​Quotes of the Day:

"The first rule is to keep an untroubled spirit. The second is to look things in the face and know them for what they are."

– Marcus Aurelius

"Practice justice in word and deed, and do not get in the habit of acting thoughtlessly about anything."

– Pythagoras

"Every man is a creature of the age in which he lives, and few are able to raise themes aveo the ideas of the time."

– Voltaire

1. No Sympathy for the Devil (BookReview/interview - The Persistence of the Ideological Lie )

2. Microsoft to stop using engineers in China for tech support of US military, Hegseth orders review

3. Air Force will buy more KC-46s, skip competition

4. The Big Five - 20 July edition by Mick Ryan

5. ASEAN is collapsing, and nobody wants to admit it

6. 4 reasons why Trump should reject China’s invitation to its military parade

7. 'Top Gun' for drones: Pentagon plans August exercise with FPV drone units

8. Chinese Rare-Earth Magnet Exports Surge After U.S. Trade Truce

9. On Ukraine War, Trump Proves His Foreign Policy Is Pragmatic and That Adversaries Who Defy Him Will Face Consequences

10. Time for QUAD to step up to Taiwan's defense

11. U.S. Special Operations Drones Get Game-Changing Upgrade to Launch Secretive Attack Drones

12. Non-State Special Operations, with Craig Whiteside

13. Defense of the Homeland: A National Strategy for Combating Irregular Warfare

14. As Trump Courts a More Assertive Beijing, China Hawks Are Losing Out

15. Two Days Inside the Movement to ‘Reindustrialize,’ and Rearm, America

16. Trump Aides Discussed Ending Some SpaceX Contracts, but Found Most Were Vital

17. Ukraine Keeps Sinking Russian Ships In The Black Sea Without A Conventional Navy — Here's How

18. Why this is China's golden age of hacking

19. Opinion | Why the global balance of power is shifting in China’s favour

20. Why Plato Matters Now

1. No Sympathy for the Devil (BookReview/interview - The Persistence of the Ideological Lie )

​For reflection on a Sunday.

"The totalitarian impulse"

Excerpts:

At the heart of this “impulse,” as I call it, is the desire to destroy the primordial commonsense distinction between good and evil. It’s a lie, of course. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote: “The line separating good and evil passes not through states, nor between classes, nor between political parties either—but right through every human heart—and through all human hearts.” That remains the truth of the matter.

But instead of recognizing the evil inside of every human heart, the “totalitarian impulse” localizes evil in certain suspect groups that are said to be ontologically guilty, guilty for who they are and not what they have done. So instead of individual responsibility, you have group guilt. It’s what twentieth century Communists did to justify the repression of Christians and the bourgeoise. It’s what the Nazis did so murderously with the Jews. It’s what’s been happening with a race-class-gender regime that profoundly distorts our appreciation of personal responsibility. In this new woke dispensation, you know exactly who the victims are; you know exactly who the oppressors are. The French Enlightenment first introduced this mendacious distinction between “progress and reaction” and it culminated in bloodletting in the form of Jacobin terror. But the Communists perfected it in the twentieth century with an unprecedented form of totalitarianism. Once they label you reactionary, you’re more than a political opponent—you’re a pernicious “enemy” getting in the way of the unfolding of history and the march of progress.

...

Where is the “totalitarian impulse” today, and what can be done to repudiate it?

As I mentioned before, it has colonized large swaths of civil society. Entertainment business. Films. Television. Higher education. The president is making a test case of Harvard, Columbia, Penn. But they don’t teach political history in those institutions—it’s neo-Marxism and “history from below” as well as endless drivel about “settler colonialism.” States under pressure are renaming their DEI departments but they still exist in slightly concealed forms. Some of the new schools for civic thought, like the one at the University of Texas, are very promising. There’s at least an opportunity for pluralism, though many of the churches have gone over to secular progressivism. And, of course, the “totalitarian impulse” doesn’t tolerate free speech.

Solzhenitsyn recognized that you need more than ordinary scholarship to capture the surreal character of the totalitarian world. You need insight. You need art. You need sardonic wit and artful powers of description to make the incomprehensible intelligible. His book The Gulag Archipelago was a self-described “experiment in literary investigation.” It was translated into 30 languages and did more than anything to destroy the moral legitimacy of Communism. Among the great insights of his work was that any system that tries to get rid of evil in toto will only make it magnify in unimaginable ways. We can and ought to restrict evil through the rule of law and through self-restraint. But if we try to get rid of evil, abolish evil, we will only make evil universally triumph by scapegoating the innocent as well as the guilty. Solzhenitsyn is the most powerful, insightful, and eloquent foe of the “totalitarian impulse.” A lot of sophisticates said his work was old-fashioned but sometimes the old verities help us to understand reality best. So I argue, I hope compellingly, in my book.

No Sympathy for the Devil

By John J. Waters

July 16, 2025

https://www.realclearhistory.com/articles/2025/07/16/no_sympathy_for_the_devil_1123197.html

There is a sickness inside our hearts. It aches for something brighter, better, a more resplendent mode of being. God, perhaps. Or temporary deliverance from the pain of being alive, and of knowing we will die. It urges us to create something: family; home; work; and art. To contribute something good and useful to future generations. But it also impels us to assert ourselves here and now, to compete for power over others. Please allow me to introduce myself … Because it feels good to have power—telling people what to do, getting things done. The boss sets the agenda, defines progress as he sees fit, or how he’s told to see fit. When the boss encounters obstacles or impediments to progress – either within himself or externally – power can make the impediments vanish. I’m a man of wealth and taste … Totalitarians, especially, excel at removing impediments to progress, however defined.

During the French Revolution, the Jacobins employed the guillotine as part of a public spectacle of murder. They executed some 17,000 people deemed enemies of the revolution. I’ve been around for a long, long year … During Argentina’s Dirty War, the military junta used kidnap and arrest to “disappear” some 30,000 people identified as enemies of the regime. Hitler destroyed millions of enemies across Europe through overwork, torture, execution, shooting, and starvation, and instituted an organizational program designed to exterminate Jews. Stalin contributed the Gulag, a system of forced labor camps that housed both ordinary criminals and political prisoners. Stole many a man’s soul and faith …

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who spent eight years in the Gulag as a political prisoner, was our greatest witness to the basic human sickness that constitutes the totalitarian temptation, and his life and work continue to inspire scholar Daniel J. Mahoney. In the new book The Persistence of the Ideological Lie (Encounter, 2025), Mahoney examines the totalitarian impulse then and now, how modern revolutionaries replaced the commonsense distinction between good and evil with “progress and reaction,” how people commit evil acts in the name of justice. What follows is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation.

What is the “totalitarian impulse?”

At the heart of this “impulse,” as I call it, is the desire to destroy the primordial commonsense distinction between good and evil. It’s a lie, of course. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote: “The line separating good and evil passes not through states, nor between classes, nor between political parties either—but right through every human heart—and through all human hearts.” That remains the truth of the matter.

But instead of recognizing the evil inside of every human heart, the “totalitarian impulse” localizes evil in certain suspect groups that are said to be ontologically guilty, guilty for who they are and not what they have done. So instead of individual responsibility, you have group guilt. It’s what twentieth century Communists did to justify the repression of Christians and the bourgeoise. It’s what the Nazis did so murderously with the Jews. It’s what’s been happening with a race-class-gender regime that profoundly distorts our appreciation of personal responsibility. In this new woke dispensation, you know exactly who the victims are; you know exactly who the oppressors are. The French Enlightenment first introduced this mendacious distinction between “progress and reaction” and it culminated in bloodletting in the form of Jacobin terror. But the Communists perfected it in the twentieth century with an unprecedented form of totalitarianism. Once they label you reactionary, you’re more than a political opponent—you’re a pernicious “enemy” getting in the way of the unfolding of history and the march of progress.

People are finding the courage nowadays to confront the “impulse,” to stand up to it. But the impulse is deeply ingrained in civil society. Old-fashioned liberals and conservatives always looked for despotism or totalitarianism in a centralized, self-aggrandizing state like the Soviet Union. But what happens when this tyrannical impulse has taken refuge in journalism, education, nonprofits, and in other segments of society? What happens when these groups start imposing despotism in the name of anti-racism, anti-slavery, anti-colonialism? In the freest society on earth, this impulse is deeply instantiated in our institutions. If this mentality wins, we end up with nihilism, contempt for patriotism, and contempt for customary morality.

So, modern revolutionaries tell the “ideological lie” about good and evil. If you believe the lie, then you might find yourself living in a “second reality,” one that removes you from contact with the natural world ...

Yes, the “totalitarian impulse” is about replacing the commonsense world with a new grid that has a superficial coherence but distorts reality and estranges us from ordinary experience and common sense. Over the past several years, what particularly disturbed me was that more decent and moderate folk who would never think of themselves as enemies of freedom began to buy into concepts that were incompatible with civilized life. Systemic racism caught on with people. Systemic oppression, too.  

The political philosopher Eric Voegelin used the image of a “second reality” to describe the phenomenon. Totalitarians, he suggested, invent their own distorting language. Think of “intersectionality” and the now omnipresent discourse of “power” and “oppression.” People start talking this way and they feel they are sophisticates. But they’re using a language that makes very little reference to reality. Look at “equity.” It’s a fundamental concept of the common law, which is used to address issues of fairness and justice. But this word became a placeholder for “disparity equals oppression.” The new meaning disregards any natural forms of difference that come from a society respecting merit! So, yes, “totalitarian impulse” is tied to destroying the meaning of words.

This conversation relates to the chaos of 2020. Covid. Lockdowns. Riots. Feelings of instability and change. What happened to America in 2020?

We found ourselves in what felt like an ominous cultural revolution. Christopher Rufo has argued that almost everything that became status quo in 2020 – culture of self-loathing, repudiation, etc. – had been marching through the institutions for many years, but it really struck around the time of the death of George Floyd. The country was locked down. Christopher Caldwell has made the argument that the whole country was glued to social media, which was dominated by the youngest, loudest, and most zealous voices. Mitt Romney was marching in the street for Black Lives Matter; a perfectly decent man, of course, but what would lead him into the street to do this, to align with a Maoist organization that preached racial hatred in the name of anti-racism?

There was an atmosphere in 2020, a destructive field of energy that permeated the whole of society. People felt obliged to say and do certain things unworthy of free men and women. American Express was sponsoring seminars for their workers to learn about the evils of speculative capitalism! This was the atmosphere in Russia in 1917. You had the Russian bourgeoisie wearing red carnations and waving red banners. The French have the phrase bien pensant meaning “right thinking.” As the French philosopher and man of letters Charles Péguy suggested over a hundred years ago, never underestimate all the terrible things done by people who are afraid of appearing insufficiently progressive.

The modern Left has absorbed certain beliefs and impulses of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, is that right?      

I don’t see any appetite on the Left to return to moderation. Liberalism is dead. The old Democrat party was patriotic and religious, but today’s party is militantly secular, and that’s a thoroughgoing difference. I think a lot of people on the Left felt liberated in 1989 because they didn’t have to justify the Soviet Union. We thought in 1989 that totalitarianism had ended, but we never educated ourselves about the fundamental program: Karl Marx wanted to abolish not only the nation-state, but also the bourgeois family and religion. His project to radically change human nature and build a new society was a palpable failure. The greatest force for murder and destruction in modern times has been politicized atheism. Communism killed up to 120 million people. Some 60-80 million people died from government-induced famines in China and the Soviet Union. It’s a story barely told. Instead of saying “we won” in 1989, we should have explained how these regimes established an unprecedented amount of control over human beings. Because we made no efforts to understand this, the progressive ideology picked up where the totalitarian regime left off.

In your book, you reference thinkers and writers who have spoken truth to power and repudiated the ideological lie. Why do you cite Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky?

Dostoevsky articulated the truth that some people support the destruction of the world—that nihilism is the core of the revolutionary temptation. In his powerful and prescient novel Demons in particular, published in 1872, Dostoevsky showed that the Left is not sentimental about people or about romantic ideals. He dramatized the radical atheism, the zeal for destruction, the taste for violence, and the unrelenting moral nihilism that characterized the emerging revolutionary Left. It was against the grain because in Russia, serious thinkers who didn’t hate God or mock religion were not considered to be intellectuals. Demons is in my view the most prophetic book of the last 100 years.

You also cite Václav Havel, the last president of Czechoslovakia before he became the first president of the Czech Republic. How did he repudiate the ideological lie?

He came from a bourgeois family in Czechoslovakia. He was self-educated and became a prominent playwright. In the 1970s, he became a dissident, was arrested, and spent hard time in prison. He saw that the regime’s systematic lies were backed up by violence, and that it ground down the people. Even so, he made a commitment to live not by lies, to paraphrase Solzhenitsyn, and wrote forcefully about the Communist regime in The Power and the Powerless, among other works. He and other dissidents founded reading groups, exposed human rights abuses and aimed to create the rudiments of a “parallel polis.” In short, Havel demonstrated that a group of determined people who say “we’ve had enough” can allow genuine moral consciousness to be restored which is a precondition for the restoration of political liberty and human dignity.

Where is the “totalitarian impulse” today, and what can be done to repudiate it?

As I mentioned before, it has colonized large swaths of civil society. Entertainment business. Films. Television. Higher education. The president is making a test case of Harvard, Columbia, Penn. But they don’t teach political history in those institutions—it’s neo-Marxism and “history from below” as well as endless drivel about “settler colonialism.” States under pressure are renaming their DEI departments but they still exist in slightly concealed forms. Some of the new schools for civic thought, like the one at the University of Texas, are very promising. There’s at least an opportunity for pluralism, though many of the churches have gone over to secular progressivism. And, of course, the “totalitarian impulse” doesn’t tolerate free speech.

Solzhenitsyn recognized that you need more than ordinary scholarship to capture the surreal character of the totalitarian world. You need insight. You need art. You need sardonic wit and artful powers of description to make the incomprehensible intelligible. His book The Gulag Archipelago was a self-described “experiment in literary investigation.” It was translated into 30 languages and did more than anything to destroy the moral legitimacy of Communism. Among the great insights of his work was that any system that tries to get rid of evil in toto will only make it magnify in unimaginable ways. We can and ought to restrict evil through the rule of law and through self-restraint. But if we try to get rid of evil, abolish evil, we will only make evil universally triumph by scapegoating the innocent as well as the guilty. Solzhenitsyn is the most powerful, insightful, and eloquent foe of the “totalitarian impulse.” A lot of sophisticates said his work was old-fashioned but sometimes the old verities help us to understand reality best. So I argue, I hope compellingly, in my book.

John J. Waters is author of the postwar novel River City One. Follow him at @JohnJWaters1 on X. ​

2. Microsoft to stop using engineers in China for tech support of US military, Hegseth orders review

What were we thinking by allowing this to happen?

Microsoft to stop using engineers in China for tech support of US military, Hegseth orders review 

https://www.reuters.com/world/us/microsoft-stop-using-engineers-china-tech-support-us-military-hegseth-orders-2025-07-18/

By Stephen Nellis

July 18, 20256:57 PM EDTUpdated 16 hours ago

A man looks at his phone in front of the Microsoft logo during the 2025 Mobile World Congress (MWC) in Barcelona, Spain, March 3, 2025. REUTERS/Albert Gea/ File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

SAN FRANCISCO, July 18 (Reuters) - Microsoft (MSFT.O), opens new tab on Friday said it will stop using China-based engineers to provide technical assistance to the U.S. military after a report in investigative journalism outlet ProPublica sparked questions from a U.S. senator and prompted Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to order a two-week review of Pentagon cloud deals.

The report detailed Microsoft's use of Chinese engineers, opens new tab to work on U.S. military cloud computing systems under the supervision of U.S. "digital escorts" hired through subcontractors who have security clearances but often lacked the technical skills to assess whether the work of the Chinese engineers posed a cybersecurity threat.

The Reuters Tariff Watch newsletter is your daily guide to the latest global trade and tariff news. Sign up here.Microsoft, a major contractor to the U.S. government, has had its systems breached by Chinese and Russian hackers. It told ProPublica it disclosed its practices to the U.S. government during an authorization process.

On Friday, Microsoft spokesperson Frank Shaw said on social media website X the company changed how it supports U.S. government customers "in response to concerns raised earlier this week ... to assure that no China-based engineering teams are providing technical assistance" for services used by the Pentagon.

Earlier on Friday, Senator Tom Cotton, an Arkansas Republican who chairs the chamber's intelligence committee and also serves on its armed services committee, sent a letter to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth about Microsoft's reported practices.

Cotton asked the U.S. military for a list of contractors that use Chinese personnel and more information on how U.S. "digital escorts" are trained to detect suspicious activity.

"The U.S. government recognizes that China's cyber capabilities pose one of the most aggressive and dangerous threats to the United States, as evidenced by infiltration of our critical infrastructure, telecommunications networks, and supply chains," Cotton wrote in the letter. The U.S. military "must guard against all potential threats within its supply chain, including those from subcontractors," he wrote.

In a video posted on X on Friday, Hegseth said he was initiating a two-week review to ensure China-based engineers were not working on any other cloud services contracts across the Defense Department.

"I'm announcing that China will no longer have any involvement whatsoever in our cloud services, effective immediately," Hegseth said in the video. "We will continue to monitor and counter all threats to our military infrastructure and online networks."

Reporting by Stephen Nellis in San Francisco; Editing by Leslie Adler, David Gregorio and Chris Reese

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

3. Air Force will buy more KC-46s, skip competition

​I will leave it to the air power experts to comment on and assess this action but it seems to me that one of the most important capabilities that the US possesses is our tanker fleet. Aerial refueling is the key to protecting and sustaining combat power.

Air Force will buy more KC-46s, skip competition

The service is mulling whether to move away from fixed-priced on the next buy.

By Audrey Decker

Staff Writer

July 20, 2025 08:19 AM ET

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

ROYAL AIR FORCE FAIRFORD, England—After years of uncertainty about the Air Force’s tanker plans, the service has decided to buy more KC-46s instead of launching a new competition for its next tanker buy.

This decision ends speculation that the service might launch a contest, likely between Boeing and Airbus, for an interim tanker buy of 75 aircraft to replace the aging KC-135 fleet. Instead, the Air Force will purchase more of the troubled but already-in-production KC-46 as a “bridge” solution until it figures out its long-term tanking needs.

“The Air Force approved the acquisition strategy for the KC-46 extension program. That acquisition strategy approves up to 75 additional KC-46s. Now, there are obviously details to be worked out in the pricing and all the management there, but the acquisition strategy has been approved for up to 75 KC-46s in the KC-46 extension plan as part of KC-135 recapitalization,” Air Force Chief Gen. David Allvin told Defense One on the sidelines of the Royal International Air Tattoo.

