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Quotes of the Day:
"The real horror, to me, lies in the fact that there is absolutely no vehicle in American journalism for the kind of “sensitive” and “intellectual” and essentially moral/merciless reporting that we all understand is necessary–not only for the survival of good journalism in this country, but for the dying idea that you can walk up to a newsstand and find something that will tell you what is really happening."
– Hunter S. Thompson
“We train young men to drop fire on people, but their commanders won’t allow them to write fu*k on their airplanes because it’s obscene.”
– Marlon Brando
“It’s not so much staying alive, it’s staying human that’s important. What counts is that we don’t betray each other.”
– George Orwell
1. The Peril of American Neglect in the Pacific: To Compete With Beijing, Washington Must Beef Up Its Presence in the Region
2. The Death of Deterrence: How Biden’s Public Signals Are Undermining Global Security
3. Iran’s Secret Warning to U.S. Allies: Don’t Help Israel, or You’re Next
4. Observers: Chinese-made fighter jets play key role in deadly airstrikes in Myanmar
5. U.S. Officials Race to Understand Severity of China’s Salt Typhoon Hacks
6. National Security Experts: Harris and Trump Both Fail to Inspire Confidence
7. Clashes on South China Sea, Ukraine dominate Asia summit
8. The drownings of 2 Navy SEALs were preventable, military investigation finds
9. The US Navy is burning through missiles in the Middle East that it would need in a war with China
10. Douglas Murray: A Time of War
11. Calls for intervention: Will Iran send forces to aid Hezbollah against Israel? - analysis
12. I’m Not Good Enough—And That’s OK
13. China Seizes Initiative at Key Asian Summit Ahead of US Election
14. Wars are won with code, says German military AI maker
15. China lacks will and way to lead the world
16. IDF all-female tank crew heroes
17. Opinion: Ukraine's road to victory may lie in a 'Korean solution'
18. S Korea piles in with US in arming up the Philippines
19. Filming Under Fire: John Ford’s OSS Field Photo Branch
20. Hezbollah forges new command for crucial ground war after heavy Israeli blows
21. The Price of Victory
22. Army Battalions Don’t Have Organic Cyber Intelligence Capabilities—Here’s Why They Should
23. Putin’s Greatest Weakness
24. I was rescued from Hurricane Helene by the military — and all I got was a lousy TikTok conspiracy
25. Prep Courses, Policy Tweaks Largely Drove the Military's Recruiting Success in 2024
1. The Peril of American Neglect in the Pacific: To Compete With Beijing, Washington Must Beef Up Its Presence in the Region
This is not a focus on military presence but everything else. This is about thickening all the instruments of power in the region beyond the military.
I had a thought about how to improve our 3D presence (the 3D term coined by a US ambassador to the Philippines - diplomacy, development (economic instrument), and defense).
A Northeast Asia Command in Korea
A Northeast Ambassador in Japan
A Northeast Asia Economic Engagement Center in Taiwan
Extracts from two papers. Both these proposals were made during the previous administration based on the 2017 NSS.
"THE ROK-US ALLIANCE: ONE AMERICAN’S PERSPECTIVE NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE" (2020)
https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/pathways-to-peace-achieving-the-stable-transformation-of-the-korean-peninsula
(Page 70-71
"One of the ways for the United States to look at its future in Northeast Asia is to revise its military, diplomatic, and economic structures in the region. In recent years, Washington has undertaken a pivot or rebalance to Asia, and under the current administration transformed the US Pacific Command into the US Indo-Pacific Command. The latter highlights the importance of the entire region, which has been codified in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, the Asia-Pacific theater is large and complex. Perhaps it is time to reexamine the Unified Command Plan and consider reorganizing the structure and responsibilities in the theater. The United States should examine the feasibility of establishing a Northeast Asia Command as a new and separate combatant command. This is not a new idea, but it has never been sufficiently examined. Given the importance of the entire region and Northeast Asia within it, a separate combatant command with responsibility for Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Taiwan, China, and the Russian Far East would enhance US strategic capabilities. However, one argument against this idea will always come to the fore. Whenever a new set of boundaries is established, it will always create gaps and seams. This is especially true when competition with China is considered. But such a recommendation should not be "discounted solely for that reason. The analysis may reveal other opportunities and, even if the proposal is not accepted, may reveal other ways to better support US strategic objectives.
While new ideas tend to focus on how to organize the military, the other instruments of power should also be considered. Perhaps it is time to think about creating a diplomatic organization in the region to coordinate all diplomatic activities and all information and influence activities to support US strategic objectives. A US Northeast Asia ambassador with the requisite supporting staff organization would provide the diplomatic and information effort necessary to synchronize the elements of national power. A third organization to support the economic instrument of power could be a Northeast Asia Economic Engagement Center. These three organizations would not only bring the strength of the US instruments of power to the region in a new and dynamic way; they would also send a powerful message of commitment, especially if they were located in the right places. The Northeast Asia Command could be located in Korea, the Northeast Asia ambassador in Japan, and the Northeast Asia Economic Engagement Center in Taiwan. Of course, this would create political challenges. However, such a proposal could also enhance the strength and power of the US alliance structure in the region and provide allies with effective tools to compete with the revisionist powers and defend against the rogue powers as outlined in the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. These are merely proposals and may not be at all feasible. However, it is time to creatively reexamine employment of the instruments of power to see if the United States can be more effective in achieving its strategic objectives and maintaining and strengthening its alliances in Northeast Asia."
From a paper presented to the Council on US-Korean Security Studies in September 2019.
A Free and Open INDOPACIFIC
The ROK/U.S. alliance is aligned on the objective of ensuring a free and open INDOPACIFIC. Complex strategic competition is taking place through the region and around the globe. Given the changing dynamics on the peninsula, for example OPCON transition and north Korea’s growing threat not only to the South but all Japan and the U.S. homeland, it may be time to relook the U.S. combatant command structure in Asia.
When OPCON transition is fully implemented with a Korean general officer leading the command with responsibility for deterrence and defense it may be time to resurrect an idea that was floated more than two decades ago. That is the establishment of a Northeast Asia or Far East Combatant Command. Such a proposal has only been whispered about in the past as the former Pacific Command quickly shut down all discussion of anything that would reduce its influence.
Given the size and complexity of the INDOPACIFIC and the various conflicts that are likely to occur it may be time to conduct a thorough analysis and determine if a Northeast Asia Combatant Command should be established in Korea with responsibility for forces in Korea and Japan while INDOPACOM assumes responsibility for South and Southeast Asia and the maritime domain of the Asia Pacific region. Establishing new geographic boundaries and dividing roles and responsibilities would be a difficult undertaking fraught with controversy, but it may be time to make some bold moves at this inflection point in history.
To really demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the INDOPACIFIC and achieve the elusive pivot to Asia the U.S. could provide decisive elements of national power to the region beyond the military. The U.S. could also establish two other organizations in addition to a new military command in Korea. First, the U.S. could appoint a regional Ambassador located in Tokyo and provide them with a staff to conduct regional diplomacy focused on engagement with regional organizations and lead a U.S. information and influence campaign throughout the region to support the U.S. INDOPACIFIC strategy and other national objectives. Second, the U.S. could establish an East Economic Engagement Center in Taipei to manage the complex issues in the region and specifically manage trade agreements to ensure U.S. economic interests are protected throughout the region.
Collectively these three actions would demonstrate U.S. strategic reassurance of U.S. allies and strategic resolve to defend U.S. interests and our allies.
The Peril of American Neglect in the Pacific
To Compete With Beijing, Washington Must Beef Up Its Presence in the Region
October 10, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Charles Edel and Kathryn Paik · October 10, 2024
Under Democratic and Republican administrations alike, policymakers in Washington have in recent years reached a consensus about the need to compete with China. They have paid growing attention to the technological and military aspects of the competition, shoring up relationships with partners and allies, and trying to prevent China from gaining access to critical technologies. But they have neglected one key area: the United States’ diplomatic ground game. To compete effectively with China, Washington must better support the efforts of its often beleaguered and overstretched diplomats abroad. Nowhere is this deficit more evident than in the Pacific Islands region—an area that encompasses nearly a fifth of the world’s surface, through which the American military and a good deal of U.S. trade travel, and that is home to more than a dozen democratic states.
After years of neglect, and in response to increased Chinese activity in the region, Washington has stepped up its engagement in the Pacific. It has opened new embassies, signed new security agreements, hosted two summits at the White House with all the region’s leaders, released a Pacific-focused national strategy that responds to regional priorities, and worked with major allies and partners elsewhere to deliver needed infrastructure to Pacific Island countries. Those efforts are welcome—and overdue. But the United States’ influence in the region is still being undercut by the limitations of its diplomacy: insufficient reach, inadequate funding, and outdated reporting requirements. Together, these flaws make it harder for Washington to compete with Beijing in the Pacific. Without a shift in how Washington prioritizes and supports diplomacy in this area, the United States will continue to cede ground to China across a region that reaches from the Philippines to Hawaii.
PINSTRIPES ON THE BEACH
The political scientist Bernard Brodie wrote that strategy wears a dollar sign, suggesting that budgets reveal much about a country’s priorities. But strategy also sits on a map, and where a country places its resources also tells the story of what it values. According to the Lowy Institute’s 2024 Global Diplomacy Index, China now leads the world in diplomatic presence, notably with more diplomatic outposts than the United States in Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific Islands. The study looks purely at diplomatic installations—embassies and consulates—but the contrast is even starker when considering the number of diplomatic personnel who work at those installations. China has embassies in nine Pacific Island countries (the United States has them in eight), and Chinese diplomats vastly outnumber U.S. diplomats, sometimes by a factor of ten to one. In the archipelago country of Vanuatu, a Chinese official reported that the Chinese embassy had between 12 and 16 diplomats. The United States has just one temporary representative. In the Solomon Islands, China’s embassy can house up to 100 Chinese personnel but currently holds 30, a figure that does not include its 12-person police liaison team. The new U.S. embassy in the Solomon Islands, meanwhile, usually has only two to five U.S. personnel.
Worse, there are places in the region where the United States has no permanent presence at all and has completely ceded the field. Take, for instance, the island country of Nauru. Since 2005, Nauru had been one of a handful of countries to maintain formal ties with Taiwan rather than with China. But that changed in January of this year, when Nauru switched to recognizing the government in Beijing, a move precipitated by intense Chinese engagement. Washington, with no diplomatic presence on the ground, had no forewarning of the switch, much less any hope of convincing the Nauru government to change its mind. Intermittent diplomacy or depending on allies and partners, such as Australia and New Zealand, to advance and defend U.S. interests is insufficient. In the absence of a real diplomatic presence, the United States invariably struggles to influence decisions that may have significant strategic repercussions.
In other areas, the U.S. presence and diplomatic buildup is no longer commensurate with strategic developments. The United States has entered a close security partnership with Australia under the auspices of the AUKUS deal, which includes the United Kingdom. Even as the United States has strengthened its military alliance with Australia, it has failed to make an equivalent investment in diplomacy. As part of AUKUS, the United States plans to rotate up to four Virginia-class attack submarines out of the Australian port of Perth by 2027. To do so, Washington will have to station many more Americans—civilians and military—in western Australia to help with the maintenance and supply of these vessels. But the United States is not ready to manage such an endeavor. The U.S. consulate in Perth has just a handful of staff, clearly insufficient for the task of supporting more than 2,000 new American residents that the buildup would require.
Chinese diplomats vastly outnumber U.S. diplomats in the Pacific, sometimes by ten to one.
Even where the United States has, or will soon have, a diplomatic presence in the Pacific, the State Department’s bureaucratic requirements get in the way of its expansion. The United States has announced the opening of embassies in Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu; the reopening of a USAID mission in Fiji; and the return of the Peace Corps to the region. But bureaucratic, legal, and legislative hurdles delay these efforts. It took two years for the embassy in Vanuatu to open, and the promised embassy in Kiribati has yet to materialize. The United States has only a handful of diplomats in the Solomon Islands and Tonga, with no ambassador and few or no consular services.
China does not have this problem. After Nauru recognized China this year, it took Beijing all of five days to establish an official embassy there. Meanwhile, the United States still does not maintain an embassy in Nauru, relying instead on diplomats 1,400 miles away in Fiji. Although a strong diplomatic presence does not guarantee successful diplomatic outcomes, it is a prerequisite for establishing and maintaining key government relationships and effectively implementing national security priorities.
One of the primary reasons for recent delays in beefing up the U.S. presence in the Pacific is the mandatory security requirements for U.S. diplomatic installations. Many of these requirements are misaligned with the realities on the ground in the Pacific. For example, the State Department requires an embassy building to have a 100-foot setback from the perimeter of the property. But that is nearly impossible on the narrow atoll island of Kiribati, where such a setback would likely land the embassy in the water. Although waivers for these requirements exist, the fallout for senior personnel in the aftermath of the 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in the Libyan city of Benghazi has created an environment of excessive caution, to the detriment of needed action.
Security requirements exist for legitimate reasons, but uniform global policies are unnecessarily restrictive and do not consider the unique circumstances of these smaller island states. Instead of simply granting waiver authority to the State Department, Congress could establish different security requirements for certain countries or regions, such as those that are less developed or smaller, or where there is a low likelihood that an embassy will come under attack. Most Pacific Island countries would easily qualify for reduced security requirements using these metrics, which would allow American diplomats to more easily ramp up their activities there.
A THICKER PRESENCE
Wherever these diplomats are housed, the United States needs more of them everywhere in the Pacific. China has many more diplomatic personnel there, and Beijing uses this disparity to underline the notion that Washington is an unreliable actor in the region.
There are numerous ways to bolster the diplomatic workforce, many of which are within the purview of the State Department, such as offering staff additional incentives to serve in remote locations. One of the most significant steps the State Department could take to signal that Pacific diplomats are valued and have a viable career path would be to create an independent Bureau of the Pacific, separate from the existing Bureau of East Asia and the Pacific. Currently, the entire region is covered by a single deputy assistant secretary of state. With 16 countries—including the major U.S. ally Australia—the region certainly deserves several deputy assistant secretary positions and a standalone or specially allocated budget. Creating new levels of bureaucracy can sometimes result in slowing things down, but in this case the creation of an additional bureau would allow officials to better direct attention and resources to a critically under-resourced region.
Moreover, changes by both Congress and the State Department are needed to maximize the effectiveness of personnel already on the ground, especially in smaller posts. An embassy of ten to 15 diplomats, never mind a mission housing only one or two, should not be expected to fulfill the same administrative requirements as larger posts. The State Department is taking some steps to relieve this burden, waiving many reporting requirements for posts under a certain size, but some reports are congressionally mandated and must be drafted by the officials posted abroad. A diplomat who must write a 27-page human rights report, one among many required annual reports, is not conducting diplomacy. Reports on subjects such as human rights and human trafficking are certainly important, but critical information could be distilled into abbreviated formats, saving time for both the preparers and the readers. Diplomats are American representatives—their purpose is to be out and about in their host country, not just compiling reports at a desk.
The U.S. diplomatic presence no longer matches strategic needs in the Pacific.
More broadly, Washington must allocate more resources to the State Department. As General James Mattis famously said in 2013, when he was head of U.S. Central Command, “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately.” Congress will have to act to ensure the State Department gets the funds it needs to deal with the magnitude of today’s threats.
The proliferation of challenges across multiple sectors—from energy and climate change to food security and health care—has expanded the role of the diplomat. Although larger U.S. embassies have long housed personnel from other departments and agencies, such as USAID, the Departments of Defense and Commerce, and the FBI, smaller posts also need staff with this range of expertise and responsibility. Departments and agencies traditionally considered domestic bodies, such as the Departments of Transportation, Energy, or Agriculture, are finding themselves increasingly focused on issues abroad that directly affect U.S. strategic interests. These departments may already have a presence overseas, but they do not have sufficient funds to keep pace with a changing global environment. Maximizing the breadth of U.S. interagency power will require reimagining how the United States appoints diplomats. Congress should require these departments to place attachés in key countries and regions—and fund them accordingly. Such additional staffing would help the U.S. government follow through on key strategic initiatives, such as the U.S.-Pacific Transportation Partnership, launched in September 2022 with the aim of enhancing connectivity between Pacific islands and the rest of the world.
Of course, the best diplomacy is often conducted through nontraditional means, especially in complex and far-flung regions such as the Pacific. Arguably the most popular and successful engagement the United States conducts in the Pacific is via the United States Coast Guard and the Peace Corps, both of which yield exceptionally positive results for a relatively low cost. Both excel at building relationships on the ground and meeting critical local needs such as protecting fisheries or supplementing educational shortfalls.
Yet both agencies remain woefully underfunded. The Coast Guard has managed to play a greater role in the Pacific, including by deploying three larger vessels to Guam that can patrol as far as Papua New Guinea, but it will need more money to further expand the number of personnel and ships it can deploy in the Indo-Pacific. The overall Peace Corps budget has remained relatively flat for the last decade, even as more countries have asked Washington for a Peace Corps presence. The United States should also consider innovative ideas such as establishing a permanent mission to the Pacific Islands Forum, the region’s principal intergovernmental organization, similar to how the United States established a mission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2010 (the first non-ASEAN country to do so). And it should create a diplomatic reserve corps of retired or former U.S. diplomats who could fill strategic gaps in an ever-evolving geopolitical landscape.
THE GROUND GAME
Over half a century ago, during another period of intense strategic competition, U.S. President John F. Kennedy mapped the way forward through a host of institutions, ideas, and initiatives founded in the belief that on-the-ground diplomacy was essential to the survival of a world free from authoritarianism. “How many of you are willing to work in the Foreign Service?” Kennedy challenged a group of college students at the University of Michigan in 1960. “On your willingness to do that,” he said, “I think will depend the answer whether a free society can compete.” This call to action, echoed in his inaugural address, is generally credited with serving as the inspiration for the Peace Corps and fueling greater American interest, participation, and contribution in the world. To compete today, the United States needs diplomats to meet with foreign leaders, navigate local culture and customs, identify opportunities for collaboration, report on emerging challenges, combat disinformation, and support democratic principles. None of that can happen, however, if these people are not on the ground, establishing connections, and promoting the country’s interests.
The status quo of half-hearted diplomacy in the Pacific will not suffice at a time when China is ramping up its presence in the region. The United States must make a concerted effort to rectify its diplomatic shortcomings after decades of relative neglect. China represents the United States’ defining foreign policy challenge of the twenty-first century. Some have called this competition a modern-day iteration of the “Great Game,” the British-Russian competition for influence in Central Asia in the nineteenth century. Others have urged the United States to play “a long game” in the contest with China. Maybe so. But what the United States urgently needs if it is to compete effectively is a better ground game.
- CHARLES EDEL is Senior Adviser and Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served on the U.S. Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff from 2015 to 2017.
- KATHRYN PAIK is Senior Fellow with the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and previously served as Director for the Pacific and Southeast Asia on the National Security Council from 2021 to 2023.
Foreign Affairs · by Charles Edel and Kathryn Paik · October 10, 2024
2. The Death of Deterrence: How Biden’s Public Signals Are Undermining Global Security
As an aside the author reminded me of our visit to the new Genghis Khan museum in Mongolia in 2023. It is an amazing display. We could not get through all 7 floors of exhibits in the time we had to spend there. But I will never forget the docnet explaining how Genghis Khan was a great humanitarian who was liberating all the people across Asia and Europe because they were unhappy with their governments and rulers.
Excerpts:
Perhaps one of the most original and effective practitioners of deterrence in history was Genghis Khan. While his name is often associated with brutality, it was the calculated ambiguity of his actions that paralyzed entire civilizations before they were even conquered. Genghis Khan famously offered two options to his enemies: surrender and live, or resist and be annihilated. However, he never revealed the true extent of his wrath until it was too late. This uncertainty about what the Mongols might do next created a psychological advantage that allowed them to conquer vast territories with minimal resistance. Some cities surrendered without a fight, terrified by the prospect of Mongol retribution, while others gambled and were obliterated.
The brilliance of Genghis Khan’s deterrence was in keeping his enemies in a perpetual state of fear—not knowing when or how he might strike. This historical lesson highlights the power of unpredictability in maintaining control over adversaries. Biden’s clear signaling to Iran does the exact opposite.
The U.S. must adopt a similar approach, ensuring that adversaries like Iran, China, and Russia are left in a state of perpetual doubt regarding American intentions. Without this uncertainty, the U.S. risks losing its grip on global stability, with consequences that could echo across generations.
The Death of Deterrence
By Carlo J.V. Caro
October 11, 2024
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/10/11/the_death_of_deterrence_1064436.html
The Death of Deterrence: How Biden’s Public Signals Are Undermining Global Security
Since April, President Biden’s public assurances—stating that the United States would not join Israel in a military response to the initial Iranian aerial attacks, and more recently his statements that he would not support an Israeli counterattack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—mark a critical departure from the core principles of deterrence. Deterrence is not merely about wielding overwhelming force but about creating an environment of uncertainty and fear in the minds of adversaries. Historically, successful deterrence has thrived on ambiguity—the calculated uncertainty that prevents enemies from predicting the consequences of their actions. Yet, under Biden’s administration, this essential principle is eroding through public declarations, particularly toward Iran. This shift threatens to dismantle a carefully maintained balance, with potentially far-reaching consequences for the U.S., Israel, and the global order.
The Middle East, a region historically fraught with sectarian rivalries, territorial disputes, and the constant specter of conflict, has long relied on a delicate balance of power maintained by external actors, primarily the United States. For decades, U.S. ambiguity regarding its military involvement in the region served as a check on Tehran's nuclear ambitions. This ambiguity kept Iran in a perpetual state of caution, never quite certain how the U.S. or Israel might respond to further nuclear development.
Without the fear of U.S. intervention, Iran faces a clearer path to accelerate its nuclear ambitions and regional powers like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt may feel compelled to develop their own nuclear programs, creating a new and highly volatile dynamic in an already unstable region. The breakdown of deterrence here is reminiscent of the fall of ancient empires like Assyria, which failed to recognize the rising threats around them. The collapse of Assyria was not due to military defeat but to complacency in its dominance, allowing adversaries like Babylon to gain strength unchecked. In much the same way, Iran’s ambitions may grow unhindered, pushing the region toward a tipping point.
While Biden’s signaling to Iran presents immediate dangers in the Middle East, its ripple effects extend to global powers like China and Russia. Both nations closely observe U.S. actions in one theater to gauge its resolve in others. China, for instance, has long tested U.S. deterrence, particularly in the South China Sea and regarding Taiwan. Each time the U.S. signals reluctance to engage militarily, Beijing recalibrates its strategy, pushing further into contested waters and escalating its claims over Taiwan. Strategic ambiguity, the cornerstone of Cold War-era deterrence, is being steadily replaced by public assurances of non-involvement. This predictability, far from providing stability, only emboldens aggressors.
Yet, this pattern of erosion in U.S. deterrence is not new. The Obama administration’s failure to enforce the infamous “red line” in Syria signaled to the world that the U.S. was unwilling to commit to its own declarations. This failure emboldened not only Assad but also China and Russia, both of whom saw this as indicative of a broader U.S. reluctance to engage militarily. By the time Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the pattern of U.S. restraint was firmly established, giving Moscow the confidence to act with impunity. The erosion of U.S. deterrence, therefore, has been a gradual process, one that Biden’s administration is exacerbating through its overly transparent signals of limitation.
History offers numerous lessons on the consequences of telegraphed restraint. One example is the downfall of Carthage during the Punic Wars. While the Second Punic War is most remembered for Hannibal’s military genius, Carthage’s downfall was as much a product of its diplomatic and strategic signals as it was of battlefield defeats. After Hannibal’s victories in Italy, Carthage adopted a policy of restraint, signaling to Rome its reluctance to engage in full-scale retaliation. This hesitation was perceived as weakness by the Romans, who regrouped and ultimately destroyed Carthage. Had Carthage maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity, its fate may have been dramatically different. The lesson is clear: public declarations of restraint only serve to embolden adversaries.
Napoleon, one of history’s most brilliant military minds, offers another instructive case. Napoleon understood that the key to deterrence was unpredictability. During his campaign in Italy in 1796, Napoleon masterfully manipulated his enemies by allowing false reports to circulate about his plans. This ambiguity forced his adversaries to spread their forces thin, unsure of where the next blow would land. By maintaining a shroud of uncertainty, Napoleon struck with devastating precision, turning ambiguity into his most potent weapon.
Machiavelli, in The Discourses, emphasized the importance of unpredictability in statecraft. He warned that rulers who signal their limitations too openly invite exploitation by their adversaries. Much like Machiavelli’s cautionary advice, Biden’s public assurances reveal America's strategic limits, inviting aggression from those who seek to exploit American restraint.
