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Quotes of the Day:
“Hatred is the coward’s revenge for being intimated.”
– George Bernard Shaw
“A politician divides mankind into two classes: tools and enemies.”
– Friedrich Nietzsche
“Those who promise us paradise on earth never produced anything but hell.”
– Karl Popper
1. A Weakened Iran Still Has a Major Deterrent: the Nuclear Option
2. America Needs Better Bombs
3. Reflections on Buffalo Bill Cody: Lessons for Warfighters and Strategists
4. How Ukraine’s Recovery From War Can Inform Kyiv’s Car-driven Chaos
5. Is the attack helicopter dead?
6. The QUAD – or Most of it – Has Little Wish to Challenge China
7. Stepping Up U.S. Deterrence in Taiwan
8. Opinion As drone tech zooms ahead, the Pentagon scrambles to adapt
9. Side Effects – The Human Rights Implications of Global Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Linkages to XUAR
10. Washington Worries the Israelis Will Bomb Iran’s Nuclear Sites. But Can They?
11. Israel not expected to attack Iran nuclear facilities, to focus on bases, intelligence sites - NYT
12. The UK deal on Diego Garcia is positive, but it won’t reverse declining support for the rules-based order
13. Does Finland’s "total defence" doctrine hold lessons for Australia?
14. Veterans, troops targeted in Iran-backed disinformation campaign ahead of US election
15. Ukraine strikes a Russian oil hub as Zelenskyy says the war is in 'a very important phase'
16. Marines Fly in Food, Shelter Kits, Tarps to Aid Philippines After Typhoon Destroys Homes
17. Junior enlisted pay raise will strengthen the current and future force
18. Fact checking falsehoods about FEMA funding and Hurricane Helene
19. An Ethical Mine Field? On Counter-Mobility and Weapon Autonomy
20. Wars Are Not Accidents
21. The Myth That Foreign Policy Doesn’t Matter in Presidential Elections
22. A troubling military trend by David Deptula
23. The strategic plan that never was
1. A Weakened Iran Still Has a Major Deterrent: the Nuclear Option
See the graphics at the link for an overview of the steps to a nuclear weapon.
Excerpts:
An attack that merely pushes back Iran’s nuclear program by months or a year would be a major gamble. Iranian officials have previously warned that an attack could prompt them to follow in North Korea’s footsteps and quit the treaty that ensures international oversight of nuclear programs.
“The big question then will be whether Iran withdraws from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and kicks out the inspectors,” said Eric Brewer, deputy vice president at the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security Program.
A Weakened Iran Still Has a Major Deterrent: the Nuclear Option
With Hezbollah reeling and its own missiles so far failing to do much damage, attention has turned to the potential threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/a-weakened-iran-still-has-a-major-deterrent-the-nuclear-option-907c3c34?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1
By Laurence NormanFollow and Sune Engel RasmussenFollow
Updated Oct. 8, 2024 12:04 am ET
Israel has shown Iran’s two most important deterrents against an attack—its ballistic missiles and allied militia Hezbollah—are less powerful than previously thought. Now attention is turning to whether Iran will accelerate its nuclear program to deter its biggest regional foe.
For months, Iranian officials have said that Tehran has accumulated most of the knowledge needed to build a weapon and that it might reconsider Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s two-decade-old pledge not to procure weapons of mass destruction.
In late September, a former head of Iran’s atomic agency, Fereydoun Abbasi, suggested that Tehran could start producing 90% enriched, weapons-grade uranium. U.S. officials have said it would take Iran less than two weeks to convert its current 60% nuclear-fuel stockpile into weapons-grade material.
The 2015 nuclear deal curbed Iran’s program in return for sanctions relief. In the years since the U.S. pulled out, Tehran has significantly advanced its program, leaving it on the cusp of being able to develop a nuclear weapon.
“The weakening of its capabilities versus Israel will force Tehran to develop new sources of deterrence, increasing pressure on expanding the nuclear program,” said Gregory Brew, senior analyst on Iran and energy at the Eurasia Group consulting firm. “What we’re likely to see is more pressure to advance the program and warnings that it may not stay ‘peaceful.’”
Emergency workers at the site of an Israeli strike in Beirut’s southern suburbs last month. Photo: Manu Brabo for WSJ
Men buried the body of a civilian killed in an Israeli airstrike in the Lebanese village of Ain el-Delb last week. Photo: Manu Brabo for WSJ
How close is Iran to a nuclear weapon?
While it claims its nuclear program is for purely peaceful purposes, Iran is the only nonnuclear weapons power that produces highly enriched uranium. It currently has enough near-weapons-grade fuel for almost four nuclear weapons, according to the most recent data from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran also has been conducting experiments with uranium metal, a key component of a nuclear weapon, and has cut back much of the international oversight granted by the nuclear deal.
U.S. intelligence officials and the IAEA no longer offer what were once standard assurances that Tehran isn’t working on a weapons program. U.S. officials said this summer that Tehran had begun activities to gain more of the knowledge needed to build a bomb. Iran’s weaponization work would be harder to swiftly detect. Some experts believe Iran could produce a crude nuclear device in a matter of months.
Steps to Nuclear Weapon
Iran is believed to have mastered most of the techniques for building a nuclear weapon, using enriched uranium. Iran told the U.N. atomic agency in 2005 it has received blueprints for processing uranium gas and casting and enriching uranium from Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Experts believe Iran could produce a crude nuclear weapon in several months, but it would take far longer for Iran to develop nuclear warheads that are missile-deliverable. Iran claims its nuclear work is for purely peaceful purposes.
Iran converts pure uranium into gas form and then uses thousands of centrifuges in its enrichment sites to spin the material into a highly enriched form. Once it has enriched uranium to around 90%, it is usable for a nuclear weapon.
1
Centrifuges
Iran’s status
6.9 ft
Iran is currently employing almost 13,000 centrifuges, including thousands of more advanced machines. It is the only nonnuclear weapons country to be producing 60% highly enriched uranium.
IR-1
5.2
IR-2M
The weapons-grade enriched uranium needs to be converted from its gas form into metallic form through a chemical process. The metal then needs melding and casting into hemispheric forms, a mechanical process requiring high precision machinery.
2
Iran’s status
Iran resumed work on uranium metal in 2021.
To create a warhead, Iran has worked on creating an implosion weapon that uses high explosives to compress fissile material to start a chain reaction. Among the ingredients required is a wiring system that sends a huge electrical impulse to a detonator that uniformly ignites the high explosives in the weapon. The core of a nuclear weapon is made up of the uranium metal and a neutron initiator, which triggers a burst of neutrons to set off the chain reaction in a nuclear explosion.
3
Fission reaction
Explosives
Plutonium
Iran’s status
Detonator
Uranium
Iran is known to have produced and worked on many of the components of a warhead in the past.
Initiator
Nuclear payload
Re-entry vehicle
Iran’s past nuclear weapons work aims to deliver a warhead using its Shahab-3 liquid-based ballistic missiles, although a warhead could theoretically be delivered by truck or ship. The Shahab-3 employs a separating re-entry vehicle, protecting the weapon during launch and re-entry into the atmosphere.
4
Iran’s status
Shahab-3
Iran is believed to have kept its missile system largely separate from its past nuclear weapons work. It’s therefore believed not to have carried out all the usual tests on how a warhead would actually perform with its missiles.
Range: 497-808 miles
54.4 ft
Key Iranian nuclear sites
Key aspects of Iran producing a nuclear weapon would have to be covert, working around on-ground inspectors from the U.N. atomic agency and close scrutiny from foreign intelligence agencies. That would require Iran to build facilities to make nuclear weapons components and finetune its knowledge of building a weapon and possibly to enrich uranium. Such a covert breakout would take time, and the U.S. and Israel are among the powers that have said they would act to prevent Iran from developing the bomb.
5
Turkmenistan
Caspian
Sea
Fordow
Uranium
enrichment
facility
Natanz
Uranium enrichment
facility, centrifuge
parts factory
Iran
Isfahan
Uranium
conversion
facility
Saghand
Uranium
mine
Iraq
Ardakan
Yellowcake
concentration
plant
Iran’s status
Iran built a number of nuclear facilities in the past secretly without informing the U.N. atomic agency.
Saudi
Arabia
Sources: King’s College (centrifuges); Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control (fission reaction); Center for Strategic and International Studies (Shahab-3); Nuclear Threat Initiative (nuclear sites)
What could Israel and the U.S. do in response?
Israel has in the past taken action against Iran’s nuclear program through sabotage without permanently setting back Tehran’s enrichment efforts. Still, a dash for a nuclear weapon—which the U.S. has vowed to prevent—would carry huge risks for Iran.
Israel has demonstrated deep intelligence penetration into Iran and its allies through its recent attacks, including one that killed Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in a military-run guesthouse in Tehran. Israel could choose to strike Iran’s nuclear sites if Tehran accelerates its nuclear work.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said last week that Iran had “made a big mistake” with its missile attack and would pay for it. In a separate speech last week directed at the Iranian people, he said, “There is nowhere in the Middle East Israel cannot reach.”
Hezbollah, the world’s most heavily armed nonstate militia, has long been seen as Iran’s main insurance policy. The Lebanese group, which is designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization, is positioned on Israel’s border. But the recent Israeli military campaign has weakened the group, killing its longtime chief, Hassan Nasrallah, and targeting its weaponry. Last week, Israel launched the first ground operation into southern Lebanon in about two decades to attack Hezbollah positions in villages near the border.
Iran’s other major threat is its estimated stockpile of at least 3,000 ballistic missiles. While a number of missiles made it through Israel’s air defenses in a 180-missile barrage last week, they did little damage. Tehran has threatened to unleash a bigger attack.
After Iran’s first-ever direct attack on Israel—an April barrage of more than 300 missiles and drones—Israel responded with a small warning shot, knocking out air-defense batteries located just 13 miles from Iran’s Natanz nuclear-enrichment facilities.
Then-President Barack Obama and then-Vice President Joe Biden on their way to speak about the nuclear deal with Iran at the White House in July 2015. Photo: Mandel Ngan / AFP via Getty Images
The head of Iran’s atomic agency, Mohammad Eslami, said last week that the country’s armed forces had created the necessary deterrence against what he said were Israeli threats against his country’s nuclear facilities.
Israel so far has chosen not to act alone in striking Iran’s nuclear facilities. While the Biden administration has said the U.S. would ensure that Iran faces severe consequences for last week’s attack, there is no appetite in Washington for a broader war, particularly ahead of November’s presidential election.
Israeli airstrikes would damage Iran’s nuclear enrichment sites, but fully disabling its nuclear program would pose significant challenges, said people familiar with Iran’s nuclear program. It is unclear how deeply Israeli strikes could penetrate new facilities Tehran has built deep underground at Natanz or the Fordow site, which is dug into a mountainside.
There are challenges beyond the fortifications, the people said. Iran holds more than five tons of enriched uranium—including 165 kilograms of highly enriched uranium—outside of its enrichment facilities and next to mobile vans that can move it quickly. Airstrikes would also be of limited value against the work Tehran would need to do to build a bomb—its potential weaponization efforts. In the past, Israel is believed to have assassinated several of Iran’s top nuclear scientists as a way to prevent that work.
The risk of setting off race to a bomb
An attack that merely pushes back Iran’s nuclear program by months or a year would be a major gamble. Iranian officials have previously warned that an attack could prompt them to follow in North Korea’s footsteps and quit the treaty that ensures international oversight of nuclear programs.
“The big question then will be whether Iran withdraws from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and kicks out the inspectors,” said Eric Brewer, deputy vice president at the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security Program.
Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, intends to use diplomatic outreach to win sanctions relief, but any such measures likely hinge on Iran’s taking steps to end its production of highly enriched uranium. Photo: Shadati/Zuma Press
An Iranian race for a nuclear bomb could force the U.S. to act to stop Tehran from attaining a nuclear weapon.
Iran may decide for now to continue its incremental approach of inching closer to nuclear-weapons capabilities, said Michael Horowitz, the Israel-based head of intelligence for the consulting firm Le Beck.
“Iran will focus on its own security first, before taking any drastic and risky steps, including building a bomb,” he said.
A nuclear push also comes with political liability for Iran. Recently elected President Masoud Pezeshkian intends to use diplomatic outreach to win relief from Western sanctions on Iran’s ailing economy. Any hope of achieving that likely hinges on Iran’s taking steps to end its production of highly enriched uranium and granting improved access for the United Nations’ nuclear agency, the IAEA.
“I don’t think Iran would have made the decision to retaliate without some level of introspection when it comes to its nuclear program,” said Nicole Grajewski, fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“This doesn’t mean like all out weaponization but perhaps more work on ensuring their ability to quickly weaponize if need be,” she added.
Write to Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com and Sune Engel Rasmussen at sune.rasmussen@wsj.com
2. America Needs Better Bombs
Who is today's Nobel who will invent the new dynamite?
America Needs Better Bombs
‘Energetics’—chemicals that propel and explode—gave the U.S. a battlefield edge for decades, but that advantage is eroding.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/red-tape-hamstrings-research-for-the-next-tnt-national-defense-cf4fa228?mod=latest_headlines
By Mike Gallagher
Oct. 7, 2024 5:42 pm ET
The guided-missile destroyer USS Carney launches a missile in February. Photo: U.S. Navy/Zuma Press
The U.S. and its allies must maintain our technological edge against adversaries, be they Houthi rebels or the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. An important place to start: advanced energetic materials—chemicals that propel or explode.
During World War II, the U.S. and Britain made huge progress in energetic materials. Among them was Torpex, a blend of aluminum power, TNT and another explosive, RDX. Torpex, short for “torpedo explosive,” was about 50% more powerful than TNT. This new compound, used in mines, torpedoes and depth charges, gave the Allies a crucial advantage. Torpex-filled Tallboy bombs helped sink the German battleship Tirpitz in 1944. The U.S. military still relies on materials from that era, reflecting the brilliance of its scientists but also the lack of innovation since.
Why do 21st-century missiles rely on explosives from the 1940s and ’50s? For decades, the U.S. had a comfortable lead in stealth, precision and force integration. That tactical and operational superiority has narrowed, if not vanished. Accordingly, the Defense Department is seeking to restore the edge U.S. forces took for granted.
WSJ Opinion Docs: “Get the Jew”: The Crown Heights Riot Revisited
This 20 minute film sheds light on the worst antisemitic riot in American history, which occurred in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, in 1991. The current wave of antisemitism makes these events newly relevant and worthy of reconsideration.
Enter energetic materials. One need not be a chemist to appreciate how crucial the chemicals that make missiles fly and bombs explode are for military effectiveness. Their characteristics—energy density, detonation velocity and stability—largely determine the destructive power of warheads and the range of munitions. Advanced materials such as CL-20, discovered in 1986, offer improvements over older ones like RDX. They can increase the destructive power of warheads and extend the range of munitions. Better energetic materials let our military neutralize enemy targets with fewer or smaller munitions from farther away. Our adversaries know this. China and Russia have both made strides in energetic-materials research and development. If the U.S. fails to keep pace, it risks losing its technological superiority.
The Pentagon and Congress recognize that advanced energetics are crucial. The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act includes provisions to revitalize advances in energetic materials. Section 241 in the act establishes a Joint Energetics Transition Office to expedite the transition from R&D of more lethal munitions to their application. But for this new effort to succeed, the U.S. must address the contradictions and complexities within its defense acquisition system.
A daunting Pentagon procurement process governs weapons-systems acquisition. At its core is the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, which lays out rigorous steps for identifying requirements, conducting thorough analyses, and documenting compliance. This process sacrifices innovation for comprehensiveness. It also complicates the integration of advanced energetic materials.
The program managers responsible for delivering munitions to the military services face structural challenges in incorporating new technologies under the Defense Department’s timelines. Advanced energetic materials typically are ready for real-world applications only after 20 to 30 years of research and development. Meanwhile, program managers must deliver munitions within the constraints of the Pentagon’s five-year Future Years Defense Program. Understandably, they tend to rely on proven materials rather than risk novel ones that may not work out in time, regardless of any potential improved performance.
This timing disconnect exacerbates a cultural gap between munitions programs and the science and technology communities. Energetic materials researchers often struggle to align their work with acquisition requirements due to a lack of coordination on both sides. As the Pentagon’s May 2023 National Energetics Plan noted, “insufficient coordination and misaligned timelines” between the science and technology community and acquisition-program offices stifle the deployment of advanced energetics.
The Defense Department needs to embed the consideration of advanced energetic materials into key points along the development of munitions systems. The Joint Energetics Transition Office should provide a comprehensive view of the entire energetics system, from research to integration. By considering new materials early in the acquisition process, the Pentagon can increase the likelihood of unleashing their full potential.
Dedicated funding is essential to expedite the transition of promising materials from research to production. This would keep many promising technologies from stalling due to insufficient resources for testing and qualification. The private sector also needs incentives to invest in novel materials with military applications.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy puts a priority on a lethal future force. Especially in the Indo-Pacific, this force needs “strike capabilities that can penetrate adversary defenses at range.” Those capabilities rely on advanced energetic materials, which can increase the penetration depth of existing warheads by 40%. Achieving such progress requires the hard work of addressing the systemic barriers and aligning acquisition processes with technological readiness. But that effort underlies a more lethal future force. More agile acquisitions can put advanced energetics into more effective munitions, giving U.S. fighters a decisive edge on the battlefield.
Mr. Gallagher, a Journal contributor, is head of defense for Palantir Technologies and a distinguished fellow at the Hudson Institute. He represented Wisconsin’s Eighth Congressional District (2017-24) and was chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party.
3. Reflections on Buffalo Bill Cody: Lessons for Warfighters and Strategists
Mon, 10/07/2024 - 5:10pm
Reflections on Buffalo Bill Cody: Lessons for Warfighters and Strategists
By Tom Ordeman, Jr.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reflections-buffalo-bill-cody-lessons-warfighters-and-strategists
In 2020, I had occasion to begin reacquainting myself with one of my childhood heroes: Buffalo Bill Cody.
As a youngster, my family took occasional trips to the city in Wyoming that bears his name. We visited the Buffalo Bill Center of the West, and I read the semi-apocryphal biography penned by Cody's sister. Not long before the pandemic, I acquired a copy of Cody's own autobiography at my local library's annual book sale. During the pandemic, I listened to an audiobook of that selection while taking our high energy puppy out for his daily constitutionals. It was a great reminder of this larger-than-life figure, whose exploits have faded from the public consciousness over time, but who served as such an inspiration during my own youth.
Then, in 2021, I watched as American troops concluded their two-decade-long campaign in Afghanistan. Like many members of my generation, the events that precipitated America's foray into that ancient land proved life-changing for me. When the entire enterprise collapsed, I found myself trying to make sense of it. As a historian by training, I'm fond of the phrase, "History doesn't repeat itself, but it rhymes"; and as a practicing Catholic, I'm fond of the repetitive line from Ecclesiastes: "There is nothing new under the sun." In 2023, I consumed another audiobook, this time William Dalrymple's exhaustive tome on the First Anglo-Afghan War, Return of a King. It would seem that, like other events, America's ill-fated campaign in Afghanistan was predicted in prior historical stanzas.
Conversely, the more I learned about what had happened in Afghanistan - and also in Iraq, but let's focus on the first for the sake of discussion - the more I found myself stewing on the exploits of a man who could arguably be counted as one of America's earliest special operators.
As most Americans know, during the post-Civil War era, Washington dispatched much of the remainder of the U.S. Army westward to facilitate the settlement of western states by settlers of European ancestry. Volume upon volume has been written on this period, and more recently, on later concerns about the ethical compromises associated with displacing the American Indians from territory to which they possessed a pre-existing claim. By and large, discussion of those controversies falls outside the scope of this article. I introduce the topic merely to note that, when revisiting Cody's life, it became apparent that the over-simplified version of events - that it was the federal cavalry and settler militias against a monolithic corpus of American Indians - serves as a dangerous over-simplification of the historical narrative.
The truth, of course, is more complicated. Students of the French and Indian War - or those who read Lynne Reid Banks' Indian in the Cupboard novels at around the same age that I was when I originally learned about Buffalo Bill - will remember that tribes like the Iroquois allied with the English, while tribes like the Algonquian allied with the French. American Indian tribes, like most of the planet's inhabitants, found themselves in competition with one another, leading to shifting states of alliance and war between the various tribal confederacies. The arrival of European colonists led not to an immediate state of war between colonist and native, but to an intermingling of the pre-existing tribal political structure with that of the Europeans. Colonists from one European country leveraged their relationships with the indigenous tribes to engineer a strategic advantage against their rivals, and vice versa.
By Cody's day, the various European factions had largely consolidated into a single American entity, though the American Revolution, Civil War, and other conflicts demonstrated that the Europeans themselves were prone to violent political disunity. Long before foreign scouts arrived to survey the Great Plains for the arrival of Europeans, a similar dynamic had played out among the tribes of those Plains - Arapaho, Sioux, Commanche, and others - in which they competed for territory and resources. U.S. Army troops managed to partner with some tribes, affording them strategic advantage in their own conflicts with their rivals.
William Frederick Cody was born in Le Claire, Iowa Territory, in 1846. By 1868, aged twenty-two, having come of age on the Kansas plains and worked on wagon trains and as a Pony Express rider, Cody was operating as a sort of primitive defense contractor. General Philip Sheridan named him “Chief of Scouts” for the 5th Cavalry Regiment, a title bestowed after a particularly daring mission that Cody completed through hostile territory, and in recognition of his experience tracking, guiding, living off of the land, and thriving under austere circumstances. Cody's support to the 5th Cavalry leveraged his knowledge of the territory, but also his knowledge of the Plains Indians themselves. He could communicate in their languages, and in his role as Chief of Scouts, Cody trained and led a Pawnee militia in a manner similar to the mission profile of today's Army Special Forces. Additionally, Cody was familiar enough with the Sioux and their dialects to have earned a moniker in their language: "Pahaska," or "Long Hair." Cody's tenure as Chief of Scouts followed a stint of active duty military service during the Civil War, and preceded a later, non-operational appointment as a Colonel in the Nebraska National Guard.
From his childhood onward, Cody experienced many hostile encounters with the natives, killing some in a combat context, and one - a Cheyenne named Heova'ehe, "Yellow Hair," sometimes mistranslated as "Yellow Hand" - in a bizarre 1876 duel known as the Battle of Warbonnet Creek. Even during this phase of his life, Cody seemed to show respect to his adversaries. According to Cody himself:
"While at the [Red Cloud Agency] I learned the name of the Indian Chief whom I had killed in the morning; it was Yellow Hand; a son of old Cut-nose—a leading chief of the Cheyennes. Cut-nose, having learned that I had killed his son sent a white interpreter to me with a message to the effect that he would give me four mules if I would turn over to him Yellow Hand's war-bonnet, guns, pistols, ornaments, and other paraphernalia which I had captured. I sent back word to the old gentleman that it would give me pleasure to accommodate him, but I could not do it this time."
Today, we know that the Pawnee and the Cheyenne, like the other tribes, eventually lost their land to European settlers, resulting in their consolidation into the reservation system. Nearly a century and a half later, it would be easy to interpret that outcome as a foregone conclusion. Having spent a great deal of the last decade studying the First World War, and specifically the challenges associated with determining the post-war state of affairs in the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, I've come to recognize that some of those whom society now considers to be monsters were doing the best they could under difficult circumstances, attempting to reconcile a litany of mutually exclusive imperatives. Though condemnation may be in vogue, I lean toward learning of, and from, their mistakes.
To this end, Bill Cody's legacy merits consideration. As a twenty-something Chief of Scouts, Buffalo Bill found himself effectively conscripted into show business, appearing onstage as himself and recounting stories of his frontier exploits on stages east of the Mississippi. As demand for plains scouts and buffalo hunters diminished, Cody became an actor and showman. In 1883, Cody founded Buffalo Bill's Wild West, the most famous of a genre of traveling vaudeville acts of the time. Popularizing the danger, action, and intrigue of the American frontier, Buffalo Bill's Wild West became an international sensation, touring not only the United States, but also extensively in Europe. Notably, Cody's show hired American Indians, and while traveling with the show's company, they showcased their culture and lifestyle to fascinated attendees. Cody was known for paying a fair wage, which allowed members of his cast to improve the circumstances of their families and tribes. Later in his life, Cody became an advocate for the American Indians, publicly encouraging officials in Washington to treat "the former foe, present friend, the American" fairly and respectfully. Cody was once quoted as saying, "Every Indian outbreak that I have ever known has resulted from broken promises and broken treaties by the government."
As I mentioned, as I reacquainted myself with Cody's life, I couldn't help but make the inevitable comparisons to more recent events. The American government - under a succession of administrations led by Presidents from both parties - made promises to the Afghans that were broken on a rolling basis, leading to a growing animosity between the two parties. In a manner similar to the conflict between the natives and the European settlers, complex cultural and political factors were reduced to singular, monolithic concepts by troops and citizens alike: references to "the Indians" and "the Taliban" both lump disparate groups together, while ignoring important contextual distinctions within those bodies. Operation Pineapple Express, the now-infamous effort by special operations veterans to extricate Afghans and their families during the fall of Kabul, echoed Cody's own efforts to promote the welfare of the American Indian tribes during and after formal hostilities. The list goes on, and expands considerably when one considers the wider context of post-9/11 operations.
Conversely, despite some of these uncomfortable similarities, the contrasts between contemporary operations and those of Buffalo Bill's day also merit consideration. While scouts like Buffalo Bill may not have "gone native" in the strictest sense of the phrase, they would have been comfortable living off the land in a manner that today's special operators practice only during their selection pipeline. They would have been prepared to share in the austere lifestyles of the tribes with which they partnered, building common cause and esprit de corps with those they sought to influence. Additionally, scouts like Cody would have brought intimate knowledge not only of the terrain, but also of the political and cultural dynamics of the indigenous tribes, to their work. In this sense, Cody and his colleagues would have functioned not only in a capacity comparable to that of the 18-series Special Forces, but also as the nineteenth century equivalent of 48-series Foreign Area Officers.
