Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“The capacity to learn is a gift;

The ability to learn is a skill;

The willingness to learn is a choice.”

– Brian Herbert

No man is an island,

Entire of itself;

Every man is a piece of the continent,

A part of the main.

If a clod be washed away by the sea,

Europe is the less,

As well as if a promontory were:

As well as if a manor of thy friend's

Or of thine own were.

Any man's death diminishes me,

Because I am involved in mankind.

And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls;

It tolls for thee.

By John Donne

"Our power is in our ability to decide."

– R. Buckminster Fuller

1. How is War Fought in the Gray Zone?

2. How USSOF Resistance Operations Strengthen Security Cooperation

3. How DeepSeek changed the future of AI—and what that means for national security

4. An evergreen assessment – Ancient wisdom that holds true today by Matt Armstrong

5. Is the defense budget ready for a cold war?

6. Group 'linked to DeepSeek' DID steal OpenAI data, Microsoft fears, as concerns grow that the communist tech has ripped off US intellectual property

7. What DeepSeek knows about you — and why it matters

8. U.S. Businesses Already Love DeepSeek

9. The Classic Art of War Requires Integrating All Elements of Power

10. Trump’s Transactional Foreign Policy Leads to Flurry of Pledges

11. misunderstandings – military aircraft

12. Army's hurry-up force-design ideas are due in March, chief says

13. Feds shouldn't take ‘deferred resignation’ offer, warn employee groups, Democrats, experts

14. Some Say AI Is the Greatest Invention of All Time. I Don’t Get It.

15. AI Needs a Lot of Computing Power. Is a Market for ‘Compute’ the Next Big Thing?

16. ‘I Gave My Life to the FBI. And It Damn Near Broke Me.’

17. Kash Patel: How I’ll Rebuild Public Trust in the FBI

18. Expert Q&A: The AI Challenge for the U.S. Military

19. Ex-Ukraine Prime Minister: Trump Holds Keys to ‘Future of Ukraine’

20. Trump’s ‘Iron Dome’ is a fantasy. But there are practical options.

21. Fighting Ghosts: Passive Integrated Air Defenses

22. The Case for Peace Through Strength – and Diplomacy

23. At Gabbard’s Confirmation Hearing, Edward Snowden May Loom Large

24. The Price of Trump’s Power Politics

25. The Case for Reglobalization

26. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2025

27. Iran Update, January 29, 2025

28. Found in Translation: Bolster U.S. Coalition Warfighting by Fixing the Linguist Shortfall

29. Five questions to ask before declaring war on cartels

30. How Would Iranian Nuclear Forces Be Deployed?

1. How is War Fought in the Gray Zone?

First, as Clausewitz said, "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish... the kind of war on which they are embarking,"

It should be hard for anyone to disagree with this this excerpt below though many of us have been called chicken little or the boy who cried wolf when we talk about political warfare (or asymmetric or hybrid warfare or unrestricted warfare, or new or non-linear generation warfare,) in the gray zone or what the author mulls over: a Cold War 2.0.

I do not think you can deter "gray zone activities" by our adversaries. You have to execute a superior political warfare strategy to win in the gay one of strategic competition. We need to purge this idea that everything and everyone can be deterred in every situation. It is like deterrence has become the holy grail for national security doctrine.

But I strongly agree with the author on her third point on 'how and when we should fight and fight back in the gray zone" and that "we need bold new thinking, creativity and assertiveness to respond to gray-zone threats." But it is more than "responding to the threats". We need offensive action to attack the strategies of the threats. We have to adopt an offensive mindset to compete and win in the gray zone of strategic competition.

Excerpt:

The sum of it all is this: Whether defined as a war or not, the United States, its institutions and its dominant role in the world are indeed under attack, predominantly in a realm called the gray zone. It’s called the gray zone – and some-times hybrid or asymmetric warfare – because such activities take place in the hazy, gray space between peace and traditional war. One can see its allure. Gray zone attacks can serve the same purpose as war – to coerce or weaken an adversary—but without justifying or provoking a military, or perhaps any, response from the attacked party. Safe and effective. Unfortunately for us, our adversaries are getting better and better at this game. As in the childhood contest, King of the Hill, we are the King, and a lot of actors are gunning for us, mostly without using any guns. Here are four concerning recent examples, among many.

Some dilemmas:

These examples demonstrate several dilemmas associated with gray-zone activities and established U.S. and Allied deterrence practices. First, attributing the malicious actor behind such activities is difficult, often time-consuming and sometimes inconclusive. Second, America and its allies have no effective, let alone coordinated, strategy to deal with gray-zone aggression in aggregate. Third, we currently have few tools to respond to such attacks short of military force, doubly so against Russia since it is already the most sanctioned country in the world. Defining proportional responses consistent with our values and the rule of law remains elusive, particularly if the gray-zone attacks in question do not directly cause deaths.

Not simply "response options" though they are necessary - but offensive options by seizing the initiative in the gray zone.

What to do? The United States and its partners should start by seeking to under- stand, label and publicly reveal the range of gray-zone activities for what they are: part of a coordinated campaign by our adversaries that threatens us, could lead to loss of life and represents potential acts of war. The strategy must comprehensively name and shame such activity across the globe, just as the Philip- pine government has adopted an aggressive transparency campaign to call out China’s coercive belligerence in the South China Sea. Simply revealing such activity is unlikely to fully deter such behavior. Over time, however, global publicity about bad behavior can erode the willingness of other countries to work with offending states and curb the most dangerous activity.

We need to flesh out real response options. So far, we and our allies have focused mostly on strengthening detection and improving the resilience of our systems against threats that have manifested in particular sectors. For example, the Biden administration has imposed new regulations to compel private critical-infrastructure companies to improve cybersecurity. Legal approaches such as banning the sale of land near critical infrastructure and military bases, and England’s recent banning of foreign ownership of newspapers could provide protection. Such measures are what folks in the business call “deterrence by denial.” In other words, you harden your systems so much that attacks aren’t possible or worth the effort. All are important steps but not sufficient to deter our adversaries fully.

Conclusion:

In sum, we are living in a new world, perhaps a Cold War 2.0, where technology creates vulnerabilities and attack options we never imagined, and our systems and institutions were never designed to manage. Unfortunately, the international institutions that should be at the forefront of addressing such issues, like the United Nations, are increasingly hamstrung by the veto powers of the main perpetrators. Therefore, we need bold new thinking, creativity and assertiveness to respond to gray-zone threats. If we fail to do so, our adversaries no doubt will hold us hostage, coerce us and perhaps prevent us from fighting and winning the next war, should it come to that.

How is War Fought in the Gray Zone?

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/how-is-war-fought-in-the-gray-zone

And what can the U.S. do about it?

SPECIAL SERIES

The Chinese ship, the bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 is anchored and being monitored by a Danish naval patrol vessel in the sea of Kattegat, near the City of Granaa in Jutland, Denmark, on November 20, 2024. (Photo by Mikkel Berg Pedersen / Ritzau Scanpix / AFP via Getty Images)

Posted: January 29th, 2025

By Beth Sanner

Beth Sanner served in the U.S. Intelligence Community for 35 years holding senior roles at ODNI and CIA. She was former Deputy Director for National Intelligence at ODNI, and served as daily briefer to the president during the Trump Administration.

Beth Sanner is a principal member of The Cipher Brief’s Gray Zone Group, a gathering of experts focused on raising awareness of adversarial activities that are carried out below the threshold of war.

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE / OPINION – In talks to business groups about geopolitics in recent months, I’ve been asking whether they believe we are at war. Most in the audience have voted yes. But if you asked the National Security Adviser, I’m fairly certain he would disagree, at least in the technical sense. This is in part political, because only Congress has the authority to formally declare war and, as hard as it is to believe, they haven’t done so since World War II.

This disconnect has made me wonder: What are people thinking about when they say the United States is again at war? My guess is a whole range of thoughts have prompted such a response. Perhaps these include the culture wars and polarization of our country, U.S. support for Ukraine that some have termed – in- correctly in my view – a proxy war against Russia, the U.S. retaliatory attacks on the Houthis in the Red Sea, persistent cyberattacks by nation states and gangs, global disinformation campaigns by our adversaries or perhaps the economic warfare between America and China. None of these activities meet the tradition- al definition of war, and yet it is hard to view these actions in aggregate and not feel otherwise.

The sum of it all is this: Whether defined as a war or not, the United States, its institutions and its dominant role in the world are indeed under attack, predominantly in a realm called the gray zone. It’s called the gray zone – and some-times hybrid or asymmetric warfare – because such activities take place in the hazy, gray space between peace and traditional war. One can see its allure. Gray zone attacks can serve the same purpose as war – to coerce or weaken an adversary—but without justifying or provoking a military, or perhaps any, response from the attacked party. Safe and effective. Unfortunately for us, our adversaries are getting better and better at this game. As in the childhood contest, King of the Hill, we are the King, and a lot of actors are gunning for us, mostly without using any guns. Here are four concerning recent examples, among many.

The intersection of technology, defense, space and intelligence is critical to future U.S. national security.Join The Cipher Brief on June 5th and 6th in Austin, Texas for the NatSecEDGE conference. Find out how to get an invitation to this invite-only event at natsecedge.com

In early 2024 leaked intelligence reports indicated that Russia was considering placing a nuclear weapon in space. Russia’s purpose for this weapon, outlawed by treaty, would be to threaten the United States or its allies, or perhaps to make a last-ditch effort to save itself in anticipation of a regime-threatening attack. A nuclear detonation in space would not create a mushroom cloud and a physically destructive shock wave as it does on Earth. Instead, it emits an electromagnetic pulse that would disable non-hardened military and intelligence satellites that provide command-and-control for military and civilian communications, and the Global Positioning System used for navigation and weapons targeting. Unfortunately, the collateral damage could be the global economic and communications systems, thereby causing panic, and the resulting space-debris fields would render certain orbits unusable.

Both China and Russia have been detected inside the IT networks of U.S. critical infrastructure, including our electrical grids, oil and gas pipelines, water treatment plants and transportation systems. Our government has warned that China intends to use this access to cause chaos or even injure and kill Americans at a time of China’s choosing. Beijing could do so, for example, to deter and undermine our ability to counter an attack on Taiwan, other Asian allies or U.S. forces. Russia also has burrowed into our critical infrastructure, giving Moscow similar options. And Iran has attacked U.S. water systems.

In October 2023 a Chinese commercial ship, the Newnew Polar Bear, escorted by a Russian icebreaker, improbably dragged its anchor for more than 110 miles (nearly nine hours) along the seafloor of the Gulf of Finland, severely damaging several telecommunications cables and shut- ting down the Balticconnector gas pipeline between Estonia and Finland for more than six months. As the Newnew Polar Bear traversed inter- national and national waters of several nations, the damage it wrought wasn’t immediately known. When it was discovered, the ship nonetheless continued unmolested, exploiting gaps in national and internation- al authority to board or seize it. The investigation is ongoing as of this writing, but experts say its mission was almost certainly sabotage. NATO pledged an unspecified “determined” response if this is proven. Both accident and sabotage have damaged undersea cables traversing the Red Sea, connecting Taiwan and servicing parts of Europe and Africa. With nearly 500 undersea cables transmitting about 95 percent of the world’s communications, from cat videos to financial transactions to top secret intelligence, they present a key vulnerability.

Russia’s increasingly brazen gray-zone attacks, aimed at undermining support for Ukraine and European governments, have included unprecedented plots to kill a European defense industry CEO and to attack and disrupt the Paris Olympics. Dozens have been arrested for these and other plots, such as an attempted assassination of Ukraine’s President Zelensky and sabotage of U.S. and other military and defense industry facilities. Some arson and cyberattacks have succeeded. Moscow’s use of common criminals and its own “illegals” – covert intelligence assets embedded in societies – makes defending against such attacks harder, in part because Russia takes advantage of seams in information-sharing and operational collaboration among militaries and local and national law enforcement.

These examples demonstrate several dilemmas associated with gray-zone activities and established U.S. and Allied deterrence practices. First, attributing the malicious actor behind such activities is difficult, often time-consuming and sometimes inconclusive. Second, America and its allies have no effective, let alone coordinated, strategy to deal with gray-zone aggression in aggregate. Third, we currently have few tools to respond to such attacks short of military force, doubly so against Russia since it is already the most sanctioned country in the world. Defining proportional responses consistent with our values and the rule of law remains elusive, particularly if the gray-zone attacks in question do not directly cause deaths.

Also read former Assistant Director of CIA for South and Central Asia (and Gray Zone Group member) Dave Pitts’ three-part series on the gray zone. Read parts one and two and three exclusively in The Cipher Brief.

What to do? The United States and its partners should start by seeking to under- stand, label and publicly reveal the range of gray-zone activities for what they are: part of a coordinated campaign by our adversaries that threatens us, could lead to loss of life and represents potential acts of war. The strategy must comprehensively name and shame such activity across the globe, just as the Philip- pine government has adopted an aggressive transparency campaign to call out China’s coercive belligerence in the South China Sea. Simply revealing such activity is unlikely to fully deter such behavior. Over time, however, global publicity about bad behavior can erode the willingness of other countries to work with offending states and curb the most dangerous activity.

We need to flesh out real response options. So far, we and our allies have focused mostly on strengthening detection and improving the resilience of our systems against threats that have manifested in particular sectors. For example, the Biden administration has imposed new regulations to compel private critical-infrastructure companies to improve cybersecurity. Legal approaches such as banning the sale of land near critical infrastructure and military bases, and England’s recent banning of foreign ownership of newspapers could provide protection. Such measures are what folks in the business call “deterrence by denial.” In other words, you harden your systems so much that attacks aren’t possible or worth the effort. All are important steps but not sufficient to deter our adversaries fully.

Also necessary is “deterrence by punishment.” That is, asserting clarity about the consequences adversaries will face if they take hostile measures, and solidifying their belief that we will follow through and impose consequences outweighing the benefits of their actions. America and its allies have agreed to impose such costs for gray-zone attacks, particularly cyberattacks. For example, for a decade, NATO members agreed that “hybrid attacks” could trigger Article 5 of the organization’s charter, in which case Allies would come to the defense of the attacked member state. But no one knows exactly what situation might trigger the needed NATO consensus under Article 5, nor has it been established what response this would entail.

Likewise, DOD’s 2022 National Defense Strategy for the first time called the threats posed by our adversaries’ gray-zone activities a priority; and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin introduced the concept of “integrated defense” to prepare for a spectrum of conflict, from high-intensity warfare to the gray zone. Although these sorts of documents tend to spur military planning, potential responses to such attacks remain vague, at least in the public domain.

With all this in mind, I recommend three broad steps to improve our deterrence posture.

First, we should address the lack of an agreed-upon definition of what actions and attacks fall within the gray zone and consider the entire range of adversarial activities as a coordinated campaign. U.S. agencies and departments, not to mention the public, appear to be operating under different understandings. This definitional exercise should be expanded to establish what types and thresholds of a gray-zone attack warrant a response.

Second, we need to develop a whole-of-government-plus-private-sector strategy for gray-zone attacks writ large, including anticipating gray-zone vectors that are vulnerable but have not yet been attacked, for example, Russia’s weaponization of migrants against its NATO neighbors. Militaries and civilian security and law enforcement agencies must develop more agile and robust collaboration.

The private sector is the victim in most gray-zone attacks, and yet government-to-private-sector communications about threats and responses, while tremendously improved since COVID, remain stove-piped and situational rather than continuous and structured across all threat vectors. The strategy should therefore include mapping and creating mechanisms and structure for communication between the whole of government and the private sector.

Furthermore, we should devise a menu of pre planned actions that can be deployed in response to specific scenarios and that encompass the full range of our instruments of power, from information campaigns to economic sanctions to cyber and military responses. This process will surely reveal major shortcomings in available options, necessitating some new creative thinking.

This leads to the third, concurrent step. The administration and Congress should begin a dialogue on whether, how and when we should fight and fight back in the gray zone. For example, while offensive cyber operations are now part of U.S. military doctrine, such operations remain definitionally vague, and we probably lack clarity or agreement on how far they should go under different scenarios. Certainly, at least part of the discussion should take place in the public domain.

Coordinating and planning collective responses with allies and partners, including AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and us), our Five Eyes partners (the AUKUS trio plus Canada and New Zealand), NATO and our friends in the Indo-Pacific will be key. Roles and responsibilities among countries and institutions are needed to address mismatched and confusing jurisdictions and authorities – as was the case for the Newnew Polar Bear incident. These responses are just as important to practice as are traditional military exercises. NATO will need further work on creating seamless coordination for hybrid attacks as part of preparing for the full spectrum of conflict. We must determine when and how to communicate red lines to adversaries, including the goal of avoiding escalation.

In sum, we are living in a new world, perhaps a Cold War 2.0, where technology creates vulnerabilities and attack options we never imagined, and our systems and institutions were never designed to manage. Unfortunately, the international institutions that should be at the forefront of addressing such issues, like the United Nations, are increasingly hamstrung by the veto powers of the main perpetrators. Therefore, we need bold new thinking, creativity and assertiveness to respond to gray-zone threats. If we fail to do so, our adversaries no doubt will hold us hostage, coerce us and perhaps prevent us from fighting and winning the next war, should it come to that.

This essay by Cipher Brief Expert Beth Sanner was first published as a chapter in IMAGINE: Winning the New Cold War by Phil Berardelli.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

2. How USSOF Resistance Operations Strengthen Security Cooperation

A thoughtful essay that makes an important contribution to the discussion. One major omission is that there is no substantive discussion about campaign planning and campaigning.

"Refined Process, Authorities, and Oversight" must be addressed through campaigning. Congressional programs , e.g. sector 127d (formerly 1202) are obviously important but each campaign is unique and may not fit into an existing program. Effective campaign planning will identify what authorities must be requested and campaign planners must not be trapped into only trying to fit operations into already existing authorities.

And as important as authorities are permissions. Campaign plan approval provides the permissions.

Conclusion:

The gray zone has become a pivotal battlefield in an international security environment marked by great power competition. As such, US capacity to support allies and partners through USSOF—in Ukraine and elsewhere—has become integral to our ability to compete strategically. However, current security cooperation mechanisms—such as section 127d and the SSCI process—are ill-equipped to meet USSOF’s needs. A new authority could address critical deficiencies in both mechanisms and forge a much-needed middle ground by improving components such as the appropriate funding cap, deployment speed, and oversight. These legislative adjustments will ensure that USSOF remains agile, innovative, and strategically impactful in supporting partner resistance and advancing US strategic objectives.

How USSOF Resistance Operations Strengthen Security Cooperation

irregularwarfare.org · by Jacob Zack, Adam Foote · January 30, 2025

Introduction

US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) provide a unique advantage to the Joint Force with their responsiveness, adaptability, and specialized skills. USSOF capabilities—from cyber expertise to civil affairs—enable them to shape and stabilize regions and preempt threats before they escalate. USSOF is incredibly impactful in Irregular Warfare, where they enhance partner nations’ abilities to counter or resist hostile powers. USSOF has proven effective in strengthening partner resistance and promoting a “Total Defense” posture in gray zone conflicts. This concept is best outlined in the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) and has been demonstrated by the Ukrainian version of “Total Defense” in the face of Russian aggression.

However, despite significant US support for Ukraine, current US Security Cooperation (SC) mechanisms do not adequately empower USSOF’s support for ally and partner resistance efforts. Given the growing importance of irregular warfare in strategic competition, SC mechanisms must evolve. Policymakers across the SC enterprise should explore how tailored authorities, processes, and oversight can better enable USSOF support for resistance activities.

Resistance in Ukraine

Over the past decade, Ukraine has progressively incorporated resistance tactics into its national defense strategy, and in 2021, the Government of Ukraine (GOU) codified Ukraine’s “Total Defense” posture. The national resistance mindset became apparent in the early days of the current conflict when guerilla attacks on Russian supply lines—perpetrated by local civilians and reservists —rendered several Russian positions unsustainable. Indeed, the GOU published the National Resistance Center website to disseminate news and offer how-to guides on reporting Russian troop movements, securing communications, and conducting sabotage. Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces (TDF)—a “people’s army” within the Ukrainian Armed Forces—exemplify “voluntary organizations” integral to Total Defense. That is not to suggest that Ukrainian resistance is exclusively government-directed. Endogenous Ukrainian resistance partially originates from decades of popular frustration with the Ukrainian state itself. However, the point remains that resistance permeates Ukrainian society; ordinary Ukrainians have sourced and delivered essentials like vehicles and batteries directly to soldiers, bypassing slow government channels. Ukrainian civilians in Russian-occupied territories are creating roadblocks, organizing protests, and providing intelligence. Deeply ingrained Ukrainian resistance raises the question: to what extent have USSOF efforts shaped Ukraine’s resistance against Russian aggression?

While USSOF operations are predictably classified, specific US engagements offer clues to answering this question. Following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, the US intensified efforts to strengthen Ukrainian resistance capacity. This included the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Minister of Defense Advisor (MODA) program to train and educate Ukrainian forces on NATO doctrine and USSOF efforts to professionalize Ukrainian SOF by building a “special operations capability, culture, and joint warfighting organization.” Before the current conflict, USSOF deployed Army Special Forces, civil affairs, psychological operations soldiers, Navy Seals, and senior advisors on long-term assignments to help craft Ukraine’s “national security methods,” many of which align with tactics prescribed in the ROC. While Ukrainians are unequivocally leading their resistance, USSOF and its partners have helped lay the foundation for Ukraine’s Total Defense approach for nearly a decade.

The US Security Cooperation Enterprise

USSOF’s resistance-oriented security cooperation activities—in Ukraine and elsewhere—rely on several funding and authority mechanisms. In the Ukrainian context, DoD relies largely on Section 127d of US Code Title 10—part of broader “emergency and extraordinary expenses”—to support USSOF irregular warfare activities. More broadly and on a non-emergency basis, USSOF’s resistance-oriented security cooperation activities also fall under Section 333 of US Code Title 10, which authorizes the DoD to work with the Department of State to provide training, equipment, and other assistance to partner security forces through annual appropriations. Both are imperfect mechanisms that fail to address the current USSOF problem set and operating environment.

As part of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress enacted section 127d “Support of Special Operations for Irregular Warfare” (replacing Sec. 1202) to offer dedicated support for USSOF irregular warfare operations. The funds for this authority are derived from the DoD’s operations and maintenance budget. Section 127d provides broader Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) authority compared to prior iterations and raises the funding cap to $20 million per fiscal year. It authorizes the SECDEF to fund irregular warfare operations with the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission. The SECDEF is prohibited from delegating this authority and must notify Congress 15 days before providing funds to support ongoing operations.

Section 333 security cooperation is effectively planned, executed, and monitored by the security cooperation enterprise or the array of interagency actors collaborating in the Significant Security Cooperation Initiative (SSCI) process. Key security cooperation stakeholders include entities across the DoD, such as the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency; the Department of State, including the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; the Combatant Commands; and U.S. Embassies, where Defense Attachés and Security Cooperation Officers play a critical role. Each actor plays a different role in the multi-phase SSCI process of planning and executing SC programs.

The SSCI approval process starts with the Combatant Command’s partner assessment and Initiative Design Document (IDD), which identifies needs and outlines a proposed program. This is followed by a DSCA-led feasibility study—including a Rough Order of Magnitude pricing to estimate costs—before the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy reviews proposals and issues approvals. The office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy then prioritizes and allocates resources, and corresponding programs are implemented by embassies in coordination with the Combatant Commands and DSCA.

Critical Deficiencies

Notwithstanding successful Ukrainian resistance, current mechanisms are ill-equipped to meet USSOF’s needs as it expands gray zone activities. Section 127d is an emergency measure useful for urgent requirements but insufficient for supporting global USSOF operations on an ongoing basis. The relatively low 20-million-dollar annual cap restricts the impact and scope of operations. The delegation restriction could also hinder fund deployment when decision speed is critical. Furthermore, section 127d also creates a somewhat restrictive legal framework that could limit USSOF’s ability to engage in certain contexts, particularly those classified as covert actions. Finally, the 15-day congressional notification requirement could compromise operational security and delay time-sensitive missions, presenting an obstacle in dynamic combat environments.

The SSCI process is likewise ill-equipped to meet the USSOF’s needs. First, consider the time horizon. The SSCI process can take one to two years from requirement identification through SC program implementation. This poses obvious challenges for maintaining operational effectiveness in irregular warfare, which is characterized by dynamic, indirect, and continuous employment of multi-domain tactics. Second, although USSOF comprises just 3% of DoD’s budget, it must compete with all other Combatant Commands for Section 333 funding.

USSOF’s unique operational mandate necessitates a middle-ground, one that combines the streamlined nature of the 127d authority with the rigor and oversight of the SSCI process. Acknowledging that excessive authorities risk complicating oversight, a narrowly defined funding authority that addresses both the 127d and SSCI deficiencies is needed.

Refined Process, Authorities, and Oversight

A new “middle-ground” authority could build upon the most successful elements of these mechanisms. A tiered funding cap—offering scaled support based on threat levels or operational priorities—should be introduced to better support USSOF’s global mandate. The 127d restriction on delegation should be adjusted to allow limited delegation to the Commanders of the regional Theater Special Operations Commands and other senior military officials. This would ensure rapid deployment of funds and empower creative problem-solving for issues that do not rise to the level of SECDEF consideration. The restrictive legal prohibitions against covert action should be reinterpreted under a broader framework of contingency operations to enhance USSOF’s engagement capabilities. Finally, the 15-day congressional notification requirement should be reduced to 48-72 hours to prevent compromising operational security and ensure timely execution of time-sensitive missions.

While there are many positive elements of the SSCI process, current timelines fail to meet the demands of dynamic operational environments where timely support delivery can determine mission success. A streamlined process could feature a quarterly review committee led by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. This committee could include representatives from DSCA, the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnership, and Theater Special Operations Commands, enabling rapid review and approval of proposals involving smaller dollar amounts and context-specific needs. A system rewarding the best ideas with faster approval and funding would ensure that the most effective strategies rise to the top.

This new “middle ground” authority should also capitalize on cost efficiencies tailored to resistance-focused security cooperation, such as leveraging excess defense articles or small-scale, targeted training and equipment. Unlike traditional security cooperation programs, which feature large or complex weapons systems, resistance activities focus on empowering small partner units with discrete solutions. The review process should reflect this scope, balancing oversight with flexibility. Ensuring that US government-provided equipment is properly used, known as end-use monitoring, is mandated by Congress. This authority should require that new programs dedicate 5% of total value to independent third-party monitoring, which could improve compliance and enhance accountability without stifling innovation.

Oversight of USSOF’s resistance programs must also evolve to account for the unconventional nature of these operations. Traditional success metrics—often centered on observable outcomes—overlook the value of preventative actions, such as deterring hostile advances. Resistance operations may achieve their greatest success through non-events, which require alternative criteria for evaluation. A new mechanism attuned to these nuances could better capture the strategic value of USSOF’s preventive and innovative efforts. Such a mechanism would provide accountability while granting USSOF the necessary latitude to pursue strategies that anticipate and mitigate emerging threats.

Conclusion

The gray zone has become a pivotal battlefield in an international security environment marked by great power competition. As such, US capacity to support allies and partners through USSOF—in Ukraine and elsewhere—has become integral to our ability to compete strategically. However, current security cooperation mechanisms—such as section 127d and the SSCI process—are ill-equipped to meet USSOF’s needs. A new authority could address critical deficiencies in both mechanisms and forge a much-needed middle ground by improving components such as the appropriate funding cap, deployment speed, and oversight. These legislative adjustments will ensure that USSOF remains agile, innovative, and strategically impactful in supporting partner resistance and advancing US strategic objectives.

Author Bios

Jacob Zack is a Senior Technical Specialist at 413, LLC, where he crafts tailored products for policymakers. Jacob has led research and analysis for clients across the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the US Institute of Peace.

Adam Foote is the Director of Operations at 413, LLC. Adam began his work in IW during his active-duty time with 5th SFG and continued his engagement as a program manager for counterterrorism assistance at the Department of State and as a consultant supporting DoD’s security cooperation enterprise.

Image Credit: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Public Domain.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government. If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

3. How DeepSeek changed the future of AI—and what that means for national security

Excerpts:

”The internet has historically thrived as a decentralized set of services,” Gupta said. If the goal is to get everyone to have their own ‘personal AI’, then it will be necessary for small models to run on people’s personal devices. I expect companies like Apple, who have a privacy-first model, to continue to push for offline, disconnected algorithms.”

But Khlaaf warns that substituting big models for distilled ones poses individual privacy risks that apply to troops, too, as exposure of personal data affects them just as it does civilians, making them vulnerable to adversarial targeting, coercion, etc.

And the broad exposure of Americans’ personal data is in itself a national vulnerability that adversaries could use in the event of conflict, as military leaders have pointed out. Without comprehensive reform to help individuals better safeguard their own data, a proliferation of robust small models like DeepSeek could make a bad trend worse.

“DeepSeek challenges the idea that larger scale models are always more performative, which has important implications given the security and privacy vulnerabilities that come with building AI models at scale,” Khlaaf said.

For personal privacy, “distillation techniques allow the compression of larger models into smaller ones while preserving many of the properties of the larger model. For citizens who had foundation models train on their data, all of the same privacy issues would be perpetuated into DeepSeek’s distilled models—only now not under U.S. jurisdiction. That’s why we’ve warned that training AI models on sensitive data poses a national security risk.”

How DeepSeek changed the future of AI—and what that means for national security

China’s breakthrough is an opportunity for American companies to build more efficient tools. That will also help the U.S. military.

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor

January 29, 2025 03:36 PM E

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

Days after China’s DeepSeek detailed an approach to generative AI that needs just a fraction of the computing power used to build prominent U.S. tools, the global conversation around AI and national security—from how the Pentagon buys and uses AI to how foreign powers might disrupt American life, including privacy—is changing.

DeepSeek’s announcement drew a collective wail from the White House, Wall Street and Silicon Valley. In Washington, D.C., President Trump called it a “wake-up for our industries that we need to be laser focused on competing” against China. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said the National Security Council is currently reviewing the app. The Navy has already banned it. On Wall Street, chip maker Nvidia’s stock tumbled. OpenAI, DeepSeek’s closest U.S. competitor, is crying foul and claiming the app essentially distills their own model.

If you believe the United States “must win the AI competition that is intensifying strategic competition with China,” as former Google chairman Eric Schmidt and former Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work wrote in 2021, then DeepSeek is a big deal.

Why is DeepSeek so significant? For one thing, it’s much more open-source than other models. But the defining technical innovation lies in the model’s ability to distill advanced reasoning capabilities from massive models into smaller, more efficient counterparts. One DeepSeek model often outperforms larger open-source alternatives, setting a new standard (or at least a very public one) for compact AI performance.

DeepSeek relies heavily on reinforcement learning to develop reasoning skills, sidestepping the supervised fine-tuning typically used in the initial phases by competitors like OpenAI. This approach is a deliberate divergence from the hybrid training strategies employed by U.S.-based AI giants.

Benchmark results described in the paper reveal that DeepSeek’s models are highly competitive in reasoning-intensive tasks, consistently achieving top-tier performance in areas like mathematics and coding. However, the research highlights some vulnerabilities as well, particularly in non-reasoning tasks and factual query accuracy, where it falls short of OpenAI’s most advanced offerings.

No one has independently verified that DeepSeek isn’t using large compute resources to achieve its benchmark results (or has not essentially copied OpenAI), but U.S. controls on highly advanced microchips would limit the resources available to China.

Alex Wang, CEO of Scale AI, whose company also evaluates AI models, described DeepSeek as comparable to OpenAI in a CNBC interview. He also said China has obtained roughly 50,000 of Nvidia’s H100 chips despite export controls.

An Nvidia spokesperson didn’t address the claim directly. He told Defense One: “DeepSeek is an excellent AI advancement and a perfect example of Test Time Scaling,” a technique that increases computing power when the model is taking in data to produce a new result. The extra compute power allows the model to explore different options and improve their answers, thus reaching better answers with less training (less compute.) The model can then focus its computational energy more effectively. It’s sort of like exercise: At first, working out depletes energy, but in the longer term it helps the body build the capacity to store and more effectively use energy.

“DeepSeek’s work illustrates how new models can be created using that technique, leveraging widely-available models and compute that is fully export-control compliant. Inference requires significant numbers of NVIDIA GPUs and high-performance networking. We now have three scaling laws: pre-training and post-training, which continue, and new test-time scaling,” the Nvidia spokesperson said.