Thomas Schelling emphasized the importance of the “threat that leaves something to chance.” Schelling’s insight was that deterrence works most effectively when adversaries are uncertain about the full range of possible consequences. A clear, predictable threat can be calculated and potentially countered. But a threat that leaves open the possibility of uncontrolled escalation forces adversaries to consider the worst-case scenario, preventing them from taking aggressive actions. During the Cold War, it was this very concept of unpredictability that prevented nuclear conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Neither side could be entirely sure what the other might do in a moment of crisis, and this mutual uncertainty maintained a fragile peace.
Chinese geopolitical strategy draws heavily from the game of wei qi—a strategic exercise of encirclement and calculated ambiguity. Unlike chess, where the objective is visible from the outset, wei qi emphasizes gradual control through subtle, unpredictable maneuvers designed to surround and outmaneuver the opponent. Each time the U.S. signals hesitation or reluctance to engage militarily, China interprets it as an opportunity to advance its strategic aims, much like the deliberate encirclement in wei qi.
Perhaps one of the most original and effective practitioners of deterrence in history was Genghis Khan. While his name is often associated with brutality, it was the calculated ambiguity of his actions that paralyzed entire civilizations before they were even conquered. Genghis Khan famously offered two options to his enemies: surrender and live, or resist and be annihilated. However, he never revealed the true extent of his wrath until it was too late. This uncertainty about what the Mongols might do next created a psychological advantage that allowed them to conquer vast territories with minimal resistance. Some cities surrendered without a fight, terrified by the prospect of Mongol retribution, while others gambled and were obliterated.
The brilliance of Genghis Khan’s deterrence was in keeping his enemies in a perpetual state of fear—not knowing when or how he might strike. This historical lesson highlights the power of unpredictability in maintaining control over adversaries. Biden’s clear signaling to Iran does the exact opposite.
The U.S. must adopt a similar approach, ensuring that adversaries like Iran, China, and Russia are left in a state of perpetual doubt regarding American intentions. Without this uncertainty, the U.S. risks losing its grip on global stability, with consequences that could echo across generations.
Carlo J.V. Caro has a postgraduate degree in Islamic Studies from Columbia University and is a political and military analyst. He has published numerous articles in the US and Israel on foreign affairs and security.
3. Iran’s Secret Warning to U.S. Allies: Don’t Help Israel, or You’re Next
Credible threats?
Iran’s Secret Warning to U.S. Allies: Don’t Help Israel, or You’re Next
The threats through diplomatic channels have prompted Arab states to tell the U.S. that they won’t aid any attack on Iran
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-secret-warning-to-u-s-allies-dont-help-israel-or-youre-next-ccfa5fa0?mod=hp_lead_pos1
By Summer SaidFollow
, Nancy A. YoussefFollow
and Omar Abdel-BaquiFollow
Updated Oct. 10, 2024 9:52 pm ET
DUBAI—Tehran is threatening in secret diplomatic backchannels to target the oil-rich Arab Gulf states and other American allies in the Middle East if their territories or airspace are used for an attack on Iran, said Arab officials.
Israel has threatened Tehran with a severe reprisal after Iran fired about 180 ballistic missiles at Israel earlier this month, with some Israeli officials and commentators pushing for damaging strikes on Tehran’s nuclear facilities or oil infrastructure. In that event, Iran has warned it would respond with devastating hits on Israel’s civilian infrastructure, and would retaliate against any Arab state that facilitated the attack, the officials said.
The Arab officials said the countries that Iran has threatened include Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, all of which host U.S. troops. These states have told the Biden administration that they don’t want their military infrastructure or airspace to be used by the U.S. or Israel for any offensive operations against Iran, the officials said.
While the Iranian threats are vague, they have raised concerns in energy-rich Persian Gulf states that their oil facilities—long viewed as protected by an American security umbrella—could be hit, the Arab officials said. U.S. military installations and forces in the region could also be at risk in a region with one of the highest concentrations of American troops in the world, they added.
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met with Qatari Defense Minister Khalid bin Mohammed al-Attiyah last year outside Doha. Photo: Zuma Press
The escalating conflict in the Middle East is straining the alignment of Arab states and Israel, which all oppose Iran’s military posture in the region. The U.S. is the backbone of this bloc, and harbors hopes that in the future it could be a sort of Middle East NATO, aligned around countering Iran rather than Russia. Arab states including Jordan helped shoot down Iranian projectiles headed for Israel in April, but supporting a direct Israeli strike on Iran may be a step too far.
U.S. defense officials acknowledged that some regional partners have told the Pentagon that they don’t want Israeli warplanes flying over their territories or U.S. troops launching offensive operations from inside or over their airspace. The Arab countries have said the U.S. forces are allowed to conduct self-defense operations, the officials said.
The Arab countries’ requests remain informal, a U.S. defense official said. Since the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza began last year, Arab countries have repeatedly added and removed limits on American operations, defense officials said. But these countries were more assertive as the war expanded into clashes between Israel and Iran, including Israeli attacks in Lebanon, the officials said.
Iran fired a salvo of ballistic missiles at Israel earlier this month. Photo: Jamal Awad/Reuters
The Israeli military struck buildings in Beirut earlier this month. Photo: Manu Brabo for WSJ
President Biden and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Wednesday discussed Israel’s expected military retaliation against Iran in their first call since Aug. 21. U.S. officials said they don’t yet have either the timing of the strike or what Israel might target. Israel’s security cabinet had been set to convene, with members presented with options for a response to the Iranian attack, according to an Israeli official.
Israel likely has other routes for sending warplanes to attack Iran, including over Syria, where its air force has freedom of movement, and Iraq, where air defenses are no match for Israeli stealth technology.
Still, any restrictions on how the U.S. military moves throughout the region makes it potentially harder to secure or resupply its assets, such as aircraft carriers operating in the Red Sea.
U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East, referred questions to its allies. The Iranian Foreign Ministry and Israeli prime minister’s office didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Earlier this month, Iran’s Mission to the United Nations publicly warned “any country render[ing] assistance” to an Israeli attack “shall likewise be deemed an accomplice and a legitimate target,” but did not provide any specifics.
The U.S. has supported Israel’s right to defend itself but is pressing to keep the response limited, as it works to stop the fighting from spilling across the region ever since the Hamas-led Oct. 7 attack left 1,200 people dead and set off a devastating war in the Gaza Strip.
In April, when Iran first targeted Israel in a direct attack, Israeli and U.S. forces intercepted most of the Iranian drones and missiles. But they could do so in part because Arab countries passed along intelligence about Tehran’s attack plans, opened their airspace to warplanes, shared radar-tracking information or, in some cases, supplied their own forces to help, officials had said at the time.
Iranian demonstrators shouted anti-Israel slogans this week as they held posters showing miltary leader Qassem Soleimani, who was killed by the U.S. in 2020, kissing the forehead of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed by Israel last month. Photo: Maryam Rahmanian for WSJ
With Iran warning that it would hit back if Israel attacks, Arab leaders are worried that the escalation would force the U.S. to step in to help Israel, its closest ally in the Middle East.
“My worry in this situation is the risk of miscalculation, or if something goes wrong,” said Yossi Mekelberg, a Middle East analyst at London-based think tank Chatham House. “It may push the other side to do things for which they don’t have a prepared and calculated plan.”
The Arab intermediaries are trying to calm tensions as they shuttle messages between Israel and Iran—a backchannel that has opened up since April, when Iran struck Israel with 300 projectiles. The stealth diplomacy has intensified since Israel killed Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Iran-backed Lebanese militia Hezbollah, and launched a ground offensive in Lebanon. Iran launched its latest ballistic missile on Israel days afterward.
The menacing messages underline the risks for the U.S. if the counterpunching between Israel and Iran spirals out of control. U.S. officials said they were beefing up their military presence in the region, including by bolstering the number of warplanes it has deployed in the Middle East and keeping the Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier battle group in the region.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently sought to rally leaders against Iran at the United Nations, while Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei denounced Israel in Tehran.
Andrea Renault/ZUMA Press ; Iranian Supreme Leader's Office/ZUMA Press
During an emergency meeting last week in an effort to avert any attack by Tehran, Persian Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E, promised not to allow their territories or airspace to be used in any possible strikes on Iran.
Some Arab states fear the broadening war could choke back oil exports that pass through the Strait of Hormuz—the narrow waterway connecting the Gulf to the wider world—which could push oil prices higher, the Arab government officials said.
Public rhetoric between Israel and Iran also has gotten sharper, with the two sides making harsher direct threats, with officials from both countries keeping targeting nonmilitary infrastructure on the table. Previously the threats mostly focused on military targets or proxies.
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Fears of a broader conflict in the Middle East are complicating flights in one of the most densely traversed regions of the world. WSJ explains how airlines are adjusting to the volatile situation. Illustration: Ksenia Shaikhutdinova
The tone of the private messages are much tougher than they were in April, after the earlier Iranian missile-and-drone salvo, when Israel’s tough public rhetoric was accompanied by de-escalatory backchannel messaging.
At that time, Israel, urged by the U.S. to temper its response, targeted Iranian air-defense systems.
Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com, Nancy A. Youssef at nancy.youssef@wsj.com and Omar Abdel-Baqui at omar.abdel-baqui@wsj.com
4. Observers: Chinese-made fighter jets play key role in deadly airstrikes in Myanmar
Observers: Chinese-made fighter jets play key role in deadly airstrikes in Myanmar
https://www.voanews.com/amp/observers-chinese-made-fighter-jets-play-key-role-in-deadly-airstrikes-in-myanmar/7816747.html
October 09, 2024 10:45 PM
FILE - China's FTC-2000G combat aircraft is on display in Zhuhai, Guangdong province, China, Nov. 1, 2018.
Washington —
Local media in Myanmar are reporting that six FTC-2000G fighter jets purchased from China have arrived, and observers are concerned that Chinese military support for the Myanmar military is prolonging the conflict and worsening civilian suffering.
China's supply of fighter jets, such as the FTC-2000G, has helped the junta maintain air superiority, and that has caused widespread casualties across Myanmar.
According to media reports, this delivery in August 2024 is the second batch of FTC-2000G jets received by Myanmar’s military. The junta took delivery of the first batch in November 2022.
Military-controlled media later showed the FTC-2000G aircraft at a Myanmar Air Force ceremony on Dec. 15, 2022. The second batch is widely expected to be showcased at this year’s Air Force Day celebration in December.
Zay Ya, a former sergeant in the Myanmar Air Force, explained to VOA from an undisclosed location on the Thai-Myanmar border, “Many of the Russian-made Yak-130s are out of service, so the Chinese jets are now critical to the military’s operations."
He added that the Chinese jets are already used in combat, with several stationed at key air bases.
Zay Ya, who served in Myanmar’s Air Force for nearly a decade, deserted the military following the February 2021 overthrow of an elected government and is now assisting fellow former service members who have joined the Civil Disobedience Movement against the military junta.
Based on his hands-on experience with the Myanmar Air Force, Zay Ya pointed out that Russia’s aircraft are high-cost and fuel-consuming, while Chinese planes are more compatible with Myanmar’s existing defense industry. "The Russian-made Sukhoi Su-30 — four of them arrived before the FTC-2000G — but the FTC-2000G can be used immediately," Zay Ya said.
VOA’s Burmese Service contacted the Myanmar government’s military information team in Nay Pyi Taw and the Chinese Embassy in Yangon and Washington, D.C., regarding the delivery of FTC-2000G jets but has not yet received a response.
FILE - Members of the Mandalay Peoples Defense Forces (MDY-PDF) walk through a structure bombed by a Myanmar military aircraft near the front line amid clashes in northern Shan State, Dec. 11, 2023.
Use of FTC-2000G
The FTC-2000G’s ability to carry missiles, rockets and bombs has significantly enhanced the junta’s airstrike capabilities, particularly in conflict zones like northern Shan State and areas controlled by the Brotherhood Alliance, an ethnic armed group near the Chinese border, according to the observers.
A report by Justice for Myanmar and Info Birmanie highlighted how China's FTC-2000G aircraft have been used for air raids on civilian areas. On Jan. 16, 2024, opposition forces downed an FTC-2000G jet involved in an attack over the Namhpatkar region in northern Shan State. In December 2023, another FTC-2000G jet dropped bombs on residential buildings near Namkham.
‘It will not shift the balance’
Dr. Abdul Rahman Yaacob, an expert on Southeast Asia’s defense and security issues with Lowy Institute, commented on the broader implications of the jet deliveries. “China is clearly taking sides in the civil war,” he told VOA. “It shows that China is not a neutral actor in the Myanmar crisis by supplying arms to the junta."
While the delivery of combat aircraft may give the junta some tactical advantage, Yaacob said, “Overall, it will not shift the balance to the side of the junta. The junta is actually facing a counterinsurgency. An insurgency campaign cannot be dealt with just by air power alone. It has to be fought by foot soldiers. And this is where the junta is facing a major problem — it has a shortage of manpower.”
Several experts believe China’s actions are about more than military support.
Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at the United States Institute of Peace, or USIP, told VOA, "It’s very clear that China still sees the Myanmar military as the government of Myanmar, and it seems unlikely that over the short term, China’s posture is going to change."
He argues that the sale of the fighter jets signals China’s intention to maintain stability in Myanmar and convince other international actors to accept the military junta.
Thomas Kean, a senior consultant at the International Crisis Group, said China’s goal is to stabilize Myanmar and protect its strategic interests. "I think China wants stability and a degree of normalization," Kean said. "China is pushing for a deal between the military and ethnic armed groups."
Civilian impact, international calls
The conflict has displaced millions, with the United Nations estimating that more than 2.3 million people have fled their homes since the coup. Bombings have targeted schools, hospitals, and residential areas with little regard for civilian lives, according to the U.N.
The international community has condemned Myanmar’s military for its atrocities. In a statement to the U.N. Human Rights Council, Nicholas Koumjian, head of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, said, "In many instances, civilians are not just collateral damage but the target of attacks, which appear intended to create terror."
Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Justice for Myanmar, have called on China to stop arms transfers to the junta.
5. U.S. Officials Race to Understand Severity of China’s Salt Typhoon Hacks
Pretty smart on China's part to go after wiretap capabilities.
Excerpts:
Among the concerns are that the hackers may have essentially been able to spy on the U.S. government’s efforts to surveil Chinese threats, including the FBI’s investigations.
...
While the law enforcement wiretaps chiefly concerns surveillance within the U.S. that can be used in court proceedings, FISA surveillance generally points beyond U.S. borders and is seen as the most vital intelligence tool available to American spy agencies. It couldn’t be determined if systems that support foreign intelligence surveillance were also vulnerable in the breach.
“If Chinese intelligence operatives were able to get access to the government’s foreign-intelligence surveillance systems, either with the ability to identify all or a significant portion of the targets under collection, it would be a counterintelligence failure of the highest order,” said Jamil Jaffer, a former White House national security official and executive director of the National Security Institute at the George Mason University’s Scalia Law School.
U.S. Officials Race to Understand Severity of China’s Salt Typhoon Hacks
In letters to AT&T, Verizon and Lumen, lawmakers ask about proposed measures the companies will take to protect U.S. wiretap systems
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-officials-race-to-understand-severity-of-chinas-salt-typhoon-hacks-6e7c3951?mod=latest_headlines
By Dustin Volz
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and Drew FitzGerald
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Oct. 11, 2024 5:30 am ET
Sen. Ron Wyden (D., Ore.) said the companies involved in the hack were responsible for their own cybersecurity failures but that ‘the government shares much of the blame.’ Photo: Will Oliver/Shutterstock
WASHINGTON—U.S. officials are racing to understand the full scope of a China-linked hack of major U.S. broadband providers, as concerns mount from members of Congress that the breach could amount to a devastating counterintelligence failure.
Federal authorities and cybersecurity investigators are probing the breaches of Verizon Communications, AT&T and Lumen Technologies. A stealthy hacking group known as Salt Typhoon tied to Chinese intelligence is believed to be responsible. The compromises may have allowed hackers to access information from systems the federal government uses for court-authorized network wiretapping requests, The Wall Street Journal reported last week.
Among the concerns are that the hackers may have essentially been able to spy on the U.S. government’s efforts to surveil Chinese threats, including the FBI’s investigations.
The House Select Committee on China sent letters Thursday asking the three companies to describe when they became aware of the breaches and what measures they are taking to protect their wiretap systems from attack.
Spokespeople for AT&T, Lumen and Verizon declined to comment on the attack. A spokesman at the Chinese Embassy in Washington has denied that Beijing is responsible for the alleged breaches.
Combined with other Chinese cyber threats, news of the Salt Typhoon assault makes clear that “we face a cyber-adversary the likes of which we have never confronted before,” Rep. John Moolenaar, the Republican chairman of the House Select Committee Committee on China, and Raja Krishnamoorthi, the panel’s top Democrat, said in the letters. “The implications of any breach of this nature would be difficult to overstate,” they said.
Cybersecurity investigators are probing the breaches of Verizon, AT&T and Lumen. Photo: Jeenah Moon/Bloomberg News
Hackers still had access to some parts of U.S. broadband networks within the last week, and more companies were being notified that their networks had been breached, people familiar with the matter said. Investigators remain in the dark about precisely what the hackers were seeking to do, according to people familiar with the response.
The breaches are considered by some investigators to be a possibly catastrophic security lapse that could have enabled China to spy on U.S. domestic wiretapping efforts, but others have cautioned that it is too soon to know the severity of the intrusions.
In separate letters also sent Thursday to the companies, Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R., Wash.), the chairwoman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and other lawmakers on Capitol Hill pressed for answers and requested briefings by the end of next week.
Sen. Ron Wyden, a Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee and a leading voice in Congress on cybersecurity issues, said in his own dispatch Friday to the Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission that the companies were responsible for their own cybersecurity failures but that “the government shares much of the blame.”
The agencies for decades ignored warnings about vulnerabilities in systems required to comply with law enforcement surveillance requests, Wyden wrote. His office separately asked the FCC for security and integrity plans submitted by AT&T, Verizon, and Lumen under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, the federal law that requires telecommunications firms to allow U.S. agencies access to data pursuant to a court order.
The alleged Salt Typhoon attack follows a string of recent telecom-security lapses. In July, AT&T revealed that a hacker had stolen call and text-message metadata covering nearly all of its cellular customers’ activity during a six-month span in 2022. The telecom giant said the breached system wasn’t used for any law enforcement purpose. It was also one of more than 100 customers of the software provider Snowflake attacked earlier this year.
After that hack, Wyden requested a briefing from the Justice Department concerning steps the department had taken to ensure AT&T was protecting the sensitive surveillance services it provides to the government. The DOJ ignored Wyden’s request, an aide to the senator said. A spokeswoman for the department said it was in touch with Wyden’s office.
The view of the Salt Typhoon hack in Washington has evolved since it was first disclosed publicly by the Journal two weeks ago, when many senior Biden administration officials—and the companies themselves in some cases—weren’t yet aware of the intrusions.
Last week, the president’s daily brief—a classified daily compendium of security threats and issues produced by the nation’s spy agencies for President Biden—included information about the hack, according to people familiar with the matter. Staff on the congressional intelligence committees have also been briefed on the intrusions.
A customer looks at smartphones in a Verizon store in New York. Photo: Victor J. Blue/Bloomberg News
The hack is one of several ongoing cyber campaigns linked to Beijing’s intelligence services that have stunned U.S. officials both in terms of their sophistication and audacious intent.
Other recent hacks tied to China have focused on maintaining quiet but persistent access to vital infrastructure ranging from airports to energy providers and water treatment systems.
In contrast, the Salt Typhoon compromise is being treated by the Biden administration as a more traditional cyber-espionage threat.
In recent years, the federal government, often in close coordination with private-sector partners such as Microsoft and others, has become increasingly comfortable disclosing and discussing foreign hacking operations as a means to spread awareness of the threats, promote fixes to software vulnerabilities, and to name and shame the attackers.
That hasn’t been the case this time. The number of people being read into the breaches has remained small in both the government and in companies responding to them because of concerns about leaks and the sensitive nature of the compromises, according to current and former U.S. officials.
It remains unclear whether other U.S. surveillance programs were targeted by the hackers. Former U.S. officials said that while a breach of the court-authorized wiretapping systems that are governed under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act would be extremely significant, a far more dire scenario would involve the compromise of systems used for foreign intelligence collection under a separate law known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA.
While the law enforcement wiretaps chiefly concerns surveillance within the U.S. that can be used in court proceedings, FISA surveillance generally points beyond U.S. borders and is seen as the most vital intelligence tool available to American spy agencies. It couldn’t be determined if systems that support foreign intelligence surveillance were also vulnerable in the breach.
“If Chinese intelligence operatives were able to get access to the government’s foreign-intelligence surveillance systems, either with the ability to identify all or a significant portion of the targets under collection, it would be a counterintelligence failure of the highest order,” said Jamil Jaffer, a former White House national security official and executive director of the National Security Institute at the George Mason University’s Scalia Law School.
Sarah Krouse and Aruna Viswanatha contributed to this article.
Write to Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com and Drew FitzGerald at andrew.fitzgerald@wsj.com
6. National Security Experts: Harris and Trump Both Fail to Inspire Confidence
Equal criticism of both on national security policy.
National Security Experts: Harris and Trump Both Fail to Inspire Confidence
A Dispatch symposium.
https://thedispatch.com/article/national-security-symposium-trump-harris-election/
By Dispatch Contributors
Published October 8, 2024 • Updated October 9, 2024
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Editor’s Note: Although partisans on both sides of the aisle have warned that the stakes of the upcoming presidential election could not be higher, the two campaigns themselves have been remarkably light on policy substance. With Election Day now less than a month away, we reached out to dozens of thinkers, writers, and analysts we trust with a simple question: What are your biggest policy concerns about a potential Trump or Harris administration? We will be publishing their responses—broken up thematically—in the coming days and weeks.
Today’s entry features experts in the national security and foreign policy realm. The world is in a precarious position, with major wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East. The United States’ adversaries—Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea—are growing closer to one another. That instability will present a daunting challenge to whichever candidate wins the election in November. Is either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump up to the challenge? Our foreign policy and national security experts highlight how, for disparate reasons, neither candidate inspires much confidence.
A bleak outlook for Ukraine.
Regrettably, I don’t see many positive outcomes for Ukraine after November, whether under a Trump or Harris administration. Former President Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed he could quickly end the conflict but has yet to offer even a basic outline of how he would achieve this. The worst-case scenario for Ukraine under a Trump administration would be a cessation of U.S. military and economic support, forcing the Ukrainians to unwillingly cede territory to Russia in exchange for a dubious ceasefire agreement. Given Russia’s track record of dishonoring such agreements, it is highly likely that after a period of relative calm, the Kremlin would resume its aggression, leaving Ukraine in an even more precarious position.
A Harris administration, meanwhile, would likely continue the same indecisive “muddle along” approach pursued by the Biden White House. While President Joe Biden deserves credit for arming Ukraine early, his major decisions on critical weapons systems since then—such as Patriot missiles, HIMARS, Abrams tanks, and F-16s— have all come months too late to make the necessary impact on the battlefield. My concern is that a Harris administration would continue this policy of arming Ukraine to survive, but not to win—prolonging not only the war but also the suffering.
Neither Trump nor Harris seems to fully grasp the historical significance of this moment. The 2024 Republican platform does not mention Ukraine once. Running a total of 42,000 words, the Democratic Platform is only slightly better with an uninspiring section promising continued support for Ukraine running 96 words long.* This is hardly the inspiring stuff that will shape world events.
The outcome of the war in Ukraine will define the security of Europe—which one should remember is America’s largest export market and source of foreign direct investment—for a generation. If either candidate understands this, they have not shown it on the campaign trail. Trump knows supporting Ukraine is unpopular with his base, and Harris has shown no inclination to deviate from Biden’s minimalistic approach. Unfortunately, looking at it objectively, the next four years look bleak for Ukraine.
—Luke Coffey, senior fellow at Hudson Institute with a focus on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations
Trump’s undercutting of allies can embolden adversaries.
Former President Donald Trump’s repeated praise for North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, China’s Xi Jinping, and Russia’s Vladimir Putin is a national embarrassment. But his undercutting of American security commitments to allies in these men’s sights is downright dangerous: It tempts aggression and endangers peace.
Trump asks, “Why would we defend” South Korea as “they’re a very wealthy country.” Trump questions the implicit U.S. promise to defend Taiwan, stating, “Taiwan should pay us for defense” as “we’re no different than an insurance company,” while asking, “How stupid are we? They took all of our chip business.” He questions America’s formal obligation to defend Japan, stating, “We’ll have to change” that defense agreement because it’s “unfair.” Trump won’t protect NATO allies not spending enough on defense; rather, he’ll “encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to them.
There are ways to restrain a president who steps in the wrong direction as commander in chief. Congress can withdraw funds from ill-conceived operations; the military must disobey illegal orders. But no one can force a president to go to war. Courts won’t entertain so-called “political questions”: They won’t order a president to defend an ally, as courts cannot enforce such an injunction. Congress might impeach and remove a president if it considered failure to fulfill a treaty obligation to be a “high crime” within the meaning of the Constitution. After the Senate failed to convict Trump for his role in the January 6 assault on the Capitol, though, impeachment appears to be a dead letter.