Buffalo Bill's Wild West toured the United States and Europe for more than three decades, ending just a few years before Cody's 1917 death. In 1872, Cody had received the Medal of Honor, but this was revoked in 1917 following actions in Washington to recalibrate the military awards system. Cody's award was restored in 1989 following a lengthy campaign by his family and Wyoming Senator Alan K. Simpson, which led to the recognition of scouts like Cody as officers. While Cody's ranch outside North Platte, Nebraska is now a state historical park, he gave his name to the city in northwestern Wyoming where a complex of memorial museums were eventually built in his honor. Today, the Buffalo Bill Center of the West features museums highlighting western art, natural history, firearms, the Plains Indians, and Buffalo Bill himself. The complex deserves a pilgrimage by every American, and both Cody's memoirs and the sensationalized biography by his sister are worth reading. Archival versions of both are available at the Internet Archive, and prolific LibriVox reader Barry Eads has recorded both volumes as free audiobooks.
In his 2005 book, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground, author Robert D. Kaplan recounts American troops, many of them Green Berets, describing overseas hot spots as "Indian Country" in recognition of conditions encountered by American troops during the Indian Wars. For various reasons, some legitimate and some less so, study of these campaigns and their historical context - both by professional historians and by serving troops - has fallen out of favor. While many warfighters may have shifted their focus back to more conventional conflicts, ample grounds persist to expect some continuation of "Indian Wars" throughout the world: either small wars in their own right, or proxy conflicts in which American forces seek strategic advantage against prominent nation state competitors. In this regard, Buffalo Bill deserves renewed consideration, both for his own heroism and character, and also for the key operational concepts to which his story serves as an accessible entrée.
Note: A 2021 podcast interview about Buffalo Bill Cody, conducted by the author and featuring Center of the West Curator Dr. Jeremy Johnston, can be found here, and bonus content from that interview can be found here.
Tom Ordeman, Jr. is an Oregon-based information security professional, freelance military historian, and former federal contractor. A graduate with Distinction from the University of Aberdeen’s MSc program in Strategic Studies, he holds multiple DoD and industry security certifications. Between 2006 and 2017, he supported training and enterprise risk management requirements for multiple DoD and federal civilian agencies. His research interests include the modern history of the Sultanate of Oman, and the exploits of the Gordon Highlanders during the First World War. His opinions are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of any entity with which he is associated.
4. How Ukraine’s Recovery From War Can Inform Kyiv’s Car-driven Chaos
Mon, 10/07/2024 - 5:18pm
How Ukraine’s Recovery From War Can Inform Kyiv’s Car-driven Chaos[1]
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-ukraines-recovery-war-can-inform-kyivs-car-driven-chaos
Russell W. Glenn
How much space is occupied by people using a bus, bicycle, or car?[2]
Here's a shocker: In 2023, The Economist's Global Liveability Index ranked Kyiv among the ten least comfortable cities in which to live.[3] Russian missile and drone attacks will do that, as will resultant interruptions in public services and other of war’s disruptions. That said, Ukraine’s capital had issues before Bad Neighbor’s February 2022 renewal of its incursions from 2014. The residue of Soviet-era plans and associated failure to develop a viable development strategy in their stead meant Kyiv’s quality of life suffered increased pollution, disproportionately high rates of vehicle-related injuries and deaths, and other problems. Additionally, post-World War II urban construction under Soviet influence inadequately prepared Ukraine’s cities for the proliferation of automobiles following the 1991 end of Cold War. Housing construction in the 1950s focused on large apartment complexes rather than standalone dwellings as in the United States and elsewhere. The original apartment complexes were well served by public transportation, services that atrophied with the breakup of the Soviet Union other than—in the case of Kyiv—the well-maintained metro train system. Later housing projects built on the city’s outskirts were likewise poorly served. (Ukrainian cities today still have a considerably higher percentage of residents living in apartments when compared to Western Europe, the US, and Canada.) The result: Kyivans’ reliance on private cars or mini-buses with its accompanying congestion and pollution.
So here it is: How Kyiv’s frenetic traffic, frenzied parking, and pedestrians’ daily fight to survive the capital’s streets (or any horizontal surface for that matter) can benefit as Ukraine begins its recovery from war…even as war continues.
Driving and parking in Kyiv
The considerable gap between Kyiv’s car-related regulations and reality on the streets—and sidewalks…and parks…and playgrounds…and public transport lanes—is a titanic one.[4] Vehicle ownership was constrained prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Then came the fall of The Wall and fragmentation. Enter the automobile in large numbers. Driver training fell well short of need, a condition persisting today. It is also not unusual for drivers to lack a legitimate license. Courtesy is frequently in short supply. Driver aggression shows little regard for pedestrian safety. It does show a willingness to see sidewalks as an extension of road surfaces. The brutal level of accidents is unsurprising in light of TomTom company analytics finding pre-2022 Kyiv’s congestion among the world’s worst. The city is notorious in terms of pedestrian, bike rider, passenger, and driver unsafety. Further compounding the problem is that failure of the once notable public transportation system. The exception of the metro unfortunately became part of the problem when a section on one of the city’s three lines was damaged by flooding, causing closure of several stations, though Kyiv adapted somewhat with shuttles providing between-closed-stations movement.[5] War is chaos. So are driving and parking in Kyiv.
It’s pretty clear: Moving cars are a problem in Ukrainian cities. The problems don’t cease when they stop. Parking in Kyiv is no less anarchical than driving. This is not to imply there haven’t been efforts to tame the thus far untamable. Kyiv wisely prorates the cost of parking based on local vehicle density:
- Zone I (the central part of the city): 35 hryvnia/hour ($0.85/hour)
- Zone II (central districts away from the city center and other commercial areas such as shopping centers and rail stations): 25 hryvnia/hour ($0.61/hour)
- Zone III (other areas): 5 hryvnia/hour ($0.12/hour)
Daily fines follow the same logic. All are twenty times the hourly rate, so the penalties by zone are:
- Zone I: 700 hryvnia ($17.04)
- Zone II: 500 hryvnia ($12.17)
- Zone III: 100 hryvnia ($2.43)
[These fees might seem an exceptionally good bargain in comparison to US parking costs, but note the average monthly salary for Kyiv is 25,000 hryvnia ($604.60), that for Ukraine as a whole 21,400 hryvnia ($517.54).][6]
Parking in Ukraine is not free of the country’s longtime bugaboo of corruption. But here too, countermeasures have been put in place. Whereas cash was once allowed, now payment must be via an app or other automated form. The policy should help Kyiv’s coffers. In commenting on the previously permitted policy, one author noted, “in other cities this type of fee collection has led to spillage of revenue. There is no doubt that the payment scheme in Kiev is leading to lost income.” That said, what was lost to theft must have paled in comparison to income foregone due to scofflaws and poor enforcement. The same author related that “official estimates assume that only 30% of drivers pay for parking.”[7] There is occasionally legitimate respite from having to pay, however. The VisitUkraine.Today website advises car owners “that during an air raid, inspectors do not fine drivers and do not evacuate [tow] cars. So you shouldn't worry about it.” The website goes on to reasonably suggest, “if you hear the air raid alarm, take cover immediately.”[8]
Where Kyiv’s drivers park is but part of the problem. How they park can be another. Signs dictate how to park where confusion might otherwise arise, though the variety of options around Kyiv is near amazing:[9]
Mind the gap…between regulation and reality
Calibrated parking fees, automated payment, and clearly specified guidance regarding how to park belie what one finds on the ground. The international Institute for Development and Transportation Policy described parking in 2015 Kyiv as
visibly chaotic. Drivers park their cars everywhere—on the sidewalk, in crosswalks, in moving lanes, on playgrounds, in public plazas, on grass, and seemingly wherever a surface space can be accessed. Though a municipal enterprise, known as KyivTransParkService (KTPS), oversees payments in officially sanctioned spaces, there is still rampant illegal parking…. The problem starts with numbers. With a population of 3.5 million, [Kyiv] has approximately 1.5 million cars. These vehicles vie for only 25,000 regulated public parking spaces, of which only 6,500 are on the street. As a result, drivers fill whatever space they can find, causing obstructed sidewalks and overrun public plazas. Though the answer to [Kyiv’s] parking problem will need to include a greater focus on public transit and non-motorized transport, it is clear that better management of existing infrastructure is needed. Even for the spaces that exist, the current system is broken.[10]
Less-than-safe foot movement begins once a passenger or driver exits their vehicle. Those with disabilities or other special needs can find getting around especially challenging. Just as designated parking places are too few, pedestrian-designated (or pedestrian-protected) routes from where one might park fail to meet needs. Those seeking an elevator or ramp to assist with mobility limitations, pushing a baby carriage (pram for you British and Commonwealth readers), pulling a suitcase, or otherwise looking for an alternative to stairs and other obstacles rarely find succor. Many are the below-ground passageways devoid of ready access. Above ground, marked crosswalks are scarce, helping to explain the precariousness of moving about on foot.
It seems not much has changed with the passage of the near-decade since 2015.
Kyiv’s cars and Ukraine’s recovery from war
Despite the enduring war, Kyiv’s ongoing recovery efforts are far less frenzied than conditions on the streets…and sidewalks…etc., etc., … That is true despite broad spectrum of citizens’ suffering. Urban areas farther west have but occasionally been on the receiving end of Russian aggression. Others have been all but destroyed, Mariupol in the country’s southeast being a prime example. Each has or will have choices in terms of the extent to which it redefines itself or instead chooses to return to some pre-war state. History tells us a combination of the two is likely.
Whether Russian-inflicted damage is limited to a few buildings or spread city-wide, closed roads and disrupted lives will be the norm as cities continue to rebuild and replace. These interruptions will test public patience. Yet Ukraine’s citizens have again and again proven themselves up to life’s toughest tests. The days following Russia’s 24 February 24, 2022 renewed invasion saw citizens rush to aid in throwing back the attackers. Some went online to report enemy locations and movements. Others provided food or another form of support to defenders. No few took up arms and fought alongside their soldiers. These actions were extraordinary; most throughout history choose to do little more than avoid danger. Extraordinary, but unsurprising. These are the same citizens who had been asserting themselves in years prior to the attacks, whether by challenging politicians who refused to promote their country’s newfound sovereignty or reporting low-level corruption in a society where its absence is noteworthy. Many have since shown a no less extraordinary willingness to forego amenities in support of their men and women at the front as the New York Times attests:
Braving rain and snow, hundreds of Ukrainians gathered last week outside the Kyiv City Council with signs reading, “I don’t want a park” and “Why do I need paving stones?” They chanted, jumped and clapped as they called for an end to road repairs and a freeze on the construction of a new subway depot. Protesting the renovation of one’s city may seem highly unusual, especially in a country whose president was elected four years ago on a promise to repair roads. But protesters said a more urgent cause demands funding today — the war effort…. The capital’s military budget for 2024 — about $27 million, according to official figures — is only a fraction of [2023’s], which has outraged protesters. “I want the budget to be used for the defense of our country, not to repave sidewalks or put asphalt on roads that already look normal,” said Tetiana Nagumuk, who was standing among protesters last week, a Ukrainian flag draped around her shoulders.[11]
Recovery from any disaster, man-caused as is the case with war or as a result of Mother Nature, requires that social and economic considerations receive attention in addition to the obvious demands of restoring physical infrastructure. Car-related issues span the gamut in this regard as the above discussion makes clear. For example, restoring the physical infrastructure of streets should also incorporate social considerations (residents’ confidence in being able to move around safely and the emotional implications of a traffic victim’s death or injury, for example) and those economic (cost of medical-related tribulations brought about by accidents or exacerbated by pollution). Ukraine’s leaders can reward citizens’ patience and commitment to front-line support by taking on its chaotic driving and parking during recovery planning. Other cities provide relevant lessons. New York is among those taking from cars to give to pedestrians, cyclists, and residents seeking a moment’s rest. Some changes cleverly take on both parking and pedestrian safety by putting parked cars between flowing traffic and bike lanes such that the sequence is traveled way->parking slots->bike lane->curb->sidewalk. Barcelona is another, adapting their streets by adopting a Superblock approach that relegates automobiles to secondary status (of which more in a moment). Given that above-noted average income in Ukraine’s cities is low by Western standards, parking fines can be punishing for those less wealthy while hardly qualifying as an inconvenience for the rich, this in a country with considerable income disparity. Finland and Norway are among the countries offering a possible way ahead in this regard. Both prorate fines based on income, speeding in Norway costing an astounding one-tenth of the violator’s annual income. If that speed is excessive, penalties also include a mandatory minimum 18-day jail sentence. Canada and Switzerland are among the countries that also levy hefty fines for driving or parking violations…or both.[12]
Henry Graber, in his Paved Paradise: How Parking Explains the World, offers a number of counters to long-accepted parking policy practices, some of which could reduce both public and private rebuilding costs in Kyiv.[13] Grabar reports that “in Las Vegas, an above-ground parking garage built to code added 50 percent of the cost of the building. In Los Angeles, 32 percent. If the garage was underground, those figures rose by double digits.”[14]
His advice: do away with or revise minimum requirements for the number of required parking spaces required when building and reverse counterproductive policies such as cheap or free curbside parking (or, in the case of Kyiv, sometimes-on-the-sidewalk parking). Benefits include reduced congestion, less pollution, and lower fuel consumption. All three are rewards for making street parking more expensive as drivers then choose lower-cost nearby garage or lot parking rather than spending lengthy periods trolling for more economical street spaces. Those same residents who argue for more money being allocated to the front lines will easily grasp that less gasoline consumed in the hunt for parking translates to more petroleum available for home heating during cold Ukrainian winters, vehicles taking the fight to the enemy, and less demand for what will for a number of years be a much-in-demand and expensive commodity given refusal to support Russian providers in the aftermath of February 2022’s renewed incursions.
Ukrainians’ patience will be needed for many years. It will, for example, take decades and billions of dollars to neutralize Ukraine’s millions of mines and other unexploded ordnance. That same patience will be called for in awaiting housing and other infrastructure replacement or repair. Why then, look not just at immediate ways to better Ukraine’s urban transportation but consider others looking toward the more distant future? The Netherlands began fighting its dependency on cars in the early 1970s, motivated by the expense of the country’s vehicle-based infrastructure and a gas crisis. A post-WWII surge in vehicle casualties was also a factor. Dutch drivers were the perpetrators of 20 percent more car-related fatalities per capita than the United States in 1975. With the dawning of the 21st century, however, reliance on bicycles had become world famous while the number of traffic-related deaths dropped to 60 percent less than in the US. Acceptance and related benefits were slow to come at first, but by 2019 over a quarter of trips were on bicycles even as car accidents (mostly car-bike) and bike rider fatalities decreased. (US bicycle trips constitute well under 5% of the country’s travel share.) Think of the fuel savings, pollution reduction, and health upticks in these numbers. Dutch use of bicycles remains world famous. Day or night; summer, winter, autumn, or spring—cyclists rule the roads and woe to a motor vehicle operator striking one.[15]
Other upsides in robbing Chevfordota to pay Paulina and Paul include more parks, playgrounds, and other quality of life amenities. Grabar notes that Los Angeles County’s parking requirements have resulted in two hundred square miles being dedicated to storing cars not in use, the equivalent of a three-story garage covering the entirety of Washington, D.C. NYC’s protected bike lanes, Barcelona’s Superblocks, the Netherlands’ bicycle-centrality: only limits to imagination hinder innovative thinking. Ingenuity, invention, and a willingness to listen to residents and experts are all part of solutions.
Recovery from war is one of mankind’s most difficult undertakings. “Winning the peace” has often proved harder than winning a war as Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan attest. Notably, those governing Ukraine are already taking giant strides toward a successful recovery, that even as war continues. Unlike with devastated urban areas in post-World War II Germany and Japan, Ukrainians do not face a Year Zero scenario in which destruction is so great that what was offers little upon which to build (with notable exceptions such as Mariupol). Legitimate governments remain in place aside from cities subjected to continued Russian occupation. How might they address driving dissonance and parking pandemonium, thereby enhancing constituents’ quality of life? Among the forums for improvement: policy development, management, and leadership; public health; countering corruption along with its cousin black marketing; and education and information campaigns.
Vehicle policies, management, and leadership
Quality urban leadership makes for quality urban life. In addition to soliciting local resident views on how best to balance community desires and city needs, better leaders avoid a soda straw perspective when viewing car-related issues. We have noted that both driving and parking involve far more than streets and spaces no less than urban recovery generally. Separating traveled ways from sidewalks, parks, playgrounds, outside dining, and bike and scooter ways and other enhancements require maintaining a grip on the big picture. Solutions might involve denying drivers access to select streets altogether. Alternatively, removing other-than-drivers from some locations to the extent feasible could be desirable. Statistics and need suggest introducing passenger bridges or tunnels in Kyiv where pre-war conditions made them impractical. Encouraging above- or below-ground street-spanning connections (with good pedestrian access) between buildings via tax breaks or other incentives is a too little-used solution. Such spans would be especially appropriate for linking public transport facilities and parking garages, school properties to pedestrian ways, and otherwise avoiding high-density and particularly dangerous locations.
Were city regulations to differ within Ukraine, bad habits tolerated in City A would migrate when its drivers visit City B. City B officials would ensure visitors pay the price of their evil ways, but residents in the better-behaved city would in the interim undergo inconvenience or worse. Similarly, uniform standards for clearing explosives, suppression of corruption, and treatment of those who collaborate with the enemy are a must to ensure countrywide public safety and just treatment. Some degree of tension between such centralized federal guidance and the need for legitimate local adaptation will certainly exist across Ukraine’s recovery efforts. The issue of collaboration with Russian occupiers has already seen several dubious official dictates from Kyiv. The result has been ill-will as community members watch those they believe deserve punishment escape retribution while others suffer what locals think are injustices. Early guidance from the capital condemned virtually any cooperation with Russian authorities. Many had legitimate reasons for continuing work despite it being under occupying authorities’ jurisdiction. Doctors treated patients and teachers chose to teach, both groups fearing the effects of lengthy periods with no provision of their services. So too did cities depend on those providing essential services such as policing, fire response, and utilities maintenance. When it comes to driving and parking, finding the balance between overarching guidance and reasonable adaptation to local conditions will be the right answer.
Kyiv’s—and Ukraine’s—recovery comes at a pivotal time in terms of urban design. Driverless cars and those electric are likely to reach tipping points at which they become ubiquitous if not dominant parts of urban life. Parking will be less called for as ridesharing companies operate driverless vehicles 24-7. Standalone refueling stations will be less necessary. Collocation of recharging stations for electric vehicles with what parking facilities remain, commercial properties, and residences will become the norm. Though the current immaturity of the driverless movement makes details of its future difficult to assess, proliferation of such vehicles should have some—and potentially a significant—influence in reducing congestion. The same is true of related software allowing for less distance between bumpers and (eventually) elimination of the need to stop at intersections when traffic flows allow. The already established popularity of car-sharing rentals in larger European cities and elsewhere further foretells of a decrease in private vehicle ownership…and corresponding total number of vehicles on roads and in spaces.
Public health and quality of life
Barcelona’s population density in 2023 was five times that of Amsterdam and fourfold greater than Berlin’s. It had been one of Europe’s most congested, polluted, and noisy cities thirty years before. Today, its 400 by 400 meter (1300 by 1300 feet) Superblocks dictate that cars, bicycles, scooters, and other other-than-pedestrian modes of transport share a speed limit of ten kilometers (six miles) per hour in these mini-havens. Pedestrian traffic has increased by 10%, bike trips by 30%. Vehicle usage fell by 92% in one “superblocked” area without exacerbating traffic on nearby streets while noise and air pollution likewise decreased. Cars, according to one observer, simply “‘evaporated’; people chose not to use them as often.”[16] Ukraine take note: As with wiser parking regulations and pricing, the result has reduced health risks, clamor, and congestion. What’s not to like?
Corruption and black marketing
What other challenges lurk in Kyiv’s car use that might be informed by or, perhaps, inform recovery from the ongoing war? The use of automated payments in lieu of cash has spread to other public transactions in the fight against petty corruption. Online apps also enable passport, car insurance, home title, and other public-service transactions. Yet the corrupt are sure to adapt. New York City found counterfeiting or falsely obtaining disabled placards became a popular way to sidestep paying for parking. Some of the city’s boys in blue—the police—were unfortunately among the fraudsters. Applying justice to urban scofflaws should present no great challenge. Potential remedies include public shaming, many hours of unpaid public service, stiff financial penalties, loss of jobs, and stints in prison. Some have shown noteworthy creativity when it comes to shaming. For example, fan of public shaming
Ivanov-Kostetskyi mentions an interesting method of shaming for violations he observed in Germany. "Punishments are issued very cunningly there for not paying for a parking space. Instead of a check [ticket], the driver is given a piece of paper under the windshield wiper on which it is noted that they behaved badly, the authorities recorded the license plate number, and the driver will receive a fine within the time limit specified by law.”[17]
Ivanov-Kostetskyi might be too nice a guy. Some individuals in the United States post photographs of exceptionally bad parking jobs on the internet or leave notes on the perpetrator’s windshield. Americans are not alone in the practice. A remarkably bad parking effort in the United Kingdom gained the perpetrator a note accompanied by a condom, a signal that perhaps the driver should consider not reproducing.[18]
Stiffer penalties could be put in place for particularly egregious or repeated driving or parking violations. Late 11th-century author Nizam al-Mulk offers pithy advice in his Siyasat Nameh or Book of Politics:
If an official assesses a farmer more than is due to the authorities, the sum he unjustly raised should be demanded of him and returned to the farmer, and if the official has any property, it should be confiscated as an example to other agents so they refrain from tyrannical acts.[19]
There is no need confiscation need apply only to public officials. Along the lines of the US “Don’t even think of parking here” might be a Ukrainian adoption of “Park without paying: Donate your car to the army” to ensure might-be abusers realize just how stiff a resultant fine could be. Surely the military would benefit from no-cost acquisition of behind-front-lines transportation.
Draconian? Perhaps you’ll think differently given the need for a Kyiv website to advise drivers not to park their cars:
- “on streetcar tracks and at railroad crossings;
- at bus and minibus stops;
- on flowerbeds, lawns, greenery areas;
- at crosswalks and 10 meters before them;
- in tunnels and on entrances and exits;
- on overpasses, bridges, various overpasses and under them;
-
in other places where the auto may interfere with the movement of other vehicles and pedestrians.”[20]
Education and information campaigns
The education campaigns put together by the Allies in Berlin, Tokyo, and other cities under occupation following World War II took on the considerable challenge of reorienting societies long indoctrinated in the ways of fascism. Years of propaganda meant everything from textbooks to newspapers and motion pictures had to be drastically revised or pulped. That Ukraine benefits from the good fortune of not having experienced such brutal attacks on its national psyche (other than in those less fortunate areas long occupied by the enemy) does not mean there will not be a need for extensive and well-considered education initiatives. Nevertheless, those post-WWII approaches employed by the Allies can advise the molding of new behaviors in the vehicle arena as cities make known new standards. Insights from that distant past and newly created traffic public information campaigns can in turn advise the far more challenging tasks that will come when cities long Russian-occupied return to Kyiv’s governing fold. An incomplete list of other areas already needing Ukraine-wide information campaigns include (1) warning of dangers associated with mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), (2) how to compensate for energy, construction material, and other shortages, (3) advice regarding procedures for making wartime loss claims, and (4) where and how to seek assistance with post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) and other injuries, these in addition to better guidelines regarding just ways of dealing with those accused of enemy collaboration. None of these will be one and done. Surprising though it may be when the topics include such life-threatening issues as UXO and PTSD, public information programs require frequent reinforcement as diligence wanes.
Are we getting there from here?: Measuring progress…or lack of it
Good measures of progress are easy to understand, un-burdensome to support with data, avoid motivating negative behaviors, encourage positive ones, are adaptable to changing conditions, and—vitally—measure effectiveness (impact) rather than merely the amount of effort expended. In contrast, poorly designed metrics can lead to destructive conduct. Examples of metrics gone bad include the notorious use of body count during the US war in Vietnam (motivating false reporting at best and counting deceased civilians as enemy at worst) and dollars spent during America’s efforts to rebuild postwar Iraq and Afghanistan (for encouraging spending with no understanding of the benefits accrued). Ukrainian UXO neutralization organizations continue to suffer the consequences of misunderstanding the difference measures of effort and measures of effect. Despite education initiatives, some donors insist on gaging demining success by the number of explosive items removed per unit area or the cost of clearance per square meter. Both merely reflect labor expended. Neither tells of the benefits accruing from that effort. Removing thousands of mines to no significant effect might look good on paper. Removing one hundred mines and by so doing opening ten vital trafficways tells of benefits obtained.
Insightfully designed measures of success in addressing traffic challenges have the potential to inform metrics design in all of Ukraine’s recovery sectors (corruption reduction, effectiveness of donor dollars spent, and value of information campaigns, food distribution, and economic recovery among them). A reduction in the number of collisions and vehicle-related deaths might suggest the effects of better traffic enforcement and street design. Other metric designs will demand greater subtly. Increased income from vehicle violations might seem a reflection of better enforcement. If fines are so low that drivers don’t consider them an incentive to obey the law, however, then the metric merely reflects greater effort expended in writing tickets. Among the lessons key to developing recovery metrics: Sometimes multifaceted measures will be needed to gage effectiveness. More income from parking fines combined with less traffic congestion and fewer cars where they shouldn’t be gets at effectiveness. (By the way, there is potential irony in reducing parking violations. Better adherence to parking laws can reduce city income as there are fewer cars to fine.) As with the case of UXO disposal, city officials will find measuring improvements in the traffic sector has its share of potholes.