The development represents a fundamental shift in the discussion of how to build AI dominance. While companies like OpenAI achieved their results based on huge data sets, very large models, and ever-expanding computer resources, the next phase of AI will likely usher in smaller models that need fewer compute resources.

That might bode poorly for large enterprise cloud providers, including many of the tech giants whose leaders attended Trump’s inauguration. Many companies were counting on huge demand for resource-hungry generative AI products—and were squeezing out alternative approaches. But the change in discussion around how to build AI could be good news for troops who want to tap into the most robust tools in places where power and connectivity to big cloud resources are patchy. And it could also be helpful for a Defense Department tasked with capturing the best AI capabilities while simultaneously reigning in spending.

A new, smaller future for artificial intelligence

AI researchers who were attempting to chart a very different path than that of OpenAI and the big enterprise cloud providers were not surprised by the DeepSeek breakthrough.

Data scientist Drew Breunig told Defense One, “If there's a lesson from DeepSeek's triumph, it's this: be wary when the route to progress is simply spending more money. This path fosters no innovation and your poorer competitors will be forced to get creative, work within their constraints, and eventually...they'll win. Spending is not innovating.”

In a recent blog post, he described how synthetic data can reduce the amount of raw data—and compute power—needed to produce high-performing models. “This tactic benefits smaller models at the same rate as large ones,” he said.

Pete Warden, CEO of AI startup Useful Sensors, told Defense One, “DeepSeek demonstrates that spending more and more money on larger and larger models isn't the only approach to improving AI. TinyML is based around the idea that using smaller models that are cheaper to train, we can build applications that have a big impact, despite their size.”

But Stanford AI researcher Ritwik Gupta, who with several colleagues wrote one of the seminal papers on building smaller AI models that produce big results, cautioned that much of the hype around DeepSeek shows a misreading of exactly what it is, which he described as “still a big model,” with 671 billion parameters.

“However, it is very notable that the DeepSeek-R1 team offers first-party ‘distilled’ versions of their models,” Gupta told Defense One. “What DeepSeek has done is take smaller versions of Llama and Qwen ranging from 1.5-70 billion parameters and trained them on the outputs of DeepSeek-R1. This allows an ‘R1-like’ model to work on smaller devices, like laptops or phones.”

DeepSeek’s performance—insofar as it shows what is possible—will give the Defense Department more leverage in its discussions with industry, and allow the department to find more competitors.

“I would not be surprised to see the DOD embrace open-source American reproductions of DeepSeek and Qwen,” Gupta said. “The DOD has always had the pull to ask for special, on-premise versions of otherwise cloud-only service offerings. I would not be surprised if they make this ask of OpenAI and Claude.”

Heidy Khlaaf, the chief AI scientist at the AI Now Institute, focuses her research on AI safety in weapons systems and national security. She told Defense One that the breakthrough, if it’s real, could open up the use of generative AI to smaller players, including potentially small manufacturers. But such models will never be suitable for combat, she said, despite an eagerness to employ them in such contexts.

“In general, LLMs or foundation models are not suited for safety-critical tasks given how error-prone they are with applications requiring dependability and precision. However, the size and capabilities of DeepSeek does open up the use of foundation models to smaller actors who previously may have not had access, and that may include car manufacturers who may be interested in using foundation models in a non-safety critical way,” Khlaaf said.

Andrew Redding, who leads the technology and cybersecurity portfolios at Berkeley’s Center for Security in Politics, told Defense One, “The performance of DeepSeek is entirely unsurprising for those of us who have been tracking how AI researchers are able to develop models with decreasing amounts of compute.”

American companies should see the breakthrough as an opportunity to pursue innovation in a different direction, he said. “Interestingly, the compute challenges faced by Chinese researchers (in light of U.S. export control on NVIDIA GPUs) are not dissimilar to those that U.S. academics are facing given that we are increasingly compute-constrained compared to the players in private industry.”

The United States military is already spending significantly on edge capabilities to get computing power as close to warfighters as possible. The smaller model performance breakthrough suggests that those edge-computing investments have increased in value, Redding said.

“There's also a really interesting question as to the use of open as opposed to closed models within the military context,” he said. “The advantage of the former is that they are easy to move inside of government networks to leverage gov/mil data, but there are the obvious risks of adversary states getting their hands on the training data, model weights, etc.”

But perhaps the most important take-away from DeepSeek’s announcement is not what it means for the competition between the United States and China, but for individuals, public institutions, and anyone skeptical of the growing influence of an ever-smaller group of technology players. It’s good news if you want to build your own generative AI tool, with data you control, rather than rely on a tool from a big company that may or may not have your best interests at heart.

”The internet has historically thrived as a decentralized set of services,” Gupta said. If the goal is to get everyone to have their own ‘personal AI’, then it will be necessary for small models to run on people’s personal devices. I expect companies like Apple, who have a privacy-first model, to continue to push for offline, disconnected algorithms.”

But Khlaaf warns that substituting big models for distilled ones poses individual privacy risks that apply to troops, too, as exposure of personal data affects them just as it does civilians, making them vulnerable to adversarial targeting, coercion, etc.

And the broad exposure of Americans’ personal data is in itself a national vulnerability that adversaries could use in the event of conflict, as military leaders have pointed out. Without comprehensive reform to help individuals better safeguard their own data, a proliferation of robust small models like DeepSeek could make a bad trend worse.

“DeepSeek challenges the idea that larger scale models are always more performative, which has important implications given the security and privacy vulnerabilities that come with building AI models at scale,” Khlaaf said.

For personal privacy, “distillation techniques allow the compression of larger models into smaller ones while preserving many of the properties of the larger model. For citizens who had foundation models train on their data, all of the same privacy issues would be perpetuated into DeepSeek’s distilled models—only now not under U.S. jurisdiction. That’s why we’ve warned that training AI models on sensitive data poses a national security risk.”

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

4. An evergreen assessment – Ancient wisdom that holds true today by Matt Armstrong

Matt Armstrong did what I wish more people would do - read my piece (or anybody's piece) and provide a thoughtful analysis to improve the arguments.

I would make two points in response to my essay on Solarium 2.0 (https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/project-solarium-2-0-can-eisenhowers-cold-war-strategy-work-today/)- one that I should have made clearer in the article and one that is not explicitly stated in the article but is a result of something Matt has long taught me so I will start with that. For any national security proposal to be effective, whether an organizational proposal or a process proposal (such as mine) or the adoption of a National Security Strategy it requires leadership at the highest level. How did we get the OSS? - FDR acted on Donovan's proposal and empowered him to fill a critical national security gap. As an example, we will never conduct effective political warfare (or information warfare) without strong national leadership.

My second response is that the proposal is "simply" (yes in war [or national security]everything is simple - but even the simplest thing is hard or so said Clausewitz) about institutionalizing a process that the president can use to develop and sustain national security strategy. In addition, if institutionalized, it could assist in maintaining some continuity of national security strategy across administrations based on continuous assessment of the conditions, challenging assumptions and ensure an alignment of interest, resources, and strategy.

B\ut back to the first point and again something Matt continues to drill into us (or at least into my head). Without the strongest national leadership at the highest level such a process, if ever implemented, will never live up to the intent, but the paradox is it will never be implemented without national leadership.

But please read Matt's essay. It is much more than simply a critique of mine.

An evergreen assessment

Ancient wisdom that holds true today

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/an-evergreen-assessment?utm

Matt Armstrong

Jan 29, 2025

I had no intention of posting anything today or this week, but I just read a passage I feel compelled to share. It is a true example of an evergreen analysis. For those who may not be aware, Evergreen refers to something that remains popular or relevant over time. In this case, it’s not popular, just relevant. Here is the passage:

It is my own conviction that Americans too often give this ‘organizational problem’ a priority which it does not deserve. Americans are prone to believe that if they can find an apt name and draw up an imposing organizational chart, then matters will more or less take care of themselves.

Ha! This applies to seemingly countless national security topics today, not the least of which has been in my sights for literally decades: the chant of “bring back USIA.” The author above wrote long before Field of Dreams came out and long before the book it was based on came out (1989 and 1982, respectively, for those who want to feel old).1

What was the “organizational problem”? Directly preceding the above, which appeared on page 244 of his book, were the questions, “Who is going to conduct such operations as I have been discussing? Who, in the sense not of particularly individuals, but of agencies or organizations?” The operations were countering, preemptively and reactively, Russian “political-subversive warfare.”

At the risk of spoiling the end, the answer was ultimately no one, which remains true today.

In words that fit today as then, he continued:

The blueprinted outfit will somehow, after it comes into neat existence, discover and fulfill its mission by an intuitive trial and error. This approach is the preset bureaucratism. The appropriate order is the reverse: first we must understand clearly what is to be done. Then we seek the instrumentalities for doing it. These we may find by adapting to the new use organizations which already exist, or we may feel that a new, specifically designed agency is preferable. The name doesn’t make much difference, and exact organizational charts can wait upon the teachings of experience. [italics in the original]

In Washington and elsewhere supporting Washington, too many chase definitions to identify and separate lines of effort rather than execute, improve, and coordinate the lines of effort themselves. Senior leadership enables, furthers, and protects this “bureaucratism.”

By the way, the book is from 1950: The Coming Defeat of Communism by James Burnham. Another book, a 1952 RAND Study, The Organizational Weapon, was published in book form in 1960 (333 pages excluding index) is also evergreen with analysis and recommendations that apply to the present with only minor edits, primarily find-and-replace.

Separately, a friend recently published an interesting article at the website 1945: Project Solarium 2.0: Can Eisenhower’s Cold War Strategy Work Today?

The term “Solarium Project” has been used so frequently in recent years that its original purpose and power have been diluted. Today, it’s often invoked as a generic term for strategic brainstorming.

However, the roots of the original Project Solarium – initiated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953 – represent something far more profound and disciplined. It was a process that provided the foundation for a coherent, enduring strategy that ultimately helped the United States win the Cold War. To address the complexities of today’s global challenges, we should return to the original intent and rigor of Project Solarium and institutionalize it as a standard process to support the President in developing a National Security Strategy.

This new Solarium Project would synchronize all elements of national power and provide continuity of strategy, ensuring the safeguarding of US interests over the long term. It should be the foundation for an America First National Security Strategy.

It’s worth a read. However, I shared my reaction to the article with the author and on a listserv. I’m reposting that below for your comment:

I know Dave had limited space, but I’d like to know how “Solarium 2.0” that I’ve heard so often we need fits in with the national security strategy process we have now. I’d expect a statement like, “The NSS is lacking, we need to fix it / ditch it / whatever and Sol 2 is the way to go.”

Further, just like the “bring back USIA” mantra, the calls for Sol 2.0 leave aside other leadership and organizational realities present then and absent now. Sol 2.0 is another strategy of hope: if only we really thought about the problem, maybe we’ll do better. No, there is an absence of serious leadership to make the hard decisions.

Setting aside Ike’s farewell lament about the military-industrial complex that suggests Sol 1.0 wasn’t able to achieve what was hoped, a strategic lament in my book looking at the organizational defects not found in a superficial reading of history.

I suggest James Marchio’s “The Planning Coordination Group: Bureaucratic Casualty in the Cold War Campaign to Exploit Soviet-Bloc Vulnerabilities” (Fall 2002, Journal of Cold War Studies)

This article addresses three fundamental questions. First, why was the PCG established, and what did it do during its short existence? Second, why did it fail to achieve its objectives? Finally, what insight does this assessment of the PCG provide into the overall nature and shortcomings of the Eisenhower administration’s policies toward the Soviet bloc during one of the most critical years of the Cold War? How does its fate alter our understanding of the broader historical literature on the evolution of the Eisenhower administration’s security strategy? The evidence that has emerged over the last decade suggests that the PCG’s problems and its unrealized potential were indicative of flaws in the administration’s foreign policies that left Eisenhower and his staff no better prepared to respond to the unrest behind the Iron Curtain in 1956 than they were during the East German uprising in 1953.

And, Stephen John Kenneth Long’s PhD thesis from 2008 “Disorder Over Design: Strategy, Bureaucracy And The Development Of U.S. Political Warfare In Europe, 1945-1950” (University of Birmingham).

This was particularly the case for the United States in the early Cold War as it struggled to develop a coherent basis for its policies, its operations, and its national security objectives. Washington struggled to develop foreign policy on a unified, national basis partly because of the entrenchment of internal divisions within the government bureaucracy. Although the drafters of the National Security Act hoped to ameliorate administrative tensions and parochial attitudes in one organisational sweep, such attitudes proved intrinsic to the system and therefore persisted.

Relating this back to the “bring back USIA,” let me remind readers that USIA was never what it was supposed to be. Ejecting the capabilities from State was agreed upon with the promise it would be elevated to have a seat not just at the NSC table (it was on an invite-only basis, with Kissinger, as Nixon’s NSA, famously telling the USIA Director “Don’t call us, we’ll call you”) but an operational leadership role with interagency information planning, where both roles had been held by USIA’s predecessor agency, the International Information Administration.

Sol 1.0 itself may have been laudable, but its last effects were minimal. Perhaps this was because of the focused militarization of national security policy, as it established a Maginot Line that left the “grey areas” vulnerable, to quote 1955 Kissinger.

Since only the threat of “massive retaliation" can deter Soviet aggression, major reliance must be placed on the development of our Strategic Air Force and on increasing the power of our nuclear arsenal… But in the remainder of the world, the part which Mr. Finletter calls the "grey areas," Sino-Soviet moves can be prevented only by the threat of a general war. This in substance seems to be the rationale for our present military policy… In these circumstances a major or exclusive reliance on general war as a deterrent to Sino-Soviet aggression may come dangerously close to a Maginot mentality – a belief in a strategy which may never be tested but which meanwhile prevents the consideration of any alternative. If we accept an all-or-nothing military policy we may well find ourselves paralyzed in the years ahead, when the increasing Soviet nuclear capability undermines our willingness to run the risk of a general war for anything less than to counter a direct attack on the United States.

For Dave’s argument to be compelling, he needs to address the elephants in the room that inhibit if not outright block, as can be anticipated in not just in this administration but was denied currency (literal and figurative) in past D and R administrations, what Sol 1.0 and a prospective Sol 2.0 might recommend.

For the parting shot, here is another photo from the ride shared in my prior post.2 Back to the grindstone… Thanks for reading.

This, of course, refers to “if you build it, he will come.”

I dropped the lens cloth (doubling as a cloth sack for the glasses) after I cleaned my riding glasses at this pause. I realized it didn’t make it into my pocket later. I came up here a day or three later in the hopes I could find it, but I didn’t, perhaps because it was white. Months later, after the snow melted, I retrieved the lens cloth after someone hung it a branch to the left. That was nice of whoever did that. (Yes, I took it and washed it and still have it.)

5. Is the defense budget ready for a cold war?

Excerpt:

Cold wars are expensive when waged effectively but less costly than trying to fight them on a budget. The first step in addressing these challenges is to acknowledge that the U.S. is in a cold war that might be as precarious as the last. The second step is to start acting like it.

Is the defense budget ready for a cold war? - Washington Examiner

By Michael P. Ferguson

January 28, 2025 3:10 pm

Washington Examiner · January 28, 2025

In 2023, then-Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) made similar remarks at a Heritage Foundation event titled, “Winning the New Cold War with China.” Despite a growing consensus toward the idea of a Cold War redux, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s confirmation hearing failed to include discussion about the type of budget needed to fight one.

America’s five-decade competition with the Soviet Union triggered profound adjustments in defense spending, government organization, and acquisitions. The present competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, however, has elicited a more subdued response.

Over the last 10 years, the Defense Department budget has fluctuated by less than 1% in relation to gross domestic product, hovering between a low of 2.7% last year and a high of 3.7% in 2020. Trump returns to the White House at an exceptionally dangerous moment for the nation and the world with the smallest defense budget in nearly 100 years. If the U.S. is in a cold war, it seems to be cheaper and less urgent than the last.

In the early 1950s, President Harry Truman nearly tripled the defense budget before Dwight Eisenhower succeeded him in 1953. Over the next eight years, the administration built a vast nuclear arsenal, aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, space programs, and an Air Force with global reach. These investments deterred war with the Soviet Union and defined power projection throughout the century and into the next.

To do this, Eisenhower dedicated 68 cents of every federal dollar to defense in 1955. In contrast, last year, the U.S. gave 12 cents of every federal dollar to defense, or $824 billion out of $6.75 trillion. That amounts to 2.7% of GDP, a number projected to decrease in real terms by $15 billion in 2025 according to the Congressional Budget Office.

Modernization was a cornerstone of Eisenhower’s strategy. His administration gave roughly three cents of every federal dollar to nuclear research and stockpiling. To support Eisenhower’s strategies, the Air Force acquired more aircraft between 1952 and 1956 than it did between 1957 and 1990.

Two interactions during Hegseth’s confirmation hearing stand out as relevant to cold war spending practices. In the first, Sen. Tim Sheehy (R-MT), a former Navy SEAL, characterized the process of building a modern navy as a “decadeslong pursuit.” A single Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier, for instance, costs $13 billion. The Navy’s new Vanguard unmanned surface vessel has a price tag of $56 million, and the Manta Ray uncrewed underwater vessel could be much more expensive. Navies are not cheap, and the Chinese military now has the largest one in the world.

Another exchange at the hearing involved Sen. Mike Rounds (R-SD). He expressed concern with the U.S. military sharing portions of its wireless communications band with foreign nations, a vulnerability he believes could be exploited by adversaries on a war footing. Relocating the Navy’s destroyers and coastal radars to another part of the band would cost an estimated $250 billion, more than a quarter of the Pentagon’s annual budget.

None of this begins to explore the price of updating America’s nuclear triad, taking better care of military families, hardening critical infrastructure against cyber and drone attacks, or acquiring more sixth-generation fighters and bombers, such as Northrop Grumman’s B-21 Raider.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

It is true cold wars are fought with economic and diplomatic weapons as well, and how the U.S. spends its money is as important as how much it spends. Still, budgets speak volumes about priorities. While announcing the budget for fiscal 2023, then-President Joe Biden attributed a quote to his father: “Don’t tell me what you value. Show me your budget, and I’ll tell you what you value.” This is sound advice, but it is also ironic.

Cold wars are expensive when waged effectively but less costly than trying to fight them on a budget. The first step in addressing these challenges is to acknowledge that the U.S. is in a cold war that might be as precarious as the last. The second step is to start acting like it.

Army Maj. Michael P. Ferguson is a doctorate student in the Department of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is a co-author of The Military Legacy of Alexander the Great: Lessons for the Information Age. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policies or positions of the U.S. Army, U.S. Department of Defense, or U.S. government.

Washington Examiner · January 28, 2025

6. Group 'linked to DeepSeek' DID steal OpenAI data, Microsoft fears, as concerns grow that the communist tech has ripped off US intellectual property

This is another indication that one of our students at the National War College around 2010 was correct when he described the Chinese research and development strategy as "steal to leap ahead."

Group 'linked to DeepSeek' DID steal OpenAI data, Microsoft fears, as concerns grow that the communist tech has ripped off US intellectual property

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14337263/DeepSeek-steal-OpenAI-data-Microsoft-concerns-communist-tech-intellectual-property.html

By ELENA SALVONI and REUTERS

Published: 05:52 EST, 29 January 2025 | Updated: 12:22 EST, 29 January 2025

Tech giants Microsoft and OpenAI are reportedly investigating whether data output from the ChatGPT maker's technology was secretly taken by a group linked to Chinese artificial intelligence startup DeepSeek.

Microsoft's security researchers observed individuals they believed to be connected to DeepSeek exfiltrating a large amount of data using the OpenAI's application programming interface (API), according to a report by Bloomberg News.

OpenAI's API is the main way that software developers and business customers access its services, buying a licence in order to integrate its models into their own applications.

US firm Microsoft, the largest investor for OpenAI, notified the company of suspicious activity in the autumn, according to the Bloomberg report.

Low-cost Chinese AI startup DeepSeek, an alternative to US rivals, sparked a tech stock selloff on Monday as its free AI assistant overtook OpenAI's ChatGPT on Apple's App Store in the US.

DeepSeek's meteoric rise has raised questions about how a start-up could have become a market leader so rapidly, apparently side-stepping a US ban on Chinese firms using the most advanced microchips available to domestic tech companies.

The Chinese firm has rocked the AI sector by stating that it cost just $6 million to build an AI model using less-advanced chips - a claim some experts have suggested may be too good to be true.

David Sacks, the White House's AI and crypto czar, told Fox News in an interview earlier on Tuesday that it was 'possible' that DeepSeek stole intellectual property from the US.

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DeepSeek's meteoric rise has raised questions about how a start-up could have become a market leader so rapidly

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Pictured is Liang Wenfeng, the founder of Chinese AI startup DeepSeek, speaking at the symposium presided by Chinese Premier Li Qiang on January 20, 2025

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David Sacks, Donald Trump's 'AI and Crypto Czar', speaks to the President as he signs a series of executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House on January 23, 2025

DeepSeek founder meets with Chinese Premier

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'There's substantial evidence that what DeepSeek did here is they distilled the knowledge out of OpenAI's models,' Sacks said.

Asked for comment on the Bloomberg report, an OpenAI spokesperson echoed Sacks in a statement that noted China-based companies and others were constantly attempting to replicate the models of leading US AI companies, without specifically naming DeepSeek or any other company.

'We engage in counter-measures to protect our IP, including a careful process for which frontier capabilities to include in released models, and believe as we go forward that it is critically important that we are working closely with the US government to best protect the most capable models from efforts by adversaries and competitors to take US technology.'

Microsoft declined to comment, while DeepSeek could not be immediately reached for a comment.

It comes as Chinese tech giant Alibaba today announced the release of a new version of its Qwen 2.5 AI model that it claimed surpassed the highly-acclaimed DeepSeek-V3.

The unusual timing of the release, on the first day of the Lunar New Year when most Chinese people are off work, points to the pressure Chinese AI startup DeepSeek's rise in the past three weeks has placed on not just overseas rivals, but also its domestic competition.

Chinese state media has celebrated DeepSeek's work for showing that even with limited computing power, firms can 'create miracles'.

DeepSeek has said its recent models were built with Nvidia's lower-performing H800 chips, which are not banned in China, sending a message that the fanciest hardware might not be needed for cutting-edge AI research.

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Chinese tech giant Alibaba today announced the release of a new version of its Qwen 2.5 AI model

Experts have now suggested that the company could have had Beijing's help in sourcing powerful chips as part of the Chinese government's drive to get ahead in its battle with the West for technological supremacy and harvest information on its enemies.

Luke de Pulford, director of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, told MailOnline that the UK and US governments should be worried about the power that could give DeepSeek - and by extension the Chinese government.

He said that under the Chinese Communist Party's doctrine of Military-Civil Fusion 'the line between the private sector and state is increasingly blurred.'

'As with TikTok, DeepSeek has the ability to collect masses of sensitive data, all of which is vulnerable to state interference,' he said.

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David Sacks said that it was 'possible' that DeepSeek stole intellectual property from the US

'Aside from violations of data protection, this hands the Communist Party a strategic advantage - they can crunch and analyse intimate information on hundreds of millions of foreign nationals.'

Fears China's DeepSeek 'communist AI' could be Beijing's secret weapon as the world gears up for WW3

DeepSeek this week became the most downloaded free app in the US - with its skyrocketing popularity seeing the value of its rival AI firms tumble and sending shockwaves through Wall Street and Silicon Valley.

Shadow Security Minister Alicia Kearns said of DeepSeek: 'There's no such thing as low cost, because the security and privacy costs are extremely high - let alone the perverted prism through which many answers will be presented.

'AI may be the space race of our time, but this time every member of our community has a role to play.

'If your data is going into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, you're helping them on this race as they suck every bit of detail about you that they can - even your keystrokes.'

When asked about Taiwan, DeepSeek states that the island is part of China and adds that 'compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are connected by blood'

China hawks have labelled it 'Communist AI', with a major concern among Western officials being that the chatbot feeds users Chinese propaganda and disinformation.

The chatbot says it is 'programmed' to provide answers that toe the Chinese government line, for example refusing to answer questions about Beijing's crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and declaring that 'Taiwan is an inalienable part of China'.

Why are American companies worried about DeepSeek?

What is DeepSeek?

DeepSeek in a Chinese start-up that develops open-source AI models, meaning the developer community can inspect and improve the software.

The company unveiled its first AI model in November 2023, followed by DeepSeek-V2 in May 2024 and DeepSeek-V3 in December 2024.

Then, on January 20, 2025, DeepSeek-R1 was released, which topped the Apple Store's most popular free apps list as of January 27.

DeepSeek's latest AI Assistant is said to perform comparably with OpenAI's most recent ChatGPT release.

However, the cost of training and developing DeepSeek's models appears to be only a fraction of what is required for its Western rivals.

DeepSeek says V3 used Nvidia's H800 chips for training, which are not top-of-the-line - and only 2000 of them, compared with the tens of thousands that are normally used for training models of a similar size.

This is said to have cost just $6million, compared to $100million+ that US firms have funnelled into their models.

The app also distinguishes itself from other chatbots by articulating its reasoning before delivering a response to a prompt.

Who founded DeepSeek and why?

Deepseek was founded in May 2023 by Liang Wenfeng, the founder and chief of AI-driven quantitative hedge-fund High-Flyer.

DeepSeek operates independently, but is solely funded by High-Flyer.

This funding models allows DeepSeek to pursue ambitious projects without the pressure of external investors, meaning they can more easily invest in long-term research and development.

The team comprises of mostly young, talented graduates from top Chinese universities, fostering a culture of innovation and deep understanding of the Chinese language and culture.

Their hiring practices prioritise technical abilities over traditional work experience, resulting in a workforce that is highly skilled and bring new perspectives on AI.

Why is DeepSeek such a threat to US big tech firms?

The emergence of DeepSeek's viable, cheaper AI alternative may mark a turning point in the level of spending and investment needed for AI.

Marc Andreessen, the Silicon Valley venture capitalist, said that DeepSeek's R1 model was AI's 'Sputnik moment', referencing the former Soviet Union's launch of a satellite that marked the start of the space race in the late 1950s.

In a separate post, he said: 'Deepseek R1 is one of the most amazing and impressive breakthroughs I´ve ever seen - and as open source, a profound gift to the world.'

DeepSeek has upended widely held views about US primary in AI and the effectiveness of Washington's export controls targeting China's advanced chip and AI capabilities.

Firms like OpenAI, Meta, Google, Apple, and Microsoft will now have to face up to this new competitor.

7. What DeepSeek knows about you — and why it matters

Be afraid. Be very afraid.

What DeepSeek knows about you — and why it matters

Do DeepSeek’s privacy issues worry you? They should.

https://mashable.com/article/deepseeks-privacy-policy-your-personal-data

By Christianna Silva on January 29, 2025

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DeepSeek's privacy policy isn't so private

DeepSeek, a Chinese AI chatbot similar to OpenAI's ChatGPT, is the most downloaded free app in the U.S. — but its swift rise to the top of the app store charts has raised potent privacy concerns at a time when the U.S. is banning TikTok over its ties to the Chinese government.

Like most apps, DeepSeek requires you to agree to its privacy policy when you sign up to access it — but you probably don't read it.

Here's the TL;DR from DeepSeek's privacy policy:

It collects "Information You Provide"
Profile information like date of birth, username, email address, telephone number, password
The text, audio, prompt, feedback, chat history, uploaded files, and other content you provide to DeepSeek
Information when you contact them, like proof of identity or age and feedback or inquiries
It collects "Automatically Collected Information"
Internet and other network activity information like your IP address, device identifier, and cookies
Technical information like your device model, operating system, keystroke patterns or rhythms, IP address, system language, diagnostic and performance information, and an automatically assigned device ID and user ID
Usage information like the features you use
Payment information, which is self-explanatory
It collects "Information from Other Sources"
Log-in, sign-up, or linked services and accounts, like if you sign up using Google or Apple
Advertising measurement and other partners share user information with DeepSeek, such as what you've bought at their stores

What do "keystroke patterns or rhythms" mean?

DeepSeek's privacy policy states that it collects "keystroke patterns or rhythms," which might seem unusual but not completely uncommon. For instance, TikTok collects the same information, while Instagram does not.

DeepSeek didn't immediately respond to a request for clarification from Mashable, but there's a bit unknown regarding its keystroke data collection. We don't know what DeepSeek will do with the information. For its part, TikTok has said that collecting "keystroke patterns or rhythms" specifically refers to the timing of when keys are pressed — not the specific keys that are pressed. This creates a form of biometric identification that makes one user different from another. TikTok told Snopes that this practice is "fundamentally" different from keylogging, a type of monitoring originally developed in the mid-1970s by the Soviet Union that's still used today by hundreds of popular sites.

What does DeepSeek do with my data?

It uses all this information for various purposes, like ensuring it sends users relevant advertising and notifying them about changes to its services, which is pretty typical. But it will also "comply with our legal obligations, or as necessary to perform tasks in the public interest, or to protect the vital interests of our users and other people." Moreover, its "corporate group" can access its data and share information with law enforcement agencies.

Many companies include that blanket statement in their privacy policies, but DeepSeek's data is stored "in secure servers located in the People's Republic of China." China has some notable legal requirements under its cybersecurity and privacy laws, including laws that demand tech companies cooperate with national intelligence efforts. This, combined with the current TikTok ban, leads to propaganda fears. For example, you can't ask DeepSeek questions about the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

DeepSeek AI: What you need to know about the ChatGPT rival

"DeepSeek’s privacy policy openly states that the wide array of user data they collect goes to servers in China," Watson said. "This alone raises big questions about how that data could be used beyond just running the app. It’s so easy to get swept up in the hype of a new trending AI tool and accept the terms of use without thinking twice, but this privacy policy should make users stop and ask: Am I giving away private details like my location, browsing activity, or even personal messages without realizing it?"

WIRED reviewed the website's activity and found that DeepSeek appears to send data to Baidu Tongji, the widely used web analytics tool owned by Chinese tech giant Baidu, and the Chinese internet infrastructure firm Volces, among other companies.

Why should an average user be concerned?

It's easy to ignore the importance of data security. At its core, reading through the fine print of privacy terms and conditions can be remarkably boring, which is precisely what makes it so dangerous. DeepSeek is subject to government access under China's cybersecurity laws, which mandate that companies provide access whenever the Chinese government demands it. We don't know how many AI models are trained or how they operate, and that's concerning, too, especially if your data could be misused or maliciously exploited.

What can an average user do? Is this worse than what all the other tech giants do?

"It shouldn’t take a panic over Chinese AI to remind people that most companies in the business set the terms for how they use your private data," John Scott-Railton, a senior researcher at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab, told WIRED. "And that when you use their services, you’re doing work for them, not the other way around."

Safeguarding your data from DeepSeek is probably a good idea — but experts urge users not to stop there.

"To mitigate these risks, users should adopt a proactive approach to their cybersecurity," Warmenhoven suggested. "This includes scrutinizing the terms and conditions of any platform they engage with, understanding where their data is stored and who has access to it."

However, ultimately, it shouldn't be up to an individual. As F. Mario Trujillo, a staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, told Mashable, "When you type intimate thoughts and questions to a chatbot or search engine, that content should be protected and not be unnecessarily used or shared. The best way to do that is to enact strong data privacy laws that apply to all companies, whether it be Google, OpenAI, TikTok, or DeepSeek."

Protecting your privacy shouldn’t be up to you alone. Stronger data privacy laws would help everyone, whether it concerns apps located in China or apps with similarly questionable data privacy laws in the U.S., like Meta and OpenAI.

This story has been updated to add more context and clarity about the data DeepSeek allegedly sends to other companies, specifically about Baidu Tongji.

Topics Artificial Intelligence Privacy DeepSeek

Christianna Silva

Senior Culture Reporter

Christianna Silva is a senior culture reporter covering social platforms and the creator economy, with a focus on the intersection of social media, politics, and the economic systems that govern us. Since joining Mashable in 2021, they have reported extensively on meme creators, content moderation, and the nature of online creation under capitalism.

Before joining Mashable, they worked as an editor at NPR and MTV News, a reporter at Teen Vogue and VICE News, and as a stablehand at a mini-horse farm. You can follow her on Bluesky @christiannaj.bsky.social and Instagram @christianna_j.

8. U.S. Businesses Already Love DeepSeek

We have met the enemy and he is us.

The AK of AI - they would rather buy the cheap, reliable, functional AK instead of the sleek, expensive, hard to maintain M-16.

