Quotes of the Day:

“Popular culture often provides useful pointers about the real world. The old Cold War kept Hollywood busy, yet major studios today are extremely reticent about casting the Chinese Communist Party as a villain. Hollywood’s priority has been to gain access to the lucrative China market, and to that end they stripped movies of anything that might upset Party censors. The Chinese movie industry has no such reticence when it comes to casting the West as villains. The top two grossing movies of recent years were Wolf Warrior 2, a Rambo-style action film, and The Battle at Lake Changjin, a Korean War epic, both of which depict Americans as almost comic-book enemies. While Hollywood pursues profit from China and kowtows to the Party, China’s propaganda machine is going into battle with a chilling sense of purpose–the new Cold War is in full swing in China’s biggest home-grown movies, and in the broader language and imagery of Party propagandists.”

– Ian Williams, The Fire of the Dragon: China's New Cold War 

"The measure of success is not whether you have a tough problem to deal with, but whether or not it is the same problem you had last year." 

– John Foster Dulles

"A faith that cannot survive collision with the truth is not worth many regrets." 

– Arthur C. Clarke

1. What North Koreans want to know most: How does the world see us?

2. South Korea Can Stand Up to China

3. Taiwan and S.Korea favored, India down, BofA fund manager survey shows

4. S. Korea pulls bill to move unification think tank under ministry

5. South Korea's Lee says North produces material for 10-20 nuclear weapons annually

6. North Korea is a nuclear power. Trump’s omission is an admission.

7. North Korea denuclearization ideal but unrealistic, South’s president says

8. Defector group asks rights panel to block new label for arrivals

9. Lee orders probe, tough penalties over civilian drones sent to N. Korea

10.​ South Korea probes if spies funded drones flown into North by student

​11. Editorial: Lee's 'Grave Crime' Claim Points Back to His Intelligence Agency

​12. Why stopping drones from entering North Korea will be easier said than done

​13. Lee vows diplomatic efforts for resumption of N. Korea-U.S. talks, creating conditions for inter-Korean dialogue

14. Trump touts 'historic' deals with S. Korea, Japan, other countries; stresses push to acquire Greenland

1. What North Koreans want to know most: How does the world see us?

Comment: This will be one of the most important essays we may ever publish at the Korea Regional Review (though all our Witness for Freedom essays from Korean escapees are brilliant). For anyone who is focused on the information instrument of national power applied to north Korea, this is absolutely a must read. For all others this provides important insights about the Korean people in the north and how they view the world and what they desire to know.

From my good friend and colleague from north Korea, Hyunseung Lee.

Voices Jan. 20, 2026 / 10:46 AM

What North Koreans want to know most: How does the world see us?

By Hyunseung Lee, NKYLA

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un waves during an art performance celebrating the new year at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang, North Korea, on January 1. According to the North Korean Central News Agency, Kim delivered a speech lauding what he called the country's successes in 2025 Photo by KNCA/EPA

Jan. 20 (UPI) -- Have you ever considered what it would feel like to discover that the life you've lived, the sacrifices you've made, were all built on lies? This is the question every North Korean who encounters outside information must confront.

The great divide

When people in the West and around the world think of North Korea, they likely conjure three images: a leader with a distinctive hairstyle, Kim Jong Un,,a military regime obsessed with nuclear weapons and missile development, and the tragic reality of people starving to death.

But, ask North Korean citizens about their homeland, and they'll tell you three entirely different things. What occupies their minds is: the great Leader Kim Jong Un, a proud nuclear power and North Korea as an earthly paradise.

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This stark contrast reveals one of the most profound information gaps in the modern world. For more than 70 years, the North Korean regime has constructed an alternate reality for its 25 million citizens -- a reality so complete that most have no idea how drastically it differs from the world's perception of their country.

The first search

In 2006, when I first arrived in China, the very first thing I did after connecting to the Internet was type "Kim Jong-il" and "Joseon" into a search bar.

My hands were shaking as I entered those words. This was forbidden, even dangerous. If someone saw my search history on the computer and reported it to the Workers' Party, the consequences would be severe -- not just for me, but potentially for my entire family.

Yet, I had to know. For years, we North Korean citizens had been told that our Supreme Leader was revered worldwide, that foreign leaders envied our system, that North Korea was "a beacon of socialism." I had to see what the outside world actually said about us.

What I discovered shattered everything I had ever believed.

The architecture of ignorance

The North Korean regime doesn't merely control information -- it constructs an entirely alternate reality. This isn't accidental; it's the foundation of the regime's survival. Citizens have virtually no access to foreign media, international Internet or uncensored news. Radios are sealed with frequencies fixed to receive only government broadcasts. Televisions pick up only state channels. Even conversations with foreigners are thoroughly monitored and restricted.

In this vacuum, the regime fills every space with its own narrative. From kindergarten onward, children are taught that Kim Il-sung was a great general who defeated the Japanese and American imperialists and is our benevolent father who cared only for the people. They learn that America tried to invade North Korea to enslave us. They're told that despite international sanctions and "temporary difficulties," North Korea remains one of the world's most powerful and respected nations.

But humans are instinctively curious creatures. No matter how perfect the information blockade, questions inevitably arise. If we're truly an earthly paradise, why is it so hard to avoid starvation? If our leader is so internationally respected, why are we so isolated? Why are there such strict regulations on what we can watch, read, and say?

These questions don't disappear. They simply go underground -- whispered among trusted people or kept locked deep in one's own mind.

The dangerous search for truth

For North Koreans sent abroad -- whether as diplomats, workers, or operatives - the temptation to access forbidden information becomes overwhelming. Nearly all North Koreans working overseas engage in some form of information-seeking, despite enormous risks.

A North Korean computer engineer who was dispatched to Dalian, China, in 2012 told me, "Before leaving the country, we received continuous education: Don't watch South Korean dramas, don't search for North Korea-related information on the Internet, don't make contact with South Koreans.

They said there were eyes watching us, that there were informants among us. But on my first night in the Chinese dormitory, after my roommates fell asleep, I put in earphones and found South Korean news broadcasts online. I watched for hours, barely breathing, terrified of being discovered. The first news I searched for was how people around the world were mourning the passing of General Kim Jong-il."

What drives people to take such risks isn't simple curiosity. It's a deep, desperate need to verify whether the life they've lived is built on truth or lies.

Many begin by searching for the most basic facts: What is North Korea's actual economic standing? How does the international media portray Kim Jong-un? Do people in other countries really envy the North Korean system?

The answers they encounter can be devastating. Learning that North Korea is among the world's poorest countries, that its leaders are sometimes objects of ridicule in the international community, that the outside world views their homeland not with admiration but with pity -- this creates profound psychological shock.

The instinct for verification

This yearning for truth reveals something fundamental about human nature. People need to know whether their lives are legitimate, whether the sacrifices they've endured have meaning, whether the system they've defended truly deserves their loyalty.

I remember my own moment of reckoning vividly. While searching Korean news, I came across articles describing North Korea as a "hermit kingdom," a "failed state," an "oppressive regime." The 1990s famine, which we'd been taught was caused by American economic sanctions and anti-DPRK conspiracies, was explained as a man-made disaster resulting from North Korean regime policies. Kim Jong-il was portrayed not as a brilliant strategist, but as an eccentric dictator.

My first reaction was rage. Surely, this was false propaganda spread by the CIA or the South Korean puppet regime. But as I continued reading articles over several months, a terrible thought slowly crept in: What if they were telling the truth? What if everything I'd believed, everything I'd been taught, everything I'd sacrificed for -- what if all of it was built on lies?

This is the question that haunts every North Korean who glimpses the outside world's perspective.

The burden of knowing

The regime understands this danger all too well. That's why it imposes such harsh punishments for accessing outside information. Getting caught watching South Korean dramas can result in years in a labor camp, and sharing such information with others can lead to execution. The regime knows that information poses a more lethal threat to its survival than any external military danger.

Yet, North Koreans continue seeking the truth. USB drives containing foreign films and dramas circulate secretly through underground markets. People with illegal radios listen clandestinely to foreign broadcasts in the dead of night. Workers sent abroad find ways to access the Internet, even if only briefly. Each act of information-seeking is a small rebellion, a refusal to accept enforced ignorance.

What they most want to know

When North Koreans finally access outside information, the questions that repeatedly surface are remarkably similar:

Is our country truly respected internationally, or is it isolated and ridiculed? Are other countries really worse off than us, or have we been deceived about our relative prosperity? Do foreign leaders truly respect Kim Jong Un, or do they view him as a threat or a joke? Are we really a nuclear power the world fears, or just a struggling nation barely holding on?

And the most painful question: Have we wasted our lives serving a lie?

These aren't abstract political questions. They strike directly at the core of personal identity and life's meaning. For someone who has endured poverty, sacrificed personal desires, monitored and reported on neighbors, and lived in constant fear -- all for the system -- discovering that the system itself is built on lies is devastating beyond words.

The day truth arrives

The truth North Koreans most desperately seek remains largely beyond their reach. But each small crack in the information barrier matters. Each smuggled USB drive, each secretly heard radio broadcast, each whispered conversation about what someone saw abroad -- these become seeds of awareness. Once planted, these seeds aren't easily uprooted.