Some might argue that Ukrainian drivers’ creative parking and aggressive driving reflect the same innovation and “can do” attitude prominent in the country’s inventive weapons manufacturing emergent since February 2022. Perhaps, but allowing drivers to run amok at the cost of fellow citizens’ welfare is far different than taking the fight to Russian invaders. A bit of restraint in the service of Kyivan and other residents’ quality of life will in no way hinder resourcefulness in other arenas. Solving Kyiv’s driving and parking problems would be but one benefit gathered along the path of Ukraine’s successful recovery from war. Yet Kyiv’s driving and parking provide a microcosm from which to learn and trial approaches to the much greater challenge Ukraine’s cities face in recovering from war, this no less than recovery writ large can advise how to improve the daily lives of the country’s citizens.
Endnotes
[1] Readers wanting to access one or more of the sources from which much of the below is drawn should check out “Tackling Parking in Kiev, Ukraine,” Institute for Development and Transportation Policy. 6 August 2015, https://itdp.org/2015/08/06/tackling-parking-in-kiev-ukraine/; “What are the problems with Kyiv’s urban planning and how can international experience help?” Rubryka, 7 February 2024, https://rubryka.com/en/article/kyiv-genplan-i-zatory/; “Traffic and Road Conditions in Ukraine,” CountryReports, 2024, https://www.countryreports.org/country/Ukraine/traffic.htm; “Kyiv returns paid parking: where and how much you will have to pay,” Visit Ukraine Today. 8 November 2022, https://visitukraine.today/blog/1138/kyiv-returns-paid-parking-where-and-how-much-you-will-have-to-pay; “Parking in Kyiv.” LLC Autoprokat LTD, 2024, https://autoprokat.net.ua/en/articles/kyiv-parking.html; “Paying for Parking in Kyiv.” Department of Transport Infrastructure of the Kyiv City State Administration, 2011, https://parking.kyiv.digital; and Henry Grabar, Paved Paradise: How Parking Explains the World. New York: Penguin, 2024.
[2] Photo from Daniel Bowen, “Road space: bus vs bikes vs cars – a famous photo recreated in Canberra,” 19 September 2012, https://danielbowen.com/2012/09/19/road-space-photo/. Bowen reports the photograph is freely available thanks to its originator, the Australian Cycling Promotion Board. Also see “Bikes, People, a Bus and Cars,” We Are Traffic!, 11June 2012, https://wearetraffic.org/car-vs-bicycle-vs-bus. The photo is an approximation as both the bicycles and cars would take more space if actually using a roadway. See comment in Jarrett Walker, “Canberra: ‘They Only Refer to Buses.” Human Transfer, 28 September 2010, https://humantransit.org/2010/09/canberra-they-only-refer-to-buses.html.
[3] “Best and Worst Cities in which to live,” Economist Intelligence Unit Global Livability Index 2023, https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/global-liveability-index-2023/.
[4] Henry Grabar, Paved Paradise, 273.
[5] Leo Chiu, “Metro Section in Kyiv to Be Closed for 6 Months Due to Emergency Repairs,” Kyiv Post. 11 December 2023, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/25338. A later decision was made to replace rather than repair the faulty section. See “A new section of the tunnel will be built on the blue line of the Kyiv metro instead of repairing the old one.” Front News. 30 January 2024, https://frontnews.eu/en/news/details/73705.
[6] “Average salary in Kyiv” and “Average salary in Ukraine,” Work.ua. 2024, https://www.work.ua/en/salary-kyiv/ and https://www.work.ua/en/salary-all/, respectively.
[7] “Tackling Parking in Kiev, Ukraine.”
[8] “Parking in Kyiv will be paid again: how much does it cost and how to pay.” VisitUkraine.Today. 11 April 2024, https://visitukraine.today/blog/3798/parking-in-kyiv-will-be-paid-again-how-much-does-it-cost-and-how-to-pay#how-to-pay-for-parking-using-the-kyiv-digital-app.
[9] “Parking in Kyiv.”
[10] “Tackling Parking in Kiev, Ukraine.”
[11] Constant Méheut, “More Drones, Fewer Parks. Ukrainians Urge Spending Shift as War Drags On.” New York Times. 22 December 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/22/world/europe/ukraine-spending-war-russia.html?unlocked_article_code=1.IU0.wM3u.RYSo6j1Ti7zU&smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare.
[12] “Finland’s ‘progressive punishment’ when it comes to speeding tickets.” Euro News. 4 January 2024, https://www.euronews.com/2023/01/04/finlands-progressive-punishment-when-it-comes-to-speeding-tickets#:~:text=or%20very%20cheap?-,Did%20you%20know%20getting%20a%20speeding%20ticket%20in%20Finland%20can,daily%20salary%20divided%20by%20two; and "Don't Speed in Norway! Speeding Fines Around the World," The Weiland Firm, undated, https://www.cnrlawyers.com/news/high-speeding-ticket-fines/#:~:text=Do%20you%20make%20an%20annual,annual%20income%20for%20speeding%20tickets.
[13] Grabar, Paved Paradise.
[14] Grabar, Paved Paradise, 222.
[15] “What are the problems with Kyiv’s urban planning and how can international experience help?” Rubryka. 7 February 2024, https://rubryka.com/en/article/kyiv-genplan-i-zatory/; and Grabar, 274. For a good overview of this transition, see “The Dutch Approach to Bicycle Mobility: Retrofitting Street Design for Cycling,” US Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Office of International Programs. 1 2019, https://international.fhwa.dot.gov/pubs/pl18004/chap02.cfm.
[16] Michele Castrezzati, “Barcelona’s Superblocks: Putting People at the Centre – Literally.” CityChangers.org. 28 March 2023, https://citychangers.org/barcelona-superblocks/; Ronika Postaria, “Superblock (Superilla) Barcelona – a city redefined.” Cities Forum. 31 May 2021, https://www.citiesforum.org/news/superblock-superilla-barcelona-a-city-redefined/; and Mathieu Desprez, “[Panorama Sustainable Cities: #6 Barcelona is being transformed thanks to superblocks,” Bouygues Construction Blog. 1 February 2024, https://www.bouygues-construction.com/blog/en/villes-durables-barcelone/. Also see David Roberts, “Barcelona wants to build 500 superblocks. This is what it learned from the first ones,.” Vox. 9 April 2019, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/4/9/18273894/barcelona-urban-planning-superblocks-poblenou. These are early times in Barcelona’s Superblock introduction. Six existed in early 2024. Plans are to greatly expand application with 503 such areas in place by 2030. Longer-term impacts on traffic and other factors thus merits continued monitoring.
[17] “What are the problems with Kyiv’s urban planning and how can international experience help?” Rubryka. 7 February 2024, https://rubryka.com/en/article/kyiv-genplan-i-zatory/.
[18] “Driver finds snarky note, condom on his poorly parked car,” WDBO radio. 21 March 2016, https://www.wdbo.com/news/local/driver-finds-snarky-note-condom-his-poorly-parked-car/D8sV7itDXDhquNbEpyh0IK/.
[19] Quoted in Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security. NewYork: W.W. Norton, 2015, 10-11.
[20] “Parking in Kyiv, Autoprokat LTD, 2024, https://autoprokat.net.ua/en/articles/kyiv-parking.html.
Categories: urban environment - urban areas - Dense Urban Areas - urban operations - dense urban terrain
About the Author(s)
Russell W. Glenn
Dr. Russell W. Glenn spent sixteen years in the think tank community before joining the faculty of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, this after over twenty-five years with the US Army. His most recent publications are Brutal Catalyst: What Ukraine’s Cities Tell Us about Recovery from War (KeyPoint Press, 2024) and Gods’ War, a Civil War novel (2023).
5. Is the attack helicopter dead?
I have never heard of this website before. But it asks an important question. Will drones replace the attack helicopter?
Is the attack helicopter dead?
hushkit.net · by Hush Kit · October 7, 2024
The attack helicopter is costly and complex to operate, yet it is taking a mauling in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion attempt of Ukraine starting in 2022 has shown both the vulnerability of helicopters and the effectiveness of small, uncrewed aircraft against armour. With this in mind, we ask: Is the attack helicopter dead?
Few observers thought Ukraine could withstand the Russian onslaught of 2022. Footage released in April footage of the destruction of a Russian Kamov attack helicopter was a huge morale boost. And more followed.
https://twitter.com/Conflicts/status/1511289960862789635
The conflict in Ukraine has been marked by comparatively staggering losses of both anti-armour helicopters and armour. A quick internet search (July 2024) suggests the following losses:
Russia:
Tanks: “More than 3,000” (Feb 2024) www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-relying-old-stocks-after-losing-3000-tanks-ukraine-leading-military-2024-02-13/
Helicopters: Flight Global “Kyiv claims to have destroyed 310 Russian helicopters since Moscow’s forces invaded Ukraine in February 2022, although this total cannot be independently verified. Losses have included multiple examples of the Kamov Ka-52 and Mil Mi-28N.”
Ukraine:
Tanks: One estimate indicates about one third of the losses sustained by Russia – so approx. 1,000
Helicopters: Wikipedia lists 61, of which 16 Mil 24/35 and 39 Mil 8/17
Armour operations
Typical Western doctrine (offensive or defensive) uses manned armoured reconnaissance ahead of the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) to locate enemy forces and determine their intentions. Increasingly, manned operations will be supported by other ISR, such as UAVs and later UGVs, to augment the manned platforms.
Recce: This is driven by a recce Plan determined by the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), which are designed to fill in gaps in intelligence and distinguish enemy feints and deception tactics from their main force’s true intentions and timing. Other objectives would typically be to locate enemy command and control, logistics, air defence units, long-range artillery, and other high-value/high-threat components.
The recce info will then shape the deployment of main armour and infantry (again offensive or defensive), supporting anti-armour helicopter and precision long-range artillery operations.
Manned armoured reconnaissance beyond the FLOT (i.e. in enemy territory) is likely to be hazardous, particularly if the enemy has effective electronic surveillance capabilities. Traffic analysis can be used to locate signal traffic from unknown forces and, even if encrypted, is likely to result in unwelcome attention. The US tends to assume their comms cannot be read, so they report every enemy observation. The UK is more concerned about transmissions being detected (even if not read) and tends to operate largely under radio silence.
Terrain masking to avoid detection may make VHF traffic difficult, so HF or datalink to SATCOMs may have to be used.
Armour and Mechanised Infantry: In addition, armour, on both sides, is having a hard time. In the Ukraine case, the threat has proven to be a combination of precision artillery and long-range missile attack, combined with top attack by armed drones.
The author identified this latter threat as a concern more than a dozen years ago – having noted that Hezbollah, in the first Lebanon conflict, had deployed armed drones against Israeli armour.
Because of the high mass of protective armour leading to weight and mobility issues, MBT protection is concentrated against direct fire attacks from other MBTs. Top protection is typically reduced, primarily against artillery near misses – rather than direct hits, now being the norm. Even with these measures, deployed MBT mass is typically around 62 tonnes, and top protection is one area that is typically traded off in order to achieve acceptable mobility.
Active protection systems are not yet regarded as mature and may introduce hazards to nearby personnel (if operating with infantry, for example). I am unsure how successful these are in Israeli use, or whether they have been used successfully in Ukraine.
Furthermore, Western armour generally has no organic means of detecting or countering the drone threat, although directed energy weapons or RF countermeasures may offer some capability in the future and are undoubtedly being actively researched and trialled.
So heavy armour is looking increasingly vulnerable, as, in the Ukrainian conflict at least, attack helicopters. However, heavy armour is clearly still important for taking and holding ground, so it will most likely continue to be central in many operations.
Attack Helicopter operations
When the UK was developing its thinking for GST3971 to acquire a dedicated attack helicopter in the mid-1980s, the vision was of a helicopter that could engage in autonomous direct-fire attack of heavy armour. The threat was essentially Cold War, with massed Soviet armour operating across the North German Plain. Organic air defence (then primarily radar-directed ZSU-23-4) was a significant threat, leading to a desire to stand-off outside its lethal range. Priority targets were enemy air defence, command and control centres and heavy armour.
The solution was deemed to be a low-signature helicopter (radar and IR signatures, particularly) fitted with a mast-mounted sight and using terrain screening. A long-range fire-and-forget weapon was required so that the helicopter would not be exposed throughout the weapon’s flight time.
Initially, Apache was not favoured because the AH-64A was regarded as having large visual and radar signatures and an inadequate sighting system. Without a mast-mounted sight, Scout helicopter support would also be required for target acquisition and designation.
The AH-64D with Longbow and RF Hellfire largely solved these problems by acquiring targets at long range and engaging in indirect fire. However, the missile and target detection range exceeded the recognition and identification range of the TADS sight (which also required the helicopter to be exposed to gain a line of sight to the target). This introduced some concern about the ability to achieve positive target identification when operating under restrictive rules of engagement.
The Situation in Ukraine
Russian operations over Ukrainian-held territory
Today, taking the Ukraine experience as representative, Russian attack helicopters are operating over large regions of Ukrainian-held territory without air superiority and with a dispersed infantry threat armed with capable MANPADS systems. The defending forces can adopt positions that are well hidden, but which offer good fields of fire.
The difficulty of detecting and countering this threat, combined with extensive areas lacking terrain cover, significantly increases the risk to attack helicopters in transit to and from their targets. This is compounded by the apparent ineffectiveness of the helicopter protection and countermeasures equipment.
There are reports of both sides in Ukraine using armed drones for anti-personnel operations against individual soldiers, so operation under cover, if not actually below ground is becoming necessary, if there are enemy drones in the area. This undoubtedly reduces the opportunities for, or increases the risk of, MANPADS operation.
Ukraine perspective – early phase
In the early phase of the invasion there was an armoured attack along the borders, but particularly moving south towards Kyiv from Belarus. This was largely canalised along main routes, as were its supporting logistic columns. This resulted in heavy losses. These were inflicted mainly by mines and artillery. Flooding of off-road terrain reduced the transit route options for the invading force.
Later Developments
After the pushing back of the initial armour thrust, Russian armour and mechanised infantry have been grinding out attacks from Ukraine’s borders, particularly from the south and east. This relatively static land battle is accompanied by long-range missile attacks on critical infrastructure and centres of population.
Both sides have effective anti-aircraft missile systems and neither side has achieved full air superiority over the battlefield. The later Russian attack has featured the use of medium- to long-range stand-off weapons (cruise or ballistic missiles and glide bombs), air-, or ground-launched, often from within Russian territory. There seems little scope to counter this, while the political does not exist to mount attacks on launch locations well into Russian territory. The best possible missile defence system may ameliorate damage, but will not hasten the end of the conflict, which has become strategic, rather than tactical.
Significant numbers of western ground-to-air missile systems are also being supplied. Ukrainian anti-armour operations have increasingly been able to use precision artillery such as HIMARS and ATACMS. The availability of such systems and their munitions is likely to be in short supply and is dependent on enduring political support from EU and NATO countries. It is, therefore, vulnerable, for example, should Donald Trump be returned as US President following the November election.
It seems likely that NATO surveillance assets (E-3, RC-135W, U-2S and satellite cover) are gathering real time intelligence over the battlefield – whether such information is being passed to inform Ukraine deployments and targeting decisions has not been revealed. In any future conflict, the use of such overhead assets and effective datalinks for the transmission of near real-time intelligence is likely to be a key to effective offensive, or defensive, operations.
Both Russia and the Ukraine have adopted the use of armed drones for the top attack of armour and these appear to have been very successful. (Relatively little imagery has been released showing Ukraine anti-armour helicopter attacks on Russian armour, or indeed Russian helicopter attacks on Ukrainian armour – Western, or otherwise).
NATO nations are beginning to supply air to ground weapons such as Brimstone and Storm Shadow and F-16 aircraft are also on just about to enter Ukrainian service. It is not known whether western air to ground missiles have been integrated for release form existing Russian-built equipment operating with the Ukrainian Air Force.
Suggested Success Factors for Helicopter anti-armour operations
What do you need for successful helicopter anti-armour missions? Ideally, you want air superiority and not to operate over large swathes of enemy-held territory occupied by determined resistance, equipped with capable MANPADS and other air defence systems such as S-200 and S-300.
Here is a list of possible success factors for postulated helicopter anti-armour operations.
- Accurate intelligence as to disposition and movement of enemy armour: satellite, aerial recce, stand-off radar, comms / SIGINT, manned armoured reconnaissance, SF, etc.
- A command and control infrastructure capable of providing updated target information in near real-time
- Ability to comply with restrictive rules of engagement when necessary
- Preferably having air superiority over the area of operations
- Ability to reach an engagement position with minimal exposure to threat systems
- Ability to engage at long-range
- The necessity of avoiding enemy drone threats to AH is likely to favour mobile rather than static operation.
- Carriage of sufficient weapons to inflict significant attrition on the enemy force (likely to determine the number of helicopters in the attack)
- Use of longer-range missiles (Rafael Spike NLOS quotes 27 km range, helicopter-launched Brimstone is said to have similar range capability).
- Proven and effective countermeasures against unexpected missile attack – missile launch detection and tracking, plus sophisticated countermeasures and effective signature reduction. There must, today, be some query as to the availability and effectiveness of such systems.
- Ballistic tolerance at least against small arms and medium machine gun threats
- Reliable, low-maintenance platform, capable of operation in all weathers and climatic conditions.
- Crashworthy fuel systems
- Run-dry transmission systems
Defensive Operations
Considering the above factors suggests that deploying attack helicopters when operating defensively (over one’s territory) could still be effective.
If the enemy is using the same or similar equipment, there would still be problems to solve in terms of positive target ID. Also, effective command and control to deal with a fluid ground situation could be problematic, as could maintaining a supply of munitions to the AH force. Missile countermeasures remain an uncertain problem.
Offensive Operations
Long-range indirect fire engagements would be preferred for both offensive and defensive operations—and probably essential in the offensive case.
The high helicopter losses sustained by Russia in current offensive operations probably reflect high risk operations, in the face of determined opposition with capable weapons and not much terrain cover for the helicopters. Also, no air superiority to provide top cover and hinder ground air defence, together with apparently ineffective measures to hinder missile lock-on and to break lock, once engaged.
Moreover, the threat is not the organic air defences of battlegroups or a Soviet Motor-Rifle Regiment or Brigade, but dispersed and well-hidden infantry and special forces units equipped with modern MANPADS missile systems. Furthermore, because the enemy forces are operating over the defenders’ own ground, the defence can be cued and alerted to approaching helicopters, given good data connectivity.
In the case of offensive operations, it would appear that stand-off operations from ground already held by one’s own forces might be the order of the day. In this case, the helicopters might operate similarly to a highly mobile precision artillery unit, able to redeploy kilometres across the field of operations in minutes. With a lack of local air superiority, the Russian use of stand-off weapons launched from within their territory supports this proposition.
A further consideration is that maintaining the mobility of the helicopter force is likely to be beneficial in hampering any drone threat targeted on it.
The focus of attack might shift towards enemy logistics – MBTs without fuel or ammunition cannot conduct manoeuvre warfare.
Increasing the range at which the attack is conducted could suggest the use of larger helicopters to carry the heavier weapons likely to be required – feasible, if operating over safe ground. The carriage of Exocet on certain export Sea King aircraft is an example of such a usage. Rafael Spike and Brimstone are also attracting interest because of their long-range capability. Clearly, target selection would be entirely dependent on the higher-level ISTAR infrastructure, although salvo-fired Brimstone has already shown some autonomous target discrimination capability.
An alternative to using one heavy long-range missile per tank destroyed might be to use a larger helicopter to launch long-range drone-carrying systems. This could allow several medium helicopters to launch attack and surveillance drones into a given operational area, possibly in the enemy’s rear. Command and control, logistics, comms, armour, barracks, and hardened targets could all be engaged in this way.
Forward-launched recce drones could provide target designation and satisfy positive ID requirements when operating under tight rules of engagement.
Such an approach could also overload the enemy air defence command and control and be usefully deployed in conjunction with simultaneous missile and/or manned aircraft operations.
This capability is alluded to in several planned US programmes, including both the abandoned FARA and FLRAA. We are talking about air-launched effects (LE) for reconnaissance or attack and Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The air-launched effects were described (Vertiflite March / April 2024) as being deployed from FARA, FLRAA and Black Hawk “to decoy, disrupt or destroy enemy air defences and to spot targets for joint forces”. In the same article, it indicates that ”the Army plans first flight of a fully-integrated ALTIUS – Air-Launched, Tube Integrated Unmanned System from a Black Hawk this year” potentially for a rapid fielding decision in 2025.
Associated with this is the US’s”long-standing interest in technologies that enable a single operator to control multiple UAS.”
Perhaps network-enabled command & control, ISTAR and other means of target verification can integrate existing AH capability in defensive operations, with medium helicopters operating further back launching a mix of longer-range weapons and ‘Launched effect UAS’ in both offensive and defensive scenarios.
Further to the suggestion of stand-off medium helicopters for anti-armour ops over enemy territory (and the US reference to Air Launched Effects), see this link: https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2022/06/tube-launched-uas/ ;
It is also worth noting that Sea King was cleared for export customers to launch Sea Eagle (India) and Exocet (Qatar, Pakistan) suggesting plenty of payload for air launched systems controlled by medium support helicopters. [A good role for the FAA Merlin Mk.4 force?]
The Drone Threat to Helicopters
In a traditional mechanised offensive, armour and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) operate collectively to gain and hold ground. Helicopters are used forward to take out enemy armour and attack command posts while scouting and designating targets for precision artillery strikes.
Infantry also relies on helicopter support for air cover and casevac. Recently, drones have been used in kamikaze attacks on helicopters. Used in this way, drones could significantly hamper helicopter operations and severely affect infantry morale.
Both helicopters and ground vehicles now need to adopt design and protection / defensive measures cognisant of the drone threat. In this scenario, the twin tail rotors suggested on some Westland designs (admittedly for other purposes) could provide a degree of redundancy.
General Observations
As the earlier discussion shows, the systems are more important than the platform. Ideally, you want to be network-enabled (so that someone else sorts out the targets and satisfies the rules of engagement). Then you want a long-range fire-and-forget weapon system capable of defeating enemy countermeasures and with a tandem charge warhead to deal with ERA. If the missile sensor is capable of discriminating between target types, so much the better. If I were in a tank, I’d still be worried about drones – as I said in a briefing a dozen years ago.
Given the right network integration and the right weapons you could inflict a deal of pain in a fairly basic helicopter while staying well out of the way of any air defence. You still have to protect yourself against chance encounters – partisans or special forces with shoulder-launched weapons, for example. This appears easier said than done.
Assuming conditions allow offensive aircraft operations, integrating western weapon systems such as Brimstone on suitable platforms, such as Frogfoot, could provide the ability to salvo fire against multiple targets. Its MMW radar seeker is supposed to support this capability, with the weapons themselves avoiding duplication of effort and allocating targets across the salvo (fire-and-forget en masse).
The capacity offered by a medium helicopter in this role could extend to area denial or countermobility operations. This type of platform might be used to deliver area denial or scatterable countermeasures (even mines, perhaps) to rapidly counter enemy armour. Missiles such as Brimstone might be more effectively employed in this scenario.
Whether in a defensive or offensive posture, an agile and responsive command and control system will be required to maintain a responsive decision-making process. This is known as the OODA-loop (OODA stands for observe, orient, decide, act). There is some question as to whether current NATO surveillance assets are providing near-real time intelligence to Ukraine. It is clear, however, that long-range stand-off anti-armour operations will require a persistent (probably stealthy) high-flying or stand-off system to provide situation awareness, detect armour targets across the battlefield and enable the use of precision indirect fires (whether by artillery or helicopter, operations).
One very good use case for low or zero sensors but good comms is to have airborne nodes in a ‘scrum half’ position behind the tactical edge. Anything up threat (exquisite and LO) can use directional comms to get data back / receive C2 and Intel from the nodes; the nodes then use any route to get to the optimal place – including space and terrestrial – from a position that cannot be easily targeted by OPFOR.
Very nice, I would also like to add a section about the timescale of military aircraft development and how that works with real high-intensity wars – I’m sure one of us can get hold of a Apache pilot for a pilot’s perspective on this too – sound good?
Rapid change during conflict is managed by UORs, usually in response to painful lessons learned. This is generally at sub-system / protection level, rather than at system and platform level. Examples could be the rapid introduction of electronic countermeasures, protective screens and response to enemy counter-countermeasures.
Interestingly, the available description of the Leonardo AW249 mentions the ability to operate air launched RPVs. The latest Aerospace magazine indicates more on its network capability, as follows: “acts as a sensor ISR node on a C4 network, and (can) control and manage UAVs – with a Wide Band LOS Datalink … LTE Gateway and Link 16.” The articles seen do not address routine concept of operations, but the connectivity and network capabilities could allow a range of collaborating systems to provide targeting data. Now they just need to adapt AW149 and/or NH90 TTH to the stand-off anti armour role …
Tentative Conclusions
There are many problems facing armoured units in modern land warfare. Broadly, these fall into (1) threats: enemy armour, helicopters, armed drones, precision artillery and missiles, minefields and obstacles; and (2) the difficulty of sustaining operations over time at long range: logistics – fuel, ammunition, repair, crew sustainment, rules of engagement.
Similarly, one can discuss the problems facing the counter-armour forces – again dependent on terrain/area of operations, posture, equipment and C4ISTAR systems and their connectivity.
The operational changes that may arise fall under TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) rather than wholesale doctrinal revisions. The challenge is to inflict heavy casualties on enemy forces while increasing one’s own chances of survival.