A North Korean invasion of South Korea, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, an adversary’s attack on Japan, or a Russian invasion of a NATO ally that failed to draw a U.S. military response would mark the end of America as a superpower. Washington’s security guarantees mostly kept the peace since 1945; indeed it’s when the U.S. is not clear about her willingness to defend an ally that trouble follows, as in Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990. Yet Trump actively casts doubt on his intent to honor American promises, which could easily embolden Kim, Xi, and/or Putin, causing devastating conflicts even if the U.S. sought to remain on the sidelines as at the outset of past world wars.
—Kevin Carroll, former senior counsel to Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly
Complacency or dysfunction: The two candidates present different risks.
There are reasonable concerns to be had about the foreign policies of both prospective Harris and Trump administrations. Yet, that does not make them equivalent nor does it obviate the dramatic downside risks that Trump’s testing of our constitutional order represents.
In Vice President Harris’ case, the widely shared expectation of policy continuity with the Biden administration is itself worrying. In my judgment the current confluence of crises in different regions of the world is a result of U.S. policy choices over successive administrations—including prominently by the present one.
The gradual hollowing out of our defense budget, the failure to enforce President Barack Obama’s red line in Syria, the tepid response to the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the commendable but too sluggish assistance to Ukraine since 2022 have all chipped away at our ability to deter our adversaries and have emboldened China, Russia, Iran, and others to test the limits of our willingness to stand by our commitments.
Nothing that Harris has said or done inspires confidence that her presidency would break with the complacency that has placed the United States and its allies on a path of managed decline and rising geopolitical instability. Perhaps such a shift will be dictated by events. Yet, the intellectual capital needed to respond to those events effectively might not be there.
The prospect of a Trump presidency is no less reassuring—quite the contrary. Trump’s mercurial nature and his zeal to fight the “deep state” to protect himself from criminal prosecutions are bound to bring dysfunction to Washington, dramatically increasing uncertainty.
If “personnel is policy,” then Americans, our allies, and our adversaries are all in the dark about America’s future behavior on the global stage: The range of personalities occupying positions of influence within the next administration will likely vary from the likes of Robert O’Brien to J.D. Vance. It is anybody’s guess to whom Trump will listen on any given day. In the past, we have watched him go from issuing nuclear threats against dictators to fawning over their love letters. In addition, a possible constitutional crisis and a soft spot for some of the worst autocrats on the global stage make Trump’s return to the White House a singularly perilous path toward restoring America’s leadership in the world.
—Dalibor Rohac, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute studying European political and economic trends
America’s turn toward isolationism is undeniable—and bipartisan.
It’s tempting to make sweeping, existential statements about the perils to American democracy posed by both candidates: Trump will end our republic as we know it; Kamala will use a Democratic majority to bring new states into the union, expand the Supreme Court, and install an effective permanent Democratic dictatorship. Both seem apocalyptic and unlikely to be true, at least not for as long as the GOP controls the Senate. Rather, the future we should fear is a continuation and expansion of the present, a growing economic, political, and strategic isolationism supported by both parties. The Democrats’ performative internationalism—NATO! The G7!—is hollow, under-resourced, and unserious. Although the poohbahs of the GOP would be loath to admit it, their attention to the brie and chardonnay international circuit is actually similarly motivated.
Both sides see international alliances not as intrinsic goods, but as a means for the United States to do less. Harris would like to go to the parties and pretend everyone is doing something so Washington can turn to other pressing matters; Trump would like to shun the internationalist confabs and assert, more correctly than not, that everyone is doing too little, so why should Washington do more. Either way, both parties have an unspoken consensus around the idea that America should do less, others should do more, that free trade is a relic of the past, and that while we should all focus on China, we should not spend what is necessary on defense to make that focus meaningful.
The truth of bipartisan America’s inward turn is undeniable. And unfortunately, the world’s rogues have cottoned on. The stars of 1930s-style ideological and territorial revanchism in the 21st century may be Russia, China, and Iran, but there are plenty of others eager to play their part in overturning the global order that has served to make America and Americans the world’s richest and most powerful. The vagaries of Chaplinesque dictators like Kim Jong Un are all good and fun until they use or share their nuclear weapons. So while J.D. Vance rails against the evil warmongers and Kamala seeks to replicate the drivers of the Great Depression, our enemies advance. Four years is a long time for them to have a free hand.
—Danielle Pletka, distinguished senior fellow in foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute
Bipartisan risk aversion on Iran only makes conflict more likely.
My primary concern is the absence of any serious bipartisan discussion or strategy to counter Iran. After the collapse of the JCPOA revival negotiations in 2022, there has been a policy drift on Iran—both on nuclear and non-nuclear matters. The Biden administration and Congress had an opportunity over the last three years to establish a bipartisan structure—akin to the committees empaneled for China policy—to develop a consensus on the acceptable contours of an Iran strategy. Despite the significant threats the Islamic Republic poses to the interests of the United States and its allies, this unfortunately has not been a priority.
To date, in the presidential campaign, there has been no public discussion from any candidate as to how they plan to handle the expiration of the snapback sanctions mechanism in October 2025 under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. If allowed to lapse, this would conclude consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue at the U.N. Security Council and terminate all previous restrictions on Tehran. It’s still on the books, despite the death of the 2015 agreement, and the clock is ticking. That is just months after the new president will take office in January 2025.
There needs to be a bipartisan recognition that U.S. deterrence against Iran has been dangerously eroded. U.S. responses to Iranian aggression have been inconsistent across administrations and have not kinetically targeted the source of the threats: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its assets in Iran. The supreme leader exploits this U.S. risk aversion and self-deterrence. U.S. restraint, in contrast, makes war more likely, especially when Iran is challenging the U.S. on its own soil via assassination plots and America is not responding on Iranian soil.
There also needs to be greater recognition that nuclear diplomacy with the Islamic Republic is likely to never be durable because the current leadership in Iran will view it as the ceiling and not the floor of engagement with the West, but Western policymakers will view it as the floor and not the ceiling of their concerns with Tehran. This necessitates a long-term policy based on deterrence—economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, and the development of a credible military threat. Iran can be deterred, even without a nuclear agreement.
—Jason M. Brodsky, policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran
Trump is a threat to the constitutional order.
My top concern about the Harris administration is that, because of her lack of expertise on defense issues, she won’t commit the resources needed to quickly build up our forces to deter the converging axis of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
I am, however, much more concerned about a Trump administration. Donald Trump and his supporters are a danger to constitutional governance in America.
One specific scenario I worry about is President Trump, enabled by an enfeebled Congress and more ruthlessly competent advisers, to issue legal orders for the military to engage in violent suppression of domestic protest or to execute arrest warrants for the president’s political opponents. The president has unchecked constitutional authority to declare an insurrection is occurring and deploy our military forces to use violence against their fellow Americans. Trump wanted to do it in 2020, and he’s threatening it now.
It’s a myth that the U.S. military can refuse to carry out immoral orders; they do not get to make that judgment, they can only resign. And Trump has been working to discredit the military’s leadership, most of whom would resign rather than carry out such an order … but at some point he’d find willing accomplices, and it would destroy the relationship between our military and the American public.
—Kori Schake, senior fellow and director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute
Correction, October 9, 2024: Luke Coffey’s contribution to this symposium originally referenced the Democrats’ 2020 platform on Ukraine rather than the party’s 2024 platform.
7. Clashes on South China Sea, Ukraine dominate Asia summit
Clashes on South China Sea, Ukraine dominate Asia summit
https://sg.news.yahoo.com/asian-leaders-meet-laos-us-210349483.html
Shaun TANDON
Fri, 11 October 2024 at 4:35 am GMT-4·4-min read
Leaders meet for an ASEAN Plus Three Summit in Vientiane, Laos (NHAC NGUYEN) (NHAC NGUYEN/AFP/AFP)
The United States and its allies clashed on Friday with Russia and China at a summit in Laos dominated by disputes on maritime claims and Ukraine.
World leaders descended on the normally tranquil, temple-lined streets of the Laotian capital Vientiane, which marked a rare occasion bringing together the top US and Russian diplomats.
The East Asia Summit came on the heels of meetings of the ASEAN bloc, where the Philippines has led the charge in criticising Beijing's actions in the hotly disputed South China Sea.
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, meeting ASEAN leaders before the full summit, reiterated calls for freedom of navigation in the bustling waterway.
"We remain concerned about China's increasingly dangerous and unlawful actions on the South and East China Seas, which have injured people, harmed vessels from ASEAN nations and contradict commitments to peaceful resolution of disputes," Blinken said.
China has deployed military and coast guard vessels in recent months in a bid to eject the Philippines from a trio of strategically important reefs and islands in the South China Sea.
It has also been ratcheting up pressure over a disputed island group controlled by Japan in the East China Sea, rattling Tokyo and its allies.
Blinken also warned China over Taiwan, where the new leader delivered an annual speech in which he vowed that the self-governing democracy would resist annexation.
"China should not use it in any fashion as a pretext for provocative actions," Blinken told reporters.
- US, Russia hostility -
Despite disagreements, tensions over the past year have markedly eased between China and the United States, with President Joe Biden supporting dialogue to reduce the potential for conflict.
Biden and his political heir Vice President Kamala Harris, who both skipped the summit ahead of elections, have taken a different approach to Russia, believing Moscow's diplomatic overtures are insincere.
Blinken and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov were spaced apart by the leaders of South Korea and India at the summit. Blinken said he did not speak to Lavrov but that neither walked out when the other addressed the summit.
"I think it's safe to say that we heard each other. I didn't hear anything new, unfortunately, about the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine," Blinken said.
Lavrov told reporters that the United States was "destructive" in Asia.
He also attacked the "militarisation" of Japan, where security-minded new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has in the past called for a NATO-style Asian pact with an unstated goal of deterring China.
"The Japanese are obviously being pushed to such a course by the United States," Lavrov charged.
Japan's foreign ministry said that Ishiba, on his first foreign trip since taking over, reiterated "serious concerns" about the "intensification of Chinese military activities in areas surrounding Japan" in a meeting with Premier Li Qiang.
Li made a veiled swipe at Ishiba during an ASEAN-related meeting on Thursday, warning of the danger of "attempts to introduce bloc confrontation and geopolitical conflicts into Asia".
In an interview with AFP at the summit, EU chief Charles Michel called for disputes to be resolved "through peaceful means" in the South China Sea.
- Push for Myanmar diplomacy -
The summit saw participation for the first time in more than three years by military-run Myanmar, which has brushed aside a 2021 ASEAN plan after its coup that calls for dialogue and an immediate end to violence.
ASEAN leaders in a statement voiced "deep concern" over Myanmar's path and stood by the plan, known as the Five-Point Consensus.
The United States, while supporting ASEAN diplomacy, has urged no let-up in pressure against the junta until it shows signs of progress.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has engaged the junta in the neighbouring country, voiced support for the restoration of democracy but said: "We believe that Myanmar should be engaged rather than isolated in this process."
Modi, who was seen speaking warmly with Blinken, has annoyed Washington by refusing to back Western sanctions on Russia, India's Cold War partner.
India, by contrast, has a border dispute with China and Modi at the summit voiced firm support for open navigation in the South China Sea.
sct/pdw/lb
8. The drownings of 2 Navy SEALs were preventable, military investigation finds
It is always so painful to read these accounts.
Excerpts:
“The entire tragic event elapsed in just 47 seconds and two NSW warriors were lost to the sea,” DeVore wrote, referring to Naval Special Warfare Command.
Flotation equipment that was properly maintained, working well and used correctly would have been able to keep them afloat until they were rescued, the report said. Other team members told investigators that while they knew the importance of their tactical flotation system — which includes two inflatable floats that attach to a belt and foam inserts that can be added — few had ever operated one in training and there is little instruction on how to wear it.
The report said the team was operating in 6- to 8-foot seas, and while the vessel they were boarding was rolling in the waves, the conditions were well within their abilities.
The drownings of 2 Navy SEALs were preventable, military investigation finds
AP · October 11, 2024
WASHINGTON (AP) — Two U.S. Navy SEALs drowned as they tried to climb aboard a ship carrying illicit Iranian-made weapons to Yemen because of glaring training failures and a lack of understanding about what to do after falling into deep, turbulent waters, according to a military investigation into the January deaths.
The review concluded that the drownings of Chief Special Warfare Operator Christopher J. Chambers and Navy Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Nathan Gage Ingram could have been prevented. But both sank quickly in the high seas off the coast of Somalia, weighed down by heavy equipment they were carrying and not knowing or disregarding concerns that their flotation devices could not compensate for the additional weight. Both were lost at sea.
The highly critical and heavily redacted report — written by a Navy officer from outside Naval Special Warfare Command, which oversees the SEALs — concluded there were “deficiencies, gaps and inconsistencies” in training, policies, tactics and procedures as well as “conflicting guidance” on when and how to use emergency flotation devices and extra buoyancy material that could have kept them alive.
The Associated Press obtained the report upon request before its public release.
The mission’s goal was to intercept weapons headed to the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, who have been launching missile and drone attacks against commercial and U.S. Navy ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza began a year ago. U.S. retaliatory strikes have so far not deterred their assaults.
Mission gone wrong
Chambers and Ingram, members of SEAL Team 3, died during a nighttime mission to board an unflagged ship in the Arabian Sea. Their names were redacted in the report, but officials have confirmed Chambers slipped and fell as he was climbing onto the ship’s deck and Ingram jumped in to try to save him.
“Encumbered by the weight of each individual’s gear, neither their physical capability nor emergency supplemental flotations devices, if activated, were sufficient to keep them at the surface,” Rear Adm. Michael DeVore wrote in the report.
The report said Chambers was “intermittently” at the surface for 26 seconds after his fall and Ingram was at the surface for about 32 seconds.
“The entire tragic event elapsed in just 47 seconds and two NSW warriors were lost to the sea,” DeVore wrote, referring to Naval Special Warfare Command.
Flotation equipment that was properly maintained, working well and used correctly would have been able to keep them afloat until they were rescued, the report said. Other team members told investigators that while they knew the importance of their tactical flotation system — which includes two inflatable floats that attach to a belt and foam inserts that can be added — few had ever operated one in training and there is little instruction on how to wear it.
The report said the team was operating in 6- to 8-foot seas, and while the vessel they were boarding was rolling in the waves, the conditions were well within their abilities.
As time went on, however, the rolling increased, and Chambers tried to board by jumping from his combat craft’s engine compartment to the top rail of the ship they were boarding, the report said. Some of the commandos used an attachable ladder, but because of the waves, others jumped to the top rail, which they said was within reach but slippery.
Chambers’ hands slipped off the rail, and he fell 9 feet into the water. Based on video of the mission, he was able to grab the lower rung of the ladder, but when he turned to try to get back to the combat craft, he was swept under by a wave.
Eleven seconds after he fell, Ingram jumped in. For at least 10 seconds, video shows they were above water intermittently and at times were able to grab a ladder extension that was submerged. But both were knocked about by waves. The last sighting of Chambers was about 26 seconds after he fell.
At one point, Ingram tried to climb back on the ladder but was overcome by a wave. He appeared to try to deploy his flotation device, but within two seconds, an unattached water wing was seen about a foot away from him. He also seemed to try to remove some of his equipment, but he slipped underwater and was not seen again. The sea depth was about 12,000 feet.
‘Shock and disbelief’
Both were wearing body armor, and Ingram also was carrying radio equipment that added as much as 40 more pounds. Each of the inflatable floats can lift a minimum of 40 pounds in seawater, the report said.
It said members of the SEAL team expressed “shock and disbelief” that Chambers, their strongest swimmer, could not stay at the surface. The report concluded that the conflicting and meager guidance on the flotation devices may have left it to individuals to configure their buoyancy needs, potentially leading to mistakes.
While SEALs routinely conduct pre-mission “buddy checks” to review each other’s gear, it said Ingram’s flotation equipment may have been incorrectly attached and a more thorough buddy exam could have discovered that.
SEAL team members also told investigators that adding the foam inserts makes the flotation device more bulky and it becomes more difficult to climb or crawl.
The report said SEAL Team 3 members began prompt and appropriate man-overboard procedures “within seconds,” and there were two helicopters and two drones overhead providing surveillance, light and video for the mission.
After 10 days, the search was called off because of the water depth and low probability of finding the two.
“The Navy respects the sanctity of human remains and recognized the sea as a fit and final resting place,” the report said.
Chambers, 37, of Maryland, enlisted in the Navy in 2012 and graduated from SEAL training in 2014. Ingram, 27, of Texas, enlisted in 2019 and graduated from SEAL training in 2021.
Changes to training
In response to the investigation, Naval Special Warfare Command said changes are already being made to training and guidance. It said the command is considering developing a force-wide policy to address water safety during maritime operations and is setting standard procedures for buoyancy requirements.
Other changes would refine man-overboard procedures, pre-mission checks and maintenance of flotation devices. It also said it’s looking into “fail safe” buoyancy equipment and plans to review safety processes.
Rear Adm. Keith Davids, who headed the command at the time of the mission, said it would learn from the tragic deaths and “doggedly pursue” recommended changes. Davids left the job in August in a routine change of command and is in the process of retiring.
The report recommends that Ingram receive a commendation for heroism for giving his life while trying to save his teammate. That recommendation is under review. Both were posthumously promoted one rank.
According to a separate Defense Intelligence Agency report, the Jan. 11 mission seized Iranian “propulsion, guidance systems and warheads” for medium-range ballistic missiles and antiship cruise missiles destined for the Houthis.
AP · October 11, 2024
9. The US Navy is burning through missiles in the Middle East that it would need in a war with China
What is our defense industrial base doing about this? Have we not had a wake up call?
The US Navy is burning through missiles in the Middle East that it would need in a war with China
Business Insider · by Jake Epstein, Chris Panella
Military & Defense
2024-10-11T08:00:01Z
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An SM-3 is launched from the USS Lake Erie during a test. US Navy photo
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- The US Navy has been burning through interceptors fighting in Middle East conflicts, including the valuable SM-3.
- This interceptor and others would be crucial in a potential war with China.
- But America isn't replacing the interceptors it's expending fast enough.
US Navy warships have twice been called upon to defend Israel from massive Iranian ballistic missile attacks and have used SM-3 interceptors to defeat the incoming threats.
The Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), a key air-defense interceptor made by RTX and, for some variants, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, was first used in combat in April to shield Israel from an unprecedented attack, and then it saw combat again in October when Iran attacked a second time. The weapons, which can cost between $10 million and almost $30 million depending on the variant, were fired by American destroyers in the area.
Navy leadership has said that it needs many more SM-3s to counter threats in the Pacific, like China, but it's burning through these weapons in conflicts in the Middle East without sufficient plans to replace them.
Archer Macy, a retired Navy admiral, told Business Insider that the SM-3 is particularly important in a fight with China because the interceptor is designed to counter China's "apparent preference for long-range theater weapons."
A key missile interceptor
The SM-3 is an element of the Navy's highly advanced Aegis Combat System. It uses a kinetic kill vehicle to hit and destroy short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their mid-course phase of flight.
US Navy photo
Unlike other air defenses on American warships, the SM-3 can make exo-atmospheric intercepts, meaning it can eliminate targets in space.
The SM-3 has been tested dozens of times over the past two decades, but it first saw combat on April 13, when Navy warships used the interceptor to defend Israel from an Iranian attack involving a mix of over 300 missiles and drones. Then, less than six months later, on October 1, the SM-3 made its second known appearance in combat when Navy warships again defended Israel, this time from more than 180 Iranian ballistic missiles.
The use of valuable SM-3s against Iranian missile attacks, which experts say are but a fraction of what the US might face in a war with China, has raised concerns among analysts that the US is not producing sufficient numbers of the weapons to ensure readiness for a potential great-power conflict.
"We are far below rates of production to support a high-end conflict," Bryan McGrath, a retired naval officer and the managing director of The FerryBridge Group LLC, told BI, explaining that interceptor missiles, like the SM-3, "play a key role" in protecting and sustaining US seapower in a war with China.
But it's not just the SM-3 that the Navy is using up battling foes in the Middle East.
Photo by US Navy via Getty Images
For nearly a year, American warships have been shooting down missiles and drones launched by the Houthis, an Iranian proxy group in Yemen that's been attacking merchant shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
During the Navy's counter-Houthi campaign, American warships have expended other interceptors in the Standard Missile family, like the SM-2 and SM-6 — both of which would still be needed in great quantities for a major war in the Pacific.
"The closer you get to China, or to any threat country, your ranges become shorter," said Macy, a non-resident senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Missile Defense Project.
In a short-range engagement, China's missiles wouldn't need to travel as high, and they would likely have shorter flight times and travel at slower speeds. In that situation, the Navy probably wouldn't need to rely on its SM-3s to counter this threat because an SM-2 or SM-6 would potentially do the trick. That means the Navy cannot afford to come up short on these, either.
Related stories
'Burning through' SM-3s
After the SM-3 made its combat debut in April, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro told lawmakers that the sea service needs more of this interceptor to counter potential future threats in the Pacific, like China, which the Pentagon has identified as its "pacing challenge."
US Navy photo
"I truly believe that the SM-3s will be needed in greater numbers in the future, given the operations that took place in defense of Israel," Del Toro said at the time. "Recently, some were fired. And very effectively. So I think given the future threat and our deterrence mission of the Indo-Pacific, we are going to need more SM-3s in the future."
The Fiscal Year 2025 defense budget proposal doesn't reflect that urgency though. According to unclassified Pentagon budget documents, the US will only produce 12 SM-3 Block IIA annually over the next five years, half of what was procured in FY2023 and a drop from previous years.
"It is a huge concern that we are burning through SM-3s as fast as we are," Jim Fein, a research assistant for national security and European affairs at The Heritage Foundation, said. He said that the Standard Missile series is "essential" for intercepting missiles launched by China's massive rocket force to protect American assets such as warships and aircraft carriers.
"We don't know exactly how many were used in repelling Iran's attacks, but the fact of the matter is we are buying less than 20 per year and need thousands in case of a high-intensity conflict, like with China," Fein said. "Each expenditure really matters, even disregarding the cost."
"We don't have anywhere enough SM-series missiles," Fein said, explaining that the US is buying 125 SM-6s per year. And the number of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, long-range cruise missiles designed by RTX, being produced has decreased annually as well.
Photo by API/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images
Tomahawks, which aren't interceptors but rather long-range strike options that both surface warships and submarines can launch, have also been identified as useful weapons the Navy would need in a potential war with China.
After Iran's attack earlier this month, US Sen. Roger Wicker, the Republican ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the US "expended numerous SM-3 Block IIA missiles defending Israel" and called on Congress to expand production.
Wicker also noted that Congress was "poised" to reject the Biden administration's proposal to cancel the SM-3 Block IB production line.
Alternatives to the more expensive interceptors
While the US isn't meeting the current demand for air-defense interceptors or what it may need in a fight with China, Bryan Clark, a former Navy officer and defense expert at the Hudson Institute, explained that there are alternatives to supplement those more expensive options being considered.
US Navy photo by Lt. Laura Radspinner/Released
Clark told BI that the biggest problems facing SM-series procurement are how expensive the missiles are — SM-6s and SM-2s run for $4 million and $2 million, respectively — and supply chain issues.
Since the designs of these missiles are finalized and tend to rely on very specific technologies, "they tend to rely on a generation of microelectronics that probably precedes what the current generation is," Clark said, "and that means those microelectronics tend to be fairly specialized and bespoke," effectively meaning they need to be "tailor-made" for these weapons.
Reinvesting in adapting those designs to incorporate new technologies takes time and money and means the weapon has to be re-qualified.
Clark said that the most significant movement will be "the transition from relying on these bespoke, highly integrated, highly sophisticated weapons" toward lower-cost options, such as unmanned systems or much cheaper missiles, that can be produced at scale.
That development would give US forces, in a fight with China, for example, a variety of air-defense options and reserve the high-value interceptors for when they need them most.
Defense China Iran
Business Insider · by Jake Epstein, Chris Panella
10. Douglas Murray: A Time of War
"drunk on peace?"
Excerpt:
No one I know understands the moral urgency of this moment better than Douglas Murray. Douglas isn’t Jewish. He has no Israeli family members, although I know a lot of Israeli families who consider him an adoptive family member. And it is Douglas, more than almost anyone in the world, who has articulated the stakes of this war with the moral clarity it requires.
Douglas’s work as a reporter has taken him to Iraq, North Korea, northern Nigeria, Ukraine, and most recently, of course, to Israel, where he has become a celebrity. When you walk down the streets of Tel Aviv with Douglas Murray, it’s like being with The Beatles. He’s also the best-selling author of seven books, a regular contributor at the New York Post, National Review, and most importantly, at The Free Press, where he writes the beloved Sunday column, Things Worth Remembering. There is just no one I would rather be sitting with as we watch the Middle East and, really, the world transformed before our eyes.
