies, building and stabilizing states, and countering terror organizations was thought to draw to an ambivalent, unsatisfying end. At the same time as militaries seem to be pushed out of low-intensity conflicts, there has been an alarming pull in the opposite direction, back to preparing for major combat operations.

With the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European countries in particular have raced to enact a wide range of reforms that support a radical change in posture toward territorial defense. Given that much of the early fighting in Ukraine took place in urban environments, it also served as an indicator that urban warfighting and the lessons learned from two decades of COIN remain still relevant. This belief was reinforced in October 2023, when Hamas launched an attack into Israel, leading to a large-scale urban warfighting operation in the Gaza Strip, while also reminding the world that the era of counter-insurgency might not be coming to an end.

Whether history repeats itself or merely “rhymes” (to borrow a phrase attributed apocryphally to Mark Twain), today’s dilemmas demand comparison with those of the late 1970s. At that time, the quagmire of Vietnam was taken by many military leaders as an object lesson in what sorts of tasks militaries must not—must never again—accept. This conviction paired with growing concerns about an aggressive Soviet force posture, especially the Soviet military’s capacity to exploit NATO’s vulnerabilities around the Fulda Gap, led to a rush to rethink conventional deterrence and prepare for future major combat operations. 

This mixture of regret and fear birthed a new operating concept that seemed to offer a clever way to prepare forces to overcome the Soviet challenge. Originally conceived as Active Defense, later evolving into AirLand Battle, this new concept became the dominant logic shaping how militaries developed officer competencies for many years. Unfortunately, the push away from low-intensity conflict undermined military readiness in that competency for many decades, leading to a difficult re-learning process in the early Global War on Terror era. Likewise, many Western countries redesigned their militaries to fit into an expeditionary role. This has once again been “reversed” as the focus since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, has shifted towards building conventional warfighting capabilities with the purpose of territorial defense.

As history repeats (or rhymes), so has a new “hot” topic of today’s military operations began to take shape. AirLand Battle expanded on the ideas of joint operations. Today, we see the next step of joint evolution, as the concept loosely referred to as Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), is gaining traction within Western militaries. MDO, which began life as the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Battle, has evolved into Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) in the U.S. joint environment, Multi-Domain Integration in the UK, and MDO in NATO. These concepts share an orientation toward preparing militaries to operate in two new domains (space and cyber, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum), adapt existing military ways to include so-called disruptive emerging technologies (like AI and quantum computing), all while emphasizing the need for both more alignment and more flexibility in how military services, government organizations, and coalitions coordinate instruments of national power.

The fundamental problem is one of endless aggregation: more and more expectations are placed on the shoulders of officers as the concept of the officer’s role comes to encompass an ever-wider range of tasks. Before World War II, officers were expected to master their occupational specialty (e.g., infantry, surface warfare) and not much else. Following World War II, the benefits of jointness that had been so obvious during the war led to increased demands on intermediate-level officers, who were now expected to develop competencies in working with other services, in addition to mastering their own fields. Then during the Vietnam War, a whole new suite of competencies was suddenly introduced as critical for success: intermediate officers were expected to be politically savvy and culturally nuanced in ways they had never been before.

The groups of competencies continued to proliferate. Active Defense, AirLand Battle, and later concepts brought in new competencies, requiring officers to actively contemplate how their actions align with actions in other domains and, later, other instruments of national power. With the return of low-intensity conflict and irregular warfare in the 1990s and 2000s, yet more competencies were added to the list. As MDO and its sister concepts seek to encompass two new domains and an engagement with a wide array of exotic technologies as fundamental competencies, it becomes clear that unless officers are to spend all their time in the classroom, militaries must prioritize which of the many legitimate competencies should be the focus of officer education.

This article series looks at the changing global security environment from the perspective of military educators. While professional military education (PME) accomplishes many different things, at the fundamental level it must serve one specific purpose above all: PME is the primary tool available to nations to develop the competencies needed by their officers to achieve success on the battlefield. In other words, whatever else a given PME program may do, it must at least prepare its students to succeed at the next relevant level of operations. In general terms, PME at the academy or undergraduate level prepares individuals to be junior officers acting at the tactical level. PME at the staff course or intermediate level prepares junior officers to transition to the operational or joint level. PME in war colleges, CAPSTONE courses and the like prepare intermediate officers to enter the strategic level. Each program will do much more than simply prepare officers for the next level, but it must at least do that. (Those looking for a basic overview of the history of PME globally are encouraged to read Tamir Libel’s 2021 article, which argues that we are currently in the middle of the fifth phase of global PME, a period marked by accreditation and other forms of “academicization.”)

The competency development (COMPDEV) approach is a way of thinking about education that begins with the end product: what do students need to be able to do at the end of the program?

The aim of this series is to describe a more pragmatic approach to prioritizing competencies in officer education. Any given PME program will inevitably be limited by institutional factors (resource allocation between departments, availability of experts in given topics, accreditation concerns and the like). We believe these considerations, as important as they are, must only be addressed after first prioritizing the sorts of competencies any given military wants its officers to master. The competency development (COMPDEV) approach is a way of thinking about education that begins with the end product: what do students need to be able to do at the end of the program? A COMPDEV approach is exceptionally useful for PME, which (after all) prepares officers to participate in a global profession with strictly defined standards. Logically, as the security environment changes, a COMPDEV approach would demand we change what we teach to ensure that newly prioritized competencies are taught. Due to the rigid constraints imposed upon most (if not all) PME programs, new competencies come at the cost of old, deprioritized competencies.

The articles that follow will focus on six different ways that countries may reasonably choose to prioritize sets of competencies at the intermediate level of education. These six groupings are snapshots of what future warfighting trends might look like in the future and which corresponding skillsets will be needed to function in that future operational environment. These six snapshots are single-service operations; joint operations; low-intensity conflict and irregular warfare; hybrid warfare; multi-domain operations; and technological innovation. Each of these six trends will shape the future of warfighting, and therefore militaries must understand how to build and extract the necessary competencies to best prepare military officers for the future.

Which competencies are critical to develop? Which should be deleted from the curricula? Which can be reserved for only some fraction of the officer corps or, within the NATO, perhaps only for some national militaries? These are the sorts of COMPDEV questions that we will explore in the articles to come. Critically, there is no one-size-fits-all answer to the question “what are the right competencies that PME programs need to develop now?” There is, however, a spectrum of legitimacy, reflected in the six snapshots, offering different yet equally valid ways to prepare for the future operating environment.

The articles that follow look from the perspective of what we term “program owners,” the individual or group in charge of defining the broad aims of any given staff course. This role could appear under a variety of titles: academic dean, program director, lead instructor, special advisor, or even commandant of the college. Of course, there are many peculiarities associated with each specific program. Our focus, however, is on general trendlines that can be observed across national settings. Indeed, we are ultimately concerned with global patterns observed in democratic states, rather than individual national perspectives. For that reason, when we refer to “intermediate” PME, we are referring broadly to that middle stage of education that brings officers from the tactical to the operational level, an educational input that was traditionally known as the staff course, but which today appears under many guises, from traditional staff courses to varying types of master’s degree or other degree- or certificate-granting programs. What must military officers in democratic countries be prepared to do at the operational level? What principles should guide our prioritization of how to provide officers with these skills, given that programs will inevitably run short on time and difficult choices will have to be made? These questions animate the following articles, but our goal is not to definitely answer the questions. Rather, our goal is to spark a broader debate about how we prioritize what we teach officers.

Thomas Crosbie is an Associate Professor of Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is the series editor of Military Politics (Berghahn Books) and has published widely on topics including the military profession, military politics, Professional Military Education. He is currently the director of the Educating Future Warfighters Project.

Holger Lindhardtsen is a researcher at the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is a project member of Educating Future Warfighters Project, focusing on competency development for future conflicts.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.

Photo Description: Clockwise from top left: Sculpture of the Wright Flyer at Maxwell Air Force Base, on Chennault Circle–around the curve from the Air War College; Flags lining the hallway entrance to Mahan Hall at the Naval War College; Eisenhower Hall at the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy at the National Defense University; The 600-person Bliss Auditorium at the U.S. Army War College; Lt Gen Michael T. Plehn, USAF, 17th President of National Defense University welcomes the incoming class of 2025; Center – A clock stands in front of the General Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia.

Photo Credit: Clockwise from top left: Courtesy of the Air War College Facebook page; Courtesy of the U.S. Naval War College About page; Courtesy of the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy Twitter page; Christopher Fincham; Courtesy of the National Defense University website; Center – U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Sean Potter.



4. With a drop of blood, an Army device can diagnose traumatic brain injuries in 15 minutes


Is this a game changer? And think of the potential application beyond the military (e.g., contact sports). If this works it will be another in a long line of examples of military research contributing to the greater good (think of Walter Reed).



With a drop of blood, an Army device can diagnose traumatic brain injuries in 15 minutes

The Army says it has developed a tool that can rule out the need for a brain scan for a suspected traumatic brain injury. All it requires is a drop of blood and 15 minutes.

Patty Nieberg


Posted on Oct 2, 2024 7:00 AM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg

A little over two decades ago, military scientists sat around a conference table to eat breakfast and discuss biological clues for diagnosing traumatic brain injuries among service members. The meeting took place at a combat casualty conference in St. Petersburg, Florida, where researchers and doctors discussed TBIs soldiers could suffer on the battlefield.

It was the morning of Sept. 11, 2001.

Within days, the U.S. would enter a series of wars that would last nearly two decades and TBIs would become “one of the signature injuries of troops wounded” in those conflicts. Since 2000, over half a million troops have been diagnosed with at least mild TBIs from combat or training.

That meeting on the morning of 9/11 “marks the inception” of the Defense Department’s involvement in TBI blood-based biomarker research, said Damien Hoffman, biomedical engineer and product manager for the Army’s traumatic brain injury tool.

More than 20 years later, the Army co-developed a test that researchers could not have envisioned that morning: A battlefield device that, by testing a single drop of blood, can give combat medics better insight into a soldier’s head injury.

The Analyzer Traumatic Brain Injury program is a test developed by the Army in conjunction with Abbott Laboratories. With one drop of blood, the ATBI device can detect early indications of a potential TBI within 15 minutes, researchers said.

The impact of having such a diagnosis in the field could be large.

For a field medic, a positive test could allow medical personnel to push an injured patient toward computed tomography or ‘CT’ scan, while a negative test would allow them to rule it out.

And beyond the frontlines, knowing who needs evacuation, and who can wait may be key information in the future. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S military medically evacuated countless troops for treatment of suspected TBIs. But in a conflict where the U.S. might not have air superiority, Hoffman said the test can help the military limit evacuations, treat troops locally and get those healthy enough back to the front lines.

U.S. Army Sgt. Raymond Calzada, a medical laboratory specialist waits for test results from the Analyzer Traumatic Brain Injury system during Global Medic, a combat support training exercise, Fort Hunter Liggett, California, in June 2023. Army photo.

“Given the large numbers of expected casualties with all severities of traumatic brain injury in future large-scale combat operations,” the test can help medical providers prioritize more severe cases and “eliminate unnecessary evacuations,” Army Lt. Col. Bradley Dengler, neurosurgical consultant to the Surgeon General said in a release.

During U.S. operations in the Middle East over the last two decades, Hoffman said the U.S. had an “over reliance” on evacuations. Army research has since determined that the test “may have” prevented 30 to 35% of all rotary-wing evacuations for isolated mild TBIs during counter insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2002 and 2018, he added.

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Before the device, mild TBIs had been a challenge to diagnose, with the CT scan as the “gold standard,” according to Hoffman. Otherwise, medical providers were left with basic diagnostic skills like checking a patient’s eyes or an interview — an approach that’s less than definitive.

“Aside from imaging, the only other clinical information that the clinician had to make their decision on was really subjective,” he said. “Your level 10 headache may be a level 11 headache for me. You and I don’t know that difference and the clinician won’t know. We’ll just say that we have a really bad headache.”

In April, the tool was approved for use by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. In 2025 — but possibly earlier — the Army plans to field the tool, first to large and small hospitals, followed by “Charlie Med stations” which are company-sized units that provide care for brigades.

While the tool has not been widely deployed, it was tested with troops in the U.S. and others deployed to support U.S. Central Command operations. In July 2023, the tool was tested during a medic combat training exercise at Fort Hunter Liggett, California. In the Middle East, test results were analyzed by military labs in the region in Kuwait and Baghdad.

“By providing this capability to CENTCOM, we got real data from the operational community on the utilization, on the impact to their clinical practice and their clinical decision making that the [Analyzer Traumatic Brain Injury] will have once it goes live,” Hoffman said.

Soldier brain health

The tool is part of the military’s focus on troop brain and head injuries that have prompted millions of dollars in research, new offices and programs that consider these issues early in service members’ careers. In August, the Pentagon announced that the services would conduct baseline cognitive assessments during Initial Entry Training. Along with the assessments, the Defense Department also published new rules on safe distances to limit troops’ exposure to heavy blasts or what the military calls “blast overpressure.”

In the Army, officials plan to evaluate soldiers’ cognition every three years after their initial screening for early intervention and to “identify any unusual cognitive change,” according to an Army release. While the schedule and ongoing evaluations are new, the testing is part of a program that began in 2007. For nearly two decades, over 3.4 million assessments have been collected, analyzed, and stored at the Neurocognitive Assessment Branch Data Repository at Joint Base San Antonio, Texas.

Those same cognitive tests were mandated for troops deploying to combat in Iraq and Afghanistan through the Department of Defense Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics center. The computer-based test is used as a baseline assessment and detects “speed and accuracy of attention, memory, and thinking ability,” according to an Army release.

Ongoing TBI research

With the ability to detect TBIs faster and more accurately, research in the civilian and military worlds are expanding what two of the main TBI blood biomarkers (GFAP and UCH-L1) can teach scientists about treatment and other diseases.

“Getting the rule-out test was the tip of the iceberg for these two biomarkers, in my opinion,” Hoffman said.

Other research within the Army tool portfolio is looking at how biomarkers can aid in the development of drug treatments for TBI, he added. Researchers are also testing oral treatments for moderate TBI and intravenous and intramuscular TBI drug treatments for severe TBI, according to the Army.

“There is interest in seeing if we can determine return to duty or recovery rate based on maybe the decrease in the biomarkers at an ‘X’ rate and at what point you are considered mission capable,” Hoffman said about a separate line of study.

Two studies published this month also highlighted the importance of biomarkers in further research. One study reiterated the Army’s analysis that biomarkers “obtained this early after injury could inform decision-making” such as prehospital transport to trauma centers, military theater evacuations to medical facilities, and sports-related brain injuries on the sidelines.

The FDA’s first approved blood test for evaluating mild traumatic brain injury has even led researchers to look at how blood markers may help with diagnoses for a host of other fatal health conditions like viral infections and bacterial sepsis, according to a new Navy medical research study published earlier this month.

The latest on Task & Purpose

Patty Nieberg

Sr. Staff Writer

Patty is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. She has covered the military and national defense for five years, including embedding with the National Guard during Hurricane Florence and covering legal proceedings for a former al Qaeda commander at Guantanamo Bay. Her previous bylines can be found at the Associated Press, Bloomberg Government, Washington Post, The New York Times, and ABC.

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg




5. Military Special Operators, Drones Should Take Out Mexico Fentanyl Networks, GOP Senate Candidate Says



Sigh....


Military Special Operators, Drones Should Take Out Mexico Fentanyl Networks, GOP Senate Candidate Says

military.com · by Associated Press | By Marc Levy Published October 02, 2024 at 9:36am ET · October 2, 2024

STEELTON, Pa. — The Republican challenger trying to flip the U.S. Senate seat in swing-state Pennsylvania said he’ll press for U.S. military action in Mexico to target fentanyl trafficking networks, a controversial and complicated idea that seemed to originate with former President Donald Trump.

David McCormick, who is challenging third-term Democratic Sen. Bob Casey of Pennsylvania, is making the idea part of his plan for fighting the fentanyl scourge, which is playing a big role in the campaign and has been central to dueling TV ads in the race.

The idea of using the military garnered attention in last year's GOP primaries before Trump emerged as his party's presidential nominee for the third consecutive time.

But now, McCormick — a decorated Army combat veteran and ex- hedge fund CEO who served on Trump’s Defense Advisory Board — is testing the message of unilateral U.S. military action in Mexico in a state that could be decisive in determining which party wins the White House and a Senate majority in November’s election.

McCormick envisions using the U.S. military’s drones and special operations teams in Mexico to destroy fentanyl trafficking cartels, though he stresses that the military should be used “selectively and thoughtfully.”

“I’m not saying we’re going to send the 82nd Airborne Division to do a jump into Mexico,” McCormick said. “What I’m saying is the combination of special operations and drones, I think, could eradicate the manufacturing facilities, kill the distribution networks and do a real dent in what is a terrorist activity.”

Military action is justified, McCormick says, by what he calls “the biggest killer in our country.” The U.S. shouldn’t wait for a blessing from a Mexican government that has failed to address its problem with fentanyl production and trafficking, he said.

“So the time for negotiating with the Mexican government to get their DEA on this is gone,” McCormick told one audience in September. “We’ve got to get tough on it. And that’s what I would do.”

The idea received high-profile attention when Trump’s former defense secretary, Mark Esper, said in 2022 that Trump had asked him about firing missiles into Mexico, a precedent-setting notion that Esper and other defense officials quickly rejected.

The idea gained cachet among some Republican lawmakers last year and Trump embraced it, saying “it’s now time for America to wage war on the cartels.”

Trump's then-competitors on the Republican presidential primary campaign trail also embraced the idea, but that talk has quieted. Legislation to provide military authorization hasn't received a committee vote in the Republican-controlled House and, while McCormick’s proposal lacks specifics and echoes an idea Trump broached, it goes further than what most—if not all—other Senate candidates are saying across the U.S.

Critics of using the U.S. military in Mexico say such operations would do little to hurt the cartels or stem the flow of fentanyl, while raising delicate questions about sovereignty.

They could, for example, destroy the relationship with the U.S.' largest trade partner, whose just-departed President Andres Manuel López Obradorrepeatedlydenied Mexico is producing the synthetic opioid despite considerable evidence to the contrary.

Casey has neither criticized nor backed the idea of using the U.S. military in Mexico. Instead. he has pointed to his support for measures in Congress to strengthen screening at border checkpoints.

The vast majority of fentanyl seized is brought into the United States by American citizens at the southern border, according to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

McCormick and other Republicans compare fentanyl deaths to combat losses in the Vietnam War: Roughly 110,000 drug overdose deaths each of the last two years in which fentanyl was the primary culprit two-thirds of the time, compared to 58,000 reported U.S. casualties in the war.

“What we’re in is unprecedented,” he said. “The numbers are beyond imagination in terms of what we’re experiencing right now.”

McCormick says the closest model for what he has in mind is the U.S. military's cocaine interdiction work with the cooperation of the Colombian government against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. McCormick called that effort “incredibly successful.”

But Justin Logan, director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, said the Colombian operation failed to stop the flow of cocaine.

It’s true that Colombia became more stable, its governance improved and cartel activity receded, Logan said. But the price of cocaine in the U.S. dropped significantly, which he called an indication that cocaine had become more widely available.

“And I think that is the first reason to be skeptical of the claim that using the U.S. military against the cartels in Mexico is going to have an effect in the United States on the amount and abundance of fentanyl in the United States,” Logan said.

Analysts say it seems unlikely that Mexico would agree to U.S. military operations on its territory.

Vanda Felbab-Brown, director of the Brookings Institution's Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors, said a sustained military and law enforcement effort by Mexico over months or years would be necessary to shut down labs and round up a trafficking network’s management.

But unilateral U.S. military strikes will have little long-term effect, because the labs and cartel commanders that get taken out are easily replaced, she said.

“And meanwhile you would incur very large costs,” she said. “You could imagine the complete rupture in the relationship that has many consequences.”

Mexico, for example, could end its cooperation of stemming the flow of migrants to its border with the United States, she said.

In Congress, bipartisan agreement has revolved around hiring more Customs and Border Patrol personnel at the southern border and expanding the capacity to screen vehicles coming from Mexico.

In April, President Joe Biden signed bipartisan legislation to expand the use of sanctions to disrupt trafficking networks and money laundering.