Used with care, existing attack helicopters operating over ‘friendly’ terrain can still be effective. Increased use of ‘network-enabled warfare’ seems essential, combined with the ability to engage targets primarily at range, and preferably non-line-of-sight.
You might end up with some new operational concepts and the reprioritisation of target lists. Flooding of land to ‘canalise’ (literally and metaphorically) the routes available to armour (and logistics); out-of-contact launching and controlling of recce/designator / armed drones – and longer-range missiles from medium helicopters looks like a decent tactic for anti-armour operations and may have a place in both defensive and offensive postures.
Brimstone 2 (helicopter launched) has a stated range of 40 km+. As an operational concept, half a dozen AW149s (or NH90s, or Merlins, or Sea Kings) each with 8 Brimstone 2, could do a lot of damage providing indirect fire – provided near real-time networked stand-off target information was available. In this role, the helicopter fleet operates as a highly mobile precision artillery force.
Exploitation of night capability and simultaneous attacks along a front might come into play. Deep strikes into enemy training and rear areas (and recruitment centres) might also be targeted to affect public opinion and morale.
Other options could include using dummy armour supported by signals deception activity to draw in enemy forces or distract from more covert operations.
Finally, it would appear that heavy armour forces do need organic close-in air defence. Perhaps the naval approach (e.g., Phalanx)—whether by high rate-of-fire radar-directed gun systems, electronic countermeasures (potentially including EMP to disrupt connectivity of control systems), or directed energy means—might go a good way to countering the ‘kamikaze drone’ threat. Target detection and tracking systems would have to be modified to suit the targets to be engaged.
The low cost and simplicity of the drones means that they have a significant numbers advantage and identifying and then defeating drones once in air is hard; their low profile and low signature is a challenge and their agility makes physical defeat hard. This strongly favours electronic countermeasures might be the preferred approach.
There’s a Hush-Kit Book of Warplanes Vol 1, and there will soon be a Vol 2 and then a Vol 3!
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The whole discussion suggests that intelligence, communications and the ability to counter enemy operations are becoming dominant factors in future land warfare. Land platforms and helicopters should now be designed taking into account enemy drone operations as a key threat.
Equally, friendly drone operations – offensive, defensive, intelligence gathering, defence suppression, etc. —should be integrated into and with operational planning and land and air platform capabilities.
RV Smith
Dr Ron Smith joined the British helicopter company Westland in 1975, working in Research Aerodynamics, and remotely piloted helicopters (before they were cool), and later became Head of Future Projects. He had a strong influence on the design of the NH90 helicopter, and was involved in the assessment of the Apache for Britain. He also explored a variety of exotic future technologies for Westland. One such exotic machine was a secret stealth attack helicopter.
Credit is also due to John Puddy, Robert Hopkins, Jeremy Smith, and Jim Smith for the valuable insights they provided.
hushkit.net · by Hush Kit · October 7, 2024
6. The QUAD – or Most of it – Has Little Wish to Challenge China
Excerpts:
Even though it was born on paper 17 years ago, the QUAD thus continues to struggle. Although it has been partly institutionalized via regular summits and meetings at the ministerial levels, its ability to become a regional force continues to be stifled by the diverse geopolitical trajectories of member states.
Therefore, if the rationale for Washington’s support for an idea that originated from Japan was to develop QUAD as an instrument to manage and expand its interests in Asia-Pacific, it continues to lack supporting mechanisms and is still far from fully operationalized. As it stands, the only time even the media pays some attention is when a summit takes place. The attention, however, seems to result from the fact that leaders of the four nations met rather than from the expectation of any major developments, leaving serious questions about the future of this alliance as a major player in the Asia-Pacific region.
The QUAD – or Most of it – Has Little Wish to Challenge China
Despite Washington’s wish to inject some virility, QUAD’s no NATO
https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/quadrilateral-security-dialogue-challenge-china?utm
Oct 08, 2024
By: Salman Rafi Sheikh
Maybe just four for bridge instead... Photo from White House
Born in 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’s struggle for meaningful growth seems never ending despite US aspirations to resuscitate it into a potent counterweight to China in the Asia Pacific. In what was US President Joe Biden’s last summit as host of the club, comprising the US, Japan, India, and Australia, he would have hoped for a more frontal and united diplomatic assault. That expectation can’t be naïve given that Biden promised to make the American presence in the Asian region more robust.
Biden himself was quick to remind his guests that “China continues to behave aggressively, testing us all across the region, and it’s true in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, South China, South Asia, and the Taiwan [Strait].” Yet, his guests didn’t agree with him, leaving him disappointed. In the joint statement issued after the late September summit in Biden’s hometown of Wilmington, Delaware, there was not a single direct reference to China, the country itself, or to Beijing, or Xi, or the Communist party. Although the statement expressed its “concern” about the geopolitical situation in the East and South China Seas, the visible absence of any actor responsible for the situation revealed more about internal disunity than anything else.
“QUAD is here to stay,” assured India’s Premier Narendra Modi. But what exactly it will do to counter what has always been seen as the main elephant in the room was neither mentioned nor discussed publicly. Why, despite tensions with Beijing, would India even support Biden’s push against China? First, it has no direct interest or stake in the South and East China Seas. Second, while India has deep concerns about China’s military presence in Ladakh along the disputed 4,057-km Line of Actual Control between the two nations, New Delhi and Beijing have been able to use non-military means of dispute resolution, especially since December 2022 when the last border clashes were reported. Since then, Chinese and Indian Corps commanders have met at least four times, with the fifth likely to take place soon. No fresh clashes have been reported, with both sides increasingly appearing amicable in their statements. This is both a disengagement in military terms and a reset of ties in diplomatic terms. More importantly, this thaw happened without any external mediation or intervention.
Still, India’s resentment of – and opposition to – Washington’s approach to Russia is public knowledge. In fact, contrary to what Washington would have expected a few years ago, India is one of the largest buyers of Russian oil, helping Moscow to defeat the impact of Washington-backed sanctions. But New Delhi can pull this leverage mainly because of its importance for Washington’s Asia-Pacific strategy. New Delhi understands this importance perfectly well. Therefore, it is willing to support the QUAD, although that mainly comes in the form of rhetoric.
There is little denying that Japan and Australia, unlike India, have stronger incentives to integrate with the US vis-à-vis China. But, for them, the QUAD isn’t the only mechanism. Australia, for instance, is part of the AUKUS (Australia, UK, US) treaty that gave it access to nuclear-powered submarines to maintain the maritime balance of power. As opposed to the QUAD lack of financing, AUKUS members are spending billions of US dollars. Japan recently also joined the US and South Korea in a trilateral security pact in addition to Tokyo’s recent decision to massively increase its military strength, although with US help.
The point is that such bilateral and trilateral arrangements have much more visible military face – and are, therefore, more valuable platforms – than the QUAD, which is one key reason why most member states other than the US are not very keen to invest any more than they already have in this alliance. It is for this reason that the last summit particularly emphasized ‘encouraging’ member states to secure funds for the QUAD from within their national budgets. Other intentions include working “with their respective legislatures to deepen interparliamentary exchanges, and encourage other stakeholders to deepen engagement with QUAD counterparts.”
A concrete development includes the establishment of a regional Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI), whose intended purpose is to help member states “monitor and secure their waters, enforce their laws, and deter unlawful behavior.” However, how MAITRI would be funded, where it would be based, and what its structure would look like are key details that are yet to be filled. Its first “workshop” will be held in India in 2025.
Whether it will yield any significant results depends not only on its presumed viability for QUAD states – and not all states have direct maritime disputes with China – but also on what happens in Washington next month. Donald Trump’s victory and return to the presidency could deliver a serious dent in QUAD’s nascent armor. Other weapons rhetorically added to this armor include initiatives in public health, cutting-edge and critical technologies, and quality infrastructure – issues that have nothing to do with China per se.
Even though it was born on paper 17 years ago, the QUAD thus continues to struggle. Although it has been partly institutionalized via regular summits and meetings at the ministerial levels, its ability to become a regional force continues to be stifled by the diverse geopolitical trajectories of member states.
Therefore, if the rationale for Washington’s support for an idea that originated from Japan was to develop QUAD as an instrument to manage and expand its interests in Asia-Pacific, it continues to lack supporting mechanisms and is still far from fully operationalized. As it stands, the only time even the media pays some attention is when a summit takes place. The attention, however, seems to result from the fact that leaders of the four nations met rather than from the expectation of any major developments, leaving serious questions about the future of this alliance as a major player in the Asia-Pacific region.
Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor to Asia Sentinel
7. Stepping Up U.S. Deterrence in Taiwan
Excerpts:
A real-world demonstration of U.S. power, perhaps regarding the Philippines, could be salutary. China is currently bullying the Philippines for control of the Second Thomas Shoal in the Philippines in a fashion similar to what we might see regarding Taiwan. The introduction of a U.S. Coast Guard vessel to accompany the Philippines Coast Guard on certain missions would send a message to Beijing that the United States takes its military treaties seriously. The United States need not intervened directly in the Second Thomas Shoal resupply missions; there are ancillary ways in which U.S. involvement could be helpful and send a clear signal.
Taiwan, for its part, should heed the ancient advice: If you seek peace, prepare for war. Taiwan should increase its defense budget, currently at 2.2 percent of its GDP, and build out its conscription (currently set at one year).
China is unlikely to show restraint unless a cost is attached to its actions. Time to attach a cost.
Stepping Up U.S. Deterrence in Taiwan
. . . to counter China’s “salami tactics” of incremental escalation and forestall an attack.
https://www.thebulwark.com/p/stepping-up-american-deterrence-in-taiwan-china-escalation
Frank Lavin
Oct 08, 2024
Taiwanese soldiers take part in a live-ammunition artillery training conducted by the Taiwanese Army, at a coastal area in Taichung, Taiwan, on August 8, 2024. The two-day training aiming to ensure preparedness and functions of weapons comes after Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te announced that the authorities will increase its defense budgets, amid heightening tensions between the United States and China over the self-governing island. (Photo by Daniel Ceng/Anadolu via Getty Images)
TO DATE, THE UNITED STATES HAS DONE A CREDIBLE JOB of helping Taiwan deter a formal military attack by China—mainly by ensuring that the ultimate outcome would be uncertain and that a protracted conflict might disrupt China’s imports of food and energy. In other words, Taiwan would not be a cheap or an easy victory for China, if a victory at all.
Alongside this stick is the carrot of reassurance: The United States has repeatedly and publicly stated that it would not support a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence and it has similarly cautioned Taiwan not to take such a step, which Beijing would likely consider tantamount to a declaration of war. So the politics of the issue have been diffused, if only for the moment.
But this at least temporary success in formal deterrence is balanced out by China’s increasingly assertive “gray zone” activity: military activity short of war that is designed to intimidate Taiwan, reduce its operational space, or circumscribe its politico-military options. U.S. policy has had little impact and China’s military activity continues to grow in this sphere.
Just after the inauguration of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, China carried out its most ambitious blockade exercise ever, Joint Sword 2024A, in which it simulated an encirclement of Taiwan.
Other gray zone activities are less dramatic, but still signal hostility: a continued military buildout in the South China Sea and ongoing incursions by the PLA Air Force all serve to remind us that China views military pressure on Taiwan as a legitimate and appropriate policy. Taiwan states that PLA air incursions have increased more than fivefold, from 36 in January to 193 in August.
More troubling, the stage is set for escalation. As Australian Ambassador to the United States Kevin Rudd relates, “Importantly, there is nothing preventing an accelerating multidimensional gray zone strategy from folding into a broader blockade or even military invasion if gray zone measures fail to procure the desired political end state in Taiwan itself.”
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We should expect ongoing incremental, escalation from China. Taiwan policy is a domestic political issue in China and everybody in the chain of command must show fidelity to this core national policy. If a midlevel official were to show restraint regarding overflights, for example, it would be perceived as disloyalty or cowardice, not wise statecraft.
The Chinese system is geared to mission creep. If reunification has been defined as a national mission and if everyone in the Chinese system must support it, they all have a need not just to loyally support the mission but to conspicuously demonstrate their support through occasional intrusions, escalations, and confrontations. Public friction is a feature, not a bug.
China benefits from a bad habit. The Chinese military will continue to take risks, to experiment, to try new ways to prod, test, and even provoke Taiwan. If it can successfully bully Taiwan at will, it will set a pattern of expectations and morale. The PLA could soon be on par with the American military, at least in the Asia-Pacific region. If Taiwan and the United States are habituated to these incremental wins by China, it will be that much harder for them to respond to the next aggressive act in the gray zone. China is lowering the bar.
SO WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO? It can reassure Taiwan and signal China by deepening economic ties with Taiwan. The best step would be a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement, which might not be possible given the current domestic political environment. But short of an FTA, the United States and Taiwan could move partially or fully toward open skies in air travel, improving tourism and connectivity. Similarly, the two trading partners could undertake a sectoral liberalization in electric vehicles or medical supplies, again capturing some economic benefits and sending a useful signal.
American leaders must also be mindful of negative signals, especially statements that appear to degrade the relationship or focus exclusively on its costs. Former President Donald Trump said in a recent Bloomberg interview, “Taiwan. I know the people very well, respect them greatly. They did take about 100 percent of our chip business. I think Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything. Taiwan is 9,500 miles away.” Statements of this sort are likely to be interpreted in Beijing as a sign that the United States does not attach importance to Taiwan’s defense.
A real-world demonstration of U.S. power, perhaps regarding the Philippines, could be salutary. China is currently bullying the Philippines for control of the Second Thomas Shoal in the Philippines in a fashion similar to what we might see regarding Taiwan. The introduction of a U.S. Coast Guard vessel to accompany the Philippines Coast Guard on certain missions would send a message to Beijing that the United States takes its military treaties seriously. The United States need not intervened directly in the Second Thomas Shoal resupply missions; there are ancillary ways in which U.S. involvement could be helpful and send a clear signal.
Taiwan, for its part, should heed the ancient advice: If you seek peace, prepare for war. Taiwan should increase its defense budget, currently at 2.2 percent of its GDP, and build out its conscription (currently set at one year).
China is unlikely to show restraint unless a cost is attached to its actions. Time to attach a cost.
8. Opinion As drone tech zooms ahead, the Pentagon scrambles to adapt
Excerpts:
In the history of warfare, there is always a lag between offensive innovations and defensive reactions. So, at the moment, defenses against drones are struggling to keep up with their rapidly evolving capabilities, particularly given the constant innovations undertaken by Russian and Ukrainian drone developers and operators. That creates a growing vulnerability for the U.S. armed forces that the Pentagon — one of the world’s largest bureaucracies — is struggling to address.
In late September, the Defense Department announced a new initiative known as Replicator 2 to field drone defenses, but the initiative’s fate, coming at the tail end of the Biden administration, remains uncertain at a time when the need has never been greater.
...
The Pentagon recognizes that it has a problem, which is why it recently unveiled plans for the Replicator 2 initiative. The original Replicator initiative, announced last year, was an urgent effort to field more drones for the U.S. military; Replicator is budgeted at $500 million for this year. Replicator 2, announced on Sept. 27, will focus on rapidly fielding technologies to counter small unmanned aerial systems.
Yet the outlook for Replicator 2 remains unclear; its implementation will be up to the next administration and its funding will be up to Congress.
This is an area that needs a big increase in defense spending — which could be paid for in part by cutting back spending on, say, surface warships and other “legacy” systems that will be inviting targets for enemy drones and missiles. Bonzagni suggested to me that the Pentagon should make much better use of the war in Ukraine to develop counterdrone systems by sharing timely information from the battlefield with contractors and facilitating real-time tests of drone defenses against Russian attacks.
It is vitally important that the Pentagon prioritize drone defenses, because drones are rapidly becoming omnipresent in warfare, placing U.S. forces at risk from aerial and naval attack in a way that they have not been since the end of World War II.
Opinion As drone tech zooms ahead, the Pentagon scrambles to adapt
Drone use in Ukraine and the Middle East is rewriting warfare tactics.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/10/07/defense-department-drone-warfare/?utm
A Ukrainian serviceman prepares a first-person-view drone for targeting Russian troops in the Kharkiv region of Ukraine on Sept. 25. (Yevhen Titov/Reuters)
By Max Boot
October 7, 2024 at 1:48 p.m. EDT
Drones, particularly aerial drones (or what the U.S. military calls “unmanned aerial systems”), are all the rage in warfare. Hailed as the new wonder weapon of the 21st century, they are employed in combat by Ukraine and Russia, and by Israel and Hezbollah. Drones conduct surveillance missions (making it almost impossible for ground forces to advance undetected) and strike missions — either by doing an explosives-laden kamikaze dive at a target or by firing a missile or dropping a bomb. And drones are so cheap and widely available that any armed group in the world can now field its own air force — or its own navy. Ukraine, lacking a conventional navy of its own, used sea drones to disable at least a third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and reopen the Black Sea to Ukrainian exports.
In the history of warfare, there is always a lag between offensive innovations and defensive reactions. So, at the moment, defenses against drones are struggling to keep up with their rapidly evolving capabilities, particularly given the constant innovations undertaken by Russian and Ukrainian drone developers and operators. That creates a growing vulnerability for the U.S. armed forces that the Pentagon — one of the world’s largest bureaucracies — is struggling to address.
In late September, the Defense Department announced a new initiative known as Replicator 2 to field drone defenses, but the initiative’s fate, coming at the tail end of the Biden administration, remains uncertain at a time when the need has never been greater.
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High-end hardware such as the Patriot surface-to-air missile system is best reserved for taking down cruise missiles, ballistic missiles or enemy bombers: You don’t want to waste a $4 million Patriot missile on shooting down a drone that might cost less than $1,000. But that leaves armed forces around the world, including the U.S. military, scrambling to figure out how to detect and defeat drones, especially smaller, lower-cost drones like the first-person-view models widely used in the Russia-Ukraine war.
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Talking with experts in the nascent counter-drone field, I often hear variations on “there is no panacea,” as Chris Bonzagni, a former U.S. Air Force officer, told me. (He is now the founder of Contact Front Technologies, a firm that helps Ukraine to integrate cutting-edge military systems from allies.)
Various acoustic sensors have been developed to detect smaller drones (Ukraine has been using, among other methods, a network of cellphones), and many methods are being developed to intercept them. These include automated Gatling (i.e., machine) guns; small missiles; air-defense drones that crash into other drones or use nets to bring them down; radio-frequency jammers; cyberweapons that can take control of drones; and lasers and high-powered microwave weapons that can zap drones. Some countries have even experimented with using birds of prey such as trained eagles to attack drones — obviously an approach that is hard to scale. In a throwback to the early days of aerial warfare, Ukraine has been deploying its own drones to bring down Russian drones in aerial dogfights. None of these methods is close to foolproof; Ukraine’s top general said in August that his forces were intercepting less than half of Russia’s drones.
Mark D. Jacobsen, a retired U.S. Air Force officer who is now director of research and development at Tilt Autonomy (which develops unmanned weapons systems), emphasized to me the “need for a system of systems, because any one detect-and-defeat modality has real limitations.” In other words, a full-spectrum drone defense requires many different technologies integrated to work seamlessly together — and it has to be done cheaply enough to be scalable against a low-cost threat that is constantly evolving and expanding. Almost every major defense manufacturer (including Raytheon and Northrop Grumman) has entered the market, with some of the most inventive solutions coming from start-ups such as Anduril, Dedrone and Fortem Technologies.
A senior Defense Department official assured me that the Pentagon has been focused on the problem and is making progress. The U.S. military has already fielded directed-energy weapons and other innovative systems against drones. A Joint Counter-Small UAS Office has been set up in the Pentagon, and a Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems University has opened at Fort Sill, Okla., to study and teach drone-fighting techniques. This year, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin set up a departmentwide Warfighter Senior Integration Group to coordinate and accelerate the acquisition of drone defenses among all the military services.
The senior defense official pointed out to me the success that the U.S. military has had in shooting down drones fired by the Houthis in Yemen — including drones aimed at U.S. Navy ships in the Red Sea. “We’ve tested and fielded pretty much everything you can think of,” this official told me. “You look at the number of attacks that have been carried out since Oct. 7 [2023] against U.S. forces in Central Command or U.S. ships in the area, and you will see that our counter-UAS systems are working and working quite well.”
No defense is perfect, however, and there has been at least one notable failure: An Iranian-made drone struck a U.S. base in Jordan on Jan. 28, killing three U.S. service members. The Post reported that an initial military assessment concluded that the base did not detect the low-flying drone and did not have systems to shoot it down. That was an isolated drone attack. Imagine how the U.S. military would fare against massive swarms of drones. The danger is that the U.S. inventory of drone defenses would be rapidly depleted in a high-intensity conflict against an adversary such as China or Russia — or even Iran.
Indeed, many of the current defensive systems are too expensive to use for extended periods in combat. Gen. Mark A. Milley, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Eric Schmidt, the former Google CEO, wrote in Foreign Affairs in August that “Iran’s April mass drone and missile strike against Israel cost at most $100 million, but U.S. and Israeli interception efforts cost more than $2 billion.” That’s not a sustainable or winning cost curve. As Jacobsen told me, “Drone innovation is happening at warp speed, but Defense Department acquisition is happening at industrial speed.”
The Pentagon recognizes that it has a problem, which is why it recently unveiled plans for the Replicator 2 initiative. The original Replicator initiative, announced last year, was an urgent effort to field more drones for the U.S. military; Replicator is budgeted at $500 million for this year. Replicator 2, announced on Sept. 27, will focus on rapidly fielding technologies to counter small unmanned aerial systems.
Yet the outlook for Replicator 2 remains unclear; its implementation will be up to the next administration and its funding will be up to Congress.
This is an area that needs a big increase in defense spending — which could be paid for in part by cutting back spending on, say, surface warships and other “legacy” systems that will be inviting targets for enemy drones and missiles. Bonzagni suggested to me that the Pentagon should make much better use of the war in Ukraine to develop counterdrone systems by sharing timely information from the battlefield with contractors and facilitating real-time tests of drone defenses against Russian attacks.
It is vitally important that the Pentagon prioritize drone defenses, because drones are rapidly becoming omnipresent in warfare, placing U.S. forces at risk from aerial and naval attack in a way that they have not been since the end of World War II.
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Opinion by Max Boot
Max Boot is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Pulitzer Prize finalist in biography, he is the author, most recently, of the New York Times bestseller “Reagan: His Life and Legend.”follow on X MaxBoot
9. Side Effects – The Human Rights Implications of Global Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Linkages to XUAR
Download the 44 page report at this link: https://c4ads.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/SideEffects-C4ADS.pdf
Side Effects
The Human Rights Implications of Global Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Linkages to XUAR
https://c4ads.org/reports/side-effects/?utm
Report
October 8, 2024
By: Mishel Kondi
The Bottom Line Up Front
Despite ongoing efforts to derisk supply chains, the global pharmaceutical industry continues to rely heavily on active pharmaceutical ingredients and other related products manufactured in XUAR using Uyghur forced labor.
Executive Summary
As part of an organized campaign spanning national and regional governments, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) subjects Uyghur and Turkic peoples to ongoing repression. This has taken the form of forced labor and assimilation, mass detention, and coercive labor and land transfers in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). These human rights abuses have drawn ample public reporting and international outcry, leading to legislation such as the U.S. Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), designed to block imports of XUAR-linked products into the United States. However, since its passage, dark data environments, complex supply chains, and policy implementation obstacles have continued to enable the CCP’s human rights abuses. As manufacturers, importers, and end-users continue to inadvertently consume everything from food to construction materials linked to the Uyghur Region, stakeholders must examine current due diligence limitations and propose new or improve existing formal avenues for reinforcing supply-chain restrictions like the UFPLA.
While China is the world’s largest active pharmaceutical ingredient producer and the second-largest pharmaceutical market in the world, the global footprint of XUAR pharmaceuticals has yet to be analyzed in depth. Not only are these products exposed to forced labor, but they also make the market riskier for governments and downstream consumers. Forced labor creates artificial trade advantages for entities that are actively exploiting marginalized people. These advantages concentrate market demand toward actors whose compliance with regulations is difficult to audit. To shed light on the pharmaceutical sector, public and private sector actors must coordinate their actions and shift consumer reliance on critical products from entities posing undue risk.
C4ADS has used publicly available information to identify and demonstrate key factors characterizing the permeation of Uyghur forced labor in the pharmaceutical industry. Each represents an opportunity to reduce the human and market security risks introduced by XUAR pharmaceuticals. Specifically, we found:
- International Government Connections to XUAR Pharmaceuticals. International government bodies continue to register and source from XUAR and XUAR-linked pharmaceutical companies. These bodies include the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) via its contractor Chemonics International, and Japan’s Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA).
- Pharmaceutical products being manufactured solely in XUAR expose global supply chains to forced labor. Seventy-six pharmaceutical products exported from China, including some over-the-counter pain relief products, are only produced in XUAR. According to official Chinese data, any of these specific products sourced from China can be definitively linked to the Uyghur region.
- The world depends on XUAR-based manufacturers for many critical pharmaceutical products. The Uyghur region is the fourth-largest manufacturing base for Sinopharm (中药集团有限公司), China’s largest pharmaceutical company. XUAR-based Xinjiang Deyuan Bioengineering (新疆德源生物工程有限公司) is among the top ten Chinese manufacturers of drugs derived from human-sourced plasma. Meanwhile, Xinjiang Nuziline Bio-Pharmaceutical (新疆新姿源生物制药有限责任公司), which produces a quarter of the world’s PMU (pregnant mare urine extract) estrogen, is the only company licensed in China to produce conjugated estrogen tablets and creams. Data shows that the XUAR region also has significant production volumes of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM).