U.S. Businesses Already Love DeepSeek

The Chinese company’s new model promises to lower the cost of AI for enterprises—even amid concerns about cybersecurity and geopolitics

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-businesses-already-love-deepseek-1679cde2?utm_medium=social

By Isabelle Bousquette

and

Jan. 29, 2025 7:00 am ET

DeepSeek, constrained by lack of access to highest-end AI chips from Nvidia by Washington’s export curbs, has taken a different approach than its U.S. competitors. Photo: Yuki Iwamura/Bloomberg News

Chinese AI company DeepSeek shocked the world with the release of its “R1” model that appeared to perform as well as leading U.S. models at a fraction of the training cost.

And while it is stoking uncertainty for existing Big Tech players and raising questions about U.S. competitiveness, enterprises, frustrated by the high cost of artificial intelligence over the last two years, are feeling pretty positive about the development.

Some chief information officers are already testing the effectiveness of the model for business use cases. While others, who remain cautious about data concerns and the model’s Chinese ownership, are still thrilled about the prospect of it driving down the cost of AI in the U.S.

“I see this is a positive thing for enterprises—maybe not for OpenAI or some of the Big Tech companies, but for a regular enterprise CIO,” said Reynolds American CIO Aaron Gwinner.

Gwinner said he isn’t planning to test DeepSeek directly because of data security concerns, but he is hoping that the techniques the Chinese company used to build the model can be replicated by U.S. vendors like Microsoft, ultimately driving costs down for corporate tech leaders.

Using AI has remained expensive because of the high cost of computing power needed to train models. For Reynolds, it has even been a deterrent to scaling AI internally, Gwinner said.

DeepSeek, constrained by lack of access to highest-end AI chips from Nvidia by Washington’s export curbs, has taken a different approach than its U.S. competitors. It said training one of its latest models cost $5.6 million, compared with the $100 million to $1 billion range cited last year by Dario Amodei, chief executive of AI company Anthropic.

“Even if they’re off by 10-fold, if we can figure out how to do that in the U.S. it could really change the game,” Gwinner said.

Some corporate leaders are forging ahead with DeepSeek’s technology.

New York Life Chief Data and Analytics Officer Don Vu said the insurance company is exploring the use of DeepSeek’s AI model. Vu said the company has a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of different models, like OpenAI’s GPT, Anthropic’s Claude and Meta Platforms’ Llama, for different use cases. It will now test how effective DeepSeek’s new model is in areas such as service and claims.

What New York Life won’t be doing, Vu said, is using the existing DeepSeek app, which raises data security questions. It will instead download the open-source version and begin experimenting with that.

For security reasons as well as ease of use, some enterprises will prefer not to host their own versions of the DeepSeek model and will turn to vendors like Amazon that make them available through their platforms. Smaller versions of new DeepSeek models are now available on Amazon Bedrock, the company’s AI development platform, for enterprises to test, run and use for business cases, a company spokesperson said.

German software company SAP said it is open to leveraging AI models coming from Chinese companies like DeepSeek if they meet certain cost, reliability and data privacy requirements, its Chief Financial Officer Dominik Asam told The Wall Street Journal.

“Anything that can also drive costs down is helpful,” he said, but added it might be tricky dealing with data privacy laws and reliability when it comes to Chinese products.

The Chinese ownership is a clear deterrent for some CIOs who might otherwise consider leveraging the tech, even as they remain optimistic about the pressures it could put on U.S. tech companies.

Marc Kermisch, chief technology officer of Emergent Software, said tech leaders should consider blocking the app for overzealous employees who might inadvertently put corporate data into it, although he said he is experimenting with it in a controlled environment. Given its Chinese ownership, Kermisch said he is skeptical that DeepSeek’s model will become viable for widespread use by American companies. But he said he is still hoping it can take a role in pressuring U.S. model makers to drive down costs.

“What is exciting to me is having additional competition in this space and frankly having them shoot an arrow across the bow of the Big Tech firms,” Kermisch said. “I would have to assume we’ll see some pricing pressure on the U.S. market.”

Brian Greenberg, CIO of leadership consulting firm RHR International, said he considers DeepSeek’s new model “fascinating and worthy of exploration.” However, that excitement should be tempered. To use the open-source version of DeepSeek inside the company, Greenberg added, would require a strict cybersecurity review.

Adnan Masood, chief AI architect of digital technology and information-technology services firm UST, said, “The anxiety is that you’re feeding sensitive corporate data into a system that originated from a strategic adversary, no matter how ingenious the engineering.”

“On the flip side, drastically lower costs and advanced capabilities tempt executives to risk these concerns for competitive advantage,” he added.

Write to Isabelle Bousquette at isabelle.bousquette@wsj.com and Belle Lin at belle.lin@wsj.com

9. The Classic Art of War Requires Integrating All Elements of Power

Excerpts:

In Ran Baratz’s essay “What’s Wrong with the Postmodern Military” and Victor Davis Hanson’s response, titled “What We Have Forgotten About War,” the authors lament the disease of strategic incompetence in Israel and the United States.

...

While it is proper to focus initially on improving the competence of the militaries in Western societies, I imagine that Baratz and Hanson would agree that it is also important to improve an understanding of war and warfare in government, academia, and the private sector. Understanding war is necessary if citizens are to grasp what is at stake and how they can help prepare for and ideally prevent it. Threats do not stop at the border and enemies will attempt to exploit vulnerabilities across all of society. Because new arenas of warfare transcend the limits of geography and reach into society and industry, every citizen should understand how they might contribute to defending the nation. Civilians play vital roles in countering hostile actions such as cyber-attacks and cyber-enabled information warfare. Engineers and scientists are vital for maintaining competitive advantages in military technology.

As the historian Zachary Shore observed, “the greatest source of national strength is an educated populace.” Reinvigoration of history in higher-level education is particularly important as many courses in diplomatic and military history have been displaced by theory-based international-relations courses that tend to mask the complex causality of events and obscure the profound cultural, psychological, social, and economic elements that distinguish cases from one another. Many universities do not teach military and diplomatic history or teach it only in relation to social history. Equating the study of military history to militarism is illogical. Thinking clearly about war and warfare is necessary for preventing as well as fighting wars. The analogy drawn by the late historian Dennis Showalter is apt: no one would ever accuse an oncologist of being an advocate for the disease he or she studies.

The Classic Art of War Requires Integrating All Elements of Power

Only the study of history can prepare us for the strategic challenges of the future.

https://mosaicmagazine.com/response/israel-zionism/2025/01/the-classic-art-of-war-requires-integrating-all-elements-of-power/?utm

Response

H.R. McMaster

Jan. 29 2025

About the author

H.R. McMaster retired from the U.S. Army in 2018 with rank of lieutenant-general, after serving in the Iraq and Afghan war. Between 2016 and 2018, he was the U.S. national security advisor and is currently a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

n Ran Baratz’s essay “What’s Wrong with the Postmodern Military” and Victor Davis Hanson’s response, titled “What We Have Forgotten About War,” the authors lament the disease of strategic incompetence in Israel and the United States. They also diagnose its causes and prescribe therapies. In so doing they advance arguments that are important to consider and act upon. The inability to employ military forces effectively in combination with other instruments of national power is dangerous as Israel and the United States face persistent threats to their security. Sadly, their examination of the erosion of strategic competence across eight decades indicates that we remain unlikely to learn from even our most recent strategic failures and disappointments.

Baratz and Hanson trace the erosion of competence to the displacement of classical strategy and military history with social science-based theories during the cold war. Baratz’s critique is consistent with that of Colin Gray in his 1971 Foreign Policy essay, “What Rand Hath Wrought,” in which Gray lamented the “economic conflict model” that “men of ideas” used without recognizing the impracticability of that model in “the world of action.” Their analysis is also consistent with my interpretation of U.S. failure in the Vietnam War in my 1997 book Dereliction of Duty. Robert McNamara, who served as secretary of defense from 1961–1968, and the “whiz kids” who joined him in the Pentagon viewed human relations through the lenses of rational-choice economics and systems analysis. Their conceit made them vulnerable to mirror-imaging an enemy driven by an ideology they did not comprehend.

Baratz points out that the belief that social-science theories combined with new technologies can reduce dramatically or eliminate the uncertainty of war is particularly problematic. He and Hanson agree that the orthodoxy associated with the “revolution in military affairs” or RMA in the 1990s considered war in a way that was alien to its nature. In a 2003 monograph on the principal assumption that underpinned the RMA-related concepts for future war, I observed that “despite its enthusiastic embrace, the assumption of near-certainty in future war is a dangerous fallacy” and predicted that “transformation efforts based on that assumption would disadvantage rather than advantage our forces and create vulnerability rather than build strength.”

In 2009, after returning from my third consecutive tour of duty in the Middle East where I saw how the belief in “dominant knowledge in future war” led to many of the frustrations encountered after the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, I penned an essay for World Affairs titled “When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy.” In it I observed that, in Vietnam and the U.S. war in Iraq that began in 2003, a “fixation on American technological superiority and an associated neglect of the human, psychological, and political dimensions of war doomed one effort and very nearly the other.”

Hanson argues that social dynamics within “more affluent and leisured Western capitalist consensual societies” combine with the continued belief that technological advantage to inspire “self-restraint” and a rejection of “the traditional aims of war to defeat, humiliate, and win concessions from the defeated.” Baratz argues that postmodernist thought eroded the IDF’s military professionalism, diverted its focus away from its “traditional national-security objective—namely, to fight and defeat the enemy,” leaving the IDF ill-prepared to prevent, or respond effectively to, the heinous attacks of October 7,2023.

Baratz and Hanson are right to place equal blame on military leaders as well as their civilian bosses for softheaded thinking that resulted in strategic incompetence and failures in wartime. Their arguments resonate with what I learned from practical experience as well as from the study of history. In Afghanistan and Iraq I witnessed inconsistent and flawed strategies that did not satisfy the simple definition of strategy taught in the U.S. military’s professional education system: the intelligent identification, use, and coordination of resources for the successful attainment of an objective. Put more bluntly, strategy is the use of the military’s available means to achieve a desired end.

And I had concluded that strategic incompetence was a moral failure as well as a failure of logic and reason. As commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq in the summer of 2005, I briefed my division and corps commanders on our plans for a major offensive operation in western Ninewa Province against al-Qaeda in Iraq (the organization that later became Islamic State). Our mission statement communicated clearly our intention to “defeat the enemy” in our area of operations and “set conditions for sustainable security” in the region. My senior commanders objected, asking “why do you have ‘defeat the enemy’ in your mission statement? We are not asking you to do that.” I responded that “we are engaged with modern-day barbarians who are the enemies of all civilized people, we have the means to defeat them, and, since we did come all this way, I thought we would knock it out.”

My answer did not go over well, but our soldiers, fighting alongside Iraqi Army and police units, inflicted a devastating defeat on the enemy and allowed life to return to normal for the people of a city and a region that had been beleaguered and living in abject fear for over a year. The true test of strategy, I came to believe, is whether a captain can explain to the soldiers in his or her company how the risks they will take and the sacrifices they may make will contribute to an end worthy of those risks and sacrifices.

I believed that the strategies in both Iraq and Afghanistan had become morally untenable because they did not describe to the American people how they would achieve outcomes worthy of the cost in blood and treasure. As in Vietnam, the wars of 9/11 suffered initially from a form of strategic narcissism based on the conceit that American military and technological prowess obviated the need to think deeply about the nature of the enemy or the political and human complexities of the war. That conceit was made possible through the neglect of history and, in particular, neglect of continuities in the very nature of war. It is easy to ignore continuities and assume that future war or future competitions short of war will be fundamentally different from the past.

Baratz is therefore right to call for a “return to a classical military mindset.” The problem with the orthodoxy of the RMA in the 1990s and today’s emerging theories of future war based on the assumption that artificial intelligence-related technologies render land warfare and close combat obsolete, is that they neglect continuities in the nature of war. To improve strategic competence, military and civilian leaders should study military history to develop an appreciation for four continuities, the neglect of which has contributed to strategic setbacks and failures in recent wars.

First, war is political. In Afghanistan and Iraq and, later, in Syria, our strategies violated the 18th-century philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum that “war should never be thought of as something autonomous, but always as an instrument of policy.” Although they were limited by space, Baratz and Hanson might have devoted more attention to the need to consolidate military gains to achieve sustainable political outcomes. There was no simple or purely military solution to the problem of Vietnam just as there was no military-only solution for more recent wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and the multi-front war inflicted on Israel since October 7, 2023. As the IDF is experiencing in Gaza, successful military operations are not ends in and of themselves; they are only one instrument of power that must be coordinated with others to achieve and sustain political goals.

Second, war is human. As Hanson observed in his concluding paragraph, “human nature stays constant across time and space.” Indeed, people fight today for the same fundamental reasons the Greek historian Thucydides identified nearly 2,500 years ago: fear, honor, and interest. In Vietnam, as was predicted, covert raids and “tit-for-tat” bombing did not convince Ho Chi Minh and the leaders of North Vietnam to desist from supporting the Vietnamese Communist insurgency in the South. In Afghanistan, Iraq, Gaza, and Lebanon, we have relearned that strategies that simply target enemy leaders or forces do not address the human as well as the political drivers of violence. That is why breaking the cycle of violence, restoring hope, reforming education, and isolating populations from ideologies that foment hatred and perpetuate violence are essential to enduring victory.

It is equally important to remember that the battles that comprise military campaigns and are the building blocks of victory are directed toward the disintegration of human groups. While Hanson is correct to remind us that killing and the prospect of death are inherent in war and it is vital to overmatch the enemy in battle, it is also important to apply firepower with discipline and discrimination lest the indiscriminate use of force undermine one’s objectives or lead to the undoing of moral character in military units and the erosion of the warrior ethos.

Third: war is uncertain. War is uncertain because it is political and human and because, as the saying goes, the enemy gets a vote. As Baratz points out, militaries must be capable of operating at sufficient scale and for ample duration to cope with uncertainty and impose its will on the enemy. Forces designed for efficiency based on flawed assumptions are likely to result in longer and costlier wars. And because the enemy has a say in the future course of events, military forces must be designed to operate under conditions of uncertainty and adapt continuously to retain the initiative. The United States Army’s recent decision to eliminate its reconnaissance and security squadrons from its light infantry brigades is utterly inconsistent with the lessons of recent and ongoing conflicts.

Fourth, war is a contest of wills. As General George Marshall observed in his address to the American Historical Association’s annual meeting in 1939, “In our democracy where the government is truly an agent of the popular will,” foreign policy and military policy are “dependent on public opinion,” and our policies and strategies “will be as good or bad as the public is well informed or poorly informed regarding the factors that bear on the subject.” The unexpected length and difficulty of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq sapped American will. U.S. leaders did not devote sufficient effort to explaining what was at stake in those wars and how the sacrifices of their fellow citizens were contributing to a worthy outcome. War reporting focused on casualties or troop levels while portraying soldiers as victims who had no authorship over their fate. Over time, post-9/11 “endless wars” became conflated with the trauma of Vietnam and drained the reservoir of America’s will.

While it is proper to focus initially on improving the competence of the militaries in Western societies, I imagine that Baratz and Hanson would agree that it is also important to improve an understanding of war and warfare in government, academia, and the private sector. Understanding war is necessary if citizens are to grasp what is at stake and how they can help prepare for and ideally prevent it. Threats do not stop at the border and enemies will attempt to exploit vulnerabilities across all of society. Because new arenas of warfare transcend the limits of geography and reach into society and industry, every citizen should understand how they might contribute to defending the nation. Civilians play vital roles in countering hostile actions such as cyber-attacks and cyber-enabled information warfare. Engineers and scientists are vital for maintaining competitive advantages in military technology.

As the historian Zachary Shore observed, “the greatest source of national strength is an educated populace.” Reinvigoration of history in higher-level education is particularly important as many courses in diplomatic and military history have been displaced by theory-based international-relations courses that tend to mask the complex causality of events and obscure the profound cultural, psychological, social, and economic elements that distinguish cases from one another. Many universities do not teach military and diplomatic history or teach it only in relation to social history. Equating the study of military history to militarism is illogical. Thinking clearly about war and warfare is necessary for preventing as well as fighting wars. The analogy drawn by the late historian Dennis Showalter is apt: no one would ever accuse an oncologist of being an advocate for the disease he or she studies.

Full disclosure:

Victor Davis Hanson and I are friends and colleagues. We occupy offices on the 11th floor of the Hoover Tower at the center of Stanford University’s campus. Herbert Hoover founded the institution that bears his name a century earlier after witnessing the horrors of the Great War. Hoover, an orphan who graduated from Stanford University’s inaugural class and would later become America’s 31st president, resolved to do all he could to help prevent another war. The experience of World War I, a conflict that took the lives of over 16 million people, highlighted the need to understand the political and historical basis for violent conflict as critical both to preserving peace and ending wars. He meant the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace to be a place where scholars might study past wars to prevent future conflicts and preserve peace. As we know, however, the “war to end all wars” was instead the first of two world wars that marked the bloodiest century in human history. The tower that contains the vast collection of the Hoover Archive, a collection meant to provide scholars with materials that might help explain both the origins of wars and uncover prospects for peace, was completed in 1941, the year the United States entered World War II.

Hoover’s hopes that humanity would find a way to end war were thus dashed, and it is unlikely they will be fulfilled in the foreseeable future. But wars are best avoided, and it takes a good deal of political wisdom and effort to do so. Once one is in a war, however, it is best to win it, and to do so as swiftly and decisively as possible. New technologies may change tactics, but will not change the fundamental nature of war. And that nature can only be understood by the study of history and the classic art of integrating all elements of power and connecting military means to strategic ends. The future of Israel, and America, depends on whether generals and political leaders learn from the past.

More about: Iraq war, Military history, U.S. military

10. Trump’s Transactional Foreign Policy Leads to Flurry of Pledges

POTUS has them right where he wants them. He is going to get cooperation. Can he exploit it to serve US national interests? Will there be short term gains at the expense of long term relationships? What should be the basis for a strategic relationship: purely transactional or shared values, sufficiently aligned interests, and trust? What best suits US national interests?

Excerpts:

“What he’s basically tried to do is create something like a global bidding war for America’s favor — which means Trump’s favor,” said Hal Brands, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington who’s advised US government agencies.

The big challenge for Trump is that while such an approach might succeed in attracting more investment, there’s no sign it will help on bigger, more intractable problems, like ridding the Korean Peninsula of nuclear weapons or resolving the war in Ukraine.

It’s also too early to say whether the approach will pull poorer countries out of the orbit of China, which for years has offered low-interest loans and massive infrastructure investment. Trump’s combination of carrots and sticks may even spur countries to hedge their bets against the US in the long run.

“The danger is that the larger project of American global leadership over the past 80 years has been premised on the idea that the US will not weaponize its power to the fullest in search of narrow transactional gains,” Brands said.

Trump’s Transactional Foreign Policy Leads to Flurry of Pledges

Promises of Saudi investment, LNG for Europe, Boeing planes
It’s ‘a global bidding war’ for Trump’s favor, an analyst says
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-30/trump-s-transanctional-foreign-policy-leads-to-flurry-of-pledges?utm

By Iain Marlow

January 29, 2025 at 7:00 PM EST

President Donald Trump has boasted about bringing a more transactional approach to his relationship with world leaders. Just over a week into his second term, many have shown they’re eager to make the deals he treasures.

Saudi Arabia offered to invest more than $600 billion in the next four years while European governments will look to purchase more US-produced liquefied natural gas. Vietnam’s leader suggested his country might buy more Boeing Co. planes. India raised the possibility of importing more oil.

The rush to curry Trump’s favor makes clear just how much global leaders learned their lesson from his first term, when the quickest way to the president’s heart was to offer investment and other deals. Very early in his second term, they’re doubling down on that strategy.

The offers are often accompanied by reassurances that such decisions are in their national interest. Beyond trying to get in Trump’s good graces, nations want to avoid being in the crosshairs of the tariffs he’s already threatened — not only against adversary China but also against US partners Canada, Mexico and Colombia.

“What he’s basically tried to do is create something like a global bidding war for America’s favor — which means Trump’s favor,” said Hal Brands, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington who’s advised US government agencies.

The big challenge for Trump is that while such an approach might succeed in attracting more investment, there’s no sign it will help on bigger, more intractable problems, like ridding the Korean Peninsula of nuclear weapons or resolving the war in Ukraine.

It’s also too early to say whether the approach will pull poorer countries out of the orbit of China, which for years has offered low-interest loans and massive infrastructure investment. Trump’s combination of carrots and sticks may even spur countries to hedge their bets against the US in the long run.

“The danger is that the larger project of American global leadership over the past 80 years has been premised on the idea that the US will not weaponize its power to the fullest in search of narrow transactional gains,” Brands said.

After Trump took office for the second time, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman offered his vow to expand investment and trade by $600 billion. Ever the negotiator, Trump said he wanted the crown prince to push that to $1 trillion.

Later, speaking at a rally in Las Vegas, Trump made clear why he thought Saudi Arabia had made the offer. “It’s because of the election,” he said.

Canada also pledged to spend almost $1 billion on border security after Trump threatened 25% tariffs over what he alleged were excessive flows of illegal drugs and migrants over the northern border — figures which, in fact, pale in comparison to the southern border with Mexico.

Vietnam’s Prime Minister, Pham Minh Chinh, told a crowd at the World Economic Forum in Davos that he was “working on solutions” to try and rebalance his country’s trade surplus with the US, including buying more Boeing planes and other high-tech items.

“If playing golf can help bring benefits to my country and my people, then I can play golf all day long,” Pham said, invoking Trump’s favorite hobby.

At the moment, countries are trying to parse the logistics of how they can offer Trump big economic and investment packages to win his favor, one diplomat from an allied country said, asking not to be identified to discuss private deliberations.

El Salvadorean leader Nayib Bukele received praise from White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller as a “very great and strong partner” after he offered “tremendous degrees of cooperation” on migration.

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is planning to get off on the right note with Trump in a meeting planned for February by pledging to increase imports of American shale gas, Nikkei has reported.

Trump’s transactional approach and penchant for big deals has led to criticism. During their presidential debate, the Democratic nominee Kamala Harris warned that autocrats would try to “manipulate you with flattery and favors.’

There’s also a possibility that threatened countries have already figured out how they might handle him. In Canada, long one of America’s closest allies, politicians vying to succeed Prime Minister Justin Trudeau have discussed how to deal with the American president’s threats.

Chrystia Freeland, the finance minister who renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement during the first Trump administration, told Bloomberg this week that the US president “has come to the conclusion that if he can show the rest of the world how mean and tough he can be with his closest partners and allies,” then that will send a message to America’s foes. She warned that “for Trump, weakness is a provocation. I think capitulation is not a negotiating strategy with him.”

“Leaders of other countries aren’t stupid,” said Emma Ashford, a senior fellow with the Stimson Center. “It’s a viable strategy, both for other states who want to win over the president, and for the new administration in trying to get concessions. But it’s probably a strategy with declining returns and one that isn’t going to work on big or difficult issues.”

— With assistance from Stephanie Lai

10. misunderstandings – military aircraft

From one of my many great mentors on the use of military aircraft for other than military purposes (e.g., deportation), the tragic crash in DC last evening, and north Korea.

Actions create consequences

misunderstandings

military aircraft

https://cynthiawatson.substack.com/p/misunderstandings?utm

Cynthia Watson

Jan 30, 2025

I read seemingly countless sources of ideas every day, some better and others worse. Much of it relates to national security in one way or another because that’s been my scholarly focus for so long, plus as a citizen I want to know what is going on.

An exchange in a huge chatroom caught my attention early this morning amid our week of tragedy, upheaval, and day-to-day humdrum, all of which are occurring simultaneously. The primary focus of the original email message condemned the Trump administration’s choice to use U.S. military flights for the deportations being carried out across the country. Retired Lieutenant General Mark Hertling, a National War College student in the 1990s before rising to be a senior Army officer in Europe, wrote an article on The Bulwark about using these cargo flights to deport migrants, condemning the spectacle of parading the apprehended into the planes on military bases.

It wasn’t Hertling’s article that got my attention but another chatroom member’s note “[S]ocial media, even ’normal media’, are awash with comments like ‘Well, why not use air force planes? They’re free. They’re just sitting around doing nothing’”.

This is a misunderstanding on so many levels. Military planes are hardly free in any sense I can conjure up: they are expensive, specialized tools of national security whether the airframes or the crews. As Hertling notes, a civilian Boeing 737 costs about $100 million per plane. Air Force planes, equipped again by manufacturer Boeing, are at least twice as expensive because they fly with specialized fuel tanks, aeronautics, different landing gears, and various defensive features which we provide our pilots. That cost figure is merely for the plane, without exploring the costs of training the superb fliers who take these cargo planes into the air. That cost also ignores the maintenance costs required to keep these superb machines at their maximum capacity. Under no circumstances can one describe these as free.

Military cargo planes are enormous, expensive war machines. That is why you and I the taxpayer buy them, using them as tools of statecraft to support military operations. People probably focus more on fighters and bombers but cargo flights are utterly vital to transporting people and materiel across the globe. Those trained to fly the C-17, the C-9, or the C-130 airframes are—like all military personnel—exquisitely trained. They exercise to be the finest force in the world to be available at a moment’s notice to carry out the security needs of our country whenever required. In an era where we deploy forces so frequently, military aviation activity across the services is frequent.

If those on social media mean the cargo planes are just sitting around rather than on long-term deployment, that assumption is wrong as well. Being a pilot doesn’t mean “one and done” qualifying to fly but requires constant reappraisals of skills to assure most effective performance. Our vast array of requirements across the globe mandate the armed forces put its personnel through constant, on-going, persistent training to assure mastery and safety, both for the planes and the crews. You and I hardly want to lose a plane worth hundreds of millions dollars any more than we want to see a crew injured or killed. The constant efforts to assure the best quality force means everything is going on all of the time rather than awaiting a mission. U.S. military units are also involved around the world 24/7 every single day of the year. They are not sitting around without something to do but, whether active duty or reservists or National Guard, these fliers are hardly looking for something to do with their time.

The tragic crash less than eight hours ago between an Army helicopter and an American Airlines regional jet 400 feet over the Potomac River reflects this reality. We have no answers yet on the cause of the mid-air collision but we do know the Blackhawk was on a training mission en route from Fort Belvoir (south of Washington, D.C. in Virginia) while the commercial flight was on final approach on its flight from Wichita. Trying to find the sixty-seven people on both crafts is the immediate concern, as it should be, but we will later hear more on what the Blackhawk crew was doing last night over the Potomac.

It’s tempting to assume the military (or federal government, for that matter) operates automatically, as if there were no costs and actions involved. But the argument that the military is automatically cheaper or unencumbered with missions is just incorrect.

A response to yesterday’s column on nuclear weapons and Dr. Strangelove. A faithful paid subscriber who knows the North Korean problem better than anyone I know sent me the following comment yesterday afternoon:

4. This is the critical Strategic Assumption: North Korea will never negotiate away its nuclear capabilities as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. However, denuclearization must remain the long term goal, and the US cannot fall victim to the regime’s political warfare strategy by entering into arms control negotiations or recognizing the north as a nuclear state.

5. Recognize that it is the Kim family regime that has the hostile policy and strategy toward the ROK, the US, and the free world.

6. Recognize that north Korea is an integral part of the Axis of upheaval or Dark Quad and actually provides key support to China (as a disruptor of the ROK/US alliance and ROK/Japan/US trilateral cooperation), Russia (military support to Putin’s War), and Iran (with advanced military equipment to Iran and its proxies through its extensive proliferation activities to raise funds for regime survival). If you want to achieve effects versus China, Russia, and Iran you must attack the relationships among the four. Northeast/East Asia is the new “great game” of “strategic competition” and the South Korean political turmoil is a casualty in the game. China is playing the game but does the US recognize that such a game is taking place?

7. Therefore, given the hostile nature of the Kim family regime it is imperative to maintain a high level of combined military readiness in Northeast Asia to deter and recognize the single most important contribution to deterring the Kim family regime is the presence of US troops.

8. Recognize that while the defense of Taiwan is important to the free world, that a free Taiwan is of little value if it comes at the expense of South Korea being dominated by north Korea and China. The US must take a holistic approach to national security in the Indo-Pacific.

9. The neglected threat from north Korea is internal instability. The conditions that lead to internal instability and potential regime collapse are also the conditions that could lead Kim to make the decision to go to war as a desperate attempt to survive. It is critical to recognize that Kim Jong Un is under threat from within. He fears the Korean people in the north more than the combined ROK and US militaries. Information is an existential threat to his rule, and this must be used to US and ROK/US alliance advantage.

10. The long term strategy of the U.S. must rest on the foundation of military deterrence and “strategic strangulation” – the well-executed use of sanctions and all instruments of national power to prevent weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, and global illicit activities to support the regime. The new strategy must consist of three pillars to support the Korean people in the north to create the conditions for change inside north Korea: (1) a human rights upfront approach (emphasize the fundamental human right of self-determination of government per the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights); (2) an information and influence campaign to inform and educate the Korean people in the north about their human rights and provide them practical knowledge for how to take collective action and create the conditions for change; (3) support to the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ as they seek to solve the Korean question and establish a free and unified Korea, a new nation, a United Republic of Korea (ROK). A Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK).

11. If I could only give 12 words to the Trump administration it would be these: Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through human rights.

Tough words on a scary problem.

Not a good start to any day. My thoughts are with those lost last night in this tragedy.

12. Army's hurry-up force-design ideas are due in March, chief says

Army's hurry-up force-design ideas are due in March, chief says

Planners are working against a six-month deadline to recommend force-structure cuts and unit reconfigurations

By Meghann Myers

Staff Reporter

January 29, 2025 05:36 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers

The Army is getting ready to move out on its plan to cut force structure and reconfigure some units, a year after the changes were first announced.

Army Training and Doctrine Command is due to provide feedback to top leadership in March that will help inform the Army’s new force design, the Army chief of staff said Wednesday at an Association of the U.S. Army event outside Washington, D.C.

“Everybody says, ‘Hey, it takes three years to do a force-design update,’ “ Gen. Randy George told the audience. “And, you know, we all got together at the four-star conference…last October, and said, ‘OK, you've got six months.’ “

Expected changes include beefed up air-and-missile defense units and the deactivation of some formations, such as cavalry squadrons—units that made more sense in the close-combat days of counterinsurgency but are no longer in high demand.

The new force design will be heavily influenced by the Army’s ongoing Transformation in Contact project, which has sent units into the field with updated training scenarios and allowed them to work closely with industry to come up with solutions on the fly. Ukraine’s use of drones, for example, has inspired the Army to work them into U.S. doctrine.

Those lessons will inform how the Army’s brigade combat teams operate.

“There are only lessons observed until you change how you train and operate,” he said. “These units are changing how they train and operate.”

George is headed to Germany next week to see the Army’s third TiC brigade in action, he said. Through mid-February, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division is participating in Exercise Combined Resolve.

This latest iteration of transformation in contact is slightly different, he said, with a strike company inside each battalion, which includes scouts, armed drones, mortars, counter-drone systems and electronic warfare teams.

Previously, TiC units had tested multifunctional reconnaissance companies that use sensors and drones to detect enemy activity, then call in strikes.

George said the Army is looking to also lighten soldiers’ workload. Long, drawn-out equipment layouts, where everything is catalogued and assessed, are getting an update, he said.

“But we're not maintaining equipment…that we don't need,” he said.

Light brigade combat teams in particular will see this change because, he said, they have taken on too many vehicles and thus, add too much of a maintenance burden on the soldier.

“So you'll see some of that when you see some of the force-design update,” he said.

defenseone.com · by Meghann Myers

13. Feds shouldn't take ‘deferred resignation’ offer, warn employee groups, Democrats, experts

Three articles below from Defense One, NPR, and Forbes/AP:

1. Feds shouldn't take ‘deferred resignation’ offer, warn employee groups, Democrats, experts

'2. Not a buyout': Attorneys and unions urge federal workers not to resign

3. Everything you need to know about Trump’s buyout proposal for the federal government’s 2+ million employees, who warn the purge will have vast ‘unintended consequences’

Feds shouldn't take ‘deferred resignation’ offer, warn employee groups, Democrats, experts

They say the purported severance package may lack a legal underpinning—and that Trump and Musk have been accused of reneging on promises to employees.

By Eric Katz and Erich Wagner

January 29, 2025 05:19 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Eric Katz

Federal-employee groups, Democratic lawmakers, and good-government experts are warning workers not to respond to the Trump administration’s “deferred resignation” email, which officials said offered “buyouts” to nearly the entire federal workforce but whose terms more closely resemble extended paid leave before leaving government.