Democrats, meanwhile, have accused Trump and Republicans of hypocrisy after they sank a sweeping immigration reform bill this year that carried hundreds of millions of dollars to hire more customs agents and bolster investigations into fentanyl trafficking.

Trump said the attached immigration measures weren't tough enough.

If he wins in November, congressional authorization may not matter. Trump has said he intends to act with or without congressional approval.

The Biden administration, meanwhile, has suggested it already has the legal authority to strike cartels in Mexico, if it wanted to.

Presidents will always assert that they have the inherent authority to use the armed forces to protect the national security of the United States, said Geoffrey S. Corn, director of the Center for Military Law and Policy at Texas Tech’s School of Law.

Congress in 1973 passed a law requiring their approval for taking such action, but presidents have assumed the authority to strike at non-state enemies in other countries that they deem to be either unwilling or unable to rein them in, Corn said.

It’s a gray area of international law that has been tested by presidents of both parties.

“It's the same rationale that Obama used when he ordered a raid into Pakistan to kill Osama Bin Laden,” Corn said. “As far as we know, we didn't have consent from the Pakistanis to do that.”

The question, then, may be whether the flow of fentanyl into the United States warrants military action, Corn said.

“It's a hard question,” Corn said. “It is killing millions of people, but it’s not like they're flying drones across the border and dropping this stuff.”

military.com · by Associated Press | By Marc Levy Published October 02, 2024 at 9:36am ET · October 2, 2024



6. A Wider War in the Middle East, From Hamas to Hezbollah and Now Iran



​Map graphic at the link: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/02/us/politics/israel-iran.html?unlocked_article_code=1.PE4.sNbq.coTgl-6Jgw8Z&smid=url-share


​Excerpts:


This is the spiral that Mr. Biden has cautioned against repeatedly, but has not been able to stop, even with 40,000 American forces in the region.


“From Israel’s perspective, we have been in a regional war since Oct. 7, and that war is now an all-out war,” said Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to the United States, a historian and one of the country’s more hawkish diplomats. “We are in a war for our national survival, period.” Winning over the next few weeks, he said, is a “duty” for a nation “created in the aftermath of the Holocaust.”

The unknown is how Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel will interpret that existential mission as he weighs how, not whether, to strike back at Iran.


Mr. Biden’s warnings started early, on his visit to Israel less than two weeks after Oct. 7, to show solidarity after one of the most gruesome terrorist attacks of modern times.


That was before Israel obliterated Gaza from above and sent its military in on the ground, against Mr. Biden’s advice in a series of heated conversations with Mr. Netanyahu. It was before Israel booby-trapped pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah that exploded across Lebanon, and before Mr. Netanyahu approved the plan to kill Mr. Nasrallah and systematically decapitate much of the Hezbollah leadership.
​...
This new era runs many risks. There is the risk that Iran, frustrated by the failure of its missile force to break through Israeli and American weapons, will convince itself that it is finally time to race for a nuclear weapon, viewing that risky move as the only way to hold off an adversary who has penetrated iPhones and pagers and computer systems. There is the risk that despite the election of a moderate-sounding new Iranian president, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps will win the country’s internal arguments and double down on its missile programs and agents of influence.

“A full-scale war, or even a more limited one, could be devastating for Lebanon, Israel, and the region,” said Jonathan Panikoff, the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. “But from it, unexpected opportunities will also come — to undermine Iranian malign influence in the region, for example, by actively impeding its efforts to reconstitute Hezbollah. And a new administration should be prepared to take advantage of them.”

That is what wars do. They create new power dynamics, vacuums to be filled.

But there remains the danger that wider wars, once begun, take years to put back in the box. And the presence of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and an instinct to escalate creates a particularly toxic brew.

A Wider War in the Middle East, From Hamas to Hezbollah and Now Iran

The main questions now are how much the conflict will escalate and whether the United States will get more directly involved in the defense of Israel.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/02/us/politics/israel-iran.html?unlocked_article_code=1.PE4.sNbq.coTgl-6Jgw8Z&smid=url-share


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Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system intercepted rockets after Iran fired a salvo of ballistic missiles on Tuesday.Credit...Amir Cohen/Reuters


By David E. Sanger

Oct. 2, 2024

Leer en español


Follow our latest updates on the Middle East crisis here.

The long-feared “wider war” in the Middle East is here.

For the last 360 days, since the images of the slaughter of about 1,200 people in Israel last Oct. 7 flashed around the world, President Biden has warned at every turn against allowing a terrorist attack by Hamas to spread into a conflict with Iran’s other proxy force, Hezbollah, and ultimately with Iran itself.

Now, after Israel assassinated the Hezbollah chief, Hassan Nasrallah, and began a ground invasion of Lebanon, and after Iran retaliated on Tuesday by launching nearly 200 missiles at Israel, it has turned into one of the region’s most dangerous moments since the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.

The main questions now are how much the conflict might intensify, and whether the United States’ own forces will get more directly involved.

The past few days may prove to have been a turning point. Since Israel killed Mr. Nasrallah on Friday, the Biden administration has been shifting from cautioning against a wider war to trying to manage it. Officials have defended Israel’s right to strike back at Iran, but Mr. Biden said on Wednesday that he would not support direct attacks on its nuclear facilities that could tip the conflict out of control, warning that Israel must respond “proportionally.”

A month of escalating air attacks

Israel is fighting adversaries across the Middle East: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen and Iran.

LEBANON

Israel escalated air attacks on Lebanon and killed Hezbollah’s leader. Hezbollah retaliated with rocket fire.

TURKEY

AIR ATTACKS

SYRIA

Israel struck Damascus two days in a row.

IRAN

Iran fired nearly 200 missiles at Israel,

which vowed to retaliate.

IRAQ

GAZA

Israel continues to

strike Gaza.

ISRAEL

QATAR

EGYPT

RED SEA

U.A.E.

SAUDI

ARABIA

OMAN

SUDAN

YEMEN

The Houthis fired a missile at Tel Aviv.

Israeli airstrikes destroyed a power station

and a seaport.

ETHIOPIA

By Josh Holder, Leanne Abraham and Bora Erden/The New York Times

This is the spiral that Mr. Biden has cautioned against repeatedly, but has not been able to stop, even with 40,000 American forces in the region.


“From Israel’s perspective, we have been in a regional war since Oct. 7, and that war is now an all-out war,” said Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to the United States, a historian and one of the country’s more hawkish diplomats. “We are in a war for our national survival, period.” Winning over the next few weeks, he said, is a “duty” for a nation “created in the aftermath of the Holocaust.”

The unknown is how Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel will interpret that existential mission as he weighs how, not whether, to strike back at Iran.

Mr. Biden’s warnings started early, on his visit to Israel less than two weeks after Oct. 7, to show solidarity after one of the most gruesome terrorist attacks of modern times.

That was before Israel obliterated Gaza from above and sent its military in on the ground, against Mr. Biden’s advice in a series of heated conversations with Mr. Netanyahu. It was before Israel booby-trapped pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah that exploded across Lebanon, and before Mr. Netanyahu approved the plan to kill Mr. Nasrallah and systematically decapitate much of the Hezbollah leadership.

Middle East Crisis: Live Updates

Updated 

Oct. 3, 2024, 7:44 a.m. ET34 minutes ago

It was before the administration hinted last week that Israel had agreed to join a 21-day cease-fire, only to be defied, again, by Mr. Netanyahu, who then turned around and authorized the strikes into Lebanon.

To Mr. Biden’s critics on the right, this is all the result of American hesitance, his unwillingness to back Israel unconditionally and his understandable tendency to nuance every promise of aid with a warning not to make the mistakes the United States made after the Sept. 11 attacks.

To his critics on the left, what has happened in the past 10 days is another example of Mr. Biden’s failure to make use of American leverage over Israel, including the threat of withholding American weapons after more than 41,000 people have died in Gaza. While several thousand of those killed were almost certainly Hamas leaders or fighters, a vast majority were civilians.



To many Israelis, this escalation was inevitable, another chapter in a struggle for survival that began with the nation’s creation in 1948.

Mr. Netanyahu clearly has America’s blessing to retaliate against Iran. At the White House on Tuesday, Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, said the Iranian attack had been “defeated and ineffective,” largely because of the coordinated efforts of American and Israeli forces, who had spent months planning how to intercept the incoming missiles. “We have made clear that there will be consequences — severe consequences — for this attack, and we will work with Israel to make that the case,” Mr. Sullivan told reporters.

Mr. Sullivan said the White House was consulting extensively with Israel, including with the prime minister’s office, to formulate the appropriate response. He emphasized the degree of communication, leaving unsaid the obvious: Mr. Biden and Mr. Netanyahu barely talked as Israel took the fight to Lebanon, planned the Nasrallah operation and the ground invasion.

But once Iran, a lethal threat to Israel with military powers that Hamas and Hezbollah can only aspire to, directly entered the fray, America’s tone and strategy changed — and so have Israel’s.

The behind-the-scenes negotiations now boil down to Mr. Netanyahu’s intent. Will he send another message to Iran about what Israel could do in the future, as he did in April when he aimed at military facilities in the holy city of Isfahan? Will he take out oil production facilities and ports?

Or will he aim directly for the facilities he has threatened to strike for years, starting with the underground Natanz facility where Iran is enriching uranium to near-bomb grade?

American officials believe they can persuade Mr. Netanyahu to make his point without setting off a full-blown war. But they concede that the Israeli prime minister may see the next five weeks until the American presidential election as a ripe moment to try to set that program back by years. After all, former President Donald J. Trump would not complain about a major attack on Iran’s military infrastructure, and Democrats cannot afford to be accused of restraining Israel after Tuesday’s missile attack.

“Israel will do its best to be disproportionate,” Gen. Wesley K. Clark, a former supreme allied commander of NATO, said on CNN on Tuesday. White House officials take the opposite view: Mr. Netanyahu, they say, cannot afford to be anything but proportionate.

This new era runs many risks. There is the risk that Iran, frustrated by the failure of its missile force to break through Israeli and American weapons, will convince itself that it is finally time to race for a nuclear weapon, viewing that risky move as the only way to hold off an adversary who has penetrated iPhones and pagers and computer systems. There is the risk that despite the election of a moderate-sounding new Iranian president, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps will win the country’s internal arguments and double down on its missile programs and agents of influence.

“A full-scale war, or even a more limited one, could be devastating for Lebanon, Israel, and the region,” said Jonathan Panikoff, the director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. “But from it, unexpected opportunities will also come — to undermine Iranian malign influence in the region, for example, by actively impeding its efforts to reconstitute Hezbollah. And a new administration should be prepared to take advantage of them.”

That is what wars do. They create new power dynamics, vacuums to be filled.

But there remains the danger that wider wars, once begun, take years to put back in the box. And the presence of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and an instinct to escalate creates a particularly toxic brew.

David E. Sanger covers the Biden administration and national security. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written several books on challenges to American national security. More about David E. Sanger

A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 3, 2024, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Wider Mideast Conflict Arrives, as Biden Has Repeatedly Warned. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

See more on: Israel-Hamas War News, Hamas, Hezbollah, Benjamin Netanyahu, President Joe Biden




7. Pentagon Wants to Fastrack Buy of Cheap One-Way Drones


Perhaps we should simply hire Ukrainian acquisition officers. They seem to be doing this well.


Pentagon Wants to Fastrack Buy of Cheap One-Way Drones

airandspaceforces.com · by John Tirpak · October 2, 2024

Oct. 2, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak

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The Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit is soliciting industry to offer commercial, inexpensive, one-way drones to perform a variety of battlefield tasks—and the military wants them soon.

The DIU said that once a solution or solutions are chosen, there may be no further competition and that selected systems may go right into development “following a live flight demonstration during Phase 2 of the Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO) selection process,” according to an agency announcement. The Pentagon’s technology arm wants responses by midnight on Oct. 14.


Under the expedited format, the government is looking for heavy involvement of small businesses or “nontraditional” defense contractors.

The solicitation did not specify that the uncrewed aerial systems would be used by any particular military service. It also did not refer to the Pentagon’s year-old Replicator initiative, in which inexpensive, autonomous systems would be produced at scale to augment and enhance the fighting force.

“Recent conflicts”—presumably in Ukraine and the Middle East—“have highlighted the asymmetric impact low-cost, one-way unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have on the modern battlefield,” the DIU said. The Defense Department “must be able to employ low-cost precision effects at extended ranges. Reliable, affordable, and adaptable UAS platforms that allow for employment at scale will maximize operational flexibility for the joint force,” it added.

The Pentagon wants commercial systems that:

  • Can operate from 50-300+ kilometers with at least a 10 Kg payload; “ideally, 25+ Kg”
  • “Launch quickly and expeditiously” from the ground
  • Are “difficult to detect and track”
  • Navigate at low altitudes
  • Carry a variety of payloads
  • Operate beyond-line-of-sight in “disrupted, disconnected, intermittent and low-bandwidth (DDIL) and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)-denied environments.”

The DIU wants systems “capable of supporting high-speed, low-altitude, beyond-line-of-sight flight operations” under DDIL conditions, explaining that the UAS “should be able to execute its mission without continuous communication from an operator, though solutions that provide multiple pathways and mechanisms for two-way communications are desired.”


The announcement didn’t specify cost bounds for the submitted systems.

Replies are to be in the form of a short presentation that describes “the mechanism of ground launch, operational limitations, and rate of launch per team.” The DIU said it strongly recommends all proposals “be formatted as presentations no more than 12 slides in length.”

Responses are to explain “the ability of the platform to perform terminal guidance in denied environments and the capabilities available on the platform to support such maneuvers.”

Companies pitching a system have to provide details on “the precision, accuracy, and reliability of the proposed solution,” the number of flight tests accomplished so far, and “any information about testing environments, production facilities, and projected production capacities.”

Companies proposing a solution also have to “discuss the mission planning software that will be made available with the submitted platform.” That software should be “intuitive and integrate other first- and third-party platforms.”


The DIU noted that offerings will be assessed for their ability to “on the order of hours, integrate third-party software and hardware components (including payloads) in a modular, warm-swappable manner.”

Offerings must also use open hardware and software interfaces “that allow for seamless integration of third-party systems.”

The DIU isn’t interested in an intellectual property negotiation. It won’t accept any “proprietary interfaces, message formatting or hardware” requiring vendor licensing.

While DIU will accept “teaming solutions,” all proposals must “address the hardware and software requirements holistically.”

Any award made in response to the solicitation “may result in the award of a follow-on production contract or transaction without the use of further competitive procedures,” DIU said. The resulting “follow-on production contract or transaction will be available for use by one or more organizations in the Department of Defense and, as a result, the magnitude of the follow-on production contract or agreement could be significantly larger than that of the prototype” agreement.

Any prototype “Other Transaction” deal may result “in the award of a follow-on production contract or transaction without the use of competitive procedures,” DIU said.

Air

Operational Imperative 4: Tactical Air Dominance

airandspaceforces.com · by John Tirpak · October 2, 2024


8.Chinese Aircraft Carrier Operating Near the Philippines


Maps, data, and photos at the link: https://news.usni.org/2024/10/02/chinese-aircraft-carrier-operating-near-the-philippines-u-s-marines-arrive?mc_cid=d8a3e99982&mc_eid=70bf478f36


Chinese Aircraft Carrier Operating Near the Philippines - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · October 2, 2024

Chinese carrier Liaoning. JSDF Photo

The Chinese Liaoning Carrier Strike Group is now operating southeast of the Philippine main island of Mindanao and heading toward the Celebes Sea, based on the latest release by Japan’s Joint Staff Office.

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps announced on Wednesday that Marine Rotational Force – Southeast Asia (MRF-SEA) has arrived in the Philippines to begin a six month deployment.

On Wednesday, the JSO issued a release stating that the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) had confirmed a number of PLAN ships including aircraft carrier CNS Liaoning (16) were operating in the Philippine Sea since Sept. 20. The JSO had earlier issued a report detailing the composition of the Liaoning CSG and its activities from Sept. 20-26, with Wednesday’s release updating the activities and composition of the CSG from Friday to Tuesday.

The release also stated that from Friday to Tuesday, Liaoning carried out 130 launches and recoveries of its fighter aircraft and 90 take-offs and landings by its embarked helicopters for a total of 220 sorties and 630 sorties in total since Sept. 20.

From Tuesday to Wednesday, Liaoning and several PLAN ships sailed southwest in the waters east of the Philippines, according to the release. A map of the Liaoning CSG’s movement showed its last position as southeast of the Philippin main island Mindanao and approaching the Celebes Sea. The release stated that destroyers JS Asahi (DD-119) and JS Kirisame (DD-104) shadowed the CSG. Kirisame likely relieved Asahi, which had been shadowing the PLAN CSG since Sept. 20.

The location of the Liaoning CSG for each day is listed below as relative to the distance from Okinotorishima, an atoll in the Philippine Sea administered by Japan and located midway between Taiwan and Guam.

Date: Friday, Sept. 27

Position: 745 miles southwest of Okinotorishima

Carrier: Liaoning

Destroyer: CNS Chengdu (120)

Date: Saturday, Sept. 28

Position: 459 miles southwest of Okinotorishima

Carrier: Liaoning

Destroyer: Chengdu

Date: Sunday, Sept. 29

Position: 391 miles south of Okinotorishima

Carrier: Liaoning

Date: Monday, Sept. 30

Position: 689 miles south of Okinotorishima

Carrier: Liaoning

Destroyer: CNS Urumqi (118)

Date: Tuesday, Oct. 1

Position: 944 miles southwest of Okinotorishima

Carrier: Liaoning

Cruiser: CNS Anshan (103)

Destroyers: Urumqi, Chengdu and CNS Huainan (123)

Fast Combat Support Ship: CNS Hulunhu (901)

Meanwhile on Wednesday, the Marine Corps issued a release stating that U.S. Marines and sailors from I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) have arrived in the Philippines as part of the third-annual rotational deployment of MRF-SEA, with the force beginning its six-month deployment in the region by participating in Philippine military exercises Sama Sama 2024 and Kamandag 8 from Oct. 7-24.

The release added that the MRF-SEA deployment continues through March 2025 and includes six additional exercises and security cooperation engagements throughout Southeast Asia. This includes training alongside the Philippine Marine Corps, the Malaysian Army, the Indonesian Marine Corps, the Royal Brunei Land Forces, the Singapore Armed Forces and the Royal Thai Armed Forces.

“This annual rotational deployment of Marines is designed to build upon cooperative relationships with important regional Allies and partners, increasing effective interoperability, maintaining U.S. Marine Corps forces in the region, and contributing to freedom within the Indo-Pacific,” read the release.

The 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) command element will lead MRF-SEA throughout this six-month rotation and vary the force’s size and composition to execute each of the eight planned exercises, according to the release. Elements from 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, I MEF Information Group and 1st Marine Division will composite with the rotational force to achieve each exercise’s purpose and maintain U.S. Marine forces in Southeast Asia.

“Marine Rotational Force-Southeast Asia is deploying to the Indo-Pacific region to train and operate alongside our Allies and partners,” said Col. Stuart W. Glenn, commanding officer, MRF-SEA, in the release. “The Marine Corps is committed to preserving the freedom of the region and its people. We train together to strengthen our relationships and collective capabilities, and the intent of MRF-SEA is to cultivate and reinforce the common values and capabilities between our partners and to preserve a rules-based international order.”

Related

news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · October 2, 2024


9. Pentagon taps commercial vendors for low-cost, throwaway drones




Pentagon taps commercial vendors for low-cost, throwaway drones

Defense News · by Courtney Albon · October 2, 2024

Pentagon officials want to build America’s arsenal of cheap, disposable drones, staple weapons of the war in Ukraine, pinging commercial vendors for systems with mass-production potential.

The Defense Innovation Unit released a solicitation this week for one-way, uncrewed aerial systems that can fly at ranges of 50 to 300 kilometers in low-bandwidth, GPS-denied environments.

“Recent conflicts have highlighted the asymmetric impact low-cost, one-way unmanned aerial systems have on the modern battlefield,” DIU said in the notice. “The Department of Defense must be able to employ low-cost precision effects at extended ranges.”

DIU plans to hold a live flyoff demonstration as soon as December to evaluate the proposed systems.

Small, one-way attack drones have featured heavily in recent conflicts — from Ukraine to the Middle East. Since last fall, the Iran-backed Houthi militia group has targeted commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea, using aerial vehicles, uncrewed surface vessels and cruise missiles. Last week, the group launched what the Pentagon termed a “complex attack” on U.S. ships in the region.