These findings increase visibility into pharmaceutical products made profitable by human rights abuses associated with the Uyghur region. The United States, Mexico, and Canada already have forced labor legislation. In 2024, the European Union passed a forced labor ban which will come into effect within three years, and further policies are likely to pass globally. To avoid penalties commensurate with links to human rights abuses, private-sector actors can leverage this report’s insights. In parallel, policymakers can identify where supply chain due diligence has failed, where sanctions regimes can complement their efforts, and where licensing restrictions can be expanded in defense of human rights.
10. Washington Worries the Israelis Will Bomb Iran’s Nuclear Sites. But Can They?
Washington Worries the Israelis Will Bomb Iran’s Nuclear Sites. But Can They?
For 22 years, Israeli forces have planned for this moment. But it seems unlikely that they will strike Iran’s nuclear facilities in the next round of retaliation, or that they would be successful without American help.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/07/us/politics/israel-iran-nuclear-facilities-strikes.html
An Israeli F-15 flying over southern Israel in March. The country is capable of striking targets deep inside Iran, but would prefer to have the support of the United States.Credit...Abir Sultan/EPA, via Shutterstock
By David E. SangerEric Schmitt and Ronen Bergman
David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt reported from Washington, and Ronen Bergman from Tel Aviv. All three have reported on the Iranian nuclear program for more than two decades.
Oct. 7, 2024
Two years ago, dozens of Israeli fighter jets roared over the Mediterranean Sea, simulating a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, a drill the Israeli defense forces openly advertised as an exercise in “long-range flight, aerial refueling and striking distant targets.”
The point of the exercise was not simply to intimidate the Iranians. It was also designed to send a message to the Biden administration: The Israeli air force was training to conduct the operation alone, even though chances of success would be far higher if the United States — with its arsenal of 30,000-pound “bunker busters” — joined in the attack.
In interviews, former and current senior Israeli officials acknowledged doubts about whether the country has the capability to do significant damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, for the past few days, Pentagon officials have been wondering quietly whether the Israelis are preparing to go it alone, after concluding that they may never again have a moment like this one.
President Biden has warned them against striking nuclear or energy sites, saying any response should be “proportionate” to the Iranian attack on Israel last week, essentially acknowledging that some counterstrike is appropriate. Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III has been clear with his Israeli counterpart, Yoav Gallant, that the United States wanted Israel to avoid retaliatory steps that would result in new escalation by the Iranians. Mr. Gallant is scheduled to meet with Mr. Austin in Washington on Wednesday.
It is likely that Israel’s first retaliation against Iran for Tuesday’s missile strikes will focus on military bases, and perhaps some intelligence or leadership sites, officials say. At least initially, Israel seems unlikely to go after the country’s nuclear crown jewels. After considerable debate, those targets seem to have been reserved for later, if the Iranians escalate with counterstrikes of their own.
Nonetheless, there is a rising call inside Israel, echoed by some in the United States, to seize the moment — to set back, for years or more, an Iranian capability that American intelligence officials and outside experts increasingly say is at the threshold of producing a bomb. While much of the public discussion has focused on the fact that Iran could almost certainly ramp up enrichment to produce bomb-grade uranium in a matter of weeks, the more relevant fact is that it would take Iranian engineers months or maybe more than a year to fashion that fuel into a deliverable weapon.
“Israel has now its greatest opportunity in 50 years, to change the face of the Middle East,” Naftali Bennett, a hard-line nationalist and former prime minister who once described himself as to the right of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, recently wrote on social media. “We must act *now* to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, its central energy facilities, and to fatally cripple this terrorist regime.”
He added: “We have the justification. We have the tools. Now that Hezbollah and Hamas are paralyzed, Iran stands exposed.”
American officials, starting with Mr. Biden, have mounted a campaign to take such strikes off the table, saying they would likely be ineffective and could plunge the region into a full-scale war.
The question of how to strike Iran has become a campaign issue. Former President Donald J. Trump argued that Israel should “hit the nuclear first and worry about the rest later.” It is an approach even he shied away from as president. On Sunday, Representative Michael R. Turner, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, criticized Mr. Biden on CBS’s “Face the Nation,” saying that “it’s completely irresponsible for the president to say that it is off the table, when he’s previously said it’s on the table.”
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The sudden debate over a strike has raised new questions. If Israel attacked, how much could it really set back Iran’s nuclear capabilities? Or, would the result be simply to drive Iran’s nuclear program deeper underground, leading Iran to bar the few nuclear inspectors who still have regular, if limited, access to its major facilities? And what if an Israeli strike prompts Iran’s leaders to finally decide to race for a bomb — the line that Iran’s mullahs and generals have, for nearly a quarter of a century, stopped short of crossing?
At Natanz, an Old Target and a New One
Image
The Natanz nuclear enrichment plant has captured Israel’s attention for 22 years. Credit...Planet Labs
For 22 years, the locus of Israel’s attention — and Washington’s — in Iran has been the Natanz nuclear enrichment plant, buried about three stories into the desert.
Updated
Oct. 8, 2024, 7:14 a.m. ETJust now
Israel has developed plans to destroy or cripple the giant centrifuge hall, where thousands of the tall, silver machines spin at supersonic speeds until the uranium approaches bomb-grade material. While Tehran officially denies that it is seeking to possess a bomb, in recent months some Iranian officials and commentators have intensely debated whether a fatwa issued in 2003 by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, barring the possession of nuclear weapons, should be reversed.
Meanwhile, Iran has stepped up production of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity, just shy of bomb grade. It now has enough of that fuel for three or four bombs, experts believe, and getting it to bomb grade, at 90 percent, would take just days.
While Natanz would be a fairly easy target, hitting it would be an act of war. So for the past 15 years, the United States has urged diplomacy, sabotage and sanctions, not bombs, to foul up the program. And it has actively blocked Israel from getting the weapons it would need to destroy another centrifuge facility, called Fordow, built deep in a mountain.
President George W. Bush turned aside Israel’s demands to give its air force the United States’ biggest bunker-busting bombs, and the B-2 bombers that are needed to deliver them. Those weapons would be essential to any effort to take out Fordow and other deep, heavily reinforced facilities.
Mr. Bush’s decision touched off an argument inside the White House. Vice President Dick Cheney embraced the idea of a strike, but Mr. Bush held fast, arguing that the United States could not risk another war in the Middle East. Ehud Barak, who served as Israel’s highest-ranked uniformed officer and also as prime minister, said in an interview with The Times in 2019 that Mr. Bush’s warning “did not really make any difference for us.” As of the end of 2008, he said, Israel did not have a feasible plan for attacking Iran.
It soon developed several. The argument over the bunker busters helped give birth to a huge covert operation known as “Olympic Games,” a highly classified Israeli-American program to destroy the centrifuges using a cyberweapon. More than 1,000 centrifuges were destroyed by what became known as the Stuxnet virus, setting the program back by a year or more.
But Olympic Games was no silver bullet: The Iranians rebuilt, adding thousands more centrifuges. They moved more of their effort deep underground. And the fact that the malicious computer code escaped the plant, and was revealed to the world, prompted other countries to focus on developing their own infrastructure attacks, including electric grids and water systems.
The Israelis also assassinated scientists and struck aboveground enrichment facilities, attacked centrifuge-manufacturing centers with drones and invested huge resources in preparation for a possible attack on the facilities.
The Israeli efforts faltered after the Obama administration reached a nuclear deal with Iran that led the country to ship much of its nuclear fuel out of the country. And later, when Mr. Trump pulled out of the deal, he and Mr. Netanyahu were convinced the Iranians would give up their projects in response to Washington’s threats. The Israel Defense Forces focused instead on Hezbollah, and the underground tunnels where it stored Iranian-produced missiles.
When Mr. Bennett became prime minister in 2021, Israeli officials say, he was shocked by Israel’s lack of preparedness to attack the Iranian program, ordering new exercises to simulate flying the long distances to Iran and pouring new resources into the preparations. Even today, Israel’s capability is limited. The country relies on an aging fleet of Boeing 707 aerial refueling planes, and it will be years before newer models, capable of carrying fuel for far longer ranges, are delivered by the United States.
Israel’s own bunker busters have been effective against the kinds of tunnels where Hezbollah stores missiles, and they enabled Israeli forces to kill Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader, last month. The Israelis believe they can take out the air defenses around many of the nuclear sites; they hit one, to send a message, in a missile exchange with Iran in April. But Israel simply cannot get into highly reinforced nuclear facilities dug into mountains.
“The nuclear target is a very difficult target,” said Gen. Frank McKenzie, who was in charge of the Iran war plans when he ran United States Central Command. “There are a lot of other alternatives to that target,” he said, adding that many of them — including energy infrastructure — would be easier to execute.
Iran’s Next Moves
Image
President Masoud Pezeshkian of Iran speaking at the United Nations General Assembly last month.Credit...Graham Dickie/The New York Times
Whether Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities or not, there are new reasons for concern about Iran’s nuclear future.
The first is one that Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken has raised repeatedly in recent weeks: He has asserted, based on intelligence the United States declines to talk about, that Russia is sharing technology with Iran on nuclear issues. Officials describe the help as “technical assistance” and say there is no evidence that it is providing Iran with the hardware it needs to make a warhead.
But until the war broke out in Ukraine, Russia had cooperated with the United States and Europe in restraining the Iranian nuclear program, even joining the 2015 negotiations on the side of Western nations. Now, if the American reports are right, Russia’s need for Iranian drones and other weaponry means it could speed Iran’s progress toward building a nuclear device.
The second concern is that the damage done to Hezbollah in the past few weeks, including the decapitation of its leadership, could make Iran feel vulnerable. It can no longer count on the terror group’s ability to strike into Israel. Moving to obtain a nuclear weapon might become its only real way to deter Israel.
And the third concern is that the Iranian program will only get harder to hit. Several years ago, under the watchful eyes of American and Israeli satellites, Iran began digging a vast tunnel network just south of Natanz, for what the United States believes is a new enrichment center, Iran’s largest. It is not yet up and running. In the past — when Israel destroyed not-yet-complete nuclear reactors in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 — that is exactly the moment it chose to mount pre-emptive attacks.
David E. Sanger covers the Biden administration and national security. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written several books on challenges to American national security. More about David E. Sanger
Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt
Ronen Bergman is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, based in Tel Aviv. His latest book is “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” published by Random House. More about Ronen Bergman
See more on: Israel-Hamas War News, President Joe Biden, Benjamin Netanyahu
11. Israel not expected to attack Iran nuclear facilities, to focus on bases, intelligence sites - NYT
Highlights from the NY Times article on the possibility that Israel would attack iran's nuclear facilities.
Israel not expected to attack Iran nuclear facilities, to focus on bases, intelligence sites - NYT
Jerusalem Post
Israel's response to Iran's missile barrage attack at the beginning of October will not be attacking its nuclear facilities but rather targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps's military bases and intelligence sites, according to a Monday report from the New York Times citing officials.
The report said while Israel would prefer to have US backing in its response, Biden and other US officials have said that strikes on nuclear facilities would be ineffective and "plunge the region into a full-scale war," the report said. However, the nuclear facilities as targets may come into consideration should Iran escalate with attacks of their own. Both former and senior Israeli officials have
The Times also reported Pentagon officials wondering whether Israel is preparing a retaliatory response against Iran alone. The report also cited former and current senior Israeli officials who acknowledged doubts about whether Israel can actually cause damage to Iran's nuclear facilities.
Iran has already attacked Israel twice this year directly, with the first time being in April.
Warnings of escalation
US President Joe Biden has initially warned Israel after the Iranian strike earlier this month that the Jewish state's response should be "proportionate." US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told his Israeli counterpart Yoav Gallant that Israel should avoid any steps that would result in Iran escalating tensions. Over the years, Iran has increased its production of uranium that would allow it to build a bomb, according to estimates.
A view of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility 250 km (155 miles) south of the Iranian capital Tehran, March 30, 2005. (credit: REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi/File Photo)
The Times report also claims a "rising call" in Israel where the country has the opportunity to set back Iranian capability in the region by a few years. Former US President Donald Trump said in a speech that Israel should “hit the nuclear first and worry about the rest later.” It also mentioned should tensions escalate between the two countries, one likely target for Israel's response would be Iran's Natanz nuclear enrichment plant, and reported that Israel already has developed plans in how to "cripple the giant centrifuge hall."
The Times stated that the enrichment plant has been the focus of Israel's and the US's attention for around 22 years.
Jerusalem Post
12. The UK deal on Diego Garcia is positive, but it won’t reverse declining support for the rules-based order
Excerpts:
But grass roots Mauritian reactions have been mixed with social media commentators accusing the Prime Minister of selling out: “What kind of a deal is this when Diego Garcia remains US property for at least 99 more years???” asked one commenter. Another saw the deal as a betrayal of non-aligned principles: “What about relations with emerging powers like China and India? These nations, which have supported Mauritius in its quest for sovereignty, may well see this agreement as a betrayal, a de facto alignment with Western interests.”
Regionally, the African Union and India have come out strongly in favour of the deal. Still, it’s worth remaining attune to the possibility that over time, some countries (especially China) may paint the deal as just another example of Western countries gaming the system to suit themselves. Countries such as China and Russia will certainly seek to leverage local discontent in Mauritius.
The UK-Mauritius accord is in fact a good deal, for everyone. It’s the result of years of Mauritian advocacy in the international system, and thoughtful British diplomacy. It compensates Chagossians for historic injustice and trauma. It gives the US military base certainty at a time when that is needed more than ever. And it demonstrates that the rules-based order can work for small states, just as much as for the major powers. But the result won’t on its own counteract deep-seated discontent across the Global South with the rules-based order – that’s a much longer game.
The UK deal on Diego Garcia is positive, but it won’t reverse declining support for the rules-based order | Lowy Institute
China and Russia might argue this is just another example
of Western countries gaming the system to suit themselves.
Published 8 Oct 2024 United Kingdom International law Africa
lowyinstitute.org · by Kate O’Shaughnessy
The UK government announced last week that it will cede sovereignty of the Chagos archipelago to Mauritius. The agreement ends an almost 60-year dispute between the two countries, allowing Chagossians displaced in the early 1970s to return home, and ensuring the continued operation for the next 99 years of the US military base on Diego Garcia (one of the islands in the archipelago).
But concluding this deal likely won’t reverse declining support for the international rules-based order, especially across Africa. And for those countries who want more and better multilateralism – like Australia – there’s important lessons to be learned from how the Chagos dispute played out, and now in watching early reactions to the deal, especially in the “Global South”.
What was the Chagos dispute about, and why does it matter?
The dispute over this little-known archipelago goes to the heart of efforts to maintain strategic stability in the Indian Ocean.
At the height of the Cold War in 1965, the UK detached Chagos from its then-colony of Mauritius, three years before Mauritius gained its independence. The United Kingdom renamed the archipelago the British Indian Ocean Territory, forcibly removed Chagos islanders to Mauritius and Seychelles, and leased the island of Diego Garcia to the United States in return for a US$14 million discount on Polaris nuclear missiles.
In the years ahead, Diego Garcia became a critically important US military asset – essential for power projection into the Indian Ocean and a staging point for operations in the Middle East including Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11. With the establishment of a Chinese military base in Djibouti in 2016 and increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, the significance of Diego Garcia has only grown.
But every Mauritian prime minister since independence has argued that the archipelago belongs to Mauritius. Most vocal has been current Mauritian Prime Minister Pravind Jugnauth, who established a dedicated Chagos unit within his office, and obtained an advisory opinion in 2019 from the International Court of Justice, calling for the United Kingdom to return Chagos to Mauritius as quickly as possible. Overwhelming endorsements for Mauritian sovereignty soon followed in multilateral bodies including the UN General Assembly, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the Universal Postal Union, with just five countries throwing their support behind the United Kingdom – the United States, Israel, Australia, Maldives, and Hungary.
And what can we learn from how the dispute was resolved?
That weight of international opprobrium was what – ultimately – forced the UK’s hand. It tried compensation (announcing in 2016 a GBP40 million package of support for displaced Chagossians), legal technicalities (arguing the ICJ’s opinion was advisory and non-binding), and hard-nosed strategic realism (it’s hard to imagine a secure Indian Ocean without the US military base at Diego Garcia). But in the end, none of these efforts could counteract a widespread global narrative that the United Kingdom (and supporters such as the United States and Australia) only adhered to the rules-based order when it suited them.
That’s a refrain that in recent years British, Australian and American diplomats based in Port Louis heard repeatedly, not only from Mauritian counterparts, but from non-aligned countries such as India (a strong supporter of Mauritius’ claims), and of course China. “You tell others to respect the rules-based order, but you don’t comply yourself.”
Grass roots Mauritian reactions have been mixed with social media commentators accusing the Prime Minister of selling out.
The new deal, in theory, takes the oxygen out of those arguments. But there’ll be one sticking point – the United Kingdom is authorised to exercise Mauritius’ sovereignty in Diego Garcia for an “initial period of 99 year,” a crucial element of the agreement that enables certainty for the US base.
In his address to the nation on 3 October, Jugnauth said that “many people doubted that a small country like ours could get justice, against a major power like the UK. But guided by our convictions, we finished the decolonisation of our republic.”
But grass roots Mauritian reactions have been mixed with social media commentators accusing the Prime Minister of selling out: “What kind of a deal is this when Diego Garcia remains US property for at least 99 more years???” asked one commenter. Another saw the deal as a betrayal of non-aligned principles: “What about relations with emerging powers like China and India? These nations, which have supported Mauritius in its quest for sovereignty, may well see this agreement as a betrayal, a de facto alignment with Western interests.”
Regionally, the African Union and India have come out strongly in favour of the deal. Still, it’s worth remaining attune to the possibility that over time, some countries (especially China) may paint the deal as just another example of Western countries gaming the system to suit themselves. Countries such as China and Russia will certainly seek to leverage local discontent in Mauritius.
The UK-Mauritius accord is in fact a good deal, for everyone. It’s the result of years of Mauritian advocacy in the international system, and thoughtful British diplomacy. It compensates Chagossians for historic injustice and trauma. It gives the US military base certainty at a time when that is needed more than ever. And it demonstrates that the rules-based order can work for small states, just as much as for the major powers. But the result won’t on its own counteract deep-seated discontent across the Global South with the rules-based order – that’s a much longer game.
lowyinstitute.org · by Kate O’Shaughnessy
13. Does Finland’s "total defence" doctrine hold lessons for Australia?
I think I will use this quote in the future: "Liberal democracy doesn’t defend itself."
And others, in addition to Australia, might learn from the Finns as well.
Excerpts:
Here Australia could take greater cues from Finland. The Finns, along with the Swedes, are at the forefront of this psychological defence, building public capabilities to detect and resist information warfare that attempts to take advantage of the openness of liberal democracy in order to undermine it.
Australia has been edging towards a similar understanding of its own security. The recent National Defence Strategy widened the concept of national defence to not only the protection of the country’s borders but to the protection of its way of life. This is a recognition that the country’s prosperity, its values, political structures, and social cohesion are all innate to its security.
While the government may have sharpened its recognition of these threats, a “whole-of-nation” approach to this broader concept of security still requires greater substance and conviction. Australia coasts on its natural security advantages, and a culture of complacency has flowed from this. There’s a reluctance to ask what Australians can do for their country. Or a fear of having few takers.
Finns consider being a Finnish citizen a compact that one must commit to and tend to. While this may seem illiberal to some in Australia, the Finns have understood that liberal democracy doesn’t defend itself. Liberalism is not freedom from responsibility, it is the freedom to be responsible.
Does Finland’s "total defence" doctrine hold lessons for Australia? | Lowy Institute
Liberal democracy doesn’t defend itself. The Finns know a thing or two about protecting it.
Published 8 Oct 2024 Australia Australian Defence Force Defence & Security Follow @grantwyeth
lowyinstitute.org · by Grant Wyeth
The theme of this year’s Helsinki Security Forum was Towards a Total Defence of Europe. Drawn from Finland’s own doctrine of defence – which the president, Alexander Stubb, corrected to “comprehensive defence” – it incorporates social resilience and civil preparedness into its security apparatus. The not-too-subtle signal is that Finland takes its defence incredibly seriously, and given current conditions on the continent, the rest of Europe should do likewise.
Although Australia is far from the front line of any hot war, recently Canberra has promoted an approach to security and foreign policy that, in theory at least, attempts to embody similar principles. Government rhetoric has included phrases such as “whole-of-government”, “whole-of-nation”, and using “all tools of statecraft” in the hope of developing a more effective approach to advancing Australia’s interests.
Sharing a long border with a belligerent state means that it is in a permanent mode of heightened awareness.
However, moving this approach to security and foreign policy out of abstract concepts and rhetorical devices into Finnish-style practicalities may be more difficult than the government anticipates. What may be required is a cultural shift that Australia isn’t attuned for.
Finland is a nation of preppers. Sharing a long border with a belligerent state means that it is in a permanent state of heightened awareness. This awareness motivates the country to develop plans for every foreseeable scenario. Each element of the country – from government and the private sector to civil society groups and individual citizens – is tasked with a role to play.
With a strong focus on the security of supply, critical sectors all have mandated contingencies to maintain vital infrastructure, the supply of energy, food and pharmaceuticals, and the country’s financial capabilities. Four times a year, politicians, business leaders and civil society organisations meet for crisis simulations.
Finns consistently rank as the world’s happiest people (Tapio Haaja/Unsplash)
Public facilities such as car parks, metro stations, swimming pools and ice rinks double as bunkers and evacuation shelters. These facilities are connected to a series of tunnels that traverse subterranean Helsinki, which also allow the Finns to move military equipment undetected. Civil defence shelters are requirements of the country’s building code – and Finland currently has bunkers that can accommodate 4.8 million people (close to 90 per cent of the population).
Finland also has mandatory military service for all men at age 18. This includes a minimum of six months of basic training – more depending on the designated role for each individual. Following this training, each man is placed in a reserve unit until they are 50 years old, or 60 for those of a higher rank. Throughout these years, men are obligated to undertake refresher exercises of at least 40 days to maintain their skills. National service is voluntary for women, but a record number are participating since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In total, close to one-third of Finland's population can be called upon at short notice.
Alongside manpower, Finland’s national service also instils a strong public sense of duty and responsibility, built on individual recognition of the stakes. It has developed a culture where personal integrity is important, good faith is intrinsic, and service is not scoffed at. The country’s national character – embodied by the term sisu – is one of stoic determination and an action-oriented mindset. It is no coincidence that the Finns consistently rank as the world’s happiest people.
Australia coasts on its natural security advantages, and a culture of complacency has flowed from this.
National service may be a political non-starter in Australia – even with the country’s shortfall of defence personnel – but it is clearly a core feature of Finland’s cohesive sense of purpose. It also plays a vital role in enhancing the country’s psychological resilience, one of Finland’s seven vital functions for society. This is the ability to withstand the pressures of crises, which is coupled with an education system that works to create a citizenry with an immunity to malign information and the manipulative tactics of nefarious forces.
Here Australia could take greater cues from Finland. The Finns, along with the Swedes, are at the forefront of this psychological defence, building public capabilities to detect and resist information warfare that attempts to take advantage of the openness of liberal democracy in order to undermine it.
Australia has been edging towards a similar understanding of its own security. The recent National Defence Strategy widened the concept of national defence to not only the protection of the country’s borders but to the protection of its way of life. This is a recognition that the country’s prosperity, its values, political structures, and social cohesion are all innate to its security.
While the government may have sharpened its recognition of these threats, a “whole-of-nation” approach to this broader concept of security still requires greater substance and conviction. Australia coasts on its natural security advantages, and a culture of complacency has flowed from this. There’s a reluctance to ask what Australians can do for their country. Or a fear of having few takers.
Finns consider being a Finnish citizen a compact that one must commit to and tend to. While this may seem illiberal to some in Australia, the Finns have understood that liberal democracy doesn’t defend itself. Liberalism is not freedom from responsibility, it is the freedom to be responsible.
lowyinstitute.org · by Grant Wyeth
14. Veterans, troops targeted in Iran-backed disinformation campaign ahead of US election
Veterans, troops targeted in Iran-backed disinformation campaign ahead of US election
Stars and Stripes · by Linda F. Hersey · October 7, 2024
People wait in line to vote at a polling place on Nov. 8, 2022, in Fuquay Varina, N.C. (Allison Joyce, Getty Images/TNS)
WASHINGTON — An Iran-backed website called “Not Our War” is targeting U.S. veterans and active-duty service members with a disinformation campaign that is part of a broader effort to influence American voters before the November election, according to a Washington think tank.
The nonprofit Foundation for Defense of Democracies issued a report warning of attempts by Tehran to present false content for American audiences that is critical of the U.S. election process and U.S. foreign policy.
The Iran-backed website is part of a larger network of about 20 websites purporting to cover U.S. politics and election issues with content tailored for specific readers, including veterans, Black voters and people who are Spanish-speaking, the organization said.
“Iran is attempting to pass off as legitimate news outlets [through] a series of websites it controls, attempting to trick Americans into consuming Iranian propaganda,” the report said. “These websites attempt to portray themselves as authentic, local voices but are likely run by Iranian operatives.”
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which conducts research on national security and foreign policy, published its report in September titled “How U.S. Adversaries Undermine the Perception of Election Integrity.”
A focus of the report was the website, notourwar.com, which has a dedicated tab for U.S. military veterans.
Max Lesser, senior analyst at the foundation, said a goal of the content is to cause U.S. veterans to feel disaffected with both major presidential candidates and disillusioned with American democracy more broadly.
“Not Our War is one of the most explicitly pro-Iran websites in the network, with one article alleging that the United States is secretly researching a weather-controlling weapon meant to curb Iran’s geopolitical supremacy,” the report said. The site also contains hundreds of embedded back links that connect readers to explicit anti-American websites, some of them in Arabic.