Douglas Murray: A Time of War
The West is ‘drunk on peace.’ What will it take to wake them up?
https://www.thefp.com/p/douglas-murray-a-time-of-war
By Bari Weiss
October 3, 2024
When we planned this episode of Honestly, I thought we would be looking back at the past year from a slightly quieter vantage point. We were going to release it on October 7. But quiet is the last thing happening in the Middle East right now. The war that Iran outsourced to its proxies since October 7, 2023 has now become a war explicitly between Iran and Israel.
Hours before I sat down with Douglas Murray in New York City, Iran launched over 100 ballistic missiles toward Israel. As Israel’s 9 million citizens huddled in bomb shelters, a handful of them made a direct impact. For a lot of Americans, it still feels like a faraway war. But it is not.
There are not many bright lines that divide good and evil. This is one of them. This is a war between Israel and Iran. But it’s also a war between civilization and barbarism. That was true some 360 days ago. And it’s even more true today. And yet this testing moment has been met with alarming moral confusion.
Consider a few examples from the last week. At the United Nations, 12 countries, including the U.S., presented a plan for a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon without mentioning the word Hezbollah. Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib tweeted, “Our country is funding this bloodbath,” minutes after Israel assassinated the leader of the most fearsome terrorist army on the planet, Hassan Nasrallah, who, The New York Times described as “beloved,” “a towering figure” and “a powerful orator.” Here in New York, students chanted for an intifada moments after the Jewish community memorialized six civilian hostages murdered by Hamas. At Yale this week, students chanted, “From Gaza to Beirut, all martyrs we salute.” That’s just a few examples from the past week.
No one I know understands the moral urgency of this moment better than Douglas Murray. Douglas isn’t Jewish. He has no Israeli family members, although I know a lot of Israeli families who consider him an adoptive family member. And it is Douglas, more than almost anyone in the world, who has articulated the stakes of this war with the moral clarity it requires.
Douglas’s work as a reporter has taken him to Iraq, North Korea, northern Nigeria, Ukraine, and most recently, of course, to Israel, where he has become a celebrity. When you walk down the streets of Tel Aviv with Douglas Murray, it’s like being with The Beatles. He’s also the best-selling author of seven books, a regular contributor at the New York Post, National Review, and most importantly, at The Free Press, where he writes the beloved Sunday column, Things Worth Remembering. There is just no one I would rather be sitting with as we watch the Middle East and, really, the world transformed before our eyes.
To watch the Honestly episode with Bari and Douglas, click here:
Click below to listen to our conversation or scroll down for an edited transcript:
On what brought us to this moment. And what’s next after Iran’s missile attack on Israel:
Bari Weiss: We are speaking on the eve of what some people are saying feels like the beginning of World War III. And I guess the first question I want to ask you is, how did we get here? How did we get to a moment where Iran is dropping 100 ballistic missiles on Israel? And, you know, Israel is vowing to respond to it. What are the factors that led us to this moment?
Douglas Murray: Probably with the plane that took off in 1979 from Paris, taking the Ayatollah Khomeini to Tehran[, Iran]. This is one of the worst journeys of the twentieth century. All of this starts from there.
Iran had the opportunity to be a progressive country in the region. In the 1970s, Israel had an ambassador in Iran. There was the opportunity for normalization. But the revolutionary Islamic government in Tehran chose a different path. It’s an apocalyptic terror movement. The revolutionary Islamic government decided to oppress the people it presumes to govern and try to expand itself across the region. And my worry early in the period after October 7th was always that Hamas would take up all of the energy and that Israel wouldn’t be allowed, as it were, to do what else needed to be done. But as it happens, as we come to the first anniversary, the tide has turned. And the Israeli government and the Israeli armed forces and military have shown that there was a price to pay for trying to eradicate the Jewish people. And the price is high, and it should always have been high, and it will probably get higher.
Hamas is almost completely destroyed. Its cowardly leader, Yahya Sinwar, is hiding in the tunnels somewhere in the south of Gaza surrounded by what he would regard as the best hostages. That’s his end. In less than two weeks, Hezbollah has been utterly destroyed. Three thousand of his operatives, they couldn’t trust their cell phones, decided to go to old-fashioned pager devices. But someone we don’t know put explosives in all of those pager devices. And so 3,000 of their operatives in one moment across Lebanon and Syria all suffered grievous injury. The next day, their walkie-talkies blew up. By day three, they couldn’t trust putting on a kettle in Beirut. Then, best of all, when Benjamin Netanyahu came to New York last week, he went onstage to the UN. I watched from the gallery as the traditional walk out of various despots and dictators and their minions occurred. Somewhere in Beirut, Hassan Nasrallah was watching Benjamin Netanyahu on television, and that’s when Hassan Nasrallah went to meet his maker.
BW: It’s like the baptism scene from The Godfather.
DM: I was told by a Jewish friend the other day that apparently there is something in the Torah that says one should not take enormous delight in the decimation of one’s foes. But I’m not Jewish, and so I don’t have to follow this.
Hassan Nasrallah and the other people who have also gone to the dust, have not just spent recent decades killing Israelis, kidnapping them from the border regions, firing rockets at people and communities across the north of Israel. They killed 241 Americans at the Marine barracks in 1983, and they got away with it. They got away with it. They killed French soldiers. They killed many other foreign nationals. They got away with it. Not anymore.
Hezbollah built up their rocket arsenal, and most of that has been destroyed in recent days. So that’s Iran’s proxy to the north. The Houthis in Yemen, everyone’s favorite new terrorists recently discovered by morons on American campuses—they’re not doing too well either. The mullahs in Tehran no longer have active proxies able to try to destroy the Jewish state. They’ve gone in Gaza. They’ve gone in Lebanon. They’re going in Yemen. So now, it’s the mullahs versus Israel.
BW: So what happens next? You’re deeply sourced in Israel. What do you think the next few weeks look like?
DM: I would just say it seems obvious that if Tehran is going to fire ballistic missiles at Israel, Israel has to be allowed to reply in kind. As Golda Meir famously said, “We can’t afford to lose once.” The mullahs have made their choice. Is it possible they could be punished in a way that would topple the regime? Maybe. I don’t know if Israel can do that alone or if America needs to do it with them.
On winning the peace and why de-escalation isn’t the answer:
BW: We now know from Financial Times reporting over the past few days that Israel, in the days after October 7th, believed it had a way to get Nasrallah, and the Americans stopped them. And the theme that emerges for me is they seem not to view Islamic totalitarianism as the enemy, but escalation itself.
DM: Yes. And the problem is that when you need to win a war, you need to escalate. Absolutely. You need to escalate. Of course, the whole thing is always about de-escalation, always de-escalation. This is just madness—people, governments drunk on peace, thinking that peace is the only thing that should ever happen. And we don’t need to go back to Ecclesiastes to know this, but there is a season and a list. The list includes a time of war and a time of peace. This is a time of war. It was a war started by the mullahs in Tehran when they decided to send their barbarians into Israel on October 7th to rape and burn and murder. They chose the war. The Israelis want a time of peace. Most people in the region want a time of peace. But in order to get to peace, you have to get to victory in war.
BW: I want to quote something from the BBC today. Shortly after Iran launched these ballistic missiles against Israel, one of its commentators said this (and I promise you it is not satire), “The international community has to make sure that whatever Israel does is not upending the regional order as we know it. We’ve been in this for 12 months now of constant red lines being crossed mostly by the Israelis. Hezbollah and Iran have played it fairly rationally, trying to always be cautious in how they respond.”
DM: By the way, this moron is a teacher at King’s College in London. He worked for four years for the Qatari government. He was in the pay of the Qatari government. He now teaches at King’s College London, which is funded by the Qataris. Why the British Broadcasting Corporation should be inviting on people who are in the pay of Qatar, which is the mini terrorist state to Iran’s great terror state in the region, I don’t know. But that’s why you get moronic commentary like that.
We have to ask ourselves in all these institutions, how do you end up with one of these Qatari stooges, who works at a Qatar-funded institution in London, giving his Qatari propaganda for a terrorist state on the British Broadcasting Corporation? It’s rot all the way down. Rot in the media supported by rotted institutions of rotten states like Qatar.
On why conservatives back Israel but have soured on Ukraine:
BW: I want to ask you a question about Ukraine. I think it’s now become the consensus in large portions of the American right that we should support Israel’s war. But Ukraine—let’s give up on those guys—to be very crude about it. I would say Israel has become almost a conservative cause, and Ukraine has become a liberal cause. And I find this quite strange, because the way I see it, these two conflicts are profoundly and deeply linked. But many of your fellow conservatives no longer see it that way. What are they seeing?
DM: Well, of course, Ukraine is obvious. It’s a rather basic lesson from the twentieth century that you shouldn’t be allowed to roll tanks into other countries with impunity. And also, it’s never quite a good idea to start redrawing the borders of the outskirts of Europe because you can open up an awful lot of old enmities that way. There’s quite a lot of trouble in that part of the world.
BW: But tell that to J.D. Vance or Donald Trump.
DM: Well, I think they get that. I think they get that. I think the problem that’s happened with the right on Ukraine is, well, you’re right. It’s become a sort of left-wing shibboleth. You know, the people who’ve never been there.
BW: The same people that put up the black square on social media in 2020, and then put the pronouns in their bio, then put up the Ukraine flag.
DM: Which is all true. And I mean there are a lot of irritating people out there. But just because people are irritating does not mean that you can form your foreign policy in opposition to irritating people. The thing that has changed on the right with Ukraine, as I see it, is that after the spring offensive last year failed, it seems that there’s going to be some kind of negotiated settlement, which will include a change of borders in the region. And once people started to see that, then, yes, a lot of support fell away.
On how the Middle East could thrive without the mullahs:
DM: Now, look, Ukraine has fallen into a sort of torpor as a war. And a lot of people want to end it, and a lot of people think it will probably just have to be settled by some gruesome and difficult land swap. Who knows? Israel is different on this because there is the glimpse, a clear sight at this point, particularly after recent weeks, there is a sight of what victory looks like. And that is what makes these conflicts at this stage different. It makes it wildly different because it is clear at this point how this war in the Middle East could end.
If you didn’t have that terror regime oppressing the people of Iran and spreading their terror around the region, look at what’s possible. Look at what Bahrain has achieved in recent years. Saudi Arabia has done extraordinary things. And the same with the Emiratis. I mean, you know, you have Israelis holidaying in the [United Arab Emirates], and you have international businesses doing business in Saudi. You have pop concerts in Saudi again. And there is this opportunity to say, Look, how about if everything was normalized?
Look at what the Israelis could do with these countries in terms of water supplies, or technology, or crops, or new energy, or all of these things. And there is a possible future for the region. It does not involve the mullahs in Tehran having power. And it is not predicated on Palestine president Mahmoud Abbas or the Palestinian Authority or whatever comes next in Gaza creating the perfect Palestinian state. The region cannot wait for that. It has waited for that for decades.
BW: But what do you do if you’re Israel? In other words, I don’t disagree with the idea that if the Palestinians of the West Bank were given a state tomorrow, it would likely turn toward Hamas.
DM: It’ll be another failed Arab state. And most likely it will just be another Iranian proxy state.
BW: But then occupation forever?
DM: No.
BW: Then what?
DM: Whatever happens in Gaza should be a regional agreement with regional investment. Regional security deals. But the absolute bottom line is never again will young Israelis have to lose their lives going into another conflict to get Iranian rockets out of Gaza. My hope is this is the last Gaza war, the last Lebanon war.
On what can be done about the growing antisemitism in the West?:
BW: How do you square the possible victory for Israel abroad and the reality for Jews here in America who always believed, or at least since 1945, have believed, that this country was exceptional for us? Talk to us a little bit about how you see ascendant antisemitism and what can be done about it.
DM: Well, one of the things I was very struck about in Israel after [October 7th], as delegations started to come through from America and Canada and Britain and elsewhere, delegations of Jews and Christians and others just trying to show support, really often doing menial tasks like picking fruit in the south that needed fixing and that sort of thing. A large number would say things along the following lines: I can’t understand what’s happened, Douglas. I’m a liberal. I was there for #MeToo. I was there for BLM. And after the seventh, no one was there for me. And I always said the same thing, which was, Welcome.
BW: What do you mean by that?
DM: This was always going to be the case. You’re a fool to think that BLM wouldn’t go the way it did or that Occupy Wall Street wouldn’t. Why do all these movements go to antisemitism straight away? The rancid movements based on half-truths and lies will always fall into the supreme paranoid lie, which is antisemitism. Antisemitism is a psychosis that human beings are very vulnerable to.
And the Jewish tragedy is that they provide such an easy excuse for people who are failing in their lives in all sorts of ways. And as I’ve often said, you know, the amazing thing about antisemitism is the Jews can simultaneously be accused of being rich and of being poor, of being integrated and not integrating enough, and of being stateless and of having a state.
These are young people searching for a cause. And they’ve been given a cause by wicked people. And they’ll have to decide in their lives what they think about that. If you chant intifada, you are chanting for something like the suicide bomber who went into a university in Jerusalem 20 years ago and detonated in the café, killing American students, among others. Are you happy with that? When you say you want the intifada everywhere, do you really mean you want your fellow students to be blown up whilst buying a cappuccino? Really? Like, have you thought about this at all? Are you this morally frivolous or wicked? These, by the way, these people have joined the losing side. This is very important to stress. They have joined a death cult. They have joined a losing side.
BW: This is one of a lot of alarming statistics: 51 percent of Americans between the ages of 18 and 24, all of them on TikTok, I’m sure, believe that Israel should be ended and given to Hamas and to the Palestinians. What do we do about that?
DM: Well, the first thing is pray they never get what they want. If they got what they wanted, what they chant for, if Iran got the nuclear bomb and the ayatollahs used it, that’s it. The Jewish people who survived the pharaoh, and the Babylonians, and the Assyrians, and the Romans, and [Josef] Mengele would have been done in in our own time. Are you sure you would be happy to live with that, young Columbia student?
BW: I don’t see people just naturally growing out of something that is being reinforced by so many of the institutions in their lives, by the people they admire. Not just by their professors, but by many people in the culture who let these lies go unchallenged.
DM: You know, as I say, there’s a lot of rot in the culture. There’s a lot of rotten institutions.
BW: Is it going to take something catastrophic?
DM: It will take a mass-casualty terror attack. Probably. Sadly. You know, there’s a line from T.S. Eliot, that rather sobering line in Murder in a Cathedral. He says, We do not know very much [of] the future except [that] from generation to generation, the same things happen again and again. Men learn little. And most likely a mass-casualty terror attack could be about the only thing that would bring this reality home.
On why young Israelis give him hope:
BW: You’ve met so many people in your time in Israel. You’ve talked to survivors. You’ve gone to jails where terrorists are being held. You’ve, of course, met with so many political leaders. One of the things you talked about recently is that you’re actually less pessimistic. Give us some reasons why you’ve left some of that pessimism behind.
DM: From my generation in Britain, it was always the question: Would we be able to do what our grandparents had done? You know, living through The Blitz in London night after night and not losing their faith and not losing their strength. And I used to hear terrible stories when I was growing up about what that was like—of those who went and fought, the ones who didn’t come back. And in my country of birth, Great Britain, like in America, every country is filled with family stories. And my grandmother on my father’s side lost her father in the First [World] War and then her brothers in the second, always fighting the Germans. And every family was like that. And it was always this question of, if the time of trial came, would we be up to it?
Everyone in the West, somewhere in the back of our heads, has this thing. Israelis always had it. Since 1973, in particular, the first Lebanon war, the second Lebanon war, always this question of, are the young people going to be up to it?
And I have so much admiration and pride for this generation of young Israelis who were put to the test, and they have been magnificent. And if you see what these young men and women do on a daily basis from the south of Gaza to the mountains of Lebanon and Syria in the north, they don’t do any of it with hatred in their hearts. Some of what they’ve had to do is just beyond description. But they do it from love of their country, love of their people, love of their tradition, defense of their people, defense of their tradition. They know that they are fighting for the Jewish people as their forebears have before, but this time with a state, with an army, with an air force. And they’ve stepped up to this moment, and they have been extraordinary.
People will write books about this generation. And the best thing about it is that it should tell us that there is also a better way. There is a better way than this nihilism and hatred which has been bred in America. There is something else other than this culture of resentment and failure. There is such a thing as gratitude instead of resentment: pride in protecting your people and your faith and your community, and indeed, in my view, the civilized world. Anyone who feels down from spending too much time with people in America should come to Israel. And you will see that, among other things, the people who thought the next generation of Israelis just wanted to party were wrong. It turned out not to be an either-or thing. You can fight for your country and your people, and you can still dance. And that’s what they’re showing.
If you liked what you heard from today’s episode, consider forwarding this to a friend—and encouraging them to become a Free Press subscriber today.
11. Calls for intervention: Will Iran send forces to aid Hezbollah against Israel? - analysis
Cooler heads prevailing in Tehran?
Calls for intervention: Will Iran send forces to aid Hezbollah against Israel? - analysis
The Iranian regime appears to be blocking initiatives to send forces to Lebanon, likely because it recognizes that the damage from such a move would outweigh the potential benefits.
By DR. YOSSI MANSHAROF
OCTOBER 11, 2024 09:28
Jerusalem Post
In the Iranian media discourse since the assassination of Nasrallah, initiatives from various factions have emerged, calling for the deployment of forces to support Hezbollah’s fight against Israel.
The Iranian regime appears to be blocking these initiatives, likely because it recognizes that the damage from such a move would outweigh the potential benefits.
But the question remains: Will Iran send forces to Lebanon to fight against Israel?
The ideological and emotional connection with Nasrallah
Since the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, along with Quds Force Commander in Lebanon Abbas Nilforoushan, on September 27, initiatives have surfaced within the Iranian regime and its supporters, calling for the Islamic Republic to send volunteer forces to Lebanon to aid Hezbollah in its time of crisis.
The unprecedented blows Israel has dealt to Hezbollah not only place the terrorist organization in a difficult situation but also create a problematic scenario for Iran.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah speaks, July 29, 2024 (credit: SHUTTERSTOCK)
The Lebanese arena, and Hezbollah in particular, represent the most successful model of exporting the Islamic Revolution. Hezbollah is seen as "the jewel in the crown" of Iran's proxy network, which it has cultivated since the early 1980s.
Beyond Hezbollah’s strategic importance to Iran's national security concept, many within the Iranian regime had an ideological and emotional connection with Nasrallah, a relationship that developed over many years.
These ties grew when Nasrallah studied in religious seminaries at the leading spiritual center in Iran, the city of Qom, in the second half of the 1980s, before Nasrallah was appointed Hezbollah leader following Abbas Musawi’s assassination by the IDF in 1992.
Since then, his personal connections have grown stronger. This was driven by his close collaboration with Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, who assumed the role in 1998.
Nasrallah’s landmark achievement in 2000, with the IDF’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, further solidified his position, and his rise as a senior figure in Iran’s proxy network intensified even more after Soleimani’s assassination by the US in 2020.
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'Iran cannot be indifferent to the blows Hezbollah is suffering'
In light of this, it was Ayatollah Mohammad Hassan Akhtari (born 1939) who, on September 28, the day after Nasrallah's assassination, proposed to the regime to send volunteer forces to Lebanon and the Syrian Golan.
Akhtari, known as one of Hezbollah’s founding fathers, played a senior role in establishing and nurturing the organization while serving as Iran’s ambassador to Syria from 1986 to 1997.
Currently, Akhtari heads the "Committee for the Support of the Islamic Revolution of the Palestinian People," under the office of the Iranian president, established through the 1990 law to promote support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel.
Akhtari explained that Iran cannot remain indifferent and must participate directly in the fighting; thus, it should send young volunteers to Lebanon and the Syrian Golan to fight against Israel.
The Basij, a volunteer paramilitary militia within the IRGC, also opened social media accounts to register citizens for deployment to Lebanon.
On September 30, a group of students and residents from Qom arrived at Tehran’s airport and demanded that the regime send them to fight in Lebanon.
Subsequently, Mohsen Rafighdoost, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guards, stated in a media interview on October 3 that the option of sending military forces to Lebanon and the Syrian Golan is on the table for Iranian decision-makers.
The regime restrains initiatives to send forces to Lebanon and the Syrian Golan
However, the Iranian authorities quickly clarified that they had no intention of responding to these calls. On September 30, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani announced that Tehran would not send volunteer forces to Lebanon, explaining that Lebanon has the capacity to defend itself.
The deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, added on October 6 that Tehran does not intend to send forces to Lebanon, stating that the commanders of the resistance front have not reported a manpower shortage and, therefore, they have not requested such assistance from Iran.
A senior official in Iran’s religious seminaries echoed this sentiment in a media interview on October 6, explaining that the physical presence of Iranian elements in Lebanon would not be beneficial at this time and, therefore, no volunteers should be sent to Lebanon unless Iran's leader, Khamenei, approves it.
IRAN’S SUPREME Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei attends Friday prayers and a memorial ceremony for Hassan Nasrallah in Tehran earlier this month. (credit: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/West Asia News Agency/Reuters)
In the past year, following assassinations attributed to Israel targeting senior Quds Force officials, particularly Hassan Mahdavi, the Quds Force commander in Syria and Lebanon, Khamenei has led a significant shift in Iran's security strategy.
In April, he decided to attack Israel directly with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. In early October, he again led a direct attack on Israel, this time consisting of around 200 ballistic missiles.
Before this, for decades, Iran overwhelmingly preferred to attack Israel indirectly through its proxy network.
Earlier, in the second half of the last decade, Khamenei had already sent thousands of fighters from the Quds Force, the Iranian army, and even the Iranian police and Basij to the battlefield in Syria and Iraq to fight against ISIS, which posed an existential threat to Iran.
However, the shift Khamenei is leading is not all-encompassing and does not include sending fighters for direct combat against Israel.
It appears Khamenei is aware that such a move would place Iran squarely in the spotlight in the fight against Israel and push Israel to launch significant attacks on Iranian territory.
This goes beyond the risky gamble Khamenei already took with his recent missile strike, which presents Israel with an excellent opportunity to strike back at Iran with considerable international legitimacy.
Moreover, sending fighters would leave Iran exposed to attacks from Israeli troops on the ground and other retaliatory strikes from Israel.
Khamenei, whose entire regime, and especially the nuclear program, are his life's work, would not want to put them at high risk.
Reformists have voiced concern through their media outlets, warning that Khamenei might be dragging Iran into an Israeli trap designed to provoke Iran into a full-scale regional war involving the US.
Therefore, while the initiatives to send forces to Lebanon and the Syrian Golan may continue, Khamenei is expected to manage the risks carefully and avoid escalating beyond the already high level of risk he has placed on Iran.
Dr. Yossi Mansharof is a researcher of Iran, Hezbollah, and Shia militias at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy.
Jerusalem Post
12. I’m Not Good Enough—And That’s OK
Some possible morning inspiration.
Excerpts:
Failure and defeat aren’t synonyms. Failure and adversity are springboards to becoming legendary. Right now, I’m on the road to retirement, and I am not good enough to leave the military and do what I need to do to be successful on the outside. I’m okay with that, and I’m also excited about it. I love the constant cycle of moving from ignorance to competence. That’s why I’m in multiple programs to help prepare me for that journey and help me become good enough.
I’ll wrap this up by sharing one of my morning affirmations, “Embrace adversity. Use every failure to improve. Embrace not being good enough. Weaponize it for self-development in the endless pursuit of excellence. In doing so, hopefully, I inspire others to do the same.” That’s why I enjoy doing seemingly stupid things like taking an ACFT three days before a hip replacement. Maybe some young soldier is on the other side struggling through his events, and he sees my old broke ass doing it and goes, “Okay, I can do this. I just need to up my game.”
It goes back to the original saying: a bad day for the ego is a great day for the soul if you have the right mindset.
Live with Purpose, Embrace Adversity, and Pursue Arete.
I’m Not Good Enough—And That’s OK • The Havok Journal
havokjournal.com · by Special Guest · October 10, 2024
by Charles “Chuck “Ritter
Failure. Adversity. Struggle. Friction. Not being good enough. These words associate with feelings we generally try to avoid because they cause stress, anxiety, irritation, and unpleasant internal feelings. But we shouldn’t avoid them; instead, we need to embrace them. The only true path to being fulfilled and legendary in life is through these words. I can tell you right now I’m not good enough, and that’s difficult to say, but it’s also something I’m excited about.
Someone once said, “A bad day for the ego is a great day for the soul.” Think about that concept as you read.
Early in my career, I really wanted to go to Ranger School, which is known as one of the toughest schools in the military. I didn’t get a chance to go as a young infantryman. And when I graduated from the U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course in 2003 the deployment tempo was so wild that it wasn’t until 2010 that I finally got my chance as a decently-senior sergeant first class/E7.