On Monday, Secretary Lloyd Austin announced that the Pentagon would focus the next round of its Replicator effort — a process for quickly fielding high-need technology at scale — on countering drone threats like these. But the department also recognizes the impact these systems can have and wants to stock up on its own supply.

“Reliable, affordable, and adaptable long-range UAS platforms that allow for employment at scale will maximize operational flexibility for the joint force,” DIU said.

A DIU spokesperson told Defense News that while the drones the department wants could perform attack missions, it’s also interested in systems that can fly electronic warfare, ISR and communications relay payloads.

According to the solicitation, the vehicles should also be hard to detect and track, have several pathways for two-way communications and be equipped with mission planning software. Critically, the department wants modular systems that can integrate new hardware or software in a matter of hours.

“Proprietary interfaces, message formatting or hardware that require vendor-specific licensing are not permitted,” DIU said.

The notice doesn’t detail how many systems the department might buy and it doesn’t set a cost target. The spokesperson said that omission was intentional because DIU’s selections won’t be based on the cost of a particular drone, but on the cost of the effect the platform achieves.

“The best way to think of what we’re targeting is a cost per effect,” the spokesperson said. “If we launch one $1M platform or ten $100k platforms and generate the same effect, then the cost per effect is the same and that’s what we want to focus on.”

About Courtney Albon

Courtney Albon is C4ISRNET’s space and emerging technology reporter. She has covered the U.S. military since 2012, with a focus on the Air Force and Space Force. She has reported on some of the Defense Department’s most significant acquisition, budget and policy challenges.



10. Time to Move Beyond Cannons




Thu, 10/03/2024 - 10:09am

Time to Move Beyond Cannons

by

L. Lance Boothe

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/time-move-beyond-cannons

 

 

Reading is fundamental. This is also true for arithmetic. While it is only a lot of reading if you do it, so too with math – a professional fighting force should struggle with neither.

 

Yet in the US Army, a struggle with math is happening, particularly in the Field Artillery. For a combat arm which demands meeting the five requirements for accurate predicted fire (target location and size, firing unit location, weapon and ammunition information, meteorological data, and computational procedures) as essential to putting steel on target, one would think arithmetic near reverential. Calculus and geometry, simply being able to count to ten, and doing math in increments of 10s, 50s, or 100s applies to just about every one of the “five requirements” in some form or fashion. Yet some artillerymen cannot seem to do the simplest math of all – merely counting munitions and systems.

 

While “sight-to-crest,” standard and nonstandard factors, “met worksheets” for applying data from ballistic MET (meteorological) messages, the tabular firing table (TFT), graphical firing tables (GFT), “charts and darts,” muzzle velocity records for calculating muzzle velocity variations, and high burst mean point of impact worksheets for solving the gunnery problem (the practical application of the science of ballistics) would be a stimulating discussion, suffice it to say math is involved.[1] And that arithmetic goes a bit beyond balancing your checkbook, which the bank does for you now anyway. Perhaps this is the problem – computing power, which alleviates the individual from doing math. Recalling my days in a fire direction center (FDC) with a battery computer system (BCS), now the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), we still laboriously and quickly checked the computer with our TFT, GFT, chart with “whiz-wheel,” range-deflection protractor, and calculations from MET data correction sheets along with a handheld computing device called the back-up computer system (BUCS) – a calculator to check another calculator. Dual independent checks make the gunnery world go ‘round. It is all about the math.

 

The FDC is not the only place in artillery world where math matters. Once upon a time, howitzers had to be laid on a common azimuth. To put the guns on that azimuth required either an aiming circle (a surveying telescope, but without the laser of today’s devices) or the trusty old M2 lensatic compass. After “declinating” (not an English word, but Army-ese) the aiming circle on a designated spot (OS – orienting station) put in by “survey” (a position and azimuth determining system – PADS – now just a handheld GPS device) you get to apply TFOOL-ULU or SAD-ULU to the aiming circle to lay the guns. If all this makes you sad, it ought to. But a picture, even if it is a picture of words, is worth a thousand words. The irony should not get lost. Here is my cheater card received from the schoolhouse nearly 35 years ago, which I carried for years when in uniform:


 

Note the far-right column, the one where each step literally begins with words “MATH STEP.” Get the idea?

 

Now, I could also go into counting and converting mils to meters for adjusting observed fire (the first requirement for accurate predicted fire – target location and size), but it should be rather obvious by now artillery is a branch which lives and dies by math. 

 

Of course, technology has moved on. The guns lay themselves through on-board GPS and compute gunnery solutions. The FDC is mere redundancy now, a back-up. There is not, and never was, manual gunnery for rockets. Those firing solutions are done on-board the launcher by the common fire control system (CFCS). In my day, we just called it the fire control panel. Now, forward observers lase a target to get its precise location and elevation. Computers run the show and will only do so more in the future. But the US Army Field Artillery School still teaches manual gunnery. Today’s artillerymen can still do arithmetic, which makes the reluctance on the part of the Army to convert its entire artillery park to rockets so puzzling. One system with the firepower of 18 to 24 howitzers sells itself; at least, one would think. We shall circle back to this math shortly.

 

Enter direct support artillery rockets (DSAR), known officially as Direct Support Fires Technology (DSFT). Do not ponder too long how we got from calling it rockets in a direct support role to “fires technology.” At least, the direct support part is unambiguous – baby steps. This is just the way the Fires Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (FCDID) and US Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Aviation & Missile Center (DEVCOM AvMC) roll. Nothing like obscuring a capability through opaque and nebulous naming conventions. In the Army, we like to confuse ourselves as much as our enemies. This is “standard data” as we would say in the artillery. Anyhow, for our purposes, I shall call this capability DSAR (direct support artillery rockets), which paints a better mental picture.

 

A brief history on the development of DSAR is in order. Rumbling, bumbling, and stumbling into history as the Army is wont to do, it dawned on the powers-that-be that perhaps having a one size fits all rocket caliber (227mm or 8.9-inch to be exact) doesn’t provide the greatest of flexibility in either the present or future fight. How or why it took decades to figure this out remains a mystery, but along came the war in Ukraine. Again, another epiphany was had by leadership – massing fires still matters. And this becomes particularly true when fighting an enemy with a rather robust and effective electronic warfare capability, if nothing else. In yet another unprecedented step, the institutional Army decided to learn from an ongoing conflict. GPS aided munitions such as the M3l series of guided rocket (G-MLRS in the profession’s parlance and popularized in the press) are not optimized for an environment where the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is denied, degraded, intermittent, and limited (DDIL). As the layman may observe, the Army loves acronyms. In fact, soldiers probably could not communicate amongst themselves without them. Anyhow, DDIL is Army-ese for interference related to the EMS. This is not good for everything from computers to radios, and certainly global positioning system (GPS) transmitters and receivers. In fact, it is so bad for GPS reliant munitions that they may not function effectively. This is problematic to say the least as the putative Ukrainians have found out.[2] There is a reason why the vaunted HIMARS (the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), which Ukraine demanded they must have to win the war, and NATO leadership thought such a “game-changer,” have all but disappeared from the news.[3] To sum it up, while the idea for DSAR predates the Ukraine-Russia War, that war seems to have accelerated interest in developing DSAR for the reasons previous stated.

 

So as the wheel turns, the Army has gone from looking at 2.75 to 6-inch rockets with ranges from approximately 30 to 80 km, appearing to settle on the 4.75 inch (120mm) unguided rocket with a range out to 50 km, maybe more, maybe less. The compromise here is probably about right. The 4.75-inch rocket is around half the size of the current rocket, but more importantly 30 rockets can be packaged into the standard HIMARS or MLRS (M270A2 Multiple Launch Rocket System) munitions pod. The lethality of the 120mm rocket is that of a 155mm high explosive (HE) cannon projectile. So, in a smaller caliber munition, you get the same bang. But not just the same bang, but also the ability to strike targets faster, more accurately, and in greater volumes than with howitzer projectiles. And here is where we come back to some rudimentary math. An MLRS uploaded with two pods of DSAR (that would be 60 rockets) has the firepower of a battalion with 18 or 24 howitzers on any given fire mission. Two DSAR pods provide the equivalent of a “Battalion 3 Round” of HE (three volleys from 18 cannons). ONE launcher generates that firepower.

 

If we do a little more math, we find one battery of launchers (preferably multi-mission remote/robotic autonomous systems, but that is a discussion for another time) could provide fire support to three brigade combat teams (BCTs). It is called economy of force – something oft discussed and rarely practiced. Nine launchers (we must return to that number per battery) uploaded with 60 rockets a piece with resupply trucks hauling eight pods each gives the supported BCTs 9,180 rockets. This dwarfs the unit basic load of a howitzer battalion, assuming 18 guns, which is roughly 3,700 projectiles. In fact, at over 9,000 rockets per launcher battery that is about 1,600 more munitions than provided by two howitzer battalions and about 2,000 less than carried by three cannon battalions.[4] Life is about compromises at times. Here is one. If we consider that one rocket battalion brings just over 27,500 rockets to the fight, it represents the firepower of a little over seven howitzer battalions. The DSAR numbers sell themselves – ONE rocket battalion is the equivalent of SEVEN howitzer battalions.

 

No matter how the exact math turns out, it is certain to favor DSAR and a launcher-based artillery force. [5] A 1:1 ratio of DSAR rocket to 155mm HE projectile is assumed. As of the writing of this piece, DSAR (aka direct support fires technology) is under development, so perhaps the ratio will change. What can be guaranteed, if the Army gets the memo and acquires DSAR, is that given the technological trends in lethality (with warhead variety)[6] and energetics, the ratio is only going to increase in favor of DSAR.[7] My guess is one rocket to three 155mm HE projectiles, if not more. In the past and now, six M30 rockets (DPICM – dual purpose improved conventional munition) with 404 submunitions (M85) each is the firepower equivalent of a little more than 24 M483A1 (DPICM) 155mm projectiles with 88 submunitions each (64x M42 and 24x M46 bomblets).[8] This is a “Battalion One Round,” meaning all 24 howitzers[9] in the battalion (assuming 24 as it once was and may be again) firing a single volley. That is literally half of one M270A2 launcher’s firepower capacity because its Launcher Loader Module carries two pods of six rockets (227mm) each. One M30 rocket six-pack translates into the firepower of one howitzer battalion on any given fire mission, and that of another howitzer battalion if the M270 fires the other rocket six-pack. Six DPICM rockets (M30s) dispense 2,424 submunitions capable of penetrating several inches of steel over approximately a 100m radius, assuming a circular sheaf. Twenty-four DPICM cannon projectiles dispense 2,112 submunitions over about the same radius, but note, it takes 24 howitzers to deliver less munitions on target than from ONE HALF of ONE launcher (M270A2). Future growth potential in magazine depth may exceed this, but for now, a DSAR pod is projected to hold five times more rockets than the current 227mm rocket container. This point cannot be over emphasized. In addition to the lethality differential between rocket munitions and cannon munitions that exists now, which will only widen in the future, launcher magazine depth will increase where that of howitzers remains stagnate.

 

Given the dangers of doing math in public, please indulge me in one last foray. Consider the costs involved here in systems and the potential savings. A self-propelled howitzer in a wheeled variant costs anywhere from $4.5 to 8 million in yesterday’s dollars; in a track variant $14 million ($18 million if you go high end like the PzH2000). The M270A2 (MLRS) costs approximately $10 million per system; the M142 (HIMARS) costs about $7 million. But let us compare apples to apples as the colloquialism goes and look at track system versus track system – M270A2 launcher compared to M109A7 howitzer. Looking strictly at howitzers, a battalion (18 systems currently) costs approximately $252 million. Based strictly on launchers, a rocket battalion (also 18 systems) costs approximately $180 million. To equip a division artillery (DIVARTY) with four howitzer battalions (a future plan for DIVARTYs) that bill comes to over $1 billion just in howitzers where two launcher battalions would cost about $360 million in launchers alone. A few things are obvious here. First, elected officials can count, if nothing else. Second, a fair number of them are always looking to cut the military budget. Third, whenever politicians are told more can be done with less, which is really not true – generally, less is done with less, but on rare occasion the same can be done with less – they suddenly get interested. Here is a case where, in fact, money could be saved and the warfighter gets the same, if not more, fire support from fewer and better artillery systems. Launchers have more firepower than cannons. All of this would certainly get the attention of Congress. Put the numbers before them. The numbers sell the capability.

 

Usually, in the acquisition business within the Department of War (pardon me, I mean Defense), the driving principles, dare we even say first principles, are good, fast, cheap. Pick two. If you want the item fast and cheap, then do not expect it to be good. If you want the item fast and good, then it will not be cheap. And if you want the item good and cheap, then good luck on seeing it anytime soon. By the time it rolls off the assembly line it could be facing obsolescence. But every once and awhile the planets align, fair winds blow, the world is in balance, and lo and behold a system comes along at the right time, which promises to be good, fast, and cheap. DSAR hits the trifecta.

 

DSAR – direct support artillery rockets – along with loitering autonomous munitions (intelligent drones) are the wave of the future. I have written about the latter for Military Review to deafening silence from Army leadership. Regardless, the storm is building. Intelligent machines are upon us and will overtake us, redefining warfare in ways we cannot possibly imagine. Yet given the trendlines in recent conflicts from eastern Europe to the Caucasus and Mideast, a prognostication with some degree of assurance can be made that massed firepower will still matter in the future. The EMS will only get more contested. And we must have munitions that function within that contested environment. In the here and now, all that matters is how do we get the best bang for our buck as we strive to develop an army for the future. DSAR is before us.

 

While unguided cannon projectiles are certainly unaffected by EMS disruption, it simply takes too many howitzers at too great a cost per system too long to deliver and sustain any meaningful volume of fires on a near transparent battlefield against peer adversaries. Howitzer speed and survivability is suspect given what we see playing out in Ukraine. In that war, artillery is producing more than 80% of the casualties.[10] The overwhelming majority of the artillery munitions being fired are unguided. These “dumb” munitions do their work through mass. These munitions function regardless of EMS interference. These munitions are accurate enough when the five requirements for accurate predicted fire are met. When high explosive overpressure with fragmentation gets within 50m of someone, they have a bad day. This said, precision strike has a time and a place, but it is not at all times and in all places. Balance is required. Let sophisticated (and relatively expensive) autonomous attack munitions with their automatic target recognition software, multifaceted seekers, enclosed network, inertial and terrain associating navigation, and hardened circuitry (among other EMS and directed energy countermeasures) go after exquisite targets. Let the dumb munitions do what they do best, create mass destruction on all other targets. Artillery is predominantly for area fires, not extreme range sniping. Dumb munitions are cheaper than precision ones, and as the war in Ukraine is reteaching us, if we let it, the preponderance of munitions fired, now and in the future, will not (and cannot) be guided strictly by GPS.

 

 As a last thought, please consider that in theory loitering autonomous munitions are optimized for engagement where target acquisition is less than optimal. They are designed to hunt. The form factor, communications array, internal circuitry, and seeker required to do this is unlikely to survive the shock from the force of being shot (i.e. exploded out) from a cannon. These things, outside of the circuitry, probably cannot be miniaturized to fit within a 155mm shell in any reasonable and affordable way that would justify the effort versus simply lobbing 95-lbs (if memory services, it is really only 35-lbs) of high explosive at the target. More importantly, putting smart drones in cannon projectiles would not be cost effective when compared to DPICM. As the war in Ukraine is demonstrating, DPICM remains effective. It is not at all obvious that delivering smart drones via cannon projectiles can work or would be any more affordable than DPICM. Which brings us to the crux of the matter, DPICM comes in both 155mm projectile and 227mm rocket form in the US inventory (please reference Endnote 8 again). But only rockets are proving a more efficient and affordable delivery means for both DPICM and autonomous attack munitions. Yet one more reason why cannons are fading into the past.

 

So, while any argument for the versatility (and utility) of cannons becomes more and more moot given the math and the advent of intelligent attack munitions, there will still be some light fighter out there clinging desperately to the towed howitzer. (Yes, that is right “towed” as if being a cannon were not bad enough now that we are nearly a century deep into the era of mechanized warfare and rocket propulsion; let that sink in.) While it is beyond the scope of this article to go into the obsolescence of the airborne and air assault operational paradigms, one becoming obsolete within the very war it was introduced, nothing suggests rocket launchers cannot provide the same degree of fire support than towed howitzers do for these operations. If indirect fires are required below the minimum range of rockets, use mortars. To argue for the continued and future use of antiquated towed artillery is ignorant. Anyone with lingering nostalgia for cannons ought to read the late artilleryman Colonel David E. Johnson’s book Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945. You may get a chuckle out of his references to articles published in the late 1920s and early 30s expounding on the virtue of horses over the combustion engine. Many of these articles appearing in the Infantry Journal of all places. Yes, that is right, the Infantry Journal, the infantry was the proponent for tanks at the time, and all the horse lovers at Fort Riley were losing their minds over engines replacing horses. You cannot make this stuff up, I dare you. Only in the Army can such incongruence and advocacy for the obsolete based solely on emotional appeal make print in official publications. Let us not be those guys – antiquated thinkers. Let us do better in the 21st Century. Like with America’s worst general Douglas MacArthur “going over the top” in WWI with no gas mask and nothing but a riding crop, actions such as these and the mentality that foster them are vestiges of the past that need to be buried in it. Let the dead bury their dead.[11] We have put our hand to rockets and to look back is folly.

 

Undoubtably, I will get a considerable amount of hate mail over daring to suggest that the sun has set on cannon artillery. My own community will brand me a heretic no matter how sound the assessment. This is how we roll in the Field Artillery. But before what has been written here is declared anathema, note how behind the Army is in its thinking. According to a recent Hoover Institute report, “Marine command decided that a few missile systems would produce, through precision, better fire support than the 96 artillery tubes that were jettisoned.”[12] Does this sound familiar? The math is obvious to the Marine Corps. We (the US Army) do not need to be Mensa members to figure it out either.

 

Nostalgia dies hard. Cannons adorn my office and home. In fact, every Saturday weather permitting I roll out my fully functional eight-pound Napoleon cannon, which I restored, to proudly display to passers-by. I recognize that cannon for what it is – an antique – and I treat it as the relic it is. The US Army has a bunch of relics adorning its motor pools around the world. These cannons are a waste of money and space and do nothing to enhance any future warfighting ability. Let us put aside emotional attachment to them and employ our reason as our brothers in the Marine Corps have done. War requires us to be clear eyed and coldly rational – time to move beyond cannons. War does not respect sentimentality.

 

  -------------------------------------------

 

Postscript. Bureaucratic inertia is a thing. Acquisition programs are in motion now, were set in motion years prior, and will continue in years to come to deliver systems for the Army of 2030 and beyond. The problem with our acquisitions process is that it holds the future hostage to the present. Decisions are being taken now by those who will not be around to be held accountable for their decisions, much less subject to the ramifications of their decisions. This is a problem. And it is a huge problem because those who will suffer the consequences of those decisions will be our children and their children. Throwing our hands up in the air and saying we cannot do anything about the Defense Department’s institutional inertia because we believe ourselves hostage to the vicissitudes of Congress and its funding cycles or the rigidity of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process is the shabby excuse of defeatism. Mostly, we are just trapped in our own biases and by our intuitions, and hostage to the mindsets they produce. We owe it to our kids to be as forward looking as humanly possible. We owe generations of soldiers to come (again, our kids) to give them the best tools possible to do the job. In this case, to fight and win our nation’s wars. Nothing is more serious in its consequences than war. This is why I write so poignantly. The time for being gentle is long past. The powers-that-be are not listening or do not get it or both. This is how, at least, it looks from my perspective as a mere cog in the DoD machine. Policymakers and military leaders must pull in the reins. They must halt the institutional inertia on sunset capabilities like howitzers. It is not at all obvious that we are on the right path for future success. A comprehensive reevaluation of systems and programs is necessary for the Army. If this means the production of howitzers must stop immediately and the ones we have get mothballed, then so be it. Turning the Titanic around is far preferable to hitting the iceberg. Look how that turned out.

 

My certitude on DSAR is based on the math as presented in this article.