Lesser said “Not Our War” shared a number of technical features, such as shared web hosting infrastructure, with other known Iranian-influenced websites.
“This domain includes overtly pro-Iran [content], with one article even claiming that Iran has ‘geopolitical supremacy,’ ’’ he said.
The foundation’s report follows a pair of alerts from Microsoft and the global security firm Mandiant about a larger effort by foreign state actors to influence the presidential election in November.
In an intelligence briefing to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Mandiant warned in March that the “Not Our War” website was part of a pro-Iran “propaganda ecosystem” with a focus on cultivating an audience of veterans and active-duty service members.
The website content commends the Iranian government, its political interests and leaders, according to Mandiant, a subsidiary of Google.
Content on the website is specifically critical of U.S. military operations in the Middle East. A news story published on the website in February described the U.S. presidential campaign as “the clash of two doddering fools” casting a shadow over Middle East politics.
The website praises Russian President Vladimir Putin and raises conspiracy theories about U.S. elections and the voting process. It appears to be registered in Germany, uses a proxy server that makes internet activity untraceable and enables its originator to remain anonymous. The registrar is Public Domain Registry, a subsidiary of Endurance International Group Holdings in India.
The Foundation for Defense Democracies’ report also stated it identified more than 2,000 Iran-backed social media accounts on the social media website X, formerly Twitter. The accounts post content about the U.S. election, primarily in the Persian language. Several accounts use false pictures that appear to have been generated by artificial intelligence.
The House Veterans’ Affairs Committee in 2020 sent a report to the entire lower chamber raising concern about foreign state actors targeting veterans ahead of national elections.
Titled “Exploiting veterans through disinformation on social media,” the report discussed the growth of online influence campaigns originating outside the U.S. to influence elections. The report specifically looked at online misinformation campaigns that seek to reach veterans and military service members to “misappropriate” their perceived credibility and authority.
“If individuals or groups are able to influence elections with false narratives, the faith in the electoral process is undermined,” according to the House report.
Stars and Stripes · by Linda F. Hersey · October 7, 2024
15. Ukraine strikes a Russian oil hub as Zelenskyy says the war is in 'a very important phase'
Ukraine strikes a Russian oil hub as Zelenskyy says the war is in 'a very important phase'
By ILLIA NOVIKOV and HANNA ARHIROVA
Updated 9:16 AM EDT, October 7, 2024
AP · by HANNA ARHIROVA · October 7, 2024
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Ukraine’s military said it struck a major oil terminal Monday in Crimea that provides fuel for Russia’s war effort as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the war has entered a key phase.
Both sides are facing the issue of how to sustain their costly war of attrition — a conflict that started with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and that shows no signs of a resolution.
Ukraine’s General Staff said on social media that the oil terminal in Feodosia, on the south coast of the Russia-occupied Crimea Peninsula, has been supplying the Russian army with fuel and that the strike was part of an ongoing effort to “undermine the military and economic potential of the Russian Federation.”
Russian-installed authorities in the city of Feodosia on the coast of the Black Sea reported a fire at the terminal on Monday morning but did not say what might have caused it.
Ukraine has increasingly targeted rear areas that are essential for Russia’s onslaught, now deep into its third year. It has developed long-range drones that have hit oil depots and refineries as well as armories.
Ukraine’s aim is to impair Russia’s ability to support its front-line units, especially in the eastern Donetsk region where the main Russian battlefield effort is stretching weary Ukrainian forces.
Kyiv is still awaiting word from its Western partners on its repeated requests to use the long-range weapons they provide to hit targets on Russian soil.
Developments on that question could come next weekend at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, when defense leaders from the 50-plus partner nations that coordinate military aid to Ukraine are due to meet.
The conflict has largely been a war of attrition, which requires large amounts of ammunition. Late on Sunday, Zelenskyy said the war is in “a very important phase” as the Ukrainian army works hard to hold the bigger Russian forces at bay in the east while also holding ground in Russia’s Kursk border region, which it captured two months ago.
Ukraine needs to “put pressure on Russia in the way that’s necessary for Russia to realize that the war will gain them nothing,” Zelenskyy said in a video statement.
“We will continue to apply even greater pressure on Russia — because only through strength can we bring peace closer,” he added.
Meanwhile, Russia fired six missiles of various types and 74 Shahed drones at Ukraine overnight, Ukraine’s air force said.
Missile debris fell in three districts of Kyiv, causing minor damage to civilian infrastructure and starting a fire, Mayor Vitalii Klitschko said. He said nobody was hurt. Three missile fragments fell on a kindergarten, he said without elaborating.
The acting head of the Communications Department of Ukraine’s Air Force, Yurii Ihnat, said that two of the hypersonic Kinzhal missiles that were shot down over the Kyiv region were aimed at the capital city.
“Despite the fact that it’s getting harder, despite (Russia’s) improvements and the use of new tactics, today we have two shoot-downs,” Ihnat said.
Despite Ukraine’s high interception rates, some weapons still get through.
“They are learning from their mistakes and from our mistakes. They are improving their technology so that we are able to shoot down fewer of them,” Ihnat told AP.
Russia’s Defense Ministry said it shot down almost two dozen Ukrainian drones overnight.
___
Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine
HANNA ARHIROVA
Arhirova is an Associated Press reporter covering Ukraine. She is based in Kyiv.
AP · by HANNA ARHIROVA · October 7, 2024
16. Marines Fly in Food, Shelter Kits, Tarps to Aid Philippines After Typhoon Destroys Homes
Our military is so good at doing this overseas. Does our bureaucracy and our bureaucratic and legal processes and our fears of the military operating on US soil hinder our relief abilities? Isn't it ironic that we have a strong desire to prevent government interference with our lives and then demand government support in disaster (and then create conspiracy theories surrounding that government help).
Marines Fly in Food, Shelter Kits, Tarps to Aid Philippines After Typhoon Destroys Homes
military.com · by Drew F. Lawrence · October 7, 2024
U.S. Marines were tapped to support disaster relief efforts in the Philippines after a typhoon wrought torrential wind and rain to the country's northernmost islands last week, the service announced Saturday.
Typhoon Krathon -- known as Julian, locally -- made landfall in the country on Sept. 30, with hundreds of families evacuated and nearly 1,500 homes destroyed in the path of the northern-moving storm, the governor of one of the provinces said last week.
Two Marine Corps KC-130Js left Okinawa, Japan, and landed in Manila on Saturday to distribute tarps, shelter kits, food packets and other supplies, the service said. The Marine units involved include III Marine Expeditionary Force, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit and Marine Rotational Force-Southeast Asia, or MRF-SEA, which Military.com reported began an exercise in the country recently.
The request for assistance came from the Philippine government, the announcement said, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific to aid the U.S. Agency for International Development in its relief efforts in the region.
The KC-130s belonged to Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 out of Kadena Air Base in Okinawa.
The Marines are delivering supplies by air transport in coordination with regional military units as well. Military.com contacted the headquarters of the Marine Corps on Monday for details regarding how many Marines were involved in the relief effort, tonnage of support delivered and other information, but did not hear back by publication.
Stars and Stripes reported on Monday that more than two dozen Marines loaded nearly 100,000 pounds of relief support for delivery, citing the MRF-SEA commander, Col. Stuart Glenn. The publication also reported that MV-22 Ospreys were involved in the deliveries to the northern part of the country.
MRF-SEA is on its third rotation to the Philippines as part of a broader Marine Corps effort in the region. The service -- and those involved in the initial rotational concept -- signaled that this year's rotation is much more robust than previous iterations, Military.com reported.
The service said disaster relief operations are part of III MEF's repertoire. Earlier this year, III MEF worked with other government agencies to deliver nearly 60,000 pounds of aid to the southern parts of the Philippines after the country was ravaged by deadly mudslides and rain. That operation also involved two Marine KC-130s landing in the Philippines to deliver pallets of aid.
military.com · by Drew F. Lawrence · October 7, 2024
17. Junior enlisted pay raise will strengthen the current and future force
Junior enlisted pay raise will strengthen the current and future force
militarytimes.com · by Air Force Lt. Gen. Brian T. Kelly (ret.) · October 7, 2024
While there has always been a deep appreciation for the sacrifices and dedication of our uniformed services, national support for service members and veterans has been particularly strong in recent decades. Yet, full resourcing is always difficult, and the military is only one part of a limited national budget that must address a wide range of priorities. Even within the Defense Department, resources must be carefully balanced between modernization, training, operations and caring for those who serve and their families. Tough decisions are made with careful thought, but finding the right balance remains a central challenge.
Having managed the U.S. Air Force’s manpower and personnel portfolios, I understand the need to make difficult budgetary decisions, and I understood when we sometimes had to prioritize modernization and operational capabilities over legitimate people needs.
However, it is disheartening to hear decision-makers downplay and dismiss a clear priority — the fair compensation of our junior enlisted service members — when the real issue is insufficient funding and not a lack of need. Our junior enlisted personnel play a critical role in safeguarding our nation’s security, and their strategic importance in maintaining a strong, capable and ready force must remain a top priority.
RELATED
Decision on junior enlisted pay boost not expected until November
The House-passed draft of the authorization bill called for pay raises up to 19.5% for troops ranked E-4 and below.
In this context, the April 2024 report from the bipartisan Quality of Life (QOL) Panel for the House Armed Services Committee, led by Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., and Rep. Chrissy Houlahan, D-Pa., becomes particularly significant.
The report highlighted the substantial financial difficulties faced by junior enlisted members and made clear the need to improve their financial well-being to address systemic challenges that affect recruitment, retention, family stability and overall force readiness. The panel recommended a 4.5% pay raise for all service members and an additional 15% increase for those ranked E-1 to E-4.
The Military Officers Association of America and fellow military advocacy organizations embraced the move to support these young service members. But despite compelling evidence, opposition from the White House, DOD and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle dismissed these recommendations. Critics framed the issue as a false dilemma between funding new weapons systems or increasing pay, instead of making the case that both might be necessary.
Some examples of the flawed rationale:
-
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation: Some argued any pay raises should wait until the next Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) report is released. But QRMC members informed the QOL Panel’s findings, and waiting means no additional support for these families for years — likely until 2027.
- Pay compression: Others asserted a targeted raise would compress pay for midcareer personnel — in other words, service members would no longer receive appropriate financial reward for reaching beyond the junior pay grades. This argument failed to mention compression already exists within the current pay table at both the E7-to-E8 levels and E1-to-E3 levels with little impact. This argument also leaves out other components of full military compensation. Under the new tables, for instance, an E-4 with four years of service would receive an 8% pay raise when considering all base pay and allowances, which falls within the Society for Human Resource Management-recommended 7-12% pay increase when receiving a promotion.
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External factors: Critics have also suggested the pay raise wouldn’t solve recruitment and retention challenges. While pay is clearly not the only issue impacting recruiting, 51% of potential recruits cite pay as a primary factor influencing their decision to enlist. As for retention, with unemployment among junior enlisted spouses 10% higher than all other military spouses and DOD data showing up to 25% face food insecurity, junior members who have little or no economic margin for error can be forced to consider leaving the services as they stretch their income to make ends meet.
‘Generational investment’
Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, rightly points out the need for a “generational investment” in the military to meet rising threats. A pay adjustment for junior enlisted personnel should be part of this broader investment, not an either-or choice.
The most junior of our uniformed services will carry the heaviest burdens for our nation in the years ahead. Investing in them now is essential. While the pay raise targeted by the QOL Panel would be well-deserved, I understand the full 19.5% increase might not be possible given the many priorities our nation must address. But ignoring and dismissing the clear indicators of need, doing nothing or simply deferring action should not be an acceptable option.
As Congress reconciles its annual National Defense Authorization Act, the Military Officers Association of America urges lawmakers to show the same dedication to those who serve as these individuals have shown to our nation and authorize additional funding at a level that makes a difference for those who we depend on and need the most.
U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Brian T. Kelly (ret.) is the president and CEO of the Military Officers Association of America, which advocates on behalf of all who serve and have served, their families and their survivors, regardless of rank or branch of service.
18. Fact checking falsehoods about FEMA funding and Hurricane Helene
It just seems that conspiracy theories are getting worse and worse and it also seems as if more and more people are believing them.
And I see so much of this proliferated on social media by people who I assumed were smart and had common sense.
Fact checking falsehoods about FEMA funding and Hurricane Helene
Updated October 7, 20246:47 PM ET
NPR · by Stephen Fowler
Debris seen in the aftermath of Hurricane Helene on September 30, in Asheville, N.C. Mike Stewart/AP
Rumors, misinformation and lies about the federal government’s response to Hurricane Helene in the southeastern United States have run rampant since the storm made landfall, especially around funding for the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
The claims have become so widespread that FEMA set up a response page to debunk many falsehoods around how disaster funding works and what the agency’s response has been.
As of Sunday, FEMA says it has provided more than $137 million in assistance to six states in the southeast, including 7,000 federal personnel, nearly 15 million meals, 14 million liters of water, 157 generators and more than half a million tarps.
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The agency also says more than 3,000 North Carolina residents have been rescued or supported by more than 1,200 urban search and rescue personnel, with recovery efforts aided by National Guard and active duty troops. North Carolina has also received $100 million in federal transportation funds to rebuild roads and bridges washed out by the storm.
Republicans, especially former President Donald Trump, have sought to wield the storm as a political tool against Vice President Harris with less than a month to go before Election Day. Trump has repeatedly attacked Harris and President Biden as doing a “bad job” handling the storm’s aftermath without specifics, instead using misleading math to complain about immigration and foreign aid.
“They’re offering them $750 to people whose homes have been washed away,” Trump said Saturday at a rally in Butler, Pa. “And yet we send tens of billions of dollars to foreign countries that most people have never heard of. They’re offering them $750. They’ve been destroyed. These people have been destroyed.”
The $750 Trump refers to is what’s called Serious Needs Assistance, an initial direct relief payment intended to help cover emergency supplies like food, water, baby formula and other basics. The serious needs assistance is one of many changes to FEMA’s individual assistance programs that took effect earlier this year, along with displacement assistance to cover immediate housing needs while residents sort out long-term options. FEMA assistance also covers storm-related damage to homes and personal property.
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Vice President Harris pushed back against Trump's claims on Monday.
“There’s a lot of mis- and disinformation being pushed out there by the former president about what is available in particular to the survivors of Helene,” Harris said, urging people to apply for aid. “It’s extraordinarily irresponsible: it’s about him, it’s not about you. And the reality is that FEMA has so many resources that are available to folks who desperately need them,” she said.
Misinformation is "extremely damaging" to disaster response efforts, said Keith Turi, acting associate administrator for response and recovery at FEMA. "It is reducing the likelihood that survivors will come to FEMA with a trusted way to register for assistance," Turi told reporters on a call Monday afternoon. "It's important that we have those close, trusted relationships with all of our partners and the public, and that misinformation is directly impacting our ability to help people, and it's unfortunate because these individuals have been through extremely traumatic times."
Is FEMA running out of money?
Another popular refrain that has gained traction on the right in recent days is the claim that FEMA has no money for hurricane recovery because of money spent on migrants, something that is not true.
The money used in the aftermath of Helene and other major disasters is not part of FEMA’s operating budget, but instead comes from the Disaster Relief Fund, which is appropriated by Congress.
Last week, Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas reportedly said the agency “does not have the funds to make it through” the rest of hurricane season.
FEMA is required to share monthly status reports on the DRF, and before the end of the fiscal year the agency had to implement “Immediate Needs Funding” that puts a pause on some of the agency’s spending that is not tied to lifesaving and life-sustaining efforts when the needs of the DRF could be more than the remaining balance.
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The most recent report that runs through August showed a projected deficit by the end of September — and that’s before Helene made landfall.
October is the start of the federal government’s fiscal year, and a stopgap spending measure approved by lawmakers last month replenished the DRF at last year’s baseline level of $20 billion, though some of that money is reserved for ongoing recovery efforts from previous disasters and projects to mitigate future impacts.
The White House, in a release on Monday afternoon, said FEMA "has sufficient funding to both support the response to Hurricane Milton and continue to support the response to Hurricane Helene -– including funding to support first responders and provide immediate assistance to disaster survivors."
Could FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund get more money soon?
The DRF is often considered the first line of response while FEMA and other agencies assess the damage and needs related to a specific disaster. Once that information is compiled, the president typically sends a formal request to Congress for supplemental appropriations to provide more closely tailored funding and programs for any given response.
Congress has not yet passed supplemental funding for other disasters that occurred earlier in the year, much to the frustration of members in communities recovering from floods, fires and other major events. Even if they had approved the existing funding request, the money would not have been directed to Helene relief since the storm damage happened after Congress left Washington at the end of September.
Lawmakers could return to Washington to try to pass more aid but they are waiting for the White House to send an updated funding request. President Biden wrote a letter to Congress last week that said FEMA “has the resources needed for the immediate emergency response phase.”
Biden went on to say an updated request is on its way.
Sponsor Message
“My Administration will keep the Congress apprised of efforts to assess the full resource requirements associated with Hurricane Helene, including for long-term rebuilding and resilience efforts, as those estimates become available,” he wrote.
One continuing resolution proposed in the House last month would have included an additional $10 billion for the fund, but that version failed because it was tied to a controversial Republican-backed election bill that focused on further cracking down on already-illegal non-citizen voting.
Trump uses immigration attacks to make more false claims
An August report from the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General argues that billions of dollars earmarked for disasters that occurred more than a decade ago could be returned to the Disaster Relief Fund.
But the false argument from Trump and other Republicans has been that the Biden administration diverted disaster money to take care of migrants.
“They stole the FEMA money, just like they stole it from a bank, so they could give it to their illegal immigrants that they want to have vote for them this season,” Trump said in Michigan last week.
Non-citizens cannot vote in the election, and no disaster funds have been diverted. Instead, Trump and his allies are referring to the Shelter and Services Program that saw FEMA disseminate hundreds of millions in grants from Customs and Border Protection to municipalities that saw an influx of migrants.
That program was a separate funding source with a separate purpose covering separate years – and not relevant to the current hurricane recovery efforts.
Meanwhile, Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson said Sunday he had no plans to bring lawmakers back from recess before the election to address requests for additional disaster relief as Hurricane Milton approaches the Florida coast as a Category 5 storm.
NPR · by Stephen Fowler
19. An Ethical Mine Field? On Counter-Mobility and Weapon Autonomy
Excerpts:
Conclusion
Mines are a nasty business. But counter-mobility is back in Europe, and I argued that using AI-enabled anti-tank mines to autonomously engage “military objects by nature,” as the International Committee of the Red Cross puts it, can render these weapons both safer and more effective. Anti-tank mines are a niche case in which “more” and smarter weapon autonomy (by using additional sensors and more sophisticated, tighter target profiles in a stationary weapon) is straightforwardly better than “less” (relying solely on a tripwire-style cable to perform the same function in the kill chain).
Proper international regulation remains highly desirable for weapon autonomy, of course. But based on my own ten years of experience with engaging at the U.N., the diplomatic debate has largely remained an exchange of quite abstract views and sweeping declarations on international humanitarian law, ethics, and security in general. But progress in technology has made these discussions much less hypothetical than they used to be in the beginning. Policymakers, diplomats, the military community, and civil society could seek a more technologically grounded, pragmatic and focused approach.
A blanket ban or quantifiable limits on a weapons category — akin to nuclear arms control or the prohibition processes on landmines and cluster munitions — is impossible due to the cross-cutting, enabling nature of weapon autonomy. But the international community could — and most definitely should — stipulate meaningful human control as a norm in a binding legal instrument, affirming foreseeability, administrability, and traceability as obligations under the law whenever autonomy in weapon systems is used. And if such a multilateral, binding international legal instrument is not in the cards (for now), then stakeholders should at least hasten their efforts to establish best practices and norms of responsible development for the prudent as well as lawful application of weapon autonomy. Exploring specific use cases, such as anti-tank mines, to determine the scope of military benefits as well as ethical and legal boundaries is what will put lawful and responsible applications and shared rules of the road for weapon autonomy within reach.
An Ethical Mine Field? On Counter-Mobility and Weapon Autonomy - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Frank Sauer · October 8, 2024
The Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023 delivered a grim lesson in the brutal effectiveness of counter-mobility operations. Advancing Ukrainian forces found themselves in vast Russian minefields in the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, where in some places multiple anti-tank mines were stacked in deadly vertical layers. For many Ukrainian crews, survival came down to the superior resilience of Western-supplied armored vehicles.
Anti-tank mines ended up playing a crucial role in impeding and eventually thwarting the Ukrainian effort to break the land bridge to Crimea. NATO states in Europe took notice. Now, a concerted effort is underway to ensure that if Russia ever targets alliance territory, it will risk a taste of its own medicine.
The comeback of counter-mobility in Europe due to Russia’s war against Ukraine will include the use of anti-vehicle mines to shape, disrupt, and destroy an enemy’s movement. Weapon autonomy will also be playing an integral role in this effort.
We need not fear AI and weapon autonomy in this specific application. If done right, AI can make the use of anti-vehicle mines more compliant with international humanitarian law by reducing the risk of collateral damage.
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Weapon Autonomy
“Autonomous weapons” are not their own fixed category. Whereas a main battle tank, a nuclear warhead, or a cluster munition is a describable object, autonomy is a cross-cutting enabler. It allows machines to operate without human intervention. Hence, trying to define “lethal autonomous weapon systems” as a clearly delineated weapons class is a non-starter. Instead, the issue is best understood as a shift in the interaction between humans and machines in warfighting.
Weapon autonomy is about the delegation of functions in the kill chain, about who or what — human or machine — is doing what, when, and where in the battlespace. Autonomy in the kill chain’s “critical functions,” that is, the selection and engagement of targets, grants speed and helps autonomous systems prevail over remotely operated, slower systems. It is also where legal concerns about responsibility and accountability, security concerns about flash wars, and ethical qualms about dehumanizing warfare come into play.
While weapon autonomy is not necessarily problematic (nor new, with older and potentially life-saving systems such as Patriot featuring it for decades), it does raise risks if human control is not retained in a differentiated, context-dependent manner. This renders it a proverbial minefield from security, legal, and ethical points of view. So, can autonomy make the use of mines more ethical?
Mines
A victim-activated tripwire anti-personnel landmine is not a weapon with autonomy in its critical functions. The mine exists in only two states: off or on. It does not select targets, and thus it cannot discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets, civilians and combatants, often harming innocent civilians many years after hostilities ended. That’s why 164 countries prohibit them. They are not compatible with the obligations — specifically the principle of distinction prohibiting indiscriminate attacks — deriving from existing international humanitarian law.
Anti-tank mines with sensors and a feedback mechanism to perform target selection can be said to feature weapon autonomy, albeit crude. The Ottawa Convention (Art. 2 (1)), which bans anti-personnel mines, excludes “mines other than anti-personnel mines” (as long as they are not equipped with “anti-handling devices”). In other words, anti-tank mines without booby traps are legal, and they feature autonomous target selection and engagement.
Counter-Mobility in Europe
With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Europe’s security architecture collapsed. Russia is now widely considered to pose a threat above and beyond Ukraine. The Estonian Ministry of Defense estimates that a victorious Russia with reconstituted armed forces could be able to attack a NATO country within five years. Part of the reaction in the Baltic states as well as in Finland and Poland is to establish defensive lines providing counter-mobility.
Mapped, smart, networked, and remotely deactivatable anti-vehicle mines are a cornerstone of this effort. The remote control feature makes mines more easily clearable after hostilities and redeployable, thus more economical. It also allows blue forces to safely cross the minefield at any given time.
Counter-Mobility and Meaningful Human Control: The Example of PARM
The engineering solutions for target selection in anti-tank mines have so far been remarkably simple. Take the German Panzerrichtmine (PARM) as an example. Unlike the buried circular metal cases most people associate with anti-tank mines, PARM does not detonate vertically when a vehicle drives over it. It is an off-route mine ambushing the enemy horizontally from cover. When triggered, a tripod fires a Panzerfaust-style shaped-charge warhead. PARM is thus able to hit the vulnerable side of the tank. It penetrates reactive armor and bypasses active protection systems because the warhead comes in low, indistinguishable from ground clutter. The overall result is a high likelihood of immobilizing the target. Interestingly, PARM’s target selection sensor registers pressure by gauging the amount of light in a thin fiber-optic cable. It is safe to cross that cable in a car, but a tank will compress it to a degree that the mine goes off. Tracked vehicles tend to destroy the cable, also triggering the mine. PARM deactivates automatically after a period of time, rendering it Ottawa-compatible, but it cannot be remotely deactivated. It is legal to deploy this Cold War mine that relies on 1980s technology today.
So what would newer technology, including AI, mean for applying weapon autonomy in an anti-vehicle mine?
A near-consensus view holds that using weapon autonomy requires “meaningful human control” or “appropriate levels of judgment” to be retained in the human-machine relationship throughout the weapon’s entire lifecycle. Simply put, this means control by design and control in use.
The human-machine interface has to provide adequate situational awareness to the operator to be able to foresee the results of the weapon deployment after activation. The operator needs to be able to retake control over the autonomously working system at any point during its operation. Consequently, and lastly, the operator can be held responsible for the outcomes. The trifecta of foreseeability, administrability, and traceability is, in a nutshell, what constitutes meaningful human control.
Keeping that in mind, and before we examine the old PARM more closely in this regard, let us now imagine a hypothetical, AI-enabled PARM. This hypothetical mine would be in an encrypted mesh network, allowing for it to be remotely activated and deactivated. For target selection, it would make use of sensor data fusion and machine learning in addition to the fiber-optic cable. Let’s assume a Russian T-72 main battle tank as one of its target profiles. The mine would use a passive thermo-optic camera and draw on the machine learning model to classify input by looking for specific features, such as the overall silhouette of the object in question. How big is it? Does it run on tracks? Does it have a turret? It would also classify the target’s heat and exhaust signature. In addition, it would have an acoustic sensor: If the target looks like a T-72, and it has the heat signature of a T-72, does it also sound like a T-72? Lastly, it would gauge the pressure exerted on the cable. In sum, this hypothetical new PARM would only trigger if the target is as heavy as a main battle tank, looks like a T-72, emits heat and exhaust like a T-72, and sounds like a T-72.