The decision to stick with Boeing’s KC-46 likely stems from budget pressures, since continuing Pegasus production would cost less than putting research and development money into a new program. The new contract will come after Boeing finishes delivering tankers under the current program of record, for 188 aircraft.

While a strategy has been approved, the Air Force stressed that details like contract type and cost still need to be worked out. Boeing has been building the KC-46 under a fixed-price contract, which has resulted in billions of dollars in losses for the company. If the service changes the current contract, it could move some parts of the program—such as needed fixes or upgrades to the tanker—to a cost-plus arrangement, under which Boeing would be reimbursed for work.

The decision to buy additional KC-46s was looking more and more likely after the service included funds for a “Tanker Production Extension” program in its 2026 budget request. That program would use the KC-46 as “the most affordable requirements basis” for the extension effort, according to budget documents.

For two decades, the Air Force had planned to build its tanker fleet under a three-pronged plan: buy a commercial modified tanker, launch a competition for another commercial modified tanker to be the “bridge buy,” and eventually build a next-generation aircraft. The first step of the plan was the KC-46.

Then, in 2023, service officials announced they would cut the second part of the plan— the bridge tanker buy—down from 160 to 75 aircraft, and accelerate the next-gen tanker program, called “Next Generation Air Refueling System.”

The service had once hoped to field the stealthy new tanker by the end of the 2030s, but that timeline looks increasingly unlikely, since the Air Force cut NGAS funding down to $13 million in the 2026 budget request and has instead focused its attention on the sixth-gen fighter program, the F-47.

Allvin stressed that NGAS is not one platform, but rather a family of systems that may or may not include a brand-new tanker. And, he said, some of the funds in the 2026 NGAS budget line will go to look at how the service can make its current tankers more survivable.

Meanwhile, the Air Force continues to work through problems with the KC-46 program, which has been plagued by a number of "category one” deficiencies—problems with the potential to cause a crash or loss of life—and delivery pauses.

Allvin said he’s “comfortable” with Boeing’s progress on the deficiencies, and that the tanker is still functioning “very well” in operations, referring to the tanker’s role in Operation Midnight Hammer, where KC-46s helped refuel B-2s that struck Iran’s nuclear development sites in June.

“I’m not saying we’re totally out of the woods, but I believe we are making good progress clearing those deficiencies, and the aircraft is performing very well operationally,” Allvin said.

defenseone.com · by Audrey Decker

4. The Big Five - 20 July edition by Mick Ryan

​Following a Ukraine and Pacific assessment are the big 5:

1. Is China Ready for War?

2. Ukraine’s Drone Industrial Complex

3. The New Defence of Japan Paper

4. The Air War Over Iran

5. Finland’s Conscription Lessons

The Big Five

The Big Five - 20 July edition

My regular update on global conflicting & confrontation. This week: Ukraine's new government, Russia's 'big push' on the ground and in the air, and major military exercises in Taiwan and Australia.

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-big-five-20-july-edition?utm

Mick Ryan

Jul 19, 2025

Image: @GeneralStaffUA and @DefenceU

As the US-led peace initiative continues to falter, the unfolding summer campaigning season in Ukraine promises to be among the bloodiest of the entire war. In the coming months, Russia is hoping to build on more than a year of gradual advances to achieve breakthroughs on the eastern front, while Ukraine aims to demonstrate to the country’s partners that it is capable of stopping Putin’s war machine and holding the line. Mykola Bielieskov, 8 May 2025.

Welcome to this week’s edition of The Big Five.

In this edition of The Big Five, I explore issues concerning the war in Ukraine from the past week, as well as news from the Pacific region. As always, I have included my top five national security and war reads.

Ukraine

Image: @DefenceU and 28th Mech Brigade

Ukraine’s New Government. In the past week, the Ukrainian president announced changes to the Ukrainian government. These changes can add new energy to a government. But, the reshuffle also appears to be aimed at improving Ukraine’s relationship with the Trump administration.

The new Prime Minister is Yulia Svyrydenko and the new Defence Minister is the former Prime Minister, Denys Shmyhal. As these new appointment were announced, the Ukrainian parliament also passed a law to merge the defence ministry and the ministry for strategic industries. Therefore, new Defence Minister Shmyhal will be in charge of the defence sector, domestic weapon production and international cooperation in weapons and defence.

Other new appointments in the government shuffle included:

• Oleksii Sobolev, who will head the new ministry for economy, environment and agriculture, after these previously separate ministries were merged.
• Taras Kachin, will be the Deputy Prime Minister for EU Integration.
• Mykhailo Federov, who remains in charge of digital transformation, innovation, science and technology, moves up from Deputy PM to First Deputy PM as well.

President Zelenskyy also appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18. Umerov’s new duties include coordination and control of the security and defence sector; coordination of arms deliveries, joint production efforts, and defence partnerships; and, peace negotiations.

President Zelenskyy, after appointing the new government, noted that:

I am counting on sufficient support from the Members of Parliament for the new configuration of the Government of Ukraine. It is also important that the Government promptly conducts an audit of all agreements with our partners to determine what is working and what requires reassessment or intensification.

More European sanctions. This week, the EU announced its next sanctions package against Russia, its 18th such package since February 2022. Key aspects of this new package include:

• An oil cap to contain Russian oil prices at 15 percent of the average market price, which will automatically adjust semi-annually.
• A full ban on any transactions related to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which will prevent the completion, maintenance, and operation of the pipelines.
• A ban on all transactions with Russian financial institutions.
• Sanctions on an additional 105 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet. Related to this was sanctions on Russian and foreign companies managing the shadow fleet, an oil refinery in India in which the Russians are the main shareholder, and a company in the Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector.
• The ending of Czechia's exemptions for Russian oil imports.
• An import ban on refined petroleum products made from Russian crude oil and imported from any third country, with the exception of Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Russia’s Big Push. It is apparent that the Russians have decided that 2025 is to be the year of decision for their war against Ukraine. It is likely that the challenges of a straining national budget, declining quality of their ground forces, increasing reliance on North Korea & China to support their war and pressure from President Trump to end the war, are forcing the Russian president to step up operations on the ground and in the air against Ukraine. While he might publicly discuss being able to fight this war into the far future, the reality is far from the case.

Just one indication of this was Putin’s announcement at the end of June that military spending by Russia would be cut from 2026. Putin hopes that a major effort this year will put him in an advantageous position for negotiations. It is not working out this way for him.

On the ground, Russia has increased the overall seizure of territory in the past couple of months. It should be noted however that the ‘acceleration’ of capturing Ukrainian territory is measured against the largely anemic progress that Russia has made in the past 18 months or so. That said, the Ukrainian eastern front line is under considerable pressure from the Russians at present.

In June, Russia gained 550-600 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory, which was an increase compared to previous months. But, as can be seen from the graph below, these gains are not decisive in the overall scheme of the war. The Russian’s are not gaining enough territory to project any real sense of overall success.

Image: Russia Matters, 9 July 2025.

Too much analysis is focussed on the few kilometres Russia is gaining in the east, and not enough on why Putin might be going all out to make these gains now. He needs something to negotiate with when peace negotiations do begin, he needs to eventually reduce spending on the war, and he probably wants to reduce his overall reliance on North Korea and China. He is probably under far more pressure than we realise.

But it is also clear that Putin still believes he can will this war. Until he can be disabused on this notion, the Russians will continue with their current ‘big push’.

In the air, Russia continues to pummel Ukraine with large-scale drone and missile raids. The latest series of raids occurred 16-19 July. Beginning with a 401 drone and missile raid on the 16th, Russian then conducted two nights of smaller raids on the 17th (64 drones) and 18th (35 drones) before returning to another large raid of 379 drones and missiles on the night of the 19th of July. While a large proportion of these were shot down, enough are still getting through Ukraine’s air defence network to cause damage, and increase the suffering and misery of Ukrainian people in many cities.

Image: Institute for the Study of War

While Russia is able to generate large aerial attacks against Ukraine, and is increasing the production of Shahed/Geran-2 drones, this expanded aerial onslaught may prove strategically counterproductive for Russia and drive up the level of foreign military aid for Ukraine. Russia’s enlarged air campaign against Ukrainian civilians (see graph above) was clearly a driver in Trump’s recent decision to step up provision of air defence systems and issue his 50-day ultimatum to Putin.

Despite this step up in their air-land assault, it is unlikely that this Russian air-land push will result in a major shift in the correlation of forces, or provide either side with any significant new leverage points for eventual peace negotiations. While Ukraine is suffering from a manpower shortage, it appears still able to impose significant personnel costs on the Russians and deny them the capacity for large-scale breakthroughs. Ukrainian efforts to construct multiple defensive lines in eastern Ukraine are bearing fruit, and the Russian offensive in the Sumy region appears to have be largely halted by the Ukrainians.

Russia’s main effort remains the region around Pokrovsk. Here the Russians are making gains, but these gains are taking time to achieve and are still resulting in major casualties.

This overall situation with the air and ground campaigns in Ukraine is neatly summarised by @Tatarigami in a recent assessment:

Fundamentally, both Russia and Ukraine face organizational challenges, though of different kinds. Ukraine suffers from delayed mobilization and delayed structural adaptations, while Russia struggles to translate its vast resource advantage into a combined and coordinated force

Image: Australian Department of Defence.

Ukrainian Military Force Structure. Ukraine’s program to replace temporary ground force organisations with standing army corps continues. Multiple new corps have been formed over the last few months, and brigades have been assigned to these corps. There has also been a steady flow of appointments of new corps commanders. A great source for following force structure changes of the Ukrainian military is MilitaryLand, which you can see at this link.

Australian M1 Tanks Arrive - Finally. It appears that the first of Australia’s donated M1 tanks have finally started to arrive in Ukraine. It took nine months for these to arrive while Ukrainians fight for to defend their nation. One hopes that Australia’s defence bureaucrats can do better if Australia was in the middle of its own war of national survival.

The Pacific

Image: @TaiwanMonitor

Exercise Han Kuang 2025. This week, Taiwan wrapped up its major annual military exercise. Conducted across the length and breadth of Taiwanese territory, the exercise rehearsed a range of military and civil capabilities that might be needed to respond to increased Chinese military aggression, or at worse, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Key military capabilities rehearsed over the course of the exercise included the following:

• The mobilisation of reserve troops, such as the 6th Army Corps, 104th and 302nd Brigades, and employment of those troops.
• Live fire drills.
• Amphibious and urban operations.
• Deployment of dispersed anti-ship missile units.
• Integration of uncrewed systems.
• Aerial and naval drills including air defence, runway repair and mine laying exercises.
• Night fighting activities.
• Subterranean operations in Taiwan’s subway.
• The emplacement of coastal fortifications and obstacles by military engineers and anti-landing and anti-airborne exercises.
• Civil air raid drills.

A useful breakdown of all the activities is shown in the graphic below, courtesy of the Taiwan Security Monitor.

Image: @TaiwanMonitor

This year’s Han Kuang was the largest and most comprehensive exercise held to date. Integrating civil and military operations, and including high level joint activities and the conduct of counter-landing, counter-airborne, air defence, anti-maritime and counter-drone operations, it is an indication of Taiwan’s ongoing modernisation of its military strategy for defending the nation in the event of a Chinese invasion.

One interesting thing to note about this event is that it is a unilateral military exercise. There is no overt participation by nations that might be key supporters of Taiwan in the event of a Chinese campaign to seize the nation of Taiwan. The most likely supporters, America and Japan, were absent from this exercise. This is an issue taken up in an article published by National Defense, which you can read here.

This approach stands in stark contrast to the other major military exercise currently underway in the Pacific region: Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025.

Integrated firepower exercise with forces from Australia, US, French, Korean, Philippines and Singapore. Image: @TalismanSabre

Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025. This major multinational exercise, with 19 nations and 40,000 personnel participating, began on 14 July and is currently taking place along the east coast of Australia as well as across northern Australia. Featuring large scale joint operations, Talisman Sabre tests the integration of joint and combined forces from across the Pacific region, as well as smaller contributions from European countries.

The exercise has also featured live fire activities. This includes the live fire exercise with multiple nations (see image above) as well as the first live fire of the Australian Army’s new National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS).

There are also a lot of operations that are not immediately visible to outside observers. These include space and cyber operations.

Another vital element of the exercise is the supporting logistics. Deploying military forces is a logistic intensive activity, and the ‘loggies’ from multiple nations work hard in the lead up to, during and after these major exercises to make them happen.

Importantly, testing and rehearsing higher level command and control will be a crucial aspect of Talisman Sabre. While we still call these events ‘exercises’, in many respects they are now closer to ‘rehearsals’ for the kinds of response options that the U.S., its allies and security partners might be called upon to execute in the event of accelerated Chinese military aggression - including an invasion of Taiwan - in the coming years.

Having participated in a couple of these exercises, I believe they are not only extraordinarily important but they are also one of the best learning opportunities our service personnel receive. I wish all the participants a successful and safe conduct of Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025.

*******

It’s time to cover this week’s recommended readings.

I have included a new article from Foreign Affairs that examines whether China is ready for a military invasion of Taiwan, and the new annual Defence of Japan publication which is always a great resource. There is an article on Finnish conscription and national mobilisation, as well as articles on Ukraine’s evolving drone industry and the lessons from Israel’s air war over Iran.

As always, if you only have time to read one of my recommendations, the first one is my read of the week.

Happy reading!

1. Is China Ready for War?

The year 2027 is a crucial one in discussions about potential Chinese military operations against Taiwan. President Xi has given 2027 as a capability milestone (not an operational objective) for the PLA to be ready to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. As such, explorations of Chinese readiness to achieve this milestone are important in guiding the diplomacy, intelligence collection, force structure and military readiness of Pacific nation. In this article, the authors explore Chinese military readiness through the lens of senior leader purges and appointments. You can read the full piece here.

2. Ukraine’s Drone Industrial Complex

The development of a modern drone industrial complex in Ukraine has been crucial to Ukraine’s survival as a nation. Ukraine has transformed military affairs with its early adoption of large-scale drone operations in the air, at sea, and more recently on the ground, in defending itself. In this report, the development of Ukraine’s employment of drones, and how it as evolved its procurement of drones to exploit rapid learning and adaptation about drone technology and tactics, is explored in this article. It also proposes lessons for other nations. You can read the article here.

3. The New Defence of Japan Paper

The annual issue of the Defence of Japan document is something I look forward to. It is one of the best defence documents released by any military in the world. The Defence of Japan publications provide very clear explanations of the threats that concern the government of Japan and which its military forces are preparing for. They have also provided good assessments of lessons from Ukraine and the Middle East, and have a relatively transparent description of where the Japanese defence budget is being spent. You can read this excellent document at this link.

4. The Air War Over Iran

Israel’s recent take down Iran’s air defence network with sophisticated 5th generation aircraft, supported by older F16, F15 and tanker aircraft, shows that the future of war in the air is not just about uncrewed aerial warfare. The Israeli’s showed why a balance of crewed and unscrewed systems is essential, particularly as a key enabler to getting their crewed aircraft over Iran was the initial strikes on Iran’s air defence system with small UAVs. You can read the full article at this link.

5. Finland’s Conscription Lessons

It is no secret that the all-volunteer models of many western military organisations are starting to show vulnerabilities. Recruiting sufficient numbers to fill the ranks is difficult. And even if the ranks were filled, our military organisations are still too small for the scale of likely future conflicts. To that end, a re-examination of conscription is needed. There are several models in existence from which we might learn, including the Finland model, which is explored in this article. You can read for the full piece at this link.

5. ASEAN is collapsing, and nobody wants to admit it

​What does the future hold for ASEAN?

Excerpts:

Behind closed doors, ASEAN officials increasingly acknowledge the dysfunction. Some are frustrated by the charade of unity. But the bloc’s institutional design — a rotating chairmanship, no enforcement powers, and a culture of diplomatic avoidance — makes real change nearly impossible. The result is performative multilateralism: summits that produce boilerplate communiqués, working groups that avoid hard issues and a growing gap between ASEAN’s image and its actual influence. 

This matters for U.S. strategy. Washington has long relied on ASEAN centrality as a foundation for its Indo-Pacific engagement. But if ASEAN cannot function as a reliable partner, U.S. policymakers will need to shift course. That may mean building more flexible “mini-lateral” coalitions with individual countries like the Philippines, Vietnam or Indonesia. It may also require confronting the uncomfortable truth that ASEAN’s decline helps Beijing, which has long exploited the bloc’s divisions to blunt regional resistance to Chinese assertiveness. 

Southeast Asia remains one of the world’s most dynamic regions — economically vibrant, demographically young and strategically pivotal. But its central political institution is in retreat. ASEAN is not dead, but it has become hollow. Until its member states and their international partners are willing to admit that reality, the region will remain vulnerable — not just to external pressure, but to its own slow unravelling. 

ASEAN is collapsing, and nobody wants to admit it

by Joseph Black, opinion contributor - 07/18/25 3:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5406582-china-invites-trump-military-parade/

For decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations — known as ASEAN — has been treated in Washington and other capitals as a bedrock of regional stability. It has been a model of consensus-driven diplomacy and a potential counterweight to Chinese dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

But in 2025, that image is becoming dangerously outdated. ASEAN is no longer a coherent political bloc. Fragmented by internal crises, paralyzed in the face of regional threats, and unable to coordinate a meaningful response to the great power rivalry unfolding around it, ASEAN is collapsing — slowly, quietly, but unmistakably. 

The crisis is perhaps most vivid in Myanmar, where the military junta that seized power in 2021 is now fighting for its survival. The country is in open civil war. Resistance groups have taken control of large parts of the borderlands, while the regime continues to commit war crimes and ignore every diplomatic overture. ASEAN’s so-called Five-Point Consensus — once touted as a pathway to peace — has become a dead letter.

The bloc has refused to suspend Myanmar’s membership, despite growing international pressure. Its only action has been to exclude the junta from high-level summits, a symbolic gesture that does nothing to halt the violence or alleviate the suffering of civilians. 

Myanmar is not the only fracture. Thailand, one of ASEAN’s founding members and once seen as a stabilizing force in the region, is now consumed by its own political drama. After the 2023 general election, the progressive Move Forward Party won the most seats, only to be blocked from forming a government by the military-appointed Senate. In a stunning reversal, the Pheu Thai Party — once the main opposition to military rule — formed a coalition with those same military-aligned forces. The deal returned the old guard to power, sowing deep distrust among voters.