By Tuesday morning, a consensus had emerged among unions and other federal employee associations: Don’t take the deal. Between the questionable legal authority to grant deferred resignations, a lack of guarantee that an employees’ resignation will be accepted and that their pay and benefits will actually continue, and Elon Musk’s involvement and past history with mass resignation efforts, feds should be wary, they said.

“Right now, we have more questions than answers about this email and the ‘deferred resignation program,’” reads an email from Matt Biggs, president of the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers to union locals. “We know of no underlying policy nor any authority under which OPM is offering ‘deferred resignation.’ We ask you . . . to tell [bargaining unit employees] not to ‘resign’ and accept the terms of the ‘deferred resignation program.’”

The administration's email claimed that federal employees who resign by Feb. 6 can retain their current pay and benefits until Sept. 30. Although federal regulations cap buyouts through the Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment program at $25,000, the administration appears to be circumventing this by instructing agencies to place resigning employees on paid administrative leave for the remainder of the fiscal year.

In an FAQ compiled for members, the American Federation of Government Employees warned that the administration could exploit loopholes to avoid paying employees who accepted the resignation offer.

“Nothing in the program documentation purports to prohibit the termination or separation of an employee who accepts deferred resignation,” the union wrote. “While the OPM email suggest that employees will maintain their compensation and benefits until the effective date of their resignation date, it does not explicitly state that employees are shielded from layoffs or other adverse actions before Sept. 30, 2025. There is no guarantee that employees opting into the program will not be targeted for such actions.”

Democrats on Capitol Hill also noted that Donald Trump and Musk have been accused of bilking vendors and employees. When Musk acquired Twitter in 2022, he sent a similar mass email to employees—also entitled “Fork in the Road”—soliciting resignations. Last year, former employees sued the multi-billionaire for allegedly reneging on severance payments, though the case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

“I'm just saying to folks, ‘Don't fall for what so many contractors have fallen for with this guy',” Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., said. “‘Come work on my casino, come work on my hotel,’ and then they end up getting stiffed. And I think they're getting set up to face the same treatment.”

Kaine added he did not think Trump had the legal authority to carry out the quasi-severance offers and the only guarantee is the administration would not backfill for those individuals who do leave.

“It looked like another rushed Trump scam to me,” said Sen. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md. “I’m not sure if it’s legal but I would advise [federal employees] to make sure it is if they’re even thinking about it because…Donald Trump has a history of not following through.”

Several Democrats cautioned that if Trump backtracks on his offer or it is deemed unlawful, those who did sign up for the severance would then have targets on their backs as disloyal workers. Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., the top Democrat on the Senate Appropriations Committee, said federal workers could face consequences if the offers are rescinded.

“We have not been able to see any authority for that, nor do we have the appropriations to do that,” Murray said. “I think it could leave the employees in a tough spot.”

Republican lawmakers, meanwhile, embraced Trump’s push.

“Totally support it," Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wisc., said, adding he is in favor of “weaning people off the federal government.” He noted he had not “scoured federal statutes” to determine whether the offers were legal but he assumed they “probably” were.

Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., who chairs the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, said any effort to downsize government was “a good idea.”

“I think we should try every possible legal means of making government smaller and making government live within its means,” Paul said, adding that he believed that the president has wide authorities to conduct hiring and firing of federal employees.

Max Stier, president of the Partnership for Public Service, said the measure was likely to eliminate critical skills at agencies, hurting their abilities to carry out their missions.

“The Trump administration’s recent efforts to encourage the bulk of the federal workforce to resign are perplexing, of questionable legality and dangerous,” Stier said in a statement. “Americans rely on federal workers to fly safely, help veterans and seniors access their benefits, keep our food and water safe, protect public health, respond to natural disasters and maintain the rule of law. Stripping away expert talent through such a non-strategic approach puts all of us at risk in a profound way.”

And Doreen Greenwald, national president of the National Treasury Employees Union, described the the resignation offer, coupled with the new administration’s ongoing efforts to strip federal workers of their civil service protections and effectively end telework,” as “coercive.”

“The so-called ‘deal’ is a hostile effort to disparage federal employees, weaken agencies and disrupt the valuable services that these employees provide to the public daily,” she said. “The OPM documents lack clarity about the exact terms of the offer, making it unreliable. We also question whether OPM has the legal authority to use a ‘deferred resignation’ to put people on extended administrative leave under these circumstances.”

defenseone.com · by Eric Katz

'Not a buyout': Attorneys and unions urge federal workers not to resign

NPR · by Andrea Hsu · January 29, 2025

The Theodore Roosevelt Federal Building that houses the Office of Personnel Management headquarters is shown June 5, 2015 in Washington, D.C. Mark Wilson/Getty Images North America

Federal employee unions and attorneys are urging government workers not to accept an offer from the Trump administration to resign from their jobs by Feb. 6 and be paid through the end of September.

"This 'fork' thing is not a buyout," said Jim Eisenmann, a partner with Alden Law Group who represents federal employees, referring to the "Fork in the Road" subject line that accompanied an email sent to federal workers Tuesday. "It's not based on any law or regulation or anything really other than an idea they cooked up to get federal employees out of the government."

Sponsor Message

The email told employees they had until Feb. 6 to accept the deal, calling it a "deferred resignation program." Anyone wishing to resign was instructed to reply to the email with the word "resign" and hit "send."

Almost immediately after the memo hit inboxes, federal workers began sharing their confusion, anger and disbelief on Reddit and elsewhere.

Memo lacked clarity on whether employees who resigned would continue to work

Some of the confusion arose from mixed messaging coming from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM).

The original OPM memo was unclear on whether employees who choose to resign would be expected to work between now and Sept. 30.

Language included in the memo states: "I understand my employing agency will likely make adjustments in response to my resignation including moving, eliminating, consolidating, reassigning my position and tasks, reducing my official duties, and/or placing me on paid administrative leave until my resignation date."

One part of the letter that was clear was that employees who accepted the offer would not have to comply with return-to-office requirements.

Many employees took that to mean if they accepted the offer, they would still be expected to work through Sept. 30, but could continue teleworking.

Later, the agency posted an FAQ stating: "Except in rare cases determined by your agency, you are not expected to work."

An OPM spokesperson confirmed to NPR Tuesday night that the expectation was that employees would be put on paid administrative leave soon after they replied to the memo.

Sponsor Message

Eisenmann cautioned federal workers to be wary.

"There's no guarantee other things won't happen to them between now and then, like they won't get fired for some other reason or they won't get laid off pursuant to a reduction in force," he said.

Some employees even wondered if the email was real

Another red flag for many employees was the fact that the email came directly from OPM, not from their agency heads, which is standard protocol.

Several federal employees told NPR that before last week, they had never received any communications directly from OPM. Some even questioned whether the email was real.

Federal employee unions have condemned the email and are telling their employees not to resign.

Matthew Biggs, president of the International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers (IFPTE), went as far as to call the email a "resignation threat."

"It's written pretty clearly that if you don't take this thing, this so-called offer, you may not have a job," he said, pointing to a part of the memo that informs employees who wish to remain in their jobs that "the certainty of your position or agency" is not assured.

IFPTE represents roughly 30,000 federal employees including at NASA, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice.

Biggs says members who work in areas the memo excludes from the resignation offer, including immigration enforcement and national security, nevertheless received the memo.

"We represent people that do cybersecurity at NASA and other places. We represent scientists, engineers. At the Navy yards, we represent folks that prepare these submarines and these aircraft carriers to go out to sea to support our Navy personnel," he said.

"What if all these people accepted the offer? What would that do to our national security?"

NPR · by Andrea Hsu · January 29, 2025

Everything you need to know about Trump’s buyout proposal for the federal government’s 2+ million employees, who warn the purge will have vast ‘unintended consequences’

BYBrian Witte and The Associated Press

January 29, 2025 at 2:38 PM EST

President Donald Trump’s administration is offering buyouts to federal employees to quickly reduce the government workforce. They don’t have a long time to decide: The deadline is Feb. 6.

The buyouts are for all full-time federal employees except for military personnel, employees of the U.S. Postal Service and those in positions related to immigration enforcement and national security. They would get about eight months of salary if they accept.

An email about the offer was sent Tuesday to more than 2 million workers, according to Katie Miller, who serves on an advisory board to the Department of Government Efficiency, a special commission headed by Tesla CEO Elon Musk and tasked with shrinking the size of government.

Here’s what we know about the offer and the makeup of the federal workforce:

What is the offer?

In addition to receiving their salary and retaining all benefits during this time, workers who go along will be exempted from all applicable in-person work requirements until Sept. 30, as the administration pushes to require employees to return to offices. The emailed offer includes instructions on how to accept: select “Reply” and “Type the word ‘Resign’ into the body of this email and hit ‘send.'”

What if workers decide to stay?

They will be expected to return to their offices full time, in keeping with the president’s push to end COVID-19 pandemic-era remote work. The memo says Trump “will insist on excellence at every level.” It also notes that the majority of federal agencies “are likely to be downsized,” and that “employees will be subject to enhanced standards of suitability and conduct as we move forward.”

Can they return to government service?

Workers who take the buyout can apply for other government work in the future.

How many employees are there?

The federal government employed more than 3 million people as of November, accounting for nearly 1.9% of the nation’s entire civilian workforce, according to the Pew Research Center. The civilian workforce is about 2.4 million, excluding U.S. Postal Service employees and active-duty military.

The number of federal workers who are not postal employees or active-duty military has been slowly growing since 2000, but has mostly kept pace with the growth of the overall population, according to an analysis by Pew.

How long do federal employees stay on the job?

The average tenure for a federal employee is nearly 12 years, according to a Pew analysis of data from the Office of Personnel Management. The highest percentage of them, about 19%, have worked for the government between five years and 10 years About 15% have worked between 10 years to 14 years, and about 14% have worked between 15 years and 19 years. The numbers drop off after that. Nearly 9% have worked 20 years to 24 years, and nearly 4% have worked between 25 years and 29 years. A little more than 3% have worked 30 years to 34 years, and about 3.4% have worked 35 or more years.

Where do they work?

The largest chunk of federal workers, nearly 20%, are in the District of Columbia and neighboring Maryland and Virginia, according to the Pew analysis. California, the nation’s largest state by population, has the highest number, about 147,500, but that’s less than 1% of total nonfarming employees in the state.

Other big states also have large numbers of federal workers. There are about 130,000 in Texas, but that accounts for less than 1% of nonfarming jobs there; Florida has about 94,000.

What do workers say about the offer?

Federal workers only got the offer late Tuesday. The proposal was criticized by the head of the American Federation of Government Employees Union, Everett Kelley, who said the buyouts were more of an effort to pressure workers who were not considered loyal to the new administration to leave their jobs.

“Purging the federal government of dedicated career federal employees will have vast, unintended consequences that will cause chaos for the Americans who depend on a functioning federal government,” Kelley said in a statement. “Between the flurry of anti-worker executive orders and policies, it is clear that the Trump administration’s goal is to turn the federal government into a toxic environment where workers cannot stay even if they want to.”

14. Some Say AI Is the Greatest Invention of All Time. I Don’t Get It.

Excerpts:

Silicon Valley really needs AI to work, financially. It’s been looking for a new market to monetize for some time. Social media companies have relentlessly tried to wring every last cent out of their networks, and even so there are indicators that social media is a declining economic phenomenon. (Does “the next Facebook” sound like a remotely sexy investment to you?) Smartphones have become a technology that people don’t feel they have to upgrade every year anymore, while virtual reality has not lived up to its hype, at least financially. For years now, the tech industry has believed in limitless growth, but with so many mature product categories and saturated fields, right now one of the only areas of potentially explosive growth in Silicon Valley is AI—whether it’s actually useful or not. And the fact that Nvidia just lost almost $600 billion in hypothetical worth because a company in China produced an LLM system as powerful as the best offered by Silicon Valley, for a lot less money, is a sign that here, “worth” is an idea rather than a reality.

There will be some gradual improvements to productivity and time management from these systems, just as with routine software development. But whatever the hype machine says, I don’t think artificial intelligence will impact average quality of life anywhere near as much as changes in distribution of wealth, and in matters of war and peace. And I’d bet money that the technological growth most likely to actually revolutionize some aspect of human existence is not AI but biomedical science, probably genetic engineering specifically. In the field of IVF, for example, very likely developments in near-future technology would have immense consequences if realized.

I think there’s something else besides economics going on with the AI hype, though: People badly wish to escape mundane reality and all of its grinding indignities, and artificial intelligence—or those who market it, at least—has tapped into that desire. To those people, I say: in 10, and 20, and 30 years, you’ll still have to do chores that you hate, and if they find some way to automate away a particularly onerous chore, there will be some other petty task to take its place. That’s how human life works. You’ll still have to stand in impotent resentment while you wait for a subway train that will arrive already stuffed with too many riders. And if they invent the teleporter, then you’ll find other reasons to feel bored and annoyed. The good news is that for those who aren’t impoverished or seriously disabled, and who live in the developed world, there’s a great deal of opportunity for frequently sunny and generally comfortable lives that feature loving relationships. You will always be unsatisfied, but it will still be enough.

Some Say AI Is the Greatest Invention of All Time. I Don’t Get It.

People want artificial intelligence to save them from the grinding indignities of life. Spoiler alert: It won’t.

By Freddie deBoer

01.29.25 — Culture and Ideas

https://www.thefp.com/p/freddie-de-boer-is-ai-the-greatest-invention-or-overhyped?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

The conversation about artificial intelligence remains absurd, hype-ridden, and utterly out of touch with actual material reality. I could have written that sentence in 2024, 2023, or 2022, and it would have also been true. But it felt particularly true earlier this week, when America woke to the news that the stock price of Nvidia, a Silicon Valley company responsible for a lot of our AI breakthroughs, had tanked because a Chinese start-up had succeeded in quickly and cheaply making comparable models.

Many, many powerful people have said that artificial intelligence is one of the most important human inventions of all time. My reaction to them is: Wow, these people must really enjoy shitting in the yard.

Here’s an important human invention: plumbing. Bringing fresh water from one place to another, and disposing of human waste via engineering. It wasn’t until the 1960s that a majority of American homes could do this, which means that the beginning of the Space Age overlapped with a period when most Americans couldn’t wash their hands whenever they wanted to. And as cool as launching satellites and orbiting the earth and traveling to the moon are, their practical impacts on human life pale in comparison to modern plumbing.

Anyone who cites AI as the pinnacle of human ingenuity, above plumbing, should try spending a month without the latter. You have to piss outside. If you want to wash your hands after doing so, your problems multiply. You have to walk to a well, if you can find one, to get (hopefully clean) water, and then you have to heat it up on your stove if you want it hot. You can’t shower, and taking a bath would be a remarkably laborious process. Before mass indoor plumbing, cholera, typhoid, gastrointestinal worms, scarlet fever, hepatitis, and more were massively harder to avoid. I don’t know you, but I feel considerable confidence in suggesting that your desire to avoid those diseases is greater than your attachment to ChatGPT.

You might call this the shitting-in-the-yard test—or the indoor plumbing test, for those who prefer to avoid vulgarity. The test requires you to compare the hype about a particular tech product to a brick-and-mortar change wrought in the last century. Is Zoom really a bigger part of your life than food refrigeration, a technology that has saved untold millions of lives over the decades by dramatically reducing deaths from foodborne illness? Is cloud storage really a bigger deal than infant vaccines, which save six lives a minute? Is AI more important than the bowl? By which I mean, bowls. To put food in. To eat out of. Try and spend the rest of your life without ever using another food container and get back to me about whether generative AI is more important. Food containers are inventions, too!

What can AI allow us to do today that we couldn’t do without AI? Watch this Apple Intelligence advertisement. It is about a dumb and lazy white-collar worker named Warren who spends his days in the office playing with a tape dispenser. He spends 30 seconds writing a very bad email, then uses AI on his iPhone to translate it into a more professional, formulaic 50-word message that sounds fine. When Warren’s boss receives it, he is flabbergasted. That is how low his expectations of Warren are. The explicit message of this ad is that the product being sold is for the dumbest people alive. And Apple is not the only company that’s selling AI by trumpeting its ability to shepherd the tragically stupid through life.

Anyone who cites AI as the pinnacle of human ingenuity, above plumbing, should try spending a month without the latter.

I struggle to see how fobbing off minor administrative tasks to software warrants the hype. I can tell you the social importance of replacing oil lamps with incandescent bulbs and of replacing incandescents with LEDs. I can’t tell you the social importance of allowing Warren to get away with being a shitty employee.

But you can understand the conundrum: AI is being sold with the most outsize hype of any development in my 43 years of life, but what AI can do right now is maybe automate a few dull tasks that afflict the white-collar worker. A little over two years since people declared the world forever changed by the release of ChatGPT, what large language models (LLM) can actually do is remarkably limited. They can access and synthesize information, but not better than an educated adult. For important tasks, almost anyone will choose to do that work themselves, especially given ongoing issues with the outputs of LLMs. Doing it yourself is how you get and stay smart. And when LLMs get as good at humans at writing formulaic emails. . .

. . . so what? Before the invention of the airplane, we couldn’t fly. After the invention of the airplane, we could. In any plausible nearish future, what affordances can AI provide us that could not be produced via other means?

You can use AI to produce images from text, but the output is nothing that humans couldn’t already produce, and working with a graphic designer will be far more effective when it comes to actually implementing your vision. And anyway, for the vast majority of people, the ability to generate images from text falls firmly into the “that’s cool” category of minor amusements, not into the realm of real, practical consequence. Also, I note with some amusement that you can now pay to take classes in how to use text-to-image engines most effectively. This technology is supposed to be accessible, yet like so much of what’s valuable in our society, the actual skill to use it is paywalled. Moreover, if you trawl forums dedicated to these engines, you’ll find immense frustration even among their most devoted users; for every amazing image someone shares that came from an AI, there are dozens that came out borked and were discarded.

The ways in which AI could be really useful remain firmly in the realm of science fiction, like the idea it could eliminate money or end death. Yet the absolutely constant hype inflation never stops. Here’s someone named Ross Lazer claiming that the ability of an AI “agent” to order a pizza for you is as transformative as the automobile. To be clear: What’s not being referred to here is the ability to order a pizza online, which is an affordance so old that pizza is believed to be the first thing ever sold via the internet. No, what’s as transformative as the automobile—which utterly changed commerce, socializing, and our lived environments—is simply the ability to get a bot to do that simple, decades-old task for you. I find it profoundly easy to order a pizza online. Can it really be a socially optimal use of resources—immense amounts of money, manpower, and electricity—to create incredibly complex systems that can, with tons of training and eye-watering power costs, take that simple task off my hands?

I don’t get it.

Or maybe I do. The ultimate source of the hype is obvious: money. Lazer is himself in the AI industry, so he has a vested interest in believing—or pretending to believe—that telling an “agent” on the computer to order a pizza is categorically more impressive than, uh, using a computer to order a pizza. The hype pays his bills. On this podcast episode, Kevin Roose of The New York Times keeps defending the outlandish claims of AI companies by insisting that people in the AI industry feel the same way. “They’re very sincere,” he says. To which I would say, You mean everyone whose stock holdings, and thus net worth, are directly related to AI hype is in agreement about AI hype? You don’t say! Sam Altman says there is no slowdown in improvements to LLM-based AI systems; his wealth is directly tied to public perception of whether there is a slowdown or not. These are not unrelated phenomena. What I don’t understand is why the media, so often, justify AI hype by credulously reporting what people in the industry are saying about it. Frito-Lay says that Doritos are snacktacular too! But I don’t take their word for it.

I struggle to see how fobbing off minor tasks to software warrants the hype.

Silicon Valley really needs AI to work, financially. It’s been looking for a new market to monetize for some time. Social media companies have relentlessly tried to wring every last cent out of their networks, and even so there are indicators that social media is a declining economic phenomenon. (Does “the next Facebook” sound like a remotely sexy investment to you?) Smartphones have become a technology that people don’t feel they have to upgrade every year anymore, while virtual reality has not lived up to its hype, at least financially. For years now, the tech industry has believed in limitless growth, but with so many mature product categories and saturated fields, right now one of the only areas of potentially explosive growth in Silicon Valley is AI—whether it’s actually useful or not. And the fact that Nvidia just lost almost $600 billion in hypothetical worth because a company in China produced an LLM system as powerful as the best offered by Silicon Valley, for a lot less money, is a sign that here, “worth” is an idea rather than a reality.

There will be some gradual improvements to productivity and time management from these systems, just as with routine software development. But whatever the hype machine says, I don’t think artificial intelligence will impact average quality of life anywhere near as much as changes in distribution of wealth, and in matters of war and peace. And I’d bet money that the technological growth most likely to actually revolutionize some aspect of human existence is not AI but biomedical science, probably genetic engineering specifically. In the field of IVF, for example, very likely developments in near-future technology would have immense consequences if realized.

I think there’s something else besides economics going on with the AI hype, though: People badly wish to escape mundane reality and all of its grinding indignities, and artificial intelligence—or those who market it, at least—has tapped into that desire. To those people, I say: in 10, and 20, and 30 years, you’ll still have to do chores that you hate, and if they find some way to automate away a particularly onerous chore, there will be some other petty task to take its place. That’s how human life works. You’ll still have to stand in impotent resentment while you wait for a subway train that will arrive already stuffed with too many riders. And if they invent the teleporter, then you’ll find other reasons to feel bored and annoyed. The good news is that for those who aren’t impoverished or seriously disabled, and who live in the developed world, there’s a great deal of opportunity for frequently sunny and generally comfortable lives that feature loving relationships. You will always be unsatisfied, but it will still be enough.

15. AI Needs a Lot of Computing Power. Is a Market for ‘Compute’ the Next Big Thing?

Excerpts:

The current market for computing power is “quite opaque,” said Simeon Bochev, chief executive of Compute Exchange and its other founder. AI startups looking for compute must undergo a time-consuming process of shopping around to find the best price, and they often get stuck in longer-term contracts than they really need, Bochev said.

Others have also sought to develop organized markets for computing power. Perhaps the best known is the San Francisco Compute Company, or SF Compute for short. Founded in 2023, the company says it has sold more than $50 million of compute contracts over the past year. Its investors include the venture-capital firm of Jack Altman, brother of OpenAI CEO Sam Altman.

The founders of SF Compute were initially seeking to train a model for an AI audio startup when they discovered it was difficult to get cloud providers to sell them computing capacity in the quantities they needed.

“They couldn’t sell you an hour at a time, or even a week at a time,” said Evan Conrad, a co-founder of SF Compute. “You had to buy for a year or longer.”

SF Compute’s founders pivoted to creating a marketplace for computing power. Unlike Compute Exchange, SF Compute doesn’t run intermittent auctions. Instead, it runs a continuous market where AI companies can buy computing power as they need it, for times as short as one hour. Software developed by SF Compute allows the buyers to connect to different clusters of Nvidia H100 chips and easily shift their workload from one cluster to another.

A significant market for computing power could emerge eventually, said Demirors of Crucible Capital, who has explored making an investment in the space.

“It’s probably several years too early,” she said.

AI Needs a Lot of Computing Power. Is a Market for ‘Compute’ the Next Big Thing?

Startup trading platforms seek to capitalize on AI’s need for vast amounts of processing capacity

https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/ai-needs-a-lot-of-computing-power-is-a-market-for-compute-the-next-big-thing-2302133c?mod=latest_headlines

By Alexander Osipovich

Updated Jan. 29, 2025 9:37 pm ET

Illustration: Rachel Mendelson/WSJ, Pixelsquid (2)

Some investors are betting that the artificial-intelligence revolution of the 21st century will give rise to a huge, actively traded market for computing power, the same way that global energy demand led to the emergence of the crude-oil market last century.

Compute Exchange, a startup that announced its launch on Wednesday, plans to conduct auctions where data-center operators and cloud providers can sell their computing capacity—or “compute” in tech-industry jargon. Buyers such as AI companies can use the auctions to buy chunks of processing time for arrays of chips, such as Nvidia’s H100 and H200 systems.

The trading platform’s co-founder and best-known investor is Donald Wilson Jr., founder of high-frequency trading firm DRW Holdings and a veteran Chicago trader.

“The total dollars spent on compute will, over the next 10 years, exceed total dollars spent on oil,” predicted Wilson. “Obviously oil is the largest commodity right now, so I believe it will be displaced by compute.”

Compute Exchange plans to hold its first public auction Feb. 25, after quietly holding two test auctions late last year. About a dozen sellers are expected to take part, according to the Palo Alto, Calif.-based startup.

Donald Wilson Jr., co-founder of Compute Exchange Photo: Christopher Dilts/Bloomberg News

The debut comes just after the tech industry was roiled by China’s DeepSeek. The Chinese startup triggered a huge selloff in AI-linked stocks when it unveiled a sophisticated model that it trained using fewer, less advanced chips than its Silicon Valley rivals and at a fraction of the cost.

Wilson argues that the DeepSeek drama shows how AI is highly fluid and subject to big shifts in demand for computing power. That volatility makes it more important to have transparent market mechanisms to determine prices, he said.

There are obstacles to the emergence of a traded market for computing power. One challenge is that the largest sellers of compute—the hyperscalers such as Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud and Microsoft Azure—have so far stayed away from startup trading platforms such as Compute Exchange, preferring to sign big-ticket deals. Similarly, huge buyers such as OpenAI tend to secure massive amounts of computing capacity, rather than buying small portions on the spot market.

Skeptics also question whether computing power can truly be considered a commodity. An oil refiner might buy crude from Saudi Arabia, West Africa or the U.S. But compute comes in a diverse array of underlying chips and configurations, without a commonly agreed upon standard. Typically, AI companies can’t just switch from one provider to another to get a lower price, unless they are willing to put up with technical headaches.

“Compute isn’t necessarily a fungible resource,” said Meltem Demirors, founder of early-stage investment fund Crucible Capital. “A compute-hour in one facility with one type of chip is not equal to a compute-hour in another facility with another type of chip.”

Besides Compute Exchange, Wilson has invested in Silicon Data, a startup that researches the market for computing power. Silicon Data aims to publish indexes that could become the basis for futures contracts tied to the price of compute. In theory, data-center operators could use such futures to hedge against the risk of a drop in prices, the same way energy companies trade futures to protect against a potential crash in the oil market.

Workers unpack Nvidia chips at a data center in India. Photo: Dhiraj Singh/Bloomberg News

The current market for computing power is “quite opaque,” said Simeon Bochev, chief executive of Compute Exchange and its other founder. AI startups looking for compute must undergo a time-consuming process of shopping around to find the best price, and they often get stuck in longer-term contracts than they really need, Bochev said.

Others have also sought to develop organized markets for computing power. Perhaps the best known is the San Francisco Compute Company, or SF Compute for short. Founded in 2023, the company says it has sold more than $50 million of compute contracts over the past year. Its investors include the venture-capital firm of Jack Altman, brother of OpenAI CEO Sam Altman.

The founders of SF Compute were initially seeking to train a model for an AI audio startup when they discovered it was difficult to get cloud providers to sell them computing capacity in the quantities they needed.

“They couldn’t sell you an hour at a time, or even a week at a time,” said Evan Conrad, a co-founder of SF Compute. “You had to buy for a year or longer.”

SF Compute’s founders pivoted to creating a marketplace for computing power. Unlike Compute Exchange, SF Compute doesn’t run intermittent auctions. Instead, it runs a continuous market where AI companies can buy computing power as they need it, for times as short as one hour. Software developed by SF Compute allows the buyers to connect to different clusters of Nvidia H100 chips and easily shift their workload from one cluster to another.

A significant market for computing power could emerge eventually, said Demirors of Crucible Capital, who has explored making an investment in the space.

“It’s probably several years too early,” she said.

Write to Alexander Osipovich at alexo@wsj.com

16. ‘I Gave My Life to the FBI. And It Damn Near Broke Me.’

Excerpts:

If I could speak to Patel, I’d tell him: Respect your people. Pay them enough to provide for their families. Increase the number of special agents—which has remained at 13,700 for as long as I can remember, despite the Global War on Terror, despite the spike in online predation, despite the immense counterintelligence threat posed by Russia and China. And make mental health a priority. Every single agent should be given the tools to do their jobs without having to pay the ultimate price.

Even now, I keep hearing about FBI agents who’ve snapped or taken their lives. A few months ago, I learned that a retired FBI agent in a mental health crisis was shot and killed by a school district officer after he was caught throwing rocks at a public school in El Paso, Texas. Last fall, I was told that an agent—haunted by memories of identifying victims from the remains of the 2023 Maui fires—had killed himself.

How many more agents do we have to lose before the government wakes up? Kash Patel, I’m begging you: Be the first FBI director to take a stand.

‘I Gave My Life to the FBI. And It Damn Near Broke Me.’

As an agent, Pat McMonigle fought terrorists abroad and survived missile strikes. But it was a case close to home that finally made him crack.

https://www.thefp.com/p/fbi-veteran-pat-mcmonigle-ptsd-kash-patel

By Pat McMonigle

01.29.25 — The Big Read

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Pat McMonigle, 44, was an FBI analyst, agent, and then field supervisor over his 19-year career. During his time with the Bureau, he investigated national security crimes, served as a hostage negotiator and Joint Terrorism Task Force coordinator, trained dozens of other special agents, and was deployed three times overseas. He was awarded 24 commendations including the Combat Theater Award for his 2017 deployment to Afghanistan. But he also lost at least nine colleagues to suicide, in many cases because they suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder on the job. Then, in 2022, Pat worked on a case so devastating he was also diagnosed with PTSD. In June 2024, he finally resigned from the agency to save himself from the same fate as his fellow agents. Here, he tells his story to The Free Press.

I suppose it is fitting that my Federal Bureau of Investigation story begins—and ends—with a crisis.

I first decided that I would join the FBI after my college classmate, Deora Bodley, lost her life as a passenger on Flight 93 during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

At the time, I was a junior at Santa Clara University. When I found out from a college memo that Deora was on that plane, I immediately changed my major from business to political science, and in 2005, I joined the FBI as an analyst. Five years later, I decided to train as a special agent at the academy. On my first day, I stood up in front of my fellow cadets and declared that I had joined the agency because I wanted to fight terrorists like the ones who stole 2,977 innocent lives, including Deora’s, that day.

More than two decades later, I made another consequential choice: to walk away from the career I had dedicated my life to, because the job had damn near broken me.

My story, sadly, is not unique.

From 2017 to 2023, I served on the FBI Agents Association Board, a group dedicated to helping the families of agents who suffered injuries or died while in service. During my time on the board, I learned the stories of at least nine FBI agents who died by suicide. Many of them had worked intense undercover roles or investigated horrific cases of crimes against children. Others suffered severe PTSD from deployments abroad, like the agent in Montana who hanged himself after surviving an improvised explosive device (IED) attack in Pakistan a few years earlier.

Almost every agent I knew was haunted by the psychological toll of the job. I remember one guy who used to keep a picture of a teenage girl in his pocket. She had been kidnapped but was never found, a victim he couldn’t save.

McMonigle stands alongside a Gulfstream V while deployed in Mogadishu, Somalia. (Courtesy of the author)

Like most agents, I worked tough cases and found myself in life-or-death situations. As part of the agency’s counterterrorism mission, I was deployed abroad to work with the military and CIA in war zones. Once, on Christmas Day in 2017, I was so close to an IED explosion in Kabul, Afghanistan, that I was thrown from my bed. In 2019, I was walking through the Green Zone at the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, when I heard air sirens ahead. I quickly took shelter in a nearby building, and the next day, I noticed that the exact spot where I had been standing was obliterated by the strike. I also did two tours in Afghanistan, including from 2017 to 2018, when I covertly assisted a U.S. military operation that killed 55 Taliban fighters.

The details of that strike are classified, so I can’t say more about it, except that it was the highlight of my career. I felt like I was making the biggest impact ridding the world of terrorists. When I was out in the field, there was so much adrenaline running through my veins. But it’s also terrifying. And when I came home to my wife and children, it could be even harder in some ways. Life is so much slower that you don’t know how to behave. There’s no threat around every corner, but you’re still looking for one. And all the while, you crave being back out in the field.

In 2019, I turned to working on domestic cases near my home in Tacoma, Washington. After my tours abroad, I didn’t expect this to be the work that would break me. But it did.