 

When I entered the Field Artillery (FA) in the First Infantry Division’s DIVARTY, the M270 (MLRS) had been fielded and it was recognized that the MLRS battery assigned to the DIVARTY had the firepower equivalent to one cannon battalion. Not much has changed since. It has not helped that cannon and launcher technology has changed so little that this firepower disparity persists today. MLRS replaced the 8-inch howitzer. Within the FA community at the time, there was a fair amount of weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth over replacing a cannon system, much loved by artillerymen, with rocket systems. There is no manual back-up to MLRS (it just becomes an expensive paperweight when the electronics fail), so the old-timers had their reservations, complaining and pining for the M110, but time marched on. As MLRS proved its reliability and lethality thanks to the First Gulf War, the 8-inch howitzer, which also saw action in that war, faded into the past along with 8-lbs Napoleon cannons a century or so prior. So forgotten is the M110 today that if one fell from the sky and landed in front of today’s generation of artillerymen, few of them would have any clue as to what it is, and none of them could tell you what all the arguments pro and con were regarding phasing it out and phasing in MLRS. This is why the coming firestorm over touching the “third rail” in the FA branch – cannon artillery – will be so contentious and disappointing, ultimately proving much ado about nothing. When the exact math based on the most updated numbers that can be gleaned from behind the “pay wall” of officialdom gets done, it will show (actually reconfirm) the disparity in the firepower ratios between rocket and cannon systems whether 1 to 7 as I claim or 5.5 to 1 or even a mere 3 to 1. It doesn’t matter. The math favors rockets and that will matter to a cash strapped nation and potential zero growth Army. The only question will be can the FA community accept the math without being force fed? Unfortunately, the US Army Field Artillery has a bad track record with innovation and embracing cutting edge of technology within the last few decades. As a result, Army artillery entered the Global War on Terror without the precision munitions required to be effective in counterinsurgency operations and ended up playing second fiddle to the USAF. Artillery has been trying to regain its place in the sun ever since. Some artillerymen will get what is written here, some won’t, and some won’t try. Regardless, it would be refreshing if the branch could get out of its own way and embrace technology as it did when some very forward-thinking artillerymen introduced MLRS into the force, and of course, just do and respect the math.

 

The opinions expressed and analysis presented in this article are those of the author.

 

 [1] Field Manual (FM) 6-40 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery, now Training Circular (TC) 3-09.81 Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery, will explain all you ever want to know about cannon gunnery, allowing you to get your manual gunnery on if you find my cursory references to it lacking. Enjoy. For the active-duty soldiers out there who may wish to check my gunnery bona fides, I’m on the Global. Feel free to contact me anytime and we can talk manual gunnery to your heart’s content. We can even do it down at Summerall Hall, the Mecca of US Army Field Artillery gunnery instruction with all the certified instructors there in the department, and you can school me on how outdated I am and on all the crucial things I missed. It has been decades since I was an FDO or FCO. I’ll bring a notebook. But for the discussion here, the point is that math is central to our job as artillerymen.

[2] https://thedefensepost.com/2024/05/27/us-himars-ineffective-ukraine/; https://www.businessinsider.com/us-himars-completely-ineffective-against-russian-jamming-report-2024-5; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/24/russia-jamming-us-weapons-ukraine/; https://www.c4isrnet.com/electronic-warfare/2024/05/06/electronic-warfare-in-ukraine-has-lessons-for-us-weapons-navigation/; https://www.airandspaceforces.com/russian-gps-jamming-nato-ukraine/; https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/04/another-us-precision-guided-weapon-falls-prey-russian-electronic-warfare-us-says/396141/

[3] Ibid. 

As an aside, HIMARS is not the greatest rocket artillery on the planet despite the press it’s getting. MLRS (the M270A2 rocket launcher) is what the Ukrainians really need, and they have gotten it from other NATO allies. MLRS provides twice the firepower of HIMARS with far superior open terrain mobility. And as I point out later in this article, they are essentially the same price, given the numbers that are available in the public domain. Let that sink in. But military and civil leadership are enamored with HIMARS for whatever reason (the claim is transportability and affordability), so we’ve not only increased production of the M142 rocket launcher into the foreseeable future, but in the process, we’re trying to convince ourselves as much as the world that this system is the next best thing to sliced bread. Such are the vicissitudes of the military-industrial complex and its hold on policymakers. An objective assessment of wheeled rocket artillery systems would show that the 9A52/3/4 is perhaps better, but these are Russian systems, so they will never get a fair hearing. After all, we must keep our hate on for all things Russian.

[4] The established practice is to provide each BCT with a DS cannon battalion. So that means given the numbers provided here, one rocket battery uploaded with DSAR is about the equivalent of 2.5 howitzer battalions, so one of the BCTs in a division would be somewhat shorted on direct support artillery. But this is not exactly the case. All BCTs in a division cannot be the main effort or even the supporting effort. Someone is in reserve. That means the two BCTs engaged have direct support artillery and then some. The DS margin is tight but workable. And given the rest of the numbers I have presented, a DIVARTY with even ONE rocket battalion can more than cover any firepower shortfalls that may come when the reserve BCT is committed. But who says a DIVARTY must only have one rocket battalion? We must rethink the way we organize and manage fire support, which is happening, but a discussion of that is beyond the scope of this article. The point is we must relearn what we once practiced when a DIVARTY managed the scarce fire support resources of a division, allocating them to the BCTs as needed, not as wanted. We must stop being hard-of-learning.

[5] Because DSAR is still in development, modeling its lethality is still underway, so there is no way for me to give you the “exact math” on 120mm rocket lethality compared to 155mm projectiles. And even if the modeling were done and the data available within DoD, it would not be open to public release from behind the “pay wall” of officialdom (DoD’s propensity for over classifying things); therefore, I could not share it. The Joint Munitions Impact Modeling System (JMIMS) is used to determine the effectiveness of all munitions in the US military’s inventory. This data is upload into command and control / fire control systems like AFATDS where it is used by the computer to select the optimal munition and shooter to engage any given target. By this point, it should be obvious that I’m basing my argument on weapon system capacity (the amount of munitions that can be uploaded on it and fired) and I’m trying to compare “apples to apples” using known (and proven) munitions in the inventory like DPICM and HE, which can be delivered by launchers and howitzers.

[6]Special munitions (smoke, illumination, infrared-illumination, perhaps scatter-able mines) would have to be warhead options for DSAR to make it a viable replacement for 155mm cannon projectiles. All those special munitions have uses on the battlefield in both large-scale combat operations and counterinsurgency. What does danger close become with DSAR? It must be comparable to cannon projectiles or it’s a nonstarter in a direct support role to maneuver units. How do FA units train with supported maneuver units to build trust in the fire support structure that has traditionally been done by firing thousands of cannon rounds annually? Short answer: fire thousands of DSAR, demonstrating its reliability, functionality, and firepower. The point is these concerns can be overcome and the key is making DSAR as versatile as possible with a variety of warhead options, and then start shooting them. Testing, testing, and more testing is the key.

[7] A 4.75-inch (120mm) DSAR rocket is obviously a smaller caliber than a 155mm cannon projectile, yet given the trends in advanced explosives as mentioned it provides, or at least, it’s expected to provide, the same destructive power of the larger caliber cannon projectile because you can put more explosives in it – rockets are longer. Also, it follows that with more explosive it will have greater fragmentary lethality through dispersing tungsten cubes – what is call euphemistically “alternate effects.” The 155mm HE projectile rips apart upon exploding, sending out shrapnel. Shrapnel patterns are not uniform nor very effective at penetrating armor or concrete. It will rip you apart though and lightly armored vehicles or soft skinned equipment, but little else. Explosive overpressure is generally the greatest killer from HE rounds, not fragmentation – look no further than the casualties in Iraq from IEDs (improvised explosive devices) made from 122mm artillery shells for a good point of reference on fatalities from overpressure versus shrapnel.  

[8] Data sheet on US rocket munitions - https://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/mlrs.html;

Data sheet on the M483A1 155mm projectile - Technical Manual (TM) 43 0001-28 Army Ammunition Data Sheets, Artillery Ammunition Guns, Howitzers, Mortars, Recoilless Rifles, Grenade Launchers, and Artillery Fuzes (Federal Supply Class 1310, 1315, 1320, 1390), Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1977 with changes 1-16 dated 24 July 1987, pg. 3-105.

Lest we go too far down the rabbit hole of munitions geekdom, yes, DPICM is being phased out of the inventory. In fact, most of it is being shot-up by the Ukrainians. DPICM is being replaced with sensor-fuzed munitions, which are supposedly more effective ergo presumably more lethal. The jury is still out. Here is a good article, if a bit dated, expounding on the virtues of C-DAEM (Cannon Delivered Area Effects Munition): https://www.army.mil/article/224986/c_daem_program_maximizes_industry_innovation_to_expedite_capability_to_the_warfighter. As previously mentioned in Endnote 7, the future of rocket warheads is “alternate effects” (silly Army-ese for covering an area with fragmentation), which is produced by tungsten cubes or ball bearings. Is tungsten fragmentation more effective than M42, M46, or M85 bomblets/grenades (DPICM) with their armor penetrating power? Well, you be the judge. The answer is there behind the “pay wall” of officialdom. I shall offer no further comment other than to say phasing out DPICM is a bad idea. And if the developers of DSAR/DSFT are smart, they will figure out how to put DPICM-next into DSAR/DSFT. I’m confident in their technical abilities.

[9] I started in cannons, the M109A3 to be exact. Eventually, we upgraded to the A5. At that time, a firing battalion consisted of 24 M109A3 self-propelled howitzers in three batteries of eight howitzers each comprised of two platoons of four howitzers each. Since then, the Army has gone to 18 M109A7s per firing battalion broken down into three batteries with six cannons each. The math is in flux for the future. Will it be 18 or 24 howitzers per battalion, or more? Hopefully, such concerns won’t matter once the Army jettisons these relics.

[10] https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-artillery/ Of course, the irony of this report is that the Ukrainians are howling for more 155mm cannon shells. The late Donald Rumsfeld didn’t get much right concerning our Iraq and Afghanistan entanglements to which he contributed mightily, but he proved correct about at least one thing: “You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” (https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0209/In-his-memoir-Donald-Rumsfeld-admits-five-mistakes-sort-of/The-Army-you-have) I’m sure this is of precious little consolation to those families who lost loved ones because we blundered into combat in too many instances with equipment unsuited for the type of warfare in which we found ourselves in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is why it’s so important that we cast aside relics like cannon artillery, particularly towed howitzers, and embrace pacing technologies like rockets and loitering AI-enhanced autonomous attack munitions. These things may actually save the lives of soldiers, so that in the waning years of the next war, policymakers do not make the same pathetic excuse (half-hearted, disingenuous admission of culpability) that Rumsfeld proffered. We owe it to our sons and daughters, and all American citizens for that matter, to do better than his poor excuse.

[11] The Gospel According to St Matthew 8:22 and The Gospel According to St Luke 9:60.

[12] https://www.hoover.org/research/has-high-tech-made-artillery-obsolete?utm


About the Author(s)


L. Lance Boothe

L. Lance Boothe is a senior Concepts Developer for Field Artillery in the Concepts Development Division of the Fires Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He is a retired Field Artillery Officer and veteran of Afghanistan, Iraq, Albania, and Bosnia. 











11. What reports got wrong about China’s ‘sunken nuclear submarine’


Conclusion:


The issues in U.S.-China security are of growing domestic interest and political importance, especially during an election season. As such, it is ever more vital that mass media reporting on PLA capabilities avoids the temptation to hunt for “clicks” and “eyeballs” and instead seeks out the details and context necessary to fully understand the implications of China’s military modernization.




What reports got wrong about China’s ‘sunken nuclear submarine’

Western news organizations often miss crucial context—and even the real news—about Chinese military modernization.

By J. Michael Dahm and Peter W. Singer

October 2, 2024 02:04 PM ET

defenseone.com · by J. Michael Dahm

The purported sinking of a Chinese nuclear submarine at a Wuhan shipyard pier is the latest example of Western reporting on military developments in China that overlooks important details and context, or even takes the wrong lessons from the fragments of stories they tell.

The incident, which took place in June, drew some mention the following month on social media and even in the defense press, but it went viral after a Sept. 26 report in the Wall Street Journal touched off coverage from Fox News to CBS. What apparently lit up the U.S. media landscape were the assertions, attributed to unnamed U.S. defense officials, that the submarine was nuclear-powered. Many of the subsequent reports suggested that the incident revealed safety concerns about a new class of PLA Navy nuclear submarine and a serious setback for China’s military modernization.

These are mischaracterizations. Moreover, the reporting actually buried the lead. The shipyard accident tells us very little about the future of PLA naval modernization, but the submarine itself does.

The afflicted boat was said to be a “Type 041 Zhou-class submarine” powered by a nuclear reactor. But tracing that claim to its origins reveals the importance of context and of using varied sources. The designation seems to have first publicly appeared in Chinese media sources in late 2023, which identified the “Type 041” as an improved variant of the Type 039C Yuan-class submarine. Two of the submarines were said to be in production at the Wuhan shipyard with advanced air-independent propulsion engines, not nuclear reactors.

In spring 2024, rumors began to emerge on the Chinese internet that China was developing a nuclear reactor for a 4,000-ton submarine the size of the Type 039/041. Most of the world’s nuclear-powered submarines are significantly larger. The rumors took off when Du Wenlong, a PLA senior colonel-turned-state-television commentator, appeared to drop veiled hints. “Some people say that China is making a ‘Type 041’ small nuclear submarine,” Du wrote, going on to argue that the PLA should indeed invest in such technology.

Rumors continued to percolate over the summer, even as some Chinese military forums pointed out that China’s only known nuclear-capable shipyard is in Huludao, on the northern Bohai Gulf, and that there were no indications that the Wuhan shipyard had received certifications to produce nuclear submarines. While it is possible that the Wuhan shipyard built this “Type 041” submarine only to have its nuclear power plant or fuel installed elsewhere, reactors and fuel rods are not something one just drops into a pressure hull. Installing a nuclear reactor post-assembly would be inefficient and unlikely. Moreover, China’s limited experience in building nuclear submarines suggests that it would more likely evolve its designs from conventional to nuclear rather than launch a revolutionary, keel-up nuclear design in Wuhan.

Further context comes from a PLA officer who had recently written that China’s navy will focus on building more nuclear-powered submarines. The expansion of the Huludao nuclear shipyard over the past several years supports that claim. However, given its relative dearth of nuclear submarine design experience and engineering talent, it would be difficult for China to increase nuclear-submarine production at two shipyards simultaneously.

The point is that a preponderance of public sourcing indicates there is far more uncertainty about the ship itself than the headlines would have it. Indeed, there is nothing in the available reporting that indicates an actual nuclear incident. The satellite photos showed four crane barges that may have been deployed to raise a sunken object, but no nuclear-response efforts were detected. This was not Chernobyl.

What was missed

Even worse, the media reports focusing on the potential nuclear nature of the shipyard accident missed what this submarine actually does tell us about PLA naval modernization. Today’s Chinese subs lack a vertical launch system, or VLS, limiting their ability to carry and quickly fire land-attack and anti-ship missiles. The ill-fated submarine, by contrast, had an extended hull with a section that appears to contain a VLS. Chinese language sources indicate it would accommodate long-range YJ-18 anti-ship missiles or CJ-10 land-attack missiles. Nuclear-powered or not, the prospect of numerous, difficult-to-locate submarines that can deliver a vastly larger salvo of weapons against ships or air bases would boost Chinese capability and complicate allied defense plans.

This story highlights the risk of both dropping into a topic and relying too much on unnamed U.S. military officials, who bring biases along with perspectives and information. In this case, the source appears to have been happy to highlight a Chinese submarine accident and what the incident may say about PLA capability. Yet U.S. defense officials—and the subsequent media reports—have said relatively little about the PLA’s announcement that it successfully test-launched an ICBM deep into the Pacific Ocean, the very same week of the reporting about this shipyard incident that happened months ago.

This story also underlines a larger problem in Western media reporting on China’s military in recent years: too often, it swings between two extremes that portray the PLA as either comically inept or ten feet tall.

The ICBM test reminds us of a similar media frenzy sparked by a dubious claim earlier this year. In January, Western media aired claims by unnamed U.S. officials that corrupt PLA officers had filled their missiles with water. The reporting seemed to be unaware that the Chinese term 灌水 (guànshuǐ), which does mean “to pour water into” but also references unscrupulous butchers adding water to meat to increase its weight and price, used metaphorically to refer to corruption. Yes, the PLA Rocket Force has experienced a crisis of corruption. No, they do not fill their missiles with water to cover up that corruption.

Media coverage of nuclear issues in particular often suffers from mischaracterization and hyperbole. In July, the North American Aerospace Defense Command issued a statement about a flight of Russian Tu-95s and PLA H-6 bombers near Alaska; they were not, NORAD took pains to point out, seen as a threat. Several media reports, however, heralded Chinese “nuclear-capable bombers” patrolling near the United States. A quick reference check of the H-6 tail numbers clearly visible in the NORAD photos indicates these were H-6K variants, part of the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command 10th Air Division, 28th Air Regiment. These aircraft were not the PLA’s nuclear-capable H-6Ns. Again, yes, China has nuclear-capable bombers and is building up that capability; no, they did not fly into a U.S. air defense identification zone.

The issues in U.S.-China security are of growing domestic interest and political importance, especially during an election season. As such, it is ever more vital that mass media reporting on PLA capabilities avoids the temptation to hunt for “clicks” and “eyeballs” and instead seeks out the details and context necessary to fully understand the implications of China’s military modernization.

J. Michael Dahm is a Senior Associate with BluePath Labs, a Senior Fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, and a Lecturer in International Affairs at the George Washington University.

P.W. Singer is a best-selling author of such books on war and technology as Wired for War, Ghost Fleet, and Burn-In; senior fellow at New America; and co-founder of Useful Fiction, a strategic narratives company.

defenseone.com · by J. Michael Dahm


12. Special Operations Command developing job field focused on latest battlefield technology


Humans are more important than hardware. That is because it still takes humans to create and control the hardware. 


Special Operations Command developing job field focused on latest battlefield technology

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · October 2, 2024

Cadets with U.S. Special Operations Command’s Ignite Program learn about drones at the Autonomous Systems Development Facility, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass., Sept. 19, 2024. SOCOM is starting a new job field this year to better capitalize on the skills of tech-oriented recruits. (Marleah Miller/U.S. Air Force)


U.S. Special Operations Command is paving the way for a new military specialty aimed at getting more tech-savvy recruits into jobs that will help commandos put emerging technology to use on the battlefield, Army officials said.

SOCOM is partnered with the military’s service academies and more than a dozen other colleges to create a “talent pipeline” for future officers, the command said in a recent statement.

In late September, SOCOM brought together 94 cadets to take part in its “Ignite Program,” where they worked on solutions for problems special operators are likely to encounter in conflict zones.

Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann, the senior enlisted leader for U.S. Army Special Operations Command, told the cadets during launch of the event on Sept. 19 that a tech-oriented job field was in the works.

“Special operations is leading the Army by creating a new (military occupational specialty) this year for technology, innovation and integration – a new MOS that does not exist in the Army,” she said in a statement.

Army Capt. Christopher Aliperti, an instructor with the U.S. Military Academy, gives a design crash-course to cadets during the kickoff event for the 2025 Special Operations Command Ignite Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Lexington, Mass., Sept. 20, 2024. (Marleah Miller/U.S. Air Force)

Command Sgt. Maj. JoAnn Naumann, center, senior enlisted leader for U.S. Army Special Operations Command, visits with cadets during the hackathon portion of the 2025 SOCOM Ignite Program kickoff event in Cambridge, Mass., Sept. 21, 2024. (Marleah Miller/U.S. Air Force)

During the SOCOM event, the cadets grappled with big data analytics, smart sensors, swarming drones and artificial intelligence. They focused on figuring out how to help special operators generate actionable intelligence from battlefield sensors, SOCOM said.

Such efforts coincide with Pentagon concerns about keeping pace with rapid technological innovations expected to transform how forces will fight in future wars.

Retired Gen. Mark Milley, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during a security conference in July that he expected robots and other smart machinery to represent about one-third of the U.S. military over the next 10 to 15 years.