What the regime fears most isn't military invasion but "collective enlightenment" -- the day when enough North Koreans learn their country's true standing in the world and the international assessment of their leaders.

That day hasn't arrived yet, but the cracks in the information wall are widening. Technological advancement makes information increasingly difficult to contain. Economic desperation drives more North Koreans into overseas labor, exposing them to outside perspectives in the process. Even within North Korea, smuggled foreign media continues to spread despite severe crackdowns.

On the day when the majority of North Koreans understand how the world actually views their country and leaders; the regime will face its greatest challenge. That challenge won't come from foreign powers, but from its own people armed with the most powerful weapon of all: truth.

Until that day arrives, North Koreans will continue their dangerous pursuit of truth, one forbidden search at a time. Because the human instinct to understand reality, to verify whether one's life has meaning and legitimacy, is stronger than any threat of punishment.

And this, ultimately, is what terrifies the regime most.

Hyunseung Lee is a North Korean escapee, the lead strategist at the Global Peace Foundation and the founder of North Korean Young Leaders Assembly, with prior experience in North Korea's shipping and mining sectors and as a sergeant in the DPRK Army Special Force. He fled in 2014 due to severe governmental purges. He holds a bachelor's degree in economics from Dongbei University of Finance and Economics and a master's degree in public administration from Columbia University.

2. South Korea Can Stand Up to China

​Summary:

Victor Cha argues that South Korea cannot appease or decouple from China, but it can and must push back using collective leverage with the United States, Japan, and other G-7 partners. Beijing has repeatedly used economic coercion against Seoul, from THAAD retaliation to weaponized urea exports and targeted sanctions on defense firms, and will likely respond even more harshly to the new U.S–ROK nuclear submarine deal. China is increasingly a security risk and an economic competitor, not a stabilizing partner. A coordinated “economic Article 5” among allies, built on China’s deep import dependencies, could deter future coercion and free Seoul’s strategic choices.

Comment: A very useful rundown of all the mistreatment (economic coercion) of South Korea by China as well as the threats China poses. How can Seoul balance near-term economic exposure to China with the long-term strategic gains of joining a hard collective deterrence pact against Chinese economic coercion? Is an "economic Article 5" feasible in Asia (or anywhere?).

Juxtapose this with PM Carney's speech in Davos about Middle Powers. How does South Korea fit into Carney's construct?

“Principled and pragmatic: Canada’s path” Prime Minister Carney addresses the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (Transcript)

https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2026/01/20/principled-and-pragmatic-canadas-path-prime-minister-carney-addresses

South Korea Can Stand Up to China

Foreign Affairs · More by Victor Cha · January 21, 2026

With Its Allies, Seoul Has Enough Leverage to Push Back

Victor Cha

January 21, 2026

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/south-korea-can-stand-china

Chinese leader Xi Jinping and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung meeting in Beijing, January 2026 Yonhap / Reuters

VICTOR CHA is Distinguished University Professor at Georgetown University, President of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a co-author, with Andy Lim and Ellen Kim, of China's Weaponization of Trade: Resistance Through Collective Resilience.

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South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is pulling out all the stops to improve ties with Beijing. During a four-day state visit to China in early January, he snapped a selfie with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on a new Xiaomi smartphone that his hosts had given him, told an audience that he sought to “upgrade” Chinese-South Korean relations, and signed more than a dozen agreements on topics as varied as trade, climate, and transportation. This followed the two leaders’ long conversation on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in South Korea in early November, where Lee regally welcomed Xi with an honor guard and a welcome banquet to mark the Chinese leader’s first state visit in years.

For Lee, cozying up to Xi can stabilize the relationship with South Korea’s largest trade partner and open new channels of influence over rival North Korea, which depends on China economically. Xi, for his part, seems amenable to Lee’s overtures: after frosty relations with Yoon Suk-yeol, the former South Korean president, warmer ties with Lee can boost Beijing’s position in its strategic competition with Washington by helping pull South Korea away from Japan and the United States. But the bonhomie is unlikely to last.

In mid-November, just two weeks after laying out the red carpet for Xi at APEC, Lee and U.S. President Donald Trump reached an unprecedented deal to cooperate on nuclear-powered submarines. Although many details are still unclear, the agreement will allow Seoul to fulfill a long-standing goal of upgrading its fleet, either by providing U.S. technology and fuel for South Korean nuclear submarines or by encouraging South Korea to develop its own. Seoul would use these submarines to track North Korean vessels—but also those of China, a reality that will incense Beijing.

So far, this bombshell announcement has not provoked a reaction from Beijing. It’s possible that the Chinese leader was unprepared for the surprise move or that Xi’s spat with Japan over Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments about the importance of Taiwan’s security to Tokyo has made Lee a useful friend at this moment. But Beijing will not forget about the nuclear submarine deal. China, in response to other geopolitical slights, has sanctioned at one point or another almost every Korean product, ranging from music to cosmetics to television shows to kimchi. Xi did not seem convinced by Lee’s explanation that Seoul needed the new military capability to counter the expanding North Korean nuclear threat. Instead, during Lee’s visit to Beijing, Xi warned the South Korean president to make the “correct strategic choice,” a cryptic threat that Lee brushed aside to minimize any appearance of discord as he tries to repair ties.

When Beijing eventually turns up the economic heat on Seoul, South Korea cannot stand up to China alone. Instead, Japan, the United States, and other regional partners should work with South Korea to fend off Beijing’s severe economic coercion. Together, past and future targets of China’s economic bullying can amass enough economic leverage to fight back against such pressure tactics and liberate their foreign policy decision-making from under Beijing’s thumb.

HISTORY REPEATS

South Korea is no stranger to Chinese coercion. In 2016–17, Seoul allowed the United States to place a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in Seongju, South Korea, to defend against North Korean ballistic missiles. Beijing opposed this move because it claimed that THAAD’s radar systems could penetrate deep into Chinese territory; it responded by imposing massive sanctions against South Korea’s entertainment, cosmetics, and tourism industries. A targeted pressure campaign against Lotte, the South Korean conglomerate that originally owned the land where the THAAD system was placed, forced the company to eventually shutter its 112 grocery stores in China. The total amount of lost revenue in South Korea’s economy amounted to over $15 billion.

Then in October 2021, China suddenly stopped exporting urea, an organic compound used to reduce diesel emissions and as a fertilizer, ostensibly to stabilize domestic prices and supply. Because South Korea relies almost entirely on China for its supply of urea, Beijing’s action caused panic buying and disrupted logistics and supply chains in South Korea. China resumed exporting a limited supply of the compound after a few months. But Beijing has repeatedly paused or slowed urea exports since, including from late 2023 to early 2024, delivering a clear warning to Seoul that China could paralyze the South Korean economy if it wanted to.

Soon after Lee and Trump announced in August 2025 that South Korean companies Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai would build ships in the United States, China again resorted to economic coercion to express its displeasure. It sanctioned five U.S. subsidiaries of Hanwha Ocean, which sent stock prices falling, upset South Korea’s shipbuilding industry, and signaled the geostrategic risk of more South Korean defense industrial cooperation with the United States.

China’s bullying is likely to be even more aggressive in response to the nuclear submarine deal between Washington and Seoul because the agreement will extend South Korea’s undersea warfare capabilities beyond the Korean peninsula, which would make it possible to use them to support U.S. military operations against China. Beijing could target South Korean companies operating in China, as it did in response to THAAD in 2016–17. Or it might sanction rare earth minerals, which both South Korea and the United States rely on for advanced manufacturing in critical sectors including semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, and shipbuilding. Beijing will likely pursue sanctions quietly—delaying export licenses, for example, or stopping Chinese tour groups from going to South Korea—to protect its reputation in case they don’t work. But even these efforts might inflict enough economic pain on South Korea to complicate Seoul’s nuclear submarine cooperation with the United States. In response to the THAAD sanctions, the South Korean government agreed not to pursue further missile defense cooperation trilaterally with Japan and the United States. Seoul also hesitated to criticize China’s 2013-2015 militarization of the South China Sea out of fear that it would once again find itself in Beijing’s crosshairs.

UNDER PRESSURE

Given the size of bilateral trade between the two countries, South Korea, like many other countries, cannot simply decouple from China. In 2025, trade between China and South Korea totaled more than $300 billion. But Seoul also cannot allow itself to live forever in the shadow of Beijing’s economic coercion, which gives China an effective lever to influence South Korea’s foreign policy choices. In 2019, for example, when the first Trump administration asked the South Korean government to stop Huawei from entering its 5G market, Seoul was paralyzed because it worried Beijing would retaliate with economic punishment similar to what it unleashed in the conflict over THAAD.

South Korea has traditionally seen good relations with China as strategically vital to its economic well-being, a key source of stability on the Korean peninsula (given Beijing’s influence over North Korea), and a security counterweight to its alliance with the United States. But it may be time to wholly rethink this strategic view because China is showing itself to be an increasingly unreliable partner.