One Sunday morning, I had to tell the parents of a young man that their troubled young son had threatened a cop while high on drugs and alcohol, and the cop had shot and killed him in self-defense. I remember sitting with his mom and dad in their living room, and breaking the news as their younger children were coming down the stairs. His mother was just wailing. I tried to console the family by telling them I had lost my own child—a stillborn baby—just months before. But I didn’t know what I was doing.

Looking back, I realize I desperately needed psychological training on how to deal with these incidents, not just so that I would know what to say to the relatives of victims—but just as importantly, for myself. Although I was an FBI veteran, I didn’t know where to look for help. Occasionally, the agency sent out an email offering “helpful tips” on breathing and meditation, but this never seemed substantial given the weight of our work. It wasn’t until 2024 that I found out the Bureau even has a psychological services unit, and by then, it was too late.

In April 2022, I faced my most harrowing case, and it took place in my own neighborhood.

Bo*, a 13-year-old boy, had hanged himself on a fence behind my local grocery store. Someone had seen a video of Bo’s suicide online and shared it with his father, who reached out to the authorities for help.

I was put on the case with my partner, and the details were devastating. We discovered that Bo had been targeted by members of 764, a neo-Nazi cult that grooms kids with mental-health difficulties or gender distress. The group coerces them over the internet into mutilating their own bodies and even killing themselves. Fueled by a sick kind of social Darwinism, 764 aims to rid the world of weakness, starting with these vulnerable kids. The group had found Bo and coached him into taking his own life and streaming it on the internet.

Over the course of gathering evidence, I had to watch the awful video of Bo’s suicide at least half a dozen times. And, to gather as much evidence as possible that I hoped to use against 764, I reviewed dozens of other videos of kids harming and killing themselves.

To make matters worse, I had to fight to keep the case alive. The local U.S. Attorney’s office and even FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., told my partner and me the investigation was a waste of time, because the suspects “had not violated federal law.” We were warned not to drain FBI resources.

Meanwhile, I couldn’t rid the image of Bo’s suicide or his innocent face from my mind.

“It wasn’t until 2024 that I found out the Bureau even has a psychological services unit, and by then, it was too late,” writes McMonigle for The Free Press.

By August 2022, with Bo’s case still unsolved, the physical and emotional toll was mounting. I started drinking too much beer at home to try and numb the pain. I struggled to sleep, and I developed a twitch in my left arm that made it hard to go about daily tasks. I was tormented by nightmares—not just about Bo—but about my own wife and four kids. I would wake up in the middle of the night in sweats, fearing that they were in danger or had died. For a period, I didn’t trust myself to carry my gun—fearful I might use it to hurt myself. I locked it up in a safe at home and asked my wife to hold the key.

Even though I tried to put on a brave face and go to work, eventually that suffered, too. I stopped going on arrests or surveillance. I was a completely ineffective negotiator. My nerves were shot.

Finally, by September, my wife—who is a therapist—forced me to see a psychiatric nurse who diagnosed me with PTSD. I told the nurse that wasn’t possible because PTSD was for “tough guys like Green Berets.” At the time, I was oblivious to the idea that my symptoms could have anything to do with my work.

When I told my direct supervisor about my diagnosis, she listened and expressed sympathy. But that’s all she could do. There is no formal process at the Bureau to handle cases like mine.

For another year, I cycled through antidepressants and tried weekly eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) psychotherapy—which I had to pay for myself. I found a great counselor, a former detective, who also helped because she understood my work. But treatment can only do so much. I kept asking myself: What is wrong with you? My dad was a decorated war hero with two tours in Vietnam. The horrors he must have witnessed! My partner was a former Marine with combat deployments. He worked the case even harder than I did. Why was I the one falling apart?

Then one sunny and clear September afternoon in 2023, when I thought I was feeling pretty good, I took my son to football practice. As I sat on the bleachers and watched him run through sprints and throw balls, I opened my phone and saw an email from Bo’s mom. It was around the time of his birthday, and the message included pictures of him, smiling, as well as a note of gratitude for me and my partner. She told us she felt like nobody else in the world cared about finding justice for her son but us. But, in my troubled mind, this only made me feel worse. I hadn’t brought Bo’s killers to justice. I felt like I had let his family down.

Suddenly, I broke down crying, right in front of all the kids, coaches, parents, and bystanders. I’m sure the kids on the field stopped and stared, but I honestly can’t remember. Finally, a friend took me home. When I arrived on my doorstep, my wife hugged me and put me straight to bed.

The next day I called The Chateau, a residential treatment center in Utah for first responders with PTSD. The person who answered the phone was named “Shepherd,” and he certainly was one—a retired highway patrol captain who had once “been there” himself. Within two weeks, I was on a plane to Utah.

I spent 30 days in the Wasatch Mountains alongside 15 others. Cops, firefighters, and paramedics—the lucky “survivors” of trauma on the job. Each day we did yoga and therapy. We went on hikes and listened to lectures on confidence and mental health.

My old self started to return. But once my month there was up, I had to go straight back to work, and I was put on the case of a preschool aide who we suspected was a member of the same 764 cult that had targeted Bo. My demons surfaced again. Finally, I asked to be reassigned to an administrative job—not exactly why I joined the FBI.

In February 2024, when it came time for my yearly medical checkup, I told the doctor about my PTSD diagnosis and the antidepressant I was taking. That’s when I first heard of the FBI’s psychological services unit—because a couple weeks later, rather than offer me help, they put me under investigation.

First, the unit sent emails to several of my colleagues, disclosing my PTSD, and interviewed them about my condition. I was told that my clearance would be pulled unless I consented to this. Then, the FBI psychologist ordered me to give up my gun to a firearm instructor who happened to be a friend of mine. Usually, turning in your gun is a sign you’ve done something wrong, and I felt deeply ashamed, like a person who had stolen cocaine from the evidence locker.

The message from the FBI was clear: I was no longer an agent to them. I was a liability.

Of course, I understand why the agency would want to protect itself. But the best way to do that is to be proactive, and help prevent agents from sinking into despair. The FBI should learn from other large police departments and the military and provide agents with yearly check-ins with counselors, who can build a long-term relationship with these first responders. When they come home from deployments, the agency should require its staffers to go through a reintegration program to help them transition back to life at home. And when agents take initiative to seek out the care they need, they should not be punished for it like I was.

[When The Free Press asked the FBI for comment on this story, an agency spokesperson said it employs “licensed clinicians and trained peer counselors” to “support their fellow FBI employees facing a variety of challenges, including stress, marital, parenting, and elder care issues, financial issues, alcohol and/or drug abuse, work-life balance, depression and anxiety, grief, and suicide.” These services are available “to all employees and their eligible family members, including free and confidential counseling and referrals to external resources.”]

Whatever services the FBI offers its employees, I wasn’t aware of them despite having served on the board of the FBI Agents Association for six years. In June 2024, at age 44, I finally decided to hand in my notice. I emailed my resignation letter to my supervisor, and said, “My medical team has advised me to leave the work and the organization as a whole.” I added that the Bureau “shows little regard for its own agents. I’ve experienced it now personally.”

McMonigle displays a detail of his retirement gift—bearing his call sign “Hollywood”—from his FBI colleagues.

My supervisor was understanding, but I never got a response from anyone higher up in the agency. The next day when I went to the office to pack up my things, I couldn’t get into the building. My pass had been deactivated.

Six months later, I’m working as a security consultant, and writing a couple of screenplays inspired by my time in the FBI, while also enjoying more time with my wife and our four wonderful children. I miss my agency pals, and our camaraderie in the bullpen. But, most of all, I miss the mission and the excitement. Looking back, I realize I was just a normal guy who had a normal reaction to terror. There wasn’t anything wrong with me. I simply needed help.

This week, the FBI is poised to move into a new era under Kash Patel, Trump’s nominee to lead the agency. I’ll be rooting for him when he faces his Senate hearing tomorrow. He’s expected to take a wrecking ball to the organization, and I have sympathy for that. The FBI is desperately in need of change.

If I could speak to Patel, I’d tell him: Respect your people. Pay them enough to provide for their families. Increase the number of special agents—which has remained at 13,700 for as long as I can remember, despite the Global War on Terror, despite the spike in online predation, despite the immense counterintelligence threat posed by Russia and China. And make mental health a priority. Every single agent should be given the tools to do their jobs without having to pay the ultimate price.

Even now, I keep hearing about FBI agents who’ve snapped or taken their lives. A few months ago, I learned that a retired FBI agent in a mental health crisis was shot and killed by a school district officer after he was caught throwing rocks at a public school in El Paso, Texas. Last fall, I was told that an agent—haunted by memories of identifying victims from the remains of the 2023 Maui fires—had killed himself.

How many more agents do we have to lose before the government wakes up? Kash Patel, I’m begging you: Be the first FBI director to take a stand.

* Bo’s name has been changed to protect his identity

—As told to Frannie Block

17. Kash Patel: How I’ll Rebuild Public Trust in the FBI

Kash Patel: How I’ll Rebuild Public Trust in the FBI

Two foundational steps are necessary: First, let good cops be cops. Second, transparency is essential.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/how-ill-rebuild-public-trust-in-the-fbi-kash-patel-on-what-he-would-do-if-confirmed-0e116c87?mod=latest_headlines

By Kash Patel

Jan. 29, 2025 8:00 pm ET

The headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, Oct. 3, 2024. Photo: Valerie Plesch/Zuma Press

When President Trump told me he would nominate me to direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I was deeply honored. I carry not only the dreams of my parents but the hopes of millions of Americans who stand for justice, fairness, and the rule of law. My commitment to these principles is deeply rooted in my family’s history.

My father fled Idi Amin’s genocidal dictatorship in Uganda. My mother was born in Tanzania. They married in India and emigrated to New York, where I was born and raised in a bustling household that included my father’s seven siblings, their spouses and six children. My family instilled in me a deep respect for the rule of law and the transformative power of education. These values have shaped the driving force behind my career: protecting the rights enshrined in our Constitution.

The recent terrorist attack in New Orleans, which claimed the lives of 14 innocent Americans, is a stark reminder of the persistent threats to our homeland. Whether combating child predators, terrorists or drug traffickers, the FBI plays a vital role in protecting our nation from its gravest dangers. A vigilant FBI that puts the mission first will end the explosion of violent crime and mitigate national-security threats.

If confirmed, I will remain focused on the FBI’s core mission and not involve the bureau in prosecutorial decisions. Determining whether someone should be charged with a crime is the responsibility of the Justice Department, not the FBI. If confirmed, I will guide the agency in investigating criminals and safeguarding the homeland.

Each step in my career has reinforced my commitment to due process and transparency. For the first eight years after law school, I served as a public defender—first with the Miami-Dade Public Defender’s Office and later in the federal Southern District of Florida. I represented defendants accused of horrific crimes. Ensuring that they receive due process is fundamental to our justice system. It is what distinguishes us from totalitarian regimes.

I joined the Obama Justice Department as a national-security prosecutor. I contributed to the successful prosecutions of terrorists from organizations such as al Qaeda and al-Shabaab, at home and abroad.

I was honored to receive the 2017 Assistant Attorney General’s Award from Loretta Lynch for helping Uganda bring members of al-Shabaab to justice for the 2010 bombing that killed 76 people, including one American. I was also proud to receive the Humint Award from the intelligence community for related work.

My experiences at the Justice Department, at the National Security Council leading counterterrorism policy, as deputy director of national intelligence and as chief of staff at the Defense Department provided me with a firsthand understanding of the persistent threats to our nation and the critical role the FBI plays in keeping Americans safe.

But my time on the House Intelligence Committee revealed how the FBI’s immense powers can be abused. I spearheaded the investigation that found the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act—a tool I had previously used to hunt down terrorists—had been unlawfully used to spy on political opponents. Such misconduct is unacceptable and undermines public trust.

The erosion of trust is evident: Only 40% of Americans hold a favorable view of the FBI. This must change. Public cooperation is vital for the bureau to solve crimes, and its declining reputation is already affecting recruitment efforts. Violent crime is destroying families across the nation. We can’t afford a lack of trust in the institution mandated to protect them. Rebuilding that trust is vital to ensuring the FBI can carry out its mission effectively.

If confirmed, I intend to collaborate closely with the Justice Department to bring safety and relief to American communities. Gallup recently reported that nearly half of all Americans—the highest in three decades—would be afraid to walk alone at night within a mile of their home. Little wonder when the country sees 20,000 homicides and 110,000 rapes a year and 200 drug overdoses a day. Violent crime demands immediate action.

We’ve also seen the FBI at its best. Recently in Oklahoma, agents foiled a planned ISIS attack, and in Colleyville, Texas, they courageously neutralized a terrorist holding synagogue congregants hostage. These examples showcase the FBI’s capability to protect Americans and underscore why restoring public confidence in the bureau is critical.

I believe two foundational steps are necessary to rebuild public confidence in the FBI. First, let good cops be cops. Leadership means supporting agents in their mission to apprehend criminals and protect our citizens. If confirmed, I will focus on streamlining operations at headquarters while bolstering the presence of field agents across the nation. Collaboration with local law enforcement is crucial to fulfilling the FBI’s mission.

Second, transparency is essential. Members of Congress have hundreds of unanswered requests to the FBI. If confirmed, I will be a strong advocate for congressional oversight, ensuring that the FBI operates with the openness necessary to rebuild trust by simply replying to lawmakers.

I am committed to working alongside the dedicated men and women of the FBI. They are our warriors of justice, and I will always have their backs, because they have the backs of the American people.

Mr. Patel is President Trump’s nominee for FBI director. This is adapted from opening remarks he prepared for his Thursday confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Appeared in the January 30, 2025, print edition as 'How I’ll Rebuild Public Trust in the FBI'.

18. Expert Q&A: The AI Challenge for the U.S. Military

Expert Q&A: The AI Challenge for the U.S. Military

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/expert-qa-the-ai-challenge-for-the-u-s-military

Posted: January 30th, 2025

By Lt. Gen. Michael Groen (US Marine Corps, Ret.)

Lt. Gen. Groen served over 36 years in the U.S. military, culminating his career as the senior executive for AI in the Department. Groen also served in the National Security Agency overseeing Computer Network Operations, and as the Director of Joint Staff Intelligence, working closely with the Chairman and Senior Leaders across the Department.

EXPERT Q&A — Chinese AI startup DeepSeek shook the U.S. tech and business communities with its launch of a free AI chatbot that it said could compete with major American competitors at a fraction of the cost‚ using cheaper chips and less data. The DeepSeek assistant overtook ChatGPT in downloads on Apple’s app store on Monday, prompting a market frenzy that saw a tumble in the shares of major U.S. AI leaders, including Nvidia, Microsoft and Alphabet. On Wednesday, Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba released a new version of its AI model, claiming it surpasses DeepSeek’s release.

The DeepSeek and Alibaba models suggest that China has worked around U.S. measures to restrict Chinese access to American-manufactured chips, and the disruption has prompted scrutiny by U.S. tech leaders — Microsoft and OpenAI are both investigating whether DeepSeek harvested data in an unauthorized manner from OpenAI’s technology, as well as the U.S. government. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said the National Security Council is “looking into” potential national security implications from DeepSeek.

All these developments raise questions about the role of AI in the tech race between the U.S. and China. Before the DeepSeek news broke, The Cipher Brief spoke with Retired Lieutenant General Michael Groen to discuss the impact and development of AI, particularly its application in the military and national security space. Lt. Gen. Groen, who served as Director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center at the Department of Defense, told us he is less worried about the technical challenges in AI development than the need for the U.S. military to think about integration, practical applications, and the cultural change he believes is needed for adopting AI.

“I think a lot of Americans are still fixated on the large language models, and really ignoring, for now, the broad application that really is going to start to influence us across almost everything that we do,” Lt. Gen. Groen said. “We can’t imagine right now what the scale enterprise is for our military capabilities, for our intelligence capabilities.”

Lt. Gen. Groen spoke with Cipher Brief CEO Suzanne Kelly for an episode of The State Secrets Podcast, which you can listen to on Spotify or Apple Podcasts or watch on our YouTube channel. Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Kelly: Give us your overall impression of the impact of AI and how quickly we all – private sector and government and others – need to understand the implications.

Lt. Gen. Groen: It kind of depends on where you poke the elephant, and you get a different sensation. We are at a transformational point within this broad transformation, and what I mean by that is we are moving past a fascination with large-language models. It’s almost more social media than tech media when we talk about the personalities, the wealth being generated, corporations that might be making money — this has become a soap opera in much of the media space.

Let’s start talking about the broad implementation focus. How can we start to do things at scale? This is especially relevant in the Department of Defense and other large organizations. I think a lot of Americans are still fixated on the large language models, and really ignoring, for now, the broad application that really is going to start to influence us across almost everything that we do.

Kelly: How worried are you about the US’ ability to remain competitive when it comes to understanding how important it is to implement AI?

Lt. Gen. Groen: I have to start with the “Vitamin I” deficiency, “I” being imagination. We can’t imagine right now what the scale enterprise is for our military capabilities, for our intelligence capabilities. Building those scaled enterprises requires a vision. When you can see it, when your workforce can see it, when your customers can see it — I’m going to get this product delivered to me in this way, and that’s exactly what I want, or I can tweak it if it’s not — when you get to that place, now we’re really starting to launch implementation at scale. I see lots of conversation about AI today and think [about how we are] digging into niche issues that in the big scheme of things are probably not all that important when we should be actually implementing and practicing our large-scale data environments.

So, how do we get started there? Where’s our gym that we can go to actually start doing this at scale? Because I think we will have lots of bad behaviors and lots of tribalism on the front end that we need to learn to overcome. Honestly, I’m not concerned about the technical stuff. We’ve got plenty of smart people who can do that. But, how do we move the culture of the Department of Defense and the IC [Intelligence Community] into something that’s integrative, rather than tribal? Many have tried, many have tilted at this windmill. We have to do it again, though, because this is the difference between success and failure, specifically with reference to China.

Kelly: Five years from now, where does the US military need to be, and what is the first step to get there?

Lt. Gen. Groen: It sounds very foreboding, right? We have this massive project to do. But AIs can start really small. There’s still the conversation about, Hey, did you hear AI did this or AI did that? Humans have used AI to identify objects in imagery and do assessments in GEOINT and every other “INT”. All of these things are happening now, but still, society writ large, at least American society, still thinks of this through the lens of, This scary thing called AI, it has its own will, it’s doing its own thing. That was a useful conversation when we were all getting used to this, but we’re way past that. We have to be past that.

Now let’s talk about the practicalities of a data environment and things like, is the Air Force going to let the Marine Corps use this data for this algorithm? All the complexities of that data mesh environment and how we actually make that go, the only way to make progress here is getting reps and sets, doing it. This exercise, this application out in CENTCOM, this application here and there. When we actually employ this, even for demonstration purposes, we move the ball forward. If you’re familiar with GIDE, this is the Global Information Dominance Experiment — and we started that years ago — that was a demonstration capability, where the department would go out to a combatant command, actually identify problems to be solved, and then actually code it and build an infrastructure for that. [It had] example after example, so that pretty soon you actually start to think systemically, because you have so many examples. That energy of real application is so important. We cannot fixate on policy and technology and culture. We have to fixate on problem solving and application.

Kelly: And information sharing. Without going too deep into it, can you give us a sense of how that works and why that’s such a critical component to having AI be an effective part of the US military strategy?

Lt. Gen. Groen: It begins with the tribalism inherent in the Department of Defense. When they built the Pentagon, they knew there was going to be a Space Force in the 1950s, so they built the Pentagon with five sides, which means there are five corners. So each service has a corner that they can back into and protect their data and their money from the other services. I joke, but that very tribal culture is derived from our origins of buying things, tanks, airplanes, ships, whatever. Now, we’re not buying things – we’re buying integration, and we’re using the data that we’ve collected as services, as war-fighting organizations. It’s not that we don’t know tech; there are plenty of people in the Department of Defense that know tech. The problem is, I think a lot of folks think, Well, we’ll just call 1-800-SILICONVALLEY and they’ll come and they’ll just code all this up and it’ll be fine, just like we do when we buy a system. But that’s not how it works, because this is so deeply inherent in how do you do command and control? How do you do fires? How do you do aviation? This is deep military expertise combined with technological expertise. Neither one alone can do this.

I don’t want to say we’ve turned our back, but we have disincentivized focus on real military application here. That should be a little bit disturbing to all of us. We need practical application now, so that we can imagine what practical application could look like when we’re doing it at scale.

Kelly: Let’s go back to China. Talk to me a little bit about your primary concerns regarding China and the way that they are both developing and implementing this technology that’s so critical.

Lt. Gen. Groen: Chinese universities are cranking out AI expertise and writing papers and doing all the science. They do not lack for the ability to understand the technology. But what always strikes me is that AI is an information technology. It’s enabled by the flow of information across industries that maybe are not even related, but the data is relevant. Information flow in a closed information society is inherently impaired. You cannot operate with the flexibility and the imagineering, the innovation. You can’t do that at speed if you always have to look over your shoulder to see if the party guy agrees with what you’re doing. So I think even with all the great science and the great technology that’s going on in China, there are real cultural inhibitions to applying this well.

I think you can see this in, for example, the Joint Swords exercises, the rehearsals for the seizure of Taiwan. Because the Chinese military is not as imaginative and they’re very rote in their actions, they have to rehearse over and oveor again. If you can’t think your way through it while you’re executing it, then you have to rehearse the rote methodology over and over again. And this is what we see. They’re pushing landing craft into the Taiwan Straits; they’re doing these large-scale exercises; they’re flying airplanes over the same routes that they would fly if they were going to try to seize Taiwan. So they have the technological tools at their disposal, but where they are, the maturity of their military capabilities, like command and control, and how do you do integrated fires, and how do you do long-scale movements, or tactical resupply, those kind of things, really important things that American military folks just inherently, they don’t have that.

I would give us a voice of caution though. We spend a lot of time thinking about, Well, they don’t have a seven-nanometer chip or they’re not pursuing two-nanometer technology. Huawei is dominating global telecommunications and they don’t need seven-nanometer chips to do that. They can do just fine with 27-nanometer chips or 52-nanometer chips. We have to be very careful not to be overconfident to say, Well, their technology is not quite as fast as ours. Technology, as long as it’s fast enough to get the job done, then it doesn’t matter. I think we Americans, especially in the Intel space and the defense space, we can become overconfident that, Hey, they’re not as good as us. They might be good enough — and that’s what we should really pay attention to.

Kelly: When you were still in the Pentagon, I know that you understood and leveraged those private-sector relationships. What do you think now that you’ve been outside as well? Do you see the landscape differently?

Lt. Gen. Groen: Yes, I do. Many of the same cultural challenges still apply. The last thing I want to do is go down the rabbit hole of defense acquisition; that ground has been covered over and over again. Yet we are not willing to make the cultural changes necessary for us to do that. But that’s one artifact. We could fix that overnight if we had the political will to do it.

Our young soldiers and sailors and airmen and guardians and Marines all have to really see this in their heads. What is their war-fighting function? I was blown away, when I was in uniform, by the expertise of functional communities. If you wanted to talk [about] how does aviation really work, you could find somebody who could talk to you for days about the nuances of the profession of aviation. Same thing [about] the profession of logistics or the profession of artillery fires. All of these things – we’re deeply steeped in that. That kind of nuance is what makes AI successful in a dirty, dangerous, chaotic environment. Even with all the data you can handle, you’re still going to have chaos, and command and control is going to be extraordinarily difficult in a fight with this kind of tempo that’s enabled by AI.

So these cultural things are so important, yet the institutions discount those. Well, that’s just people’s stuff and we’ll figure it out. Yeah, we will. But better that we figure it out now than some young sailors have to figure it out while there’s a Chinese missile inbound to their ship, right? It is that important that we get this technological transformation underway.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

19. Ex-Ukraine Prime Minister: Trump Holds Keys to ‘Future of Ukraine’

Ex-Ukraine Prime Minister: Trump Holds Keys to ‘Future of Ukraine’

Arseniy Yatsenyuk has some praise – and blunt advice – for President Trump

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/ex-ukraine-prime-minister-trump-holds-keys-to-future-of-ukraine

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW

Former Prime Minister of Ukraine and Chairman of the Kyiv Security Forum Arseniy Yatsenyuk looks on during the Warsaw Security Forum 2024 in Warsaw, Poland on October 1, 2024. (Photo by Aleksander Kalka/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

Posted: January 30th, 2025

By The Cipher Brief

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW — When Donald Trump’s Ukraine envoy announced a 100-day plan to bring peace to Ukraine, just prior to inauguration day, the news was received with a mix of skepticism and cautious optimism. In Kyiv, Washington and various European capitals, some were relieved that Trump had abandoned his promise of a 24-hour solution to the war, which many feared would have meant concessions to Russia and the imposition of a solution on Ukraine. Others said the timetable was still too ambitious, and questioned whether Russian President Vladimir Putin was interested in negotiations that would involve concessions.

Details of a U.S. approach have emerged via the Trump envoy, retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, who has floated several potential elements: stiffer sanctions against Russia; a boost in American oil and gas production to lower global energy prices and thus lower Russian revenues; security guarantees for Ukraine short of immediate NATO membership; and a freezing in place of some Russian territorial gains in Ukraine, but without formal recognition – leaving the fate of those lands to future negotiation. Meanwhile, President Trump himself says he is planning to meet with Putin in the near future.

This week, Cipher Brief Managing Editor Tom Nagorski spoke with Arseniy Yatsenyuk, a former Prime Minister of Ukraine and founder of the Open Ukraine Foundation, about the 100-day plan and the hopes and concerns it has produced in his country.

Yatsenyuk went so far as to say the fate not just of Ukraine but the rest of the “free world” rests with President Trump. “It’s up to him to decide the future of Ukraine, the future of the global order, and the future – strong or weak – of the United States.”

Their conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk

Arseniy Yatsenyuk served two terms as Prime Minister of Ukraine — from February 27, 2014 to November 27, 2014 and November 27, 2014 to April 14, 2016. He also served as Minster of Economy, Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. In 2014, he started the Narodnyi Front (People’s Front) Political Party. He is Chairman fo the Kyiv Security Forum and Founder of Open Ukraine Foundation.

The Cipher Brief: When you heard, just a couple of weeks ago, that the [Trump] administration had this 100-day plan to bring peace to your country, what were your initial reactions?

Yatsenyuk: I am not sure about the deadline – and in my humble opinion, that’s not an issue. The issue is the terms and conditions of this so-called “peace deal.” And the most important question is whether the war criminal Putin is ready to negotiate. I’m extremely skeptical about his eagerness to negotiate a just, fair and right peace for the Ukrainian people. My gut feeling is that this war criminal is trying to take over Ukraine and that this is his ultimate goal, to absorb Ukraine and to reshape the global order. The primary goal we have in Ukraine is to reach a fair and just peace. The quicker the better, but it’s all about terms and conditions.

Putin is not ready to negotiate. And Ukraine will never accept any kind of territorial concessions. How could you imagine, for example, that the president of Ukraine is to acknowledge that Russia fully, legitimately occupied Ukrainian territory? It completely contradicts international law. And we cannot allow Putin to redraw and break international law, entirely and completely.

Right now we are not in the negotiating phase. And I believe that we have to elaborate on the format of these negotiations and on the preconditions for these kind of negotiations. What could push war criminal Putin to start talks over the ceasefire deal, and a fair and just peace in Europe?

The Cipher Brief: President Trump has already said he is arranging a meeting with Vladimir Putin. We don’t know the terms, we don’t know the location, but do you think it’s a good idea, as a starting point, for him to be having a meeting with the Russian president at this point?

Yatsenyuk: Let me start with the message that my gut feeling is that everyone right now in the world – in the free world – everybody relies on President Trump. And it’s up to him to decide the future of Ukraine, the future of the global order, and the future – strong or weak – of the United States. And I believe that he has a huge ammo and huge arsenal in his hands as president, to restore the global order and to help Ukraine to survive in this unjust war, and actually help the entire European Union to survive and to stop autocrats and dictators like Putin, like [North Korean leader] Kim Jong-un, those who are right now sitting under the umbrella of China, to stop their imperialistic ambitions. So that’s the main point.

The second issue – what is needed? We need a clear-cut, credible, and implementable plan for how to stop the war and how to restore the global order, and how to make Ukraine a prosperous country with European Union membership – not just prospective but actual membership, and NATO membership as well. And I want to be very clear: [NATO’s] Article Five [security guarantee] is the only solution for Ukraine, for how to secure its future. This is the only ironclad guarantee.

Whether it’s a good idea for President Trump to meet with the war criminal Putin, I am not in the position to lecture the new administration or the new president. It’s up to the president to decide whether he wants to break the isolation that Putin is in right now. And my guess and my take is that this kind of meeting is possible, but only if President Trump gets real deliverables out of these meetings, very strong deliverables. In this case, maybe yes.

The Cipher Brief: You’ve used the word “deliverables,” you used the word “preconditions.” What would be an example of a deliverable or precondition that you think should be laid forward before any negotiations begin?

Yatsenyuk: We need to strengthen Ukraine’s position and we need to strengthen not just Ukraine’s position, but the negotiating position of the entire free world. I believe that the format of these talks would comprise the United States, the European Union, Ukraine and Russia. This is the kind of format we had in 2014, when I was the Prime Minister.

So what kind of preconditions? The first one is also the best way to persuade war criminal Putin to stop his aggression: to enact legislation in the U.S. Congress, to show to Putin that the United States will have a long-term strategic goal to support Ukraine, that the U.S. has the back of Ukraine. It would be great if President Trump were to sponsor the bill – a new security package for Ukraine. I am well aware of the doubts that the new president has over the necessity to support Ukraine both militarily and financially. But a military investment in Ukraine is the best military investment in U.S. security, and it’s obvious for everyone.

The second step is, we need to scrutinize what kind of tools we have in our arsenal to pressure the Russians. No doubt, we need to deprive Russia of its financing of their war chest – gas, oil and the rest of the stuff. The previous [U.S.] administration, in the end of its tenure, passed an impressive sanctions package. Now we need to enforce and implement these sanctions, because look what’s happening: Europe is still buying LNG from the Russians. Russia is still gaining from its oil and gas exports.

So we have enough tools in our hands to stop this circumvention of sanctions, but it’s up to the U.S. administration to impose secondary sanctions. And I believe that’s what President Trump was talking about when he said, “Look, we can impose tariffs and sanctions on Russia and on Russia’s partners.” Secondary sanctions that Trump’s administration could envisage and enforce would be very helpful.

The third issue is that we need a very strong unity between the European Union and the United States. There has to be no daylight, not even a hint of daylight, between the EU and the U.S. And we have to be rock solid within our NATO union because this beast – I mean the war criminal Putin – he understands only the language of strength. And the stronger we are, the more chances we will have to pressure him and to get a fair deal for all of us.

The Cipher Brief: You said back in November, in Berlin, that because Mr. Trump was unpredictable, you would need a crystal ball to imagine how he might act on any of the things we’ve been talking about. Now it’s a couple of months later, and 10 days or so into his administration. What have you learned? And do you feel any better or any worse, from the vantage point of Kyiv?

Yatsenyuk: President Trump made a number of statements. A few of them were very encouraging, the last one was not as encouraging, but it seems to me that he has changed the tone. And it’s important right now to underpin these right and strong statements with bold and strong actions. So I am still looking for the crystal ball, but I see a few folks who presumably know the location of this crystal ball: his National Security Adviser [Mike] Waltz, retired General Keith Kellogg, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and other very important and impressive people who represent the new political establishment of the United States. There are other folks on the different side of the aisle, but I will always focus on those who are very supportive of Ukraine and who are actually very supportive of the United States, because it’s in the interest of the United States for Ukraine to win, because this is to be a joint victory. And the leader of this victory would be President Trump, no doubt.

The Cipher Brief: President [Volodymyr] Zelensky said the other day that Vladimir Putin was trying to “manipulate” President Trump in his statements and in other ways. What do you think of that statement? And to what extent is Ukraine trying – maybe not to manipulate Mr. Trump, but to influence him?

Yatsenyuk: I share President Zelensky’s take. Look, who is Putin? Putin is a KGB operative. So they have scrutinized the portfolio of President Trump. They’ve got the previous experience of communicating to President Trump. And Putin tries to introduce this kind of flattery towards Trump. He wants to outplay Trump. That’s clear for me, but whether President Trump will buy it, I hope not.

President Trump seems to be a very impressive person. He survived one assassination. He survived politically – I won’t call this an assassination attempt, but he has resurrected politically. It’s an unprecedented story. So my guess is that Trump will be on the right side, and the right side is to help Ukraine and never buy any of KGB operative Putin’s manipulations.