“It’ll be a fundamental change, and I would argue that other nations’ militaries are going to be similarly designed …,” Milley said during the event hosted by Axios. “The country that optimizes those technologies for military use is going to have a very significant — and potentially decisive — advantage in an armed conflict.”

Naumann said a high-tech career field is needed to address such issues.

“We will have people whose job is to think about these kinds of problems, build prototypes and then help us once we get the technology integrated into the battlefield and make it work in real-world scenarios,” she said.

Army 2nd Lt. Katrina Thoms, who participated in one of SOCOM’s Ignite events, said the new job field will open doors for people interested in special operations in ways other than the rugged field work such units are known for.

“This gives a new pathway and a new job opportunity for people who are really good at technology, and not just the gung-ho, ‘let’s be in the field,’ type of people,” Thoms said.

Stars and Stripes · by John Vandiver · October 2, 2024



13. The fall of Vuhledar is a microcosm of Ukraine's wartime predicament



The fall of Vuhledar is a microcosm of Ukraine's wartime predicament

By SAMYA KULLAB and VOLODYMYR YURCHUK

Updated 9:49 AM EDT, October 2, 2024

AP · by SAMYA KULLAB · October 2, 2024

The fall of Vuhledar is a microcosm of Ukraine’s wartime predicament


1 of 5 |FILE - A destroyed car is seen in front of a residential building which was heavily bombed by Russian forces, in the frontline city of Vuhledar, Ukraine, Feb. 25, 2023. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File)





KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — The fall of a front-line town nestled atop a tactically significant hill is unlikely to change the course of Ukraine’s war against Russia. But the loss underscores Kyiv’s worsening position, in part the result of firm Western red lines, military officials and analysts said.

Vuhledar, a town Ukrainian forces fought tooth and nail to keep for two years, is the latest urban settlement to fall to the Russians. It follows a vicious summer campaign along the eastern front that saw Kyiv cede several thousand square kilometers (miles) of territory.

Ukraine’s military said they were withdrawing their troops from Vuhledar to “protect the military personnel and equipment” in a statement on Wednesday.

Vuhledar’s fall is a microcosm of Ukraine’s predicament in this chapter of the nearly three-year war. It reflects the U.S.'s refusal to grant Ukraine permission to strike targets deep inside Russian territory, preventing Kyiv from degrading Moscow’s capabilities. Meanwhile, Russia’s dominance of the skies allows it to develop and advance devastating aerial glide bombs for which Ukraine has no effective response, while a controversial mobilization drive has failed to produce a new class of Ukrainian fighters capable of holding the line.

The Ukrainians’ retreat from the town comes after a much-anticipated visit by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the U.S. last week. The Biden administration so far has refused Kyiv’s request to use Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, to strike Russian airfields and other key targets, and Zelenskyy’s “victory plan,” was dismissed by some as more of a wish list than a plan of action.

In the meantime, Russian fighter jets continued to drop aerial bombs on Vuhledar, which precipitated the retreat, soldiers there said.


“(The Russians’) main tactic was to encircle us from the flanks, and they did this constantly for six to seven months with constant aerial attacks — due to this tactic they managed to exhaust our resources, because we don’t have as much as they have,” said Arsenii Prylipka, the head of the press office of the 72nd Brigade, which had been defending Vuhledar since August 2022.

The fight for Vuhledar

After two years of failed attempts to capture Vuhledar, Russian forces switched tactics earlier this year. The town’s pre-war population of 14,000 dwindled to less than 100 during the heat of the fighting.

Russian soldiers began mounting sophisticated attacks from the north and southern flanks, powered by superior electronic warfare capabilities and an array of infantrymen on motorcycles, artillery fire, drones and aerial glide bombs. Moscow suffered heavy causalities.

Ukrainians have been pressuring the U.S. to relax restrictions on the use of Western weapons to strike targets deep inside Russia. Lawmakers said they expected a green light from the U.S. months ago, but it didn’t come: The Biden administration refused to waver on this red line.

It has meant that Russian command and control centers, logistics hubs and airfields from which Russian fighter jets carry deadly aerial glide bombs, are out of reach of Ukrainian forces.

Russia fires nearly 120 aerial bombs a day on average, about 3,000 a month. The bombs are Soviet-era weapons refitted with navigational technology.

“We cannot change the dynamics, and the Russians are pushing,” said Pavel Narozhnyi, founder of the non-profit Reactive Post, which sources spare parts for artillery.

Month after month of constant attacks eventually eroded Ukrainian defenses.

After two years of intense fighting, the 72nd Brigade — which never rotated out due to the intensity of the fight and the lack of a demobilization strategy from Ukrainian military leaders — withdrew from the patch of land many of their comrades died to defend.

Prylipka had said the brigade would stay until the very last moment when defending Vuhledar became impossible. That scenario unfolded this week.

“The Russians searched for weak spots in our defenses, a constant probe to find routes to penetrate the town and as they advanced they tried to destroy the entire town. All the time we are under fire,” said Prylipka.

Vuhledar served as a defensive stronghold, a fortress town atop a hill surrounded by open fields and near two major roads. From there, Ukrainian soldiers were able to observe approaching Russian forces at a distance. From that vantage point, it was easy to coordinate counter-attacks. That advantage now falls to Russian forces.

While tactically significant, Vuhledar isn’t a crucial logistics hub for Kyiv, and Russian forces already controlled most of the main roads through the town before capturing it, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War said. Ukraine’s access to other critical supply lines remains intact.

The road to Pokrovsk

The capture of Vuhledar is part of Moscow’s pursuit of the strategic logistics hub of Pokrovsk, just 30 kilometers (19 miles) north. Its fall would severely compromise Ukrainian defenses.

The next step for Russian forces will be to drive Ukrainian forces out of the nearby city of Kurakhove.

“This line is interconnected and the enemy will not be able to enter Pokrovsk and come close to Pokrovsk unless it can drive our troops out of Kurakhove,” said Ivan Tymochko, chairman of the Council of Reservists of Ukraine’s ground forces. “Otherwise, (the Russians) would have exposed their fronts to the flanks and would have received a serious blow to the side.”

“On the other hand, the enemy understands that if it does not take Kurakhove, it will not be able to seriously influence the course of events around Vuhledar,” he added.


SAMYA KULLAB

Kullab is an Associated Press reporter covering Ukraine since June 2023. Before that, she covered Iraq and the wider Middle East from her base in Baghdad since joining the AP in 2019.

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AP · by SAMYA KULLAB · October 2, 2024


14. 5 Chinese nationals charged with covering up midnight visit to Michigan military site



Oh those thousand talents.



Chinese Talent Plans | Federal Bureau of Investigation

https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat/chinese-talent-plans



5 Chinese nationals charged with covering up midnight visit to Michigan military site

By ED WHITE

Updated 7:06 PM EDT, October 2, 2024

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AP · by ED WHITE Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · October 2, 2024

U.S. News

FILE - This photo shows an aerial view of Camp Grayling Joint Maneuver Training Center in Grayling, Mich., July 19, 2014. (AP Photo/John L. Russell, File)

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DETROIT (AP) — U.S. authorities charged five Chinese nationals with lying and trying to cover their tracks, more than a year after they were confronted in the dark near a remote Michigan military site where thousands of people had gathered for summer drills.

The five, who were University of Michigan students at the time, were not charged for what happened at Camp Grayling in August 2023. Rather they are accused of misleading investigators about the trip and conspiring to clear their phones of photos, according to a criminal complaint filed in federal court.

The FBI noted in the Tuesday court filing that there have been instances of college students from China taking photos of vital defense sites in the United States.

There was nothing in the file revealing the whereabouts of the five men.

“The defendants are not in custody. Should they come into contact with U.S. authorities, they will be arrested and face these charges,” Gina Balaya, a spokesperson for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Detroit, said Wednesday.

In summer 2023, the five were confronted after midnight near a lake by a sergeant major with the Utah National Guard. One said, “We are media,” before they collected their belongings and agreed to leave the area, the FBI said.

The FBI learned that the men had booked a room at a nearby motel a week before they were spotted outside Camp Grayling, 200 miles (320 kilometers) north of Detroit.


Four months later, one of the men was interviewed by border officers at the Detroit airport before traveling to South Korea and China. He told investigators that he and others had taken a trip to northern Michigan “to see shooting stars,” the FBI said.

A check of his external hard drive revealed two images of military vehicles taken on the same night of the encounter with the National Guard officer, the FBI said.

The other four men were interviewed last March after arriving in Chicago on a flight from Iceland. They acknowledged being in northern Michigan in August 2023, but they said it was to see a meteor shower, the FBI said.

They mentioned the National Guard officer but referred to him only as “the soldier,” a camper or “nice guy,” according to the criminal complaint.

The men last December communicated on WeChat about clearing photos from their cameras and phones, investigators said.

The FBI said all five men graduated last spring from the University of Michigan. They were part of a joint program between the university and the Shanghai Jiao Tong University in Shanghai, China.

In 2020, two Chinese nationals who were pursuing master’s degrees at the University of Michigan were sentenced to prison for illegally photographing sites at a naval air station in Key West, Florida.

___

Follow Ed White at https://twitter.com/edwritez


The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business. More than half the world’s population sees AP journalism every day.


Copyright 2024 The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.

AP · by ED WHITE Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · October 2, 2024



15. A New Approach to Defeating an Old Enemy: Army Special Operations Forces in Operation INHERENT RESOLVE



A New Approach to Defeating an Old Enemy: Army Special Operations Forces in Operation INHERENT RESOLVE

By Christopher E. Howard army.mil7 min

October 2, 2024

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Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) deployed continuously to Iraq from March 2003 to December 2011 as part of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and NEW DAWN. After a three-year respite, ARSOF returned to Iraq in mid-2014 for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR), the campaign to destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Despite similarities with previous operations in Iraq, defeating ISIS required a new approach. The counter-ISIS coalition’s chosen tactics pushed ARSOF to the forefront, based on their expertise in training, advising, and assisting partner forces.

The Rise of ISIS

The U.S., its allies, and their Iraqi partners made great strides toward improving the overall security situation by the end of OIF in mid-2010. In the process, they defeated Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), once the most feared extremist group in Iraq. The subsequent Operation NEW DAWN focused on transitioning responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). When the U.S. departed Iraq in 2011, U.S. President Barack H. Obama heralded it as a great day for both nations.

Meanwhile, in early 2011, a spontaneous wave of anti-authoritarian popular revolts, collectively known as the “Arab Spring,” swept over the Middle East and North Africa. The Republic of Syria was one of the nations impacted, and the uprising threatened the regime of President Bashar Al-Asad. Longstanding sectarian tensions in Syria erupted into a multi-sided civil war in 2012.

In the ensuing chaos, the remnants of AQI saw an opening. After rebranding themselves as ISIS, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and abbreviated as Daesh in Arabic, they began seizing territory in remote areas of western Syria. Despite the name change, ISIS used the same brutal tactics they had employed in Iraq a decade earlier while operating as AQI. Gaining strength with each victory, ISIS prepared to avenge past defeats on their way to establishing a caliphate.

Although not directly imperiled by Arab Spring protests, Iraq grappled with internal challenges following the U.S. departure. Sectarianism tainted both the Iraqi Government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and the ISF. Complicating matters further, Iraq’s neighbor to the west, Iran, sought to expand its influence in Iraq, unsettling Iraq’s Sunni minority. This provided opportunity for ISIS.

Through 2013, ISIS gained support from disaffected Sunni Arabs in Iraq and Syria. Once strong enough, it went on the attack. The speed and brutality of the ISIS offensive in the first half of 2014 shocked the world. By June, the Iraqi cities of Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit, each wrested from AQI at great cost during OIF, were under ISIS control and the Iraqi capital of Baghdad was in ISIS’s crosshairs.

The World Responds

Alarmed by ISIS’s rapid advance, and the ineffectual Iraqi response, President Obama ordered 300 special operations soldiers to Iraq in June 2014. The U.S. then set about building an international military coalition to counter ISIS, which commenced operations on June 15, 2014. Of the administration’s nine counter-ISIS lines of effort, several fell within the purview of ARSOF. Among these were denying ISIS safe haven, building partner capacity, enhancing intelligence collection on ISIS, exposing ISIS’s true nature, and disrupting the flow of foreign fighters.

On June 24, 2014, U.S. Army, Central, assumed the role of Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC) for operations in Iraq. Based at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, JFLCC included a special operations command, Special Operations Joint Task Force – Iraq (SOJTF-I). The SOJTF-I mission centered on instructing and advising Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) forces and helping to organize Sunni tribal resistance to ISIS. Undeterred, ISIS announced the establishment of a caliphate five days later, on June 29, 2014.

An early test for the counter-ISIS coalition came in August 2014, when ISIS threatened to overrun and massacre Yazidi civilians trapped on Sinjar Mountain in northern Iraq. Coalition airstrikes ultimately forced ISIS to retreat from Sinjar, preventing a likely genocide. From September 2014 to January 2015, the Coalition and its Kurdish allies repulsed the ISIS attack on Kobani, Syria, inflicting a high cost on the attackers. Liberating territory already under ISIS control would require more than airpower, though; a reliable and capable partner force was needed.

With the battle for Kobani ongoing, the Department of Defense established Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) on October 17, 2014. Its mission was to work with partners to defeat ISIS throughout Iraq and Syria and set conditions for post-conflict regional stability. Over time, CJTF-OIR encompassed the contributions of more than sixty partners. In Iraq, the CTS proved to be the most capable partner force, having been trained and mentored by U.S. Army Special Forces during OIF. In Syria, there was no equivalent of the CTS, only a collection of Kurdish and Sunni Arab groups united in their opposition to both the Assad Regime and ISIS. However, vetting these groups in accordance with official U.S. government policy, a precursor to partnering with them, proved challenging.

After President Obama suspended the ineffective New Syrian Forces training program in October 2015, CJTF-OIR set out to identify and train a new Syrian partner force. The Kurdish “People’s Protection Units” (YPG) had proven itself in combat at Kobani and elsewhere, and it, alongside the makeshift Syrian Arab Coalition, provided the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). By year’s end, 50 USSOF advisors were in Syria supporting the SDF.

Throughout 2015, USSOF counter-ISIS efforts expanded beyond its advise and assist role. For instance, SOF raided the home of the ISIS oil minister, created PSYOP leaflets in support of counter oil-smuggling operations, and participated in the assault on an ISIS-operated prison. The latter action, occurring on October 22, 2015, yielded the first Medal of Honor awarded during OIR, to Sergeant 1st Class Thomas P. Payne, but it also resulted in the first U.S. combat death of the conflict, Master Sgt. Joshua L. Wheeler. Both Payne and Wheeler were ARSOF soldiers.

A New SOF Headquarters

In January 2016, 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (Fort Liberty since 2023), formally stood up SOJTF-OIR as the division-level SOF component of CJTF-OIR to coordinate and direct all SOF train, advise, assist, and accompany operations with partner forces in Syria and Iraq. Commanded by Maj. Gen. James E. Kraft, Jr., SOJTF-OIR fielded around 2,000 U.S. troops by late 2017. These forces assisted their Syrian and Iraqi partners as trainers, combat advisers, and forward air controllers. They also provided access to cutting-edge communications technology that enhanced their partners’ ability to operate on the battlefield.

An early SOJTF-OIR success came in March 2016, when ARSOF helped Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) fighters capture Al-Tanf, a village located near the juncture of the Iraq-Jordan-Syria borders. This outpost, previously occupied by ISIS, would serve as a train-and-equip facility for the coalition-aligned fighters for years to come.

By mid-2017, SOJTF-OIR partner forces, consisting of approximately 50,000 VSO soldiers, had liberated approximately 35,000 square miles from ISIS, including the Syrian cities of Tabqah, Manbij, and Shaddadi. In Iraq, ISF and their SOJTF-OIR advisors had liberated approximately 70 cities, including Tikrit, Haditha, Ramadi, Fallujah, Hit, and Mosul. Following each success in Syria and Iraq, CJTF-OIR-trained security forces moved into the areas cleared of ISIS, enabling military formations to focus on the next objective.

Supported by SOJTF-OIR and Coalition airpower, the SDF launched their attack on the ISIS capital of Raqqa, one of the last remaining ISIS strongholds, in June 2017. Despite heavy resistance from ISIS defenders, the SDF secured it in October 2017. Coalition forces and their partners spent most of 2018 consolidating control of liberated areas and rooting out remaining pockets of resistance in the Euphrates River Valley. Sensing that the U.S. mission in Syria had concluded, U.S. President Donald J. Trump announced his intention to withdraw the remaining American forces in Syria on December 19, 2018.

On March 23, 2019, the SDF pronounced the “destruction of the so-called Islamic State organization” after clearing the last ISIS stronghold in Baghouz in southern Syria. Later that year, on October 26, U.S. Special Operations Forces killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi near Idlib, Syria. Despite the destruction of the caliphate, the drawdown of U.S. forces, and the killing of Al-Baghdadi, OIR continues to this day.

Still, a 2021 U.S. Army Center of Military History study found that the indigenous, “by-with-through” approach to fighting the Islamic State precluded the need for significant U.S. combat troop deployments, reduced the financial cost of the campaign, and kept coalition casualties to a minimum. ARSOF soldiers of SOJTF-OIR can rightly claim to have been the lynchpin of that successful strategy, along with their Iraqi and Syrian partners, most notably the CTS and SDF. However, no victory comes without a cost. Of the 13 U.S. Army Soldiers killed in action during OIR between 2014 and 2019, seven belonged to ARSOF. This article is dedicated to their memory.

·      Master Sgt. Joshua L. Wheeler, Headquarters, USASOC, October 22, 2015

·      Staff Sgt. James F. Moriarty, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), November 4, 2016

·      Staff Sgt. Kevin J. McEnroe, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), November 4, 2016

·      Sergeant 1st Class Matthew C. Lewellen, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), November 4, 2016

·      Master Sgt. Jonathan J. Dunbar, Headquarters, USASOC, March 30, 2018

·      Chief Warrant Officer 3 Taylor J. Galvin, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), August 20, 2018

·      Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jonathan Farmer, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), January 16, 2019

For more information, see The Conflict with ISIS: Operations INHERENT RESOLVE, June 2014-January 2020. For more on the ARSOF Fallen of OIR, see Tribute our Fallen: U.S. Army Special Operations (arsof-history.org).



16. Is ‘Secret’ US Order of Decades Old Machine Guns Destined for Ukraine?



What is the new DSCS's answer to this article?




Is ‘Secret’ US Order of Decades Old Machine Guns Destined for Ukraine?

kyivpost.com · by Steve Brown · October 3, 2024

The US Army’s Contracting Command awarded a $14.96 million contract for an unspecified number of M60 machine guns but would not declare for whom they were intended.

by Steve Brown | October 3, 2024, 12:39 pm


Screenshot of a US “SEAL Team” member using the M60E6 machine gun on a live firing exercise.


The Pentagon announced a call for interest earlier this year for the provision of M60E6 and M60E4 machine guns, announcing on Monday, Sept. 30, it had awarded a contract for the provision of the weapons to the Nevada based company U.S. Ordnance.

The contract is for an unspecified number of the 7.62x51mm (7.62 NATO) weapons worth nearly $15 million and includes both new builds or kits to convert older M60s into the newer E6/E4 configurations, as well as ancillary items and training.

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The reluctance of the Pentagon to issue the normal information of the contract and the fact that the publicly released announcement was heavily redacted has spun up military commentators into speculating into where the weapons, which the US military stopped using in the late 1970s, are destined.



The redacted notice of contract award for the M60 machine guns issued by the US Army’s Contracting Command.

Speculation on the destination of the weapons wondered if they could be intended for special forces or some covert operation, a classified testing program or for a foreign ally or partner.

The immediate conclusion to which most of the military issues sites leapt was, unsurprisingly Ukraine, with earlier mention of the possible use of the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program which transfers surplus military equipment to partner countries. According to Defense Express M60 machine guns were supplied to Ukraine as part of the first US military aid packages provided a few weeks before the full-scale Russian invasion.

Other Topics of Interest

Ukraine Destroys $100M Russian Radar with ATACMS – 10 More Still in Play

Ukraine’s General Staff announced that the destruction of the Nebo-M radar will create a critical “air corridor” for the enhanced use of Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG cruise missiles.

The original M60 machine gun entered service in the 1950s with several variants being produced for infantry, vehicles, aircraft, and naval use. The M60E4 and M60E6, are modernized versions of the gun that are lighter, shorter, and contain improved operational features.