Most notably, Beijing has done little to stem North Korean nuclearization. Instead, it has allowed North Korea’s nuclear weapons program to grow, refuses to comply with UN Security Council nonproliferation or human rights sanctions, and has not tried to stop North Korea’s cooperation with Russia in the Ukraine war. The image of Xi, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un standing together on the rostrum viewing China’s September 2025 Victory Day parade conveys a clear message that China’s loyalties lie with this axis of autocracies and not with South Korea.

China is showing itself to be an increasingly unreliable partner.

Economic complementarity between China and South Korea has also transformed into economic competition. In the 1990s, South Korea exported high-tech products such as chips and displays to China, which assembled them into final products for export. China now competes with South Korea to produce these intermediate goods and controls supply chain materials such as rare-earths on which South Korea depends. China has been aggressively undercutting prices to squeeze South Korean companies out of industries as varied as car tires and steel, and cases of industrial espionage between the two countries are increasingly common.

Moreover, China has been quietly militarizing the Yellow Sea, which it can use to pressure South Korea. Beijing’s unilateral construction of an observation platform and two aquaculture stations, and its deployment of buoys for fishing in the provisional measures zone—an overlapping maritime area between the two countries’ exclusive economic zones—violates a standing bilateral agreement between Beijing and Seoul to jointly manage the area. South Korean vessels have sought to monitor Chinese expansion in the zone, but Chinese coast guard ships have intercepted South Korean attempts to do so 27 times since 2020. Leaders in Seoul can also look to what China has done in the South China Sea, where it built purportedly civilian installations such as airstrips and weather stations that can be used for military purposes, for an indication of what Beijing might do off South Korea’s coasts. Lee raised this issue with Xi during their recent talks, but China conceded nothing.

MORE LEVERAGE THAN MEETS THE EYE

Individually, no country in the region has the political or economic heft to stand up to China. But collectively, they have enough leverage. South Korea’s best option is to work with the United States, Japan, Australia, and other G-7 countries to organize a collective economic deterrence pact to stop China’s economic aggression. The pact would need to deem coercion against one to be coercion against all, and for which there would be automatic retaliation, similar to the collective security agreement of Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty.

China is dependent on South Korea in numerous critical sectors. For 48 goods worth $8.57 billion, China relies on South Korea for more than 70 percent of its imported supply, and it does not have good substitutes. Take OLED (organic LED) panel displays, for example, which Chinese manufacturers need for smartphones, smart watches, tablets, televisions, vehicle dashboards, and infotainment systems. In 2024, China imported $2.11 billion worth of these panel displays from South Korea, equivalent to 94 percent of its imports. China is also increasingly dependent on South Korean marine propulsion engines for its shipbuilding industry, purchasing $781 million—70 percent of its imported supply—from South Korea in 2024.

Such dependence extends to South Korea’s allies and partners. According to 2024 trade data, China is more than 70 percent dependent on 595 items worth $37.05 billion from the G-7 plus South Korea and Australia, and more than 90 percent dependent on 248 items at a value of $17.49 billion from these countries. Many of these are critical imports that China needs to produce everything from lithium batteries and solar panels to petrochemicals and steel.

The purpose of a collective economic deterrence pact would not be to start a trade war with China. Instead, the goal is simply to stop China’s coercion. China suffers no cost for its threats or pressure campaigns on its neighbors because it assumes—correctly—that no single target would dare to retaliate. But the threat of real costs could make Beijing think twice. There is precedent for this working elsewhere: in response to China’s targeting of Lithuania, for instance, the European Union in December 2023 implemented what it calls the Anti-Coercion Instrument, which aims to protect EU countries from outside economic pressure by invoking retaliatory response measures. Since then, there have been no reports of similar acts of coercion by China against other EU member states.

STANDING TOGETHER

The United States, Japan, and South Korea will need to work together to counter China’s pressure. But so far, the countries have not done enough to support each other. At the G-7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan, in 2023, leaders recognized the problem of Chinese economic coercion and committed to organizing against it, but they have taken no action since. When, in response to Takaichi’s comments about Japan’s commitment to Taiwan’s security in November 2025, Beijing curtailed critical mineral exports to Japan, banned Japanese seafood imports, and stopped Chinese tourism to Japan, neither Trump nor Lee spoke out in support of Takaichi or criticized Xi. And rather than using trade policy to counter China, Trump imposed onerous tariffs on both Japan and South Korea as part of his tariff spree in early 2025.

But the foundations are in place for a new era of heightened geoeconomic cooperation between Washington and its two most important Indo-Pacific allies. The recent U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-South Korean trade and investment agreements amount to a combined $900 billion of Japanese and South Korean investment in U.S. manufacturing capacity in ships, chips, energy, critical minerals, artificial intelligence, and other emerging technologies by January 2029. Together, Japan, South Korea, and the United States hold much of the economic leverage that the G-7 and regional partners can wield over China: there are 327 goods worth more than $23.19 billion that these three allies trade with China and on which Beijing is more than 70 percent dependent.

Rather than levying tariffs on its allies, the United States should use its presidency of the G-7 in 2027 to lead the effort to organize the collective economic deterrence pact to stop China’s economic bullying. Washington should publicly call out China for its coercive tactics, and Trump should voice U.S. opposition to China’s economic pressure campaigns directly to Xi when the U.S. president goes to Beijing in April. Doing so would deter China by signaling that Beijing faces costs if it continues to pressure Japan or targets U.S. companies (perennial targets of Chinese coercion), and it would preempt Chinese retaliation against South Korea for its nuclear-powered submarine agreement with the United States. Japan, South Korea, and the United States should also coordinate their commerce and intelligence agencies to more thoroughly map out China’s trade dependencies, which will help identify where this trilateral alliance—in concert with G-7 partners—has the best opportunity to push back against Beijing.

Such cooperation is not free, however. China is going to respond—and when it does, Beijing is likely to pull out every tool in its economic arsenal to target what it perceives to be the most vulnerable link in the trilateral group, South Korea. Only if all the targets of Chinese economic coercion—and South Korea, the United States, and Japan, in particular—are willing to work together will any country be able to end the escalating Chinese pressure campaigns that have so far gone unchecked.

Foreign Affairs · More by Victor Cha · January 21, 2026

3. Taiwan and S.Korea favored, India down, BofA fund manager survey shows

​Summary:

Bank of America’s January fund manager survey shows Asian investors overweight Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea while turning underweight on India. Optimism centers on a continued up-cycle in semiconductors and AI, with Korean and Taiwanese firms seen as prime beneficiaries. Japan remains the top pick, driven by expectations of fiscal stimulus, tax cuts, and only gradual Bank of Japan tightening. The KOSPI’s 75% surge in 2025 outpaced Taiwan and Japan, while India lags as doubts grow over a U.S.–India trade deal and persistent 50% U.S. tariffs. Sentiment on China is cautiously improving, as investors see its long-term story as less bleak.

Taiwan and S.Korea favored, India down, BofA fund manager survey shows By Investing.com

ca.investing.com

Author

Ambar Warrick

Stock Market

Published 2026-01-20, 08:34 p/m

https://ca.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/taiwan-and-skorea-favored-india-down-bofa-fund-manager-survey-shows-4410602?utm

JP225

NSEI

KS11

TWII

Investing.com-- Asian fund managers remained positive on Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, while turning negative towards India, a Bank of America survey showed in January.

Bullish positions on Asian markets were spurred chiefly by expectations of a positive semiconductor cycle and artificial investment, with companies in South Korea and Taiwan set to benefit the most from this trade.

Find out Asia’s most preferred stocks for 2026 with InvestingPro

Japan remained the survey’s top pick, BofA said, with focus squarely on new Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and her plans for more fiscal spending and tax cuts.

The Bank of Japan remained a secondary figure for markets, with most investors expecting the next rate hike only in June 2026. Chips, AI, and banks remained the most preferred themes in Japanese markets.

Strength in chips saw South Korea’s KOSPI blaze past its Asian peers in 2025 with a 75% gain. Taiwan’s Taiwan Weighted and Japan’s Nikkei 225 added about 26% each, while India’s Nifty 50 rose 20% in 2025.

Broader global growth expectations also improved, the BofA survey showed, with investors expecting most Asian central banks to maintain their dovish outlooks. Expectations for global growth also hit their highest point since October 2021, BofA noted.

Investors were seen growing more confident over China’s economic recovery, with BofA noting the “long-term structural narrative is no longer uniformly bleak, and household risk appetite is beginning to recover.”

AI and chips also remained the most dominant themes in China.

Investors turned underweight on India, reversing positions from the prior month amid growing uncertainty over a potential trade deal between New Delhi and Washington.

While New Delhi has signaled that negotiations with the U.S. are ongoing, neither side has provided any conclusive signal that a deal is in sight. India is still subject to a 50% tariff on exports to the U.S.-- a trend that was seen pressuring Indian economic growth in recent quarters.

India’s continued purchases of Russian oil remained a major point of contention for Washington.

BofA surveyed 227 panellists with total assets under management of $575 billion for its January survey.