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The Cipher Brief: I wanted to ask you about corruption in Ukraine. Some people here have been critical of the U.S. aid because of alleged or perceived corruption in Ukraine. There’s this story now about a standoff over the military procurement agency. And without getting into too much of the detail – unless you’d like to get into the detail – how damaging is something like that at this moment?

Yatsenyuk: Let me start with this huge network of anti-corruption agencies and law enforcement bodies that have been established in Ukraine since 2014, because I was the Prime Minister who sponsored the legislation, and who actually established the independent, amazing, efficient anti-corruption agencies in this country – the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, Anti-Corruption Court, Special National Anti-Corruption Preventive Agency, Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, and the rest. The reason I’m telling you this is because we did it together with our partners and allies in the United States and in the European Union, and we have a vast and strong network of anti-corruption law enforcement agencies in this country. Frankly speaking, in my humble opinion, it’s even stronger than in the U.S.

But whether corruption exists in my country, the thing is, what are we doing right now with the corruption? We try to mitigate corruption. You cannot eradicate corruption completely, and you guys have the same problem in the U.S. But we are on the right track. In terms of the latest news about public procurement issues in our Ministry of Defense, I believe the Ministry has to be very supportive both to the president, to the country and to the military. And the less of these articles we have in the international media, the better argument we are going to get to help Ukraine, and not to withhold the support to the Ukrainian people.

The Cipher Brief: On the good news side, we have heard over and over again about the remarkable success of the defense and innovation sectors in Ukraine. Can you comment on Ukraine’s future in this area, whatever happens with any negotiations? Is this a bright side in terms of what has happened in the nearly three years of war?

Yatsenyuk: The bright side in this country is the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian people that can innovate, the Ukrainian people that can produce cutting-edge technologies, the Ukrainian people that can fend off the Russian military, and the Ukrainian people that do really know what freedom and liberty is about. In terms of some kind of very specific innovations in the military sector, I am not an expert in this and I would never comment on stuff I don’t know about.

The Cipher Brief: Last question. You said you don’t have a crystal ball, but back to where we began, what is your assessment of the chances that within 100 days, or 200 days, or sometime this year, there will be peace in your country?

Yatsenyuk: This is an inflection point. It’s a historic moment. It’s a make or break situation, and we have to realize this because it’s not just Russia fighting against Ukraine. It’s Russia, North Korea, Iran, China, and a club of rogue states and dictators and pariahs fighting against freedoms and liberties, against the global order, and fighting against the United States, because you folks are the leaders. They’re fighting against you, using us. So we have to join our ranks. We have to win in this righteous fight.

In terms of the time frame, again, the quicker the better. And it all depends on the arsenal of tools we possess and on our political will, and whether we are ready to use every single tool in order to reach the target, in order to reach a fair and just peace for Ukraine, in order to restore the global leadership of the United States, in order to show to every single autocrat and dictator, your times are over, folks. Just over, period.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

20. Trump’s ‘Iron Dome’ is a fantasy. But there are practical options.

Perhaps President Trump has the "guts to try" to borrow a phrase from a great Air Force Special Operations officer. defending the homeland must be job one for a President.

Excerpts:

More than 40 years and hundreds of billions of dollars in missile-defense spending later, the United States has not come close to achieving Reagan’s lofty aspirations. Space lasers did not prove practical. Neither did a madcap scheme known as Brilliant Pebbles for lofting thousands of interceptors into space. The Airborne Laser — a Boeing 747 equipped with a laser — got to the testing phase before being canceled as too impractical.

The United States did develop and deploy effective defenses, such as the Patriot battery and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, for use against short- and medium-range missiles. But attempts to stop a nuclear missile strike on the United States have never advanced much beyond President George W. Bush’s deployment in 2004 of 44 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. This system was designed to defend against a few missiles launched by a rogue state, not a massive nuclear attack from Russia or China. And it isn’t clear the system could achieve even that objective: In tests, the interceptors hit their targets only 50 percent of the time.

But faith in national missile defense never dies. On Monday, President Donald Trump signed an executive order to create an “Iron Dome for America.” He directed Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to submit a plan within 60 days for “a next-generation missile defense shield” that would defeat “any foreign aerial attack on the Homeland” by employing, among other methods, “space-based interceptors.”

Opinion

Max Boot

Trump’s ‘Iron Dome’ is a fantasy. But there are practical options.

Israel’s missile defense system works in close quarters. That model won’t work for the U.S.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/01/30/donald-trump-iron-dome-missile-defense/?utm

January

Donald Trump on Capitol Hill on Jan. 8. (Craig Hudson for The Washington Post)

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan announced he was launching a Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as “Star Wars,” with the goal of rendering nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” He imagined lasers in space shooting down Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, effectively creating a space shield to save America from nuclear Armageddon.

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More than 40 years and hundreds of billions of dollars in missile-defense spending later, the United States has not come close to achieving Reagan’s lofty aspirations. Space lasers did not prove practical. Neither did a madcap scheme known as Brilliant Pebbles for lofting thousands of interceptors into space. The Airborne Laser — a Boeing 747 equipped with a laser — got to the testing phase before being canceled as too impractical.

The United States did develop and deploy effective defenses, such as the Patriot battery and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, for use against short- and medium-range missiles. But attempts to stop a nuclear missile strike on the United States have never advanced much beyond President George W. Bush’s deployment in 2004 of 44 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California. This system was designed to defend against a few missiles launched by a rogue state, not a massive nuclear attack from Russia or China. And it isn’t clear the system could achieve even that objective: In tests, the interceptors hit their targets only 50 percent of the time.

But faith in national missile defense never dies. On Monday, President Donald Trump signed an executive order to create an “Iron Dome for America.” He directed Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to submit a plan within 60 days for “a next-generation missile defense shield” that would defeat “any foreign aerial attack on the Homeland” by employing, among other methods, “space-based interceptors.”

Following Max Boot

Following

The catchy name comes from Israel’s Iron Dome, a system designed to defend against rockets that travel up to 44 miles. That’s not very useful for the United States, unless Toronto were to launch missiles at Detroit. As security analyst Joe Cirincione pointed out on the Defense One website, “We would need to deploy more than 24,700 Iron Dome batteries to defend the 3.7 million square miles of the continental United States.” That would cost nearly $2.5 trillion and wouldn’t “even protect Mar-a-Lago from missiles fired from the Bahamas, some 80 miles away.”

Of course, “Iron Dome for America” is just a marketing slogan. Presumably, like a lot of what Trump says, it is supposed to be taken seriously, not literally. But, even making allowances for Trump’s trademark hyperbole, a serious problem remains: Despite all the technological developments of the past four decades, building a “missile defense shield over our entire country” (as promised in the GOP’s 2024 platform) is no more practical today than it was in 1983.

“There is zero possibility of a comprehensive missile defense of the United States in the foreseeable future,” James N. Miller, who served as undersecretary of defense in the Obama administration, told me on Tuesday. “We are not going to escape mutual assured destruction vis-à-vis Russia or China.”

He added that “a lot of studies have shown space-based interceptors to only have value if the adversary doesn’t take obvious steps to defeat them. I don’t think we can count on our adversaries being that stupid.” Indeed, satellites are relatively easy to shoot down; Russia just launched what is believed to be a new satellite capable of knocking out U.S. satellites.

That doesn’t mean there is no need for missile defense. It does mean that the objective must be more modest than trying to protect the entire U.S. population.

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Robert Soofer, who served in the Defense Department during Trump’s first term, just issued an Atlantic Council report, written in conjunction with other missile-defense experts, outlining a more realistic vision. Soofer aims to preserve nuclear deterrence by making it more difficult for an adversary such as China or Russia to stage a decapitating first strike against U.S. nuclear forces. The report recommends, therefore, focusing missile defenses on U.S. nuclear forces, national leadership targets, and nuclear command, control and communications, all with an eye to “enhance US nuclear survivability.”

To achieve this objective in the next five years, the report proposes upgrading the existing ground-based interceptors (something the Biden administration was planning to do) and networking them with the Navy’s Standard Missile-3 system and the THAAD system to create a multilayered missile defense for key strategic targets. With that goal in mind, the report recommends increasing homeland missile defense spending from roughly $3 billion to as much as $8 billion a year.

Many well-respected defense experts are skeptical that even this more modest program could achieve much success in shooting down ICBMs, which travel at 15,000 mph and can be equipped with multiple, independently targetable warheads. An attacker can also employ countermeasures such as decoys, jammers and chaff to confuse missile defenses. And ballistic or cruise missiles can be launched from submarines off the U.S. coast, reducing warning time to almost zero. The spread of highly maneuverable hypersonic cruise missiles and glide vehicles (which fly at over 3,800 mph) further complicates the picture. Laura Grego of the Union of Concerned Scientists calls Trump’s Iron Dome plan a “fantasy” and a “bad investment.”

In an email to me, Ankit Panda of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace expressed another concern: that Trump’s plan could lead to “nuclear arms-racing.” In other words, China and Russia will react by further boosting both the quality and quantity of their own nuclear forces to maintain the ability to overwhelm U.S. defenses.

Those concerns are valid, but there is a strong case to be made for upgrading homeland missile defense to intercept a limited attack from a rogue state such as North Korea, or to discourage a first strike from China or Russia. If that’s what the Trump plan winds up doing, it could be a worthwhile investment. But if Trump insists on spending countless billions of dollars in a futile attempt to protect every inch of U.S. territory from nuclear attack, it is likely to be a costly boondoggle that will drain defense dollars from more urgent priorities — such as rebuilding America’s dilapidated defense-industrial base.

Comments

By Max Boot

Max Boot is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Pulitzer Prize finalist in biography, he is the author, most recently, of the New York Times bestseller “Reagan: His Life and Legend," which was named one of the 10 best books of 2024 by the New York Times.

21. Fighting Ghosts: Passive Integrated Air Defenses

Air and missile defense is a critical warfighting capability - more so than at any time since the dawn of airpower.

Excerpts:

It is time to start taking the passive air defense problem seriously. The Houthis present a unique opportunity for the United States to test and refine novel technologies and techniques, providing valuable insights for countering more sophisticated adversaries like China and Iran. Lessons learned from this theater should be captured, analyzed, and applied properly to future operational planning.

The emergence of passive integrated air defenses requires a fundamental shift in how the United States approaches military power projection. The days of the United States being able to dominate enemy airspaces are numbered. The military should be prepared to leverage a multitude of capabilities and adapt techniques that can provide finite windows in which to operate, and to capitalize on those opportunities. While adversaries gain ground with low-cost technologies, the United States can maintain its edge by embracing innovation, modernizing platforms, and adopting multi-domain solutions.

Re-establishing a credible posture against highly capable adversaries will call for sustained, coordinated, whole-of-government efforts by the United States and its allies. Policymakers should understand the threat facing U.S. power projection, fund decisive modernization, and sign off on critical operations to recapture U.S. dominance. Strategic leaders should communicate this message to Washington and empower their operational commanders to take chances on new strategies. Finally, operational commanders should trust warfighters to develop and execute novel tactics to recapture the offensive. Addressing the Houthi passive air defense challenge today will prepare the United States for the acute and pacing threats of tomorrow, ensuring sustained operational superiority in the face of evolving adversaries.

Fighting Ghosts: Passive Integrated Air Defenses - War on the Rocks

Aaron Chambers, William Mitchell, and David Bradfield

warontherocks.com · by Aaron Chambers · January 30, 2025

An MQ-9 Reaper drifts ominously through the crisp, pre-dawn sky over Sanaa, Yemen. Its matte-gray fuselage blends seamlessly with the deepening hues of early morning, its whirring sensors casting an invisible gaze over bustling streets below.

Thousands of miles away, in a dimly lit control room, the pilot leans back in his chair, the glow of monitors casting sharp lines across his face. He reaches for his paper coffee cup and slowly brings it to his mouth. “Another slow night,” he murmurs — the words barely escaping his lips before the screen flickers. Static. Silence. Panic hits his chest as he scans his panel, unaware that his $30-million aircraft is now a blazing comet falling to the Earth in pieces.

In an operations center half a world away, analysts erupt into motion, voices colliding as they attempt to piece together what happened. No clues. Hours later, a video emerges, confirming what many had begun to suspect.

This is no future battlefield bristling with radar-guided missiles. This is a quieter menace, a shadow war waged by something far more elusive and insidious: a passive integrated air defense system. Operating unseen, it strikes without warning, rewriting the rules of air superiority in silence.

On Jan. 12, 2024, U.S. forces, with support from other countries, conducted a strike targeting Houthi radar systems, air defense infrastructure, and weapons storage facilities in the Red Sea region. Despite these efforts, the Houthis claim to have downed 14 U.S. MQ-9s since Oct. 7, 2023. Their military parades and close ties to Iran reveal a critical enabler: passive air defense systems.

The challenge posed by passive defenses is not new. These systems have advanced alongside the evolution of the air domain. From the crude anti-aircraft artillery of World War I to today’s cutting-edge passive radar systems, each innovation has provoked the same refrain: “That’s going to be scary to go against.” Yet, despite decades of warnings, the Department of Defense has done little to address these threats proactively.

The Houthis’ abilities to degrade U.S. air assets are quickly becoming lessons for the adversary, underscoring a harsh reality: The credibility of American deterrence is eroding. Effectively countering the current passive air defense threat is crucial for restoring deterrence and ensuring credible defenses for allied nations. To do this, policymakers, leaders, and commanders need to come together to overcome distorted views, understand the threat at hand, and accept the creative solutions that tactical operators propose.

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Distorted Views of Air Superiority

The long 9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were fought against adversaries without sophisticated air defenses, allowing unfettered air operations and target engagement. This fostered complacency, undermining a focus on air superiority and neglecting the tools and training needed to maintain it. This inadequacy is evident in Yemen, where Houthi air defense systems continue to expose the limitations of outdated strategies. The proliferation of advanced systems and the demonstrated inability to counter them predict similar vulnerabilities in future conflicts. Without adopting new techniques to eliminate these threats, air superiority will remain unattainable, and combat-proven tactics will lose relevance.

Former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said that “doctrine is the last refuge of the unimaginative.” The U.S. military’s over-reliance on established practices often stifles creative problem-solving. Understanding an adversaries’ motivations, capabilities, and intentions is essential for developing effective strategies and tactics. Future conflicts with adversaries like Iran or China will demand unprecedented and adaptive approaches.

Preparation for these conflicts has unfortunately devolved into a global arms race. America’s preference for costly stealth platforms reflects an emphasis on quality over quantity, a miscalculation evident in historical conflicts. From the attritional strategies of World War II to the Taliban’s endurance in Afghanistan, quantity has frequently outperformed high-cost precision. The war in Ukraine illustrates the battlefield success of low-cost technologies, such as single-use drones. These innovations negate the need for advanced fighter aircraft to penetrate enemy airspace. Despite these lessons, reliance on stealth technology persists, ignoring vulnerabilities to passive radar and electro-optical/infrared detection systems. Adversaries continue investing in low-cost, effective systems that erode America’s technological advantage. To regain the initiative, the Department of Defense should prioritize scalable, cost-effective solutions that counter emerging threats. The survivability of passive air defense systems in conflict ensures extended engagements that the United States is currently ill-prepared to endure.

Understanding the Threat

Integrated air defense systems are designed to detect, track, and neutralize airborne threats through three core functions: air surveillance, battle management, and weapons control. Traditional air defense systems rely heavily on active radars to transmit radio frequency signals and detect returns from potential targets. Such emissions, while effective, are highly exploitable by U.S. space-based or tactical airborne sensors. However, passive integrated air defenses leverage multiple techniques to reduce the likelihood of destruction such as camouflage, concealment, dispersion of forces, rapid mobility, and strict communication security. However, the key difference is avoiding or severely limiting the use of active military radars.

At the core of any integrated air defense system is air surveillance, tasked with detecting aircraft, initiating and maintaining tracks, identifying threats, and correlating data with other sites. Traditional systems achieve this through active radars, but passive systems leverage infrared, acoustic, and electromagnetic sensors as well as other advanced techniques. These sensors detect heat, noise, and electronic signals emitted by aircraft. Some advanced passive radars can also detect disturbances in ambient civilian signals, such as radio and television broadcasts, that are created as aircraft travel through the sky. Passive integrated air defense systems may also tap into civilian air traffic control radars that are not immediately identified as providing a military function. Belligerents may also receive aircraft tracking information from countries that the United States is not currently in conflict with. In their simplest form, passive integrated air defenses may deploy visual observers equipped with binoculars to monitor predictable air corridors. These methods, combined with camouflage and concealment, make passive air surveillance nodes extremely difficult to detect and disrupt.

Information collected by air surveillance sites is then relayed to battle management centers through a variety of communication links, including landlines, satellite communications, and digital radios. While modern integrated air defenses prioritize secure, automated data sharing with built-in redundancies, these transmissions remain vulnerable to exploitation. At the battle management centers, data from multiple sensors is fused into a cohesive air picture. Here, human operators assess and prioritize threats, determine engagement authority, and select weapon systems. These decisions rely on sophisticated command-and-control suites but remain subject to delays or errors by human operators who may be under immense pressure, particularly when managing multiple threats.

The final step, weapons control, involves engaging detected threats. Traditional systems again rely on active radars to generate target-quality tracks and guide missiles to their targets. Passive systems, by contrast, tend to employ undetectable electro-optical and infrared tracking and guidance, robbing airborne assets of receiving advanced indications and cutting down their time to react. Because of their reduced detectability, passive systems can afford to let targets get in close, reducing the engagement timeline and further limiting the aircraft’s ability to defend. Passive integrated air defenses may also utilize systems that rely on limited active emissions that remain difficult to locate but may be more capable at engaging fighter aircraft. Heat-seeking systems also maintain their effectiveness against stealth platforms that are specifically designed to counter radar systems.

The rise of passive integrated air defense systems represents a fundamental challenge to U.S. air superiority. Traditional tactics, such as using anti-radiation missiles to neutralize active radar systems, are largely ineffective against passive systems. These systems reduce the detectability of their components, complicating the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess process that underpins U.S. targeting doctrine. An infrared camera placed on a residential rooftop, or an acoustic sensor hidden in a civilian vehicle is far more challenging to locate than a traditional radar site.

Despite these challenges, passive systems are not without vulnerabilities. Air surveillance nodes should still communicate with battle management centers, creating exploitable data links. Missile launches generate heat signatures possibly detectable by overhead satellites and onboard systems of select aircraft, offering opportunities for counterstrikes. Moreover, passive systems often rely on single engagements, making them susceptible to saturation tactics or coordinated attacks by multiple aircraft.

Strategic leaders ought to understand the threats that they face today but also look to prepare their forces for the future fight, which will likely involve a mix of passive and active systems. This mindset will allow them to promptly accept the solutions proposed by the operational elements that are closer to the fight. As former Delta Force commander Pete Blaber said, “Always trust the guy on the ground.”

Defining the Tactical Problem

The ability to affect an adversary’s will to wage war hinges on identifying and targeting their critical centers of gravity. This traditionally relies on extensive intelligence collection sometimes involving tactical airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms operating near potential targets. However, air defense systems deny aircraft access to the airspace, quickly shifting the priority to neutralizing these threats first.

Passive integrated air defense systems undermine traditional find-and-fix workflows mainly by minimizing their detectability. These systems can integrate seamlessly into civilian infrastructure, making them difficult to locate and neutralize without risking collateral damage. To counter these systems and regain air superiority, U.S. forces should focus on and target the more easily detectable enablers of passive integrated air defense systems. Patterns should be built to identify and prosecute the communication nodes that are associated with the passive air defense kill chain.

Passive integrated air defense systems present a novel problem set requiring novel solutions that have not been seen or practiced before at scale. Decision-makers are obligated to understand the urgency for these innovations and operational commanders should become comfortable authorizing the use of new tactics.

Novel Solutions

Addressing the passive integrated air defense threat begins with modernizing existing platforms to operate effectively in contested environments. For platforms like the MQ-9, this means equipping them with missile approach warning systems that can detect missile launches and flare dispensers that can defeat infrared-guided missiles. Additionally, extending sensor ranges would enable stand-off intelligence collection, mitigating risks associated with hostile airspace.

Modernization should also focus on munitions and other sensor capabilities. For instance, adapting the AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile to target broader emissive signatures — such as communication nodes or battle management systems — would expand its utility in degrading passive air defense networks.

Innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures are essential for addressing the unique challenges posed by passive integrated air defense systems. Examples include: operating MQ-9s in two-ship or larger formations to provide mutual support and complicate enemy targeting solutions; deploying fighter escorts to protect collection platforms and enable extended operations in contested areas; expanding the target set of the Wild Weasels (specialized teams that traditionally find and target enemy active air defenses) to include passive air defense networks; and coordinating deliberate collection operations to identify critical centers of gravity within the passive air defense network for subsequent violent or non-violent operations. Lastly, aircraft should limit or mask their emissions to reduce detectability. This, however, complicates battle tracking by U.S. operation centers and deconfliction amongst tactical assets making it crucial to conduct thorough mission planning to avoid fratricide. One tactic remains certain: continuing to fly single MQ-9s in non-permissive airspace will only result in more MQ-9s being shot down.

Cyber operations, electronic warfare, information operations, and space assets offer cost-effective, flexible approaches to disrupting passive systems. By integrating these with strike options, the United States can achieve layered effects that degrade passive air defense capabilities without escalating risk to personnel or assets.

The United States and its allies should develop robust sensing and targeting grids tailored for contested environments. These networks would leverage affordable, scalable platforms — such as maritime drones, unattended ground sensors, and small unmanned aerial vehicles — to saturate the battlespace. Some advanced systems are capable of near-real-time detection and tracking. These systems, along with satellite communication links, facilitate rapid information sharing and cross-cueing of collection assets. Drawing lessons from historical initiatives like Operation Igloo White, modern sensor networks can achieve superior situational awareness and accelerate kill chains.

The critical element in any air defense system, passive or active, is human operators. Credible threats to their safety can deter them from risking their lives to shoot at an aircraft. The United States can only buy back military credibility through force. The cost of a downed MQ-9 should not be counted by the enemy in dollars. It should be counted in the number of fighters they lost that day.

A New Operational Paradigm

It is time to start taking the passive air defense problem seriously. The Houthis present a unique opportunity for the United States to test and refine novel technologies and techniques, providing valuable insights for countering more sophisticated adversaries like China and Iran. Lessons learned from this theater should be captured, analyzed, and applied properly to future operational planning.

The emergence of passive integrated air defenses requires a fundamental shift in how the United States approaches military power projection. The days of the United States being able to dominate enemy airspaces are numbered. The military should be prepared to leverage a multitude of capabilities and adapt techniques that can provide finite windows in which to operate, and to capitalize on those opportunities. While adversaries gain ground with low-cost technologies, the United States can maintain its edge by embracing innovation, modernizing platforms, and adopting multi-domain solutions.

Re-establishing a credible posture against highly capable adversaries will call for sustained, coordinated, whole-of-government efforts by the United States and its allies. Policymakers should understand the threat facing U.S. power projection, fund decisive modernization, and sign off on critical operations to recapture U.S. dominance. Strategic leaders should communicate this message to Washington and empower their operational commanders to take chances on new strategies. Finally, operational commanders should trust warfighters to develop and execute novel tactics to recapture the offensive. Addressing the Houthi passive air defense challenge today will prepare the United States for the acute and pacing threats of tomorrow, ensuring sustained operational superiority in the face of evolving adversaries.

Become a Member

Aaron “GHOST” Chambers is an Air Force officer serving as the intelligence operations officer at the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division at the 609th Combined Air & Space Operations Center.

William Mitchell is an Air Force officer serving as an intelligence analyst at the 609th Combined Air & Space Operations Center.

David “WACO” Bradfield is an Air Force officer and the current chief of weapons and tactics at the 609th Combined Air & Space Operations Center.

The views in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the views and positions of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: U.S. Air Force

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Aaron Chambers · January 30, 2025

22. The Case for Peace Through Strength – and Diplomacy

The Case for Peace Through Strength – and Diplomacy

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/the-case-for-peace-through-strength-and-diplomacy

Posted: January 29th, 2025

By Ambassador Joseph DeTrani

Ambassador Joseph DeTrani served as the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea, was the Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, and served as the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, ODNI. He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories.

OPINION — In his inaugural address, President Donald Trump said: “Our success will be measured not only by the battles we win, but also by the wars we and, perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” It was a clear message to allies and adversaries alike.

President Trump invited China’s President, Xi Jinping, to the inauguration, and China’s Vice President, Han Zheng, did attend. A few days prior to the inauguration, Trump and Xi had a friendly and reportedly productive telephone conversation that dealt with trade, fentanyl, TikTok, Taiwan and other subjects. rump reportedly said he would like to meet with the Chinese leader as soon as possible. Media reporting said that Trump had previously advised his staff that he wanted to visit China, seeking to deepen a relationship with Xi.

A few hours after the inauguration, Russian President Vladimir Putin mentioned in Moscow that a second Trump presidency could represent an opportunity for changes in U.S.-Russian relations. He blamed the rupture in relations with the U.S. on former President Biden, while neglecting to mention Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

One day after the inauguration, Putin also had a video conference with Xi and stated that the meeting aimed to improve “good neighborly friendship and strategic cooperation” between Russia and China. Putin reportedly went on to say that both countries “jointly support a more just global order.”

It’s obvious that Mr. Trump has the attention of Messrs. Putin and Xi. That’s a positive sign. However, we should remember the February 4, 2022, visit of Putin to Beijing, when Xi spoke of a “no limits partnership” with Russia. What followed was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, China’s refusal to criticize Russia for its war of aggression in Ukraine, its delivery of satellite and space-based capabilities and satellite imagery to Russia, in addition to components and other materials needed to sustain Russia’s defense industry.

A constant theme in Xi’s numerous meetings with Putin is the “global order” and their mutual unhappiness with the role of the U.S. in this world order. As Xi reportedly said during his recent video conference with Putin, both countries aimed to positively contribute to the reform and development of the global system. Both reportedly agreed to work for “lasting peace in developing regions of the world.”

China has worked assiduously on its outreach to developing countries, especially in Africa. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, despite its many faults, does provide development assistance to several countries. A recently-constructed airport in Pakistan and other projects in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar come with a cost for the recipients of this development assistance – but China is there with financing and the Chinese labor – a contentious issue – to support these projects.

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Russia and China work closely with the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa – and now Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates as well), an intergovernmental organization that focuses on economic and geopolitical coordination. Many Global South countries – and others — are interested in joining BRICS.

Unfortunately, it is this type of outreach that the U.S. has neglected since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. There was a perception that with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. system of governance would become widely recognized as effective compared to other forms of governance. We closed the U.S. Information Agency in October 1999 and cut back on cultural exchanges, while also shuttering some of our cultural facilities and libraries abroad. In retrospect, I believe these were unfortunate mistakes.

Today our form of governance is competing with China and Russia’s autocracies. These autocracies appeal to both developing and developed countries, for various reasons. In 1991, when the Soviet Union imploded, it appeared that liberal democracies, which ensure life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for their citizens, were a desirable form of governance. We may believe it is a far superior system to dictatorship or autocracy, but this is part of the competition we’re having with China and others. To succeed, we must clearly convey our story and values.

President Trump has an opportunity to tell this story to the world. It’s also an opportunity to contribute to ending the conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and other regions experiencing turmoil. Yes, peace through strength – but also through diplomacy.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joseph DeTrani was first published in The Washington Times

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief

23. At Gabbard’s Confirmation Hearing, Edward Snowden May Loom Large

At Gabbard’s Confirmation Hearing, Edward Snowden May Loom Large

Senators are expected to ask about her defense of the former government contractor, who released reams of data on U.S. surveillance programs and fled to Russia.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/29/us/politics/tulsi-gabbard-confirmation-edward-snowden.html?searchResultPosition=1

Edward Snowden appearing via video at a Bitcoin conference in Nashville last year.Credit...Jon Cherry/Getty Images

By Julian E. Barnes Carl Hulse and Sharon LaFraniere

Reporting from Washington

Jan. 29, 2025

Tulsi Gabbard’s past statements on Syria, Russia, Ukraine and warrantless spying have all given Republican senators pause. But for some lawmakers another issue looms just as large: Edward Snowden, the former government contractor who released reams of classified data on American surveillance programs in 2013 and then fled to Russia.

While in Congress, Ms. Gabbard introduced legislation that would have offered additional whistle-blower protections for people, like Mr. Snowden, accused of violating the Espionage Act. Working with Matt Gaetz, who was then a Florida congressman, she also introduced legislation that called on the charges against Mr. Snowden to be dropped.

Ms. Gabbard is now President Trump’s pick to oversee the nation’s spy agencies as the director of national intelligence. At her confirmation on Thursday, senators plan to press her on a range of issues, including Mr. Snowden.

Senator Susan Collins, Republican of Maine and one of the lawmakers who will be questioning Ms. Gabbard, said Mr. Snowden’s disclosures “jeopardized people who were helping us.”

“One of my greatest concerns is how she views Edward Snowden in light of the resolution that she co-authored with Matt Gaetz calling for all criminal charges against him, which were extremely serious and involved sharing highly classified information with our adversaries, to be dropped,” Ms. Collins said.

In the face of such skepticism, Ms. Gabbard is expected to distance herself from Mr. Snowden at her confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, according to a person briefed on her plans. Ms. Gabbard plans to say that she believes Mr. Snowden’s disclosures hurt the intelligence community and national security, the person said.

It will be an about-face. In 2019, as a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, Ms. Gabbard suggested that Mr. Snowden’s disclosures about the National Security Agency’s activities had a positive impact. She told CNN that she and other members of Congress worked to “try to shut down these avenues that some of our intelligence agencies have abused and violated our constitutional Fourth Amendment rights.”

“If it wasn’t for Snowden the American people would never have learned the N.S.A. was collecting phone records and spying on Americans,” she said in a social media message that year. In an appearance on the popular podcast hosted by Joe Rogan, she vowed to pardon Mr. Snowden.

Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas, the new chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has been a harsh critic of Mr. Snowden’s and repeatedly called him a traitor.

Image

As a representative in Congress, Tulsi Gabbard introduced legislation that would have created a public interest defense for people, like Mr. Snowden, accused of violating the Espionage Act.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

“Edward Snowden was an egotistical serial liar and traitor who jeopardized the safety of Americans and allies,” Mr. Cotton wrote on social media in 2016.

Since becoming the committee’s chairman this month, Mr. Cotton has alluded to policy differences with Ms. Gabbard but defended her patriotism and integrity.

“I understand that people have their differences of opinion with Ms. Gabbard,” Mr. Cotton told Fox News on Sunday. “Probably some Republicans disagree with the vote she’s cast as a Democratic congresswoman. A lot of Democrats may be upset that she finally saw the light and left the Democratic Party.”

Ms. Gabbard may also be asked to defend her positions that have been at odds with Mr. Trump’s. In 2018, Mr. Trump released a long statement defending Saudi Arabia after the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, a Washington Post journalist. In a social media post, Ms. Gabbard retorted: “Hey @realdonaldtrump: being Saudi Arabia’s bitch is not ‘America First.’”

As a Democrat, Ms. Gabbard also criticized Mr. Trump’s policies on Israel, Iran and China.

Mr. Snowden however has been a repeated point of friction in Ms. Gabbard’s conversations with various senators, according to congressional aides and Trump administration officials. Senator James Lankford, the Oklahoma Republican, said he was among those who had spoken with Ms. Gabbard about Mr. Snowden.

“The office of the director of national intelligence,” Mr. Lankford has said, “has a responsibility to be able to make sure we don’t have secrets leaked out.”

In addition to Mr. Snowden, Ms Gabbard has defended Julian Assange, the WikiLeaks founder, who published documents leaked by Chelsea Manning, then a low-level Army intelligence analyst, about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“ So much of the information that has been released has informed the American people about actions that were taking place that they should be aware of,” Ms. Gabbard said in the 2019 CNN interview. “It provided transparency.”

The disagreement over Mr. Snowden reflects an underlying issue between Ms. Gabbard and at least some Republicans in the Senate over the reach of American intelligence surveillance.

Mr. Snowden exposed the broad scope of and new information about the National Security Agency’s collection of bulk records of Americans’ phone records.

Ms. Gabbard, like Mr. Trump, has been skeptical of the government’s other efforts to collect information, including a surveillance law known as Section 702. That law allows the government, without a warrant, to collect communications of foreigners abroad, including when those people are interacting with Americans.