Now, that uneasy alliance is unravelling. Paetongtarn Shinawatra, daughter of exiled former prime minister Thaksin and a prominent Pheu Thai figure, has been suspended from parliament amid an escalating scandal involving a leaked phone call with Cambodian strongman Hun Sen. The call, widely interpreted as backchannel political coordination, has triggered an uproar in Bangkok, deepened factional rifts within the ruling coalition, and prompted speculation that another military coup — Thailand’s third in two decades — may be on the horizon. 

Cambodia, for its part, is not even pretending to operate as a democracy. The 2023 handover of power from Hun Sen to his son, Hun Manet, was engineered with minimal transparency and no serious opposition. Phnom Penh remains one of Beijing’s most loyal allies in the region, frequently undermining ASEAN unity on issues involving China — especially in the South China Sea. Laos is similarly aligned with China and effectively absent from ASEAN diplomacy. 

These trends are not isolated. They expose a deeper structural failure: ASEAN’s model of consensus, non-interference and formal equality among states is no longer fit for purpose. It worked — barely — during the Cold War and its aftermath, when the region could afford strategic ambiguity. But today’s geopolitical climate is different.

Today, the region is a front line in U.S.-China competition, and ASEAN’s diplomatic architecture is proving inadequate. It lacks a unified voice on security, democracy, trade or technology — the defining issues of our time. 

The bloc’s inability to act has real consequences. As tensions rise in the South China Sea, with Chinese maritime aggression accelerating around the Philippines and Vietnam, ASEAN has failed to issue even a joint statement of condemnation. As the U.S. and its allies try to build resilient supply chains and technology partnerships, ASEAN members are signing competing deals — often with China — and undercutting each other’s positions.

Even on trade, where ASEAN was once considered relatively cohesive, real influence has shifted elsewhere. China is now the largest trading partner for nearly every ASEAN state, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership has further institutionalized Beijing’s role at the center of regional commerce. 

Behind closed doors, ASEAN officials increasingly acknowledge the dysfunction. Some are frustrated by the charade of unity. But the bloc’s institutional design — a rotating chairmanship, no enforcement powers, and a culture of diplomatic avoidance — makes real change nearly impossible. The result is performative multilateralism: summits that produce boilerplate communiqués, working groups that avoid hard issues and a growing gap between ASEAN’s image and its actual influence. 

This matters for U.S. strategy. Washington has long relied on ASEAN centrality as a foundation for its Indo-Pacific engagement. But if ASEAN cannot function as a reliable partner, U.S. policymakers will need to shift course. That may mean building more flexible “mini-lateral” coalitions with individual countries like the Philippines, Vietnam or Indonesia. It may also require confronting the uncomfortable truth that ASEAN’s decline helps Beijing, which has long exploited the bloc’s divisions to blunt regional resistance to Chinese assertiveness. 

Southeast Asia remains one of the world’s most dynamic regions — economically vibrant, demographically young and strategically pivotal. But its central political institution is in retreat. ASEAN is not dead, but it has become hollow. Until its member states and their international partners are willing to admit that reality, the region will remain vulnerable — not just to external pressure, but to its own slow unravelling. 

Joseph Black is an American expat currently pursuing a master’s in international affairs at King’s College London and a Ph.D. in gender studies at Chiang Mai University. He also serves as a research officer at the University of New South Wales.

6.  4 reasons why Trump should reject China’s invitation to its military parade

​To help inform POTUS' decision I recommend he take a short walk from the White House to visit the VIctims of Communism Memorial Foundation (https://victimsofcommunism.org/) at 900 15th Street NW, and reflect on the exhibits, in particular the Statue of Liberty from the Tiananmen square massacre.

4 reasons why Trump should reject China’s invitation to its military parade

by Vincent C. Chen, opinion contributor - 07/18/25 2:00 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5406582-china-invites-trump-military-parade/

Beijing’s Kyodo News reported June 29 that China is planning to invite President Trump to attend a military parade at Tiananmen Square on Sept. 3. 

The event marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II under the banner of the “Commemoration of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.”  

However, behind this seemingly historical commemoration lies a calculated political agenda by Beijing: the distortion of history and an ambition to challenge the free world. 

Every international visit by a U.S. president carries deep symbolic meaning. This event touches on the core of U.S.-China relations, America’s position on historical truth and the international order the U.S. upholds. 

I therefore earnestly urge President Trump to weigh the following four considerations before making any final decision should Beijing extend an official invitation.

First, this parade is not a symbol of peace, but a strategic challenge to U.S.-Led Global Order. The Chinese Communist Party is not holding this parade merely to commemorate a historic victory. It is a deliberate display of military strength, aimed at projecting the narrative of Communist Party superiority and signaling strategic rivalry with the U.S.

Since 2015, the party has increasingly normalized large-scale military parades. Domestically, they glorify one-party rule; internationally, they serve as a geopolitical tool to intimidate neighbors. By showcasing hypersonic missiles, fifth-generation fighter jets and long-range nuclear strike capabilities, these parades are clearly targeted at undermining the leadership of the U.S. and the free world.

The Xi regime’s invitation to Trump is a calculated effort to present China as America’s equal on the global stage — conveying a vision of “co-governance of the world.” Should Trump attend, his presence may be exploited as an implicit endorsement of China’s military rise, thereby weakening America’s global standing and eroding the confidence of regional allies. As President Ronald Reagan said in his 1981 inaugural address, “Above all, we must realize that no arsenal, or no weapon in the arsenals of the world, is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women.”

True strength lies not in weaponry, but in the spirit and conviction of free people. America’s greatness stems from its values — not from military displays. Moreover, the essence of a military parade should be to honor those who gave their lives in service. Just last month, Trump presided over the 250th anniversary celebration of the U.S. Army in Washington, fulfilling that solemn duty with dignity and honor. This would not be like that. 

Second, the Chinese communists have falsified history and stolen the Nationalist government’s wartime legacy. There is no historical ambiguity regarding who bore the brunt of Japan’s invasion during World War II. Following the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, China became the principal theater of war in Asia. The Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership conducted over 90 percent of the major battles and suffered the bulk of casualties.

In contrast, the Communist Party operated largely in guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, focused more on consolidating its own strength than on resisting Japan strategically. It was the Nationalist government’s sacrifices that initially earned the Republic of China a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Even after its retreat to Taiwan in 1949 following the civil war, the U.N. continued to recognize the Republic of China for nearly two more decades — underscoring its historical legitimacy.

After consolidating power, the Chinese Communist Party eliminated many of the generals and troops who had genuinely resisted Japan. Now, Beijing stages military parades as if it had been the actual victor, mocking the true heroes of World War II and engaging in historical theft of valor. If Trump were to attend, it would risk signaling U.S. endorsement of this manipulated narrative, creating the impression that America has accepted the Chinese Communist Party’s version of history. 

Third, this parade dishonors fallen American soldiers from the Korean War. During World War II, the U.S. provided significant aid to China’s anti-Japanese efforts. Yet less than five years later, the Chinese communists sent over 1 million troops across the Yalu River to directly engage U.S.-led United Nations forces in the Korean War.

The Chinese Communist Party’s support for the Kim regime in North Korea was part of its strategy to establish regional dominance in East Asia. More than 36,000 American soldiers died in the Korean War, and over 100,000 were wounded. Even today, many American families continue to grieve the loss of loved ones.

The U.S. has always deeply honored its veterans and war dead — building monuments, museums and preserving their legacy in public memory. For a U.S. president to attend this parade would amount to public recognition of the very military that opened fire on American troops.

Trump understands the profound sacrifice of military service. He must also be made to understand that attending this parade could deeply wound the families and descendants of the fallen.

Finally, sharing a platform with Putin and Xi could send the wrong signal to the free world. Reports suggest that, because Xi attended Russia’s 80th anniversary parade for the Great Patriotic War in Moscow this last May, Russian President Vladimir Putin will return the favor by attending China’s parade in September. Both men are now seen across the free world as symbols of authoritarian expansionism.

Putin has invaded Ukraine and constantly threatens Europe. Xi, meanwhile, has escalated provocations in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, suppressed freedoms in Hong Kong and continues the persecution of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet. His regime that is both militaristic and repressive.

Even if Trump does not share their goals, his standing alongside these two dictators at a military parade would be heavily exploited by Chinese and Russian media to depict an image of unity among the three powers. Such an image could damage global perceptions of the U.S. and undermine America’s moral standing as the beacon of freedom. It risks shaking allies’ trust in the values the U.S. represents. 

Trump is unquestionably one of the most influential American presidents and global leaders of our time. He has firmly defended American interests and values, taken strong action against the Iranian regime, and shown deep respect for America’s military — earning widespread admiration at home and abroad.

Yes, diplomacy involves difficult trade-offs. But China’s invitation is not a normal diplomatic event. It is a stage crafted by an authoritarian regime to whitewash history and showcase military might — not in the pursuit of peace, but to control the global narrative.  

By declining to attend, President Trump would send a powerful signal: that America stands for historical truth, democratic values and the shared honor of defending freedom with its allies. 

Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party is currently under significant pressure from U.S. tariffs and technological sanctions. Its economy is more dependent on global markets than ever. This is not the time to offer Beijing symbolic concessions or legitimacy.

A wiser, stronger strategy would be to reserve a presidential visit to China for when Beijing demonstrates genuine reform, keeps its promises, curbs its aggression and halts its theft of American technology and commerce. Only then should a U.S. president visit — with moral authority and strategic advantage. 

Trump, for the honor of the United States and in the name of historical responsibility, should firmly and respectfully decline this invitation. 

Vincent C. Chen is a senior executive in Taiwan’s information and communications technology industry who serves as an advisory board member for Taiwan Thinktank and Foundation for Future Generations, Taiwan.

7. 'Top Gun' for drones: Pentagon plans August exercise with FPV drone units

​Excerpts:

All 18 of the unmanned systems on display at the Pentagon Wednesday came through the process in 18 months or less, Michael told reporters, cutting years off typical development time. One prominent graduate is the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie, which is now being procured by the Marine Corps.

The rapid-fire experimentation-to-procurement pipeline began as the brainchild of Michael’s predecessor as undersecretary of research and engineering, defense acquisition veteran Heidi Shyu. In 2021, Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks announced what she and Shyu named the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER, pronounced “raider”). The program faced some intense criticism and a Senate push to slash funding, and the 2026 budget request includes no funding explicitly labeled as RDER — but only, Lovett explained, because RDER is no longer a pilot program but the default approach across the research and engineering undersecretariat.

“It’s been institutionalized now,” Lovett said. “ Now that is the way we do business, so we don’t specifically called it ‘RDER’ anymore. We just call it rapid prototyping and experimentation.”

'Top Gun' for drones: Pentagon plans August exercise with FPV drone units - Breaking Defense

“At this next T-REX [Technology Readiness Experimentation exercise], we’ll be starting to host TOPGUN school,” said prototyping & experimentation director Alex Lovett. “We’re going to be playing Red versus Blue, their best [offense] coming after our best defense.”

By  Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

on July 18, 2025 at 3:30 PM

breakingdefense.com · by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. · July 18, 2025

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (left) and Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering Emil Michael (right) speak in front of a Kratos XQ-58 “Valkyrie” combat drone during a “Drone Day” exhibition at the Pentagon, July 16, 2025. (DoD photo by Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

WASHINGTON — With President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth “unleashing American drone dominance” in both civil and military aviation, the Pentagon is taking a Biden-era experimentation program and turning up the heat with Top Gun-style air combat training for FPV operators.

“Drones are the biggest battlefield innovation in a generation, accounting for most of this year’s casualties in Ukraine,” Hegseth told reporters in the Pentagon courtyard at a “drone day” exhibition of new, domestically built unmanned systems.

“Our adversaries collectively produce millions of cheap drones each year,” Hegseth said. But, he warned, the US military and defense industry were well behind. “We will speed up the timeline of rapid innovation. We have to, on behalf of our warfighters.”

One of the surprising innovations in Ukraine has been the recent rise of first-person view (FPV) drones, controlled by wearing a virtual reality headset that lets the operator see through the drone’s front-mounted sensors as if they were onboard themselves. Originally built for recreational drone races, FPV drones have been adapted by both sides to serve as low-cost precision-guided missiles. While notoriously tricky to control, these armed FPVs have proven remarkably effective on the battlefield — if the operator has the reflexes and the training to handle them.

“As part of drone dominance … the services are now standing up FPV drone schools and drone capabilities,” said Alex Lovett, a veteran official in the Pentagon’s research and engineering undersecretariat, speaking to reporters after Hegseth’s remarks. Next month, as part of a semiannual experimental wargame known as Technology Readiness Experimentation (T-REX), the Pentagon will be bringing some of those young FPV jockeys together for intensive air combat training, including against cutting-edge anti-drone defenses.

“At this next T-REX, we’ll be starting to host TOPGUN school,” said Lovett, referring to the famous Navy training program for promising fighter pilots. “We’re going to start playing Red versus Blue, their best coming after our best defenses. … This August will be the first time.”

These high-speed head-to-head wargames fit into the larger plan for August’s T-REX 25-2 exercise, which will spend a lot of time on “counter-UAS and short-range air defenses … both in an urban setting as well as across the base,” Lovett explained.

The exercise will test not only individual offensive and defensive systems but the software, networks, and command structures coordinating them — including both human operators and artificial intelligence. The military concept is called the “passive and multi-spectral air-surveillance kill chain,” explained Lt. Col. Matt Limeberry, who runs the T-REX experiments at Camp Atterbury, Ind. (While he didn’t unpack the terminology, “passive” in this context usually refers to sensors that don’t actively emit energy, which usually means they have shorter range than “active” sensors but don’t give away their own position; “multi-spectral” implies a mix of different sensors picking up different things, such as acoustic, infra-red, and radar, and the using software to merge all the disparate data into one coherent picture.)

There’s a big emphasis on “low-cost, short-range air defense” right now, Limeberry told reporters, and on “low-cost, attritable” systems of all kinds: “That’s what T-REX is getting after.”

Limeberry’s team field-tests new technology at DoD ranges on a rolling basis every 30 days, with the larger, more complex, and more demanding T-REX exercises occurring every six months. It also shares promising technology with the military’s four-star Combatant Commands (COCOMs), particularly Indo-Pacific Command, which run them through their own field tests and experiments.

The whole process is open to a wide range of companies, officials said. They range from small firms like Berry Aviation, a long-time DoD contractor that produced the portable “Iron Weasel” drone on display at the Pentagon, to giants like Amazon, whose AWS branch sucked up masses of data from one T-REX and then provided analysis to DoD.

“We simulate an operational environment; they can come test under conditions [that] they would face in the field,” said Emil Michael, a former Uber executive recently confirmed as undersecretary of defense for research and engineering. “[It] allows a lot of commercial partners to apply and be included, and that makes it a wide aperture for industry to participate. [We] lower the barriers, invite more people in, do experimentation.”

Some of the vendors find their products just don’t work as advertised when given to real soldiers and tested under realistic conditions, officials explained, which provides irreplaceable feedback for improvements (or, sometimes, an exit from the defense business). Other products progress through a roughly two-year process of testing, evaluation, experimentation, and refinement under the research and engineering undersecretariat, before finally “graduating” from T-REX and being handed over to one of the armed services to procure and deploy.

All 18 of the unmanned systems on display at the Pentagon Wednesday came through the process in 18 months or less, Michael told reporters, cutting years off typical development time. One prominent graduate is the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie, which is now being procured by the Marine Corps.

The rapid-fire experimentation-to-procurement pipeline began as the brainchild of Michael’s predecessor as undersecretary of research and engineering, defense acquisition veteran Heidi Shyu. In 2021, Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks announced what she and Shyu named the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER, pronounced “raider”). The program faced some intense criticism and a Senate push to slash funding, and the 2026 budget request includes no funding explicitly labeled as RDER — but only, Lovett explained, because RDER is no longer a pilot program but the default approach across the research and engineering undersecretariat.

“It’s been institutionalized now,” Lovett said. “ Now that is the way we do business, so we don’t specifically called it ‘RDER’ anymore. We just call it rapid prototyping and experimentation.”

8. Chinese Rare-Earth Magnet Exports Surge After U.S. Trade Truce

​Graphics at the link: https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/chinese-rare-earth-magnet-exports-surge-after-u-s-trade-truce-f9f6e059?st=H7QirS&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

Chinese Rare-Earth Magnet Exports Surge After U.S. Trade Truce

Despite a detente on China’s restrictions on the critical manufacturing inputs, shipments remain far below last year’s levels

By Rebecca Feng

Follow

July 19, 2025 11:59 pm ET

A containership at a port in China earlier in July. Photo: str/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Key Points

What's This?

• China’s rare-earth magnet exports in June increased nearly threefold from the previous month.
• Despite the increase, export levels remain significantly lower than in previous years.
• Western manufacturers are seeking alternatives amid concerns that Chinese rare-earth export restrictions may persist.

HONG KONG—China’s exports of rare-earth magnets last month increased nearly threefold from the previous month after the country lifted some export controls on the critical industrial inputs following a deal with the U.S.

Still, export levels remain significantly lower than in previous years, prompting some Western companies to seek longer-term alternatives.

In year-over-year terms, total export volumes of rare-earth magnets from China decreased 38% in June from a year earlier, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of Chinese customs data released on Sunday.

Though such a large decline is hardly cause for celebration among Western manufacturers that have come to depend on Chinese rare-earth magnets to keep their production lines humming, the figure marks something of a recovery from May, when exports of these magnets tumbled 74% from a year earlier—the biggest such percentage decline in more than a decade.

In June, China exported 3.2 million kilograms of rare-earth magnets, nearly three times the 1.2 million kilograms exported in May. However, exports of rare-earth magnets are still far below last year’s levels, when monthly shipments averaged 4.8 million kilograms.

China’s dominant position in supplying rare-earth magnets and metals has proven a powerful trump card in trade negotiations with the U.S. After years in which China took market share from the West, the country now produces about two-thirds of the world’s rare-earth minerals, and processes around 90% of the supply. Rare-earth magnets are essential in products such as car motors and missile-guidance systems.

China’s exports of rare-earth magnets to the U.S. in particular continued to fall sharply in June, dropping 52% from a year earlier to roughly 353,000 kilograms. As steep as that fall is, it represents an improvement from May’s 93% year-over-year plunge in Chinese rare-earth magnet exports to the U.S.

As U.S.-China trade tensions soared in early April, Beijing said it would begin requiring licenses for export of certain rare-earth metals, including dysprosium and terbium. Following a truce between the U.S. and China in Geneva in mid-May, Beijing pledged to ease exports of rare-earth magnets.