Since being phased out by the US Army, which replaced it with the Belgian FN MAG range of weapons in the same caliber, they have been exported to and are still in use with several foreign armies including NATO forces. While this contract could simply be destined for one of the existing overseas customers the apparent secrecy will continue to raise questions.

The military issues web site The War Zone points out that a similarly unusual purchase of soviet designed 5.45 x 39 mm AK-74 assault rifles in 2023 piqued the interest of the defense talking heads only for it to turn out the contract was for an unspecified internal US “training” requirement.

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Steve Brown

After a career as a British Army Ammunition Specialist and Bomb Disposal Officer, Steve later worked in the fields of ammunition destruction, demining and explosive ordnance disposal with the UN and NATO. In 2017, after taking early retirement, he moved to Ukraine with his Ukrainian wife and two sons where he became a full-time writer. He now works as a senior writer and English language editor with the Kyiv Post.


kyivpost.com · by Steve Brown · October 3, 2024




​17. The CCP's Political Warfare: An existential fight for allies, partners and like-minded nations



Read Professors's Gershaneck entire book on CCP Political Warfare:  https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/Books-by-topic/MCUP-Titles-A-Z/Political-Warfare/


This list sounds like the activities for a concept to support strategic competition and political (and irregular) warfare. But of course no one in the US government or the pentagon wants to admit the need for US political warfare.


Excerpts:

Key steps nations can take individually to build that capacity include:
  • Rapidly generate national strategies to assess and combat the CCP’s political warfare, including establishing policies and operations to defeat it.
  • Establish education programs on political warfare for government officials, business leaders, law enforcement personnel, academics and journalists.
  • Enhance capabilities for the legal community, law enforcement and counterintelligence officials to investigate, disrupt and prosecute CCP political warfare activities. Review laws and policies to ensure adequate and effective mission statements, requirements, resources, training and assessments.
  • Routinely expose CCP political warfare operations. Mandate an annual public report that includes practical advice for leaders and citizens regarding those threats.
  • Raise the costs to the CCP of its political warfare. While many countries are increasingly focused on CCP espionage, the party’s political warfare operatives face few, if any, consequences. To counter CCP interference and intimidation, for example, Chinese diplomats who threaten media organizations should have their diplomatic status revoked and be expelled from the host nation.




The CCP's Political Warfare - per Concordiam

perconcordiam.com · by per Concordiam · September 12, 2024

An existential fight for allies, partners and like-minded nations

By Professor Kerry K. Gershaneck, fellow, NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is waging existential warfare against the rest of the world. It is a war for global control, and the CCP aspires to win it without fighting — or at least without having to engage in major kinetic combat.

The key to the CCP’s strategy is to ensure that target countries cannot — or will not — fight back.

To this end, the CCP engages in political warfare globally to shape narratives, perceptions and policies to protect the party’s power and to achieve its geopolitical and hegemonic ambitions. It employs political warfare against every nation in the Indo-Pacific as well as across Europe, Africa and the Americas. It fights this war overtly and covertly and in highly deceptive ways that are difficult to detect.

Central to achieving its goals, the CCP undermines the sovereignty and political integrity of other countries. It seeks to fulfill the aspirations of thought and behavior control dreamed by China’s earliest despots and the 20th century’s most repressive dictators. Violence and intimidation are key to this political war, as reflected in the brutal repression of peaceful protests across China over the CCP’s “zero-COVID” policy and of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protests, as well as in the combative confrontations by the CCP’s maritime militia and other armed forces with various nations to assert control of international waters and airspace.

At the CCP’s 20th National Congress in October 2022, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping fully consolidated his power. In his closing speech, Xi made clear that the CCP intends to accelerate this already intense war to attain his expansionist “China dream” to rejuvenate the nation under his autocratic terms.

The danger posed by the CCP is unprecedented. Targeted nations, especially the United States and its allies and partners, must understand the nature and scope of the CCP’s political warfare to detect, deter, counter and defeat it. Failure to do so will be catastrophic, resulting in loss of sovereignty, resources and freedoms.

Protesters hold blank sheets of paper, which represent government censorship, during a demonstration in Beijing in November 2022. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Political warfare as internal repression

Brutal internal repression is one form of the CCP’s political warfare, including religious persecution and genocide. In the Xinjiang region in northwestern China, the CCP is trying to destroy Uyghur culture, in part by imprisoning as many as 3 million Muslim-minority Uyghurs in so-called reeducation camps.

The CCP also imprisons tens of thousands of religious practitioners in its pursuit of Sinicization of society. Many are tortured and many have died from maltreatment, organ harvesting or other cruelties. Millions more not imprisoned still face relentless persecution such as torture by electric shock and beatings in their homes, loss of assets and forced indoctrination as punishment for their faith. “The gravest threat to the future of religious freedom is the Chinese Communist Party’s war against people of all faiths: Muslims, Buddhists, Christians and Falun Gong practitioners alike,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during an October 2021 speech in Indonesia.

The release of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) secret “China Cables” in 2019 and of the “Xinjiang Police Files” in 2020 proved the atrocities against Uyghurs, including rape, forced sterilization and abortions, physical and psychological torture, and execution. The leaked documents describing the internal workings of detention camps also highlighted the role Xi and other top CCP officials had in crafting the genocidal policies.

None of this is new. The CCP has brutally repressed the Chinese people for a century. It is responsible for large-scale reigns of terror beginning with the CCP conquest of China in 1949, through the Great Leap Famine (1958-62), the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and other atrocities such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy when the CCP’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) massacred civilians after students called for freedom. Historians estimate that up to 100 million Chinese people have died as a result of CCP actions.

The CCP has also conducted assimilation efforts in Tibet for more than a century. Under Xi, the CCP has renewed its campaign by implementing laws, rules and regulations intended to gradually assimilate the Tibetan population into the dominant Chinese Han culture, and undermine Tibetan culture and history. The CCP’s recent activities to undercut Mongolian traditional education, culture and language in Inner Mongolia represent another example of the CCP’s attempts at forced assimilation.

Within China, however, it is nearly impossible to learn of the CCP’s history of terror. References are heavily censored, and people risk imprisonment for even discussing the topic.

Outside China, meanwhile, the CCP’s global propaganda operation claims that accusations of genocide and persecution are the “biggest lies of the century,” and a reflection of the West’s “deep-rooted egotism and prejudice towards China.”

The CCP’s internet censorship, massive propaganda apparatus and relentless indoctrination create an insidious echo chamber for the Chinese people, many of whom embrace patriotic education programs that instill hatred and xenophobia. One outcome is that the CCP weaponizes large numbers of hypernationalized students by sending them to foreign universities, where many propagate CCP narratives and attempt to stifle criticism of the PRC.

Chinese journalists work at a media center during the CCP’s tightly controlled 20th National Congress in Beijing in October 2022. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Lawfare as a weapon

Legal warfare, or lawfare, is another key weapon in the CCP’s arsenal. In 2015, the CCP arrested and imprisoned lawyers, legal assistants and human rights defenders who were taking Chinese statutes at face value and trying to use the legal system to protect nominally guaranteed rights. The charges included nebulous offenses such as “provoking quarrels.” Many remain imprisoned.

Beginning in 2020, the CCP used a new national security law to crush Hong Kong’s freedoms and any potential opposition to the party. Journalists, former lawmakers and pro-democracy activists were among those arrested and imprisoned. The CCP also attempted to use lawfare to undermine Hong Kong’s election systems. The CCP touted its repression-by-lawfare internally and globally, with a resultant powerful psychological impact on people in the PRC, the Chinese diaspora and the people of Taiwan, among others.

The CCP has also established more than 100 so-called police stations in other countries, despite not having authorization from the host nations. Under the direction of China’s public security ministry, CCP officials at the stations monitor, harass and, in some cases, forcibly repatriate Chinese dissidents and other exiles. Such actions include Operation Fox Hunt and Operation Skynet, in which Chinese security agents penetrated foreign countries to apprehend Chinese officials accused of corruption. However, those operations were less about battling corruption and more about the CCP clamping down on rivals and dissidents. Notably, some Fox Hunt targets living in Canada had close connections with the CCP’s politburo, the party’s chief decision-making body, and knew secrets the party wanted to shield.

The CCP claims the stations, which also spread party propaganda, are administrative centers to help Chinese citizens with tasks such as renewing a driver’s license. Further, the CCP dismissed concerns about its extraterritorial police forces operating on sovereign soil, and a PRC spokesman demanded that the “U.S. side should stop the groundless hyping of this issue.”

Political warfare for global hegemony

As the CCP wages global political warfare, it employs a wide range of weapons to seduce, subjugate, infiltrate and coerce. The CCP cloaks its insidious nature behind innocuous names. The CCP rebranded its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure scheme, for example, as the Belt and Road Initiative. OBOR spin-offs that sound enticing but promote coercive policies include the Digital Silk Road and the Polar Silk Road.

Other CCP political weapons include attempting to bribe officials in Pacific island countries, Africa and the Indo-Pacific; trying to silence critics in Australia, Canada and New Zealand; and seeking to interfere in elections in the Maldives, South Korea and Taiwan.

The CCP has attempted to demoralize and destabilize many Pacific island countries through efforts to corrupt officials and socially divide populaces. Palau and Samoa have repelled such CCP neocolonial advances in the South Pacific. Through its United Front Work Department (UFWD) and intelligence operatives, the CCP uses bribes and other financial inducements against these countries — and many others — to target elected officials in hopes of undermining their democracy and national sovereignty. Some of those ensnared have signed security pacts and other agreements that open the door to CCP exploitation of their nations’ fisheries and other natural resources, as well as to PLA access to port and aviation facilities.

In Canada, according to the nation’s Security Intelligence Service, the CCP’s political warfare includes payments through intermediaries to party-affiliated candidates, potentially placing agents in positions to influence national policy, as well as seeking to co-opt and corrupt former Canadian officials, and mounting aggressive campaigns to punish Canadian politicians viewed as threats to the CCP. The party has employed similar tactics in Australia, India, New Zealand, the Philippines and South Korea, as well as in countries participating in OBOR.

In Japan, as in Canada and many other nations, the UFWD is responsible for most elite capture operations. The UFWD runs organizations such as the Japanese branch of its China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification to conduct influence operations. One such organization, the Chinese Association of International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), targets Self-Defense Force officials in Japan as it does in other countries. However, in Japan CAIFC also engages with many sectors in society, including Buddhist organizations, architects, calligraphy associations and even Japanese players of the board game Go. Further, UFWD runs at least 15 Confucius Institutes, or supposed Chinese “cultural centers,” as well as friendship associations in Japan to influence Japanese elites and elections. Fortunately, Japan is increasingly taking steps to better defend its security and sovereignty.

According to Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Christopher Wray, other forms of CCP political warfare in the U.S. include blackmail, threats of violence, stalking and kidnappings of those of Chinese ancestry. In England, PRC embassy officials have been videoed beating peaceful protesters on public streets, and in Taiwan CCP-aligned gangs have publicly beaten students protesting pro-PRC legislation. To advance its political warfare, the CCP supports proxy wars. For example, Indian officials have accused the CCP of backing terrorist separatists in the nations’ disputed border region. The CCP’s support and training of warlord armies to coerce Myanmar’s government is also well-documented.

Then-staff members of the Apple Daily pose at the pro-democracy newspaper’s headquarters in Hong Kong on June 23, 2021, the day before the paper’s last edition was printed. Six former executives of the defunct newspaper pleaded guilty to collusion charges under the CCP’s National Security Law that silenced and jailed opposition voices in the territory. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Leveraging multiple pressure points

Indonesia is among the CCP’s media warfare targets, and its experience is indicative of that of other countries such as the Philippines and Thailand. The CCP has dramatically expanded its media influence in Indonesia through content sharing, media partnerships and journalist training. Further, CCP state-run media such as the Xinhua News Agency and the China International Television Corp.’s Hi Indo! channel for young people have established branch offices in recent years, recruiting Indonesian journalists and other staff. The CCP’s return on investment is an amplification of its propaganda and the ability to censor critics and content. In one case, the Chinese tech firm ByteDance manipulated the popular Indonesian news aggregator app Baca Berita to censor articles critical of the CCP regime and all references to Indonesia-China tensions over the South China Sea.

So-called wolf warrior diplomacy is another coercive political warfare strategy of the CCP. Relentlessly belligerent, it entails CCP diplomats engaging in verbal and, on occasion, physical attacks. In October 2022, for example, Chinese diplomats were accused of grabbing and beating a protester outside their consulate in Manchester, England, according to news stories. In 2018, during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Papua New Guinea (PNG), PRC diplomats forced their way into the PNG foreign minister’s office to demand the rewording of the APEC final communique, and in 2020 PRC diplomats beat a Taiwan trade office librarian in Fiji, leaving the victim hospitalized, according to media reports.

The CCP has also succeeded in weaponizing many benign activities for political warfare. Weaponized activities include religious practices; tourism in targeted countries; flows of students; the establishment of friendship societies and sister city organizations; and the purchase of strategically important land, infrastructure and companies.

One example of weaponized religion is the CCP’s effort to exploit Buddhism as a channel for special influence. Co-opting and managing religion is a core function of the UFWD. Under its direction, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) and the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) seek to work with Buddhists globally to support the CCP’s goals. Operatives from SARA, BAC and the PLA conduct a wide range of operations to influence Buddhists. For example, in Mongolia they attempt to cultivate Buddhist leaders to influence that country’s political elite to comply with the CCP and to undermine the CCP’s perceived enemies. In Japan, these operatives seek to influence Buddhist groups to shape Tokyo’s foreign policy and defense planning in the CCP’s favor. In Australia, CCP operatives have sought to partner with a Buddhist council to influence political leaders, while in Thailand they attempt to influence Buddhist leaders to support OBOR projects and other CCP objectives in the kingdom. In Taiwan, the CCP funnels political interference funds via Taiwan-based Buddhist organizations.

The CCP’s external lawfare campaigns often entail conjuring laws to support illegitimate claims to territory and resources. They also employ bogus maps, most notably with the contrived nine-dash line that encompasses about 2.5 million square kilometers of the South China Sea, to which the PRC lays claim.

The CCP fundamentally rejects the 2016 international tribunal ruling invalidating much of its claim. It also distorts the law to extend Beijing’s administrative writ into the South China Sea, including by designating Sansha, a village in the disputed Paracel Islands, as a Chinese prefecture.

Lawfare is almost always employed with media warfare. For example, Beijing either finds or contrives so-called historical documents to establish a legal basis for its territorial claims, such as in the case of the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. The CCP then publicly promotes the documents via its state-run media as purported proof of its claim.

Protesters in Istanbul, Turkey, hold posters and pictures of victims of the CCP’s brutal crackdown on Uyghurs and other ethnic minority groups. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Countering the CCP’s ‘China Dream’

The CCP is aggressively waging political warfare globally to achieve its expansionist and totalitarian goals. Accordingly, allies and partners must build a common capacity to detect, deter, counter and defeat the threat. In the Indo-Pacific, an important step would be establishing a center of excellence to provide an intellectual foundation for combatting the CCP’s political warfare. Such a center would help like-minded nations develop an understanding of the threat and devise effective responses.

Key steps nations can take individually to build that capacity include:

  • Rapidly generate national strategies to assess and combat the CCP’s political warfare, including establishing policies and operations to defeat it.
  • Establish education programs on political warfare for government officials, business leaders, law enforcement personnel, academics and journalists.
  • Enhance capabilities for the legal community, law enforcement and counterintelligence officials to investigate, disrupt and prosecute CCP political warfare activities. Review laws and policies to ensure adequate and effective mission statements, requirements, resources, training and assessments.
  • Routinely expose CCP political warfare operations. Mandate an annual public report that includes practical advice for leaders and citizens regarding those threats.
  • Raise the costs to the CCP of its political warfare. While many countries are increasingly focused on CCP espionage, the party’s political warfare operatives face few, if any, consequences. To counter CCP interference and intimidation, for example, Chinese diplomats who threaten media organizations should have their diplomatic status revoked and be expelled from the host nation.

This article was previously published in Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, a publication of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

perconcordiam.com · by per Concordiam · September 12, 2024



18. China and Cognitive Warfare: An Overview


Excerpt:



PLA writings suggest that China should continuously expand the military application of NLP in machine translation, public opinion monitoring, voice recognition and other fields, develop intelligent mobile terminals and ‘language intelligence’ battlefield robots suitable for operations of different scales, and help front-line commanders to grasp the ever-changing battlefield information in a timely manner.30


China and Cognitive Warfare: An Overview

https://idsa.in/issuebrief/china-and-cognitive-warfare-akdarbey-270924?utm



September 27, 2024


Abhishek Kumar Darbey

Abhishek Kumar Darbey is an Associate Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.

More from the author


Download [PDF]

Summary

The Chinese leadership has been wary of possible social and political disturbances as a result of the exposure of the Chinese netizens to digital platforms. Externally, the Chinese government has robustly opposed the alleged ‘anti-China’ narratives espoused by the West. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also using virtual reality (VR) simulated technology in military training to strengthen cognitive thinking and physical training of its soldiers.

Cognitive warfare is the most advanced non-kinetic form of warfare in the 21st century. This warfare can be initiated from any part of the world by means of digital platforms. Major global powers such as the US and Russia use cognitive warfare capabilities extensively. China is also investing substantial resources in the development of AI-related technologies to support cognitive operations.

Academic/Military Writings on Cognitive Warfare

In 2013, the term ‘national cognitive security’ was coined by Zeng Huafeng of the National University of Defense and Technology (NUDT). In 2014, China’s Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) published a book on ‘mind superiority’1 that spoke about the PLA’s strategy to conduct ‘cognitive warfare’.2 ‘Mind superiority’ (制脑权, zhinaoquan) is the goal of the PLA’s cognitive domain operations by means of psychological warfare to shape or even control the enemy’s cognitive thinking and decision-making.3 The main strategy of ‘mind superiority’ is to gain advantage in cognitive domain. The strategy focuses on attacking, weakening, and disintegrating the enemy’s will to fight, creating decision-making doubts by using psychological warfare operations. The ultimate goal in the strategy is to ‘win without fighting’.4  

Ceng Qingxiang (曾庆香), researcher at the Institute of Journalism and Communication of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, distinguishes cognitive warfare from other forms of non-kinetic warfare. He argues that future wars will extend from the five combat fields associated with land, sea, air, space and network, to the cognitive field. The author notes that cognitive warfare is often confused with propaganda warfare, psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, information warfare or cyber warfare.5

Propaganda warfare and information warfare only control the flow of information and its target is limited to the soldiers of the enemy state. In the case of cognitive warfare, it also regulates the people’s interpretation and response to information, and its targets also include the public of the enemy state. Cyber warfare mainly refers to the attack on the computer or information system by using viruses or malware, whereas, cognitive warfare uses social media networks to spread information to create perceptions among the enemy’s population.

Psychological warfare seeks to change and disintegrate the psychology of soldiers whereas cognitive warfare seeks to change the cognition of everyone in the entire country. Public opinion warfare uses the means of mass communication to guide the public opinion whereas cognitive warfare uses the means of interpersonal communication and group communication to shape the cognition of the target population.6

In early 2023, Meng Haohan, Lan Peixuan from National University of Defense Technology proposed suggestions that focused on improving China’s ability to mould public opinion in the cognitive domain by extending strategic communication (using propaganda narratives and communication strategies to shape cognitive trends), rejecting cognitive offensives (by regularly implementing external propaganda management), and deepening integration of cognitive, physical and information domains. 

Meng notes that China’s concept of ‘national cognitive security’ is the security of its cognitive domain, i.e., the social cognition of the Chinese population against the forces that aims to interfere with and control cognition by using artificial intelligence, technologies such as deep fakes, social media robots and precise algorithm. China’s national cognitive security is based on an ideological defence line that protects the Chinese establishment as well as the citizens against any propaganda narratives or public opinion warfare in the cognitive domain. Second, he calls for building a firewall for information security to consolidate the tangible defence line of cognitive security. Third, he flags the need to propagate the Chinese propaganda narrative and strengthen cooperation and exchanges and build a new world order, so that China and the new players will have larger role to play.7

Zeng Huafeng, Professor at National University of Defense and Technology (NUDT), says seizing the control of the brain in the cognitive space and ‘defeating the enemy without fighting’ is the highest realm of information warfare. He notes that public opinion and ideology are main areas of cognitive space competition, and information is the main weapon. It can be manipulated by processing and producing information and can have an impact on specific targets. The strategic confrontation of the national cognitive space is persistent.