But intelligence officials, and many Republican senators, have said that Section 702 is a critical national security tool, one that has helped warn against terrorist attacks and other threats.

Privacy advocates have raised questions about all such intelligence collection. The National Security Agency programs Mr. Snowden disclosed and Section 702 involve secret intelligence agencies collecting information, sometimes including Americans, with limited oversight.

Mr. Cotton has complained about attempts to tie the issues together and said Mr. Snowden’s leaks have warped the debate over Section 702.

“Unfortunately, this and other programs were distorted in the public debate by a traitor, a disgruntled ex-N.S.A. contractor, Edward Snowden, who now sits in the warm embrace of Russian intelligence services,” Mr. Cotton said in 2017.

While 702 collection is aimed overseas, it sweeps up calls and communications involving Americans. F.B.I. agents have been criticized for improperly looking up information about Americans that was collected under Section 702. Such searches were not supposed to happen routinely, and subsequent reforms have sought to curb the practice.

After several tense conversations with lawmakers, Ms. Gabbard announced that she now supported the reauthorization of the law.

Mr. Cotton praised that switch.

“Tulsi Gabbard has assured me in our conversations that she supports Section 702 as recently amended and that she will follow the law and support its reauthorization,” Mr. Cotton said in a statement.

But Senator Mark Kelly, Democrat of Arizona, said it might be hard to trust Ms. Gabbard’s change of heart on Section 702 and Mr. Snowden, who he said “should be in jail.”

“It’s not like she said something once,” Mr. Kelly said. “She has done multiple pieces of legislation on this issue. When somebody changes their position, especially when she is changing her position to get a job, you have to wonder what she really believes.”

Kitty Bennett and Dylan Freedman contributed research.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

Carl Hulse is the chief Washington correspondent, primarily writing about Congress and national political races and issues. He has nearly four decades of experience reporting in the nation’s capital. More about Carl Hulse

Sharon LaFraniere is an investigative reporter focusing on the Trump administration. More about Sharon LaFraniere

24. The Price of Trump’s Power Politics

Excerpts:

How the United States will fare in a dog-eat-dog world also depends, of course, on decisions made elsewhere. Putin and Xi’s shared conviction that they are now driving change on a global scale may breed hubris and cause them to misstep. China’s heavy-handed “wolf warrior” diplomacy and Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine, for instance, bolstered Biden’s effort to rebuild U.S. alliances. Other countries might resent the United States, but many of them fear China and Russia in ways that could work to Washington’s advantage.

What the United States’ Asian and European allies do also matters. These countries will be tempted to try to please Trump, whether by showering him with praise, feting him with state visits, or offering preemptive concessions such as purchasing more American-made goods. Those efforts, however, will not endear them to him. Trump will happily pocket those wins and see them as vindication of his might-makes-right approach. But he will not take up the United States’ old mantle of global leadership.

To earn Trump’s respect, U.S. allies must demonstrate strength. Whether they have the capacity to do so is an open question. First, they must recognize that the era of Pax Americana is over and the era of power politics has returned. The one thing Trump understands is power—and if U.S. allies work together, they can confront him with plenty of their own. If they succeed in mobilizing their resources collectively, they may also be able to blunt some of Trump’s worst foreign-policy impulses. That may in turn create the opportunity down the road to forge a new global order that matches Pax Americana’s record for peace and prosperity. But if they fail, a darker era of unchecked power politics awaits—one that is less prosperous and more dangerous for all.

The Price of Trump’s Power Politics

Foreign Affairs · by More by Ivo H. Daalder · January 30, 2025

Why China and Russia Stand to Win in a Might-Makes-Right World

Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay

January 30, 2025

U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House, Washington, D.C., January 2025 Carlos Barria / Reuters

Ivo H. Daalder is CEO of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013.

James M. Lindsay is Mary and David Boies Distinguished Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy and Director of Fellowship Affairs at the Council on Foreign Relations.

More by James M. Lindsay

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Pax Americana is gone. Born with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the U.S.-led international rules-based order died with the second inauguration of Donald J. Trump. The president has long maintained that this order disadvantages the United States by saddling it with the burden of policing the globe and enabling its allies to play it for a sucker. “The postwar global order is not just obsolete,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared in his Senate confirmation hearing. “It is now a weapon being used against us.”

Trump’s skepticism about U.S. support for Ukraine and Taiwan, his eagerness to impose tariffs, and his threats to retake the Panama Canal, absorb Canada, and acquire Greenland make it clear that he envisions a return to nineteenth-century power politics and spheres of interest, even if he does not frame his foreign policy in those terms. In that era, the great powers of the day sought to divide the world into regions that each would dominate, regardless of the desires of those who lived there—a vision of the world that Trump explicitly echoes. Trump sees few significant U.S. interests outside the Western Hemisphere, considers alliances to be a drain on the U.S. Treasury, and believes the United States should dominate its neighborhood. His is a Thucydidean worldview—one in which “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Although the era of Pax Americana produced extraordinary achievements—the deterrence of communism, unprecedented global prosperity, relative peace—it also planted the seeds of its own destruction well before Trump’s ascent. American hubris had led to costly, humiliating wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 2008–9 financial crisis shattered faith in the U.S. government’s competence and policy prescriptions. One can understand why some Americans might feel their country would fare better in a different, might-makes-right world. The United States would seem to bring a strong hand to such an order—it commands the world’s largest economy, its most capable military, and arguably its strongest geographic position.

But it has a profoundly underrated disadvantage: lack of practice. Naked power politics is alien terrain for the United States, but it is familiar territory to its current rivals. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin have long resented Pax Americana because it limited their geopolitical ambitions. They have learned to work together to counter U.S. influence, especially in the global South. And unlike Trump, they do not face internal checks and balances on their power. They could overplay their hands and generate a backlash to their revisionist ambitions. But if they do not, Trump’s gamble could easily go awry, leaving Americans, and the rest of the world, less prosperous and less secure.

DOMINATION OVER DIPLOMACY

As anomalous as Trump’s rhetoric can sound to ears conditioned by decades of bipartisan talk of the United States as the leader of the free world, his foreign-policy vision—of expanding U.S. influence in its immediate neighborhood while backing out of global leadership—draws from older American impulses. In 1823, President James Monroe famously declared the Western Hemisphere off-limits to further European colonization. By the end of the nineteenth century, presidents would use Monroe’s proclamation to justify U.S. territorial expansion. In 1977, the United States agreed to relinquish control of the Panama Canal only in the face of rising anti-Americanism in Latin America and over the staunch opposition of Americans who believed, as one U.S. senator put it, that “we stole it fair and square.”

Indeed, Trump’s coveting of Canada and Greenland also have roots in U.S. history. The founding American generation harbored dreams of absorbing Canada; writing at the start of the War of 1812, fought between the United States and the United Kingdom, former President Thomas Jefferson declared that “the acquisition of Canada this year . . . will be a mere matter of marching.” Such a desire persisted in cries of “54-40 or fight” in the 1840s, a reference to the latitude of the southern border of what was then Russian-owned Alaskan territory and to an appeal to seize a large swath of Canada’s Pacific Northwest. President James Polk only set aside this ambition in 1846 in favor of the current U.S.-Canadian border because he was reluctant to confront a more powerful United Kingdom over a distant and largely uninhabited territory as war with Mexico loomed. President Andrew Johnson considered purchasing Greenland from Denmark when the United States bought Alaska from Russia in 1867, and President Harry Truman, citing the island’s strategic value, secretly pitched the purchase once again in 1946.

Naked power politics is alien terrain for the United States.

Similar dreams of Manifest Destiny undergird Trump’s inaugural-address call for a foreign policy that “expands our territory.” His goal to increase Washington’s sway in the Western Hemisphere does in fact have some strategic logic. The Panama Canal is a vital sea route for U.S. commerce. Roughly 40 percent of all U.S. container traffic passes through the waterway, and nearly three-quarters of all containers sailing through the canal originate in or are destined for the United States. U.S. security would be endangered if another great power controlled the canal. Greenland’s strategic importance, meanwhile, has grown alongside climate change—a phenomenon that Trump ironically insists is not occurring. The melting of the Arctic ice cap will soon create a new northern waterway, bringing additional military vulnerabilities to northern North America. Greenland also boasts large reserves of the critical minerals that the United States needs for clean energy technologies. And making Canada the 51st state would eliminate trade barriers between the two countries, in theory reducing economic inefficiencies and potentially enriching people on both sides of the border.

Washington, however, has already achieved many of these strategic objectives without resorting to threats. Panama’s president,José Raúl Molino, successfully campaigned on promises to build closer ties with the United States. As an autonomous territory of Denmark, Greenland is covered by NATO’s Article 5, meaning that it falls under the organization’s security umbrella. The island hosts the U.S. military’s northernmost installation, Pituffik Space Base, formerly known as Thule Air Base. Greenlanders have proved eager to solicit American rather than Chinese investment in their economy. And the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which Trump negotiated during his first term, has already encouraged economic integration between the United States and Canada. The agreement’s 2026 review provides an opportunity to deepen that cooperation. Yet such diplomatic tools—forging alliances and creating collective security and trade agreements—are hallmarks of the world order that Trump has now abandoned.

THE PUTIN-XI PLAYBOOK

It is clear whose approach Trump seeks to emulate instead. He considers Putin and Xi his peers, not allied leaders such as Japan’s Shigeru Ishiba, France’s Emmanuel Macron, or the United Kingdom’s Keir Starmer. Trump regularly denounces these allies for taking advantage of U.S. largess, but he has hailed Putin as “savvy,” “strong,” and “a genius” for invading Ukraine and Xi for being “exceptionally brilliant” in controlling Chinese citizens with an “iron fist.” In his praise for these autocrats, Trump reveals his singular admiration for leaders who wield power without constraint—even those who are actively hostile to U.S. interests.

Trump, moreover, appears comfortable with ceding spheres of influence to China and Russia if they return the favor. He has blamed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, not Putin, for the war in Ukraine, and he favors resolving the Ukraine war with an agreement that cedes Ukrainian territory to Russia and bars Ukraine from joining NATO. Asked in 2021 whether the United States should defend Taiwan militarily, Trump answered that if China invaded the island, “there isn’t a fucking thing we can do about it.” And Trump is comfortable with downgrading postwar alliances that extend into supposed Russian and Chinese spheres of interest. He has, for instance, repeatedly questioned the value of NATO (whose expansion he blames for triggering Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) and threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. He views such alliances as bad investments that saddle the United States with the cost of protecting countries that, to add insult to injury, also steal jobs from Americans.

Like Putin and Xi, Trump also believes that economic power should be used as a lever to extract concessions from countries that displease him. Just as Putin has used Russia’s oil and gas to intimidate Europe and Xi has manipulated China’s exports and imports to coerce countries such as Australia and Japan, Trump favors using tariffs to force both domestic and foreign corporations to relocate production to the United States. Trump also sees tariffs as instruments to compel foreign capitals to bend to his will on other issues. Mexico, for instance, now faces the prospect of higher tariffs should it fail to meet Trump’s demands to stop the flow of migrants and fentanyl across the United States’ southern border. He has threatened to use “economic force” to annex Canada. He has warned Denmark it will face higher tariffs if it refuses to sell Greenland. And just this week, he threatened to impose tariffs on Colombia for its refusal to accept military flights deporting its nationals from the United States. The creators of the postwar global order believed high tariffs only fueled destructive economic nationalism and conflict. Trump’s threats mark the dawn of a more openly coercive order in which economic intimidation replaces free trade and international cooperation as a currency of power.

PLAYING A LOSING HAND

Trump’s approach may yield some successes. Canada and Mexico may agree to do more, at least symbolically, to secure their borders. The leaders of U.S. allies will visit Washington—or Mar-a-Lago—to trumpet their desire to work with Trump’s America.

But the United States’ return to nineteenth-century power politics will likely not yield the bonanza that Trump has promised. Up until now, Washington’s network of alliances has granted the United States extraordinary influence in Europe and Asia, imposing constraints on Moscow and Beijing at a scale that neither power can replicate. Ceding that advantage will come at great cost to the United States: not only will erstwhile U.S. allies no longer follow Washington’s lead, but many could also seek safety by aligning themselves more closely with Russia and China instead.

The United States may face similar setbacks on the trade front. As Elizabeth Economy and Melanie Hart noted in Foreign Affairs in January, U.S. producers are already at a growing competitive disadvantage exporting to the 12 members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the accord negotiated in the wake of Trump’s 2017 decision to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The door for the United States to join CPTPP, which has remained ajar, may soon close. But it could open for China, potentially giving Beijing a say over the standards and rules that govern a wide swath of the global economy. During Trump’s first term, the European Union signed major trade agreements with Canada and Japan. It has just concluded new and upgraded agreements with Mexico and countries in South America, and it is finalizing deals with Australia and Indonesia. Trump’s willingness to slap tariffs on countries that defy him will only encourage foreign leaders to look elsewhere for trade opportunities and lock U.S. producers out of global markets.

To earn Trump’s respect, U.S. allies must demonstrate strength.

The United States could also fail at naked power politics simply because China and Russia may be better at it. Beijing and Moscow have not hesitated to inflame the world’s resentment of America, emphasizing the United States’ purported hypocrisy for prioritizing Ukraine as conflicts rage elsewhere and for ignoring the high civilian casualties incurred in Israel’s war in Gaza. Those efforts will likely ramp up as Trump turns to threats to pressure friends and neighbors; as a result, Washington will almost surely lose some ability to attract support. China is especially well positioned to contest U.S. influence across the globe, including in the United States’ own backyard. Trump does not offer other countries new opportunities; he demands concessions. Beijing, by contrast, is eager to do business around the world with its Belt and Road infrastructure initiative; it invests with few immediate conditions, and it speaks the language of win-win outcomes. Chinese firms also often offer competitive products at better prices than U.S. companies do. Unsurprisingly, China has already become the number one trading partner for many countries in the global South. And as Washington withdraws from international institutions such as the World Health Organization and the Paris climate agreement, Beijing is swiftly moving to fill the vacuum.

The United States’ political system also puts Trump at a disadvantage. Both China and Russia exercise near-complete control over their populations, using fear, surveillance, and repression to keep citizens in line. As a result, both countries can pursue policies that inflict great pain on their publics: Putin, for instance, has conducted his “special military operation” in Ukraine despite netting his country casualties that reportedly run more than three-quarters of a million. However hard he tries, Trump cannot command such power over the American people. Indeed, any efforts to do so will invite a backlash. U.S. society is also vulnerable to foreign influence campaigns through social and other media channels in ways that the more controlled Chinese and Russian societies are not. Should Trump’s policies meet large-scale domestic resistance, he may learn what the Vietnam War taught Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon: strong domestic opposition weakens the credibility of a president’s threats and gives rivals reason to believe they can outlast Washington.

TRUMP’S GAMBLE

How the United States will fare in a dog-eat-dog world also depends, of course, on decisions made elsewhere. Putin and Xi’s shared conviction that they are now driving change on a global scale may breed hubris and cause them to misstep. China’s heavy-handed “wolf warrior” diplomacy and Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine, for instance, bolstered Biden’s effort to rebuild U.S. alliances. Other countries might resent the United States, but many of them fear China and Russia in ways that could work to Washington’s advantage.

What the United States’ Asian and European allies do also matters. These countries will be tempted to try to please Trump, whether by showering him with praise, feting him with state visits, or offering preemptive concessions such as purchasing more American-made goods. Those efforts, however, will not endear them to him. Trump will happily pocket those wins and see them as vindication of his might-makes-right approach. But he will not take up the United States’ old mantle of global leadership.

To earn Trump’s respect, U.S. allies must demonstrate strength. Whether they have the capacity to do so is an open question. First, they must recognize that the era of Pax Americana is over and the era of power politics has returned. The one thing Trump understands is power—and if U.S. allies work together, they can confront him with plenty of their own. If they succeed in mobilizing their resources collectively, they may also be able to blunt some of Trump’s worst foreign-policy impulses. That may in turn create the opportunity down the road to forge a new global order that matches Pax Americana’s record for peace and prosperity. But if they fail, a darker era of unchecked power politics awaits—one that is less prosperous and more dangerous for all.

Ivo H. Daalder is CEO of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and served as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013.

James M. Lindsay is Mary and David Boies Distinguished Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy and Director of Fellowship Affairs at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Ivo H. Daalder · January 30, 2025

25. The Case for Reglobalization

Excerpts:

The new Trump team should start by identifying the alliances it should strengthen and the countries it should build new relationships with in Africa, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific region. In Africa and Latin America, this could include countries that are rich in the natural resources used in battery or semiconductor production, such as Chile and Zimbabwe, or are in strategically important locations, such as Djibouti due to its access to the Red Sea. In the Indo-Pacific, the United States should prioritize deepening its partnerships with countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and others where it competes with China for economic influence, as well as with Pacific Island nations whose military cooperation could prove useful to Washington in the event of a conflict with Beijing over Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

To forge new partnerships, the United States must offer economic benefits.

Next, the administration should work with U.S. business leaders in critical domestic industries, such as semiconductor manufacturing and car production, to determine the raw or processed materials that can be sourced from priority countries. The U.S. government should then invest in these countries to improve infrastructure and build up industries that can feed directly into U.S. supply chains. The Biden administration’s recent investment in a railway project in Angola followed this logic: the route connects Angola with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia, facilitating the production of critical minerals used in batteries. But Washington should be making far more of these strategic investments. In Chile, for example, the United States can invest in the copper industry, which is vital for semiconductor manufacturing. It can finance mining projects in Indonesia, which has large reserves of nickel, a mineral used to produce batteries for electric vehicles and other green technologies. In Vietnam, the United States can invest in electronic manufacturing to diversify its supply chains in this sector away from China and Taiwan.

Additionally, the United States can leverage its influence in international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to facilitate lending and investment in U.S. partner countries in the global South. The United States is the largest shareholder of the World Bank Group, and together with its closest allies, such as Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, it has an outsized influence when it comes to making policy changes and approving financial assistance packages. Washington could thus push for measures that increase the foreign investment and economic aid to its new or existing partners in the global South, adding to initial U.S. investments and boosting these countries’ long-term economic development. Other U.S. allies, including Japan, South Korea, and European countries, could also benefit from better access to new markets.

This approach is more targeted than the United States’ traditional economic aid, which has primarily focused on grants, humanitarian assistance, and trade programs. It does not just provide economic benefits to U.S. partners in the global South but also meets the United States’ economic and national security needs. With a commitment to reglobalization, carefully crafting trade and investment packages to build relationships with critical countries, Washington can strengthen its domestic industries, protect its supply chains, and enhance the partnerships it needs to advance other national security and geostrategic interests—all at once.

The Case for Reglobalization

Foreign Affairs · by More by Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. · January 30, 2025

Turning Inward Won’t Secure America’s Interests

Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., and Maximilian F. Hippold

January 30, 2025

The Port of Oakland in Oakland, California, January 2025 Michaela Vatcheva / Reuters

Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., is the Steven A. Tananbaum Distinguished Fellow for International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Maximilian F. Hippold is a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.

More by Maximilian F. Hippold

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After years of promoting globalization and free trade agreements, in the past decade, U.S. policymakers have coalesced around an economic agenda that emphasizes industrial policy and supply chain security. This pivot was in large part a reaction to the downsides of economic interdependence. Although the overall economic benefits of globalization are undisputed, they have been unevenly distributed. In many parts of the United States, unfettered international trade brought a decline of domestic industry and the loss of well-paid manufacturing jobs. Entire regions, especially rural and predominantly industrial ones, were left behind. The supply chain issues that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic further highlighted the dangers of interdependence. As a result, both Republicans and Democrats have turned to industrial policy and trade restrictions to create more domestic manufacturing jobs and reduce the United States’ reliance on other countries.

But U.S. policymakers risk overcorrecting. By adopting a narrow focus on economic security, they could miss opportunities to court countries in the global South that want economic relationships with the United States. And with great-power competition heating up, now is not the time to look further inward. Instead, the United States needs to seek out ways to reinforce its existing relationships and build new ones in regions of strategic importance.

The Trump administration needs a policy that can balance both economic and geostrategic objectives. It must initiate a process of “reglobalization,” investing in industries that support U.S. supply chains in countries in the global South. Such measures are not the broad, often unpopular, and sometimes harmful free trade agreements of past U.S. administrations. They are targeted foreign investments that ultimately boost domestic manufacturing of high-end products. By adopting this approach, the new administration could both reindustrialize the United States and strengthen the web of partnerships it needs to compete with China, Russia, and other strategic rivals.

LOSING GROUND

A global power shift has changed the terms of U.S. alliances. The post–Cold War unipolar world, dominated by the United States, is becoming a multipolar one. No longer do countries naturally gravitate into Washington’s sphere of influence. Many countries, especially in the global South, are increasingly comfortable engaging with several major powers simultaneously. Vietnam, for instance, is a U.S. partner that also maintains close ties with both China and Russia. India is a member of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue)—a grouping that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—and is considered by Washington to be a strategic partner in countering Chinese influence in Asia. But India also works closely with Russia, including by purchasing discounted Russian oil and thus indirectly funding Moscow’s war in Ukraine. Turkey is a U.S. treaty ally as a fellow member of NATO, but it also signed a deal in 2018 to purchase a Russian antimissile defense system and more recently requested to join BRICS, the group whose early members included Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

The United States and its closest allies, collectively, no longer represent the world’s largest economic bloc. The newly expanded BRICS, which now boasts ten members (the most recent additions are Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates), account for more than a third of global GDP, surpassing the share of the G-7, which includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. And as other countries build international partnerships, they are driven not by a sense of shared values but by economic benefits. Many African countries, for instance, have recently increased their economic ties not only to China through its Belt and Road Initiative but also to Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, which have made investments in ports, clean energy, mining, and more.

The United States, meanwhile, has increasingly turned its attention to domestic priorities. Washington is focused on revitalizing former manufacturing hubs and building capacity at home. There is bipartisan agreement on the need to create new manufacturing jobs, especially in parts of the country most affected by deindustrialization and production offshoring. In 2022, the U.S. Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which allocates more than $58 billion to boost domestic production of computer chips and semiconductors, with broad support from both parties.

Trump needs a policy that can balance economic and geostrategic objectives.

Washington is not about to expand its foreign economic engagement with new free trade agreements, either. Neither party has an appetite for such deals, as demonstrated by strong bipartisan objection to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which led to the U.S. withdrawal from the 12-country agreement in 2017, and stalled negotiations with the EU in 2016 over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. President Donald Trump, after renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement in his first term, has suggested he might impose 25 percent tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico ahead of the planned review of NAFTA’s successor, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, next year. Tariffs have become a mainstay of U.S. policy, used to protect domestic industries from unfair competition, primarily from China, and to ensure that products vital for U.S. national security are produced domestically. President Joe Biden maintained many of the tariffs on Chinese goods that Trump put in place in his first term, and Biden imposed new import restrictions on Chinese electric vehicles and other green technologies.

If Washington continues to train its focus inward, however, it could jeopardize its ability to build relationships with countries in the global South that could help the United States advance other strategic aims. The same countries are already growing wary of aligning with Washington. The United States’ recent foreign policy missteps and the perception of double standards in its divergent responses to the wars and human suffering in Ukraine and Gaza have damaged the country’s reputation. Many countries have started to look more favorably toward other global and emerging powers, such as China, Russia, or the United Arab Emirates, as a result. With its diminished economic and cultural appeal hampering its ability to forge new partnerships, the United States risks allowing its adversaries to deepen their ties to nonaligned countries in ways that harm U.S. interests.

The consequences are already visible in Africa, where China in particular has made significant inroads. Under its Belt and Road Initiative, China has offered loans to and invested substantial sums in infrastructure projects in countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Beijing has gained access to ports and natural resources in return. Mining projects in Congo, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere have helped China secure control of almost 90 percent of the global processing of rare earths, which are needed to manufacture computer chips, semiconductors, and batteries. Although African-sourced critical minerals still only account for a moderate proportion of global production, the industry has huge potential. By neglecting to invest in its development, the United States and its allies could miss an opportunity to reduce their dependence on China for access to these resources.

China has similarly expanded its economic influence in Latin America. Through its infrastructure investments, such as a megaport in Peru and a hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, Beijing is now the region’s second-largest trading partner after the United States. And its influence is not always benign: in March 2023, China pressured Honduras to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan in exchange for economic aid. Beijing has begun to extend its involvement in the region beyond economic ventures, too. In Argentina, for instance, China operates a deep space station that has raised concerns among U.S. defense officials about the possibility it could be used to track U.S. satellites.

TARGETED APPROACH

The Trump administration needs updated strategies to effectively compete with China for influence among nonaligned countries. Building relationships in Africa and Latin America is important not only to secure U.S. access to critical resources but also to increase the number of countries that are willing to help the United States advance its interests. And in the Indo-Pacific region, Washington must create new partnerships beyond its established alliances with Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea to curtail China’s rising economic and military influence.

But to forge those partnerships—as well as strengthen existing ones—the United States must offer economic benefits. As former United States Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in December, “No matter where I go, no matter what continent, no matter what community even, the message is the same: we want trade, not aid.” The United States therefore needs to ensure that its focus on boosting domestic manufacturing of high-end products does not lead to a wholesale rejection of new foreign economic partnerships. Such partnerships can be mutually beneficial. By investing in industries abroad that can provide inputs for U.S. manufacturing, Washington can both strengthen its supply chains and deepen its ties to pivotal countries in the global South.

The new Trump team should start by identifying the alliances it should strengthen and the countries it should build new relationships with in Africa, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific region. In Africa and Latin America, this could include countries that are rich in the natural resources used in battery or semiconductor production, such as Chile and Zimbabwe, or are in strategically important locations, such as Djibouti due to its access to the Red Sea. In the Indo-Pacific, the United States should prioritize deepening its partnerships with countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and others where it competes with China for economic influence, as well as with Pacific Island nations whose military cooperation could prove useful to Washington in the event of a conflict with Beijing over Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

To forge new partnerships, the United States must offer economic benefits.

Next, the administration should work with U.S. business leaders in critical domestic industries, such as semiconductor manufacturing and car production, to determine the raw or processed materials that can be sourced from priority countries. The U.S. government should then invest in these countries to improve infrastructure and build up industries that can feed directly into U.S. supply chains. The Biden administration’s recent investment in a railway project in Angola followed this logic: the route connects Angola with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia, facilitating the production of critical minerals used in batteries. But Washington should be making far more of these strategic investments. In Chile, for example, the United States can invest in the copper industry, which is vital for semiconductor manufacturing. It can finance mining projects in Indonesia, which has large reserves of nickel, a mineral used to produce batteries for electric vehicles and other green technologies. In Vietnam, the United States can invest in electronic manufacturing to diversify its supply chains in this sector away from China and Taiwan.

Additionally, the United States can leverage its influence in international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to facilitate lending and investment in U.S. partner countries in the global South. The United States is the largest shareholder of the World Bank Group, and together with its closest allies, such as Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, it has an outsized influence when it comes to making policy changes and approving financial assistance packages. Washington could thus push for measures that increase the foreign investment and economic aid to its new or existing partners in the global South, adding to initial U.S. investments and boosting these countries’ long-term economic development. Other U.S. allies, including Japan, South Korea, and European countries, could also benefit from better access to new markets.

This approach is more targeted than the United States’ traditional economic aid, which has primarily focused on grants, humanitarian assistance, and trade programs. It does not just provide economic benefits to U.S. partners in the global South but also meets the United States’ economic and national security needs. With a commitment to reglobalization, carefully crafting trade and investment packages to build relationships with critical countries, Washington can strengthen its domestic industries, protect its supply chains, and enhance the partnerships it needs to advance other national security and geostrategic interests—all at once.

Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., is the Steven A. Tananbaum Distinguished Fellow for International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Maximilian F. Hippold is a Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Foreign Affairs · by More by Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. · January 30, 2025

26. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2025

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty." Putin's claims about how quickly the war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance. Putin is correct, however, that additional Western military assistance — particularly US military assistance — remains critical to maintaining and further developing Ukraine's warfighting capabilities. Ukrainian forces have consistently proven throughout the war that they can achieve operationally- and strategically significant battlefield victories when armed with sufficient quantities of US and other Western-provided military assistance. Ukrainian forces have also maintained stubborn defenses even when poorly provisioned and notably forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast in April 2022 before significant deliveries of Western aid even arrived at the frontline and significantly slowed the pace of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine in Summer 2022. Putin and other Kremlin officials aim to portray Ukraine as weak and incapable of adequately leveraging Western-provided weapons at this critical moment in Western policy discussions about Ukraine — even though Ukraine has proven that it is anything but weak after fending off Russia for the almost three years of war.

Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the United States, Europe, and Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that only the United States can provide Ukraine with some critical weapons and military equipment at the scale, speed, and regularity necessary for Ukraine's defense against Russia, and Western officials have recently proposed that European states increasingly assist in funding US military assistance to Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that elements of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo and caused a fire. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of the oil refinery fire in Kstovo and reported that the refinery produces gasoline, diesel, aviation kerosene, and bitumen; processes 15 to 17 million tons of oil per year; and supports the Russian military. Geolocated footage posted on January 28 and 29 shows a fire at the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery. Russian petrochemicals company Sibur-Ksotvo Enterprise reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drone debris struck the enterprise on the night of January 28 to 29, and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged that drone debris started a fire in an industrial area. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drones also struck the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast, reportedly damaging an empty weapons storage building and three other buildings. Ukrainian forces previously struck the Russian 23rd Arsenal in September 2024.

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression.

Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the US, Europe, and Ukraine.

Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree banning negotiations with Putin.

Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify violating any future agreements with Ukraine.

Putin continues efforts to coerce US President Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiations framework on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, Robotnye, and in the Dnipro direction.

Volunteer recruitment rates in in Moscow have dropped sharply, as Russian citizens grow increasingly unwilling to serve in Ukraine.

27. Iran Update, January 29, 2025

Iran Update, January 29, 2025

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-29-2025

The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim Syrian government held a “victory conference” on January 29, during which it formalized much of its consolidation of power since the fall of Bashar al Assad. The conference announced the appointment of HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as the transitional president, though has informally been the de-factor of the interim government for months. Shara is now responsible for forming an interim legislative council until a new constitution is drafted and approved, according to the conference. Shara, at the conference, identified his priorities as ”filling the power vacuum, preserving civil peace, building state institutions, working to build a developmental economic infrastructure, and restoring Syria's international and regional standing” in his speech. Shara has previously described the interim government overseeing a three-to-four transition period, during which he would presumably rule and exert heavy influence over the allocation of political power.

The victory conference separately announced the disbanding of all Assad regime institutions and its constitution. The interim government has proposed previously holding a representative Syrian national dialogue to write a new Syrian constitution, though it is unclear whether a date or any participants have yet been identified.

The victory conference also announced the planned dissolution of all former opposition parties in Syria. The conference specifically stated that “all military factions, political, and civil revolutionary bodies will be dissolved and integrated into state institutions.” This decree follows months of talks between HTS and armed groups. The interim Defense Ministry announced on January 19 that over 60 military factions agreed to join the new Syrian armed forces.

Military factions allied with HTS that participated in the overthrow the Assad regime attended the conference, including Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) leaders, who are sanctioned by the United States for abuses against Kurds. An anti-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) source reported that the SDF was not invited to the conference. It remains unclear if the interim government’s decree dissolving all military factions will apply to the SDF or if the SDF has agreed to such terms. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said January 14 that he wants the SDF to integrate into the Defense Ministry as a “bloc,“ which the interim defense minister reportedly rejected.

Russia and the HTS-led interim Syrian government failed to reach an agreement on January 28 on Russian basing in Syria. A Russian delegation that included Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Special Presidential Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev traveled to Syria on January 28 to discuss Russian access to its military bases at Latakia and Tartus. An unspecified Syrian source told Reuters that Russia and HTS only agreed to continue discussions. An unspecified Russian source similarly told Bloomberg on January 28 that talks on Russian basing are “stuck.” The stalled negotiations come as Russia continues to evacuate military assets from its bases at Latakia and Tartus.

US envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff discussed the implementation of the hostage-ceasefire with Israeli officials in Israel on January 29. Witkoff visited the Gaza Strip and Netzarim Corridor with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer. Witkoff’s visit to Israel follows his visit to Saudi Arabia on January 28 where he reportedly worked on a “broad Middle East agreement” that includes the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and eventual normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Two senior Hamas officials said on January 29 that continued delays in the Israeli aid delivery to the Gaza Strip will affect the progression of the ceasefire-hostage agreement, including the release of hostages. The officials added to French media that Israel has slowed the speed of aid deliveries expected in the first week of the ceasefire that were to include fuel, tents, heavy machinery, and other equipment. A spokesperson for the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—refuted Hamas’ claim and said that 3,000 aid trucks have entered the Gaza Strip in the past four days alone. The ceasefire-hostage deal stipulates that 4,200 aid trucks must enter the strip weekly during the first phase of the agreement.