It was a unit policy that one had to attend a three-week Pre-Ranger course before Ranger School, regardless of rank or background. My boss got me into the Ranger Regiment’s Pre-Ranger course, which is considered the best in the Army. It would be Pre-Ranger right to Ranger School at Benning, back-to-back.
I trained hard. I was very physically fit. I hit the books: Infantry Squad and Platoon and the Ranger Handbook. I did a lot of land navigation and tactical training. And so, I went to fulfill my dream.
…but I failed Pre-Ranger.
Command Sgt. Maj. Michael Evans, sergeant major of 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Advise and Assist Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, United States Division-Center, counts out the repititions as Soldiers from the battalion do pull-ups as part of a unit competition at Camp Taji, Iraq, May 27, 2011 for the opportunity to attend Ranger School. The competition included a 12-mile ruck march as well as testing on weapons tasks, map reading and other tactical skills and was designed to give the prospective Ranger candidates a small taste of the physical and mental requirements of Ranger School. (U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. 1st Class Jon Soucy)
Not only was I not good enough to earn my Ranger tab, I wasn’t good enough to even get to Ranger School.
During land navigation, at my first attack point, I opened my compass and discovered it was broken. I had failed to do something as fundamentally basic as conducting pre-combat checks on mission-critical equipment. I ran back, grabbed a new compass, returned to my attack point, and opened it, only to find it was also broken. I didn’t learn my lesson the first time.
In the self-assessment that followed, I found that I had tripped over my ego. Ego isn’t a bad thing; it’s just our sense of self-worth. We all have one, but we often let it get in our way. It becomes problematic when it’s unbalanced, and you find yourself in the bandwidth of arrogance and hubris, which is precisely where I was and why I blew off something as essential as a pre-combat check.
I never got a chance to go back. That was my shot, and I blew it. Because of that arrogance and hubris, I don’t have a Ranger tab. I learned a lot from that experience. I grew from it, and never again blew off the basics and fundamentals.
Fast-forward from 2010 to 2021, when I was eligible for the Command Select Board for command sergeant major. I put a lot of time and effort into updating my records and board file. I was extremely confident. I had three valor awards, three purple hearts, and very strong evaluations. I was a shoo-in—or so I thought.
When the board results came out and the names were listed, mine wasn’t one of them. In the eyes of the Army, I wasn’t good enough to be a command sergeant major.
I talked to a few people with specific knowledge of that board. They said, “Chuck, it’s not your competence; you’re very competent. The consensus on you is that you shouldn’t be a Command Sergeant Major because of your personality.”
I was taken aback at first. But after some thought, I realized that it was a fair assessment. At certain levels in the Army, the system views risk differently. People don’t want to deal with problems, and I get it. I wouldn’t want to deal with working for me.
That stresses me out just thinking about it.
Not everybody has to be a provocateur. Not everybody has to be that boat captain, always going full speed ahead toward the objective, creating a ton of wake, disrupting the water for everybody else. But I do; I am that guy.
Photo Credit: Author
I evaluated the situation and said, “Okay, I am not what the Army needs as a command sergeant major. The criticisms are valid, and if I’m going to fix that, I need to retool my personality.”
Some of my core values are authenticity, courage, and humor, to name a few. I realized I wasn’t prepared to retool. I was okay with not being good enough, even though it was a blow to my ego. That was the only time I competed for command sergeant major. But I had to make a decision about what to do next because I had time left in the Army due to impending surgeries related to wounds I previously received in combat.
The wounds were bad, and my recovery took a long time. In fact, when I attended the Pre-Ranger course I was still missing my front teeth because they hadn’t finished rebuilding my upper jaw from the first time I was wounded. In 2008, I was in an RG33 MRAP, or mine-resistant light armored vehicle, when it was hit by 500lb of explosives that ripped it apart, killing two people and severely wounding the rest of us. It crushed my body. It took four years to rebuild parts of my face, mainly my nose and jaw, and I didn’t receive my final surgery from that incident (and my front teeth) until 2012. It caused substantial brain damage, destroyed both my hips and my back, and caused chronic lung issues.
In 2013, shortly after being cleared from the first time I was wounded, I took three rounds from a PKM, a Russian-made machine gun, during combat operations in Afghanistan. In 2014, I was shot again, also with a PKM. I was also seriously injured in combat a yearbefore the Pre-Ranger course. My final surgery tied to all of that—my second hip replacement—is this coming November. With all of the above experiences reminding me of my own shortcomings (as well as my own mortality), the question now is: “What do I do with my remaining time?”
I decided to retire from the Army and invest my efforts toward positively impacting the force in any way possible. The Army has been an amazing experience from start to finish. I’m thankful for even the weirdest, most absurd adversity and struggle. There has been some truly bizarre adversity and struggle. I feel truly blessed for it. But I am ready for something different. I want to help others find their own sense of arete.
More than that, we need to embrace and weaponize the concept of not being good enough. We need to embrace adversity. Life is a never-ending cycle of struggle and not being good enough. But we can keep trying. Even with my injuries, I always enjoyed the challenge and discomfort of still scoring above a 290 on a PT test or a 540 on the new ACFT. We adjust, we adapt, and we conquer.
Everything is perishable, so being great at something in the past doesn’t necessarily mean you’re still good enough at it today to stay relevant. Life is a constant cycle of figuring out what we want to excel at, prioritizing those things based on necessity or preference, and mastering them to reach our goals. Sometimes, our goals aren’t realistic, and we need to accept that we’re not good enough— even if it hurts our ego. Along the way, we’ll often fail, but that failure is a powerful tool.
Failure and defeat aren’t synonyms. Failure and adversity are springboards to becoming legendary. Right now, I’m on the road to retirement, and I am not good enough to leave the military and do what I need to do to be successful on the outside. I’m okay with that, and I’m also excited about it. I love the constant cycle of moving from ignorance to competence. That’s why I’m in multiple programs to help prepare me for that journey and help me become good enough.
I’ll wrap this up by sharing one of my morning affirmations, “Embrace adversity. Use every failure to improve. Embrace not being good enough. Weaponize it for self-development in the endless pursuit of excellence. In doing so, hopefully, I inspire others to do the same.” That’s why I enjoy doing seemingly stupid things like taking an ACFT three days before a hip replacement. Maybe some young soldier is on the other side struggling through his events, and he sees my old broke ass doing it and goes, “Okay, I can do this. I just need to up my game.”
It goes back to the original saying: a bad day for the ego is a great day for the soul if you have the right mindset.
Live with Purpose, Embrace Adversity, and Pursue Arete.
__________________________
Chuck Ritter is an active-duty Army Special Forces sergeant major stationed at Fort Liberty, NC. He is set to retire in 2025. He is a co-founder of Objective Arete LLC, a veteran-owned self-development company. Chuck previously co-hosted/produced the Pineland Underground Podcast and serves on the Board of Directors for the Dreams 4 All Foundation.
He has been awarded the Silver Star Medal, Bronze Star for Valor, Army Commendation Medal for Valor, three Purple Heart Medals, the Triple E Valor and Courage award, and most importantly, the NDSM and Air Assault Badge.
He is attending Norwich University, completing a B.S. in Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis. In 2025, he will apply to the Duke University MBA program.
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13. China Seizes Initiative at Key Asian Summit Ahead of US Election
Strategic competition.
China Seizes Initiative at Key Asian Summit Ahead of US Election
- Advances economic links with Southeast Asia, Australia
- Blinken fields questions over conflicts in Middle East
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-11/china-seizes-initiative-at-key-asian-summit-ahead-of-us-election?sref=hhjZtX76
By Lucille Liu, Josh Xiao, Ben Westcott, and Philip Heijmans
October 11, 2024 at 4:38 AM EDT
A summit in Laos this week was an opportunity for the Biden administration to showcase the relationships it has cultivated across Asia since renewing a diplomatic push three years ago. Instead, China appeared to seize the moment with a slate of new agreements.
Chinese Premier Li Qiang used the Association of Southeast Asian Nations gathering that concludes Friday to advance his nations’ economic interests across the Indo-Pacific, even as the US and its allies pressed Beijing over aggressive behavior in the East and South China Seas.
China and the 10-nation regional grouping known as Asean announced plans to upgrade and broaden an existing trade deal. Li also pitched accelerating rail projects with Thailand and Cambodia, and agreed to lift restrictions on lobster imports from Australia by year end, removing one of the last trade barriers imposed by Beijing during a recent period of tension.
The agreement on boosting trade between Asean and Beijing is an “important move, especially in this time of growing protectionism,” Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong said during a meeting with Li and other regional leaders on Thursday. “It will send a very clear and important message to everyone on the importance of free trade and win-win market cooperation.”
China has been the collective Asean bloc’s largest trading partner for 15 consecutive years.
The summit came at a complicated time for the US, with President Joe Biden missing the proceedings for a second year in a row amid the final weeks of the presidential election. He’s also contending with the devastation left by two recent hurricanes and soaring tensions in the Middle East.
Read: China’s Bullet Trains Extend Toward Singapore Despite Debt Fears
The summit was a chance for a new slate of Asian leaders from Thailand to Japan to take the global stage and show how they will navigate a middle-ground between the US and China.
Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba used his first face-to-face meeting with Li since taking office to call for a full explanation of a recent airspace intrusion by a Chinese military aircraft. He also urged China to clarify the facts around a Japanese schoolboy’s murder and a separate attack on Japanese nationals in China in June.
Despite the friction, Ishiba expressed an interest in building “constructive and stable” relations with China. Li said ties were at a “critical stage of improvement.”
The meeting was also one of the final opportunities for Secretary of State Antony Blinken to pitch stronger US-Asia ties weeks before an election whose result could have profound implications on America’s future in the region.
For his part, Blinken emphasized that he was on his 20th visit to the Indo-Pacific and that the US remains the biggest source of foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia, outpacing China and Europe.
Antony Blinken on Oct. 11.Photographer: Tang Chhin Soy/AFP/Getty Images
With Israel potentially on the brink of striking Iran, Blinken fielded questions about US support for Israel and whether a truce can be reached in the widening Mideast conflicts. He said he told Asean leaders that the US shares their “deep concern” for the plight of Palestinians in Gaza and that the Biden administration is intensely focused on preventing the conflicts from spreading.
Read: Marcos Confronts Chinese Premier Li in Laos Over ‘Intimidation’
But beyond a joint statement on promoting safe and secure policies around artificial intelligence, there were few major new policy initiatives from the US, even after separate meetings by Blinken with new Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Malaysia’s leader Anwar Ibrahim.
“The US sort of struggles a bit with Asean,” said Susannah Patton, director of the Southeast Asia program at Australia’s Lowy Institute. For China, “there’s a very clear narrative about deepening trade cooperation, upgrading the FTA, and that plays very well with all the Southeast Asian countries. Whereas the United States — I think its narrative is just less compelling.”
14. Wars are won with code, says German military AI maker
Excerpts:
“There was this gap, which structurally nobody could or wanted to solve,” said Scherf. “We didn't start the company because we thought everybody was going to do this, we started it because we thought nobody was going to do this.”
The problem wasn’t talent. In fact, Europe has always had a very strong presence in research and development. Scherf pointed to Microsoft, Google and Amazon all having crucial innovation hubs on the Continent.
The problem was money — and in some ways it still is. Helsing’s Series C funding round that raised €450 million was led by American investment firm, General Catalyst. Money in Europe is hard to find in venture capital and pension funds generally don't invest in defense technology, said Scherf.
Helsing’s first funding round was completed with contributions from British, French and German individuals who believed in the mission, he said. Later on, Spotify founder Daniel Ek poured in €100 million through his venture fund Prima Materia — and faced criticism from some artists on Spotify for doing so.
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the European mindset has slowly begun to change.
In May, the EIB waived the requirement that funding for technology used in both military and civilian applications — so-called dual-use tech — could only go to projects from which more than 50 percent of revenue came from civilian uses. But the defense industry since has called for the EIB to further shake off its shackles.
...
Scherf said Europe needs to stop shying away from putting real money into its armed forces directly to ensure they have the very best technology.
“Why do we need to always hide behind dual use?” asked Scherf, referring to a European Investment Bank’s policy of only investing in technology that has both civilian and military use.
“Either we believe in our democratic armed forces and we support them with the best technology,” he said, “or we have to have a different debate.”
Wars are won with code, says German military AI maker
Politico · by Antoaneta Roussi · October 11, 2024
Helsing is riding the wave as Europe seeks defense tech leadership.
“Defense is turning more and more into a software problem,” the company’s co-founder and co-chief executive officer Gundbert Scherf told POLITICO in an interview. | Michal Cizek/AFP via Getty Images
October 11, 2024 4:25 am CET
By
LONDON — It’s not about the kind of weapons a military has anymore; it’s the software on which it runs.
That’s the pitch with which European artificial intelligence champion Helsing is taking the defense-tech sector by storm, at a time when European governments are hurrying to funnel cash into new military systems and weaponry.
“Defense is turning more and more into a software problem,” the company’s co-founder and co-chief executive officer Gundbert Scherf told POLITICO in an interview.
Helsing, headquartered in Munich, Germany, was valued at €4.9 billion in July, just four years after its inception. Its motto, “artificial intelligence to serve our democracies,” is emblematic of the defense-tech industrial complex that has spun out of the war in Ukraine.
The company said it processes millions of data from sensors and weapon systems of European militaries to enable “faster and better decisions” by humans and increase the lethality of weapons. So far, it has signed contracts with the British, German, French, Estonian and Ukrainian governments.
“You see fighter jets, frigates and satellites, but really, what you have to look at is that each one of those systems produces an unbelievable amount of data,” Scherf said.
Despite the upcoming third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Europe still has gaps in its air and missile defense systems, said Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commander of the United States Army in Europe, during the recent Warsaw Security Forum.
Scherf said the bloc needed to achieve “technology leadership” in core areas where it's falling behind, such as AI, or otherwise be beholden to “our U.S. friends.”
Helsing has secured a series of government contracts, including the German Eurofighter Electronic Warfare upgrade with Saab, the AI infrastructure for the Future Combat Air System — a multinational joint initiative between Germany, France and Spain — and Airbus’ future Wingman system.
When the company was founded in 2021, ChatGPT hadn’t had its major breakthrough and Russian tanks hadn’t yet invaded Ukraine. Scherf said many in the tech space didn't want to touch defense.
Google employees famously protested the company’s involvement in a Pentagon program called Project Maven in 2018 that used AI to interpret video imagery to improve the targeting of drone strikes. Other big tech companies struggled with their relationship to military contracts, too.
The U.S., Israel and others built up strong links earlier between their militaries and the modern-day tech industries that grew in the internet era. European countries, on the other hand, lack strong programs to invest heavily in innovative defense technology through local tech sectors.
Europe still has gaps in its air and missile defense systems, said Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commander of the United States Army in Europe. | Gregor Fischer/Getty Images
Scherf, who worked in the German Ministry of Defense before starting Helsing, said he thought the only way technology would filter into the European system was if someone was making it.
“There was this gap, which structurally nobody could or wanted to solve,” said Scherf. “We didn't start the company because we thought everybody was going to do this, we started it because we thought nobody was going to do this.”
The problem wasn’t talent. In fact, Europe has always had a very strong presence in research and development. Scherf pointed to Microsoft, Google and Amazon all having crucial innovation hubs on the Continent.
The problem was money — and in some ways it still is. Helsing’s Series C funding round that raised €450 million was led by American investment firm, General Catalyst. Money in Europe is hard to find in venture capital and pension funds generally don't invest in defense technology, said Scherf.
Helsing’s first funding round was completed with contributions from British, French and German individuals who believed in the mission, he said. Later on, Spotify founder Daniel Ek poured in €100 million through his venture fund Prima Materia — and faced criticism from some artists on Spotify for doing so.
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the European mindset has slowly begun to change.
In May, the EIB waived the requirement that funding for technology used in both military and civilian applications — so-called dual-use tech — could only go to projects from which more than 50 percent of revenue came from civilian uses. But the defense industry since has called for the EIB to further shake off its shackles.
Scherf said Europe needs to stop shying away from putting real money into its armed forces directly to ensure they have the very best technology.
“Why do we need to always hide behind dual use?” asked Scherf, referring to a European Investment Bank’s policy of only investing in technology that has both civilian and military use.
“Either we believe in our democratic armed forces and we support them with the best technology,” he said, “or we have to have a different debate.”
Politico · by Antoaneta Roussi · October 11, 2024
15. China lacks will and way to lead the world
If I were advising Chinese influence operations this is a type of article I would seek to place on a regular basis in various media.
It somewhat counters my thesis about China: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfare to set conditions and achieve objectives.
But it is possible and probably likely that China does not want to "supplant America's global superpower role." It may only want to harm or reduce America's role to allow China to have perceived greater freedom of action to accomplish its objectives.
Excerpts:
Finally, China likely sees the costs of displacing the United States as the sole global leader as too high. Historically, overextension has led to the fall of states. From a contemporary standpoint, the multitrillion-dollar price tag of US-style global leadership is astronomical.
Beijing must realize those resources could be better used at home and within East Asia.
Washington would be prudent to understand Beijing does not seek to and cannot supplant America’s global superpower role. Instead of wasting resources on preventing something China doesn’t want, policymakers should put tangible American interests first.
This means maintaining dominance of the Western Hemisphere, bolstering economic security, deterring threats to the homeland and adhering to Constitutional principles. Only then can US global power and security be maximized.
China lacks will and way to lead the world - Asia Times
Beijing has no interest in overthrowing the US-led international order, a reality American policymakers would be wise to recognize
asiatimes.com · by Quinn Marschik · October 11, 2024
The “China Dream,” President Xi Jinping’s vision to restore China’s great power status, was the underlying theme of Xi’s 75th National Day speech.
Many influential individuals and policymakers in Washington agree as a matter of fact that the one of the China Dream’s goals is to displace the US-led international order and thus Washington’s global leadership and power.
As exemplified by the lack of concern for foreign affairs in Xi’s recent remarks, they’re wrong. Beijing is unwilling and—more importantly—unable to replace America on the global stage. US policy must adapt to this reality to put American interests first.
Xi’s 2017 speech to the 19th National Party Congress is often cited as evidence of Beijing’s intent to overturn America’s role in the world. In that speech, Xi envisions China as “a global leader” having “mov[ed] closer to the center stage.”
If Washington is to take Xi at his word, as some are wont to suggest, then China merely seeks a greater say in the global order commensurate with its rise in power – not world domination.
When assessing Xi’s remarks at the 20th National Party Congress in 2022, he had even less to say about global leadership – only that China should aim to have the most “comprehensive national strength” and “international influence” by mid-century.
While a stronger statement than in 2017, it is based on highly subjective measures. Comprehensive national strength is based on the Chinese “Comprehensive National Power” concept, which seeks to calculate power through qualitative and quantitative factors.
Different inputs will lead to different outputs. With China’s low productivity, brewing demographic crisis and limited natural resources, it is difficult to see how Beijing claims the top power spot by 2050.
Equally, given the decline in China’s favorability in the United States, Europe and US-allied Asian countries and growth of “tough on China” policies, China has a long road ahead to reverse its influence fortunes.
Even if one were to read the worst into Xi’s and other Chinese Communist Party leaders’ speeches, Beijing’s three major foreign policy visions – the Global Development, Global Security, and Global Civilization Initiatives – don’t call for an overthrow of “American leadership” or the international order.
At worst, they collectively entail a vision of a multipolar order where China has a sphere of influence in East Asia and is the most respected great power.
Outside of China’s words and ideas, the People’s Republic’s actions show that it is not willing or capable of displacing the United States’ global role.
While Beijing has established and expanded various international institutions, such as BRICS and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, these have been opened to new members who will likely dilute China’s influence.
By virtue of their more limited scopes, Chinese-created institutions cannot replace the UN system, which even Beijing acknowledges is the premier representative of international order.
Militarily, China cannot project power globally. It has only one formal military alliance with its neighbor North Korea compared to the United States’ 51 treaty allies across the Americas, Europe and the Indo-Pacific, thereby limiting the scope of its military activities.
So far, China hasn’t sought additional treaty alliances – including its “better than an alliance” with Russia, which has not seen Chinese troops join Russia’s in Ukraine.
Beijing also lacks the global network of bases essential to power projection. While US intelligence asserts China is working to establish bases in eight other countries outside of existing arrangements in Djibouti and Cambodia, this would be a far cry from Washington’s over 750 military bases in 80 countries.
If successful, Beijing’s facilities would be limited to countries along its global trade routes.
Unlike global military power, China does seek global economic and cultural influence but this will likely fail. De-risking, reshoring, nearshoring and friendshoring are the commerce terms of the day with countries and companies seeking alternative sources to China.
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Beijing is unlikely to buck these global trends as it seeks to produce more at home while its economic coercion fails abroad. Similarly, Chinese cultural exports have not taken off and improved views of China, a striking contrast with its neighbor South Korea.
American levels of global culture status appear out of reach thanks to China’s more conservative culture, difficult language and censorship concerns.
Finally, China likely sees the costs of displacing the United States as the sole global leader as too high. Historically, overextension has led to the fall of states. From a contemporary standpoint, the multitrillion-dollar price tag of US-style global leadership is astronomical.
Beijing must realize those resources could be better used at home and within East Asia.
Washington would be prudent to understand Beijing does not seek to and cannot supplant America’s global superpower role. Instead of wasting resources on preventing something China doesn’t want, policymakers should put tangible American interests first.
This means maintaining dominance of the Western Hemisphere, bolstering economic security, deterring threats to the homeland and adhering to Constitutional principles. Only then can US global power and security be maximized.
Quinn Marschik is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.
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asiatimes.com · by Quinn Marschik · October 11, 2024
16. IDF all-female tank crew heroes
11 minute video at the link: https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/idf-all-female-tank-crew-heroes/
Fascinating story. Is this an Israeli 73 Easting? (IYKYK) The video is worth watching.
IDF all-female tank crew heroes
blogs.timesofisrael.com · by Tuvia Book · October 10, 2024
Tuvia Book
Author, educator, Tour-Guide, artist
On October 7, 2023, Tal-Sara was one of seven female Israeli tank crew members from the Caracal brigade who fought against Hamas terrorists continuously for an unbelievable 18 hours! These young women were the first ever all-female tank crew to engage in active combat in history. They killed an estimated 50 terrorists, saved a kibbutz, and successfully blocked a massive hole in the border fence.
Tal-Sara one of the all-female tank crew heroes from October 7. Photo (c) T. Book, 2024
Since her discharge from the regular army, she has been on reserves in my combat medical extraction unit (Palmar) on the Gaza front. I interviewed her this week on the first anniversary of October 7. Despite her fame, both national and international, Tal-Sarah, being justifiably proud of her role, was extremely modest and soft-spoken. She had fire in her eyes and a strong spirit. Tal-Sarah told me:
I never expected to be a hero and to fight overwhelming amounts of terrorists. Only after the event when I thought of it, did I realise how we made history. We received hundreds of supportive messages from people we saved, and indeed form all over the world. We have been interviewed my mainstream media from many international outlets. I don’t believe we did anything extraordinary; we just did our duty to defend the State of Israel and her citizens.
She recounted how in the midst the battle she phoned home, during a brief lull in the fighting, to tell her family how much she loved them. She saw death before her eyes and was sure that this was her end. Instead, her crew emerged triumphant and are an inspiration to us all. Next month her dream is being fulfilled, as she will be joining a newly established all-female reserve tank crew unit in Gaza.
blogs.timesofisrael.com · by Tuvia Book · October 10, 2024
17. Opinion: Ukraine's road to victory may lie in a 'Korean solution'
With all due respect to Dr Nye, we tend to throw out these concepts easily (also like the Marshall Plan). But all we are talking about is an Armistice which is not unique to Korea. But I guess this makes it easier for people to understand.
I recall listening to some very old Koreans from the north about two decades ago who claimed that the north was on the verge of collapse in 1953 and if the UNC just continued the fight for another 2-3 months Pyongyang would have capitulated because it could not sustain operations. We will never know until after unification and we can examine the records. But that may be a lesson worth considering.
Opinion: Ukraine's road to victory may lie in a 'Korean solution'
A Korean-style armistice could provide Ukraine with a path to long-term security and sovereignty without conceding defeat to Russia.
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/idf-all-female-tank-crew-heroes/
October 9, 2024 5:24 PM
5 min read
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Former U.S. assistant defense secretary
Listen to this article7 min
This audio is created with AI assistance
Victory in war is sometimes easy to define. World War II ended with Allied troops in control of Berlin and Tokyo, and with the German and Japanese leadership removed. The Vietnam War, on the other hand, ended in a clear defeat for the United States: North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam despite the futile expenditure of 58,000 American lives. The Korean War is sometimes called a stalemate because it never formally ended.
But such definitions can be deceiving. In Iraq, the U.S. removed Saddam Hussein but neither found weapons of mass destruction (the justification for their deployment) nor turned that country into a functioning democracy. Worse, some cynics would argue that the true victor was Iran, which became the most influential political force in Iraq.