Taiwan and S.Korea favored, India down, BofA fund manager survey shows

4. S. Korea pulls bill to move unification think tank under ministry

​Summary:

South Korea’s Ministry of Unification has withdrawn a legislative notice that would have moved the Unification Research Institute from the Economic, Humanities and Social Research Council to direct control under the ministry, just three days after announcing it. The reversal followed criticism that the change was pushed without sufficient consultation across government. The National Research Council for Economic and Social Affairs reportedly raised strong objections, warning that subordination to the ministry could tilt the institute toward short term policy support at the expense of long term research on unification and social integration, despite Minister Chung’s argument that the ministry needs its own think tank.

Comment: Some good news. But this indicates a troubling desire to control information rather than provide objective research to support an important part of Korean national security (I would argue the most important part). Specifically, if the unification ministry directly controls its primary research institute, does that strengthen strategic coherence or risk politicizing analysis and narrowing long term thinking about unification? I think the answer is obvious.

World News Jan. 20, 2026 / 9:26 PM / Updated Jan. 20, 2026 at 9:26 PM

S. Korea pulls bill to move unification think tank under ministry

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/20/ministry-of-unification-has-withdrawn-legislation-notice-that-would-transferred-the-unification-research-institute-under-the-ministry/2611768961776/

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young speaks during a debate at Camp Greaves, a former U.S. military camp near the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas, in Paju, South Korea, 19 September 2025. File. Photo by YONHAP / EPA

Jan. 20 (Asia Today) -- South Korea's Ministry of Unification has withdrawn a legislative notice that would have transferred the Unification Research Institute under the ministry, three days after the notice was announced.

The ministry said it withdrew the notice on Friday after criticism that the plan required sufficient consultation with related agencies. It said it would continue discussions with relevant agencies on the proposed transfer.

The notice, issued Wednesday, would have moved the institute from the Economic, Humanities and Social Research Council, which operates under the Office for Government Policy Coordination, to the Ministry of Unification.

Opposition emerged after the ministry announced the notice without consulting related ministries, the report said.

Related

• South Korea startup count tops 4.9 million in 2023, up 1.5%
• More than 8 in 10 foreigners show favorable view of S. Korea: survey
• What North Koreans want to know most: How does the world see us?

The National Research Council for Economic and Social Affairs was also reported to have raised strong reservations during a New Year's work report at the institute on Wednesday.

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said in a work report last year that he would pursue the transfer through enactment of a Unification Research Institute Act and revisions to the Government-Funded Research Institute Act. He also asked President Lee Jae-myung to support the transfer, saying the ministry lacks its own think tank.

The issue was also discussed in a business report to Prime Minister Kim Min-seok on Jan. 9 by the Economic, Social and Human Sciences Research Council, the report said. Acting institute head Hyun Seung-soo warned that if the institute is moved under the ministry and its work shifts toward short-term policy responses, it could reduce opportunities for mid- to long-term research on future unification and social integration.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

5. South Korea's Lee says North produces material for 10-20 nuclear weapons annually

​Summary:

President Lee Jae Myung warned that north Korea is now producing enough fissile material for roughly 10 to 20 nuclear warheads per year, sharply increasing the threat beyond the Korean Peninsula. He stressed Pyongyang’s continued drive to perfect ICBMs capable of striking the U.S. mainland and argued that once the regime judges it has a “surplus” arsenal, proliferation and export risks will rise globally. Lee reiterated his three stage roadmap: halt further nuclear and ICBM development and exports, then reduce the arsenal, and ultimately dismantle it, with Seoul acting as “pacemaker” for renewed U.S.-DPRK talks under POTUS.

Comment: If north Korea believes nuclear expansion guarantees regime survival, what combination of pressure and incentives could realistically persuade Kim Jong Un to freeze fissile production before he reaches his own definition of “enough” weapons? The short answer: none. We have to stop thinking as if KJU will give up his nuclear weapons. We have to think beyond nuclear weapons if we want to denuclearize north Korea. Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights.

World News Jan. 21, 2026 / 5:35 AM

South Korea's Lee says North produces material for 10-20 nuclear weapons annually

By Thomas Maresca

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/21/Lee-Jae-Myung-North-Korea-fissile-material-20-nuclear-weapons/1291768989321/

President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a New Year's press conference in Seoul on Wednesday. Photo by Yonhap

SEOUL, Jan. 21 (UPI) -- South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said Wednesday that North Korea is producing enough nuclear fissile material to build between 10 and 20 nuclear weapons each year, warning that Pyongyang presents a growing danger to the world beyond the Korean Peninsula.

Lee made the remarks during a New Year press conference in Seoul, where he outlined his administration's foreign and security priorities amid heightened regional tensions and an accelerating North Korean weapons program.

"North Korea is assessed to be producing material sufficient for roughly 10 to 20 nuclear warheads annually," Lee said.

The North also continues to develop intercontinental ballistic missile technology aimed at striking the U.S. mainland, he added.

Related

• Lee orders probe, tough penalties over civilian drones sent to N. Korea
• Kim Jong Un fires vice premier "on the spot" ahead of party congress
• North Korea-linked hackers pose as human rights activists, report says

"One day, North Korea will believe it has enough nuclear weapons to sustain its regime, as well as ICBM technology capable of threatening the entire world, including the United States," Lee said. "Once they have a surplus, the danger will overflow beyond their borders, posing a global risk."

Lee said the estimate highlights the need for pragmatic efforts to reduce tensions and prevent miscalculation.

He reiterated a call for a previously proposed three-stage plan for addressing North Korea's nuclear program, beginning with a halt to Pyongyang's nuclear weapons development, followed by a reduction of its arsenal and ultimately full dismantlement.

"A halt to nuclear material production and further development of ICBM technology, as well as preventing overseas exports, would be beneficial," Lee said.

Lee also pledged renewed efforts for Seoul to act as a "pacemaker" in facilitating dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang, calling U.S. President Donald Trump a "unique figure."

"A Trump-style approach seems helpful in dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un," Lee said.

Trump met Kim three times during his first term -- in Singapore in 2018, in Hanoi in 2019 and briefly at the Demilitarized Zone later that year -- but the talks collapsed amid disagreements over sanctions relief and steps toward denuclearization.

During a visit to South Korea in October, Trump said he wanted to meet Kim Jong Un, though the two sides were unable to coordinate timing.

Kim has also signaled a willingness to resume diplomacy with the United States but warned that any discussion of giving up his regime's nuclear arsenal would be off the table.

In a June report, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that North Korea currently possesses about 50 nuclear warheads and has enough fissile material for 40 more.

6. North Korea is a nuclear power. Trump’s omission is an admission.

​Summary:

The Washington Post editorial argues that the new Trump National Security Strategy omits north Korea because denuclearization is no longer credible. Pyongyang is now effectively a permanent nuclear power, with an estimated arsenal of around 50 warheads and material for many more, active missile testing, and a ready test site. The piece urges shifting from the fiction of full denuclearization to realistic negotiations to freeze and cap warheads and delivery systems, while warning of proliferation risks for South Korea and Japan. It calls for open acknowledgment of this shift and close coordination with allies and China and manage this reality.

Comment: If Washington openly adopts a “freeze and cap” approach, what concrete leverage and inducements are left that might actually persuade Kim Jong Un to stop expanding his arsenal? Are we really this naive? Have not yet grasped an understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime? Arms control negotiations are as equally naive and bankrupt as denuclearization. If we shift to arms control then we give KJU a victory for his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies. We need a superior strategy that has as its objective solving the "Korea questions."

Opinion

Editorial Board

North Korea is a nuclear power. Trump’s omission is an admission.

It’s time to start talking realistically about limiting the size and range of Pyongyang’s arsenal.

January 18, 2026

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/01/18/north-korea-kim-jong-un-denuclearization-dprk/?utm

Kim Jong Un, center, inspects test flights of hypersonic missiles in Pyongyang on Jan. 4. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP) (AP)

Nuclear-armed North Korea remains arguably the most dangerous and unpredictable threat to the United States, but the country was not mentioned once in the National Security Strategy released by the White House in December. Where does the Trump administration go from here?

The best of The Post’s opinions and commentary, in your inbox every morning

This omission was calculated. President Donald Trump’s first term strategy, released in 2017, stated emphatically that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons “poses a global threat that requires a global response” and committed the U.S. to “compel denuclearization of the peninsula.”

What’s changed — and what the Trump administration seems loath to say out loud — is that denuclearization of the peninsula is no longer an option. North Korea is here to stay as a nuclear power. The best estimates are that Pyongyang has up to 50 assembled nuclear warheads in its stockpile and enough fissile material to produce 40 more.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said in a report last June that North Korea’s nuclear test site at Punggye-ri remains prepared to support a nuclear test on short notice. South Korea’s intelligence agency confirmed that assessment in November.

Follow Trump’s second term

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North Korea has ramped up missile testing in recent weeks and is trying to build a new nuclear-powered submarine. On Jan. 4, dictator Kim Jong Un oversaw the test firing of hypersonic missiles, according to his state media. Kim referred to “the recent geopolitical crisis and various international circumstances.” That was the same weekend U.S. forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas.

Recognizing North Korea as a permanent member of the nuclear club would mark a seismic, and painful, policy shift. Accepting that reality would open the door for negotiations over limiting the number of warheads and missiles.