For China’s national cognitive security, Zeng Huafeng suggests major precautionary measures. First, China must strengthen its ideals and beliefs, and stick to its ideological position. In this regard, since 2013, besides party-building, the ideological campaigns under Xi Jinping’s leadership also aims to crowd out competing narratives, both within the party and in broader society, to maintain its authority and influence.

Second, China must be vigilant against the origin of historical nihilism, and enhance the self-esteem and self-confidence of the Chinese nation. Since Xi Jinping came into power in November 2012, he has repeatedly emphasised that China must “resist historical nihilism”.8 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) insists that the spiritual core of the Chinese people must never change, and ideological infiltration of the West into China must be resisted.

Third, China must seek national cultural identity in the collision between Chinese and Western cultures. The Chinese leadership believes that culture is fundamental to a nation’s foundation and future. Fourth, China must actively participate in the global governance of cyberspace security, and build a network security system that meets the requirements of country’s informatization. Fifth, China must build a system that can ensure basic and applied research on cognitive defence and security domain, and promote the development of related technologies and organisational leadership.

Metaverse is identified as a new frontier of future cognitive warfare. Chen Dongheng (陈东恒), Zhai Chan (翟婵), Feng Yaru (冯亚茹), from Military Political Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) note that the essence of the metaverse is a highly developed virtual world that exists in parallel with the real world. The authors note that when virtual technologies such as digital, the Internet, augmented reality and modern communications, blockchain, artificial intelligence, and other technologies develop to a certain stage, metaverse will emerge.

Metaverse can shape human cognitive thinking more comprehensively. They highlight that the important fulcrum of cognitive warfare is strategy and technology. The proportion of technology in cognitive warfare is increasing and its role is becoming prominent. As a complex system integrating multiple cutting-edge technologies, the metaverse has a natural advantage in the use of cognitive warfare.9 The metaverse constructs a new battlefield space with virtual and real integration and parallel interaction.10

Cognitive Threats and Policy Responses

In the 2010s, with the increasing use of the Internet and digital platforms, Chinese citizens were exposed to the ideas and narratives from outside of the mainland. The Chinese leadership felt the need to safeguard the social cognition of its population. President Xi Jinping and the CCP were wary of ‘Color Revolution’11 that can be triggered by means of cognitive warfare12 by targeting the social cognition of the Chinese netizens through digital platforms. In March 2024, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that “the US has been spreading false information about China in an organized and planned manner for many years, which has become an important means of the United States’ cognitive warfare against China.”13

It is flagged that social media platforms, particularly Weibo and Bilibili, have become important platforms to influence, guide, and even induce and manipulate domestic public opinion and public sentiment among the youth of China.14 Other analysts flag the dangers associated with the ‘Weaponization of Think Tanks’. The need for China to continue to promote the construction of new think tanks with Chinese characteristics, and enhance China's international discourse communication, is flagged.15 The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022 proposed to strengthen the construction of the all-media communication system and shape a new pattern of mainstream public opinion.16

China, therefore, seeks to use its ‘public opinion warfare’ capabilities and mechanism to counter the anti-China narrative17 that can interfere with and dominate the social cognition of the Chinese people. The Chinese government is working on building advanced network information systems18 that can store, process and disseminate data and information to the given target population. China seeks to ensure control on the perceptions created among its citizens on any subject or issues through the control of the information and data disseminated through digital platforms.19

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is also using the virtual reality (VR) simulated technology in military training to strengthen cognitive thinking and physical training of its soldiers.20 The VR-simulated environment creates various situations for the participating troops to think and act accordingly without any risk of physical damage. Such VR military training stimulates participating solder’s cognition to respond according to the virtual scenarios and helps develop abilities to face actual combat situation. 

Two separate bureaucratic systems—the ‘propaganda system’, i.e., the Publicity or Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (中国共产党中央委员会宣传部) established in May 1924, and the ‘foreign affairs system’, i.e., the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (中国共产党中央委员会外事工作委员会) upgraded in March 2018 from former Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group founded in 1958—manage China’s external propaganda.21

The Publicity or Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee is a comprehensive functional department in charge of ideological work of the CCP Central Committee, and some of its functions include coordinating the work of various central news units and proposing guidelines for the development of propaganda, ideology and culture.22 The Foreign Affairs Commission exercises general oversight on matters related to foreign affairs.23 China also announced the setting up of a discourse management system of the CCP in June 2021.24

In order to create an ecosystem to support China’s research and development in cognitive domain, the Chinese government organises competition in cognitive technology looking for young talents. In 2005, Tsinghua University established the Department of Education’s Cognitive Science Innovation Base. Similarly, Peking University and Guizhou University have established disciplines in cognitive sciences at different levels of undergraduate, master and doctoral degrees.

The government has also encouraged Chinese private companies such as Tencent, Baidu and Alibaba to promote research and development of cognitive technology. For the advanced research and development on cognitive sciences, China’s National Natural Science Foundation and the National Social Science Foundation are conducting research on cognitive sciences at the government level. The key areas of research include brain-computer interfaces, cognitive science, AI, social computing, among others.25

At the government-level, the Natural Language Processing (NLP) Research Group of the Institute of Computing Technology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences established in 198726 is mainly engaged in research related to machine translation, human-computer dialogue, etc.27 Chinese private companies are also independently developing NLP algorithms. Baidu’s NLP algorithm research covers a wide range, involving NLP sub-fields such as deep question and answer, reading comprehension, intelligent writing, dialogue systems, machine translation, semantic computing, language analysis and knowledge mining.28

It is recognised that ChatGPT, an artificially intelligent bot powered by NLP, can be applied to the military field. In peacetime, the intelligence compilation system based on ChatGPT technology can serve as a virtual assistant to help analysts conduct data analysis for the massive information on the Internet, so as to improve the efficiency of intelligence analysis and tap into potential high-value intelligence. In wartime, the intelligence compilation system based on ChatGPT technology can automatically integrate a large amount of battlefield intelligence into a comprehensive report on the battlefield situation, so as to reduce the workload of intelligence personnel and improve the intelligence analysis and program planning capabilities of combat personnel in fast-paced battlefields.29

PLA writings suggest that China should continuously expand the military application of NLP in machine translation, public opinion monitoring, voice recognition and other fields, develop intelligent mobile terminals and ‘language intelligence’ battlefield robots suitable for operations of different scales, and help front-line commanders to grasp the ever-changing battlefield information in a timely manner.30

Conclusion

China began to identify cognitive attacks as a serious security challenge after the emergence of Color Revolutions in the 21st century. Chinese military strategists recognise that national interests exist not only in physical form but also in the cognitive space. PLA writings reflect that China intends to build its cognitive offence as well as defence capabilities to be at par with its competitors and rivals. ‘Mind Superiority’ is the goal of the PLA in cognitive domain warfare, based on the principle of ‘winning without fighting’.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.



19. North Korea’s Hezbollah Connection


For those who have not been paying attention. north Korea is a key facilitator among the "Big 5" of the Dark Quad and violent extremist organizations.  We ignore the regime's contributions at our peril.



North Korea’s Hezbollah Connection

North Korea has been a key supplier and facilitator of Hezbollah’s military capabilities and logistical flexibility.

The National Interest · by Bruce E. Bechtol · October 2, 2024

As we watch Israel move into Lebanon with ground forces this week, it is important to understand that this would not be necessary unless Hezbollah had a vast network of tunnels that prevents destruction from purely air power. To destroy or degrade Hezbollah’s military ability to continue attacking Israel’s citizens, the IDF must send in land forces to attack them underground. This military paradigm shift, which started in the 2006 war, would not exist were it not for the expertise, engineering, equipment, advisors, and technicians provided by North Korea. Now we see it in action thanks to North Korean military proliferation and Hezbollah’s unending appetite for launching rockets into towns in northern Israel.

Numerous reports following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war provide evidence that Hezbollah’s underground facilities were constructed under North Korean supervision and advising in 2003–2004. The tunnels contained, among other things, dispensaries, arms dumps, and food stocks. This significant tunnel network was far more robust than Israeli forces anticipated as they prosecuted combat operations against Hezbollah in 2006. To quote an article in the Israeli press, “Hizbullah’s military bases, armories, bunkers and communications networks were much more extensive than Israel’s intelligence services estimated on the eve of the 2006 war.” Other reporting based on testimony from a former IRGC officer states, “With the assistance of several Iranian engineers and technicians, as well as North Korean experts, who traveled to Lebanon disguised as servants for the Iranian embassy and its officers, Hezbollah has successfully built a 25km long underground belt, with 12-meter openings along it, the officer added. Every four openings are connected to one another through an easily accessible passageway.” However, the system Hezbollah used in 2006 was only the beginning.

In 2021, a critical report from the Alma Research Center (AMC) in Israel revealed Hezbollah had built another larger tunnel system—with the assistance of the North Koreans, of course (and the Iranians). Hezbollah agreed to a $13 million deal with KOMID (North Korea’s primary proliferation front company) to build a forty-five-kilometer tunnel system connecting several key nodes in Lebanon, reportedly much longer and more sophisticated than the first tunnel system. The North Koreans had already been paid $6 million by 2014, and the tunnel system appears to have been completed by 2021. As the report explains, “In our estimation, the cumulative length of all the tunnels in the ‘Land of the Tunnels’ can reach up to hundreds of kilometers. Hezbollah tunnels, like Hamas tunnels, contain underground command and control rooms, weapons and supply depots, field clinics, and specified designated shafts used to fire missiles of all types (rockets, surface-to-surface missiles, anti-tank missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles). These shafts are hidden and camouflaged and cannot be detected above ground.”

What the evidence presented above shows us is that Hezbollah has been building up in anticipation of another conflict with Israel. Clearly, they have been enabled in this process by support from North Korea and Iran. It is also important to note that these tunnels are a key factor, perhaps the key factor, in Israel’s decision to bring ground forces into the conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanese territory. The tunnels not only give Hezbollah longer sustainment but also the ability to move forces and equipment from combat zone to combat zone without detection from IDF aircraft or other intelligence collection methods. Thus, North Korea has been a key aspect of Hezbollah’s military capabilities and logistical flexibility. There is now quite simply no other way of going after Hezbollah forces except to take out this extensive and sophisticated tunnel system—and that will take ground troops.

This is yet another example of the fact that North Korea’s fingerprints are all over the violence in the Middle East that has occurred since October 7, 2023. There is now definitive evidence that North Korea supplied Hamas with F-7 RPG’s 122mm rockets and launchers as well as other small arms. Pyongyang has supplied the Houthis with both conventional weapons and ballistic missiles, and Iran (its biggest customer) with the same—including the genesis of missile systems and engines that attacked Israel in April.

Despite a plethora of evidence, the United States government has yet to acknowledge the involvement of North Korea in the violence that is ongoing in the Middle East. The reasons for that are almost unexplainable. There has been no hesitation to address North Korea’s proliferation to Russia. But why is there no discussion of Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah? Unless or until the United States engages in more robust enforcement of existing sanctions and publicly announces North Korea’s role in the current violence in the Middle East, Pyongyang will continue to engage in these financially lucrative, sanctions-busting activities.

Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is a professor of Political Science at Angelo State University. He is also the president of the International Council on Korean Studies and a fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies. The author of five books dealing with North Korea, his latest work is entitled North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa.

Image: Shutterstock.com

The National Interest · by Bruce E. Bechtol · October 2, 2024



20. The lost art of understanding the enemy



​I am a supporter of Frank Hoffman's thinking here.


Frank Hoffman's Principle of Understanding. I am a supporter of Dr. Frank Hoffman’s idea that we need a new principle of war called understanding.  Although that seems like a no-brainer – as far back as Sun Tzu we have been told that we must know our enemies and know ourselves to be victorious.   We all know we need to understand war and warfare, the conditions that give rise to conflict, and the politics that lead to and end conflict.  Yet even though the need for understanding is so obvious that we think we do not need to even mention it, it is surprising how so many of our failures can be traced to our lack of understanding.  SOF, through its various assessment capabilities and engagement with indigenous populations can make a key contribution to understanding.
https://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2018/07/eight-points-of-special-warfare.html


The lost art of understanding the enemy - Asia Times

US has a long history of missing adversary cues that if understood and processed could have prevented or shortened many a conflict

asiatimes.com · by Alexander Casella · October 3, 2024

On October 1, 1970, China’s People’s Daily published a picture on its front page showing American writer Edgar Snow standing next to Mao Zedong on the Tien An Men gate tower. Snow, the author of the acclaimed “Red Star Over China”, had met Mao in Yenan in 1936, and while not himself a Communist, never hid his sympathies both for China and its new regime.

Coming at a time when relations between Washington and Beijing were beginning to thaw, the picture was supposed to convey a powerful message to the US political establishment. By appearing in public with an American, Mao showed that he personally endorsed a resumption of bilateral relations. But it was all for naught.

In Mao’s eyes, Snow was an American. But in the eyes of the American establishment, he was just another Communist sympathizer. Thus, while the writing was on the wall, the message never got through because the intended recipient did not know how to read. It thus took more time and effort to convince Washington that China was ready to talk.

Reading one’s counterpart, be it an opponent, an ally, or even just an interlocutor, is not something that governments normally excel at. And, generally, the stronger the government, the more it is tempted to impose its own views and the less it is inclined to actually understand, not to say disregard, those of the party it is dealing with.

In this regard, the United States’ record is no different from that of the imperial powers that once held sway in the international arena. Starting from the Second World War, the United States’s power was so overwhelming that it could, within its sphere of influence, operate practically on its own terms.

But there were hiccups, and Vietnam proved one of them. In the spring of 1965, as the war in Vietnam escalated, the ruling Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party asked the North Vietnamese military to assess the chances of winning a military confrontation with the United States. The military set up a working group, and its conclusions were unequivocal.

Not only were the chances of the Vietnamese defeating the United States militarily at exactly zero, but they should not even try. Conversely, if the aim of the war was to ensure that the United States pulled out its forces from Vietnam so as to enable the Communists to confront their foes directly in Saigon, this could be achieved not by winning battles or occupying ground but by eroding America’s will to fight.

In other words, America could not be defeated, but it could be worn out. This, the Vietnamese military felt, could be achieved if, year after year after year they could ensure that the Americans suffer an average casualty rate of some one thousand dead per month.

This, they assessed, was a casualty rate that the American social ecosystem could not sustain, thus forcing the political establishment into a negotiation process that would result in Washington withdrawing its troops from Vietnam.

As for the cost of the endeavor, this was estimated at some 150,000 Vietnamese dead per year, including both civilians and military. This was a cost that the military in Hanoi felt the country could bear and the war thus became, for all practical purposes, a contest between Vietnamese resolve and its related birth rate and American firepower.

What followed is history but not necessarily to Vietnam’s advantage. In 1977, two years after the fall of Saigon, US President Jimmy Carter offered Hanoi normalization without preconditions.

But Hanoi’s ruling Politburo, under the leadership of its Secretary General Le Duan refused. Le Duan was a doctrinaire Marxist who had taken a hard line during the war years and it had paid off. Now he demanded some form of economic assistance from Washington as a precondition for normalization. But the war was over and Vietnam had nothing to offer Washington.

Granted, the Americans still wanted some accounting of their Missing In Action (MIA), but after their humiliating defeat, neither Congress nor public opinion was in the mood to pay for what looked like reparations to Hanoi. Finally, in the fall of 1978, Le Duan relented and instructed vice foreign minister Nguyen Co Tach to inform Washington that Vietnam was now ready to normalize relations with the United States without preconditions. But it was too late.

With Vietnam poised to invade Cambodia and Hanoi having signed on November 3 of that year a treaty of Alliance with the Soviet Union, Washington was no longer in the mood to normalize its relations with its former foe. By misreading the Unites States, Le Duan had missed the boat and had set back by some 20 years the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Reading the enemy does not belong to the realm of spycraft. It consists, in essence, of putting oneself in the situation of one’s opponent, analyzing the parameters that determine their perceptions and taking action accordingly.

Ultimately, it is more an art than a science that requires an open mind and acceptance of the notion that the opponent one is dealing with maybe, just maybe, does have a point. To say that it is an art in short supply is an understatement.

On February 10, 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in what will be remembered as one of his keynote presentations, expressed in no uncertain terms all the frustrations, fears and humiliations that had bedeviled Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union.

In his perspective, the expansion east of NATO was only the tip of the iceberg of an existentialist threat to the Russian soul. It was the vanguard of a Western liberal order that was everything Russia, his Russia, the Russia he stood for, abhorred.

President Putin was a progeny of the KGB. Plots, sedition and subversion were his lifeblood. From that perspective, he was correct in his conviction that Russia was drifting away from its core values. That these had not evolved from the fall of the Tsarist order was incidental to him.

His Russia was imperial and to be ruled with an iron fist. In this perspective, the perceived enemy was more than NATO, which at the time was slowly drifting into irrelevance. Rather, it was the likes of Gucci, Louis Vuitton and McDonald’s, riding on the crest of the wave of a consumer society that was, in essence, the harbinger of a liberal social order that made room for greater tolerance, individual creativity and political diversity.

Putin’s Munich speech made it clear that the international order as promoted by the United States was of no interest to his Russia. As such, it was for all practical purposes a declaration of war.


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While it did produce some misgivings among some of those in attendance, it was essentially overlooked with one of the participants, then-US defense secretary Robert Gates, dismissing it as “spy talk.” Had Putin’s speech not been scoffed at but rather taken seriously it could have led to two undertakings.

First, the Europeans, and in particular the Germans, might have drawn some contingency plans to address a potential crisis with Russia. These should have focused on how the West, led by Germany, would react were a crisis with Russia to erupt without the upshot becoming a self-defeating exercise. Such a plan should have concentrated on essentials such as energy rather than on confiscating a handful of yachts belonging to Russian oligarchs.

Second, Washington should have set up a mechanism through which Putin would be engaged in a frank but confidential ongoing dialogue. Such an interchange should have been based on the American assumption that while Russia was on its knees, it had the hallmarks of an empire that could potentially bounce back and whose concerns, if not addressed, must be at least listened to.

Such an endeavor should have been conceived on the American side as a multipartisan effort spanning several administrations as an example of a long-term foreign affairs engagement that would not be held hostage to the vagaries of successive administrations.

Whether the American political system can accommodate such an endeavor is a moot point. And so is the question, had it been undertaken, as what impact, if any, it would have had on Putin’s legitimate or illegitimate concerns. In the meantime, the world has to contend with Putin’s paranoia, Washington’s hubris and a manipulative Ukrainian former comedian.

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asiatimes.com · by Alexander Casella · October 3, 2024



21. Black Hawk Down and the Battle of Mogadishu: An Urban Warfare Project Case Study





Black Hawk Down and the Battle of Mogadishu: An Urban Warfare Project Case Study - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Liam Collins, Jayson Geroux, John Spencer · October 3, 2024

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Thirty-one years ago today, at 3:32 PM local time, an assault force boarded helicopters and left an airfield near the Indian Ocean coast in Mogadishu, Somalia. A ground convoy departed the at the same time. The US special operations forces, part of Task Force Ranger, expected to be back within sixty minutes. The assault force would fast-rope to the ground near the Bakaara Market in the center of the city, raid a target building, link up with the ground convoy, and return to base with the detainees they planned to capture—senior lieutenants of the Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid.

Instead of arriving back at the airfield in an hour, though, the assault force did not return to safety until fifteen hours later, having suffered heavy casualties. Their experience in the war-torn city would go down as one of the most famous battles of the 1990s. The course of events on October 3–4, 1993 turned dramatically when armed militia fighters managed to hit three Black Hawk helicopters, two of which crashed in the city. The episode became known as Black Hawk Down after journalist Mark Bowden documented the events in a 1999 book by that name and Ridley Scott directed a film adaptation two years later. But apart from these popular treatments of the consequential battle, a rigorous and expert analysis of it reveals important lessons for urban warfare.

Read the ninth case study in the Urban Warfare Project Case Study Series, on the Battle of Mogadishu.