On the other hand, though the demilitarized zone remains in place in Korea, the southern half of the peninsula has evolved into a vibrant, prosperous democracy with an annual per capita income of $35,000, whereas North Korea is a dangerous dictatorship with an estimated annual per capita income of $1,200 and recurrent food crises. Who won the stalemated war?
Opinion: The West cannot use its values to make sense of Russia
This brings us to Ukraine, where the definition of victory depends on the participants’ war aims and time horizons. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine on the pretext of protecting Russian speakers in Crimea and parts of the eastern Donbas region. Eight years later, Russia tried to complete the process by destroying Ukraine as an independent state.
As Russian President Vladimir Putin wrote in 2021, he did not regard Ukraine as an independent nation but as part of the larger Russian world. He massed troops on the border with the intent of capturing Kyiv in a few days and replacing the Ukrainian government, much as the Soviet Union had done in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968.
He failed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected advice to flee the country and create a government in exile, and instead rallied his troops, saved the capital, and derailed Putin’s plan. Zelensky subsequently used the soft power of attraction to win foreign support and increase Ukraine’s hard power of military might. The result of Putin’s invasion was to strengthen Ukraine’s national identity and NATO, which has added two new members, Finland and Sweden, that previously had a long-standing policy of neutrality. Judging by Putin’s original war objectives, Ukraine has already won.
The problem, of course, is that Russian troops still control approximately one-fifth of Ukraine’s territory, and Putin has revised his war goals to demand that Ukraine recognize his annexation of four eastern provinces (including some that Russian troops do not fully control). The war seems to be stalemated, but Putin has turned it into a war of attrition. While Russian casualties are enormous, he may be betting that time is on his side, given Russia’s larger population and economy. Eventually, Ukraine’s will to fight may erode, as will Western support.
Two women walk past a building destroyed during a Russian missile attack in the town of Selydove, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, on April 14, 2024. (Anatolii Stepanov / AFP via Getty Images)
According to one recent poll, 26% of Ukrainians are open to a diplomatic solution, but they are not willing to engage in sham negotiations with an unrepentant Putin. Some 86% of Ukrainians believe that Russia is likely to attack again even if a peace treaty is signed. Though both Russia and Ukraine have expressed a willingness to negotiate, they remain far apart.
This past summer, Hungary’s Kremlin-friendly prime minister, Viktor Orban, went to Moscow to try to mediate, but failed to change Putin’s position. Meanwhile, Donald Trump continues to claim that he could settle the war in a day; but it is hard to see how that could be accomplished by anything short of a Ukrainian surrender.
Recently, Czech President Petr Pavel, a former NATO general who has been a strong backer of Ukraine, stated that “to talk about a defeat of Ukraine or a defeat of Russia, it will simply not happen. So the end will be somewhere in between.” Pavel warned that part of Ukrainian territory will remain under Russian occupation temporarily, and that “temporarily” could mean years.
Opinion: Putin’s economic gamble is a ticking time bomb for Russia’s future
If Ukraine defines victory as the return of all land that Russia has occupied since 2014, victory is not in sight. But if it aims to maintain its independence as a democracy linked to Europe, while reserving its right to the ultimate return of its territory, victory remains possible.
"If Ukraine defines victory as the return of all land that Russia has occupied since 2014, victory is not in sight."
But this possible victory also means that Putin must not be able to declare his own victory. Ukraine must be given the support it needs to strengthen its bargaining position. Even if Ukraine cannot achieve its maximalist goals in the short run, the legitimacy of its position would be preserved in the long term as long as Russian gains are not recognized.
This is sometimes referred to as a Korean solution. An armistice and demilitarized zone along the line of control would be monitored by international peacekeepers, so that Russia would draw in many other countries were it to resume its attack. While it may not be possible to get 32 NATO members to agree to Ukraine’s formal membership in the alliance at this time, a group of NATO members calling themselves “friends of Ukraine” could monitor the zone and vow to respond to any new act of Russian aggression.
Finally, Ukraine would also need assistance to rebuild its economy and access to EU markets. While a Korean solution would not satisfy Ukraine’s maximalist goals in the short term, it would certainly deserve to be called a Ukrainian victory.
Editor’s Note: Copyright, Project Syndicate. This article was published by Project Syndicate on Oct. 8, 2024, and has been republished by the Kyiv Independent with permission.The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.
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Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Former U.S. assistant defense secretary
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., an emeritus professor at Harvard Kennedy School and a former U.S. assistant defense secretary, is the author of "Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump" (Oxford University Press, 2020) and "A Life in the American Century" (Polity Press, 2024).Read more
18. S Korea piles in with US in arming up the Philippines
An effective partner in the Arsenal of Democracy.
S Korea piles in with US in arming up the Philippines - Asia Times
New strategic partnership will facilitate big arms deals amid furor over US deployment of Typhon missile system on Philippine soil
asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · October 8, 2024
MANILA – The Philippines and South Korea elevated ties to a strategic partnership, Manila’s latest move to build a bulwark and stockpile more arms against China’s rising threat in the South China Sea.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said after meeting counterpart Ferdinand Marcos Jr that the two sides had “opened a new chapter” and that his country would “actively take part” in the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) modernization drive.
Over the next decade, the Philippines is scheduled to invest up to US$35 billion under its Horizon 3 military modernization program, with a singular focus on naval and aerial acquisitions.
Over the past decade, South Korea has been a top supplier of modern military equipment, including fighter jets and warships.
Unlike its liberal predecessor under President Moon Jae-in – who primarily focused on the Korean Peninsula conflict and maintaining stable ties with Beijing – the conservative Yoon administration has more openly welcomed closer defense ties with Washington and like-minded powers in the region.
Cognizant of criticism of his perceived as pro-US foreign policy, especially by pro-China elements such as the powerful Duterte clan, the Marcos Jr administration has adamantly pursued its own version of a “multi-aligned” foreign policy.
To dispel accusations of overreliance on America, the Philippines has been proactively upgrading defense ties with a host of quasi-non-aligned nations, including India, New Zealand, and, most crucially, South Korea.
Although Seoul has a treaty alliance with America, the Northeast Asian nation has historically adopted more balanced foreign relations, including cultivating warm ties with Beijing and, at times, even with Tehran and Moscow in order to keep Pyongyang at bay.
Accordingly, South Korea has often shunned any direct criticism of China and other revisionist powers. In fact, Seoul has rarely criticized Beijing over the South China Sea disputes while it has adopted strategic ambiguity on any potential intervention in a Taiwan crisis.
South Korea’s adroit foreign policy has gone hand-in-hand with the development of a world-class defense industry. As a result, Seoul has become a “global pivot state”, one that has become more assertive under the Yoon administration.
While in Manila, Yoon underscored shared concerns over North Korea, the South China Sea disputes, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and threats posed by revisionist powers to a rules-based international order.
In the past decade, South Korea has provided FA-50 fighter jets, frigates, and corvettes to the Philippines. As Seoul aims to become the world’s fourth largest arms exporter by 2027, it’s keen to seal major new defense deals with rising powers with big defense budgets the Philippines.
Shortly after hosting Yoon, Marcos Jr signed a new law, known as the Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program, to boost the Philippines’ domestic arms industry.
The law’s aim is to enhance indigenous and joint production of modern weapons and revitalize the country’s long-dormant defense industry in light of rising geopolitical uncertainy in the region.
“Cyber security breaches, chemical attacks, radiological threats — these are more than hypothetical risks, but pressing realities. With this, we are broadening our perspective on defense. We are not just looking at tanks and rifles. We are building capacities that address these unconventional dangers head-on,” Marcos said.
“This means developing systems and strategies that are reactive and predictive, allowing us to stay a step ahead of those who wish harm to the Philippines,” he added.
Nevertheless, the Philippines’ ace card remains its deepening defense ties with the US. Aside from ever-larger joint military exercises, Washington has also allocated a bipartisan, multi-billion-dollar defense aid package to its Southeast Asian mutual defense treaty ally.
The US has also offered direct assistance, including escorting Philippine resupply missions to disputed land features such as the Second Thomas Shoal, the site of repeated clashes between Filipino and Chinese maritime forces over the past year.
Perhaps most crucial is the Philippines’ decision to grant the US Pentagon expanded rotational access to military facilities in northern regions of the country facing Taiwan.
Just as crucial is the recent decision to host advanced platforms such as America’s Typhon missile system, which could target vital Chinese military bases in the event of any contingency in the region. The Typhon is capable of launching SM-6 missiles and Tomahawks with a range exceeding 1,600 kilometers (994 miles).
The missile system was deployed to the Philippines for recent joint “Salaknib” military exercises with US forces but has been left in place since.
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Despite China’s strong warning and criticism, the Marcos Jr administration believes that the American weapons system could serve as a deterrent against any drastic Chinese military action amid intensifying disputes in the South China Sea and nearby Taiwan Strait.
In the future, the Philippines is expected to seek the direct acquisition of state-of-the-art American missile and other weapons systems under its newly announced Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) strategy. The aim would be to raise the cost of any Chinese kinetic action in the two sides South China China disputes and any potential assault on neighboring Taiwan.
“Relying on US’ deterrence to gain an upper hand over China in the South China Sea issue is a short-sighted and narrow-minded move by the Philippines,” Dai Fan, director of the Center for Philippine Studies at Jinan University in South China’s Guangdong Province, told the Chinese Communist Party-run Global Times newspaper.
Although some Chinese experts have tried to play down the Typhon missile system’s deployment, sharp statements made by top Chinese officials underscore Beijing’s growing concerns over deepening Philippine-US military cooperation.
Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @Richeydarian
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asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · October 8, 2024
19. Filming Under Fire: John Ford’s OSS Field Photo Branch
For those in Fayetteville this will be shown at the cinema on Hay Street tomorrow October 12th.
Filming Under Fire: John Ford’s OSS Field Photo Branch
https://www.indigomoonfilmfest.com/films/filming-under-fire-john-fords-oss-field-photo-branch/?utm
10/12/2024 @ 7:30p
LOCATION: CAMEO Art House Theatre
GENRE: Documentary Short
Filming Under Fire: John Ford’s OSS Field Photo Branch – 21:45 Minutes
Director: Dan Gagliasso
World War II was fought on many fronts. One of them was film.
“Filming Under Fire: John Ford’s OSS Field Photo Branch”
tells the story of how six-time Academy Award-winning director John Ford and many of its leading filmmakers – including cinematographers Harold Rosson, Gregg Toland, and Joe August; screenwriter Budd Schulberg and actor Sterling Hayden – contributed to America’s victory in World War II through their service in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Field Photographic Branch.
They conducted surveillance. They made training films. They shot combat. They created films to boost Americans’ morale and to demoralize the enemy.
General Eisenhower said that if it did nothing else, the intelligence gathered by the Field Photographic Branch in advance of D-Day alone justified OSS’s creation. At the war’s conclusion, it gathered evidence that was instrumental in convicting the Nazi High Command at Nuremberg.
This film is a tribute to their heroic efforts; to Hollywood’s contribution to America’s victory in World War II; and to the enduring power of film in the never-ending struggle for freedom and human dignity – a timely reminder as the free world once again confronts autocratic forces.
Charles Pinck
Producer
Dan Gagliasso
Writer
Dan Gagliasso
Director
Bruce Boxleitner
Narrator
EMOTIONS: Inspired Intrigued
TOPICS: History Slice of Life
TYPE: Documentary War
20. Hezbollah forges new command for crucial ground war after heavy Israeli blows
Rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic or trying to build a new aircraft while in flight?
Hezbollah forges new command for crucial ground war after heavy Israeli blows
By Laila Bassam, Tom Perry and Alexander Cornwell
October 11, 20246:36 AM EDTUpdated 29 min ago
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/after-heavy-israeli-blows-hezbollah-forges-new-command-crucial-ground-war-2024-10-11/?utm
Item 1 of 7 People inspect the site of an Israeli air strike, amid ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, in Beirut, Lebanon, October 11, 2024. REUTERS/Louisa Gouliamaki
[1/7]People inspect the site of an Israeli air strike, amid ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, in Beirut, Lebanon, October 11, 2024. REUTERS/Louisa Gouliamaki Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab
Summary
- Fighters in south getting orders from 'operations room'Tunnels are 'foundation' of battle: Hezbollah field commanderIsraeli analyst sees Hezbollah as 'prepared and waiting'
BEIRUT, Oct 11 (Reuters) - Hezbollah is preparing for a long war of attrition in south Lebanon, after Israel wiped out its top leadership, with a new military command directing rocket fire and the ground conflict, two sources familiar with its operations said.
Hezbollah has been diminished by three weeks of devastating Israeli blows - most notably the killing of its leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. Friends and foes alike are now watching how effectively it resists Israeli troops that have crossed into Lebanon with the stated aim of driving it away from the border.
The Iran-backed group still has a considerable stockpile of weapons, including its most powerful precision missiles which it has yet to use, four sources familiar with its operations said, despite waves of airstrikes that Israel says has severely depleted its arsenal.
Hezbollah's command was disrupted for the first few days after Nasrallah's Sept. 27 assassination until Shi'ite militants established a new "operations room" 72 hours later, the two sources - a Hezbollah field commander and a source close to the group - told Reuters.
Nasrallah was killed, along with other Hezbollah leaders and an Iranian commander, when Israel located and bombed his deep bunker below Beirut.
The new command centre has kept functioning despite subsequent Israeli attacks, meaning fighters in the south are able to fire rockets and fight according to centrally issued orders, according to the sources, who asked not to be named in order to discuss sensitive matters.
A third source, a senior official close to Hezbollah, said the group was now waging a war of attrition.
Avraham Levine, an analyst with Israeli think-tank Alma, said it should be assumed Hezbollah was "well prepared and waiting" for Israeli troops and that it was no easy target.
"The fact that the chain of command has been damaged does not take away the ability to shoot Israeli communities or try to hit" Israeli forces, Levine told Reuters, describing Hezbollah as "the same powerful terror army we all know."
Fighters have the flexibility to carry out orders "according to the capabilities of the front," the Hezbollah field commander said, described the new command as "a narrow circle" in direct contact with the field. It is rare for a Hezbollah field commander to speak to international media.
He said the new command operates in total secrecy and gave no further details about its communications or structure. Hezbollah has not named a new leader after Nasrallah, with the most likely successor also killed. The Shi'ite group's deputy leader Sheikh Naim Qassem said this week he supported ceasefire efforts, but said the group's capabilities were intact.
Another source familiar with Hezbollah's operations said the group's dedicated, fixed-line phone network was "essential" to current communications. Sources have said the network survived attacks on the group's communications in September.
A statement this week signed by the "operations room of the Islamic Resistance" said fighters were resisting incursions and "watching and listening" to Israeli troops where they least expect it - an apparent reference to concealed Hezbollah positions. The statement, the first public acknowledgment of the existence of a new command, did not name its members or say when and in what context it was established.
Hezbollah's media office did not respond to questions for this story. Asked about the situation in Lebanon, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) referred Reuters to previous public statements.
TUNNEL WARFARE
Israel announced on Oct. 1 that ground forces had entered southern Lebanon, initially with commando units, followed by regular armoured units and infantry units. Reservists from the 146th Division are now on the ground, the military said on Tuesday, bringing to four the number of divisions on Lebanese soil.
Israel has not said how many soldiers are on the ground, but an Israeli division usually consists of more than 1,000 fighters.
The troops are fighting close quarters battles with Hezbollah units, Israel says. Twelve Israeli soldiers have been killed in southern Lebanon or north Israel since the start of the operation, it says.
Hezbollah possesses an extensive tunnel network in southern Lebanon, both the group and Israel say. The tunnels grew after the group's 2006 war with Israel, according to a 2021 report by think-tank Alma. Israel estimates they extend for hundreds of kilometres.
The Hezbollah field commander said the tunnels "are the foundation of the battle". Hezbollah had toiled for years to build them, he added. "Their time has come," he said.
Israel's military has released video footage it says shows deep tunnels captured by its soldiers. One video released on Oct. 5 appears to show an underground room equipped with fixed line telephones. Reuters could not verify the date or location of the footage.
The source close to Hezbollah said the tunnels detected by Israel were built for its Radwan special forces units to one day enter the Galilee region of northern Israel. The source said Israel did not know the full extent of the tunnels.
DOWN BUT NOT OUT
Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King's College London, said Hezbollah's capabilities had been degraded but it was still able to fire rockets with intensity onto Israel while keeping their ballistic missiles as weapons of last resort.
Hezbollah says it has stepped up fire in recent days.
Prior to the latest conflict, the World Factbook of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency said Hezbollah possessed upwards of 150,000 missiles and rockets.
The two sources said Hezbollah had chosen not to use its most potent rockets - including precision guided missiles - to keep something in reserve for a long war and to avoid giving Israel a pretext to widen its strikes to Lebanese infrastructure, such as Beirut airport, roads and bridges.
The third source said the group had not targeted Israel's cities, such as Tel Aviv, with its most powerful weapons because such a move would give Israel a reason to hit Lebanon even harder.
There is no doubt Israel has inflicted enormous damage on Hezbollah. In September, thousands of booby-trapped communications devices used by Hezbollah members were detonated - an attack for which Israel has neither confirmed nor denied responsibility.
Beginning Sept. 23, Israel dramatically escalated airstrikes, claiming to have destroyed tens of thousands of Hezbollah rockets mostly in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut's southern suburbs.
Israeli officials have said that the fact that Hezbollah has been firing 100-200 missiles and rockets a day on average and not the thousands expected, shows significant weakening.
Estimates have varied about the scale of Hezbollah's losses, with one Western diplomat saying prior to Nasrallah's killing that up to 25% of the missile capacity had been lost. Reuters has previously reported that Iran had offered to restock its ally, but faced challenges in supply routes.
The Israeli military says it has killed hundreds of Hezbollah fighters, including most of the senior command of the Radwan special forces.
The United States, which deems Hezbollah a terrorist group, said deputy leader Qassem's call on Tuesday for a ceasefire showed it was on the back foot.
GUERRILLA TACTICS
In one deadly engagement last week, concealed Hezbollah fighters attacked Israeli troops as they advanced in the area of Odaisseh, a village in the south, just after Israel had pounded it with artillery and airstrikes, the source close to Hezbollah said.
The Hezbollah fighters used mines and Russian-made Kornet anti-tank missiles in their ambush - the types of weapons used against Israeli forces in a war in southern Lebanon in 2006.
The source appeared to be referring to an incident in which the Israeli military said five soldiers from a commando unit were killed and five others severely wounded in a gunbattle on Oct. 2.
The Israeli military declined to give details beyond its already published statements. That same day, two other soldiers were killed in a separate incident announced by the Israeli army.
Israel says it aims to secure the return of tens of thousands of people who evacuated northern Israel after Hezbollah began firing rockets a year ago in solidarity with Hamas in Gaza.
Lebanese authorities say Israel's offensive has uprooted more than 1 million people in Lebanon - predominantly members of the Shi'ite community from which Hezbollah draws support.
Mohanad Hage Ali of the Beirut-based Carnegie Middle East Center said he expected Israeli forces to advance. "The question is how costly will Hezbollah make it for them?"
The south is steeped in symbolism for Hezbollah. The group was founded by Iran's Revolutionary Guards in the early 1980s, in part to fight an Israeli invasion. It subsequently battled Israel's years-long occupation.
"Fighting Israel on the ground is Hezbollah's bread and butter," said Krieg.
"This is what they have trained to do and most of their defences on the ground were designed" for, he said.
He said Hezbollah wants to send a clear message to Israel, but also to its constituents in Lebanon and allies in the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance that it is still intact and "can inflict considerable harm" on Israel's forces, he said.
Get the latest news and expert analysis about the state of the global economy with the Reuters Econ World newsletter. Sign up here.
Additional reporting by Maya Gebeily in Beirut and James MacKenzie in Jerusalem; Writing by Tom Perry; Editing by Frank Jack Daniel
21. The Price of Victory
Obviously a work of fiction. Is this supposed to be a stand alone story or an excerpt from larger work?
The Price of Victory - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Garrett Chandler · October 11, 2024
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The sound of incoming enemy artillery was a low rumble in the bunker Lieutenant Colonel Duke Rogers stood in, seventy feet below ground. The space, dimly lit by flickering artificial light, was part of a massive underground complex of tunnels, bunkers, and fighting positions that made up the eastern defensive lines in the Ural Mountains. He stood silently, listening to the whir and hum of the 3D printers all around the room. He was in the main logistics bunker of his brigade and around him machines were busy printing the commodities that would keep his force in the fight.
Against the wall to his left was the munitions printer, rapidly churning out small arms bullets from sheets of metal polymer. The new rounds were launched using electromagnetic force and didn’t need any propellant, allowing for full production at the front. On the other side were the medical and food production printers. The food printer combined nutrients together and produced cubes that functioned as meal replacements. To produce medicine, the machines combined the chemicals used to produce pharmaceuticals just like in the old days at factories.
It sounded funny to Rogers to think of the old days. They hadn’t produced things in true manufacturing lines since he was a teenager. Not since the Big War of the 2020s. He had been a private then, at least when it started. That was twenty years ago now. He wasn’t the same kid as he was back then. Back then he was reckless and carefree. He had been promoted quickly, after being in one of the few tanks to survive his first battle. His tank commander had died when an explosively formed penetration round cut through their tank. After that, he did what he had trained to do. He killed enemy tanks. He killed a lot of enemy tanks. He kept doing it too. The Army gave him a medal for it, a Distinguished Service Cross. They commissioned him too. And he chose to stay because of that.
“Colonel Rogers? The boss wants to see you. This way.” Rogers recognized the division commander’s aide, who had entered unnoticed from a tunnel to his right. Rogers followed the lieutenant through a winding, underground maze connecting his series of underground bunkers to the command bunker.
The bunker was surrounded by screens showing maps and video feeds from surveillance above the surface. Intermittent chatter squawked from the radio stations around the room and phones rang. The command room hummed with energy, indicating he had been brought in for a purpose. He crossed to the lean and hawkish-looking figure with shoulder length graying hair standing with arms crossed watching one of the video feeds intently.
“Ma’am, you requested me?” Rogers slammed rigidly to attention a few paces shy of his commander.
“Yes, Steve, I did,” Major General Abigail Rose greeted Rogers using his nickname and gesturing to join her near a map. When he was younger, he picked up the nickname Steve, an homage to a comic book hero, because of his sheer presence and demeanor. He had only known Rose for a few months, but he knew the stories. She was a legend from the Big War. She had been in the Canadian Army, back before the super states existed. She was a lieutenant when that war started but rose quickly to full colonel and commanded a newly formed unit, the 2nd Ground Contact Brigade. It had been a new model, a mixture of tanks, infantry, cyber, artillery, information—all sorts of specialties rolled into one unit. It was a ground portion of the 61st Penetration Division, a unit designed to bludgeon its way through the enemy line and create an opening for follow-on heavy divisions to exploit. As brigade commander she fought the last great battle of the war and lost nearly 80 percent of her unit but held the line and secured the battlefield victory that finally brought peace. The division had earned the “elite” moniker for the fight. She had retired but a new threat of war led her to come back from retirement and the United Western Hemisphere command had rewarded her with command of her old division and a promotion to major general. Rogers now commanded her beloved brigade, having assumed command after the previous commander was killed by enemy shelling the previous month.
“You’ve read the intelligence updates?” Rose queried, gauging Rogers’s response.
“I have, ma’am. They certainly look like this will be their big push,” Rogers peered into the 3D map gazing at his exit points.
“Your assignment is Red Sector on the northern flank. We suspect they’ll use their new buzzsaw penetration method we’ve seen in some of the smaller attacks but on a larger scale. They have three of their heavy divisions with a mix of armor and quad pods,” she said. “Like the smaller buzzsaw attacks, we expect them to form their wedge and protect it using a mix of scout and sensor drones forming screen clouds.”
He had seen the technique before. The enemy liked to form units in the classic cavalry wedge formation with their heavy armor forming the center line and their quad pod vehicles forming the outside edges. The quad pods were small, two-seater, all-terrain gyrospheres that mounted four heavy weapons, which used an electromagnetic-force mechanism to launch large-caliber rounds at thousands of feet per second. It was like rolling around in a ball with four automatic rail guns on it. They were cheap systems that protected the real killers, the energy tanks. To complete their formation, the enemy forces would fly swarms of drones above and on its immediate flanks, which served both to sense locations of enemy positions as well as to absorb the defenders’ fire during an assault. The attack left an ever-widening trail of debris of damaged and destroyed equipment that made it look like sawdust along a cut piece of wood—hence the nickname buzzsaw.