Key Takeaways:

Syria: The HTS-led interim Syrian government held a “victory conference,” during which it formalized much of its consolidation of power since the fall of Bashar al Assad.

Syria: Russia and the HTS-led interim Syrian government failed to reach an agreement on Russian military basing in Syria.

Iraq: Some members of the Shia Coordination Framework, such as Nouri al Maliki, are reportedly trying to remove Falih al Fayyadh as PMF chairman.

28. Found in Translation: Bolster U.S. Coalition Warfighting by Fixing the Linguist Shortfall

Found in Translation: Bolster U.S. Coalition Warfighting by Fixing the Linguist Shortfall

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Benjamin Van Horrick

A dire shortage of Asian operation linguists in the First Island Chain hinders the United States’ capability to deter Chinese aggression. The joint force’s campaigns depend on strengthening regional partners and fighting as coalitions. Operational linguists act as interpreters and translators, forge trust, assist with planning, and enable the execution of coalition operations. Since language is culture, linguists also inform and educate the commands about the host nation’s cultural and social nuances, such as those that can affect operational integration. However, the present number of operational linguists in the Pacific is already insufficient for regular peacetime campaigning, let alone for crisis or war. The new administration can fix the problem and add more operational linguists in the Pacific before the operational need becomes a damaging shortfall.

The difficulty of Northeast Asian languages, coupled with the steep learning curve associated with translating for and working with military units, makes recruiting cleared, contracted linguists an urgent operational requirement. As America expanded operations in southern Afghanistan, the shortage of Dari and Pashtun linguists hindered operations. Coupled with the rapid advancement of PRC capabilities and the joint force’s increasing operational tempo in the Pacific, now is ideal for building a deep bench of Asian language linguists. The exercises in Korea, Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines are growing more complex and ambitious. These operations increasingly depend on accurate translations to meet exercise objectives, mitigate risk, and strengthen alliances.

Servicemembers with language skills often do not serve as operational linguists. Most uniformed linguists are crypto-linguists, specialized in listening to conversations and pulling relevant information. Uniformed Regional Area Officers (RAO) and Foreign Area Officers (FAO) possess language skills, but focus on planning with partners. These talented officers and SNCOs can and will support transition and transcription, but the investment the services make in RAOs and FAOs goes far beyond their linguist acumen. Many operational linguists, ones who interpret conversations and translate documents and correspondence between US forces and their partners, are contracted support.

Linguists will serve as an invaluable link in the killchain during wartime. All available assets from across the coalition must be brought to bear to make sense of the environment, prosecute targets, and support maneuver in all forms. Linguists will minimize friction and the fog of war as coalition members shorten the time between sensing and striking a target – no matter what country the capabilities originate from.

During conflict, command centers and coordination cells will link partners in the Pacific as they respond and counter PRC aggression. Unlike the Global War on Terror, the joint force will integrate and accentuate partner capabilities rather than advise and assist. These centers and cells’ detailed coordination and synchronization will rely on linguists to build and maintain shared awareness of the operational environment. Information sharing will allow coalition forces to generate tempo and exploit fleeting opportunities in the battlespace. Commanding and coordinating the fight in the Pacific will require proficiency in multiple difficult languages such as Japanese, Korean, Thai, Tagalog, and Mandarin.

Coalition warfighting is central to the modern U.S. way of war, placing a premium on linguists. During a crisis or war the demand for these critical personnel will only increase. If the joint force leaves the operational need unaddressed, it risks losing mission success in translation.

Major Benjamin Van Horrick is the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade current logistics operations officer.

The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views or positions of the U.S. Marine Corps and the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Col. Robert Brodie, commanding officer of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Col. Kouki Watanabe, commanding officer of the JGSDF 12th Infantry Regiment, salute the formations of U.S. Marines with Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 31st MEU, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Service Members with the 12th Infantry Regiment, 8th Division, Western Army, during the opening ceremony for Exercise Forest Light Western Army at Camp Oyanohara, Kyushu, Japan, Jan. 18, 2020. (Official Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Ethan M. LeBlanc)

cimsec.org · by Guest Author

29. Five questions to ask before declaring war on cartels

The 5:

1. What are your victory conditions?

2. What is your legal basis?

3. Do you get Mexico onboard?

4. What do you do about casualties?

5. What happens if you succeed?

Five questions to ask before declaring war on cartels

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/29/five-questions-to-ask-before-declaring-war-on-cartels/

by Henry Ziemer

01.29.2025 at 10:32pm

“The drug cartels are waging war on America—and it’s now time for America to wage war on the cartels,” these words, from a statement by President Donald Trump from 2023, reflect a nascent consensus within the Republican foreign policy establishment. Built up over years of growing anxiety over drugs, crime, and illegal immigration, the belief that the United States should take kinetic action against criminal organizations in its southern neighbor is trickling into the political mainstream. Trump is far from alone in this—his Republican primary opponents sparred in their debates over how and to what degree the United States should pursue military action against Mexican criminal organizations—and Trump’s National Security Advisor pick Mike Waltz co-sponsored a 2023 Joint Resolution on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against drug cartels. According to one report, the Trump team is not so much questioning “if” the United States should invade Mexico, but “how much.”

Let there be no mistake, the possibility that the United States could take unilateral military action against one of its closest neighbors and number one trading partner will likely be catastrophic no matter what permutation it takes. But in the interest of identifying the least-catastrophic option, this article seeks to outline some of the key considerations for any potential military action against Mexico, and what the United States should consider doing instead.

1. What are your victory conditions?

Legal frameworks and Mexico’s position aside, this is the most important question any US official should be asking when told to contemplate military action against a neighbor. Broadly speaking there are three categories of objectives the United States could pursue in Mexico; disrupting fentanyl production, degrading drug cartels, and stabilizing the Mexican security environment.

Disrupting fentanyl production is the most likely goal of a theoretical Trump campaign in Mexico. Fentanyl overdoses are the leading cause of death among adults 18-45 in the United States, and a highly salient political issue. A campaign oriented around this would likely involve light footprint strikes on major labs and trafficking outfits, paired with increased border security and efforts to “build the wall” once and for all. However, such an effort could escalate if left unchecked to include proposals to blockade Mexican ports in order to search shipments for precursor chemicals. Furthermore, while curbing fentanyl production would be a significant win for the United States in the short term, it will likely do little to address the underlying security situation in Mexico. The major criminal groups there have diversified their revenue streams significantly, branching into extortion, illegal mining and logging, and a host of other activities. If the costs of producing fentanyl become too high to bear, these groups may simply pivot to other forms of illicit commerce less likely to incur the wrath of the United States, but they will be no less deadly for Mexican citizens.

Degrading the ability of drug cartels to operate could go hand-in-hand with tackling fentanyl production, but likely encompasses a broader target set. Rather than just going after labs and traffickers, the United States could seek to eliminate the leadership structures for major cartels like Sinaloa and CJNG. More targets require more man- and airpower, likely requiring a larger US commitment. It also raises questions of designation and targeting. Legislation like the “AUMF CARTEL” (H.J.Res.18) and Senator Graham’s “Ending the NARCOS Act” (S.1048) propose designating particular criminal groups who are the greatest offenders. But how should the United States conceive of the Sinaloa Cartel, currently embroiled in a brutal civil war? Should it favor one side in the conflict, or target everyone involved? What happens if a splinter group spins off into a distinct new entity not originally conceptualized by the authorizing legislation? The case of Ecuador is a useful example of how quickly the frontlines in a (literal) war on crime can become blurred. President Daniel Noboa, in declaring a state of internal armed conflict, designated 22 gangs as supposed terrorist groups, provoking confusion from observers who noted that some of the designated entities were marginal players at best in the country’s criminal dynamics. Over-designation also raises the potential for mission creep and risks placing the goalposts for victory further out of reach. Degrading criminal capabilities is also a more open-ended goal, as criminal groups rarely disappear entirely, instead splintering into a multitude of smaller, and potentially even more violent entities. Indeed, former President Felipe Calderón is often criticized for pursuing a “kingpin strategy” going after major cartel bosses which in reality merely fueled succession crises that birthed new criminal actors. The United States accordingly may find itself involved in a game of whac-a-mole requiring a constant presence but with no end in sight.

The final, and most ambitious goal involves a long-term project aimed at helping Mexico wrest control of its security future from the cartels. Such an effort could resemble a hybrid of Plan Colombia and US security assistance in Iraq, depending on the degree of cooperation the United States could achieve with the Mexican government. It would demand sizeable troop numbers who could patrol cities and towns in drug trafficking hot spots, extensive training and equipment programs for Mexican police and armed forces, and a clear strategic vision from the President and commanders responsible for overseeing the operation. The upside to such an effort is sizeable, a Mexico where the power of transnational gangs is curbed would be a far safer, stable, and prosperous country. But the prospects of success are remote indeed. Mexico is a devilishly challenging environment for large-scale security operations. It is nearly five times the size of Iraq, nearly twice the size of Colombia, and has roughly 2.6 times the population of either. Mexico is highly urbanized, with approximately 80 percent of the population residing in cities that require security forces to operate within chaotic human and physical terrain that advantages well-entrenched criminal networks. Thus, the most long-term solution for the challenge of violence and drug trafficking from Mexico also harbors the greatest chances for suffering and destruction on both sides of the border.

2. What is your legal basis?

Any use of US military forces abroad requires an appropriate legal justification. While the United States Congress has given the president significant leeway when it comes to protecting national security, the type of justification bounds the kinds of actions a Trump Administration could take, and impacts the kinds of constraints Congress might impose.

Trump’s day-one executive order authorizing the designation of certain transnational criminal groups as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) provides an indication of how his administration might approach this question. When queried by a reporter about whether he would consider using special forces against these cartels-cum-terrorists, Trump responded that “stranger things have happened.” Indeed, the idea of kinetic action against cartels is not a new one, and reports suggest that late in the first Trump administration, the president allegedly floated air strikes against drug labs, only to be talked out of it by then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper. Now, with a team of handpicked loyalists in charge of key agencies, the prospect that Trump could exercise the presidency’s expansive counterterrorism authorities to press for more direct action against criminal groups seems far closer to reality.

It is telling indeed that, parallel to the FTO designation, another Trump Executive Order declared a state of emergency at the US southern border and ordered elements to the military, including the marines to reinforce the Customs and Border Protection units stationed there. The language of this declaration, which termed illegal border crossings to constitute an “invasion” suggests an administration that views crime and migration in and through Mexico as a legitimate national security threat. This framing of an external threat to US security by Mexican criminal groups is necessary as military deployments within the United States are constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the military from being used for domestic law enforcement. If the president is justified in deploying the armed forces on US soil to combat Mexican cartels, it is an even lower standard to meet for him to order them into Mexico for the same purpose.

Nevertheless, designating cartels as terrorist groups does not mean the United States will take military action. At its most basic level, the decision opens a wider set of legal mechanisms through which to prosecute individuals under foreign terrorist financing charges. This may have unforeseen consequences, as US persons and companies engaged in seemingly innocuous activity could find themselves staring down the barrel of terrorism financing charges. Especially as Mexican criminal groups have diversified their operations into formal markets, including lime, avocado, and tortilla production, any business with cross-border dealings could come under increased scrutiny. Applying a counter-terrorism approach could also have unforeseen implications for a Republican administration given the interconnectedness of the US and Mexican criminal underworld. For instance, surely individuals who sell weapons to terrorists should be top priority for harsher prosecution, but it seems unlikely that the Trump administration will jump at the chance to aggressively investigate gun sales.

An even more expansive option would be for Congress to pass AUMF targeting cartels. This would grant Trump sweeping authorities to employ the full might of US military capabilities against criminal groups and any state actors who stand behind them. As a Congressman, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has sponsored legislation to that effect with the “AUMF CARTEL” (notably, this AUMF could theoretically also sanction military action against China as a foreign nation involved in the production of fentanyl precursors) while Senator Lindsey Graham has sponsored thew aforementioned “Ending the NARCOS Act” to designate fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction and cartels as terrorist actors. With a Republican-controlled House and Senate, the probability that such a measure could move forward remains remote, but nonzero.

A final option is not to use the military at all, relying instead on covert operations carried out by the CIA and the like. This has the advantage of operating behind a shroud of secrecy where, in an ideal world, neither the Mexican nor US public would need to be aware of the operation. However, much as this might evoke romantic images ripped from the film reels of Sicario, a covert operations campaign would be highly limited in scope and scale. Furthermore, the risks of being uncovered, and the subsequent public relations and congressional fallout would be major, particularly if there are casualties.

3. Do you get Mexico onboard?

Everything about a military operation against cartels gets easier if the Mexican government comes onboard with the effort. US forces could use bases within Mexico for logistics and support, intelligence services could plug into trusted units built up over the course of the Mérida Initiative to better map and target cartel activity. Most importantly, cooperation between US and Mexican security forces could be leveraged to bolster Mexico’s domestic law enforcement capabilities with a view to handing off security responsibilities eventually, reducing the chances that the United States finds itself bogged down into a multi-decade operation. Unfortunately, the Sheinbaum administration, which will outlast Trump’s second term, is not predisposed to cooperate with the United States. Under her predecessor Andrés Manuel López Obrador (commonly known as AMLO), security relations between Mexico and the United States fell to historic lows. In an especially embarrassing 2021 incident, AMLO demanded the repatriation of former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos who was arrested in the United States on drug trafficking charges, exonerated him of all charges, then published the classified intelligence shared by the United States as justification for his arrest. Sheinbaum has likely inherited her predecessor’s nationalist impulse, and her constituents support her in part due to this image of not being the United States’ lapdog.

When Trump, as President-elect, floated the idea of imposing 25% tariffs on Mexico and Canada if the two countries did not act to stop the flow of migrants and fentanyl to the United States, President Sheinbaum did not race to petition Trump to drop the threat immediately as Canadian leader Justin Trudeau did. Instead, she penned a letter reaffirming the United States’ own responsibility in the matter, a move calculated to show Mexico would not be cowed by bombastic threats from its northern neighbor. Projecting strength while quietly cooperating on key issues was one of the key ingredients in AMLO’s ability to successfully navigate the first Trump term. But US-Mexico relations today are not the same as back then, and a desire to showcase strength and independence on security matters could easily come across as intransigence in Washington.

This is not to say that striking an accord is impossible. The United States could threaten eye-watering tariffs on Mexican goods to cripple Mexico’s economy (and kneecap United States’ own) unless Sheinbaum goes along with some kinetic operations. The United States could also simply issue an ultimatum that it will be launching strikes with or without Mexico’s approval, forcing Sheinbaum to either assent to save face or admit she cannot ensure Mexico’s sovereignty when push comes to shove. But coercing Mexico is second only to invading Mexico outright in the hierarchy of least desirable outcomes. Any cooperation the United States might be able to wring out of the Sheinbaum administration down the barrel of a gun would likely be undone by the unravelling of US-Mexico relations on trade, migration, and intelligence sharing. The results would also lead the United States to take on more of the cost of security operations in Mexico, reduce the odds of completing an eventual handoff to Mexican security forces, and tarnish its reputation with other key partners in Latin America.

4. What do you do about casualties?

Any military operation will inevitably result in casualties, not just among the drug traffickers. How prepared the United States will be to respond can have a sizeable impact on the way the conflict could evolve. There are three types of casualties that could shift this calculus, US uniformed service members, Mexican civilians, and US civilians.

The scale of the operation and number of personnel involved significantly changes the probability of this happening. The bigger the US effort, the more likely mistakes and miscalculations will result in lethal consequences for US uniformed personnel. A campaign conducted largely via airstrikes is less likely to see US casualties, while one involving door-to-door raids on suspected drug traffickers exposes even highly trained special forces to the potential of injury or death. Let there be no mistake, contrary to their own propaganda, the majority of cartel forces are neither well disciplined, nor prepared to resist a concerted military campaign. Nevertheless, they remain heavily armed, and have taken measures to bolster capabilities, including through the recruitment of ex-military and police, and through the creation of elite units with greater training and unit cohesion than the average gunman. Should US forces return in body bags, the calculus in Washington will become fraught, either continue to undertake operations even if it means casualties mount, escalate to show resolve and punish those criminals targeting US forces, or otherwise pull back to lower-risk, but potentially less effective tactics like airstrikes or cyber operations.

A second type of casualty is Mexican civilians. Especially if the United States elects for an airpower-intensive approach to limit its own casualties, collateral damage will likely be inevitable, and with it a host of new political challenges. In particular, the moment Mexican civilians are caught in the crossfire, public pressure within Mexico will reach a boiling point. Indeed, the Sheinbaum administration may be willing to sit back under duress as US forces launch surgical strikes on cartel forces, it will likely be untenable for her political position to be seen as standing idly by while US bombs land on Mexican nationals. Civilian casualties will also likely play into the cartels’ media narrative, allowing the groups which for years have preyed upon innocent communities to cast themselves as rebel defenders of the people. Indeed, if there is any outcome wherein the criminal dynamics in Mexico metastasize into a full-blown insurgency, it runs through US military operation that inflicts widespread civilian casualties.

A final possibility is US citizens who could be targeted. More than 30 million US citizens travel to Mexico each year as tourists, their lives could be seen by some criminal organizations as a bargaining chip to hold at risk in order to force the United States to ease up on its campaign. Again, this presents a choice, escalate or de-escalate. Escalation poses risks of drawing more US troops into a conflict, worsening relations with Mexico, and causing more damage and destruction, while de-escalation may be construed as a capitulation to the cartels.

5. What happens if you succeed?

The chances that the United States will fail to achieve some or all of its goals in Mexico are high. But more interesting, and perhaps more dangerous, is the chance that the United States succeeds.

A military operation which successfully curbs the flow of fentanyl and depletes the capabilities of criminal organizations could be seen as a template for future US security policy in Latin America. With it, the chance that the United States returns to a pre-Good Neighbor Policy approach to the region characterized by rampant invasions and an imperial approach to US-Latin American relations. Columnists have already warned of the pitfalls of applying a 21st-century Monroe Doctrine to the region, this would appear to be more akin to the Roosevelt Corollary, opening the door for US intervention throughout the Western Hemisphere. A successful operation also increases the risk of future miscalculations in security assistance by applying a one-size-fits-all model to countering transnational organized crime which fails to recognize local criminal dynamics or political differences between countries. Mexico may be a success story, but perhaps Guatemala, Ecuador, or Peru prove to be the United States’ new military morass.

This kind of success could also play into the hands of geopolitical rivals, most notably Russia and China. A US government willing to intervene unilaterally would hold at risk the security of every other country in the Western Hemisphere, and create new pressures for governments to align with great power benefactors for their self-preservation. Anti-US dictatorships such as Venezuela and Nicaragua would likely be the first to hammer down the doors of Moscow and Beijing for new security guarantees, but other countries could follow.

Another way

The US-Mexico security relationship is a wicked problem for the Trump administration to try and unravel. While statements by the administration have stoked fears and raised hackles on both sides of the border, the shape of bilateral security cooperation remains in flux. The only thing that seems certain is that the status quo before January 20 cannot remain in place.

Rather than seeking out conflict, the United States and Mexico should take this moment to reset their relations. To begin, both countries need to agree on some shared facts. This was a perennial challenge under the Biden administration, where high-level consensus on security cooperation was virtually nonexistent. AMLO himself has asserted that Mexico did not produce fentanyl to begin with. There can be no productive dialogue between the two allies and neighbors if both deny basic reality.

Arms trafficking is another bitter pill for both sides to swallow. The United States should acknowledge that the vast majority of the weapons fueling violence south of the border come from its own domestic market. Mexico, for its part, should recognize that even if arms trafficking from the United States were to cease completely, it will still need help to target and dismantle the well-armed and violent criminal groups already active within its borders. US designation of cartels as FTOs may be a boon here. While the Trump administration is assuredly reticent to be seen as acting to curb Second Amendment rights, a surgical campaign against the worst offenders in arms trafficking to Mexico could pay serious dividends. These actors tend to be clustered in border cities and have close ties to organized crime, their clientele is not the American people but rather violent non-state actors, and disrupting their ability to do business promises to directly improve the safety, strength, and prosperity of the United States.

In Mexico, the Sheinbaum administration should take steps to publicly signal openness to collaboration on security policy. The AMLO approach of maintaining low-level ties while public statements railed against US overreach is unlikely to be a recipe for success. Mexico is already taking important action, for instance stepping up seizures of fentanyl and fentanyl precursors, and moving to allow foreign troops to enter Mexico for training exercises. Sheinbaum’s response to the Sinaloa civil war, deploying over 11,000 troops to the heart of the violence in Culiacán, further indicates a tacit acceptance that AMLO’s security policy is unsustainable. But these practical efforts must be paired with high-level messaging that Mexico takes its security seriously and values the relationship with the United States. Another key signal in this regard would be walking back the country’s foreign agents law which significantly impaired the ability of US law enforcement agencies to coordinate with their Mexican counterparts. So would the convening of a high-level security dialogue between the United States and Mexico to discuss join responses to the cartel threat.

Ultimately, Mexico and the United States should consider options for joint military coordination against cartels as part of a broader package of security cooperation. Kinetic action is no silver bullet, but the security crisis in Mexico has metastasized beyond the capability of traditional law enforcement action alone to deal with. Military cooperation with the United States in this regard can grant Mexico access to resources it otherwise lacks, including advanced drones for persistent intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance of cartel activity, and the airlift capacity to surge forces to hotspots of criminal activity. At the same time, aggressive anticorruption investigations, trainings, and capacity-building efforts across all levels of Mexico’s security forces should be emphasized.

While critics may be quick to dismiss this as a mere repeat of the Bush-era Mérida Initiative, which ultimately failed to check organized crime in Mexico, there are three reasons to believe now is a more opportune moment to revisit US-Mexico security policy. For one, the United States is more invested now in its shared neighborhood than it has been likely in decades. The Trump administration has come in with a laser-focus on curbing migration and halting the flow of drugs which has drawn its attention to Latin America as a whole and Mexico in particular. Second, President Sheinbaum in Mexico benefits from a powerful political coalition and legislative supermajority giving her wide remit to implement key policy measures. While her base is unlikely to be enthusiastic about military cooperation with the United States, framing it as allowing Mexico to take the fight to cartels could draw a level of buy-in that the Mérida-era presidents Calderón and Enrique Peña Nieto never had. Finally, growing consensus among Mexico’s public and business community alike holds that violence and insecurity are reaching untenable levels. Within this tumultuous and highly contingent environment, the risks of failure are high, but so too is the potential for the United States and Mexico to strike a better deal on a safer and more prosperous shared future.

Tags: Foreign terrorist organizations, Mexican Cartels, Third Generation Gangs, Transnational Gangs

About The Author

Henry Ziemer
Henry Ziemer is an Associate Fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His research interests include transnational organized crime and human rights and security in Central America. His writing and commentary have appeared in War on the Rocks, The Diplomat, The Wall Street Journal, and the Financial Times.

30. How Would Iranian Nuclear Forces Be Deployed?

How Would Iranian Nuclear Forces Be Deployed?

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/01/30/how-would-iranian-nuclear-forces-be-deployed/

by Alex Scheers

01.30.2025 at 06:00am

Introduction

The Islamic Republic stated Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, “has absolutely no intention of utilizing its nuclear capabilities for military purposes.” He goes on to cite ideological and religious beliefs as the rationale for not seeking weaponization. However, religious persuasions do not provide a credible explanation for the leadership’s decision not to weaponize the Iranian nuclear program.

With the international security landscape changing rapidly and becoming increasingly uncertain and dangerous, it is imperative for the US national security establishment to consider how Iran would deploy its nuclear forces, should it ever exercise the political will to weaponize its nuclear program. In this article, I highlight that the impetus to develop a nuclear weapon depends on Iranian domestic political dynamics and argue that a nuclear Iran would adopt a deterrence-by-punishment posture, using its nuclear forces as a strategic deterrent.

Iranian Nuclear Behavior and Domestic Politics

Iran is a destabilizing actor in the Middle East. Its constant attempts to attack Israel and threaten regional Arab powers are emblematic of Iranian belligerence. Equally, Iran continually poses a threat to American security and interests, both regionally and internationally.

While Iran has demonstrated a propensity to sow disorder whenever the opportunity arises, the regime does not behave irrationally when it pertains to its nuclear program. Despite threatening to weaponize its nuclear program in the past, Iran has repeatedly refrained from doing so, which is indicative of its rationality. While rationality carries many meanings, it is inferred in this context that there is a logic, order, and sense to Iran’s nuclear program and concomitant nuclear latency.

Namely, that Iran’s nuclear latency has enabled the regime to maximize its ability to instrumentalize the threat of nuclear breakout in pursuit of strategic goals. A latent nuclear capability entails that Iran has all the requisite capabilities to develop nuclear weapons relatively rapidly. However, Iran has refrained from exercising the political will to weaponize its fissile materials, even while engaged in a devastating regional war with Israel.

Whilst no political leader has chosen to weaponize Iran’s nuclear program, historically hardliners tend to use the threat of uranium enrichment to gain concessions from adversaries and to rally nationalist sentiment domestically. In contrast, moderates tend to preside over periods of relative transparency regarding Iran’s nuclear activities, measured by a willingness to cooperate more closely with the United Nation’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While the distinction between moderates and hardliners in Iran is a blurred and unreliable one, presidents of varying political persuasions have behaved differently on nuclear policy issues.

For example, by the end of his tenure, Mohammad Khatami suspended Iran’s uranium enrichment activities as part of a cooperation agreement with the European Union. As Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova observed, “US National Intelligence Estimates concluded that Iran had halted the weaponization activities in 2003…at the height of US power and adventurism [in the Middle East], the perception of threat in Iran was that it led away from nuclear weapons, not toward it.” Likewise, it was under Hassan Rouhani that Tehran negotiated and signed the Joint-Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreeing to halt uranium enrichment to 3.7 percent in exchange for the unfreezing of assets and the lifting of sanctions.

Contrastingly, when hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power, the terms of the EU agreement Khatami negotiated were rejected, and the team that had successfully negotiated the agreement was replaced. Iran’s uranium enrichment activities were resumed, and IAEA inspections efforts obstructed. The consequent reinstatement of Western sanctions spurred hardliners to rhetorically corelate Iran’s nuclear program with a much-needed sense of self-sufficiency.

These patterns in Iran’s nuclear behavior align with Scott Sagan’s domestic politics model of proliferation. According to Sagan’s domestic politics model, states decide to pursue nuclear weapons based on their internal political dynamics, encompassing the role of interest groups, public opinion, political persuasions, and economic interests. As Sagan states, “domestic actors encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb.”

Similarities can be drawn with India’s proliferation model. Like Iran, India did not develop nuclear weapons when it faced dire direct military threats from China and Pakistan; instead, India waited 24 years after testing a peaceful nuclear device before officially acquiring nuclear weapons. Applying the domestic politics model to India, Sagan argued that public opinion played an instrumental role in Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1974. Likewise in 1998, political considerations drove India’s decision to openly become a nuclear power.

Had Iran weaponized its nuclear program during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) or during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 when it faced direct and existential military threats, the security model would have provided a more accurate framework in which to understand Iran’s nuclear program. However, Iran discontinued its nuclear weapons program in 1987, and during the Iraq War in 2003, Iran offered to assist US counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Therefore, the impetus to develop nuclear weapons in Iran appears contingent on domestic political factors, as opposed to external security threats or norms.

Imagining Iran’s Nuclear Posture

How Iran deploys its nuclear forces would depend on the posture it adopts. Nuclear posture can be defined as the structure, orientation, array and positioning of a state’s nuclear forces. According to Vipin Narang, the three nuclear postures regional nuclear powers can adopt are catalytic, asymmetric escalation, and assured retaliation. Because Iran does not face acute security threats on its borders, it would not seek to utilise nuclear weapons for reasons other than as a strategic deterrent.

Considering Iran’s strategic environment, it is improbable that it should adopt either a catalytic or asymmetric escalation posture. This is because a catalytic posture requires a reliable third-party nuclear patron that Iran could compel to intervene on its behalf in crises or conflict situations. Despite growing strategic partnerships with Russia and China, serious doubts remain over whether Iran could rely on either. Concerning the former, recent events in Syria suggest that Russia will gradually withdraw its military presence from the region to bolster its attritionary campaign in Ukraine, leaving Iranian proxies more exposed and further weakening the regime’s regional military standing.

An asymmetric escalation posture also seems unlikely, as Iran does not face direct external threats to its security, with neighboring adversaries Iraq and Afghanistan now conventionally weaker, and relations with Pakistan having more recently improved.

Hence, Iran is likely to adopt an assured retaliation posture.

An assured retaliation posture is a deterrence-by-punishment posture that enables a state to possess a second-strike capability, meaning that it can absorb a first strike and retaliate with a nuclear strike of its own, causing unacceptable levels of damage in the process. As a posture oriented toward strategic deterrence, achieving a credible assured retaliatory posture would best enable Iran to protect its vital interests.

Regarding assured retaliation being Iran’s likeliest prospective posture, comparisons with India are once again salient. Narang states, “India relies on a secure and survivable nuclear force, arrayed for an assure retaliatory strike against their primary opponents’ strategic targets.” Iran’s existing military capabilities support this assertion, and Iran’s current missile capabilities lend some insight into how Iran’s nuclear forces could be deployed.

According to Henrik Hiim, “Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East, several of its missiles are nuclear-capable…. In addition, Iran is developing space-launch vehicles (SLVs) which facilitate the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).” Thus, the strategic utility of Iran’s missile capabilities indicates that Iran would seek to have highly survivable nuclear forces.

Highly survivable forces enable a nuclear weapons state to more credibly threaten nuclear retaliation after it has been attacked with a nuclear-first strike. By this logic, Iran would disperse its nuclear forces in various geographic locations, making it exceedingly challenging for a would-be aggressor to launch a successful disarming first strike. Such deployment arrangements would enhance survivability and strengthen the deterrent threat, objectives inherent to assured retaliation.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic’s regime should never be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon—firstly in the interest of upholding the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and secondly due to the regime’s history of aggression and state-sponsoring of terrorism regionally and globally. Nevertheless, the regime has, so far, not taken the necessary political steps to weaponize its nuclear program. Instead, as recent statements by President Pezeshkian suggest, Iran is hoping to revert to a strategy that involves combining diplomatic overtures laced with the tacit threat of nuclear weaponization, in order to extract concessions from Western powers.

It is difficult to predict how the Trump administration will respond to this. While the US president has a deep disdain for the JCPOA, he is also unpredictable and approaches diplomatic engagements in a transactional manner. A word of caution for President Trump: it is unwise to assume that Iran is a reliable actor; hence negotiating with the regime may prove to be a futile endeavor.

What is certain is that in the current regional strategic and security environment, it would not benefit Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Becoming a nuclear weapons state would come at the consternation of Iran’s only major power partners in China and Russia, and thus deepen Iranian isolation, worsening its already lack-luster global standing. Iran’s ascension to nuclear weapons status would also exacerbate regional instability and increase the prospect of horizontal nuclear proliferation. Additionally, nuclear weapons would render Iran the target of US and NATO nuclear force targeting and, what is worse, turn the prospect of a regional nuclear conflagration with Israel into a serious and terrifying possibility. In other words, acquiring nuclear weapons would make Iran significantly less secure in what is already a dangerously precarious security environment for the regime.

Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear latency has worked relatively well for the regime so far, providing the regime with some diplomatic bargaining power. Weaponizing its nuclear program would prove to be a strategic miscalculation, reducing Tehran’s only genuine source of diplomatic leverage. However, if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would most likely adopt an assured retaliation posture and use its nuclear forces as a strategic deterrent. For now, however, that “if” remains a big one.

Tags: nuclear deterrence, Nuclear Negotiation, nuclear weapons

About The Author

Alex Scheers
Alex Alfirraz Scheers holds a diploma in Politics and History from the Open University, a bachelor’s degree in War Studies and History from King’s College London, and a master’s degree in National Security Studies from King’s College London. He has held research positions at the Henry Jackson Society and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, and his articles have been published in the Diplomat, the Global Security Review, the Times of Israel, RealClearDefense, and the Royal United Services Institute.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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How Would Iranian Nuclear Forces Be Deployed?

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