No Undue PARM?
From an ethical perspective, it is sometimes argued that life-and-death decisions should not be made by machines (I myself have done so). However, in the case of anti-tank mines, this is an already accepted practice, even while using comparably simple low-tech sensors like a fiber-optic cable.
From a legal point of view, anti-tank mines without anti-handling devices that self-deactivate after a certain period are considered compliant with existing international law. And arguably you would not want to build a new system that is worse than its predecessor. There is an incentive to iterate so the new mine is more discriminate, thus further reducing the risk of infringing on edge cases in international humanitarian law. After all, there is a genuine risk that the old PARM could be triggered by a heavy civilian truck with a pebble stuck in its tire, thus exerting an unusual amount of pressure in a single tight spot on the fiber-optic cable.
These arguments map onto the considerations on weapon autonomy and meaningful human control. The key question regarding autonomy — namely, who or what, human or machine, is deciding what, when, and where — has already been answered for the case of anti-tank mines: Selection and engagement happen in the mine. While this remains unchanged, our hypothetical future PARM features more foreseeability, administrability, and thus traceability than the old one. After all, the successor can be remotely deactivated (more administrability) and makes use of additional sensors and a much more sophisticated target profiling mechanism (more foreseeability) to allow for using the mine in a more discriminate manner. In short, it allows for more meaningful human control and is thus preferable for legal reasons.
This is not to say that using the AI techniques described above does not come with its own challenges and risks. Machine learning systems are probabilistic, so the first issue would be to which standard this new PARM should be certified. Is a 1:1,000,000 probability of a false positive safe enough? Or would it have to be 1:10,000,000? Then there is the issue of machine learning systems being susceptible to poisoned data or getting fooled during operation with manipulated sensor information. Research in the field of adversarial AI demonstrates that even small changes in input data can trip up computer vision systems. Further complications derive from a scenario in which the communications link to the mine is severed. Should the weapon then render itself inoperable due to the diminished degree of meaningful human control? Lastly, while the hypothetical PARM described above does indeed not (yet) exist, technology is advancing rapidly, and some mines currently entering the market work quite similarly. Should they adhere to the exact specifications above? For instance, should they keep the fiber-optic cable as an analog fallback sensor to prevent an enemy from tricking a mine relying solely on computer vision into firing at a mini-van?
Questions like these — that is, “How good is good enough from an engineering point of view?” and “Can we trust this system under real-world conditions?” — are legal and technical but also deeply political. They will most likely be answered differently from one military to another, depending on standards, safety culture, and experiences gathered during research and development.
But still, it stands to reason that any anti-vehicle mine that is less likely to hit unintended targets and that can be deactivated remotely and thus more easily cleared is better than what currently exists and can already legally be used.
Conclusion
Mines are a nasty business. But counter-mobility is back in Europe, and I argued that using AI-enabled anti-tank mines to autonomously engage “military objects by nature,” as the International Committee of the Red Cross puts it, can render these weapons both safer and more effective. Anti-tank mines are a niche case in which “more” and smarter weapon autonomy (by using additional sensors and more sophisticated, tighter target profiles in a stationary weapon) is straightforwardly better than “less” (relying solely on a tripwire-style cable to perform the same function in the kill chain).
Proper international regulation remains highly desirable for weapon autonomy, of course. But based on my own ten years of experience with engaging at the U.N., the diplomatic debate has largely remained an exchange of quite abstract views and sweeping declarations on international humanitarian law, ethics, and security in general. But progress in technology has made these discussions much less hypothetical than they used to be in the beginning. Policymakers, diplomats, the military community, and civil society could seek a more technologically grounded, pragmatic and focused approach.
A blanket ban or quantifiable limits on a weapons category — akin to nuclear arms control or the prohibition processes on landmines and cluster munitions — is impossible due to the cross-cutting, enabling nature of weapon autonomy. But the international community could — and most definitely should — stipulate meaningful human control as a norm in a binding legal instrument, affirming foreseeability, administrability, and traceability as obligations under the law whenever autonomy in weapon systems is used. And if such a multilateral, binding international legal instrument is not in the cards (for now), then stakeholders should at least hasten their efforts to establish best practices and norms of responsible development for the prudent as well as lawful application of weapon autonomy. Exploring specific use cases, such as anti-tank mines, to determine the scope of military benefits as well as ethical and legal boundaries is what will put lawful and responsible applications and shared rules of the road for weapon autonomy within reach.
Become a Member
PD Dr. Frank Sauer is the head of research at the Metis Institute for Strategy and Foresight at Bundeswehr University Munich. His research focuses on nuclear issues and emerging disruptive technologies, particularly the military applications of AI and robotics. Frank co-hosts the acclaimed German-language podcast Sicherheitshalber.
The author would like to thank Ryan Evans, Ulrike Franke, Franz-Stefan Gady, Paul Scharre, and Vanessa Vohs for their helpful comments and suggestions on the manuscript.
Image: Main Directorate of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Kharkiv Oblast via Wikimedia Commons
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Frank Sauer · October 8, 2024
20. Wars Are Not Accidents
Excerpts:
To avoid playing what the international relations scholar James Fearon has called the “costly lottery” of war, leaders find ways to back down from intense crisis escalation while preserving their reputation and ensuring deterrence. To do so, policymakers must craft arrangements in which all parties can claim success or find face-saving off-ramps. In Iran and Israel’s exchange last spring, for instance, Tehran was able to project strength to both domestic and international audiences simply by showcasing its ability to launch large-scale strikes on Israel, even though the attack caused minimal damage. For their part, Israeli leaders emphasized that they can safeguard the country from even a mass attack.
Rival leaders can also tacitly collude with each other to avoid war. This frequently involves mutually deciding to keep each other’s actions hidden from the public. In the 1950s, to avoid stoking pressures to escalate, neither Moscow nor Washington disclosed their air war over Korea. Beyond such unspoken coordination, communication between rivals—either directly or through intermediaries (such as Qatar, in the case of Israel and Hamas)—can help leaders step back from war. Officials can clarify intentions and thresholds and diffuse tension after accidents, avoiding miscalculations and further escalation. There is significant precedent for this type of coordination. The close calls of the Cuban missile crisis spurred Washington and Moscow to set up a crisis hotline in 1963, and the United States established a similar connection with Beijing in 2007. Other rivals might benefit from emulating this approach.
As crises become more common and intense, the role leaders play in pulling states away from the precipice of war becomes increasingly important. When tensions push states to the brink, decision-makers must play a high-stakes bargaining game and identify ways to pursue their aims and deter future harm while avoiding war. But they need not panic about inadvertent war. The tools of restraint lie in their hands.
Wars Are Not Accidents
Managing Risk in the Face of Escalation
November/December 2024
Published on October 8, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Erik Lin-Greenberg · October 8, 2024
Israel’s assassination of a top Hamas leader in Tehran in July, Ukraine’s incursion over the summer into Russia, and a recent series of increasingly assertive Chinese air and maritime interceptions in the South China Sea have fanned fears that long-simmering conflicts could escalate into broader wars. In the wake of these provocations, analysts fret about the heightened risk of military accidents and strategic misperceptions. They worry that incidents of this sort could ratchet up tensions until policymakers lose control and stumble into wars they do not intend to fight. As U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in August, attacks in the Middle East “raise the risk of dangerous outcomes that no one can predict and no one can fully control.”
Although provocative incidents can push crises up the escalation ladder, truly inadvertent wars are rare. History provides few examples of conflicts that have erupted without policymakers’ authorization, and leaders frequently exercise restraint to avoid combat, especially in high-stakes situations. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, U.S. policymakers held off on retaliating after Soviet troops shot down an American spy plane, stepping back from the brink of war. When faced with the risk of a spiraling conflict, rivals often find off-ramps to de-escalate crises. This brinkmanship requires careful choreography: states must learn how to pressure their adversaries just enough to shape their behavior without crossing thresholds that could trigger a significant response.
Even then, crossing redlines does not make conflict inevitable. The death of three U.S. soldiers in an Iranian-backed drone strike in January did not start a war between Washington and Tehran. In April, the massive drone and missile attack that Iran launched against Israel did not ignite a full-scale conflict between those two states. But to avoid war, leaders on both sides must restrain themselves at moments of crisis without losing face or showing weakness. To do so, they must carefully consider their actions—how, when, and where to pressure rivals in ways that avoid triggering escalatory retaliation. They must also establish direct or indirect communication with adversaries, facilitating arrangements that permit both sides to claim success in their coercive actions while reducing the potential for misinterpretation. Understanding how to navigate the interplay of pressure and restraint empowers leaders to step back from the edge of war.
THE SECRET HISTORY
The fear of inadvertent escalation is not new to international relations. Political scientists have spent decades arguing about whether military mobilization plans caused European states to “sleepwalk” into World War I. During the Cold War, policymakers worried that weapon malfunctions, false alarms from early warning systems, and unauthorized actions by military officers could spark a nuclear conflagration. Some academics have explored how unintended wars could unfold from technical failures in military systems. Others have suggested that states stumble into conflicts when military actions create momentum that makes it impossible for political leaders to back away from the brink. Still others have argued that leaders might respond with major military strikes if they mistakenly perceive a rival’s limited actions as an existential threat.
Although scholars describe different pathways to inadvertent war, their frameworks have a common trait: the assumption that policymakers have limited control over escalation. According to these researchers, states end up in wars they did not choose to fight because of chance or chain reactions in the military. But this does not accord with reality. Even during the tensest moments of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union never accidentally fell into conflict. Instead, leaders always found a way out.
The Cuban missile crisis was a close call. Soviet air defenses had shot down a U.S. spy plane over Cuba without approval from Moscow, and the United States considered responding with retaliatory airstrikes that could have led to war. U.S. President John F. Kennedy and his joint chiefs, however, refrained from retaliating for fear that airstrikes could start a nuclear exchange. During another exceptionally tense moment, in 1983, the Soviet Union mobilized forces after mistakenly assessing a NATO military exercise as Western preparation for a nuclear first strike. But senior U.S. commanders again held off on responding. In each of these cases, policymakers ultimately decided to step back from war, recognizing the potentially catastrophic implications of escalation.
BLURRED LINES
Rival countries routinely engage in brinkmanship during crises, taking risky actions that heighten the prospects of war. The reason why is obvious: doing so can push a rival to change its behavior. Even if that doesn’t work, by ratcheting up tensions, leaders demonstrate that they are committed to achieving their objectives. Provocations such as raids, aerial interceptions, and ground incursions signal leaders’ willingness to act against adversaries and suggest that additional actions will follow if rivals don’t accede to their demands.
But provocations are inherently dangerous. Chinese fighter jets, for example, frequently use risky maneuvers when intercepting U.S. reconnaissance planes, making collisions more likely. The unpredictable nature of these actions heightens the risk of accidents, miscommunication, or misjudgments that could lead a minor incident to spiral into a broader conflict.
What makes crises so unpredictable is that the thresholds, or redlines, that might trigger a war are often not publicly known. They also do not fall into neat categories. They can be geographic: attacks in certain locations, for example, will trigger escalation, whereas strikes elsewhere may be ignored. But they can be based on the type of target, as well. Attacks on military contractors may fall below the threshold for retaliation, for instance, but attacks that kill military members may trigger a sharp response. The intensity of a rival’s actions can also help determine thresholds. A large-scale attack may spark more significant retaliation than a single precision strike.
Understanding how to navigate the interplay of pressure and restraint empowers leaders to step back from the edge of war.
Policymakers often deliberately keep these limits vague to strengthen their hands. Although officials sometimes announce explicit thresholds, too much clarity can weaken deterrence by enabling rivals to know just how far they can go. In contrast, ambiguity can enhance deterrence by forcing opponents to exercise restraint, lest they cross an escalation threshold.
Consider the Philippines’ calculations for responding to Chinese provocations in the water around its territory. It is unclear what would drive Manila to use force in response to aggressive Chinese moves against Philippine ships. It is equally unclear how Beijing would respond to Manila’s actions and whether such a crisis would lead the Philippines to invoke the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, which commits Washington to defend the country and could thus draw U.S. forces into the dispute. The uncertainty surrounding these interactions may make Beijing more cautious than it otherwise would be.
But uncertainty also raises the prospect that provocations will lead to a crisis that could spiral out of a leader’s control. The tension between using brinkmanship to pressure a rival and the desire to limit escalation forces leaders to navigate crises cautiously, probing how far they can go while keeping a situation under control.
ON THE LEDGE
Policymakers have to carefully calibrate their actions. They must show enough capability and resolve to advance their objectives while providing rival leaders with the space to back down. They do so, in large part, by avoiding significant affronts to a rival’s honor and by anticipating and then not crossing a rival’s redlines.
States often control escalation by limiting the physical effects of their coercive actions. Avoiding casualties or major infrastructure damage makes it easier for targeted states to refrain from serious retaliation. Russia and Iran have downed U.S. military drones to convey their displeasure with Washington’s reconnaissance missions, for example, but they have avoided the escalation risks of downing a manned aircraft. Likewise, Israel responded to Iran’s April attack by striking a single radar at a critical Iranian air defense site rather than launching a larger and more destructive operation. Although the attack caused little physical damage, it demonstrated Israel’s ability to target advanced systems deep within Iran. Since the strike generated limited harm, Tehran could downplay the attack at home and avoid launching a significant retaliation.
In addition to selecting targets and using precision munitions, states can minimize harm by forewarning of their actions, allowing the targeted states to strengthen defenses and otherwise prevent damage. Before retaliating for Israel’s attack on the Iranian embassy in Damascus this April, for instance, Tehran telegraphed its response plan. Iranian officials publicly threatened imminent strikes, privately warned regional governments of the impending attack, and messaged to Israel and the rest of the world that they did not seek a full-scale war. By the time Iran launched its missile and drone barrage nearly two weeks later, Israel and its partners were prepared to shoot most of them out of the sky, ensuring minimal physical damage and casualties.
But limiting destruction and the loss of lives is only part of the story. The location, timing, and method of attack can be just as important for managing escalation, even if the physical outcomes are the same. Iranian officials would undoubtedly have seen Israel’s killing of Hamas’s political chief, Ismail Haniyeh, as far less provocative if it had taken place in Gaza instead of in Tehran. Similarly, Moscow would likely view a Ukrainian ground force assault on a Russian military base as more escalatory than a drone strike on the same facility.
As a result, decision-makers frequently avoid actions that directly challenge a rival’s territory. For example, Washington seeks to deter Iranian-sponsored attacks on U.S. forces by targeting Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps facilities and Iranian-affiliated militias in Iraq and Syria instead of carrying out direct strikes in Iran. In doing so, the United States tacitly acknowledges that attacking Iranian territory would cross an escalation threshold.
A banner showing Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran, August 2024
Majid Asgaripour / West Asia News Agency / Reuters
Policymakers can also use coercive tools that are more deniable or otherwise less visible to the public. In the 1950s, Soviet and American pilots waged a covert air war over the Korean Peninsula that Washington and Moscow both kept hidden from the public. Today, Ukraine often refuses to take responsibility for its drone strikes on Russia. States also increasingly use “gray zone” tactics such as cyberwarfare or rely on proxies such as Russia’s Wagner paramilitary company to further their aims in a plausibly deniable manner. The political scientist Austin Carson has argued that these “backstage” activities allow governments to secretly apply pressure while avoiding demands for escalation from the public, which often grows more hawkish after visible confrontations.
Once a state carries out coercive actions, policymakers can announce their intent to avoid further escalation. After Iran’s January 2020 missile attack on a U.S. military base in Iraq, Tehran issued a public statement to the UN secretary-general stating that it “took and concluded” military operations to retaliate for Washington’s assassination of Major General Qasem Soleimani, a top Iranian commander, noting that it “does not seek escalation or war.” Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweeted a similar message, stressing that Iran’s military actions were done. The United States launched no military response to the attack, opting instead to impose additional economic sanctions on Iranian firms and officials.
But even after an attacker has achieved its goals and suggested it wants to go no further, its rival must find some way to reestablish deterrence. Officials must rewrite their rules of engagement, creating new thresholds that make clear that future aggression will be met with resistance. Iran’s response to Israel’s embassy attack signaled a new normal by demonstrating a willingness to directly attack Israeli territory, a task Tehran had previously delegated to its regional proxies. Such new, unwritten rules and thresholds push already fraught relations up the escalation ladder, creating uncertainty and fear that should cause leaders to exercise greater restraint.
Controlling escalation, however, comes with tradeoffs. Actions that are too restrained may not shape a rival’s behavior. U.S. strikes on Yemeni drone and missile sites, for example, have failed to halt Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea. Although this is partly a tactical issue—the Houthis are adept at hiding and moving launchers—Washington has also failed because its actions have not imposed costs large enough to force the Houthis and their Iranian patrons to back down. More aggressive U.S. actions might deter the Houthis more effectively, but they are also more likely to provoke Iranian escalation. Getting the Houthis to back down through force, then, might come at the cost of a general escalation in the region, ultimately a more counterproductive (not to mention dangerous) outcome for all involved.
IT TAKES TWO
Even the best efforts to avoid escalation can fail. Decision-makers may misjudge their rivals’ thresholds, taking actions that opponents perceive as more provocative than intended, as Israel did when it attacked Iran’s embassy in Syria. Israeli officials expected a minor retaliation, not an onslaught of hundreds of missiles and drones.
If tensions do rise, states can try to de-escalate. But that can be challenging since policymakers face pressure to ramp up during crises. Leaders understandably fear that looking weak will harm them politically. Constituents may punish leaders at the polls for failing to act. Other rivals closely observe a state’s crisis behavior to assess capability and resolve, and appearing weak in one crisis can weaken a state’s bargaining position in future confrontations. Such concerns are particularly severe when backing down involves reneging on a commitment, such as an agreement to defend another country or a public pledge to stand firm in a crisis. In September, for instance, Gilberto Teodoro, the Philippine defense secretary, announced that he expected American intervention in the event of a Chinese attack on Philippine military outposts. Similarly, U.S. President Joe Biden has repeatedly described Washington’s defense commitment to the Philippines as “ironclad.” As a result, it will be difficult for the United States to back down from its treaty obligations without being labeled as untrustworthy.
To complicate matters, new technologies make it harder to avoid escalation pressures. Commercial imagery satellites, cellphones, and other smart devices create a world with fewer secrets. This increased transparency makes it difficult to hide the covert and gray-zone actions that leaders often use to engage in less escalatory backstage confrontations. Meanwhile, social media provides a platform for inflammatory content that can stoke escalation.
Still, as the tit for tat between Iran and Israel showed, war is almost never inevitable. The road to conflict is an action-reaction process. Leaders decide whether and how to respond to a rival’s moves, and they often search for ways to lower the temperature. Escalation to war, after all, is not always in a state’s interest. Victory is not guaranteed, and the costs of fighting might outweigh the gains. As a result, states are often better off coming to a settlement that advances their strategic objectives without going to battle—even if a leader suffers political or reputational consequences because of it.
CLIMBING DOWN THE LADDER
To avoid playing what the international relations scholar James Fearon has called the “costly lottery” of war, leaders find ways to back down from intense crisis escalation while preserving their reputation and ensuring deterrence. To do so, policymakers must craft arrangements in which all parties can claim success or find face-saving off-ramps. In Iran and Israel’s exchange last spring, for instance, Tehran was able to project strength to both domestic and international audiences simply by showcasing its ability to launch large-scale strikes on Israel, even though the attack caused minimal damage. For their part, Israeli leaders emphasized that they can safeguard the country from even a mass attack.
Rival leaders can also tacitly collude with each other to avoid war. This frequently involves mutually deciding to keep each other’s actions hidden from the public. In the 1950s, to avoid stoking pressures to escalate, neither Moscow nor Washington disclosed their air war over Korea. Beyond such unspoken coordination, communication between rivals—either directly or through intermediaries (such as Qatar, in the case of Israel and Hamas)—can help leaders step back from war. Officials can clarify intentions and thresholds and diffuse tension after accidents, avoiding miscalculations and further escalation. There is significant precedent for this type of coordination. The close calls of the Cuban missile crisis spurred Washington and Moscow to set up a crisis hotline in 1963, and the United States established a similar connection with Beijing in 2007. Other rivals might benefit from emulating this approach.
As crises become more common and intense, the role leaders play in pulling states away from the precipice of war becomes increasingly important. When tensions push states to the brink, decision-makers must play a high-stakes bargaining game and identify ways to pursue their aims and deter future harm while avoiding war. But they need not panic about inadvertent war. The tools of restraint lie in their hands.
- ERIK LIN-GREENBERG is the Leo Marx Career Development Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Foreign Affairs · by Erik Lin-Greenberg · October 8, 2024
21. The Myth That Foreign Policy Doesn’t Matter in Presidential Elections
Excerpts:
Trump’s approach to the war in Ukraine shows that he has internalized the primacy of appearing tough on foreign policy. He has dodged questions about how he would handle the conflict as president, even repeatedly refusing to say whether he wants Kyiv to win the war. Instead, he claims that Russia would never have dared to invade Ukraine in the first place if he had still been president in 2022. The notion that Trump would bring “peace through strength” is arguably his campaign’s central national security message, and it follows in a long tradition of presidential office-seekers who have employed similar rhetoric. As much as Trump comes across a maverick, unbridled by norms, his approach to foreign policy follows a well-trodden path in presidential politics.
Harris’s principal foreign policy challenge as a candidate is to demonstrate that she can offer the kind of muscular leadership that Americans demand from their commander in chief. A recent survey of battleground states conducted by the Institute for Global Affairs shows that Trump holds an eight-point lead on the question of which candidate would be a stronger leader in international affairs. So far, Harris has largely addressed this deficit with hawkishness—for example, asserting that Americans must retain “the most lethal fighting force in the world,” arguing that Trump seeks to “cozy up to tyrants” such as Russian President Vladimir Putin or North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and insisting that Trump is “weak and wrong on national security.” But if Harris wants to convince voters, she may need to provide more detail on how she will inject new life into U.S. foreign policy.
...
Ultimately, concerns about domestic issues such as inflation and immigration will almost certainly remain at the top of voters’ minds in November. Yet in an election that will likely be decided by a small number of ballots cast in a few crucial swing states, Democrats and Republicans will need to scrape and claw for every vote they can get. Conventional wisdom that elections are just about “the economy, stupid” ignores the way that foreign policy can shape presidential elections, the influence that elections can therefore exert on international affairs, and the ways in which those dynamics have already shaped the 2024 campaign.
The Myth That Foreign Policy Doesn’t Matter in Presidential Elections
Details Might Not Matter, but Voters Care About Projecting Strength
October 8, 2024
Foreign Affairs · October 8, 2024
In the run-up to the 1992 U.S. presidential election between Bill Clinton and George H. W. Bush, Clinton campaign strategist James Carville famously coined the phrase, “It’s the economy, stupid.” The quip has been an article of faith for political commentators ever since. Presidential elections, according to this logic, are decided by bread-and-butter issues: domestic politics, not foreign policy, is what matters. Recent polling would appear to bear out Carville’s insight: according to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, nearly 60 percent of voters say that the economy and inflation will greatly shape their choice in November, whereas fewer than 20 percent say the same about the ongoing wars in Gaza and Ukraine.
Yet history shows that foreign policy is far from irrelevant to presidential campaigns. Even if voters attach limited significance to individual foreign policy issues, they want to make sure that candidates are fit to serve as the country’s commander in chief. In particular, Americans believe that it is crucial to have a strong leader who will stand firm when challenged by adversaries. Presidential candidates leverage their reputations as strong leaders to win votes without needing to draw clear contrasts with their opponents on specific foreign policy issues. Others construct reputations for toughness on the campaign trail by taking hawkish positions on international affairs. For both kinds of candidates, demonstrating the ability to lead the free world plays an important role in appealing to voters. As a result, foreign policy matters more at the ballot box than the conventional wisdom dictates.
Electoral considerations can also influence the ways incumbents conduct foreign policy. In late September, as Israel openly defied U.S. calls for a cease-fire and dramatically escalated its military operations against Hezbollah, the Biden administration broadly went along, with officials doubtlessly aware that any significant U.S. pushback might expose Kamala Harris and the Democrats to charges of insufficient support for Israel during a close election. The party is experiencing what Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and Jimmy Carter found out the hard way: foreign policy is an area fraught with political risk, where unresolved conflicts and unexpected crises can do major harm to campaigns. Incumbent presidents frequently adapt the timing and nature of critical military decisions, dialing up or down the level of U.S. commitment to foreign wars to account for the pressures of the political calendar. Pollsters and commentators have downplayed these dynamics, but candidates clearly understand them, and they are central to understanding the 2024 campaign.
TALK A BIG GAME
When asked by pollsters to identify the most important problems facing the country, Americans rarely point to specific foreign policy issues. This recurring finding appears to support the idea that foreign policy does not matter much in presidential politics. But candidates’ positions on international issues are not voters’ main consideration when evaluating which party’s nominee would be the more effective commander in chief. During the 2020 presidential campaign, for example, when voters were asked to explain why they thought either Joe Biden or Donald Trump would do a better job handling foreign policy, they were more than twice as likely to cite the candidates’ personal attributes—toughness, decisiveness, and mental acuity, among others—than to describe their policy positions.