“Once they begin their assault and pass Phase Line Issi 1st Ground Contact Brigade, Stag, will launch their assault from the tunnels on the southern flank of the enemy wedge along Green Sector,” Rose continued. Rogers watched as the formations appeared and began moving along the map as she spoke. “Once the enemy formation crosses Phase Line Hattak you, Fox, will exit your tunnels and attack them from the north. You will be offset of 1st Brigade to prevent friendly fire but the two of you will conduct a double envelopment that cuts off the tip of the enemy wedge so that our artillery and the rest of the allies can destroy the enemy in detail. After you complete the envelopment, 3rd Air Contact Brigade, Bird, will follow you from your tunnel exit and provide overhead cover to shield you from enemy artillery using their antiair and antimissile lasers. This is the decisive operation of II Corps and key to holding the entire line for 3rd Western Hemisphere Army. If we don’t hold here, the People’s Republic of Asia rolls all the way to the Oder River before we can hope to stop them again, if at all. If they get through, they’ll envelop our defensive positions and the pursuit will destroy most of the rest of the Federation of Europe’s Eastern Army. I need you ready to go within a half hour. Any questions?”
“No, ma’am.” Her plan was simple enough. Draw the main enemy force into the corps’s killing space and cut off any support. Simple, effective, but dangerous. As Rogers watched the animation play through the envelopment it returned to the starting point and ran the simulation again, as if to emphasize the simplicity. There was only one thing that made him nervous: once his formation cut off the enemy force, he’d be faced with enemy formations both to the west and the east of his position. And there was a massive enemy force to his east. The mountains offered some protection by canalizing the forces into a narrower space but the seemingly endless enemy forces that would be to his east made him nervous. He would just have to trust the system to function and pray that it would destroy the lead enemy forces to his rear quickly and he could hold on long enough to be reinforced.
“Dismissed!” Rogers turned and entered the maze of tunnels leading to his command.
* * *
“Tom! Bring Sergeant Major Aguirre and join me at the map,” Rogers shouted at his operations officer as he entered his command bunker. Major Thomas Neil was anxious to prove himself to his commander, which Rogers hoped wasn’t going to be a liability. He was competent though and Aguirre, the operations noncommissioned officer that worked with Neil, was a solid and experienced Argentinian that wouldn’t let Neil get into too much trouble.
“Our sector is Red, we attack second. First brigade hits first in Green Sector to the south after the enemy cross Issi and then we hit them with the second attack from the north after they cross Hattak. Hopefully they’ll be so busy trying to respond to the southern attack that we will completely dislodge their momentum and they’ll have to pull back and reset.” Rogers was talking fast and manipulating the 3D map by hand as he spoke. “I want 1st Battalion to do the main penetration with 2nd Battalion focusing on protecting the eastern flank and 3rd Battalion planning to follow and assume the penetration.”
“Yes, sir,” Neil replied before dictating more detailed instructions to the machine that would produce the graphics and instructions he’d pass to the respective battalions. “Sir, will 1st have enough to push through?”
Rogers glanced at the forecasts on the screen next to the 3D map and frowned. “Pull three platoons of energy tanks from 2nd Battalion and task them over to 1st Battalion,” he replied and watched the projections change in real time as the orders were adjusted. “Move one of 1st Battalion’s infantry platoons to 2nd Battalion to try and offset the loss. Maybe that will give them a chance to keep some of the lighter enemy forces back for a while. That will have to be enough—anything else won’t allow any flexibility later. Send it out when you’re done, I’m going to find Al.”
“Yes, sir.” Neil responded, already busy at work with the orders machine that combined the forecasting with the current intelligence and unit status to enable the unit to operate quickly. Rogers walked down another tunnel into a large bay where the commander of his 1st Battalion, Major Allen Ricardo, was walking up and down his formation offering encouragement and last-minute instructions. He stood for a moment watching the energetic Guatemalan as he went from group to group, leaving soldiers grinning in his wake. Ricardo was Rogers stellar new battalion commander. He took command recently, his predecessor having been killed during an enemy airstrike during reception, staging, onward movement and integration. The man was young, having moved quickly through the ranks because of his natural leadership and ability to somehow understand the chaos of a modern battlefield.
“Al, I assume you got the order from Tom?”
“Yes, sir, it came through several minutes ago. I passed along the information to my commanders. We’ll be ready to go shortly. Hummingbird will be lead if you want to stop by and see him. He is over there near the front, by Bay A1,” Ricardo responded, preparing to move along to check on his additional three platoons of energy tanks to make sure they were ready.
“Thanks Al, I will. Do you have any questions?” Rogers asked.
“About the mission, sir? No. I don’t feel great about what happens after we’ve finished the envelopment though. There’s a lot of enemy units behind them.” Ricardo responded glumly.
“I know, Al. I don’t like it either. Once we’ve cut off the lead elements, I plan to shift more combat power to the east, and we will just have to hold until the air support comes and Corps has destroyed most of the cut-off units. Not much else we can do.” Rogers shrugged.
“I know, sir, I just don’t feel good about it,” Ricardo replied.
“I know. We haven’t got much choice though. If only the PRA would just join the space party, we wouldn’t have to worry about it anymore,” Rogers responded.
He was referring to the reason 3rd Western Hemisphere Army was even at the eastern border between the Federation of Europe and the People’s Republic of Asia. After the Big War, the large transnational corporations had merged and seized control of the old national governments. The Westphalian world order had fallen after nearly 220 million people died in the war. In their place, the four super states had emerged. The companies realized they could control all resources and labor rules in their entire supply chains if they controlled the entire chain. In some ways, it was a natural step of globalization. North and South America had merged, along with much of the Pacific islands and Australia, into the United Western Hemisphere. Europe had federalized, becoming the Federation of Europe and allied with United Western Hemisphere. They included much of the populated areas of former Russia, all the way to the Ural Mountains. The African Empire formed and expanded to the Tigris River and included most of Turkey, to the east side of the Bosporus Straits. The rest of Asia fell under the People’s Republic of Asia. The United Western Hemisphere and Federation of Europe alliance had worked out a deal with the African Empire on space colonization to reduce overpopulation and resource problems. The People’s Republic of Asia had vetoed the whole deal because its leaders thought it would put them at a disadvantage and wanted to unify the planet under one umbrella—their umbrella—before turning outward.
“I’ll be right behind you when we leave. We’ll do a comms check at five minutes before our departure time, so you’ve got about ten minutes to finish up here,” Rogers closed down the discussion. They just didn’t have the time to talk about their concerns more. They needed to leave in about fifteen minutes. They just had to trust that the planning models would be relatively accurate and every unit would do its part. He walked toward the front bays.
Rogers stopped to briefly go over the plan with Sam “Hummingbird” West. The guy was brilliant. He was Tohono O’odham and graduated top of his class from an Ivy League school. He had a chance for a job at the governmental corporation staff but turned it down to serve in the military. He was strapping on his sleek helmet and testing its heads-up display.
West was standing next to his command tank, which almost resembled a type of flatbed pickup. It had two tracks on each side, smaller than the big tracks of older tanks, and a turret in the front that was also smaller than its predecessors. The battery pack that powered the tank and the energy cannon ran along the V-shaped hull at the bottom, under the crew members, partially protecting them from blasts that came underneath. The flat back housed a series of mechanical arms that the automated repair system would use to fix or replace problems with the tank without the crew members needing to exit the vehicle and enabling them to stay in a battle.
The crew of three sat in the front in the turret. They typically used a camera projection system that allowed them to see outside the vehicle to drive and shoot without having the old vents or windows used to see. Those now acted as backup options in the event systems went down. These tanks were smaller and less armored than their ancestors to be more agile and harder to see, which increased their survivability on the modern battlefield. Instead of relying on heavy armor for protection, the tank had a microwave-sized box that sat on the back of the turret and functioned as an antimissile laser system and antidrone electronic warfare system. The main weapon system was an energy cannon that could fire a pulse every six seconds without need of a loader or munitions. The energy pulse itself was mostly invisible to the naked eye but was tinged in blue to help the crew track shots. The pulse killed by slamming into its target like a shock wave.
“You ready, Sam?” Rogers asked.
“Yes, sir! The sooner we get this over with the sooner I can start to see the galaxy!” West grinned. Across the brigade it was well known that his true desire was to see other planets through the planned colonization project that had led to the conflict.
“All right, be smart and go get them.,” Rogers replied before heading off to mount his command tank.
“Command, this is Fox 6, we’re in position, over.”
“Fox 6, this is Command, roger that. Stag stirred up a hornet’s nest. Launch when ready, out.”
He flicked the radio to his internal brigade net. “Lightning 6, this is Fox 6, they’ve passed Phase Line Hattak. Let’s go.” Lightning was Rogers’s first battalion.
“Fox 6, Lightning 6. We’re on our way.”
* * *
Blinding light burst through the tunnel opening before the auto-dimming features corrected the lighting on the screens as Rogers’s tank whirred and rumbled out at high speed. As he crested the tunnel, he quickly surveyed the space, taking in readings that flashed in front of his face and showed his and enemy forces disappearing off the 3D visual as units were annihilated. His driver zigzagged around hunks of steel and smoldering carcasses of tanks, quad pods, and aircraft. Constant movement was the key to survival.
Blue energy pulses flashed back and forth, tossing tanks dozens of feet aside and bending them like they’d been swatted by a giant invisible hand. Dust kicked up all around Rogers’s tank and he heard a faint buzz as his vehicle’s defensive electronic warfare kit engaged the enemy drone, which tumbled heavily to the ground.
“Lightning 6, status report!” Rogers tried to keep his voice calm amid the chaos around him.
“This is . . . 6. . . . The . . . too many . . .” came the broken reply.
“Say again Lightning 6, they’re jamming your transmission. Change wavelengths.”
“Fox 6, this is Lightning 6. The penetration is almost complete but they’re pushing around our flank. There’s too many of them to hold. We need support on the flank!” Ricardo reported. His transmission was clear this time, having switched his comms system to a new wavelength to avoid the jamming.
“Roger. Help is on the way. Fox 6, out.” Rogers spent the next moments relaying information back and forth, helping to ensure all his subordinates had a good understanding of what was happening. That was difficult because his formation had created a chokepoint halting the progress of the enemy formation. As the enemy forces looked for a way around his formation, Rogers’s unit was in danger of being surrounded like a rock in a flowing river if air support didn’t arrive soon.
“Command, this is Fox 6. Do we have an ETA on air support? Over.”
“Fox 6, this is Command. They are departing in two minutes, over.” Rogers breathed a sigh of relief. Their air support was on the way and the two ground brigades would no longer be facing multiple enemy divisions alone.
Moments later the comms system came alive again. “Fox 6, this is Command. We’re still working on trying to destroy the cut off forces, I need you to hold the rest of them back.”
“Roger Command, we’ll do our best.” Rogers glanced at an alert that flicked across his screen indicating his second battalion command group had been eliminated and shifted his map to show his left flank disposition. The live feed report showed the battalion’s combat power was down to 67 percent and dropping rapidly. The unit’s position was barely visible among the swarm of red icons overwhelming it. He ordered his third battalion to reinforce the position, hoping the two battalions together could hold until air support arrived.
A massive explosion was followed quickly by three more and slewed Rogers’s tank to the right. It crashed into a rock formation and barrel-rolled to a stop over forty feet away. Miraculously he stayed conscious and the emergency systems detached the turret and enabled him to crawl out. Blood dripping from his ears and his left leg useless he dragged himself to the side of his tank. A quick glance back at the tank showed him that the rest of his crew was not so lucky.
“Command, this is Fox 6 on foot. The tunnel exit is blocked. Air support is going to have to find another way. We need another path back to friendly lines too.” Rogers groaned as he propped himself up.
“Fox 6, this is Command. You’ll have to push through and pull back with Stag. We will try to send air around that way. I need you to buy some time. Keep them busy at all costs!”
He switched his radio back to the brigade net. “Lightning 6, this is Fox 6. We need to drive through to Stag and exfiltrate with them. Our tunnel is blown.”
“Fox 6, this is Lightning 6. That’s a negative, they just sent another division between us and Stag. We aren’t going to make it.” Ricardo stayed calm despite the desperate situation.
“Command, this is Fox 6. We can’t make it to Stag, we need air support.”
“Fox 6, this is Command. Understood, just hold them back and we will send help.”
Rose removed her headset as Major Neil ran into the command bunker, out of breath. He had sprinted from his own operations bunker after losing communications with his brigade commander. Neil watched as Rose turned to the battle captain next to her. “Tell them to blow the tunnel and bring the air support back to the final defense of the mountain line.” The entire command bunker went silent.
“They’ll all die!” Neil gasped.
Rose turned toward him, her piercing eyes burning with emotion at having to give the brutal order. “I know,” she replied soberly. “But we’ve done our job.” She walked out of the command post into the tunnel. Once out of sight her shoulders slumped, and she leaned against the wall and wept for the loss of her beloved division.
* * *
Over three thousand kilometers to the east the largest amphibious landing force that had ever been assembled stormed ashore along the Artic coast in northeast Asia. Deep behind enemy lines, the assault that would end the war had begun. The defense in the Urals had pulled most of the enemy forces into a bloody fight in the mountains as a deception that would allow an invasion to succeed. But it came at the cost of the best unit in the United Western Hemisphere Army. That was the price of victory.
Garrett Chandler is the brigade execute officer of 4th Combat Aviation Brigade and a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Garrett Chandler · October 11, 2024
22. Army Battalions Don’t Have Organic Cyber Intelligence Capabilities—Here’s Why They Should
Army Battalions Don’t Have Organic Cyber Intelligence Capabilities—Here’s Why They Should - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jacob Scheidemann · October 11, 2024
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Would you send a unit to war without adequate, organic protection from the threats it’s most likely to face? On its surface, the answer seems obvious. But when it comes to cyber threats, every Army battalion is effectively in this situation, reliant on external defenses, with little visibility on how or when these defenses are employed to protect it.
The US military represents a target-rich environment for evolving cyber threat actors intent on, for instance, extracting sensitive personally identifiable information, standard operating procedures, deployment plans, and technological data. A majority of cyber assets, however, operate from within the confines of higher-echelon units, removed from the kinetic happenings of battle. While this organization is effective in centralizing cybersecurity for operational and strategic prevention and response purposes, current Department of Defense structure leaves tactical-level units like Army battalions vulnerable to the tactical effects of cyber warfare. Remedying this vulnerability requires creative organizational solutions, developed and implemented before such efforts are too late. One simple idea? Push cyber expertise down to this level.
The Army can the systemic lack of tactical cyber threat intelligence by integrating cyber professionals into S2 shops—organic battalion staff intelligence sections. These sections traditionally serve to inform all-source intelligence requirements for battlefield commanders alongside other staff planning and garrison duties. S2 leaders are often knowledgeable in the deployment and analysis of a range of a range of intelligence disciplines—including human, signal, and geospatial intelligence—but cyber threat intelligence is a specialization left for higher-level commands. Adding just one service member who is skilled in identifying indicators of compromise and adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures into battalion intelligence sections can prove invaluable during tactical and operational decision-making.
Today’s real-world conflicts illustrate how executing defensive cyber capabilities at low levels of warfighting is necessary in preventing malicious activities. During the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, for example, cyber warfare is arguably Russia’s biggest military success, as state-sponsored actors affiliated with Russia’s military intelligence agency continue to successfully target various layers of cyberspace to disrupt Ukrainian operations. For example, the exploitation of Delta, a Ukrainian software designed to synchronize intelligence and targeting, illustrates how cyber intrusions increasingly represent significant threats to tactical forces.
For the US Army, adding organic cyber personnel into battalion intelligence staff sections would represent a crucial step toward safeguarding against attacks that higher-level echelons cannot observe or mitigate in the field. For instance, Russia’s hacking of Delta was initiated through phishing of military email accounts belonging to Ukrainian soldiers, disrupting shared situational awareness, battle tracking, and command and control. Phishing allows cyber actors initial access into vulnerable systems to install malware via a single click of a malicious link inside an email. This attack vector can bypass deliberate defenses of brigade cyber teams, introducing crippling vulnerabilities at the service member level. When targeted by malicious phishing or other attack vectors such as credential harvesting, battalion tactical operations centers, counterfire cells, and command nodes can be degraded instantly. The United States employs troop-monitoring technologies similar to Ukraine’s Delta software, including the Joint Battle Command Platform and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, depicting how key takeaways from ongoing conflicts must inform the deliberate evolution of cyber intelligence structuring in the US Army—and across the Department of Defense—to protect critical warfighting capabilities.
The largest challenge of dispersing cyber experts to battalions, of course, logistical. The Army would require creative policies to meet the manpower demand. For example, United States Army Cyber Command has 16,500 personnel, but many of these are civilian employees and contractors. And the uniformed personnel in the command are already gainfully employed, working on a wide variety of cyber mission sets. Adding an additional cyber threat intelligence analyst, noncommissioned officer, or officer to each battalion would be impossible without recruiting and training more cyber professionals. And yet, there are solutions. The Army could expand incentivization efforts to recruit cyber service members, seek voluntary branch transfers from current warfighters, or address vulnerabilities through triage. Certainly, not every battalion requires organic cyber defense capabilities to make measurable progress toward reducing vulnerability at the tactical level. The Army could start reorganization by enhancing intelligence sections of battalions that represent the most likely threats of state-sponsored targeting. For example, to protect indirect fire and maneuver, cyber threat intelligence could be integrated into combat arms battalions first. Likewise, the threat picture of deployed units is inherently greater than commands in garrison. As such, the Army could attach cyber experts to deploying units during ramp-up training cycles and while overseas to enhance tactical prevention, mitigation, and response efforts of the Army’s most vulnerable organizations.
After appropriate reorganizational steps are initiated, integrating cyber threat intelligence into battalion S2 shops would be a streamlined process. Critics might argue that integrating cyber threat analysts at the battalion level might disrupt into existing intelligence teams or that S2 shops might not have the knowledge necessary to make use of the capability, but there is little basis for either claim. Cyber threat intelligence analysts are best informed through both classified and unclassified means—just like their all-source counterparts. Moreover, many cyber analyst tools are openly available online, and even in communications-degraded environments, experts can still harden vulnerabilities without an internet connection. Furthermore, battalion staff sections are accustomed to integrating and overseeing diverse, complementary capabilities. For example, leaders within battalion communications sections oversee radio, information technology, and network solutions, which would be all but impossible for officers in charge to fully deploy without leveraging in-house expertise. Intelligence shop heads can likewise manage cyber threat intelligence by synchronizing organic cyber expertise with knowledge of existing systems and all-source personnel.
A major restructuring of Army cyber capabilities will not occur quickly. However, time is not on the Army’s side, as cyber threats evolve and vulnerabilities grow. Just one catastrophic intrusion can alter the tide of battle in any conflict defined by interconnected technological systems. The time to act is now, and the Army should deliberately investigate adopting new cyber threat intelligence capabilities at lower operational levels before it is too late.
Jacob Scheidemann is a current cyber threat intelligence analyst and intelligence management graduate student. A prior active duty Army officer with previous intelligence leadership roles in INDOPACOM and CENTCOM, Jake is also a routine contributor of national intelligence writing to platforms including the Military Times.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Edric Thompson, US Army
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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jacob Scheidemann · October 11, 2024
23. Putin’s Greatest Weakness
We should be particularly good at exploiting grievances since we seem to do it so well in US domestic politics. (note my sarcasm)
Excerpts:
For maximum effect, any sustained information campaign should be connected to the broader economic, diplomatic, and military strategies and coordinated between Ukraine and its allies. The Ukrainians are fighting for their lives and can take the lead on the most subversive communications efforts connected to their own military actions. In turn, larger allies like the UK and the United States can assist with public diplomacy, research, timely policies, and information about military assistance and economic statecraft, as well as reorienting communication channels to target ordinary mainstream Russians rather than the liberal audiences reached by most current initiatives. Front-line states in the Baltics can focus on border regions of Russia, which have taken the greatest economic hit from the war. There is a role for civil society, too: governments no longer dominate the means of communication as they did in World War II. Some of the most innovative campaigns can come from private-sector activists--though these will be more effective if their independent activity aligns with a broader strategy.
So far, however, the United States and its European allies have failed to take advantage of the Kremlin’s structural vulnerabilities. Instead, they tend to remain in a reactive mode, preoccupied with redlines and fears of Russian escalation. During each of the major shocks that have struck the Kremlin since the war started, they have stepped back and let Moscow recalibrate, recover, and come back even stronger. This is what is happening now with the Kursk offensive. After a few weeks of panic, the Kremlin appears to be getting its propaganda strategy back in order—telling Russians to be calm and not await any speedy liberation of the Kursk region. As it doubles down on its assault in the Donbas, the Kremlin is glad to have the Kursk problem fade from view. Ukraine’s allies cannot afford to squander the next time the Russian propaganda system is thrown into confusion, when its seeming total control slips to reveal the incompetence and apathy underneath.
Putin’s Greatest Weakness
To Break the Kremlin’s War Machine, the West Must Exploit the Grievances and Fears of Ordinary Russians
October 11, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by How to Win an Information War: The Propagandists Who Outwitted Hitler · October 11, 2024
In early August, as Ukrainian forces burst across the Russian border on their way to capturing some 385 square miles of Russian territory in the Kursk region, the Kremlin maintained it had everything under control: state media reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin was competently organizing relief efforts for the region’s inhabitants and directing the army to crush the invaders. “The military says Kyiv has failed to achieve its goal of securing a foothold in the Russian region,” the state-run RT network reported a day after the invasion began.
On Russian social media, the mood was less sanguine. Catching Russia’s military leadership completely by surprise, Ukraine forces had overrun the border and taken hundreds of Russian prisoners. Tens of thousands of residents had fled. And in the days and weeks that followed, Russian forces seemed unable to mount a significant counterattack. Two Majors, one of the most popular pro-war nationalist channels on the Telegram messaging app, which has 1.2 million subscribers, complained about the incompetence of the army chief, Valery Gerasimov, “and his patrons in the Kremlin.” Normally, direct criticism of the Russian president is rare on state-controlled social media, but now Putin himself was a target. “He is ruining the country,” went a comment on OK, the Russian social media platform popular among an older demographic. “I wish he’d shoot himself already. It’s sickening to watch.”
Nor were these isolated statements. According to Filter Labs, a data analytics company I have advised that uses AI to analyze Russian social media, state media and economics data, online sentiment toward Putin dropped precipitously after the Kursk offensive began and remained negative throughout August. The tenor of many of these negative comments was not subtle: “Our great strategist seems to have shit himself, there’s more to come,” one wrote. Another even made explicit the failure of Russian propaganda: “On TV we are crushing the [Ukrainian slur], occupying settlements one by one, and everything is going well for us,” the commenter wrote. “But in reality, they are bombing the Belgorod region, they have invaded Kursk, they are bombing cities in the Russian hinterland, and terrorist attacks [in Russia] are happening one after another.”
According to Filter Labs, this collapse in public support for Putin hadn’t been seen since the attempted coup by Wagner paramilitary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in the summer of 2023. In the weeks since the Kursk upheaval, several popular pro-war Telegram channels have deleted their most anti-Kremlin comments from the summer. But near the frontlines, public sentiment has not recovered. Even Russian opinion polling, whose findings experts often worry yield responses that are too pro-regime, showed a three-week dip in Putin’s popularity. The usual 60 percent who “fully approve” of Putin’s leadership dipped to 50 percent.
“He is ruining the country,” wrote one commenter on OK, the Russia social media platform.
These findings point to an underlying problem in Putin’s information system. From the outset of its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the government has stifled liberal media in Russia, forcing independent news organizations to either close down or move out of the country and blocking access to platforms, like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. Since the war began, Putin has allowed many major pillars of the Russian state—the army, Federal Security Service, presidential administration, and mercenary forces—to oversee their own popular pro-war social media and especially Telegram channels, which they use to attack one another and push their own interests. In addition to promoting Kremlin policies, this allows Putin to balance power among these power centers and keep each on their toes. Meanwhile, ordinary Russians get to vent some of their frustrations on social media—as long as they don’t criticize the leader or the decision to wage war.
In moments of crisis like the Kursk invasion, however, this combination of official propaganda and intra-elite online checks and balances buckles. These breakdowns do not mean that there is some hidden mass movement inside Russia supporting liberal ideas or opposing the war. But they do reveal a central weakness in the Kremlin’s propaganda system, one that is not simply about exposing the Kremlin’s disinformation about its war crimes or denigration of Ukrainians. Debunking the lies, hate speech, and incitement to genocide is morally right and crucial to establishing truth. But challenging such concocted stories inside Russia is unlikely to undermine Putin’s war machine, or the regime’s grip on Russian society.
Instead, the key vulnerabilities in Putin’s information system are about the limits of control and how that affects the regime’s overall confidence in its ability to wage war. Ukraine’s international partners need to understand the specific ways that information flows are organized in Russia; which agendas, media, and audiences the Kremlin thinks are important to enable its war effort; and how these relationships can be disrupted.
GHOST HOSPITALS AND MISSING EGGS
The cracks in the Kremlin’s control over what Russians say and do lie along two axes: long-term grievances that the regime struggles to manage, and sudden shocks that are too complex for its propaganda model to contain.