Such a shift also carries dangers. South Korea and Japan could look to develop their own nuclear weapons if they don’t feel fully protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

At the same time, Trump might find some common ground with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on North Korea’s proliferation. Beijing, in its own arms control white paper released on November 27, also omitted any reference to China’s longstanding goal of “the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” That aim had been included in previous white papers. Instead, the latest version only mentions working toward “peace, stability, and prosperity on the peninsula.”

South Korean President Lee ‍Jae Myung visited China over four days this month and couldn’t convince Xi to reiterate China’s support for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. But Lee said freezing Pyongyang’s nukes at the current number and halting future ballistic missile tests “would already be a gain.”

The best course is candor. If Washington is ready to shift its posture from denuclearization to “freeze and cap,” it would be helpful to say so plainly, acknowledge the risks and coordinate closely with allies. It should also work to ensure some concessions from North Korea in return. Silence is not sustainable.

7. North Korea denuclearization ideal but unrealistic, South’s president says

​Summary:

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said denuclearization of north Korea is “ideal” but unrealistic, arguing that the world has indulged in wishful thinking while Pyongyang’s arsenal steadily expanded. He cast himself as a “pacemaker” to POTUS' “peacemaker,” saying POTUS' unconventional style can help with Kim Jong Un. Lee warned the priority is now avoiding war rather than talking unification. He also said alleged South Korean civilian drone flights into the North likely deepened Pyongyang’s mistrust of his new administration, reinforcing suspicions of hypocrisy, and urged South Koreans to consider how such actions look from the northern side.

Comment: Pacemaker, peacemaker. Perhaps "pacemaker" is a useful term and analogy – certainly the hope for negotiations is on life support and needs some stimulation to keep the idea alive. Perhaps talking unification is not something POTROK wants to do but he sure should be working on the planning for it. I do not know how the dirstruct by the regime could become any deeper. We must never forget that while the north is an existential military threat to the South, the South, and specifically the example of the South and the knowledge of the South is an existential ideological threat tto the north. This is something we fail to understand. But we must understand this and deal with north Korea and the KFR as it really is and not as we would wish it to be and never forget the bottomline line: 

The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK). (You Rock)

The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK). (You Rock)

North Korea denuclearization ideal but unrealistic, South’s president says

Lee Jae Myung says North Korea would have been confused to see drones intruding during new Seoul administration

Jeongmin Kim | Jooheon Kim January 21, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/north-korea-denuclearization-ideal-but-unrealistic-souths-president-says/

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung at the Blue House | Image: Blue House (Jan. 9, 2026)

North Korea’s denuclearization is the most ideal but an unlikely choice Pyongyang will make, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said in a press conference Wednesday, adding that the notion is akin to the world “turning a blind eye” to reality. 

“Denuclearization is something that should happen — it is the most ideal outcome — but will North Korea actually give up its nuclear weapons?” Lee asked. 

North Korea’s lack of incentive to give up its nuclear arsenal “is a very clear reality” that cannot coexist easily with its ideals, he added. 

“Up to now, that has been the strategy: let’s wait, let’s endure, let’s dream of ideals while turning away from reality,” he said. “And what has been the result? [The DPRK’s] nuclear weapons [arsenal] has continued to grow.”

Lee said he remains hopeful as a “pacemaker” supporting the U.S. President Donald Trump’s “peacemaker” role, despite Trump’s “somewhat unique style” of statecraft. 

“That kind of style, President Trump’s style, seems to help when engaging in dialogue with Chairman Kim Jong Un.”

Lee also said North Korea would likely have been confused by the alleged appearance of unmanned aerial vehicles flying from the South, adding that the incidents like these likely deepened Pyongyang’s mistrust of his administration.

Speaking on the claims from a South Korean man who asserted he sent drones into North Korea, Lee said such activity would have reinforced Pyongyang’s suspicion that Seoul was acting hypocritically and assumed the government was responsible.

The unidentified man claimed he sent unarmed drones to North Korea three times over the past year to assess uranium radiation levels.

“At this point, we would be fortunate if we can avoid war, let alone talk about unification,” Lee added. 

“From the North’s perspective, even though the [Seoul] government has changed, these drones flew in again,” Lee said. “They would ask, ‘What is this? While speaking publicly about dialogue, communication, cooperation, peace and stability, are they secretly doing this because they cannot officially carry out such acts? Or are they using civilians to do it, or doing it directly?’”

Lee said he is “not taking North Korea’s side by saying this” and urged people to “[put] oneself in the other side’s position.”

A joint task force of military and police on Wednesday raided the homes and offices of three civilian suspects accused of building and flying drones into North Korea. The Korean National Police Agency confirmed to NK News that it began executing search and seizure warrants at 8 a.m. over alleged violations of the Aviation Safety Act.

“Our task force plans to carry out a thorough investigation by analyzing seized materials and questioning the suspects, keeping all possibilities open,” the agency said.

Edited by David Choi

8. Defector group asks rights panel to block new label for arrivals

​Summary:

A group of North Korean defectors petitioned South Korea’s National Human Rights Commission to block the Unification Ministry’s plan to replace terms like “North Korean defectors” and “refugees” with “North-bound residents.” The Association opposing the forced use of the new term argues the label would be effectively imposed on most defectors, infringing on their chosen identity and dignity while deepening internal rifts. They insist the state must not decide names that reflect lived experience. The ministry has already begun using the phrase internally and aims to formalize it legally once it gains wider social acceptance. The commission must now respond.

Comement: "North-bound residents" At least from the English translation perspective it seems as if these people are on the bound to return to the north, e.g., that they are bound for the north.  The ROK (and all of us) need to treat escapees with respect not only for what they have endured to reach freedom but also because so many of them are going to be the bridge between north and South when the unification process begins. But the terminology fight reveals deeper tensions over identity, legitimacy, and unification policy in South Korean society. The ROK has to deal with this correctly and should not create a self inflicted wound by getting this wrong.

World News Jan. 20, 2026 / 9:53 PM / Updated Jan. 20, 2026 at 9:53 PM

Defector group asks rights panel to block new label for arrivals

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/20/defectors-petitioned-skorea-national-human-rights-commission-to-block-unification-ministry-move-to-change-how-defectors-are-labeled/5751768963566/

North Korean defector Mr. Kim views the city center area through a window, in Seoul, South Korea, 17 January 2024 (issued 22 January 2024). Mr. Kim is one of few North Koreans who managed to flee and directly reach the South between 2020 and 2023 due to strict border closures during the Covid pandemic. On the night of 06 May 2023, he and his family were able to quietly sail through patrolled waters in the Yellow Sea and cut across the maritime border between both Koreas. Mr. Kim has refused to give his full name in order to protect relatives on both sides of the border. File. Photo by JEON HEON-KYUN/ EPA

Jan. 20 (Asia Today) -- A group of North Korean defectors on Tuesday petitioned South Korea's National Human Rights Commission to block the Unification Ministry's move to change how defectors are labeled, saying the shift could undermine their identity and deepen divisions within the community.

The group, which calls itself the Association of North Korean Defectors Opposing the Forced Use of the Term "North-bound residents," said the ministry's preferred wording goes beyond accommodating the choice of some defectors and amounts to imposing a new designation on most of them.

Lee Eun-taek, the group's representative, said in a statement that the change risks infringing on "the identity and dignity that individual defectors have chosen for themselves" and is fueling unnecessary conflict among defectors.

"What we seek to protect is the rights and identity of those who have chosen to live as North Korean defectors," Lee said, adding that diverse views within the community should be respected and that no term should be used to erase someone else's identity.

Related

• S. Korea panel urges joint command ahead of OPCON transfer
• North Korean defector arrivals to South Korea fall to 224 in 2025
• S. Korea to field electronic warfare aircraft in 2034

Lee urged the commission to prevent defectors from being deprived of the right to choose how they are identified, saying "a name" reflects a person's life experience and should not be decided by state power or politicians.

The Unification Ministry said in last year's work report that it intended to change the terms "North Korean defectors" and "North Korean refugees" to "North-bound residents." The ministry has used the new phrasing internally since this year and plans to adopt it as legal terminology once it becomes socially established, the report said.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

9. Lee orders probe, tough penalties over civilian drones sent to N. Korea

​Summary:

President Lee Jae Myung ordered a full investigation and harsh penalties over allegations that civilians sent drones into north Korea, warning such acts could provoke war and damage South Korea’s economy. He likened the flights to firing a gun into northern territory and noted prosecutors are weighing treason, foreign exchange violations, and other charges, while hints of possible state involvement require deeper inquiry. Lee pressed his defense minister on why three drone incursions went undetected, citing air defense gaps and calling for upgrades. The Cabinet also approved a broad special prosecutor bill targeting former President Yoon Suk-yeol and his wife.

Comment: POTROK's hard line on civilian drones and expanded prosecutions impacts the balance between civil liberties and "intelligence activism." He must consider what this does to government legitimacy and perceived grievance among the population and how north Korea (and China) will exploit these conditions. Do not conduct prosecutions merely to placate north Korea. Do not appear to be kowtowing to Kim Jong Un.