However, Western companies said that they still weren’t receiving enough magnets for their factories, and Chinese authorities continued to take weeks to scrutinize their applications, the Journal reported. Further, applications for raw rare earths, which are used to make magnets, have rarely been granted.

Beijing is increasing domestic oversight by addressing the smuggling of rare-earth materials. China’s Ministry of Commerce recently asked rare-earth companies based in China to list employees with technical expertise, research background and personal information, the Journal has reported. The aim is to prevent the unauthorized sharing of trade secrets.

The latest government body to join in is the country’s powerful spy agency. In a social-media post Friday, China’s Ministry of State Security accused overseas intelligence agencies from unnamed countries of stealing restricted rare-earth materials.

Western manufacturers are increasingly preparing for a scenario in which Chinese rare-earth export restrictions are here to stay.

To prepare for potential near-term shortages of magnets and production shutdowns, some Western companies have shelled out for expensive airfreight shipments to receive rare-earth product supplies as soon as licenses are granted. Some manufacturers are also exploring ways to make their products with less-powerful magnets that don’t include any controlled rare earths.

Earlier this month, America’s largest rare earths miner, MP Materials, said that it had reached a deal under which the Pentagon would take a 15% stake in the company. As part of the deal, the U.S. government committed to invest billions of dollars in the Las Vegas-based company and purchase its output. MP Materials is called to build a new facility by 2028 to make rare-earth magnets at a scale that exceeds current U.S. magnet production.

Write to Rebecca Feng at rebecca.feng@wsj.com

9. On Ukraine War, Trump Proves His Foreign Policy Is Pragmatic and That Adversaries Who Defy Him Will Face Consequences

​Just a reminder, usually we understand that leaders have at most 30- 90 days to blame their predecessor. After that they own everything.

Excerpts:

There are many factors why President Trump’s diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine have not yet succeeded. U.S.-Russia relations were at a very low point when Trump was sworn in last January due to President Biden’s deeply incompetent foreign policy and constant demonizing of Putin. Putin is paranoid about growing Western influence in Ukraine, refuses to acknowledge Ukrainian nationality, and seems determined to seize most, if not all, of the country. Ukrainian and European officials also initially opposed Trump’s efforts to push for a cease-fire and have frequently undermined his peace efforts.

I believe these factors could be overcome with time and with the additional pressure that President Trump is putting on Putin by sending additional arms to Ukraine and his threat to impose secondary energy sanctions.

I believe President Trump’s Ukraine policy shift was a deliberate change aligned with his overall national security philosophy. It shows not only that Trump is pragmatic but also that America’s enemies will face consequences if they oppose him.

History shows that great presidents are willing to be pragmatic to reach their ultimate goals, rather than being blinded by policies and ideologies that are failing. If Trump’s pragmatism on the Ukraine War succeeds in ending this conflict, he will be remembered as one of America’s greatest presidents.

On Ukraine War, Trump Proves His Foreign Policy Is Pragmatic and That Adversaries Who Defy Him Will Face Consequences › American Greatness

Trump's Ukraine pivot shows pragmatic America First: weapons via NATO, sanctions on Russia, and a cease-fire ultimatum aimed at ending the war without new U.S. entanglements.

By Fred Fleitz

July 18, 2025

amgreatness.com · by Fred Fleitz · July 18, 2025

President Trump’s announcement that he will send weapons to Ukraine through NATO and his pledge to impose crippling energy sanctions against Russia in 50 days if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not agree to a cease-fire in the Ukraine War led to the usual mocking criticism of Trump by the mainstream media.

Many reporters slammed Trump’s decision as hypocrisy and flip-flopping, claiming that it contradicted his campaign promises to quickly end the war in Ukraine and keep America out of new wars. Other reporters gloated that Trump’s decision to send additional weapons to Ukraine meant he was implementing President Biden’s Ukraine policy.

These criticisms were far from the truth. What is true about President Trump’s policy shift on the Ukraine War is that for the second time in a month, Trump demonstrated that he will adjust his America First approach to U.S. national security when circumstances change and to maintain American credibility on the world stage.

President Trump announced during a July 14 Oval Office press conference with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte that he had decided, due to Putin’s refusal to agree to a cease-fire in the Ukraine War, to sell Patriot missile batteries to NATO to provide to Ukraine. According to press reports, the president may also have decided to sell missiles to Ukraine that could be fired deep inside Russia.

In addition, President Trump announced that the U.S. will impose “severe” 100% secondary tariffs on countries that buy energy from Russia if Putin does not agree to a cease-fire in 50 days.

President Trump expressed his growing frustration with Putin for accelerating the war despite their phone discussions about implementing a cease-fire and diplomatic efforts by Trump’s national security team officials with Russian, Ukrainian, and European officials.

Unfortunately, after six months of Trump’s intensive diplomatic efforts to stop the killing in Ukraine, Putin has shown no interest in ending the war. Putin has not only ignored President Trump’s peace efforts, but he has also disrespected him.

This is why a shift in Trump’s Ukraine policy was needed.

Too often in the past, U.S. presidents issued ultimatums and set deadlines for U.S. adversaries, only to do nothing when their demands were ignored. This undermined both the president’s and America’s credibility on the world stage.

Instead of sticking with failing foreign policies, effective presidents adjust their policies when the circumstances change.

We saw this last month when President Trump decided to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites. This decision followed a 60-day period that Trump gave Iranian officials to negotiate a new nuclear deal to end the Iranian nuclear weapons program, including its uranium enrichment effort. After Iranian diplomats dragged their feet and refused to agree to such a deal, President Trump took action by ordering U.S. bunker-buster bombs and Tomahawk missiles to be dropped on deeply buried sites associated with Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

In response to criticism that this decision violated his campaign promises to keep the U.S. out of new wars, the president responded that he had always said he would not permit Iran to get a nuclear bomb and assessed, based on new intelligence, that Iran was getting too close to having operational nuclear weapons.

Trump stressed that the attack on Iran did not involve troops on the ground or a military campaign. He also noted that, as the person who conceived the America First approach to U.S. national security, he gets to decide what this approach includes.

President Trump’s shift in strategy on the war in Ukraine was similar to his decision to bomb Iran. The president adjusted his policy after diplomacy failed, but kept the door open to future negotiations.

Like the Iran situation, the president kept to a primary objective. In the Ukraine War, this is stopping the killing with an immediate cease-fire.

Also, like the decision to bomb Iran, President Trump’s new Ukraine policy was an adjustment that remained true to his core America First principles. By selling weapons to NATO to give to Ukraine, Trump was consistent with his calls for Europe to take primary responsibility for European defense and the Ukraine War. The decision to sell weapons to NATO instead of giving them to Ukraine also reflected Trump’s concern about the high costs that U.S. taxpayers have borne in this war.

There are many factors why President Trump’s diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine have not yet succeeded. U.S.-Russia relations were at a very low point when Trump was sworn in last January due to President Biden’s deeply incompetent foreign policy and constant demonizing of Putin. Putin is paranoid about growing Western influence in Ukraine, refuses to acknowledge Ukrainian nationality, and seems determined to seize most, if not all, of the country. Ukrainian and European officials also initially opposed Trump’s efforts to push for a cease-fire and have frequently undermined his peace efforts.

I believe these factors could be overcome with time and with the additional pressure that President Trump is putting on Putin by sending additional arms to Ukraine and his threat to impose secondary energy sanctions.

I believe President Trump’s Ukraine policy shift was a deliberate change aligned with his overall national security philosophy. It shows not only that Trump is pragmatic but also that America’s enemies will face consequences if they oppose him.

History shows that great presidents are willing to be pragmatic to reach their ultimate goals, rather than being blinded by policies and ideologies that are failing. If Trump’s pragmatism on the Ukraine War succeeds in ending this conflict, he will be remembered as one of America’s greatest presidents.

Fred Fleitz previously served as National Security Council chief of staff, a CIA analyst, and a House Intelligence Committee staff member. He is the Vice Chair of the America First Policy Institute’s Center for American Security.

amgreatness.com · by Fred Fleitz · July 18, 2025

10. Time for QUAD to step up to Taiwan's defense

​Publicly or quietly? What do we really think India will do?

Excerpts:

The QUAD was never designed for collective military action and lacks both the institutional structure and legally binding mutual defense commitments that define NATO. However, China’s growing assertiveness over Taiwan and its expanding capabilities demand a more coordinated response.

Even as public statements remain measured, the QUAD must avoid strategic drift to remain relevant. Coordinated efforts in contingency planning, intelligence sharing and logistical interoperability need to accelerate. The QUAD’s credibility, and that of the broader rules-based order, depends on readiness and sustained alignment.

China will continue to test the QUAD’s cohesion, but this also presents an opportunity to forge a more adaptable and politically viable model of deterrence, one rooted in regional awareness, interoperability and expanding partnerships, particularly with ASEAN.

Taiwan is no longer a peripheral concern. It has become the crucible in which the QUAD’s purpose and unity will be tested. As pressure mounts in the Taiwan Strait, the time for strategic ambiguity is narrowing. The stability of the Indo-Pacific may well depend on the QUAD’s ability to adapt, align and act with resolve.

Time for QUAD to step up to Taiwan's defense - Asia Times

China’s threat to Taiwan has become the crucible in which the QUAD’s purpose, unity and relevance will be tested

asiatimes.com · by Rishab Rathi · July 18, 2025

Taiwan’s 40th Han Kuang military exercise, its most extensive to date, spans ten days and simulates a full-scale Chinese invasion. The drills incorporate amphibious assaults, joint-force coordination and extensive civilian-military integration across multiple domains.

Taiwan is also showcasing enhanced deterrent capabilities with US-supplied HIMARS rocket systems, F-16V fighter jets and indigenous Sky Sword II and Sky Bow III missile systems.

The activation of 22,000 reservists marks an unprecedented expansion of national defense mobilization, signaling Taiwan’s growing commitment to preparing for conflict rather than merely deterring it.

This shift is a direct response to the People’s Liberation Army’s increasingly aggressive behavior. Gray-zone coercion has become routine. PLA aircraft and naval incursions across the Taiwan Strait’s median line surged from 565 in 2022 to over 3,070 in 2024, an average of more than eight per day.

In January 2025 alone, Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone recorded 248 crossings by China, which represents a 75% increase compared to January 2022.

These provocations are designed to wear down Taiwan’s defenses without crossing the threshold into open conflict, reflecting China’s long-term strategy of psychological pressure, strategic normalization and the gradual erosion of Taiwan’s sovereignty through fatigue.

But Taiwan is no longer waiting passively for external support. It is building an active and layered defense strategy in anticipation of a volatile future. This recalibration has drawn attention from Taiwan’s strategic partners, particularly Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) members.

Originally conceived as a maritime security initiative, the QUAD has evolved into a broader Indo-Pacific framework committed to ensuring a free, open and rules-based regional order. Yet the Taiwan question exposes the bloc’s limitations.

Unlike NATO, the QUAD is not a military alliance. Still, the urgency of Taiwan’s situation has sparked debate over whether the group should develop a more coherent strategy for collective deterrence.

US President Donald Trump recently called for greater clarity from Australia and Japan regarding their roles in a potential Taiwan conflict. The Pentagon is also actively working to align operational plans with allies, particularly Japan and Australia, through behind-the-scenes consultations and strategic dialogues. However, progress remains slow, hindered by political constraints and divergent national priorities.

Japan has strengthened its defense posture, increasing its budget from 6.8 trillion yen in 2023 to 8.7 trillion yen in 2025, or 1.8% of GDP. It has expanded joint drills with the United States and is reassessing its strategic doctrines.

However, constitutional limits and public ambivalence remain obstacles. A survey by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper found that 62% of Japanese citizens consider a regional conflict likely, yet a majority prefer neutrality and global cooperation, with only 18.7% supporting closer alignment with the United States.

Australia has also adopted a cautious approach. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s recent six-day visit to China highlights his government’s dual-track strategy of deepening US defense ties while preserving strong economic relations with China. Amid US calls for clarity on Taiwan, the Australian government stated that “it would not commit troops in advance to any potential conflict.”

The stakes are significant. Australian exports to China reached AUD196 billion last year, exceeding the combined total of Australia’s next four largest markets. Curtin University estimates that Australia’s trade with China contributes an additional AUD2,600 to the average household income each year.

In contrast, recent tariffs imposed by the United States average around 10%, while those under the China–Australia Free Trade Agreement remain at just 1.1%. This disparity has strengthened the perception of China as a more stable and economically reliable partner for Australia.

India, by contrast, continues to maintain deliberate silence on Taiwan, consistent with its longstanding recognition of the One China policy since 1949. Even amid rising cross-Strait tensions, it has avoided statements in forums such as ASEAN, reflecting a strategic calculation to avoid provoking China, especially given their unresolved border disputes in the Himalayas.

At the same time, India has steadily expanded its engagement with Taiwan. Companies like Foxconn and Pegatron are integral to Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat programs, and bilateral trade has increased sixfold since 2001. Talks on a free trade agreement and semiconductor cooperation are also progressing.

A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would severely disrupt global supply chains and pose significant economic risks, which India increasingly recognizes.

While the July 2025 QUAD Foreign Ministers’ meeting expressed “serious concerns” over rising tensions in the East and South China Seas, it refrained from directly condemning China. Strategic and economic divergences within the QUAD underscore its central dilemma.

The QUAD was never designed for collective military action and lacks both the institutional structure and legally binding mutual defense commitments that define NATO. However, China’s growing assertiveness over Taiwan and its expanding capabilities demand a more coordinated response.

Even as public statements remain measured, the QUAD must avoid strategic drift to remain relevant. Coordinated efforts in contingency planning, intelligence sharing and logistical interoperability need to accelerate. The QUAD’s credibility, and that of the broader rules-based order, depends on readiness and sustained alignment.

China will continue to test the QUAD’s cohesion, but this also presents an opportunity to forge a more adaptable and politically viable model of deterrence, one rooted in regional awareness, interoperability and expanding partnerships, particularly with ASEAN.

Taiwan is no longer a peripheral concern. It has become the crucible in which the QUAD’s purpose and unity will be tested. As pressure mounts in the Taiwan Strait, the time for strategic ambiguity is narrowing. The stability of the Indo-Pacific may well depend on the QUAD’s ability to adapt, align and act with resolve.

Rishab Rathi is a research assistant at the Centre of Policy Research and Governance (CPRG), leading the Conflict Studies vertical with a special emphasis on South Asia. With an academic background in international relations and political science, his work explores geopolitical dynamics, post-colonial governance and conflict resolution across diverse global contexts.

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asiatimes.com · by Rishab Rathi · July 18, 2025

11. U.S. Special Operations Drones Get Game-Changing Upgrade to Launch Secretive Attack Drones

​Excerpts:

SOCOM’s decision to refocus its LEA program towards integrating ALEs is part of a broader shift in military priorities. This change reflects the growing importance of preparing for high-end conflicts, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.

Although the LEA drones are still expected to support low-intensity operations, such as counter-terrorism, their enhanced capabilities make them adaptable for more complex and higher-end operational scenarios.

The move to integrate ALEs also aligns with broader efforts within the U.S. military to enhance the survivability and relevance of existing platforms. The integration of air-launched drones into other military assets, such as the MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1C Gray Eagle, has already been explored, and SOCOM’s plans to adapt its LEA drones are part of this larger trend. This focus on standoff capabilities ensures that U.S. forces are prepared for a range of conflict types, from irregular warfare to potential large-scale operations.

These developments also occur amid questions regarding the future of special operations aircraft in general. As SOCOM pivots towards preparing for high-end conflicts, such as those involving China, the role of drones like the LEA will continue to evolve. The modifications being made to the LEA drones reflect a broader trend in military aviation toward versatile, uncrewed platforms that can operate in both permissive and contested environments.

U.S. Special Operations Drones Get Game-Changing Upgrade to Launch Secretive Attack Drones

U.S. Special Operations drones upgraded to launch smaller unmanned systems, enhancing their versatility for surveillance and strikes.

Sarah Talbi

Published on July 19, 2025

argunners.com · July 19, 2025

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The U.S. military’s Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is upgrading its Long Endurance Aircraft (LEA) surveillance drones to include the capability to launch smaller, uncrewed aerial systems (ALEs). This modification will significantly increase the operational flexibility of these ultra-quiet drones, allowing them to conduct a broader range of missions. This new capability is a key component of SOCOM’s broader plans to enhance its drone fleet for future military operations, reports The War Zone .

SOCOM’s budget request for the 2026 fiscal year outlines the shift in priorities for the LEA program. The request reveals that SOCOM will not be seeking additional funding for the LEA UAS Next Generation program. Instead, funds will be redirected towards integrating ALE payloads and upgrading the communication systems of the existing LEA platforms.

Global Air Power in 2025: How the U.S. Dominates the Skies

ALEs: Expanding the LEA’s Operational Reach

The integration of ALEs into the LEA drones will provide a significant force multiplier, enhancing their already impressive surveillance capabilities. SOCOM’s updated budget details that these new air-launched systems will allow the drones to perform a wide variety of tasks.

These tasks include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, electronic warfare, decoy operations, and even kinetic strikes. The introduction of ALEs gives the LEA drones the ability to execute more complex missions and greatly enhances their versatility, allowing them to be used in diverse operational environments.

The term “air-launched effects” (ALE) covers a broad spectrum of unmanned aerial systems that can be deployed for ISR, combat, and support roles. These ALEs can be configured for various functions such as loitering munitions or electronic warfare, further expanding the operational use of the LEA drones beyond their original design. SOCOM has not disclosed the specific types of ALEs the LEAs will be able to launch, but it is clear that these systems will enhance the drones’ ability to respond to rapidly changing tactical situations.

Super Quiet Special Operations Drones Being Modified To Launch Smaller Drones

US special operations Long Endurance Aircraft (LEA) surveillance drones, which are based on a popular civilian powered glider design, are set to gain the ability to launch smaller uncrewed aerial… pic.twitter.com/1UDvlSBfXu

— Mike Alderson FRSA (@OpenEyeComms) July 13, 2025

The LEA Drones: Versatile and Discreet Platforms

The LEA drones, designated as RQ-29s, are currently in use by U.S. special operations forces. Derived from the Pipistrel Sinus powered glider, these drones are known for their ultra-quiet design and low-cost operations.

SOCOM’s 2026 budget request highlights that the LEAs are particularly suited for low-intensity operations, such as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, where they provide long-duration surveillance without attracting attention. These drones are ideal for gathering intelligence in permissive environments and can help establish “patterns of life” for individuals or small groups of interest.