The ninth installment of the Urban Warfare Project Case Study Series undertakes that analysis, extracting key lessons from the Battle of Mogadishu at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. You can read the case study here, and be sure to follow the Urban Warfare Project for future case studies and insightful analysis of challenges faced by military forces operating in cities.

Liam Collins, PhD was the founding director of the Modern War Institute at West Point and a Fellow at New America. He is a retired Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America, with multiple combat operations in Fallujah in 2004. He is coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.

Major Jayson Geroux is an infantry officer with The Royal Canadian Regiment and is currently with the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre. He has been a fervent student of and has been involved in urban operations training for over two decades. He is an equally passionate military historian and has participated in, planned, executed, and intensively instructed on urban operations and urban warfare history for the past ten years. He has served twenty-eight years in the Canadian Armed Forces, which included operational tours to the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Afghanistan.

John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. He served twenty-five years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connections in Modern War and coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or that of any organization with which the authors are affiliated, including the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Department of National Defence.

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Liam Collins, Jayson Geroux, John Spencer · October 3, 2024




22. Israel’s Campaign against Hezbollah and the Fight for Southern Lebanon’s Tunnels






Israel’s Campaign against Hezbollah and the Fight for Southern Lebanon’s Tunnels - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Patrick Sullivan, John Spencer, John Amble · October 2, 2024

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“Those who go beneath the surface do so at their peril.”

So warned Oscar Wilde in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Of course, his words of caution were aimed at consumers of art and not at twenty-first-century military forces. And yet for those forces, the peril beneath the surface is even more real. Even a military with extraordinary capabilities above the ground will quickly encounter extreme limitations to those capabilities below it.

So when the Israel Defense Forces acknowledged having been quietly carrying out raids into Hezbollah tunnels in southern Lebanon for months, the natural question for many observers was why. Examining that question highlights lessons on underground warfare, illuminates how Israel likely intends to treat Hezbollah’s tunnels in its plans for a broader campaign against the group, and offers a glimpse into the capabilities required to overcome the subterranean hazards of the modern battlefield.

Hezbollah’s Tunnels

Much is unknown about Hezbollah tunnels. Like the Hamas tunnels in Gaza that Israeli forces have contended with during their military campaign there, the only way to know for sure how many tunnels there are—and their scale, form, and purposes—is discovering them on the ground.

Still, there are some publicly known details about Hezbollah’s tunnel network. Some experts believe the group started digging tunnels in southern Lebanon as early the mid-1980s, when Israel withdrew from most of the Lebanese territory it had occupied since its 1982 invasion to a limited strip along the southern border with Israel. When Israeli forces later withdrew fully, in 2000, Hezbollah continued to dig. Its fighters used tunnels extensively during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. According to a RAND report, Hezbollah’s bunkers were “40 meters underground, covering an area of two square kilometers, that included firing positions, operations centers, connecting tunnels, medical facilities, weapons and ammunition stockpiles, ventilation and air conditioning, bathrooms with hot and cold running water, and dormitories, all with a roof built of slabs of reinforced concrete almost three feet thick.”

In late 2018, Israel initiated Operation Northern Shield to find and destroy Hezbollah cross-border tunnels. Israel found six such major attack tunnels intended to allow thousands of Hezbollah fighters to flow into Israel during some type of invasion.

Today, analysts believe Hezbollah has used the years since 1980, and especially since the 2006 war, with the aid of state actors like North Korea and Iran, to build hundreds of kilometers of tunnels. This network includes single contiguous tunnels as long as forty-five kilometers and some tunnels connecting to Hezbollah’s stronghold in the Beqaa Valley, near the Syrian border, and to Beirut. Hezbollah tunnels, like those of Hamas, range from just below the surface underneath buildings to over a hundred meters deep.

It is important to note there are major differences between Hamas and Hezbollah tunnels. While some of the functions may be the same, the geology, construction, location, scale, and primary purposes are completely different.

Southern Lebanon consists of hilly, rocky terrain, requiring Hezbollah to dig with drills into solid rock over months and years to create single tunnels. In Gaza, by contrast, sandy sediment allows for digging with simple hand tools, making tunnels quicker to dig but also requiring large amounts of concrete to reinforce them. Hezbollah’s rocky tunnel construction also makes them extremely sturdy, which affects which bunker-busting munitions can reach the tunnels. In addition to running under civilian areas and wooded ground, many of Hezbollah’s tunnels and bunkers are inside mountains. The geographic scale and the variety of terrain pose a different challenge than the network of Hamas tunnels under flat and very dense urban terrain.

While Hezbollah uses human shields by building tunnels under civilian homes, unlike Hamas tunnels, the Hezbollah tunnels are not almost exclusively under civilian urban areas or used as the center of gravity by attempting to cause the maximum civilian deaths on the surface to achieve their political goal in wars.

Why Go Underground?

But why has Hezbollah spent decades digging? What military purposes do the tunnels serve?

Like tunnels throughout the history of warfare, Hezbollah’s subterranean spaces offer its fighters a number of advantages. Buried deep within rocky ground, Hezbollah fighters and leaders are more protected than anywhere else in southern Lebanon from Israel’s aerial supremacy and the strike capability of its precision-guided munitions. The tunnels also enable concealed movement and maneuver—some are wide enough for convoys of vehicles and allow even large weapon systems to be repositioned where they can be most effectively employed. Tunnels offer safe places to store supplies and cache weapons and ammunition. Command-and-control facilities placed underground offer a secure means for Hezbollah commanders to employ their forces. Even barracks can be placed underground. So the years of digging tunnels, expanding them and connecting them, make it possible today for Hezbollah to benefit both logistically and from a protection standpoint. But as noted above, Israel’s discovery of cross-border attack tunnels indicate that the group also conceives an operational, offensive purpose for underground spaces, as well.

Particularly for the tunnels nearest the border, however—the tunnels that Israeli forces have reportedly begun to enter—it is useful to consider them as an integral component of Hezbollah’s defense in depth. This type of defensive plan is an extraordinarily effective one, but requires time to establish. It can consist of minefields and other obstacles, mutually supporting defensive positions, antiarmor ambush sites, preregistered artillery fires, and more, all formed into successive layers from the front lines back and often connected by an integrated network of trenches and bunkers. For Hezbollah, the front line is the Lebanese border with Israel. And tunnels are not only a sort of fully subterranean form trenches and bunkers, but a vital component of the entire defense in depth. Israeli forces’ raids into these tunnels nearest the border, then, are a deliberate effort to strip Hezbollah of this vital component.

Moreover, Hezbollah is the most militarily capable violent nonstate actor in the world. But that capability is largely conventional. The group’s forces are armed and equipped conventionally. It is organized conventionally, as an army. That enormous conventional capability would tempt any organization to use it. And yet in a conventional fight, Hezbollah’s conventional capability, enormous as it is for a nonstate actor, pales compared to the advanced capability fielded by Israel’s forces. History is replete with examples of nonstate groups who chose to fight conventionally and were defeated. Tunnels, then, are a means of staying asymmetric in the face of Israeli military superiority above ground.

Israel’s Plans

So, indeed, why is Israel attempting to use Hezbollah’s tunnels against it, despite their formidable design and utility in the defense? There are several explanations, related to both the Israel Defense Forces’ experience from the 2006 Second Lebanon War as well as the opportunities presented by the successful decapitation strikes last week against Hezbollah’s senior leadership.

Although Israel’s putative defeat in the 2006 war has since been reevaluated by the scholarly community, Israeli forces’ failure to protect its armor against Iranian-supplied, Hezbollah-delivered antitank guided missiles during that conflict’s cross-border raids endures as a salient criticism. If Israel is able to secure Hezbollah’s tunnels, then it can use them as a protected staging area for a new set of cross-border operations. Unlike in 2006, however, Israel now expects to penetrate much farther into Lebanon, probably to clear Hezbollah’s urban rocket firing areas and then occupy them to create standoff for the populated areas of northern Israel. This occupation will absolutely require armor in quantity, and using the tunnels as staging areas for force protection and holding key terrain is a creative preventative from losing armor to the still present antitank missile threat.

Protection of armor is not the only lesson that Israel is likely applying from the 2006 war in its current effort to use Hezbollah’s tunnels. Modern conventional militaries have become increasingly aware of subterranean space as an influential physical dimension of the battlefield, but this space has been effectively conceded, at least narratively, to those who have reason to infiltrate borders—not just terrorist groups like Hezbollah or Hamas, but also drug cartels on the US southern border and the North Korean military across the demilitarized zone, to name a few. To borrow from the tech industry’s lexicon, as with any emergent market for military activity, however, the first adoption of tunnels by nefarious groups has spurred fast following from modern conventional militaries, and the subterranean dimension should no longer be conceded. If nothing else, Israel’s attempted use of Hezbollah’s tunnels shows this evolution.

Finally, Israel’s use of Hezbollah’s tunnels reflects an awareness of the dangers ushered in by decapitation strikes such as the one that killed Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah. Although Hezbollah was certainly thrown into disarray by the sudden loss of its long-standing leader, the group retains a tremendous capacity to regress to unconventional fighting. Historically, when a decapitation strike is followed by a conventional ground campaign, the invading force has difficulty in countering the virulent insurgency that the decapitation spawns. Hezbollah’s tunnels—again, an important means of staying asymmetric—would play a central role in such an insurgency. Securing the tunnels not only robs a future insurgency’s best way to infiltrate northern Israel, but it also signals that the forthcoming ground campaign may not be as conventional as past campaigns. Moreover, the Israelis have the initiative, probably in greater measure than they ever have against Hezbollah and their Iranian backers. If they are going to try something as bold, unexpected, and challenging as using Hezbollah’s tunnels against them, then there is no time like the present.


Amid early reports of direct clashes between Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces, if a broader invasion is to come, the days, weeks, and perhaps even months ahead will shed more light on how the spaces beneath southern Lebanon’s ground will shape any fighting above it. And yet the case of these tunnels reveals important insights.

Hezbollah’s subterranean network highlights the enduring features that characterize underground warfare. Three in particular stand out. First, tunnels are often a major equalizing factor for an outmatched defending force. During the campaign to recapture vast territory seized by ISIS in Iraq and Syria, almost every major battle took place in cities, where ISIS forces had used existing and newly created subterranean spaces to turn urban areas into fortresses, undergirded by networks of tunnels. Second, in many cases there is virtually no alternative to sending people into tunnels, despite wishful thinking to the contrary (US Army doctrine on subterranean operations warns that “entering and fighting in a subterranean environment is extremely high-ris and units should avoid these fights whenever possible”). In April 2017, the US military dropped the largest nonnuclear bomb in its arsenal on an ISIS tunnel complex in Afghanistan that was too deep to be destroyed by less powerful bombs. Not every military force has such weapons at its disposal, and only on battlefields entirely devoid of noncombatants could its use be contemplated. In other cases, securing tunnels means entering them. And third, for military forces, there is no substitute for experience. Underground environments are so deeply unique that lessons must be learned practically. Israeli forces have benefited from more extensive experience than arguably any other military in the world. For others—like the US military—deliberate efforts to learn from the experience of others and retain lessons from its own history are vital.

In terms of how Hezbollah tunnels will factor into any broader Israeli campaign, notwithstanding the tunnels’ utility to Israel’s interest in protecting its armor and mitigating the dangers inherent to a decapitation strategy, it still has to execute the expected ground campaign to clear the rocket sites and establish a buffer zone. Thus, despite the novelty and boldness of Israel’s current efforts to use Hezbollah’s tunnels, they are simply a new shaping operation to a war that we have seen before. That war and whatever decisive operations come with it may also show something new, however. Unlike in 2006, Israel’s actions against Hezbollah’s tunnels signal a certain permanence about the ground campaign—an intent, perhaps, to finally solve the problem of Hezbollah and the sanctuary it enjoys from Lebanese territory and Iranian patronage. In this context, Israel’s use of Hezbollah’s tunnels does not just shape a future physical buffer, but a psychological one as well.

It is also important to acknowledge the forces sent as part of the reconnaissance and initial raiding forces into southern Lebanon were the same battle-experienced units adapting, innovating, and in some cases dominating against Hamas tunnels in Gaza, such as the 98th Division, the members of which were credited with becoming such experts in underground warfare that they shifted the paradigm of tunnels in Gaza, from being an obstacle to being an advantage for the attacking Israelis.

Finally, the Israel Defense Forces have also learned the two-pronged lesson that subterranean spaces are a fundamentally unique environment, but that no two tunnels are the same—in purpose, construction, advantages, or disadvantages. The challenge is crafting an approach to underground warfare that is both optimized for unique challenges and flexible enough to adapt to unique conditions that meaningfully distinguish, for instance, Hamas tunnels in Gaza and Hezbollah tunnels in southern Lebanon. Arguably, no military in the world has made more progress on this front than the Israel Defense Forces. The specialized subterranean capabilities housed in its Yahalom Unit are an example. Part of the Israeli Combat Engineering Corps, its organization, training, and equipment rightly reflect that at its core, underground warfare is as much an engineering challenge as a strictly combat one.

The net total of the impact of Hezbollah’s tunnel network on the conflict above ground will only become clear as that conflict unfolds. But Israel’s raids into the tunnels ahead of any larger-scale offensive are a clear acknowledgement of a simple reality: the fight to control the tunnels and deny their control to Hezbollah is a necessary component of any campaign against the group. A war might not be won exclusively in the tunnels, but it cannot be won without accounting for them.

Colonel Patrick Sullivan, PhD, is the director of the Modern War Institute at West Point.

John Spencer is the chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point.

John Amble is the editorial director of the Modern War Institute at West Point.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Israel Defense Forces

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Patrick Sullivan, John Spencer, John Amble · October 2, 2024


23.Decapitating The Hydra: Iran’s Response Options To Israel’s Offensive


Decapitating The Hydra: Iran’s Response Options To Israel’s Offensive - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Doug Livermore · October 3, 2024

Israel’s recent decisive operations targeting Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), and the Houthis signal a bold attempt to dismantle Iran’s proxy networks. These strikes raise critical questions about Tehran’s response options in the context of irregular warfare. For Iran, these groups form the backbone of its regional influence, and the loss of key commanders across multiple theaters through Israel’s “decapitation strikes” leaves the regime with difficult choices. Iran must balance the imperative to maintain its credibility among its remaining proxies while avoiding a direct confrontation with Israel and its Western allies, particularly given the current state of internal instability in Iran and the operational constraints of its remaining surrogates.


Decapitating The Hydra: Iran’s Response Options To Israel’s Offensive – Insider: Short of War

The Consolidation Dilemma: Hezbollah’s Tactical Conundrum

The Israeli strike that decimated Hezbollah’s leadership, including many of its key commanders, presents a tactical masterstroke. Hezbollah faced a no-win situation: either remain dispersed following the compromise of its electronic communications and face the inability to effectively have command and control (C2) in defense against a potential invasion or consolidate and risk devastating Israeli airstrikes. By consolidating forces around Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, LH’s leadership appears to have chosen the latter. However, this decision likely led to Hezbollah’s significant leadership losses in the strike.

Israel’s tactic of targeting Hezbollah leadership while simultaneously signaling the potential for a ground invasion forced Hezbollah into a defensive posture that left them exposed. From an operational perspective, this could weaken Hezbollah’s ability to resist an Israeli advance, especially given that their C2 capabilities are now severely degraded. Strategically, the question remains: Will this gamble by Israel pay off in the long term? While tactically brilliant, the destruction of Hezbollah’s command could provoke an unpredictable Iranian response.

The Dismantling of Iran’s Proxy Network

In parallel to the blow against Hezbollah, Israeli strikes on Hamas and the Houthis suggest a broader Israeli strategy aimed at weakening Iran’s entire proxy apparatus. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis serve as crucial pillars of Iran’s influence in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. By severely degrading their operational capabilities, Israel may be attempting to reshape the regional balance in its favor, clearing Iranian proxies from the board and diminishing Tehran’s ability to exert asymmetric pressure through its surrogates.

For Iran, the loss of key commanders in both Hamas and Hezbollah creates a leadership vacuum that will be difficult to fill quickly. The Houthis, having faced massive Israeli strikes, are also likely to find their capacity to project force against Israel diminished, especially in the near term. These developments significantly weaken Tehran’s proxy network, making organizing a coherent, immediate response more difficult.

The Credibility Dilemma: Tehran’s Need to Respond

Iran faces a major credibility dilemma in the wake of these strikes. The loss of key figures and capabilities within Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis undermines Tehran’s image as the protector and benefactor of its surrogates. If Iran fails to respond decisively, it risks losing influence over these groups and other potential regional partners. In the realm of irregular warfare, credibility is paramount. Without a response, Iran’s surrogates may question the regime’s ability to defend their interests, leading to a weakening of Tehran’s broader influence in the Middle East.

However, Iran’s options for retaliation are limited. A direct Iranian military attack on Israel would likely trigger a broader regional conflict, one Tehran is ill-prepared to win, especially if Israel receives military support from the United States and its NATO allies. Previous conflicts have demonstrated the strength of Israeli air defenses, and any Iranian attempt at a missile-based retaliation would likely be met with overwhelming Israeli and Western responses. The impotence of this approach was again demonstrated days ago, when a massive Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel resulted in minimal damage as Jordan, the U.S., and others came to aid in the defense of Israel. Having now ineffectually responded to Israel’s successes against its proxies, many experts believe that Iran will try to avoid uncontrolled escalation.

The Role of Iraqi Militias and the Lack of Proxy Mobilization

Given Iran’s weakened position, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq present one of the few remaining viable options for retaliation. The PMF, which consists of various Shia militias aligned with Iran, has historically been Tehran’s most reliable proxy force in Iraq. However, the relatively impotent response from the PMF indicates that even these groups may be hesitant to engage in a broader direct conflict with Israel at this juncture. The destruction of Iran’s other surrogates, including Hezbollah and Hamas, may have instilled caution among Iraqi militias. They, too, risk suffering the same fate if they engage in overt acts of aggression.

Iran’s other proxies, particularly in Syria, have also remained conspicuously inactive. Despite the Syrian regime condemning the death of Nasrallah as a “despicable aggression” by Israel, it seems disinterested in serving as a base for counter strikes against Israel, given its current focus on maintaining internal stability. In fact, many Syrians have celebrated the Israeli killing of the controversial LH leader. The usual pattern of pro-Iranian groups launching retaliatory strikes against U.S. and NATO forces in Iraq and northeastern Syria following Israeli operations has not materialized, further signaling that Tehran’s network is spooked and uncertain about its next moves.

Internal Instability in Iran and the Regime’s Calculus

Iran’s domestic situation further complicates its response options. The regime is currently grappling with significant internal unrest, with protests and economic turmoil threatening the stability of the government. The Iranian leadership may not wish to escalate a confrontation with Israel that could spiral into a broader conflict, one that could inflame public dissatisfaction with the regime’s regional adventurism and lead to further destabilization. Moreover, the regime is likely acutely aware that the United States and its allies stand ready to support Israel in the event of an Iranian escalation, as they have in past conflicts.

Conclusion: Iran’s Limited Options and the Strategic Implications

In the current context, Iran’s most viable response options are constrained by its loss of proxy capability, internal instability, and the overwhelming superiority of Israeli and Western forces. Tehran’s credibility is on the line, but further direct confrontation with Israel is unlikely to succeed and could further erode the regime’s stability. The Iraqi militias, while a potential option, have shown little indication that they are prepared to engage more fulsomely. Iran’s influence in the region may wane without a significant response as its surrogates question Tehran’s ability to protect their interests. In the broader strategic sense, Israel’s dismantling of Iran’s proxy networks may weaken Tehran’s regional power, but the long-term effects will depend on how Iran adapts to these challenges and whether it can rebuild its proxy forces in the coming years.


Doug Livermore is the Senior Vice President for Solution Engineering at the CenCore Group and the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, he is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, National Vice President for the Special Operations Association of America, Director of Development of the Corioli Institute, and serves and the Board of Directors and as Chair of the Advocacy Committee for No One Left Behind.

Main Image: Israeli Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, chief of the general staff, Israeli Defense Forces, answers questions at a news conference aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush in the Mediterranean Sea during exercise Juniper Oak, Jan. 26, 2023. Photo by Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Chandler Ludke, DOD.


The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, the United States Government, Department of Defense of the Department of the Army.

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irregularwarfare.org · by Doug Livermore · October 3, 2024










De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com



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