World News Jan. 20, 2026 / 9:58 PM / Updated Jan. 20, 2026 at 9:58 PM

Lee orders probe, tough penalties over civilian drones sent to N. Korea

By Asia Today and translated by UPI

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/01/20/president-lee-jae-myung-ordered-full-investigation-over-allegation-that-civilians-sent-drones-into-nkorea/4821768964031/

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a luncheon meeting with leaders of political parties, as well as his aides, at the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul, South Korea, 16 January 2026. Photo by YONHAP / EPA

Jan. 20 (Asia Today) -- President Lee Jae-myung on Tuesday ordered a full investigation and "severe sanctions" over allegations that civilians sent drones into North Korea, saying such actions risk inflaming tensions that could hurt the economy.

Speaking at a Cabinet meeting at the Blue House, Lee said it was "unthinkable" for drones to be flown into North Korea for illegal purposes.

Lee noted prosecutors are pursuing charges including treason and foreign exchange violations tied to allegations that drones were used to provoke conflict. He said it was unclear how civilians could carry out drone flights for intelligence-gathering and called for further investigation, adding there were claims suggesting possible involvement by state agencies.

"Isn't this the same as firing a gun into North Korean territory?" Lee said, describing the act as a potential "provocation of war" and noting there are legal provisions that punish those who invade another country.

Related

• S. Korea panel urges joint command ahead of OPCON transfer
• North Korean defector arrivals to South Korea fall to 224 in 2025
• S. Korea to field electronic warfare aircraft in 2034

Lee also questioned Defense Minister Ahn Kyu-baek about detection, citing claims the drones were sent three times. Ahn said radar monitoring is conducted but a drone can appear as only a small dot. Lee responded that the incident suggested a gap in air defenses.

"If necessary, facilities or equipment must be improved," Lee said. "If tensions are unnecessarily heightened and a confrontational atmosphere develops between the North and South, it will negatively impact the economy."

Also on Tuesday, the Cabinet approved a bill to appoint a special prosecutor to investigate allegations including sedition, foreign exchange violations and abuse of power involving former President Yoon Suk-yeol and his wife, Kim Keon-hee, the report said.

The measure, described as the second comprehensive special prosecutor act, adds to three previously approved special prosecutor investigations covering sedition, Kim and the death of Marine Sgt. Chae, the report said.

The new bill covers 17 issues, including allegations tied to the so-called "Noh Sang-won notebook" that were not addressed in the earlier investigations, the report said. The investigation period is set at up to 170 days, including 20 days for preparation, with as many as 251 investigators.

-- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

10. South Korea probes if spies funded drones flown into North by student

​Summary:

South Korea is investigating whether its military intelligence command covertly funded a graduate student, Oh, who claims he flew drones into north Korea three times since September to sample radiation near Pyongsan. Oh and an associate previously worked in former President Yoon’s office and reportedly received money from the Korea Defense Intelligence Command to run north Korea themed sites. President Lee Jae Myung likened the flights to firing a gun at the North and warned of war risk, while analysts suspect a political operation meant to stoke tensions and link the drone scandal to Yoon’s failed martial law plot.

Comment.  What is private intelligence activity? Should that be accepted and tolerated? The broader questions: How should Seoul distinguish between legitimate citizen activism and reckless private intelligence activity that can trigger armed confrontation with north Korea? But we also must not exaggerate the threat of a north Korean response. 

If KDIC involvement is proven, what (more) reforms to South Korea’s intelligence and civil-military control are needed to prevent covert political operations that gamble with strategic stability? Do the current reform measures in progress address this alleged issue?

South Korea probes if spies funded drones flown into North by student

What began as a student’s claim of hunting radioactive waste has spiralled into a scandal linking military spies to dangerous border flights

Park Chan-kyong

Published: 3:27pm, 20 Jan 2026Updated: 5:26pm, 20 Jan 2026

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3340527/south-korea-probes-if-spies-funded-drones-flown-north-student

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on Tuesday ordered an investigation into claims that the country’s military intelligence command supported a civilian accused of sending drones into North Korea.

The civilian at the centre of the allegations, a graduate student in his thirties identified only by his surname Oh, claims he flew drones into North Korea three times since September last year.

He previously worked in ex-president Yoon Suk-yeol’s office and allegedly received – according to local media reports – financial backing from the Korea Defence Intelligence Command (KDIC), whose former commanders are among those on trial over Yoon’s failed attempt to impose martial law in December 2024.

At a cabinet meeting, Lee expressed concern over whether the latest drone flights were connected to that episode.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a cabinet meeting at the presidential office in Seoul on Tuesday. Photo: Yonhap/EPA

“It is questionable how civilians could even imagine sending drones at a time when such a trial is under way,” he said, noting there were “allegations that a state agency was involved”.

Lee described the unauthorised flights as tantamount to “firing a gun at the North” and warned they could trigger a military clash. He also rebuked Defence Minister Ahn Gyu-baek for failing to detect the incursions and directed his ministry to strengthen surveillance to prevent further provocations.

“Unnecessary confrontation” between the two Koreas would likely harm the economy, he added.

Lee has repeatedly raised questions about possible links to earlier drone operations related to Yoon’s martial law attempt.

A Defence Ministry spokesman told This Week in Asia that a joint task force with the police had been formed for a “swift and thorough investigation”.

South Korean Defence Minister Ahn Gyu-baek (centre, right) and US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth look out at North Korea in November 2025. Photo: Zuma Press Wire/dpa

The investigation follows Pyongyang’s accusation earlier this month that South Korea had violated its airspace with drones in September and again on January 4.

Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, demanded an apology and branded Seoul’s leadership a “gang of hooligans”, calling the incidents proof of its hostility. South Korea’s military has denied involvement, insisting the drones were not operated by the armed forces.

In a televised interview last week, Oh said he personally flew the drones from South Korea’s border region to collect samples near a uranium concentrate plant in Pyongsan county, claiming he wanted to investigate reports of radioactive waste water being discharged into shared waterways. He said only one drone, launched in November, was recovered.

South Korea’s Unification Ministry has previously stated that tests found no significant change in radiation levels in the Yellow Sea despite public fears of cross-border radioactive contamination from North Korea’s Pyongsan plant.

We can’t rule out the possibility that Oh may have sought to fuel tensions to bolster support for Yoon

Cho Han-bum, Korea Institute for National Unification

“It’s hard to believe that he intended to collect radioactive samples from a river using amateur drones,” said Cho Han-bum, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification.

“This is a dangerous act that could spark an armed clash,” he added. “We can’t rule out the possibility that Oh may have sought to fuel tensions to bolster support for Yoon.”

Both Oh and an associate surnamed Jang, who allegedly assembled the drones, had worked together at Yoon’s presidential office and were known members of a right-wing youth group.

Jang was charged in November with operating an unregistered drone in Gyeonggi province, near the border, and investigators identified him as a suspect after finding technical similarities between that drone and those used in the alleged cross-border flights.

The case took a turn last week when Oh came forward to say he alone piloted the drones, insisting Jang’s role was limited to assembly. Prosecutors are now examining whether Oh’s activities were linked to the KDIC.

Fragments of a drone North Korea said had flown into its airspace on January 4 are seen scattered on the ground near Kaesong city, North Korea. Photo: KCNA/Reuters

Oh reportedly ran online outlets focused on North Korea that are suspected of being front companies funded by military intelligence. Investigative outlet Newstapa quoted an intelligence source as saying a KDIC officer allegedly provided Oh about 13 million won (US$8,800) to set up the websites.

Analysts say the apparent depth and organisation of the operations raise questions about who was truly behind them.

Professor Yang Moo-jin of the University of North Korean Studies said a “thorough investigation is necessary”.

Kim Il-gi, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy, added that Pyongyang was unlikely to differentiate between private and official acts.

“Ultimately, how North Korea perceives this incident is crucial,” he said. “If North Korea is provoked by the drone incident and retaliates with anti-aircraft fire, tensions on the Korean peninsula will inevitably rise significantly.”

Park Chan-kyong

Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied political science at Korea University and economics at the Yonsei University Graduate School.

11. Editorial: Lee's 'Grave Crime' Claim Points Back to His Intelligence Agency

​Summary:

The Chosun Ilbo editorial argues that President Lee Jae Myung’s denunciation of civilian drone flights as a “grave crime” boomerangs on his own government. Investigations show the Defense Intelligence Command funded and managed the civilian operators as HUMINT after Lee took office, sending drones into north Korea three times to monitor nuclear facilities like Pyongsan. The paper questions how Lee can speak of “state agency involvement” as if it were someone else’s problem and attacks military leadership as incompetent or complicit. It warns that abolishing drone and intelligence units to placate Kim Jong Un would sacrifice vital collection on existential threats.

Comment: Or what if this was perpetrated by intelligence against front henorth or China. I hope they are investigating that possibility as well. If it was KDIC the leadership should come clean immediately because they will never maintain a cover up. Because they have not come clean makes me wonder about other maling actors.

Will this turn into another victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy? It would be tragically ironic if KJU has notches a win without even trying.