With the integration of ALEs, the LEAs are poised to transition from purely ISR platforms to multi-role assets capable of kinetic strikes. This added capability would enable the drones to conduct precision strikes while maintaining their discreet operational profile. If equipped with ALEs configured for offensive tasks, the LEAs could be used to directly engage targets without the need to sacrifice their stealth or surveillance roles.

A Shift in Strategic Priorities for SOCOM

SOCOM’s decision to refocus its LEA program towards integrating ALEs is part of a broader shift in military priorities. This change reflects the growing importance of preparing for high-end conflicts, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.

Although the LEA drones are still expected to support low-intensity operations, such as counter-terrorism, their enhanced capabilities make them adaptable for more complex and higher-end operational scenarios.

The move to integrate ALEs also aligns with broader efforts within the U.S. military to enhance the survivability and relevance of existing platforms. The integration of air-launched drones into other military assets, such as the MQ-9 Reaper and MQ-1C Gray Eagle, has already been explored, and SOCOM’s plans to adapt its LEA drones are part of this larger trend. This focus on standoff capabilities ensures that U.S. forces are prepared for a range of conflict types, from irregular warfare to potential large-scale operations.

These developments also occur amid questions regarding the future of special operations aircraft in general. As SOCOM pivots towards preparing for high-end conflicts, such as those involving China, the role of drones like the LEA will continue to evolve. The modifications being made to the LEA drones reflect a broader trend in military aviation toward versatile, uncrewed platforms that can operate in both permissive and contested environments.

argunners.com · July 19, 2025

12. Non-State Special Operations, with Craig Whiteside

I will try to tune into this this afternoon.

​I would look forward to reading this book but the cost is an academic special.

But since I served with Ian Rice I will have to buy this book. We can access the Kindle version on 25 July.

Kindle

$56.99

Hardcover

$180.50

Non-State Special Operations, with Craig Whiteside - on Midrats

one threat that will always be with us

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/non-state-special-operations-with?utm

CDR Salamander

Jul 20, 2025

On today’s Midrats, we have returning guest Craig Whiteside joining us to discuss one of the nightmares we all have in the new book coming out this month. He co-authored it with Ian Rice, Non-state Special Operations: Capabilities and Effects.

From the abstract:

Building on previous research on Islamic State special operations, the book develops a theoretical framework surrounding a typology of VNSA (militants, proxies, criminal/cults, and mercenaries) to explore variations of non-state special operations, with multiple cases for each category of actor. Understanding when and why VNSA use special operations provides insights into the inner workings of such groups and how they campaign, and also has implications for the proliferation of special operation forces around the globe and its influence on non-state behaviour. This volume contributes to research on the recent trend of non-state actors surprising, and in some cases humiliating, their state opponents.

We go LIVE this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern. You can listen at this link.

If you are reading this after the show or via the email distro, check back on the Substack page later Sunday night where we will have the podcast audio available.

Craig is Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College resident program at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is the co-author of The ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement (2020). He has a PhD in Political Science from Washington State University and is a former U.S. Army infantry officer.

His coauthor Ian C. Rice is an adjunct Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, adjunct faculty member with the College of Distance Education, USMC University, and a guest lecturer with the Royal Danish Defence College. He is a retired U.S. Army officer who served with special operations forces.

13. Defense of the Homeland: A National Strategy for Combating Irregular Warfare

​A thoughtful piece.  We have seen a lot of proposals for a national level IW organization: from an OSS 2.0 or a UW or IW Command or a counterpart to NCTC.

My recommendations for a national IW strategy are here: 

A Modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare: Guidance from President Reagan’s NSDD 32

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/26/a-modern-national-security-decision-directive/

Defense of the Homeland: A National Strategy for Combating Irregular Warfare

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/defense-homeland-national-strategy-combating-warfare-sal-artiaga-3veac/?trackingId=20LgzKQASimPHexXoKpYKw%3D%3D

Sal Artiaga 

Irregular Warfare & National Security Strategist | Intelligence & Latin America Professional | Opinions = my own. Sharing ≠ endorsement.

July 19, 2025

Introduction

The modern battlespace extends beyond traditional geographical boundaries, as it now encompasses various forms of warfare that do not rely on military troop movements. The United States faces its most critical and immediate strategic threat through an invisible attack: an ongoing Irregular Warfare (IW) effort that targets national foundations rather than territorial control. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation have developed expertise in using non-military tactics to exploit American societal advantages and convert them into strategic weaknesses. The United States needs to overcome bureaucratic delays to build a unified national strategy that focuses on genuine "unity of effort," because defending the homeland requires a resilient society.

The Adversaries' Two-Front Assault

The Russian irregular warfare strategy against the U.S. homeland involves ongoing disruption efforts. Moscow's primary objective isn't the traditional military defeat of the United States, but rather to create internal divisions, political stagnation, and domestic strife. Russia aims to deepen existing social rifts to weaken the social bonds and institutional trust that support American power. The primary tool Russia uses to accomplish this is information, which it uses to pollute mental spaces. Russia employs state-sponsored trolls, advanced bot networks, and proxy media outlets to spread false narratives about racial tension, political polarization, and cultural grievances. This isn’t just "fake news"; it’s a deliberate effort to erode Americans' confidence in their elections, justice system, and even their neighbors, thereby reducing the national will and ability for collective action worldwide.

Meanwhile, China pursues a more patient and systematic form of irregular warfare, focusing on systemic erosion and co-option. Beijing’s long-term goal is to supplant the United States as the world’s leading power by eroding its economic and technological foundations without resorting to direct military conflict. This approach appears in several ways. Economically, China involves itself in widespread theft of intellectual property, draining America’s innovative edge. Strategically, it aims to control vital supply chains, from pharmaceuticals to rare earth minerals, creating dependencies that can be exploited during a crisis.

China uses its most deceitful information warfare tactic through its role in the fentanyl crisis. The PRC allows Mexican cartels to produce deadly fentanyl by subsidizing precursor chemical exports without proper regulatory oversight. The PRC has devised a strategy of synthetic societal destabilization that goes beyond simple law enforcement incompetence. The fentanyl crisis drains U.S. resources, destroys social structures, causes the healthcare and law enforcement systems to collapse, and creates border security disputes at no cost to Beijing. This irregular warfare strategy employs strategic planning to cause mass casualties and social breakdown through non-combat means.

A Flawed Defense: The Illusion of Unity of Purpose

The complex threats require a cultural shift in strategy, along with a new bureaucratic structure, which currently hampers the United States' response. The U.S. government (USG) often adopts an operational model emphasizing shared goals without recognizing the importance of collaborative work methods. Washington sets a common objective regarding fentanyl control after a threat emerges. The DEA, along with other federal agencies, acts as the designated lead to manage the effort. This approach is flawed because it treats a threat as separate when, in reality, it exists as an interconnected system.

The DEA alone cannot tackle the fentanyl crisis because it goes beyond their narcotics mandate. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for border security, while the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) oversees public health emergencies. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department oversees financial crime, the CIA conducts intelligence work, and the State Department handles diplomatic issues. The USG unintentionally creates divisions by designating a "lead' agency, causing others to focus on support rather than leadership. This operational separation leads to conflicting bureaucratic priorities, resulting in responses that address symptoms instead of the root cause of the threat. The idea of unity of purpose means everyone shares the same goal, but unity of effort requires all parties to move together in the same direction and follow the same path in their shared effort. The USG excels at setting common objectives but lacks the capabilities to promote unified action among its agencies, allowing adversaries like China and Russia to exploit gaps between departments.

Forging a National Strategy for Victory

A new strategy for defending against IW threats requires the United States to transition from a lead-agency framework to a unified whole-of-nation defense approach. The new approach should be based on two fundamental elements: building a central framework for unified effort coordination and developing national resilience as our primary protective mechanism.

A permanent national center for countering irregular warfare needs to be established by the U.S. with authority comparable to that of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). This organization would have the power to lead unified, multi-agency operations targeting specific IW threats while eliminating current coordination obstacles. It would bring together intelligence resources with law enforcement, financial, and diplomatic tools to remove existing barriers to effective action. The proposed center would execute a unified operation against fentanyl supply networks by implementing simultaneous measures, including sanctions on Chinese chemical brokers, cyberattacks on cartel logistics, and intelligence sharing with Mexico and domestic public health funding.

The primary defense against IW relies on a resilient citizenry equipped with comprehensive information. The success of Russia's disinformation campaigns depends on the willingness of the public to accept their false narratives. Chinese influence operations succeed when institutions within the United States remain vulnerable to manipulation. Combating IW requires a national strategy to strengthen America's domestic security foundation. National defense involves training all citizens in media literacy and civic education to build immunity against manipulation and misinformation. The strategic use of transparency is essential to identify and expose all adversary actions, stripping them of their ability to deny involvement. The country must also address fundamental domestic issues that underpin societal divisions, which our adversaries exploit to their advantage.

Conclusion

The siege on the American homeland is real, persistent, and strategically consequential. The disruptive IW of Russia and the erosive IW of China pose a fundamental threat to U.S. national security. Yet, our current approach, hamstrung by a bureaucratic preference for the illusion of unity over the hard work of integration, is failing. Victory in this 21st-century conflict will not be won with new weapons systems or tactical formations. It will be secured through a strategic realignment that forges true unity of effort across our government and, most importantly, recognizes that the strength, cohesion, and trust of American society are the most vital strategic assets we possess.

14. As Trump Courts a More Assertive Beijing, China Hawks Are Losing Out

​Excerpts:

Recent events have underscored the influence that China has over the U.S. economy. When Mr. Trump raised tariffs on Chinese exports in April, some top Trump officials thought Beijing would quickly fold, given its recent economic weakness. Instead, Beijing called Mr. Trump’s bluff by restricting rare earths needed by American makers of cars, military equipment, medical devices and electronics.

As the flow of those materials stopped, Mr. Trump and other officials began receiving calls from chief executives saying their factories would soon shut down. Ford, Suzuki and other companies shuttered factories because of the lack of supply.

Mr. Trump and his top advisers were surprised by the threat that Beijing’s countermove posed, people familiar with the matter say. That brought the United States back to the negotiating table this spring to strike a fragile trade truce, which Trump officials are now wary of upsetting. That agreement dropped tariffs from a minimum 145 percent to 30 percent, with the Chinese agreeing to allow rare earths to flow as freely as before.

The administration’s caution when it comes to China has been amplified by Mr. Trump’s desire for an invitation to Beijing later this year. The president, who has been feted on other foreign trips, wants to engage in face-to-face trade negotiations with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Howard Lutnick, the commerce secretary, has begun recruiting chief executives for a potential delegation, setting off a competition over who will get to ride in Air Force One, according to people familiar with the plans.

Craig Allen, a retired diplomat, said both countries were “clearly preparing for a summit meeting,” adding, “that’s bringing forth measures that the other side wants and it’s also holding back measures that the other side doesn’t want.”

“It’s like a dance,” Mr. Allen said. “One side makes a move, the other side makes a move to correspond to that.”

As Trump Courts a More Assertive Beijing, China Hawks Are Losing Out

The Trump administration has dialed back aggressive measures against China and reversed its position on technology controls as the president angles for a Chinese trip later this year.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/20/us/politics/trump-china-technology.html

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Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, left, and Jamieson Greer, the U.S. trade representative, second from right, meeting with Chinese officials in Geneva in May.Credit...Martial Trezzini/Keystone, via Reuters

By Ana Swanson and Tripp Mickle

Ana Swanson reported from Washington and Tripp Mickle from San Francisco

July 20, 2025, 5:00 a.m. ET

In recent years, one of China’s biggest requests of American officials has been that the United States relax its strict controls on advanced artificial intelligence chips, measures that were put in place to slow Beijing’s technological and military gains.

Last week, the Trump administration did just that, as it allowed the world’s leader in A.I. chips, the U.S.-based Nvidia, to begin selling a lower-level but still coveted chip known as H20 to China.

The move was a dramatic reversal from three months ago, when President Trump himself banned China from accessing the H20, while also imposing triple-digit tariffs on Beijing. That set off an economically perilous trade clash, as China retaliated by clamping down on exports of minerals and magnets that are critical to American factories, including automakers and defense manufacturers.

China’s decision to cut off access to those materials upended the dynamic between the world’s largest economies. The Trump administration, which came into office determined to bully China into changing its trade behavior with punishing tariffs, appeared to realize the perils of that approach. Now, the administration has resorted to trying to woo China instead.

Officials throughout the government say the Trump administration is putting more aggressive actions on China on hold, while pushing forward with moves that the Chinese will perceive positively. That includes the reversal on the H20 chip.

The H20 decision was primarily motivated by top Trump officials who agreed with Nvidia’s arguments that selling the chip would be better for American technology leadership than withholding it, people familiar with the move say.

But Trump officials have also claimed that it was part of the trade talks. After telling Congress in June that there was “no quid pro quo in terms of chips for rare earths,” Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, reversed those comments on July 15, saying that the H20 move was “all part of a mosaic” of talks with China. “They had things we wanted, we had things they wanted, and we’re in a very good place,” he said.

Image

A chip from Nvidia. The company’s chief executive, Jensen Huang, has gone on a lobbying blitz in Washington, pushing politicians to open China for A.I. chip sales.Credit...Mike Kai Chen for The New York Times

A Chinese Ministry of Commerce official seemed to reject that on Friday, saying that the United States had “taken the initiative” to approve the H20 sales. China believes the U.S. should continue to remove its trade and economic restrictions, the official said.

A person familiar with the talks, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly, said that the H20 chip was not specifically discussed in meetings between Chinese and American officials in Geneva and London this spring. But the reversal was part of a more recent cadence of warmer actions the United States and China have taken toward each other. For instance, Beijing agreed in recent weeks to block the export of several chemicals used to make fentanyl, an issue Mr. Trump has been concerned about.

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Recent events have underscored the influence that China has over the U.S. economy. When Mr. Trump raised tariffs on Chinese exports in April, some top Trump officials thought Beijing would quickly fold, given its recent economic weakness. Instead, Beijing called Mr. Trump’s bluff by restricting rare earths needed by American makers of cars, military equipment, medical devices and electronics.

As the flow of those materials stopped, Mr. Trump and other officials began receiving calls from chief executives saying their factories would soon shut down. Ford, Suzuki and other companies shuttered factories because of the lack of supply.

Mr. Trump and his top advisers were surprised by the threat that Beijing’s countermove posed, people familiar with the matter say. That brought the United States back to the negotiating table this spring to strike a fragile trade truce, which Trump officials are now wary of upsetting. That agreement dropped tariffs from a minimum 145 percent to 30 percent, with the Chinese agreeing to allow rare earths to flow as freely as before.

The administration’s caution when it comes to China has been amplified by Mr. Trump’s desire for an invitation to Beijing later this year. The president, who has been feted on other foreign trips, wants to engage in face-to-face trade negotiations with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Howard Lutnick, the commerce secretary, has begun recruiting chief executives for a potential delegation, setting off a competition over who will get to ride in Air Force One, according to people familiar with the plans.

​

Craig Allen, a retired diplomat, said both countries were “clearly preparing for a summit meeting,” adding, “that’s bringing forth measures that the other side wants and it’s also holding back measures that the other side doesn’t want.”

“It’s like a dance,” Mr. Allen said. “One side makes a move, the other side makes a move to correspond to that.”

The Commerce Department declined to comment. The White House, the Treasury Department and the Office of the United States Trade Representative did not respond to a request for comment.

“The government understands that forcing the world to use foreign competition would only hurt America’s economic and national security,” John Rizzo, a spokesman for Nvidia, said.

A Chinese bargaining chip

Opposition to China has fueled bipartisan action for the last decade. Now, Mr. Trump’s more hawkish supporters are quietly watching as the president remakes the party’s China strategy.

Though few are willing to speak out publicly, officials in the Trump administration and in Congress have privately expressed concern that the trade war has given China an opening to finally bring U.S. technology controls onto the negotiating table.

Christopher Padilla, a former export control official in the George W. Bush administration, said the fact that the United States was now negotiating over what were supposed to be security restrictions was “a significant accomplishment for the Chinese.”

Ana Swanson

Times reporter covering the Trump tariffs

“I have been reporting on economics, trade and international relations for over a decade, from both China and the U.S. I aim to underpin my work with data and numbers, as well as give voice to the personal stories of people I encounter in my reporting.”

Here’s our latest reporting on economic policy and tariffs.

“They’ve been after this for decades, and now they’ve succeeded,” he said. “I assume the Chinese are going to demand more concessions on export controls in return for whatever we want next.”

Mr. Trump was the first to harness the power of U.S. export controls, by targeting Chinese tech giant Huawei and putting global restrictions on American technology in his first term. But the Biden administration expanded those rules. Concerned that China’s growing A.I. capacity would advance its military, Biden officials cracked down on exports of Nvidia chips, seeing them as the most effective choke point over Chinese A.I. capabilities.

Image

President Trump and Mr. Huang at the White House in April. Mr. Huang argues that blocking U.S. technology from China has created more urgency for China to develop its own technology.Credit...Pete Marovich for The New York Times

Since then, when Chinese officials raised their objections to U.S. technology controls in meetings, U.S. officials had responded by insisting that the measures were national security matters and not up for debate.

But in the meeting in Geneva in May, China finally had a powerful counterargument. Beijing insisted that its minerals and magnets, some of which go to fighter jets, drones and weaponry, were a “dual-use” technology that could be used for the military as well as civilian industries, just like A.I. and chips. It demanded reciprocity: If the United States wanted a steady flow of rare earths, Washington should also be ready to lessen its technology controls.

It’s not clear exactly what the United States agreed to in Geneva: The agreement has never been made public. But when the United States put out an unrelated export control announcement the day after the Geneva summit concluded, China responded angrily, saying the statement “undermined the consensus” the countries had reached.

In a notice on May 13, the Commerce Department said that using Huawei’s A.I. chips “anywhere in the world” was an export control violation. The notice was directed at other nations considering purchasing Huawei chips, people familiar with the move said, not the Chinese. The announcement appeared to take other parts of the Trump administration by surprise, and within hours, the language in the release was walked back, though no policy changes were made.

Mr. Bessent and Jamieson Greer, the trade representative, expressed concerns that such moves could damage trade talks with China, people familiar with the incident said.

China once again clamped down on rare earth exports. Trying to find its own leverage, the United States responded by restricting exports of semiconductor design software, airplane parts and ethane.

The two sides restored their truce in a meeting in London in June. Since then, trade in those products has restarted. But U.S. companies complain that Chinese licenses for rare earth magnets are limited to six months, and that the Chinese government is requesting proprietary information to obtain those shipments.