Take the 1952 election, which took place at the height of the Korean War. Days before voters went to the polls, Republican candidate Dwight Eisenhower promised that he would “go to Korea” if elected. Eisenhower did not explain what he would do in Korea, but he didn’t have to. Having led U.S. forces to victory in World War II and then served as NATO’s top general, Eisenhower’s military record gave him unsurpassed credibility on national security issues. Voters trusted Eisenhower to handle the Korean War better than his Democratic rival, Adlai Stevenson, even if it was not obvious how these candidates would handle the conflict differently.
Richard Nixon ran a similar playbook during his own presidential campaign in 1968, which took place amid a darkening war in Vietnam. Nixon implied that he had a secret plan for achieving “peace with honor” in Vietnam. Voters clearly did not know what this plan was—in fact, they perceived Nixon’s Vietnam policies to be little different from those of his opponent, Hubert Humphrey. Polls nevertheless showed that voters thought Nixon was a stronger leader who would do a better job of managing the war.
Presidential candidates generally know the power of image-making and use their foreign policy agendas to showcase leadership strength. During his 1960 presidential campaign, for example, John F. Kennedy proposed a major U.S. military buildup to close an alleged “missile gap” with the Soviet Union. Polls at the time showed that just one-quarter of Americans thought that their country needed a larger defense budget. But Kennedy’s advisers assured him that “particular postures on issues will not direct many votes.” Pledging to raise military spending allowed Kennedy to argue that he would inject new vigor into U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, Kennedy’s famous promise to “pay any price, bear any burden” to advance U.S. world leadership continues to resonate with Americans today.
History shows that foreign policy is far from irrelevant to presidential campaigns.
At times of heightened threats, voters place a higher premium on electing strong leaders. This tendency is important for understanding the 2024 presidential campaign, which takes place amid major ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and elsewhere also presents the United States with great-power competition not seen since the Cold War. That the vice-presidential debate between J.D. Vance and Tim Walz opened with a question about Iran demonstrates just how much the current global turmoil has entered American political discourse.
Yet even at times when foreign policy issues are not particularly salient in American politics, presidential candidates still need to show that they can provide strong leadership on the international stage. Take Clinton’s campaign in 1992—the race that was supposedly all about “the economy, stupid.” According to Clinton’s national security adviser, Anthony Lake, campaign staff believed it was important to find a foreign policy issue that would “get a jab in [Bush’s] face” to blunt Bush’s reputation for competence in handling global affairs. Thus, Clinton promised to escalate U.S. involvement in Bosnia’s civil war in a manner that would demonstrate “real leadership,” in contrast to Bush’s more hands-off approach. Clinton aide Nancy Soderberg later explained that “what you need to do . . . is demonstrate that you can go to the mat with the incumbent on foreign policy and you’re not afraid to challenge his views.”
Such vote-winning strategies have more than rhetorical significance. Once in office, presidents face pressure to implement their campaign pledges, if only to avoid accusations of flip-flopping or not keeping their word. Kennedy followed through on his promise to implement a costly defense buildup. Nixon’s rhetoric about bringing “peace with honor” to Vietnam set expectations he could not fulfill in peace negotiations and contributed to his delaying signing the Paris Accords until after securing reelection in 1972. Clinton, too, ultimately followed through on his promise to intervene in Bosnia’s civil war.
FORCING HANDS
Elections also can encourage incumbent presidents to change the ways they conduct foreign policy. Presidents who are up for reelection or who are anxious to support their party’s candidate may adjust policy accordingly, regardless of whether they believe changes in approach serve the national interest.
Public pressure sometimes makes presidents more willing to use force. In March 1972, for example, Nixon authorized a major bombing and mining operation to counter North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive, despite having “grave doubts” about the utility of airpower: he understood that an aggressive response would bolster his image in an election year. As he told his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, “the most important thing is when they are kicking us we have got to be kicking them or we look bad.” Indeed, even as a plurality of Americans supported an agreement to end the war, 59 percent supported mining North Vietnam. Behind closed doors, Nixon admitted, “If we could survive past the election, Henry, and then Vietnam goes down the tubes, it really doesn’t make any difference.”
On the other hand, election year anxiety can also prompt incumbents to be more sensitive to the political risks of keeping troops in harm’s way. Take Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq in late 2011. Senior administration officials have acknowledged that, along with the Iraqi parliament’s resistance to signing a new status of forces agreement, public pressure on the president to fulfill his 2008 campaign pledge to end the war played into his decision to implement a full withdrawal. As the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, put it, “You go back to his campaign promise, and it was going to be zero. It’s just this question of how we were going to get there.”
An upcoming election can make the task of resolving international crises both more urgent and more difficult.
Often, presidents worry that using force in an election year carries excessive political risk. As the 1964 election approached, Lyndon Johnson pushed back when advisers recommended escalating U.S. military intervention in Vietnam, telling his national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, “I’ve got to win an election, and then you can make a decision.” Once re-elected, Johnson felt no such restraint, quickly authorizing a sustained bombing campaign in February 1965 at a pace that surprised even the administration’s more hawkish voices.
When not running for reelection, an imminent election can still undermine presidents’ leverage in ongoing diplomacy. Biden’s inability to broker a cease-fire agreement in Gaza or Lebanon echoes the challenges Johnson faced in trying to end the Vietnam War in 1968. At first, Hanoi showed little interest in offering concessions, hoping to receive better terms if Humphrey won the election. It softened as Nixon gained in the polls. But the prospect of a hard-liner in the White House meant that the South Vietnamese now held out for better terms—a position Nixon encouraged in order to “monkey wrench” negotiations that might benefit Democrats electorally. Hanoi’s and Saigon’s opposing interests in the outcome of the election guaranteed that peace would remain elusive.
An upcoming election can also make the task of resolving international crises both more urgent and more difficult. In 1980, for example, Carter understood that the safe return of U.S. hostages seized in Tehran by Iranian students was critical to a successful reelection bid. By authorizing a rescue mission that spring, he was responding to public frustration about the legal and diplomatic strategies he had pursued up to that point. Yet the rescue mission’s failure only strengthened public perceptions of the president’s weakness on foreign policy and contributed to Carter’s loss. The hostages were eventually released—on the day his successor, Ronald Reagan, was inaugurated.
BREAK POINTS
In 2024, Americans will again cast their votes in part based on their assessment of the candidates’ strength as leaders. Donald Trump’s proposal to levy double-digit tariffs on all imports seems, on its face, out of touch with voters’ attitudes. Though Americans have soured on many aspects of globalization in recent years, polls consistently show broad support for free trade and opposition to higher tariffs. But Trump’s “America First” trade policies also underscore his reputation as a hard-nosed dealmaker who fights back against countries, such as China, that employ unfair trade practices. When Kamala Harris talks about trade, her task is thus not just to explain to voters why Trump’s tariffs would raise prices on U.S. consumers but also to show that she can stick up for American workers with the same intensity as Trump.
Trump’s approach to the war in Ukraine shows that he has internalized the primacy of appearing tough on foreign policy. He has dodged questions about how he would handle the conflict as president, even repeatedly refusing to say whether he wants Kyiv to win the war. Instead, he claims that Russia would never have dared to invade Ukraine in the first place if he had still been president in 2022. The notion that Trump would bring “peace through strength” is arguably his campaign’s central national security message, and it follows in a long tradition of presidential office-seekers who have employed similar rhetoric. As much as Trump comes across a maverick, unbridled by norms, his approach to foreign policy follows a well-trodden path in presidential politics.
Harris’s principal foreign policy challenge as a candidate is to demonstrate that she can offer the kind of muscular leadership that Americans demand from their commander in chief. A recent survey of battleground states conducted by the Institute for Global Affairs shows that Trump holds an eight-point lead on the question of which candidate would be a stronger leader in international affairs. So far, Harris has largely addressed this deficit with hawkishness—for example, asserting that Americans must retain “the most lethal fighting force in the world,” arguing that Trump seeks to “cozy up to tyrants” such as Russian President Vladimir Putin or North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and insisting that Trump is “weak and wrong on national security.” But if Harris wants to convince voters, she may need to provide more detail on how she will inject new life into U.S. foreign policy.
In 2024, Americans will again cast their votes based on their assessment of the candidates’ strength as leaders.
The issue on which Harris has drawn the clearest contrast with the Biden administration is her more outspoken criticism of Israel’s war in Gaza. This approach may help win votes in swing states like Michigan, which has significant populations of progressives and Arab Americans. On a national scale, however, tacking left on Gaza could expose Harris to the charge that she is failing to support Israel or appeasing Hamas. Harris would thus do well to find additional areas in which to draw foreign policy contrasts to Biden, particularly on issues that showcase how she would stand up to America’s adversaries. The most plausible move would involve explaining how she would bolster U.S. support for Ukraine. Explaining how a new Democratic administration would do more to contain China could also fit the bill.
As the campaign enters its final stretch, the political bind Harris faces on the Middle East is likely to worsen. The escalation of conflict between Israel, Iran, and its proxies into a wider regional war is unlikely to be popular with voters. Yet, as a lame duck with limited time left in office, Biden lacks the leverage required to bring hostilities to a close. With Trump having criticized Biden’s calls for Israel to agree to a cease-fire in Gaza and pledged to let Israel “finish the job,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces few incentives to bow to pressure to exercise restraint. As he expands the war to a new front in Lebanon and publicly contemplates direct attacks on Iran, Netanyahu appears set to run out the clock on the outgoing administration. Harris’s struggles to bridge conflicting views in her own party leave Trump free to blame her for allowing regional tensions to boil over on her watch, without articulating a clear vision of how he would handle things differently.
Ultimately, concerns about domestic issues such as inflation and immigration will almost certainly remain at the top of voters’ minds in November. Yet in an election that will likely be decided by a small number of ballots cast in a few crucial swing states, Democrats and Republicans will need to scrape and claw for every vote they can get. Conventional wisdom that elections are just about “the economy, stupid” ignores the way that foreign policy can shape presidential elections, the influence that elections can therefore exert on international affairs, and the ways in which those dynamics have already shaped the 2024 campaign.
Foreign Affairs · October 8, 2024
22. A troubling military trend by David Deptula
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/10/07/ukraine-missiles-robert-gates-military/
Regarding Robert Gates’s Sept. 25 op-ed, “Failures in Washington leave U.S. defense vulnerable abroad”:
The former defense secretary was partially correct in his assessment of our military. However, he was incorrect in stating that “our Air Force has stagnated in size.” In fact, Air Force combat aircraft have been reduced by more than half since Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Today, the U.S. Air Force is the oldest, the smallest and the least ready in its entire history — and programmed to get even smaller by retiring more than 1,000 aircraft over the next five years without corresponding replacements. This dire situation stems from long-standing funding imbalances between the Air Force and its sister departments, which Mr. Gates himself oversaw from 2006 to 2011.
From 2002 to 2021, the Army received about $1.3 trillion more than the Air Force. But greater competition for power now demands a greater emphasis on air and space power. China knows this, which is why, for two decades, it has drastically cut back the end strength of the People’s Liberation Army and rebalanced toward air, space and naval forces.
Mr. Gates’s failure to acknowledge his part in creating this predicament is troubling. Capabilities such as the F-22 fighter — imprudently terminated under his tenure — are now desperately needed to deter and potentially defeat hostile powers.
It’s time for an honest reassessment of our defense priorities, and for defense leaders past and present to acknowledge the part they played in how we got here. All our services should be allocated sufficient funds to meet the needs of our defense strategy. Without that funding, a comprehensive review of our armed forces’ missions and roles is needed to best realign our military capabilities with current threats. The security of our nation depends on adapting to these new realities, not clinging to outdated assessments and funding allocations.
David Deptula, Oakton
The writer is a retired Air Force lieutenant general.
23. The strategic plan that never was
Some fascinating history with a very interesting proposal (that never came to be).
Matt Armstrong has always emphasized to me that the key to effective influence is leadership - from the national level on down.
Perhaps some enterprising congressional staffer will reprise this strategic plan in future legislation.
The strategic plan that never was
A proposal with measurable, not just aspirational, objectives
https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/the-strategic-plan-that-never-was?utm
Matt Armstrong
Oct 08, 2024
In a previous post, I mentioned that, as a Governor on the former Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), I drafted a strategic plan for the agency with the assistance of Rob Bole, who was then the chief strategy officer for the BBG. This was not a public document, but I shared it with all interested stakeholders and relevant parties, including Congressional staff, who were considering legislative options to address the structural and management issues at the BBG.1 They were uncertain about the specific approach they wanted, but they were eager to do something.
A draft of our written strategic plan was ready for comment in mid-April 2014. This was a few days before the first discussion draft of a proposed bill of what would eventually be H.R. 4490, a bill to remake the BBG into the United States International Communications Agency and the Freedom News Network. At this point, the bill didn’t yet have a number, and the organization for the consolidated grantees—Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and Middle East Broadcasting Network (MBN)—wasn’t yet named.2 Liberty News Network was initially proposed for the consolidated grantee, but that was taken. The Freedom News Network (FNN) was then selected and appeared in H.R. 4490 when it was introduced.
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I wrote the strategic plan because the then “current” strategic plan wasn’t that strategic nor much of a plan. I wanted to replace the current “strategic plan,” nominally for 2012-2016. The BBG Strategic Plan for 2012-2016 led with “a dozen key tactical steps” that were aspirational, often not tactical but strategic, and not measurable beyond determining success or failure. These steps included:
- “Unify the Agency into one organization, many brands”
- “Launch a Global News Network”
- “Seize targeted growth opportunities”
- “Focus on the global democracy wave and pockets of extremism”
- “Rationalize program delivery”
- “Elevate and expand social media innovation”
- “Employ leading-edge communication techniques and technologies”
- “Engage the world in conversation about America”
After several pages of narratives that didn’t provide any actionable or accountable strategic guidance, pages 11-19 of the 20-page document discussed these “key tactical steps,” often showing how the steps involved significant strategic shifts. For example, “Unify the Agency” included establishing “a single CEO to manage the agency’s day-to-day affairs, with a part-time board of directors focused on strategy, budget, and public outreach.” That’s not a tactical change.3
The so-called “key tactical steps” were actually the core of the strategy, but, with a few exceptions, they were merely aspirational without accountability and thus largely empty promises. Actions must align with words, and they did not.
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The plan I wrote with Rob is below. It was officially dead in July 2015, though the tombstone was written long before. Its end was attributable to two factors. First, the board chairman, who admitted to me he hadn’t read it, refused to act on it. From our conversation, he clearly interpreted the mere title and concept as something leading to significant corporate restructuring. As you will see, it wasn’t by any stretch, but he ignored it nonetheless as a result. When we hired the agency’s first CEO, the collective decision was made to allow that CEO to settle in and determine the new strategic plan. That CEO disappeared suddenly to return to NBC, and the process never restarted. Before that, I had sat down with each of the network chiefs and others inside and outside the agency to solicit feedback: what was good, bad, missing, etc. They all liked it and signed off on it. As for the network chiefs, whether they did so to appease me because they knew it would never be adopted, I don’t know.
The plan was intentionally short at five pages, less than 2,000 words, to keep out the fluff. It was digestible and actionable, and it had measures of accountability.
Regardless, below is the plan as it was presented for your reading pleasure.4 A decade later, there are changes I’d make, but I think it holds up well. As always, I’m interested in your thoughts.
FY 2014-18 Strategic Plan – Placing the Audience First
Overview
This Strategic Plan of the Broadcasting Board of Governors for 2014-2016 is the fourth plan since the Agency’s establishment in 1998 and the first under the governing board that took office beginning in August 2013. This plan supersedes the 2012-2016 plan and complies with both the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 and the requirement that federal agency strategies align with presidential terms of office.
This strategy charts our path, defines our purpose, and provides a framework for how we will respond to challenges and overcome obstacles. It aligns existing competencies, and those in development, with the requirements of our mission. Good strategy provides focus and coordination across levels, and in the case of the BBG, across entities. A good strategy should include a diagnosis of expected challenges and those that were not previously overcome. The Board believes this plan accomplishes these requirements.
The BBG appears, on its surface, to be a complex combination of different networks with seemingly different missions. Under the operating principle of “audience-first,” the BBG has begun the necessary shift to integrate our entities and their inherent strengths to provide the audiences the news and information they need, on the platforms they use, in the languages they speak, to where they are and live. This means breaking down the isolation of past “verticals” that resulted in duplication of programming, overlapping efforts, and an overall lack of coordination that limited impact and created confusion.
The BBG will articulate its role and objectives in a 21st Century media environment. The BBG empowers people with news and information that enables them to strive for, develop, and participate in a civil society and global community. This includes holding their governments accountable, understanding the realities of the challenges they face locally and regionally, and understanding the rule of law, human security, commerce, and more. We tell the American story to develop an understanding of U.S. policies and provide reflective moments for audiences to compare our present and our past with their situations. Collectively, these activities support U.S. national security and foreign policy goals.
The mission and the means of the BBG are unique and complement the other instruments of U.S. foreign policy. The Voice of America, the oldest and largest of the BBG’s entities, is the primary means for foreign audiences, including those in power, to understand U.S. policy and the lessons of civil society in the United States. The other entities, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), the Office of Cuban Broadcasting (OCB), and Middle East Broadcasting Network (MBN) provide local news and information source for audiences, especially in countries lacking media freedom. And finally, the International Broadcasting Board’s highest function is providing the agency oversight and strategy, as well as services where scale saves the taxpayer’s money and improves performance.
This plan is how we achieve our mission.
Mission Statement
The BBG’s mission is to inform, engage and connect people around the world in support of freedom & democracy.
The BBG empowers people through access to news and information, which creates local demands for accountability, transparency, rule of law, human security, commerce, and other fundamental requirements for freedom and democracy. The BBG’s media services include two federal networks, the Voice of America (VOA) and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB); and three non-profit grantees: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN). In addition to these five networks, the BBG includes the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB). Combined, the BBG is one of the largest media organizations in the world, providing news and information in over 61 languages to more than 206 million audience members weekly (an increase of nearly 31 million from last year) in more than 100 countries. The BBG operates on a wide range of broadcast and digital media platforms with some 3,600 employees, 1,500 stringer reporters, and 54 news bureaus.
Across the BBG’s broadcasting regions, governments seek to repress or withhold news and information from their citizens. This censorship comes in many forms, including denying the BBG and other international media the right to broadcast on radio and television, interfering with or jamming our satellite broadcasts in violation of multiple international agreements, blocking citizens from accessing websites, and other malicious actions that prevent populations from exercising their right to a free and open press.
News and information is a right that the BBG holds in the highest regard, as are the freedoms to speak and to listen. Through its Internet anti-censorship (IAC) tools and programs, including the Open Technology Fund, the BBG helps millions in countries suffering under censorship to access information and advance inclusive and safe access to global communication networks. IAC initiatives circumvent government firewalls, secure safe communication channels, and distribute objective news and information in repressive environments from China to Cuba to Iran and more. Unfortunate global trends mean we are supporting more people in more countries as regimes increase their efforts to deny their people from knowing and discussing the truth.
All of the BBG’s entities adhere to the standards and principles mandated by the International Broadcasting Act of 1994, as amended. This incorporates the VOA Charter, signed into law in 1976, and requires accurate, reliable, objective and comprehensive news, balanced presentations of United States’ institutions and policies, and information about developments throughout the world.
Strategic Goals
The BBG’s strategic goals operationalize the mission of the agency.
1. Deliver accurate and timely news and information based on the highest standards of journalism where access is limited by censorship or there is a lack of free and independent media.
2. Create access to news, information, and support for freedom of expression for people threatened by censorship and intimidation.
3. Counter propaganda and extremist rhetoric that threatens peace, stability, and freedom with credible news and information that empowers audiences to positively contribute and participate in a civil society.
4. Counter propaganda and misinformation about the United States by explaining U.S. policy, making available the statements and views of U.S. Government officials and important leaders across the U.S., and providing perspectives on American life and values through reporting, analysis, and commentary.
5. Support the independence of media organizations in places where media freedom is threatened through a strong affiliation program that supports their viability through content, training, and other professional services.
These goals will be achieved by taking an “audience-first” approach to all aspects of our activities. We must continue to produce quality journalism that is of exceptional value and utility to our audiences. We must identify the audiences that are underserved or denied access to the news and information they need and deploy the appropriate capabilities of the BBG to empower these people to work toward freedom and democracy.
Strategic Objectives
The strategic objectives are nested under the above strategic goals. The objectives reflect the outcome or management impact the BBG seeks to achieve. These objectives are then tied to performance goals and indicators established to help the agency monitor and understand progress, and serve as the primary units of analysis for the agency of how we are achieving our mission.
1. Deliver accurate and timely news and information based on the highest standards of journalism where access is limited by censorship or there is a lack of free and independent media.
A. Expand mobile and shareable content to interact and gather news from engaged audiences.
B. Optimize the use of video and audio content on digital platforms that deliver high-quality content.
C. Produce exceptional content that quickly responds to and engages audience needs and interests on the platforms the audiences use.
D. Establish and implement evaluation methods of BBG journalism based on the highest standards of comparable media organizations.
2. Create access to news and information and support for freedom of expression for people threatened by censorship and intimidation.
A. Expand the usage and knowledge of tools that enable circumvention of censorship in closed information societies.
B. Become a hub to facilitate and empower citizen information gathering and exchange.
C. Create country-specific and audience-specific broadcast and digital streams for those threatened by extremism and censorship.
D. Serve as a conduit for the transmission of reporting originating from inside closed societies across the closed society and to outside audiences.
3. Counter propaganda and extremist rhetoric that threatens peace, stability, and freedom with credible news and information that empowers audiences to positively contribute and participate in a civil society.
A. Become a hub to facilitate and empower citizen information gathering and exchange on solving problems and building democratic institutions.
B. Combat racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice by facilitating and empowering informed dialogue.
4. Counter propaganda and incomplete information about the United States by explaining U.S. policy, making available the statements and views of U.S. Government officials and important leaders across the U.S., and providing perspectives on American life and values through reporting, analysis, and commentary.
A. Expand Global English on digital channels, including expanded use of social media to inform and engage audiences in conversations about American policies and society.
B. Expand Learning English into a mobile and social media brand with a broad range of new product offerings.
C. Serve as a U.S. bureau for media organizations that lack other options to access news, analysis, and perspectives from the U.S.
5. Support the independence of media organizations in places where media freedom is threatened through a strong affiliation program that supports their viability through content, training, and other professional services
A. Serve as a foreign bureau for media organizations that lack other options to access news, analysis, and perspectives from the U.S. and elsewhere in the world.
B. Expand digital content support to affiliates through the Direct platform to enable them to exchange content with USIM and other affiliates.
C. Establish a BBG Fellowship program to rotate affiliate staff through USIM language services, and place USIM staff in affiliate newsrooms.
D. Establish a BBG Journalism Institute (possibly under a new grantee) to provide the highest level of training and technical support to BBG affiliates to improve their professionalism and skills.
Management Objectives
The purpose of management objectives is to provide a clear direction toward accomplishing the mission of the agency. They must be tangible, measurable, and achievable. This list is mindful of past management objectives found in previous plans, the success or shortcoming of these precedents, and of current requirements and priorities.
1. Identify and hire a Chief Executive Officer to provide day-to-day executive leadership of the agency, including its federal and non-federal entities.
2. Place the “audience first” in planning, organizing, funding, and programming across the agency.
3. Reduce or eliminate redundant or unnecessary offices, functions, and efforts to shift more resources to programming.
4. Increase internal transparency and communication across the agency and its entities to increase trust, collaboration, efficiency, and reduce organizational and personal friction in daily and strategic activities.
5. Increase external engagement and communication across the Government and with the Congress to support U.S. foreign policy, reduce redundancy of U.S. Government efforts, and increase visibility of our unique capabilities, mission, and value.
6. Improve our agility in responding to sudden and shifting circumstances.
7. Expand our revenue to offset reductions and increase opportunities for strategic internal investments.
8. Develop and encourage an environment and culture where coordinating activities across entities is the rule and not the exception, starting with the senior leadership of the agency.
9. Explore establishing a new NGO entity for program and support functions.
The parting picture
I’m not excited about the name of this section, so I’ll try to come up with something better. The idea is to share one of my scenic photos from my past adventures for something different. This photo is from July 2023 and was taken during the same ride as the picture in my previous post, but it’s a different lake in the background.
Photo by me. July 9, 2023. Overlooking Ägerisee, or Lake Aegeri. Naturally, the area where I took this picture is named Oberägeri.
1
The leadership structure, from the board to the networks, was a real problem. In a previous post, I discussed the structural defect of the BBG board, namely how it required a constant flow of new nominees confirmed to the board, something that successive administrations utterly failed to do. This sets aside the apparent qualifications deemed acceptable for the job. My previous post briefly mentioned the allocation of agency resources and priorities was treated as a zero-sum contest between the networks, with the networks coming before the agency’s mission and foreign policy requirements, leading to analysts incorrectly labeling the agency as an “illogical patchwork” of networks. What I didn’t mention then and is relevant here is that for many years (far more than a few), my board predecessors hadn’t looked at the succession plans at the networks. As part of looking at the strategic future of the agency, I asked the networks about their succession plans. No one had anything like that, though one network president had a viable candidate to replace them. One network president had worked tirelessly to prevent any successor. The top layers (plural) of leadership at another network had no viable candidate for the top leadership job, something we found out the hard way.
2
The “grantees” are called such because they operate under a grant from the then-BBG, now called the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM).
3
An outside review of the agency, completed and presented to the board in February 2012, strongly recommended establishing a CEO. The reasons were obvious but generally ignored by many commentators, academic and otherwise. My board cohort implemented the recommendation after the previous board, who commissioned the review and wrote the strategic plan, failed to (for reasons related to the consistent failure of administrations to support and replenish the board properly). Again, I discussed some of this previously.
4
You may notice the document has two-spaces between sentences. It was from another era!
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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