Editorial: Lee's 'Grave Crime' Claim Points Back to His Intelligence Agency

Defense Intelligence Command Funded Civilian Drone Operations Despite President's Condemnation of 'Grave Crime'

By The Chosunilbo

Published 2026.01.21. 00:10

Updated 2026.01.21. 08:31

On the 20th, President Lee Jae-myung speaks at a Cabinet meeting held at Cheong Wa Dae. /News1

A civilian accused of flying drones into North Korea allegedly received support funds from the Defense Intelligence Command and continued sending drones even after the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration. Military and police authorities are investigating whether the intelligence unit provided financial support to civilians for cross-border drone operations under the current government. According to the intelligence unit, it managed the civilians, who founded a drone company in 2023, as HUMINT (human intelligence) after determining they could collect information on North Korean nuclear facilities.

Kim Yo-jong of North Korea denounced South Korea as a “scum group” ten days ago, claiming a South Korean drone violated its airspace. In response, the Ministry of National Defense stated, “This was not a military operation,” while President Lee Jae-myung called it a “grave crime threatening peace and security on the Korean Peninsula” if carried out by civilians. He also ordered the formation of a military and police investigation team. The investigation revealed that the civilian had sent drones into North Korea three times since the current administration took office, with support from the intelligence unit. Effectively, the intelligence unit behind the “grave crime” is part of the current government.

On the 20th, President Lee described civilian drones as “no different from firing bullets at North Korea” and a “act of initiating war.” He added, “There are also claims that state agencies were involved.” The Yoon Suk-yeol administration is currently on trial for charges of pro-North Korea activities related to sending drones to Pyongyang. It is unlikely the intelligence unit under the current administration supported civilian drone operations without upper-level approval. If military leaders were unaware, they are incompetent. Yet President Lee mentioned the “state agency involvement theory.” Is this someone else’s problem?

In June of last year, a North Korea-focused online media outlet reported, “Nuclear wastewater is being discharged at the uranium plant in Pyeongsan County, North Korea.” The intelligence unit allegedly proposed deploying civilian drones to assess the situation. While indiscriminate drone flights by civilians risk detection and provoke issues, information on North Korea’s nuclear program directly impacts the lives of South Korean citizens. Someone must collect it. Following the dissolution of the Defense Counterintelligence Command linked to martial law, the Lee Jae-myung administration plans to abolish the Drone Operations Command, which sent drones to Pyongyang. Will the intelligence unit now be dismantled to appease Kim Jong-un?

12. Why stopping drones from entering North Korea will be easier said than done

​Summary:

North Korea’s charge that South Korean drones repeatedly crossed its airspace has exposed structural gaps in Seoul’s defenses rather than a single operational failure. A civilian has now claimed responsibility, raising sharper questions about why the ROK military never detected or intercepted the small UAVs. Experts note that sensors and doctrine are built to spot north-to-south threats, not south-to-north flights, and that light fixed-wing drones with tiny radar signatures are hard to distinguish from birds or clutter. South Korea is expanding layered anti-drone systems and joint surveillance, yet analysts warn no country can achieve perfect detection of every small drone.

Comment: So do we want the South to act like the north and focus on internal threats? Or is this an act of "defending the north" from its own people? The ROK and the alliance cannot take its eye off the ball - the real threat is and always will be from the north (and farther north and west we well).

Why stopping drones from entering North Korea will be easier said than done

Experts say South Korean military assets are oriented toward threats from the north, exposing limits to surveillance

Joon Ha Park January 21, 2026

https://www.nknews.org/2026/01/why-stopping-drones-from-entering-north-korea-will-be-easier-said-than-done/

ROK Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back receives a military readiness briefing at the ROK Army’s 22nd Division and images from Rodong Sinmun show alleged evidence of drone flights on Sept. 27, 2025 and Jan. 4, 2026 | Image: ROK Ministry of National Defense (Oct. 15, 2025), Rodong Sinmun (Jan. 10, 2026), edited by NK News

North Korea’s claim that small South Korean drones have crossed into its airspace multiple times in recent months triggered speculation about who was behind the intrusion, with Seoul denying responsibility and ordering an investigation.

But now that a civilian has claimed he sent the drone, attention has begun to shift to another question: why the ROK military failed to intercept the unmanned aerial vehicle in the first place.

Pyongyang claimed on Jan. 10 that ROK drones attempted to surveil sensitive sites inside the DPRK on two occasions, Sept. 27 and Jan. 4. State media released images and reputed flight logs identifying a daytime launch from near Ganghwa Island, heading north toward Kaesong.

On Tuesday, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung questioned how the apparent civilian drones crossed through restricted airspace near the border without attracting the military’s notice, a fact that suggests surveillance gaps despite a sustained push to deploy new anti-drone assets following past intrusions.

Experts told NK News that the latest incident points less to operational failure than to structural limits in ROK air surveillance, which remains focused on countering drones coming from the North rather than those heading in the opposite direction.

And while there are steps Seoul can take to prevent a recurrence, they emphasized that there is no way to completely eliminate the emerging risks posed by small civilian drones.

Images published with the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army statement in Saturday’s edition of Rodong Sinmun show the remains of an alleged South Korean UAV that crashed inside its territory on Jan. 4, 2026 and Sept. 27, 2025 | Image: Rodong Sinmun, edited by NK News

ANTI-DRONE WEAK SPOTS

The ROK’s border area is covered by multiple layers of military sensors, including short-range air defense systems, low-altitude surveillance radars and counter-infiltration assets. It also lies within P-518 restricted airspace, where civilian drone operations are prohibited without authorization.

But if North Korea’s account is accurate, the alleged drones transited this airspace near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) without triggering an ROK military response to intercept them. This has raised the question of whether South Korea even detected the civilian UAVs.

The military’s apparent failure has drawn comparison to its response to North Korea’s drone incursions in Dec. 2022, when it was unable to intercept five UAVs that crossed into ROK airspace, including one that entered a no-fly zone over the presidential compound in Seoul.

But Shin Seung-ki, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), warned that the two cases are not directly comparable. 

The Dec. 2022 incident, he said, involved multiple drones entering South Korean territory and flying over populated areas — a scenario squarely within the military’s defensive mission. The current allegations involve a single, smaller drone moving from south to north at a time, potentially exploiting areas where surveillance coverage is thinner or alert thresholds are higher.

“In this case, the alleged object did not enter our territory,” Shin said. “It moved in the opposite direction, where detection and response priorities are different.”

That does not mean such flights are irrelevant, the expert explained. Rather, it highlights a doctrinal choice about what the system is designed to catch first.

After the Dec. 2022 incident, Seoul established a Drone Operations Command to improve early warning and tracking. It also expanded deployment of tactical radars such as the TPS-880K and introduced portable jamming devices, or “anti-drone guns.” 

By 2024, South Korea fielded dozens of integrated anti-drone systems across capital region airbases and key command facilities. These combine radar, electro-optical, infrared sensors and radio frequency jammers into a single detection-and-response console.

Yet those upgrades did not fundamentally alter the orientation of South Korea’s air defense posture. Forward-deployed short-range radars are designed to detect north-to-south incursions, meaning small objects traveling in the opposite direction can be deprioritized within the sensor and command-and-control chain.

South Korean soldiers participating in “extermination” training against North Korean UAVs on Dec. 29, 2022, utilizing short-range surface-to-air missile Cheonma | Image: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff

CHALLENGES IN DETECTION

Experts further emphasized the inherent difficulty of detecting small drones, regardless of which way they fly.

Imagery released by North Korean state media suggests the alleged drone was a lightweight fixed-wing platform with a wingspan of about 2 meters, likely built from materials that reduce radar visibility.

Jang Beong-chul, vice chair of the Korea Anti-Drone Industry Association, said drones of that size often fall below the discrimination threshold of conventional air defense radars and must instead be detected by specialized short-range, low-altitude systems.

“It’s even smaller than the North Korean drones we’ve seen in the past,” he said. 

The expert estimated that the drone’s radar cross-section could be well below 0.03 square meters. “Even if it crossed [military radar], it could easily fall below what existing systems are able to see.”

Post-incident analysis of radar data, radio-frequency sensors and system logs should clarify whether the object was detected but filtered out, or not detected at all, he said.

Shin of KIDA noted that environmental clutter also complicates detection, as small drones can resemble birds or other natural objects on radar, particularly in certain weather or seasonal conditions.

“At that size, if it mixes with a flock of birds, it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish,” Shin said.

In 2019, a KF-16 was scrambled to investigate a flock of geese. A day after the North Korean drone incursions in Dec. 2022, radar signatures thought to be hostile drones were later identified as migratory birds.

Shin said that while technologies to distinguish drones from birds are improving, achieving comprehensive coverage would require radars emitting enormous amounts of energy along the entire border — an approach that is “neither cost-effective nor operationally realistic.”

Yang Uk, a military analyst at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, similarly assessed that the latest incident reflects structural limits rather than a clear operational lapse.

He emphasized that counter-drone systems are designed primarily to detect coordinated or massed threats, such as swarm attacks.

“Detecting and intercepting a single drone that slips through unexpectedly is extremely difficult,” Yang said. “That is the reality under current system designs.”