Beijing has also continued to build out its export controls. On June 15, the day after Nvidia said it would be permitted to sell the H20 in China, Chinese officials announced new restrictions on exports of battery technology.

The United States has been trying to decrease its dependence on China for rare earths, but there is no quick solution. China has a powerful hold over numerous industries, ranging from pharmaceuticals to solar panels to drones.

“The challenge for the Trump administration is, how do they get out of this quagmire?” said Jimmy Goodrich, a senior adviser for technology analysis to the RAND Corporation. “It appears some competitive U.S. actions are now at the whims of Beijing, who can now determine the time, place and nature of U.S. tech and trade policy toward China.”

Deal makers in the White House

The change in the relationship with China has coincided with a separate shift in the administration, in which officials who favor technology controls on China have been sidelined in favor of those who support the tech industry’s ambitions to sell abroad.

Mr. Lutnick and Marco Rubio, the secretary of state who has long been an ardent China critic, have hewed closely to the position of the president, who is more of a deal maker than a national security hawk. And hawkish members of the National Security Council have been fired in recent months, after being accused of insufficient loyalty.

Their absence has paved the way for officials like David Sacks, the White House A.I. czar, who has criticized export controls, to push for tech companies to have freer rein. Nvidia’s chief executive, Jensen Huang, has gone on a lobbying blitz in Washington, pushing politicians to open China for A.I. chip sales.

Mr. Huang has contended that blocking U.S. technology from China has backfired by creating more urgency for China to develop its own technology. He has argued that the Chinese military won’t use Nvidia chips, and pushed back against Washington’s consensus that China is an adversary, describing it a “competitor” but “not our enemy.”

Image

The change in the U.S. relationship with China has coincided with a separate shift in the Trump administration, in which officials who favor technology controls on China have been sidelined.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times

Others have challenged those assertions, pointing to past research that the Chinese military has placed orders for Nvidia chips. Scientific papers published earlier this year also showed Chinese researchers with ties to military universities and a top nuclear weapons lab using Nvidia chips for general research.

Mr. Rizzo, the Nvidia spokesman, said in a statement that “non-military papers describing new and beneficial ways to use U.S. technology promote America.”

In a letter on Friday, John Moolenaar, the Republican chairman of the House Select Committee on China, said the H20 chip had aided the rise of the Chinese A.I. model DeepSeek and would help China develop A.I. models to compete with American ones.

These arguments do not appear to have persuaded the president. In an Oval Office meeting with Mr. Huang in July, Mr. Trump agreed with Nvidia that keeping American chips out of China would only help Huawei, and decided to reverse the H20 ban.

People familiar with Mr. Trump’s views say he has always viewed export controls more transactionally. In his first term, Mr. Trump agreed to roll back U.S. restrictions on ZTE at the urging of Mr. Xi. In this term, Mr. Trump and his advisers have begun using America’s control over A.I. chips as a source of leverage in negotiations with governments from the Middle East to Asia.

With China, Mr. Trump has his own longstanding aspirations. He believes that U.S. businesses have been getting ripped off for decades, and that he can be the one to fix it, particularly if he negotiates directly with Mr. Xi. His advisers have begun strategizing toward a more substantial trade negotiation with China focused on market opening, as well as the potential visit this fall.

Ana Swanson covers trade and international economics for The Times and is based in Washington. She has been a journalist for more than a decade.

Tripp Mickle reports on Apple and Silicon Valley for The Times and is based in San Francisco. His focus on Apple includes product launches, manufacturing issues and political challenges. He also writes about trends across the tech industry, including layoffs, generative A.I. and robot taxis.

15. Two Days Inside the Movement to ‘Reindustrialize,’ and Rearm, America

Two Days Inside the Movement to ‘Reindustrialize,’ and Rearm, America

Trump cabinet officials mingled with tech investors and manufacturers in an effort to supercharge factories.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/20/us/manufacturing-tech-trump-reindustrialize.html

By Farah StockmanVisuals by Nic Antaya

Farah Stockman, who covers manufacturing, reported from Detroit.

• July 20, 2025

Investors from Silicon Valley and senior officials in the Trump administration descended on a convention hall in downtown Detroit last week for a conference committed to spurring a “techno-industrial renaissance” in the United States.

In some ways, it looked like a normal convention. The makers of everything from carbon brushes to boat propellers milled around a large hall, looking at a flying boat, a customizable electric truck, an air taxi and a humanoid robot. But at times, it turned into an urgent and literal call to arms as discussions moved from manufacturing to national security.

“You will help us forge a future where we can build and sustain an industrial base that can deliver the critical weapons we need, fast and at scale,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told the participants in a video message. “Time is short.”

The two-day summit, Reindustrialize 2025, was put on by an ad hoc group that met through Atomic Industries, a manufacturing firm in Warren, Mich. The convention’s founders include Atomic’s chief executive, Aaron Slodov, who last year penned “A Techno-Industrialist Manifesto,” which called on investors and the tech community to focus on manufacturing physical goods.

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From left, the Reindustrialize founders Gregory Bernstein, Austin Bishop, Falon Donohue and Aaron Slodov outside an electric aircraft from Joby Aviation.

About 1,200 people attended the conference, about twice the number who attended the first gathering last year, said Falon Donohue, an Atomic board member who is also a founder of the conference. Thousands were on the waiting list, she said. More than 16,000 watched the speeches, round tables and fireside chats online.

Titans of industry have been pledging to reindustrialize the United States for decades, but the idea is particularly potent at this moment, when more Americans recognize the nation’s dependence on other countries for everything from electronics to batteries to medicines.

The goal of reviving American manufacturing has been a rare point of agreement between President Trump and former President Joseph R. Biden Jr., although they differed strongly on the strategy to bring it about. Mr. Biden successfully pushed for laws that gave subsidies and tax credits to companies that were building factories to make semiconductors, batteries and electric vehicles in the United States, whereas Mr. Trump has threatened to impose large tariffs on foreign nations to boost domestic production.

The conference attracted a large cohort of like-minded tech enthusiasts who spoke of boosting American manufacturing as a solemn patriotic duty, even if they had British or Australian accents. It also managed to make factories glamorous to a jet-setting crowd that to many might seem more at home in Davos than in Detroit.

“It has become high status to invest in manufacturing,” Christian Garrett, a partner on the investment team at 137 Ventures, noted at a fried-chicken-filled after-party downtown. Mr. Garrett said the factories that deals coming out of the conference would build would also create high-tech, “high status” jobs for blue-collar workers.

Speaker after speaker emphasized that military power flows from industrial power, which they said had been eroded by the offshoring of factories and an overemphasis on software, apps and financial products.

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A mock-up of the Seaglider, a high-speed electric vessel developed by Regent.

Image

A flight deck simulator for Boom Supersonic’s Overture, a supersonic airliner in development.

From the welcome by Chris Power, chief executive of Hadrian, a defense manufacturing start-up, to remarks by senior administration officials, the speeches drove home a single theme: Maintaining the country’s superpower status requires regaining the ability to produce physical goods at scale.

Nearly every session waxed nostalgic for World War II, when Detroit’s car plants were quickly converted into munitions factories that helped achieve victory. But today, Americans have fallen behind China in the mass-production of things that would matter in a war, senior administration officials warned.

“In a world where Russia has raw materials, and China dominates manufacturing, an economy centered around McKinsey and DoorDash will not cut it,” Mike Needham, counselor and chief of staff to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, told the crowd from the main stage. “We turn to China, the rival that too often no one wants to name, even as they surpass us in industry after industry: shipbuilding, steel, electric vehicles, critical metals.”

Mr. Needham urged his audience of venture capitalists, angel investors and inventors to rekindle “that swashbuckling American spirit that does what must be done and will not take no for an answer” in the race to secure the resources to rebuild the country’s industrial base.

Other Trump administration officials who attended included Kelly Loeffler, administrator of the Small Business Administration; Jamieson Greer, the U.S. trade representative; John Phelan, the Navy secretary; and unnamed representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, who held a private round table with industry people.

In his speech, Mr. Phelan spoke bluntly about the dire state of affairs and proposed combining commercial and military shipbuilding abilities to address the shortfall of shipbuilders.

“Our shipbuilding industry has eroded, hollowing out the very capacity we need to maintain credible naval deterrence,” he said.

Video

Palmer Luckey, founder of Anduril, speaking at the conference through a robot.CreditCredit...

Conference participants from Silicon Valley included Shyam Sankar, the chief technology officer of Palantir, the data analysis and technology firm, who said the United States was “actually the underdog” when competing with China.

Palmer Luckey, the founder of Anduril, a defense contractor, spoke to the crowd remotely through a stiff, humanoid robot dressed in a Hawaiian shirt and mullet wig.

The idea for a Reindustrialize conference sprang from a factory tour of Atomic in March 2024, said Ms. Donohue, the board member. In addition to the tour, Atomic held a discussion with policymakers and investors about how to revitalize manufacturing with tech and new government policies. Ms. Donohue is also a partner at Narya, an investment firm that Vice President JD Vance co-founded in 2019.

“We walked out so energized,” she said. “We said, ‘Let’s keep this going,’ and it just grew organically from there.”

Image

A customizable electric truck called the Slate Truck.

Image

An unmanned flying wing developed by Re:Build Manufacturing.

Another founder of the conference, Gregory Bernstein, who was a board observer at Atomic in 2024, said some embraced the idea of reindustrialization because of national security, while others saw it as a way to address economic inequality or the climate crisis.

Mr. Bernstein, the chief executive of the New Industrial Corporation, an investment company, said he found the idea of an economy based on building things more compelling than one based on intangible products.

“You can’t really offer your citizens much,” he said, “if all you’re asking them to do is sit around, trade crypto, watch Netflix and order Uber Eats.”

Despite the large presence of Trump administration officials, the conference founders said the event was staunchly nonpartisan. Mr. Biden’s former national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, and one of Mr. Biden’s former deputy national security advisers, Daleep Singh, spoke onstage.

But not everyone was impressed with the conference. A group called Engineers Against Apartheid protested with megaphones against Palantir, whose software has been used by Israel to pick targets in Gaza.

And Robert Rose, chief executive of Reliable Robotics, who stumbled across a mention of the conference on LinkedIn, said it did not reflect his own experience.

Having worked at companies building real hardware in America, “I scratch my head whenever I hear ‘re’industrialize or ‘re’shoring,” he wrote on LinkedIn. “Hello! We’re right here guys! We never left!”

16. Trump Aides Discussed Ending Some SpaceX Contracts, but Found Most Were Vital

I think we can say in some ways Mr. Musk's companies have been made indispensable to some aspects of US national security. A shrewd business move.

Trump Aides Discussed Ending Some SpaceX Contracts, but Found Most Were Vital

Fallout between the president and the rocket maker’s billionaire founder threatened the company’s multibillion-dollar agreements with the government

https://www.wsj.com/business/trump-aides-discussed-ending-some-spacex-contracts-but-found-most-were-vital-d1cf9ab5

By Brian Schwartz

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, Shalini Ramachandran

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 and Micah Maidenberg

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July 19, 2025 9:00 pm ET

Elon Musk joined President Trump in the Oval Office in May as his role at the Department of Government Efficiency drew to a close. Photo: allison robbert/AFP/Getty Images

Key Points

What's This?

• The Trump administration reviewed SpaceX’s government contracts after a feud between Trump and Musk.
• Officials determined that most SpaceX contracts were critical to Defense Department and NASA missions.
• SpaceX’s technology and pricing have expanded its government work, despite frustration from industry rivals.

For the U.S. government, breaking up with Elon Musk is easier said than done.

Just days after President Trump in early June raised the prospect of cutting ties with Musk’s businesses, the Trump administration initiated a review of SpaceX’s contracts with the federal government, according to people familiar with the matter. The review was intended to identify potential waste in the multibillion-dollar agreements the company has with the government, the people said. 

But administration officials determined that they couldn’t eliminate most of those contracts because they are critical to the Defense Department and NASA, the people said. The early assessment underscored the company’s dominance as the world’s pre-eminent rocket launcher and a major satellite-internet provider.

A White House official said the review of government contracts focused on a range of companies with lucrative government contracts. 

Musk and SpaceX didn’t respond to requests for comment. 

The U.S. government relies on SpaceX to support NASA and other agencies, and the company has received more than $20 billion in federal contracts for it. As Musk and Trump threaten to cut ties, here’s what that would mean for U.S. space ambitions. Photo Illustration: Reuters/Getty Images

Space X’s ‘scorecard’

Musk was once one of Trump’s closest advisers, overseeing the cost-cutting effort known as the Department of Government Efficiency. But the relationship between the two men ruptured after the billionaire publicly criticized Trump’s signature tax-and-spending bill. 

On June 5, as Musk’s social-media attacks turned personal, Trump posted on Truth Social that the easiest way to save federal dollars was to “terminate” the government contracts for Musk’s companies. 

Days later, a senior General Services Administration official asked the Defense Department to fill out a spreadsheet with all of its current SpaceX contracts and other transaction agreements, according to an email described to The Wall Street Journal. The June 9 email was sent by Josh Gruenbaum, the GSA’s commissioner for the Federal Acquisition Service. In the email, Gruenbaum said he planned to share the data with the White House. 

Gruenbaum also made similar requests for information about SpaceX contracts to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and nearly half a dozen other federal agencies, according to an administration official. The spreadsheets, which are known as “scorecards,” included the value of the SpaceX contracts and whether a competitor could do the same job more effectively, this official said. 

Instead of terminating SpaceX contracts after reviewing the data, White House and agency officials, including those at the Pentagon, determined that most of the deals were vital to the missions of the Defense Department and NASA, according to some of the people familiar with the matter. One of the people said some SpaceX contracts could face continued scrutiny.

SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell met with White House officials in recent weeks as the review was ongoing, people familiar with the matter said.

SpaceX CEO Elon Musk gave Donald Trump, then the president-elect, a tour of the company’s Starbase facility in Texas before a launch last November. Photo: Brandon Bell/Getty Images

Musk’s dominance in space

In struggling to find ways to reduce the government’s dependence on SpaceX, the Trump administration highlighted how much agencies rely on the company’s sophisticated technology. At least for now, the government has limited alternatives for many rocket launches and low-Earth-orbit satellite services, a situation that continues to give SpaceX—and Musk himself—an outsize role in space.

The government has been aware of this dynamic for years, and the Trump administration’s review is the latest sign that policymakers are wrestling with the situation. SpaceX’s dominance has also sparked frustration among industry rivals.

Government officials have expanded agencies’ work with SpaceX because of the company’s technology and prices. They have also pushed other space companies to step up and designed some contracts to stoke competition. Many rivals still have hurdles to overcome as they develop their own space vehicles and satellites, and race to get them into service.

Several companies have faced delays and technical challenges as they worked on products that would compete with SpaceX. Setbacks are common as engineers try to mature complex hardware designed for space, and Musk’s company has faced its own problems of late with a new vehicle.  

SpaceX executives have said the company believes strongly in competition, and its rockets often launch rivals’ satellites to space. At an investor event in November, Shotwell said that the company has earned its contracts with the government by offering the best prices and executing.

A SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket at the Kennedy Space Center in April. Photo: cristobal herrera-ulashkevich/Shutterstock

This year, the company has won more government contracts and continued working on major missions following the spat between the president and Musk. 

In April, SpaceX was awarded the most money and launches under a closely watched Pentagon contract, winning 28 national-security flights in a new deal valued at $5.9 billion. It launched an upgraded GPS satellite for the Space Force in May. NASA is planning to have SpaceX fly a new crew to the International Space Station at the end of this month.

The company’s Falcon rockets, which rely on reusable boosters, have emerged as workhorses for government space missions. SpaceX’s Crew Dragon spacecraft is the only U.S. vehicle certified to fly people to and from the space station.

Musk’s threat—later walked back—to decommission Crew Dragon during his feud with Trump last month sparked worry inside NASA, the Journal previously reported. The agency has long wanted to have two different options for astronaut space-station missions.

SpaceX also has a growing business providing high-speed internet to government agencies through its Starlink satellite fleet. A SpaceX division called Starshield provides several national-security satellite capabilities, and secured a major classified deal a few years ago from the intelligence agency that operates U.S. spy satellites.

Write to Brian Schwartz at brian.schwartz@wsj.com, Shalini Ramachandran at Shalini.Ramachandran@wsj.com and Micah Maidenberg at micah.maidenberg@wsj.com

17.  Ukraine Keeps Sinking Russian Ships In The Black Sea Without A Conventional Navy — Here's How

​Lessons for us to learn?

Ukraine Keeps Sinking Russian Ships In The Black Sea Without A Conventional Navy — Here's How - SlashGear

slashgear.com · by Alec Hively · July 20, 2025

• Military
• Naval

Ukraine Keeps Sinking Russian Ships In The Black Sea Without A Conventional Navy — Here's How

By July 19, 2025 9:15 pm EST

Roden Wilmar/Shutterstock

When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, many thought the battle for the Black Sea was a foregone conclusion. Ukraine's minuscule navy was merely a remnant of its split with Moscow, when Ukraine ended up with just 18% of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet assets. Twenty-five years of ineptitude, corruption, and neglect left Ukraine with a collection of degraded Soviet warships and one flagship, the frigate Hetman Sahaydachniy. Russia's annexation of Crimea eight years earlier only worsened the problem, causing the Ukrainian Navy to lose its largest port, nearly three-quarters of its ships and sailors, and a majority of its ship repair capabilities.

Within the war's first weeks, Ukraine had lost its strategic outpost on Snake Island, closed its port in Odesa, scuttled its only flagship to prevent its seizure, and lost most of its remaining ships. Many believed that it was only a matter of time before it ceded control of the Black Sea, a geopolitical disaster that would allow Russia to blockade Crimea's Kerch Strait, cutting off Ukraine's only natural sea route for critical grain exports.

A little over a month later, however, Ukrainian forces flipped the script, sinking the flagship of Russia's Black Fleet. In the years to follow, Ukraine's Navy has used unmanned sea drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and sea mines to not only push the Russian fleet out of its territorial waters but also damage a reported 29 vessels and attack several Russian ports. In 2024, Ukraine sank several high-profile Russian warships, including several of the fleet's newest missile corvettes. Now, three years into the conflict, Ukraine's tactics offer a unique look into the changing landscape of naval warfare, providing several key lessons for those looking to understand how changing technologies may shift naval strategies.

A new type of naval war

Naval News/YouTube

The flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the guided missile cruiser christened Moskva, was a powerful force in the Kremlin's initial push into the Black Sea. Notorious for its capture of Snake Island, the Moskva was Russia's third-largest warship, equipped with 16 long-range cruise missiles, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, deck guns, mortars, and torpedoes. But on April 13, 2022, Ukraine launched two Neptune anti-ship missiles at the 12,490-ton cruiser, striking its ammunition and causing a fire that killed at least 18 sailors. It was the largest sunken Russian warship since World War II.

Following this success, Ukraine began deploying its secret weapon: the world's first combat-deployed sea drones, the Magura V5. Resembling a small speedboat, these unmanned surface vessels (USV) can carry 700 pounds of ammunition at speeds of over 50 mph undetected by radar. In October 2022, Ukraine launched at least seven of these unmanned suicide drones towards Sevastopol harbor — then home to the Black Sea Fleet — damaging the newest flagship, the frigate Admiral Makarov, and two other vessels. Together, these attacks would be a portent of things to come, as Ukraine's airborne and naval arsenals would pepper the Russian fleet, forcing Russia to evacuate the majority of its forces from its Crimean port. They have been so effective that Russia began implementing drone-specific defensive measures. Within a year of the first sea drone strike, the majority of the Black Sea Fleet had retreated to Novorossiysk, located outside occupied Crimea. A February 2025 Ukrainian General Staff release stated that Ukraine had damaged 29 vessels in Russia's fleet. According to Oryx, Ukrainian forces have destroyed at least 21 vessels, including 9 warships, eight patrol boats, and an improvised submarine. Russia, meanwhile, has destroyed 13 Ukrainian vessels and captured 19 more since 2022.

An innovation game

CNN/YouTube

Unfortunately for Russia's navy, the retreat wasn't enough to forestall Ukrainian attacks. In fact, Ukraine escalated its pressure on Russia's navy by developing long-range sea drones capable of attacking targets half a thousand miles away. Since October 2022, it has launched at least four types of drones against the Russian fleet: the Magura V5, Sea Baby, Cossack Mamay, and the newly revealed larger cousin of the V5, the Magura V7. Sea Babies, for instance, rose to notoriety in July 2023, when Ukraine's Security Service launched two of the sea drones loaded with nearly 1900 lbs of explosives at the Kerch Strait Bridge connecting Crimea to mainland Russia, a prevailing symbol of Russia's hold on the region.

Technological and tactical innovations have evolved these satellite-guided USVs to feature more intricate, complex systems. The 18-foot Sea Babies, for example, began as remote-controlled, explosive-laden suicide boats that depended on stealth tactics to reach intended targets. But to combat evolving Russian defense tactics, in which warships and ports are protected by helicopters and patrol boats, the Ukrainians have added machine guns, surface-to-air heat-seeking missiles, rocket launchers, and aerial drones to engage in firefights with Russian forces. The Magura V7 showcased the effectiveness of these additions in May 2025 when Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Chief Kyrylo Budanov credited the drones with downing two Russian Su-30 fighter jets with supersonic air-to-air missiles, a feat hailed as the first time an unmanned surface vessel took out a warplane. In July 2025, social media footage posted by Ukraine's Ministry of Defense showcased USVs launching aerial bombing drones against Russian radar facilities on the Crimean shore, revealing how drone boats can now serve as launch points against land targets. Mines have also been an effective combat tool for Ukraine's sea drones, damaging at least four ships in 2023.

Navies of the world take note

Al Jazeera English/YouTube

Whether drones constitute a revolution in naval tactics or an inevitable application of existing strategies is debated. But at the very least, Ukraine has challenged whether large naval fleets are a surefire means of projecting geopolitical power unimpeded. In particular, the conflict in the Black Sea has showcased how asymmetric warfare– in which adversaries make up for unequal military capabilities with nonconventional tactics – can challenge even the most advanced navies. In a 2024 interview with CBC, the head of Ukraine's drone operations, pseudonymed Call Sign 13, said that Ukraine's naval tactics showed "that having a large fleet is not equivalent to power" in today's naval landscape.

Both large and small navies have taken notice of this shift. For instance, in June 2025, Taiwan's state-owned weapons manufacturer, National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology began developing explosive-laden unmanned sea drones, hoping to begin production in 2026. The development is a sign that smaller nations may look to the Black Sea as a blueprint for asserting naval autonomy against larger, better-equipped foes. Other navies have followed suit, including Israel, Poland, Lithuania, and the UAE, with each taking preliminary steps to add sea drones to their naval fleets. Even Houthi rebels in Yemen have used sea drones to attack vessels in the Red Sea. China, which sports the world's largest naval fleet, has steadily incorporated drones into its naval strategies. As of 2025, China has developed a large unmanned combat vessel, an amphibious assault ship drone carrier, an extra-large submerged attack drone, and the first submarine-launched aerial drone.

The Black Sea laboratory

Center for Strategic and International Studies/YouTube

Nothing indicates the increasing role of drones in naval warfare more than the U.S. Navy's 2026 budget request. Although the U.S. Navy has invested in drone-technology in the past, the Pentagon's proposal shows a massive increase in the Navy's development of underwater, surface, and aerial drones. According to senior defense officials quoted by Defense Scoop, the Pentagon is requesting a record $13.4 billion for drone development and defense capabilities in 2026. The Navy, for its part, looks to double its drone funding from 2025, requesting $5.3 billion. The report states that roughly $2.43 billion will go to surface and underwater drones.

How the U.S. Navy deploys these resources will be heavily influenced by the conflict in the Black Sea. At a February 2025 panel, U.S. Rear Adm. Michael Mattis — commander of the Naval Task Force charged with integrating Robotic and Autonomous Systems into fleet operations — stated that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict will directly inform the Navy's drone efforts, going as far as to call it "the Black Sea Laboratory." For Mattis, the conflict is uniquely enlightening because of its various innovation cycles, in which one can observe the "action, reaction, counteraction" of both countries adjusting to the other's evolving drone attack and defense strategies. In an interview with Business Insider, Mattis noted that the U.S. Navy deployed defense strategies gleaned from the conflict in its 2025 Baltic Operations exercise with NATO partners. In a move that further indicates how the Black Sea is informing U.S. sea drone strategies, the DoD's Defense Innovation Unit released a solicitation for underwater drones, including its first "kinetic, one-way attack" unmanned underwater vehicle. On balance, these developments show that even the world's most powerful military may be taking notes from a navy without a flagship.

slashgear.com · by Alec Hively · July 20, 2025

​18. Why this is China's golden age of hacking

​Excerpts:

PFEIFFER: So what are they trying to gain by the hacking?

CARY: There's actually a diverse motivation across the folks doing the hacking. When we think about the government organizations behind this, the Ministry of Public Security - these can be - think of the internal or domestic security force in China. They're really concerned about political security, and so a lot of their hacking operations are into dissidents who live overseas or the Chinese diaspora that they're trying to keep tabs on.

The Ministry of State Security fulfills a civilian intelligence role, thought of as like the NSA or the CIA in the United States, and they're responsible for political intelligence collection. What government is going to do what? Who is negotiating with whom? Who has good relationships, and who does not?

Finally, the PLA, China's military, is responsible for procuring intelligence on foreign militaries and preparing for armed conflict. So when we hear about intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure, these are the groups associated with the military that are preparing for armed conflict so that they can disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure and impact our lives.

Why this is China's golden age of hacking

July 19, 20254:56 PM ET

Heard on All Things Considered

By 

Sacha Pfeiffer

, 

Kai McNamee

NPR · by By · July 19, 2025

Dakota Cary of the Atlantic Council Global China Hub describes this moment as China's golden age of hacking.

Sponsor Message

SACHA PFEIFFER, HOST:

Cyberattacks backed by the Chinese government are increasing. The Department of Justice indicted two hackers earlier this month and charged them with spying on behalf of the Chinese government. Dakota Cary studies China and cyberactors, and he's described this moment as China's golden age of hacking. He's a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub and a consultant at the cybersecurity platform SentinelOne. Dakota, thanks for coming on the show.

DAKOTA CARY: Of course. Thanks so much for having me.

PFEIFFER: Tell us some details about who was indicted and what the charges against them are.

CARY: So we have two individuals who were indicted, Xu Zewei and Zhang Yu. These two individuals worked at different companies in Shanghai. They've been charged with a variety of crimes typical in hacking cases - violations of the CFAA and intellectual property theft - specifically engaged in intellectual property theft research at universities in the U.S. for coronavirus vaccines. The indictment from the Department of Justice says that Zhang Yu and Xu Zewei both acted at the direction of the Shanghai State Security Bureau. That language, at the direction, is very specific language. It means that the Department of Justice and the FBI can establish a causal link between the intelligence services telling them what to do and then these individuals going and doing that behavior.

PFEIFFER: There's a U.S. cybersecurity firm, CrowdStrike, that put out its 2025 global threat report in February, and that report found that Chinese-backed instances of cyberespionage were up 150% from the previous year. How much is that reflected in the hacking we're experiencing in the U.S.?

CARY: I would say that this hacking increase is actually not only just in the U.S., but it's actually global, and it stems from investments that China made in its cybersecurity talent pipeline almost a decade ago. When Xi Jinping came into power, the Snowden revelations had just occurred. China was very aware that the cyber domain was going to be important in international competition in the coming century, and so they invested in university programs and other ways of training hackers so that eventually they would go on to graduate and do these types of jobs for the government.

PFEIFFER: So is this viewed within China as dirty work or legitimate business or maybe a little of both?

CARY: The attitude has shifted over the last 30 years or so. A wonderful report by a friend of mine, Eugenio Benincasa, covers this in detail, where hackers in the '90s and early 2000s were patriotic and self-organized, and then there was an interregnum between, you know, 2002 and 2009 where the government looked down on this behavior and then eventually came to the realization that they could standardize and professionalize the service to achieve their political objectives, and that's exactly what they've done.

PFEIFFER: So what are they trying to gain by the hacking?

CARY: There's actually a diverse motivation across the folks doing the hacking. When we think about the government organizations behind this, the Ministry of Public Security - these can be - think of the internal or domestic security force in China. They're really concerned about political security, and so a lot of their hacking operations are into dissidents who live overseas or the Chinese diaspora that they're trying to keep tabs on.

The Ministry of State Security fulfills a civilian intelligence role, thought of as like the NSA or the CIA in the United States, and they're responsible for political intelligence collection. What government is going to do what? Who is negotiating with whom? Who has good relationships, and who does not?

Finally, the PLA, China's military, is responsible for procuring intelligence on foreign militaries and preparing for armed conflict. So when we hear about intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure, these are the groups associated with the military that are preparing for armed conflict so that they can disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure and impact our lives.

PFEIFFER: Most of us civilians have experienced multiple data breaches, notifications from companies that our Social Security numbers have been released. Explain why the general public needs to be concerned about this, if at all, because you're talking about state-backed cyber attacks more than it seems to be the kind of data breach letter we often get in the mail.

CARY: If intellectual property is stolen, for example, that intellectual property is then used by competitors in China that then displace market share from U.S. firms, and it results in job losses in the United States. And so U.S. Steel is actually a really good example where the company was hacked. They lost valuable intellectual property. And then over the following decade, they lost market share and, as a result, had to close down factories, and there were job losses in the United States. And so it took a hack from something kind of, you know, abstract and happening on somebody else's computer into your kitchen.

PFEIFFER: So this is so interesting. I have a - sort of a detailed question about what these Chinese government hacking operations - how they work, what they look like behind the scenes. So they're actually private contractors working with various parts of the government. Is that typically the relationship?

CARY: So there are two groups or two ways that we think about these private companies interacting with the government. When private companies are selling services - offensive hacking to the military - they're typically selling them tools that the military is going to use, and we can think of this like a military buying weapons that then military personnel are going to go use and deploy.

When we think about the intelligence services, the model shifts a little bit. We know from leaked documents in 2024 that a company called i-Soon was selling services and intelligence to a wide number of customers, including the Ministry of Public Security, the Domestic Security Force, as well as the intelligence services, the Ministry of State Security. They, though, were hacking first and selling access and intelligence later, which meant that they would go out and carry out an operation and then try to find somebody to buy that information or access from them. So there's a wide breadth of how these operations occur, and it depends on how good these hackers are and their relationship with the government.

PFEIFFER: We obviously know that a lot of countries spy on one another and have for a very long time, centuries. The methods just get more modern. Is there anything unique about China's hacking infrastructure?

CARY: The way that China hacks is not particularly unique. Their economic model for contracting with these hackers is an innovation in the space. We've not seen other countries kind of put out a wish list of information and then just pay people who are willing to come forward with that information. That said, China is unique among countries in their ability to operationalize stolen intellectual property into their economy. And so in that way, the targeting and the purpose of Chinese hacking is very different from other nations.

PFEIFFER: Is there anything you want the American public to know why they should really focus on cyber protection?

CARY: When a foreign government is harassing individuals inside of the United States for what they say and believe in our country, that is an affront to the way that we have organized our government. And the values that we believe in - freedom of speech, everything that's in our Constitution - should be guaranteed to the people who live here. And I think China's attacks on dissidents overseas, particularly those in the United States, where people are harassed or even, you know, forcibly put onto planes and taken back to China - I think that's a direct affront to the way that we choose to live our lives.

PFEIFFER: That's Dakota Cary. He studies China and cyberactors. Thank you.

CARY: Thank you.

NPR · by By · July 19, 2025

19. Opinion | Why the global balance of power is shifting in China’s favour

​Can we really identify the cause of this shift (if it is in fact shifting)? And are we really moving to "three macro regions?" Is that good or bad?

Excerpts:

Meanwhile, as global power shifts from the US to China, the world is moving towards a new configuration centred on three macro-regions. The first is the Americas, where the dominant power – the US – aims for resource self-sufficiency, especially in rare earths. The second is the Eurasian region, led by China, Russia and their allies. The third is western Europe, primarily the EU. Meanwhile, as the Middle East undergoes geopolitical changes, India seems undecided on which macro-region it will end up aligning with.

Despite ongoing global connectivity, all three macro-regions seem to be turning inward on resource security, trade and digital platforms. A forecast by the Boston Consulting Group projects a major reconfiguration of trade flows by 2032, leading to a fragmented global economy and the greater importance of regional blocs.

If global fragmentation continues and power dynamics continue shifting towards China, the Eurasian region may become the world’s leading macro-region. China is likely to position itself as a gravitational centre through large-scale projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative while offering a sustainable growth model for others. Facing a projected decline in leadership and power, the US is increasingly taking reactive steps to delay the new global order, such as imposing tariffs and bombing other countries such as Iran.

Albert Bakhtizin

Opinion | Why the global balance of power is shifting in China’s favour

Research suggests no country can win a trade war, but national power and resilience can mean the difference between decline and progress

https://www.scmp.com/opinion/world-opinion/article/3317625/why-global-balance-power-shifting-chinas-favour

Albert Bakhtizin

Published: 5:30am, 20 Jul 2025

In recent years, the world has entered an acute phase of geopolitical confrontation, driven by structural problems such as trade imbalances. Historically, such crises have often been addressed through military conflicts aimed at weakening rivals and redirecting financial and trade flows. This logic is examined in The Price of War, a study of conflicts spanning over 150 years.

Since most major powers today possess weapons of mass destruction for deterrence, confrontation has largely taken on a hybrid form. Yet the United States’ drive to solve domestic problems at others’ expense remains, especially in its relations with China, Russia and the European Union. The toolbox of weapons has expanded to include economic tools such as tariffs or tech restrictions designed to limit the development of highly value-added industries.

The White House might be confident about this arsenal, but US President Donald Trump’s policies of tariffs, tax cuts and pressure on the US Federal Reserve have coincided with a weakening US dollar. Meanwhile, efforts to reduce the trade deficit have diminished both Washington’s global role and overall investor confidence.

The US dollar remains Washington’s key economic weapon. But its declining status weakens US geopolitical influence. Since 2000, the US dollar’s share in global reserves has fallen from 71 per cent to below 60 per cent. A recent study by the International Monetary Fund suggests that in times of rising global tension, countries diversify their currency holdings.

The S&P 500’s record performance, when measured in other major currencies, reveals a shift in the global financial system. Recent events are dispelling the illusion of US economic invincibility.

These trends are especially clear when viewed through a multidimensional national power index based on dozens of indicators such as demographics, technology, economy and military strength. My team at the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences has developed a method to rank countries based on power.

A trader is seen on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange in New York City on June 13. Photo: Xinhua

Among 193 countries, China ranks first, followed by the US and Russia. Last year, China’s National Supercomputing Centre stress-tested major economies under large-scale trade restrictions. It concluded that the same three countries have the most resilient systems.

The dynamics of national power must be considered over time. In the 19th century, Great Britain had an outsize influence on world affairs. Throughout much of the 20th century, power was divided between the US and the Soviet Union. By the early 2010s, China had steadily risen as a major power.

Our long-term forecasts indicate the rise of a new global centre led by China and its partners. The current moment is transitional: the US is struggling to maintain leadership, the EU is weakening and most countries remain at a geopolitical crossroads.

A key finding was that long-term resilience depends less on natural resources or military strength than on demographic and economic fundamentals.

How are Chinese citizens feeling the effects of the US-China tariff war?

Financial restrictions are not the only tools used to suppress an opponent’s economy. Pressure on key industrial sectors is equally critical, and protecting them is essential. These sectors have the highest multiplier effects on growth. We used an input-output analysis – focusing on industries that rely on each other for inputs and outputs – to identify the sectors in most need of state support in the face of external pressure.

In China, these sectors include textile and footwear manufacturing, electronics and optical equipment. In the US, they include cars, food, beverages and tobacco. In Russia, the most critical sectors are electrical equipment and machinery. Though only core examples are listed here, the full picture is broader. It’s perhaps no surprise that US sanctions on China and Russia have targeted these specific industries.

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However, our joint research with colleagues from the National Supercomputing Centre in Guangzhou, Guangdong province, shows that no one truly wins trade wars. Based on our research, the US appeared more vulnerable than China due to deeper de-industrialisation, whereas the EU, with its open economies, was especially exposed to risks from disrupted trade flows.

Demographic potential depends on factors like population size, urbanisation, literacy rates, as well as birth and death rates. If policymakers – such as those in the Trump administration – perceive the size of their non-immigrant population as impeding long-term resilience, they might spend heavily on border walls, detention facilities and mass deportation operations. This is the logic of the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act”.