Personnel from the ROK Army’s 53rd Infantry Division use a 20mm Vulcan cannon to counter a simulated swarm drone attack during a Ulchi Freedom Shield/TIGER exercise at Ulsan port on Aug. 20, 2025 | Image: ROK Army

ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADAPTATION

North Korea’s allegations have intensified scrutiny over whether South Korea’s surveillance doctrine reflects the emerging security environment, where civilian drones are widely accessible.

Despite the difficulties of detecting and defending against drones, experts said there are still steps Seoul can take to prevent a repeat of the latest incident.

Shin of KIDA told NK News that the military will need to move beyond its reliance on single platforms and adopt layered, overlapping surveillance supported by fully integrated command-and-control systems.

“Strengthening joint operations across services is essential to closing gaps exposed by small, low-flying aerial threats,” he stressed.

South Korea has begun exploring ways to complement ground-based sensors with airborne surveillance. Medium-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles developed domestically are entering production, with plans to equip them with sensors capable of monitoring ground activity and low-altitude airspace.

But technical upgrades alone will not resolve deeper structural limits. Local media have pointed to divisions in the military’s surveillance architecture, which is segmented by altitude. Under the current system, the air force is responsible for high-altitude monitoring, while the army oversees low-altitude airspace.

Shin said the split could complicate real-time information sharing and slow joint responses, particularly during ambiguous peacetime incidents.

“Information sharing among the military, police, local governments and aviation authorities is necessary,” he said. “That would determine how to respond, at what level and with what means.”

The challenge becomes more acute in wartime, he added, when large numbers of targets of varying sizes and speeds must be detected and distributed across command networks. 

“If we integrated and managed those systems comprehensively even in peacetime, response speed and capability could improve,” Shin said.

Rather than pursuing perfect coverage, Yang said a more realistic objective is incremental improvement — expanding sensor overlap, refining prioritization logic and strengthening inter-agency coordination.

But experts stressed that blind spots will persist under any system.

“There is no country that can detect every drone without exception,” Yang said.

Edited by Bryan Betts

13. Lee vows diplomatic efforts for resumption of N. Korea-U.S. talks, creating conditions for inter-Korean dialogue

​Summary:

President Lee Jae Myung pledged to act as a “pacemaker,” pushing for rapid resumption of U.S.–north Korea talks while creating conditions for renewed inter-Korean dialogue. He vowed to restore the suspended Sept. 19, 2018 military agreement to reduce clash risks and rebuild political military trust. Acknowledging that Pyongyang keeps producing fissile material for 10 to 20 warheads per year, he framed denuclearization as a long term goal, with a phased halt, reduction, and eventual dismantlement. Lee also stressed alliance with the United States, self-reliant defense, and domestic reforms, including prosecution reform and curbing religious interference in politics.

Comment:  Does restoring the Sept. 19 agreement risk rewarding north Korean pressure over the drone issue? Absolutely. 

(2nd LD) Lee vows diplomatic efforts for resumption of N. Korea-U.S. talks, creating conditions for inter-Korean dialogue | Yonhap News Agency

· Kim Eun-jung · January 21, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260121003752315?section=national/politics

(ATTN: ADDS remarks, details in last 7 paras, photo)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Jan. 21 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung said Wednesday he will make diplomatic efforts to help North Korea and the United States swiftly resume bilateral talks while implementing measures to create conditions for a resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.

"As a pacemaker, we will make diplomatic efforts to ensure that North Korea-U.S. dialogue will soon take place and create conditions for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue," Lee said in a nationally televised press conference for the new year.

"The sharp chill will not thaw all at once, but we will consistently pursue feasible measures to draw a response from the North and reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula," Lee said.

Lee also vowed to take steps to restore the Sept. 19 military agreement signed in 2018 between former President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The pact was fully suspended in 2024 amid heightened tensions between Seoul and Pyongyang.

"We will restore the Sept. 19 military agreement to prevent accidental clashes between the South and the North and to build political and military trust," Lee said, adding that South Korea "will also continue to consider creative solutions through which peace can benefit both Koreas."

President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a press conference for the new year held at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Jan. 21, 2026. (Yonhap)

Asked about how he would improve relations with North Korea, Lee replied that South Korea would make utmost efforts to build a "situation where peaceful coexistence is possible."

Lee said a pragmatic approach is needed to deal with North Korea, citing the North's advancement of nuclear capabilities.

"Nuclear materials capable of producing 10 to 20 nuclear weapons a year continue to be produced (in North Korea) and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology is still advancing," he said.

Lee reiterated his three-stage, phased road map for denuclearization of North Korea's nuclear program.

"It would be beneficial if no additional nuclear material is produced, if such material is not transferred abroad, and if ICBM technology is no longer developed," he said. "We should not abandon our ideals, but pursue realistic negotiations to halt the program, reduce it, and move toward denuclearization in the long term."

Lee reaffirmed his commitment to "a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula" based on the robust alliance with the U.S., strong self-reliant defense capabilities and pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests.

Lee has offered to resume stalled talks with the North, but Pyongyang has rebuffed his peace overtures. Tensions remain high after the North accused the South of sending drones into its territory and demanded an apology from Seoul.

President Lee Jae Myung (L) fields reporters' questions during a press conference for the new year held at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Jan. 21, 2026. (Yonhap)

On the domestic front, Lee pledged to press ahead firmly with prosecution reform as part of broader efforts to curb privileges and unfair practices. The reform initiative aims to separate the prosecution's investigative and indictment authorities to rein in its power.

Regarding disagreements over whether to grant prosecutors supplementary investigative powers, Lee said the government will continue to complement laws and regulations to minimize confusion and unintended side effects stemming from the revised system.

Lee also expressed regret over rival parties' failure to agree on holding a confirmation hearing for Lee Hye-hoon, the nominee to lead the newly established Ministry of Planning and Budget.

"I have not yet decided how to proceed with the nominee," he said. "I wanted to make a decision after gathering public opinion following the confirmation hearing, but that opportunity was blocked."

The nominee, a former three-term lawmaker from the conservative bloc, has drawn criticism from both the ruling Democratic Party and the main opposition People Power Party over controversies involving alleged workplace abuse, real estate investments and past remarks seen as supportive of former President Yoon Suk Yeol's declaration of martial law.

Lee also warned against collusion between religion and politics amid an ongoing probe into allegations involving the Unification Church and calls for a special counsel investigation into alleged bribery linked to the church.

"Religious intervention in politics can ruin a country," he said. "It must be eradicated at this opportunity."

President Lee Jae Myung fields reporters' questions during a press conference for the new year held at Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Jan. 21, 2026. (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · January 21, 2026

14. Trump touts 'historic' deals with S. Korea, Japan, other countries; stresses push to acquire Greenland

​Summary:

Trump used his Davos speech to praise “historic” trade deals with South Korea, Japan, Europe and others, framing them as partners whose markets rise with U.S. growth. He highlighted expanded oil and gas trade as a shared economic boon. He then returned to his ambition to acquire Greenland, arguing only the U.S. can “secure” the Arctic island and linking U.S. power to the recent Maduro capture in Venezuela. Trump stressed he will not use military force to obtain Greenland, portraying acquisition as a strategic, peaceful objective grounded in American strength and wartime legacy.

Comment: As an side, South Korea has strong interests in the Arctic as well. Our actions in Venezuela have influence on the north. 

Trump touts 'historic' deals with S. Korea, Japan, other countries; stresses push to acquire Greenland | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · January 22, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260121010500315

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday touted "historic" trade deals with South Korea, Japan and European nations, calling them "our partners," while reiterating his push to acquire Greenland, the Arctic territory of Denmark, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Trump delivered a speech during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, touching on what his administration has achieved since his return to the White House a year ago, while renewing criticism of the former Joe Biden administration.

"We've made historic trade deals with partners covering 40 percent of all U.S. trade, some of the greatest companies in countries in the world. We have countries as our partners too -- the European nations, Japan, South Korea," he said.

"They've gone into massive deals with us, especially on oil and gas, and these agreements raise growth and cause stock markets to boom, not only in the U.S. but virtually every country that came to make a deal because ... when the United States goes up, you follow," he added.

U.S. President Donald Trump delivers a special address during the World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, on Jan. 21, 2026, in this photo, released by AFP. (Yonhap)

Touching on his ambitions for the American control of Greenland, Trump stressed the U.S.' ability to "secure" the territory while noting that he will not use "force," suggesting his administration would exclude a military option to acquire the Danish island.

"The fact is no nation or group of nations is in any position to be able to secure Greenland other than the U.S.," he said.

"We are a great power, much greater than people even understand. I think they found that out two weeks ago in Venezuela," he added, referring to the military operation that captured Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro to have him face American justice for drug trafficking and other charges.

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt has indicated that the Trump administration was considering a range of options to acquire Greenland in light of national security, noting that the use of the U.S. military is among those options for the commander-in-chief.

But Trump appeared to have ruled out a military option.

"People thought I would use force, but I don't have to use force. I don't want to use force. I won't use force," he said.

"All the U.S. is asking for is a place called Greenland, where we already had it as a trustee, but respectfully returned it back to Denmark not long ago, after we defeated the Germans, the Japanese, the Italians and others in World War II."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · January 22, 2026

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com