An employee assembles products for export at an electronics factory in Lianyungang, Jiangsu province, on May 13. Photo: VCG / Getty Images

Meanwhile, as global power shifts from the US to China, the world is moving towards a new configuration centred on three macro-regions. The first is the Americas, where the dominant power – the US – aims for resource self-sufficiency, especially in rare earths. The second is the Eurasian region, led by China, Russia and their allies. The third is western Europe, primarily the EU. Meanwhile, as the Middle East undergoes geopolitical changes, India seems undecided on which macro-region it will end up aligning with.

Despite ongoing global connectivity, all three macro-regions seem to be turning inward on resource security, trade and digital platforms. A forecast by the Boston Consulting Group projects a major reconfiguration of trade flows by 2032, leading to a fragmented global economy and the greater importance of regional blocs.

If global fragmentation continues and power dynamics continue shifting towards China, the Eurasian region may become the world’s leading macro-region. China is likely to position itself as a gravitational centre through large-scale projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative while offering a sustainable growth model for others. Facing a projected decline in leadership and power, the US is increasingly taking reactive steps to delay the new global order, such as imposing tariffs and bombing other countries such as Iran.

Albert Bakhtizin

Albert Bakhtizin is director of the Central Institute of Economics and Mathematics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a member of the academy and a professor at Lomonosov Moscow State University. His research focuses on national power modelling, demographic

20. Christian Brose on the Coming Revolution in Military Tech

​Excerpts:

In the U.S., “we not only tolerate but actually reward all of these disruptive tendencies in our society and in our economy that I’m not sure the Chinese Communist Party is capable of dealing with, and it’s not clear to me that the Chinese society is capable of generating.” The real U.S. defense challenge is injecting into the defense base “more of the American capitalist system at its best—more competition, more disruption, more innovation.”

The past decade offers insights, Mr. Brose argues. A decade ago, “investors didn’t want to invest in defense. They thought it was a dry hole. The government was a terrible partner. There was no money to be made. No successful company could ever emerge in that space. No founder or engineer who was worth a damn would ever want to go work on those issues. And that’s all changed.”

What changed? “Partly a recognition of changing threat.” More Americans “see the Chinese Communist Party as a challenge, not as a source of investment or a market opportunity.” Meanwhile, “the war in Ukraine has crystallized a lot of people’s minds: ‘Wow, things that I never really thought were possible are actually quite possible still.’ That there is evil in the world, that bad things do still happen, that there’s a reason why the United States and democratic countries need to have militaries to defend ourselves.”

“Anduril is atop the CNBC disruptive companies in America list—who thought a defense company could even make that list, let alone be on top of it?” he says. “We created an entire category of technology that didn’t even exist, dozens and dozens of companies that are funded with billions of dollars of private capital . . . trying to build military systems and defense capability.”

Washington may be slow to adapt to a dangerous world, but investors are reorganizing capital and betting that the U.S. will meet the moment. At bottom, Mr. Brose says, “the reason I’m absolutely optimistic on America is our endless ability to adapt and reinvent ourselves.”

Christian Brose on the Coming Revolution in Military Tech

Anduril Industries builds ‘attritable’ aircraft like autonomous fighter jets, which are cheaper to lose than regular airplanes.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/christian-brose-on-drone-wingmen-and-other-newfangled-weapons-defense-8df34515?st=QBUNct&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Kate B. Odell

July 18, 2025 1:33 pm ET

Christian Brose Illustration: Ken Fallin

Americans cheered earlier this summer when Ukraine managed to sneak inexpensive drones deep into Russia and use them to destroy strategic bombers. Likewise when Israel began its campaign against Iran by taking out air defenses with drones. New technology is changing the geometry of the battlefield, which can give a leg up for lesser powers—which could also pose threats to the U.S.

Is America prepared for the new way of war? “At every level, I think, our conception of military power, and the industrial base that we’ve been optimizing to build it, is just systemically wrong,” says Christian Brose, president and chief strategy officer of Anduril Industries, the defense tech company founded by entrepreneur Palmer Luckey.

That’s the bad news. The worse news is a global tinderbox, including multiple hot wars. China is undertaking the world’s most significant military buildup since World War II, principally seeking the ability to defeat U.S. forces. American defense spending is stuck at a historic low of 3% of gross domestic product—proof that free societies struggle to prepare for threats that aren’t immediate.

The view from the front lines of the American defense-tech revolution deserves more attention. Private capital is flowing into solving a U.S. soldier’s pressing battlefield problems. Anduril’s inexpensive cruise missiles, unmanned wingmen for fighter jets, and other technology could be crucial to U.S. victory in a future conflict. Mr. Brose recently stopped by the Journal’s offices, and he suggests that U.S. military vulnerability is both sobering and solvable.

“Basically since the end of the Cold War, we’ve assumed . . . we were going to have superiority over any adversary,” Mr. Brose, 45, says. “If we found ourselves in a conflict, it wasn’t going to be very long.” The U.S. banked on being able to “move, shoot, communicate as we wished, and as a result of all of this, we weren’t going to have to build a lot of things.” Thirty-five years later, “we find ourselves on the business end of that problem—with an industrial base that cannot produce much, cannot produce quickly.”

America needs military power that is “mass-producible, that is adaptable, that is scalable and that is fundamentally replaceable when, God forbid, the war doesn’t end in the first 100 hours or the first month, but drags on for months and years,” Mr. Brose says.

Consider the fighter jet. Each new generation of planes is more expensive than the last, and “we have fewer of them,” Mr. Brose says. He cracks an old joke that in the future “we will have precisely one airplane, and all the military services will take turns using it.” The U.S. still needs bombers and fighter jets. “But, boy, do we need to augment that with this additional set of capabilities.”

Anduril is one of two companies that last year won a contract for “combat collaborative aircraft,” Air Force jargon for unmanned vehicles that work alongside fighter jets. Exercises conducted by the Mitchell Institute, a think tank, suggest such loyal wingmen could help U.S. forces devastate Chinese air defenses in a fight for Taiwan. Such drones reduce U.S. combat casualties and get the most out of a U.S. fighter fleet that has shrunk by half since the Cold War. Mr. Brose describes the vehicles as roughly half the size of a fighter jet—a “big, real airplane with a business jet engine in the back”—much larger than what comes to mind when most of us hear the word “drone.”

He lays out an “emerging taxonomy” of systems. On one end of a spectrum are traditional fighter jets such as the recently announced F-47: “You’re going to use it for decades.” On the other end are “expendable stuff—once you launch it, you’re not expecting to get it back. You’re going to fly it into the target, you’re going to ditch it in place, whatever.”

Then there’s “the interesting space” where Anduril is spending most of its time. These systems are “increasingly defined as attritable—in the sense of, I am willing to lose it. . . . I launch an autonomous fighter jet. I’d really love to recover it, send it out for another operation. But under certain circumstances, if I have to lose it, I’m prepared to. And I can afford to, because they don’t cost that much per copy.”

This class of technology, Mr. Brose says, is “the sweet spot, because you get to larger classes of vehicles that can be more relevant in regions like the Indo-Pacific, which is geographically very challenging. It’s very large distances. The competitor you’re looking at is obviously very capable.” The U.S. can’t “fight that fight with quadcopters that fly 20 miles.”

Mr. Brose thinks such innovations can “open up this incredibly cool market that has never really existed for additional low-cost systems—low-cost sensors, low-cost weapons” that need “low-cost platforms to put them on.”

Another instructive example is the U.S. Navy’s Battle of the Red Sea. American destroyers spent months using million-dollar missiles to swat down cheap drones from Houthi terrorists. It was the world’s most expensive game of whack-a-mole, with the U.S. “on the wrong side of the cost-exchange ratio.” A potential help: an Anduril system called Roadrunner. It’s a counter-drone interceptor that takes off vertically, and it’s recoverable. “If I don’t actually fly it out and destroy the drone that I’m targeting, I can recall it,” Mr. Brose says. A Navy admiral told reporters the system would deploy this year on some destroyers.

Building systems en masse is at least half the battle. Wars in the Middle East and Europe have exposed a brittle U.S. defense industrial base that has struggled to produce everything from missiles to the artillery Ukraine is consuming voraciously. Part of Anduril’s strategy is exploiting more commercial supply chains and designing systems to allow “access to a much broader workforce,” Mr. Brose says.

“We don’t need master welders with 15 years of experience”—a shortage that has bedeviled efforts to build high-end assets such as submarines. Anduril is “hiring people out of commercial automotive and commercial aerospace and defense. And putting together our systems is a lot closer to assembling Ikea furniture” than it is to building, say, an F-35.

What Anduril needs, however, is a consistent “demand signal from the buyer of military power, which is the United States government, that they want to buy different kinds of military systems.”

The One Big Beautiful Bill Act includes $150 billion for defense, and invests in systems like the ones Anduril is making. But the Trump administration also proposed a cut in real Pentagon spending for 2026 and relies on the budget bill’s boost to fill its own holes. Mr. Brose visited the Journal before the GOP bill passed, and Congress will put its mark on the next budget. “We’ll have to see how this all pans out. But I think it would be a tragedy if what had been designed as a real kind of surge of defense spending and production really just turned into a kind of normal everyday defense budget that dare not speak its name.”

Alternatively, “our defense budget is basically almost $1 trillion right now,” notes Mr. Brose, once an aide to the late Sen. John McCain. “I could build you a military with a trillion-dollar budget that’s still going to lose.” What matters more is how the dollars are spent, he argues, and the reconciliation bill is a boost for nascent tech at a fraction of the overall budget.

Mr. Brose suggests he “could come up with 25 programs” across the force “that can and should exist today, that are not limited because of money, that are not limited because of technology,” and that don’t require a new Pentagon procurement process. “It’s fundamentally imagination and will.”

When politicians hear that argument, they too often think America can win wars on the cheap with the latest gizmos, no hard fiscal choices required, even as the U.S. spends less on the military than it did when Jimmy Carter was president in 1979 (4.6% of GDP). Even the world’s current high-tech conflicts suggest that underlying military mass—aircraft, naval power—still matter in a protracted fight.

What should the U.S. military stop building? Mr. Brose offers an answer far more compelling than the usual Washington pablum about “legacy systems,” Pentagon slang to malign any weapon out of vogue. “There are things that we can probably do away with,” such as shorter-range aircraft. The more interesting question is: “How could we use old things in new ways that would allow us to leverage investments we’ve already made?”

There’s an argument whether “the Marine Corps is just overinvested in big amphibious ships, as if we’re going to go relaunch the Inchon invasion,” the famed 1950 U.S. landing during the Korean War. “OK, well, let’s look at it a different way: I have a large ship with a flight deck, with a well deck. I could fill that with robotic systems. I could fill it with containerized weapons. I could turn that into a very different kind of combat platform. It might not be sending as many Marines ashore, the traditional way that we’ve envisioned it. But that doesn’t mean we should just mothball the whole thing.”

Mr. Brose doesn’t equivocate about the threat from China. “It’s no secret, the rocket-ship journey that they are on, in terms of building up their own organic industrial base.” The “notion of ‘Ah, they’re good because they stole our stuff and they basically copycat American companies’—was true at a point.” Now they’re doing genuine technology development, “and they’re getting quite good.”

China is building ships and munitions at a ferocious pace, and it boasts far more shipbuilding capacity than the U.S. Beijing’s civil-military fusion strategy allows it to exploit new tech quickly. But in all the reasonable worry about those problems, I ask Mr. Brose if America’s advantages are underrated.

“I hear a lot of people who think that China has an advantage over us because of the nature of their system and how controlling it is, writing direct outcomes in a way that a democratic society would never do or condone,” he says. “There’s a degree to which they might find some advantage around the margin in their ability to do those authoritarian things.”

In the U.S., “we not only tolerate but actually reward all of these disruptive tendencies in our society and in our economy that I’m not sure the Chinese Communist Party is capable of dealing with, and it’s not clear to me that the Chinese society is capable of generating.” The real U.S. defense challenge is injecting into the defense base “more of the American capitalist system at its best—more competition, more disruption, more innovation.”

The past decade offers insights, Mr. Brose argues. A decade ago, “investors didn’t want to invest in defense. They thought it was a dry hole. The government was a terrible partner. There was no money to be made. No successful company could ever emerge in that space. No founder or engineer who was worth a damn would ever want to go work on those issues. And that’s all changed.”

What changed? “Partly a recognition of changing threat.” More Americans “see the Chinese Communist Party as a challenge, not as a source of investment or a market opportunity.” Meanwhile, “the war in Ukraine has crystallized a lot of people’s minds: ‘Wow, things that I never really thought were possible are actually quite possible still.’ That there is evil in the world, that bad things do still happen, that there’s a reason why the United States and democratic countries need to have militaries to defend ourselves.”

“Anduril is atop the CNBC disruptive companies in America list—who thought a defense company could even make that list, let alone be on top of it?” he says. “We created an entire category of technology that didn’t even exist, dozens and dozens of companies that are funded with billions of dollars of private capital . . . trying to build military systems and defense capability.”

Washington may be slow to adapt to a dangerous world, but investors are reorganizing capital and betting that the U.S. will meet the moment. At bottom, Mr. Brose says, “the reason I’m absolutely optimistic on America is our endless ability to adapt and reinvent ourselves.”

Mrs. Odell is a member of the Journal’s editorial board.

Review & Outlook: The President reverses a Pentagon decision from last week and says he'll deliver weapons to Ukraine.

Appeared in the July 19, 2025, print edition as 'The Coming Revolution in Military Tech'.

20. Why Plato Matters Now

Plato's Library

Why Plato Matters Now

An exclusive excerpt from Prof. Angie Hobbs and Bloomsbury Continuum

https://platosacademycentre.substack.com/p/why-plato-matters-now?utm

The Plato's Academy Centre

Jul 20, 2025

PAC would like to express their deepest thanks to Prof. Angie Hobbs and Bloomsbury Continuum for this exclusive excerpt from the forthcoming Why Plato Matters Now.

Prof. Hobbs is an esteemed guest speaker at our forthcoming virtual event Democracy and Tyranny on Saturday, July 26 at 1 pm EDT, where she will be speaking on Plato and his relevance now more than ever.

Reserve your spot

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From Democracy to Tyranny

Plato is only talking of the direct democracy of contemporary Athens, in which adult male Athenian-born citizens vote directly on laws and policies, and take turns (usually decided by lot) at holding the great offices of the polis. Nevertheless, his brilliant satire of the Athens of his day in the *Republic* still offers us much food for thought. It is a more nuanced and sympathetic portrait than the scathing image of the ship (6.488a–489a), in which the fractious crew ignore the advice of the one person who can help steer them to safety – an image followed by the still more hostile depiction of the *dēmos* as a large and dangerous animal (6.493a–b).

In Book 8, Socrates allows that democracy certainly has its charms: it is varied, colourful, exuberant and tolerant, and its focus on individual freedom and equality of political opportunity clearly have their attractions, particularly as the kind of ‘freedom’ on offer here is the freedom to do what you individually feel like (which we have seen contrasted in the *Gorgias* with what Socrates views there as the genuine freedom that stems from reasoned choice). In the short run, it can appear the most enticing option.

There is, however, definitely a darker underbelly to the surface charms: it is claimed that when the poor win power, they begin by killing or exiling their opponents, and Socrates also emphasizes the weaknesses of the democratic city that ensues. It is utterly disrespectful of authority and chaotic to the point of anarchy – in a playful mood, Plato even has animals in a democracy doing their own thing and sauntering about the streets as they please. Moods and allegiances are fickle and change on a whim. The description of the democratic individual that follows also suggests that language is corrupted in a democracy in ways which strongly echo Thucydides’ account of the subversion of moral terms in the Corcyran civil war: licence is called liberty and shamelessness courage, while shame is disparaged as foolishness and temperance dismissed as cowardice. All of this results in extreme fragility: the democratic city is highly vulnerable to attacks from without and, above all, from within, when a cynical and opportunistic demagogue sees a way to manipulate a path towards absolute power, pretending to be the people’s champion.

Socrates delineates the overturning of democracy with care, and we should do well to take note; as he comments, any extreme is liable to produce a violent reaction, and this holds just as true of cities, extreme anarchy yielding to ferocious oppression. The criminal group of parasites (termed ‘drones’ by Socrates) seeks to sow division through lies, turning the mass of the people against the wealthy and the elite. The most successful of these parasites, with a sharp eye to the main chance, manages to get himself elected as a single popular leader, making extravagant promises and intoxicating his supporters with the neat spirit of offers of still greater freedom. Using his demagogic rhetorical skills he creates a cult around himself where his followers believe he can do no wrong. At some point, heady with his own power, he corrupts the legal system by bringing baseless charges against his enemies and commits murder (the verb Socrates uses, *miaiphoneō*, unequivocally means ‘murder’, even though the courts are nominally involved); this first taste of blood initiates his transition ‘from man to wolf’ and from demagogue to tyrant. If the wealthy whose property he is confiscating succeed in these early days in having him exiled, he returns thirsting for revenge, demanding a personal bodyguard to protect him from his enemies (both real and, increasingly, imagined) and to enable him to continue his alleged championing of the people. Indeed, he now identifies himself entirely with ‘the people’: anyone who still tries to oppose him is labelled, precisely, ‘a hater of the people’ (8.566c), and he holds total sway, now the finished tyrant and in the grip of culpable mania.

However, although at the start he smilingly distributes land to the cult followers who raised him to power, their lives very quickly deteriorate under his despotic rule. He continually stirs up wars in order to keep his people fearful and feeling in need of a strong leader; the high levels of war taxation also make them still poorer, and less able to rise up against him. For all these reasons, says Socrates, ‘a tyrant must always be provoking war’. As his popularity wanes, and the bolder openly complain, he starts to purge all those possessed of the courage, intelligence and vision (and indeed wealth) to pose a threat. His effect on the city is precisely the opposite of the doctor: instead of cleansing the body politic of poisons, he cuts out all that is healthy and lets the poison remain. As discontent grows, his bodyguard increases as its morality declines, and when the people protest that this is not why they voted him in, and belatedly start to realize what sort of a creature they have bred, he turns on them completely and enslaves them all.

Prof. Angie Hobbs gained a degree in Classics and a PhD in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, and her chief interests are in ancient philosophy and literature, and ethics and political theory from classical thought to the present, and she has published widely in these areas, including Plato and the Hero. She works in a number of policy sectors, and contributes regularly to media around the world, including many appearances on In Our Time on Radio 4; she has spoken at the World Economic Forum at Davos, the Athens Democracy Forum, the Houses of Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and Westminster Abbey and been the guest on Desert Island Discs and Private Passions. Her latest title is the much-anticipated Why Plato Matters Now. (Bloomsbury Continuum)

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