As Maria Snegovaya of Georgetown University has observed, the Kremlin has consistently managed to build popular support for its wars—even before the era of high censorship that exists today. For example, in September 2015, on the cusp of Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war, the Levada Center, an independent Russian polling organization, found that 69 percent of the population opposed providing direct military assistance to the Syrian government. Within a month, however, opinion had dramatically shifted: 72 percent supported the Kremlin’s bombing campaign in Syria. Similarly, in December 2021, only eight percent of Russians thought Russia should send military troops to fight against the Ukrainian government. By February 2022, however, 68 percent supported the Russian troops’ actions in Ukraine, a figure that rose to 80 percent in March.
Although such swings may simply seem to show the population adapting to regime policies, survey data have also revealed an important connection between popular support for war and Russians’ sense of national identification. In studies, for example, Russians have shown a correlation between high levels of collective narcissism (the idea that Russia is superior to other countries), collective resentment (the belief that Russians are denigrated by outsiders) and backing the war. Thus, when the Kremlin argues that Russia should go to war in the name of its historic empire and to show the world it is “great again,” it is exploiting attitudes that are already present in the Russian population.
Even now, after more than two and a half years of fighting, most polling shows Russians generally displaying support, or at least acquiescence, to the war, though some dents appear to be showing. In the highly censored online environment, there are few complaints about the extraordinary rates of Russian losses, let alone expressions of sympathy for Ukrainians. Yet people do worry openly when the war affects their own self-interests.
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaking with security officials about the situation in Kursk, in Moscow, August 2024
Gavriil Grigorov / Sputnik / Reuters
Consider medical services. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine state spending in this sector decreased sharply, while spending on defense increased. In its 2023 budget, the Kremlin cut spending on medical services by 23 percent—a dramatic decline. On social media people complained of long wait times for basic medical services due to staff shortages, equipment like ventilators being out of order, and a lack of vaccines and chemotherapy. The overall sentiment toward medical services on social media dropped. In a March 2024 study of the effects of Russian propaganda, Filter Labs showed that to make up for this, state media gave lavish attention to new medical investments that the government was purportedly making and how Russian medical companies were overcoming Western sanctions. The propaganda offensive briefly boosted public sentiment, but people’s own experiences told a different story, and their opinions around this issue soon crashed again.
The government has faced some of the same challenges on economic issues. Amid persistent high inflation, Russians even in the most prosperous regions have complained that their salaries are worth less and less. Household debt has gone up: 16.9 percent between 2021 and 2022, and another 18.1 percent between 2022 and 2023. Russians have made increasing use of short-term loans and even payday loans. The Kremlin has responded by promoting the fact that salaries are increasing, including in poor regions like Buryatiya, in southern Siberia. Meanwhile the Central Bank and Ministry of Labor have funded a special public education program on financial literacy to warn of the dangers of payday loans and microloans. And there are now signs that after two years of consumer confidence fuelled by the war economy, anxiety is now increasing: the Levada “consumer confidence index” dipped by 8 percent in August—at the same moment the Kursk incursion was underway. Increasingly Russians say their economic situation has declined over the past year and that they worry about the future.
Economic worries are often a foremost concern for soldiers’ families, too. The Kremlin is now offering extravagant salaries and signing bonuses of up to $38,000 to men who sign contracts with the army. As one recruitment poster put it: “While serving your Motherland for glory, you’ll be able to complete house renovation and buy new appliances for your kitchen.” But when I spoke to journalists who still cover the poorer regions where many soldiers come from, they told me that families in these areas are far more concerned about the government not paying compensation for dead soldiers. Some fear that fallen soldiers are left on the battlefield on purpose so that the state never has to identify the dead and thus avoids paying out.
At times, Russians’ economic worries have erupted into violence. As exiled Russian media analyst and Fellow at the University of Southern California, Vasily Gatov explains, when eggs became scarce early last year, some people began attacking poultry farmers. The episode says much about the sometimes paradoxical effects of Kremlin propaganda: amid rumors of supply chain problems and price hikes, the Kremlin made a heavy-handed campaign telling people there were plenty of eggs. The result was that people assumed the opposite and rushed to buy all available eggs, augmenting the crisis.
PROPAGANDA PARALYSIS
To anyone paying attention, there is often a striking gap between calm-sounding Russian news reports and the discontent about the same developments on Russian social media. Alongside long-run economic issues, the Kremlin’s propaganda machine has had an even harder time dealing with massive, unexpected shocks related to the war. Putin’s partial mobilization in fall 2022, for example, precipitated an unexpected mass emigration. Online, the Kremlin pushed positive news about the measure, which improved public attitudes for about two weeks—before they crashed again. So the Kremlin did more messaging around the issue, only to find public sentiment falling again. With each wave of propaganda, the Kremlin’s ability to maintain public support for mobilization became less effective.
Or take the startling rebellion by Prigozhin in June 2023. As Prigozhin’s Wagner army marched toward Moscow, Kremlin state media simply went silent as they waited for instructions. It also quickly became clear that Russia’s elites, the military, and the broader public were not particularly concerned to stop the mutineers. As the country followed events with cool curiosity, some popular Russian military bloggers took Prigozhin’s side. In the end, Prigozhin never pressed home his advantage, and two months later, he was eliminated in a plane crash. But the episode showed how easily the Kremlin’s propaganda machine can jam—and that when it does, Russia’s various arms of power will not rush to the president’s aid, waiting instead for their chance to pounce.
The Kursk incursion is now the most recent such shock. In the weeks since the Ukrainian offensive began, the government has continually tried to downplay the operation and claim that Russian forces are taking care of the problem. But it has been difficult for Moscow to hide the first major invasion on Russian soil since World War II. Even local state news dared to criticize Putin’s response. “Kursk Region Residents Believe That the Government Has Abandoned Them,” ran one headline.
Russians with a sign, "There are peaceful people in the basement, no soldiers," Kursk region, Russia, August 2024
Yan Dobronosov / Reuters
In each of these shocks, the Kremlin has shown an inability to handle unforeseen events. In the immediate aftermath of both the Kursk incursion and Prigozhin’s mutiny, Russian state television, used to being directed from above, was left to flounder. When the state-controlled media aren’t immediately instructed what position to take, when Telegram nationalists let their emotions get the better of them and are not being issued clear orders, then suddenly the patriotic pseudo-pluralism cultivated by the regime collapses, leaving the regime exposed and inept.
It may be tempting to conclude that Putin’s strongman rule is impervious to temporary dips in manipulating public discourse and behavior. But even in Russia, these shifts are important, because they show that the state is not able to control society at will. Consider the weird Russian ritual of elections, despite the fact that everyone knows Putin will win. As Stephen Holmes and Ivan Krastev argued as early as 2012, the Kremlin relies on blatant voter fraud and on instructing state employees how to vote. The aim is not to convince anyone that these elections are free and fair but to show that the government is capable of rigging them—and that it has the power to get the country to play along in the farce.
Thus, any perceived erosion of Kremlin control over public speech and behavior threatens Putin’s tsar-like status. For the regime, it also likely brings back bad memories from the late Soviet era. The current Kremlin elites saw how easily control was lost in 1989 when central Europe slipped quickly away from Moscow’s grip, and again in 1991 when the seemingly solid Soviet Union collapsed. Today, Putin is constantly on the lookout for any signs of a repeat and has shaped his approach accordingly. When the leadership sees itself losing control over social discourse and behavior, it changes policy. Sometimes the Kremlin increases censorship. But it can also simply reverse an unpopular plan. Thus, the Kremlin has so far refrained from another mobilization, despite the military’s urgent manpower needs. And on the battlefield itself, whenever Ukrainian forces push Russia back, as they did with Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Putin retreats instead of risking a situation where he is no longer in control.
As Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski argued in September, if the West wants to stop Russia, it needs to change Putin’s calculations about the risks and costs he faces at home for waging the war now and new ones in the future. Doing so will require victories on the battlefield, effective economic warfare, diplomatic unity, and the necessary rearmament of Ukrainian forces. But information has a crucial role to play, as well, one that has already been shown in some of the largest wars of the twentieth century.
PRODDING THE PIG-DOG
The effort to influence Russian discourse and behavior is not unlike the challenge faced by the United Kingdom toward the citizens of Nazi Germany in World War II. At first, the British hoped they could encourage a democratic countermovement in Germany. But they ultimately realized it was hopeless. Whatever liberal values individual Germans might have privately held, there was no serious pro-democratic movement to support. Observing the popular national front that Hitler had spent years building, Lord John Reith, the British minister of information and founder of the BBC, concluded, “There may be discontent but it has no voice. . . . It is the war machine you have to beat.”
Two years into the war, however, British communication efforts pivoted. Although some parts of the government continued to hope that a democratic vision of Germany could still be achieved, a new section inside the Political Warfare Executive, the body that oversaw all British foreign communication efforts, tried a more pragmatic approach: it would organize dozens of subversive radio stations, leaflets, and newspapers focused on the economy, the splits between the army and the Nazi party, the tensions between Germany and its allies, and the repressed anger that many ordinary Germans felt toward bureaucrats. The aim was not to turn Germans into democrats but to engage what Sefton Delmer, the head of special operations at the PWE, called Germans’ inner “pig-dog”: the anger, jealousy, and desire to look out for oneself that can often undermine state propaganda about “national greatness.”
The British focused on the repressed anger that many ordinary Germans felt toward Nazi bureaucrats.
The British campaign was not entirely successful. Stations that masked their origin were quickly found out—as they would be today. Delmer would come to regret some of his experiments with disinformation, which he felt “boomeranged” back onto the allies: a warning to anyone who wants to imitate that sort of tactic today. But when the British team worked out which real information triggered ordinary Germans, the engagement was impressive.
By 1943, senior SS officials were bemoaning the subversive effect of the British-run German-language stations, which became amongst the three most popular in Munich. Snap polls the British conducted with German prisoners of war showed that by 1944, some 50 percent tuned in to the broadcasts. The details of soldiers’ lives and the dirt on internal Nazi corruption that was dished up by these stations was so rich that it made Nazi leaders suspect leaks from inside the elite—leading to paranoia and arrests.
CONFOUNDING THE KREMLIN
Like their British counterparts eighty years ago, Ukraine’s Western allies also need to refocus the way they harness information against their enemy. To the extent that there are any Western-backed communication efforts into Putin’s Russia—and there are very few, such as those overseen by the US Agency for Global Media or World Services of the BBC—they largely engage the country’s small population of liberals and follow the logic of classic Western journalism. By challenging the Kremlin’s lies and false narratives around the war, this work keeps the flame of truth alight and is a wise investment for the future, helping to develop a postimperial vision of Russia that doesn’t define itself by enslaving and dominating others. But to actively undermine Russia’s war machine now, Kyiv and its partners will need to launch more targeted communications efforts.
Firstly, Europe and the United States need to find ways to exploit and exacerbate Putin’s lack of control, particularly at moments of heightened disorder. Coming on the heels of Kursk, another such shock—such as suddenly granting Ukraine the right to strike targets inside Russia, causing a new wave of uncertainty throughout the country—might have put the Kremlin in a situation in which it felt it was losing its hold over Russian society. There are many other kinds of moves that could create similar shocks. Unlike the complex choices surrounding military actions and authorizations, information initiatives bear little risk of leading to direct military escalation: indeed, Russia has itself long exploited this fact, by attacking democracies through information warfare, recognizing that there is little the West can do to respond. While the United States and its European partners do not need to imitate Russia’s use of disinformation, they, too, can profit from this non-military strategy.
At the Russian border in Sumy region, Ukraine, August 2024
Viacheslav Ratynskyi / Reuters
New research on the Kremlin’s efforts to manage what Russians say and do during the war suggests a range of potential topics for public information campaigns into the country. One concerns the army and families of soldiers, surfacing issues about financial compensation for those killed in action. Imagine if, during the recent Kursk operation, Ukraine and its allies had already established a major communication channel aimed at Russian soldiers and their families, as the British radio broadcasts did with German soldiers in World War II. It could have been used to decrease morale and encourage defections at a moment of panic. Such a project could also include discrete channels aimed at different branches of the Russian system: the Federal Security Service and police, the army, and mercenary soldiers. Another focus could be on issues of perennial concern to the general population, such as health care and the economy. By continually undermining the Kremlin’s control over what people say and do, such efforts would make the Russian leadership less confident in its ability to contain the domestic costs of its foreign policy.
For maximum effect, any sustained information campaign should be connected to the broader economic, diplomatic, and military strategies and coordinated between Ukraine and its allies. The Ukrainians are fighting for their lives and can take the lead on the most subversive communications efforts connected to their own military actions. In turn, larger allies like the UK and the United States can assist with public diplomacy, research, timely policies, and information about military assistance and economic statecraft, as well as reorienting communication channels to target ordinary mainstream Russians rather than the liberal audiences reached by most current initiatives. Front-line states in the Baltics can focus on border regions of Russia, which have taken the greatest economic hit from the war. There is a role for civil society, too: governments no longer dominate the means of communication as they did in World War II. Some of the most innovative campaigns can come from private-sector activists--though these will be more effective if their independent activity aligns with a broader strategy.
So far, however, the United States and its European allies have failed to take advantage of the Kremlin’s structural vulnerabilities. Instead, they tend to remain in a reactive mode, preoccupied with redlines and fears of Russian escalation. During each of the major shocks that have struck the Kremlin since the war started, they have stepped back and let Moscow recalibrate, recover, and come back even stronger. This is what is happening now with the Kursk offensive. After a few weeks of panic, the Kremlin appears to be getting its propaganda strategy back in order—telling Russians to be calm and not await any speedy liberation of the Kursk region. As it doubles down on its assault in the Donbas, the Kremlin is glad to have the Kursk problem fade from view. Ukraine’s allies cannot afford to squander the next time the Russian propaganda system is thrown into confusion, when its seeming total control slips to reveal the incompetence and apathy underneath.
Foreign Affairs · by How to Win an Information War: The Propagandists Who Outwitted Hitler · October 11, 2024
24. I was rescued from Hurricane Helene by the military — and all I got was a lousy TikTok conspiracy
Disinformation is correct. And it is easy to see who are the purveyors of disinformation (we have met the enemy and he is us).
I was rescued from Hurricane Helene by the military — and all I got was a lousy TikTok conspiracy
PERSPECTIVES: This is how disinformation on social media drowns out legitimate criticisms of our government
By Minda Honey | MHoney@reckonmedia.comOpens in new window
October 10, 2024 at 10:00 am CDT
reckon.news · by Opens in new window
Hurricane Helene Rescue According to a press release from North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper on Sunday, Oct. 6, more than 6,500 people and counting have been rescued by “1,700 North Carolina National Guard and 1,000 active-duty military personnel.” (Minda Honey, Peter Zay/Getty Images/AFP)
You know that moment in the movies when the rescue helicopter crests over the trees and the people down below throw their arms in the air in relief, hearts surging with joy? Yeah, that’s about how it feels in real life to be saved by the military.
I was on the phone with my sister, three days into being stranded without electricity or running water on a mountain at a retreat 90-minutes outside of Asheville in the aftermath of Hurricane Helene. I could only get a call out by standing in a specific spot and by holding my phone at a particular angle. I hadn’t cried once until that moment. Not when the power went out. Not when we were informed our supply of drinking water was “limited.” Not when I learned that due to the surrounding devastation — the towns below us at the foot of the mountain had been completely wiped out by flooding — that it was likely it would be another week before help could reach us. Felled trees and mudslides were blocking or had destroyed every road in our direction.
The first hurricane to slam into this region of the country and the deadliest mainland hurricane since Katrina, The National Weather Service is reporting that the storm dumped over 30 inches of rain in some areas, causing catastrophic flooding. Early estimates from the state’s Department of Insurance put the damage at over $17 billion, making it one of the costliest storms ever to hit the state.
We did what we could to make peace with the reality that we wouldn’t be going home any time soon—but a lot can change in a matter of hours during a crisis.
So less than 24 hours after being told we’d be stranded another five to seven days, the military was sent in to evacuate us. “Do you hear that?” I asked my sister over the phone as the sound of blades chopping through the air roared overhead. I looked up just in time to see the military helicopter appear in the blue, blue sky, and I immediately burst into tears.
Let me reiterate, although it might have felt like a movie, this was real life. This is important to state because social media agents of disinformation would have you believe that there has been little to no government assistance in the areas decimated by Hurricane Helene. This is simply untrue. Not only did the helicopter that carried our group to safety sport ARMY on its tail, NPR reports that FEMA “has provided more than $137 million in assistance to six states in the southeast, including 7,000 federal personnel, nearly 15 million meals, 14 million liters of water, 157 generators and more than half a million tarps.”
A major obvious reason that these lies are harmful is that if people don’t know about the desperately needed aid that is readily available to them, they aren’t able to take advantage of it. But there are other less discussed reasons that these lies should be curtailed.
We were rescued by the National Guard, which means that there’s a high likelihood that the soldiers serving us were from the very area they were supporting. We were told by the group in the helicopter that landed before ours, that the same team that had rescued us had rescued 200 people the day before and volunteers distributing food and water at the site informed us that there were still 40 more people that would be rescued that same day. According to a press release from North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper on Sunday, Oct. 6, more than 6,500 people and counting have been rescued by “1,700 North Carolina National Guard and 1,000 active-duty military personnel.”
It’s disrespectful to discredit the tireless work of these individuals who, despite possibly having lost homes or loved ones themselves or who may be in the midst of worrying about the welfare of their community, are sacrificing their lives aiding in the recovery of others. To acknowledge this doesn’t suddenly shoot Uncle Sam up to the top of my favorite relatives list either.
While on the mountain, before Helene struck, many members of our crew wore keffiyehs as a sign of solidarity with the Palestinian people, and Palestine flag stickers decorated laptops and water bottles. The hope for a free Palestine and disgust over the United States government sending weapons and billions of taxpayer dollars to Israel were not considered taboo topics of discussion. These criticisms didn’t suddenly evaporate because rescuing us from a mountain put our tax dollars to work in a way that didn’t leave us feeling conflicted.
If anything, the whole ordeal left me with even more firsthand experience with how our government was falling short for certain communities. Once rescued from the mountain, we were dropped off in the parking lot of a production plant, then bussed to a makeshift shelter at a senior citizens’ center in Marion County, N.C., an area hit hard by the opioid epidemic. According to the office of the N.C. Attorney General Josh Stein, “Nine North Carolinians on average die daily from fentanyl overdoses.” And in McDowell County, where Marion sits, Carolina Public Press reports that in 2022 the rate of overdose deaths were “more than double the national rate.”
It was clear when we arrived at the shelter, that this community had been in bad shape even before the hurricane hit. What we were witnessing as we watched people go through withdrawal on thin cots in the same room where meals were served or heard stories of active drug use in the bathroom stalls were where the climate crisis and opioid crisis collide.
But these legitimate concerns about the actions (or inaction) our government cannot be heard nor addressed, if they’re being drowned out by false claims and fictitious tales about manmade hurricanes to manipulate election results. Countless hours and actual resources are being squandered dismantling these rumors that could instead be used to tackle the real issues that face Americans. And I only grow more concerned about the squall of misinformation sweeping across social media as we get closer to Election Day.
Although we were rescued by the military, sadly our luggage was left behind. So now I’m off to find out whether that whole thing about your renters’ insurance policy covering your belongings while you’re traveling is fake news or not…
reckon.news · by Opens in new window
25. Prep Courses, Policy Tweaks Largely Drove the Military's Recruiting Success in 2024
Prep Courses, Policy Tweaks Largely Drove the Military's Recruiting Success in 2024
military.com · by Konstantin Toropin,Steve Beynon,Drew F. Lawrence,Thomas Novelly · October 10, 2024
After years of negative recruiting news and headlines, all the military branches managed to eke out wins this year and meet their recruiting goals -- largely aided by new programs and policies that allowed them to sign up recruits who would have been disqualified in previous years.
However, despite the wins this year, between ambitious goals for 2025 and deeper issues relating to Generation Z, the services may not be out of trouble yet.
The story of this year's recruiting successes largely comes down to two broad changes that all the services made in some fashion -- loosening the rules on who could join and increasing the number of recruiters.
Both the Army and Navy saw success this past year largely as a result of programs that were aimed squarely at allowing otherwise disqualified candidates to still sign up and join the service. While the programs began to be introduced as far back as 2022, this was the first year that the programs in both branches were able to demonstrate their full potential.
The Army, the largest branch of the military, welcomed 55,300 new soldiers, just surpassing its target of 55,000 recruits and barely squeaking by its recruiting goals after two years of failing to meet them.
In 2022, the Army recruited 44,900 active-duty soldiers, far short of its goal of 60,000.
This slow ascent is not attributed to innovative marketing strategies or new recruiting initiatives. Instead, Army planners have shifted their focus to a series of pre-basic training programs designed to address the needs of applicants who would have otherwise been disqualified from enlistment.
The Future Soldier Preparatory Course, introduced as a pilot program in 2022, has emerged as a crucial strategy for alleviating the Army's recruitment challenges. Over the course of 90 days, soldiers are given the opportunity to achieve a qualifying score on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, or ASVAB, a test akin to the SAT that determines eligibility for various military roles. Additionally, there is a track for individuals who slightly exceed the Army's body fat standards.
Nearly a quarter of all new Army recruits went through one of those two prep courses.
Similarly, the Navy signed up 40,978 recruits, beating its goal of 40,600 by just over 300 and leading Navy officials to note that this year had the largest number of new contracts in more than 20 years.
Borrowing from the Army, the Navy also stood up its own pre-boot camp classes to help academically and fitness-challenged recruits come up to standards before proceeding with basic training.
Cmdr. Stephanie Turo, the spokeswoman for the Navy's recruiting command, told Military.com in an email that more than 5,000 recruits attended the Navy's prep courses in the past year, with a large majority, 3,451 recruits, going for the academic portion.
Turo also said that the Navy took in 5,982 recruits who were in the lowest score bracket of the ASVAB test.
The policy, announced at the end of 2022, allowed recruits to enter the Navy with low, cumulative test scores as long as they scored within standards on the "line scores" or subjects that relate to occupation-specific topics such as general science, math or mechanical comprehension.
In all, these two programs netted the Navy 11,354 recruits -- just over a quarter of their annual goal -- that they likely wouldn't have otherwise been able to sign up.
Yet within these totals for both the Army and Navy lurks a deeper issue.
In comparing 2024 figures to 2022 -- the last recruiting year before all these programs were rolled out -- the data suggests that neither service has made much headway in recruiting people who meet their standards without any assistance.
Subtracting the total number of prep course recruits from the Army's total yields 42,000 soldiers -- a figure that is smaller than what the Army achieved in 2022 without the program's aid.
Similarly, the Navy, without the help of its prep course and ASVAB tweak, only recruited about 29,600 people -- several thousand people short of its 2022 total of about 33,400 recruits.
This decline suggests that despite heightened attention to the issue, both the Army’s and Navy's ability to connect with Gen Z may not have improved.
Smoothing the Way with Policy Tweaks
Not all of the services resorted to major, new programs like those that the Army and Navy rolled out.
Coming off the worst recruiting environment in decades and missing its goal of roughly 26,000 airmen by about 10% last year, a first since 1999, the Air Force finally managed to turn the tide in 2024 -- albeit barely.
The service aimed to bring in 27,100 non-prior military enlisted active-duty airmen. They surpassed that goal by 39 people.
Much of the credit in hitting the Air Force's enlisted goal was attributed to major reforms to service policies in recent years, ranging from allowing applicants to have a greater percentage of body fat, changing the service's existing hand and neck tattoo policy, and bringing back the enlisted college loan repayment policy.
Allowing up to 26% body fat for men and up to 36% for women allowed for nearly 5,200 recruits across the Air Force, Space Force, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard to join. Roughly 2,000 recruits were able to join by being accepted but were awaiting a conditional waiver that was likely to be approved.
Additionally, permitting airmen to have appropriate tattoos of certain sizes on the hands and neck brought in 660 new recruits, and bringing back the college repayment brought in 540 new troops.
"It's impressive the team made [its] goal this year," Air Force Recruiting Service Commander Brig. Gen. Christopher Amrhein boasted last month. "I believe that the recruiting force has operationally postured itself as best as possible to start [fiscal] 2025."
That success trickled down to the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard as well. The service had a goal of 7,200 new Air Force reservists and 9,359 new Air National Guardsmen, and overshot it with 7,351 and 9,729, respectively.
The Navy's recruiting command also said it implemented some smaller policies that are aimed at making the recruiting process smoother and more seamless, which, in turn, means less recruits are turned away for minor issues.
Turo said the sea service stood up a centralized "Recruiting Operations Center" and created an innovation group "to identify and eliminate barriers at speed."
The Navy also overhauled the medical waiver process to reduce the average time potential recruits have to wait for permission to move forward in the process to no more than three days, despite having some sort of issue in their medical record.
The Success of the Little Guys
The military's smallest services -- the Marine Corps, Space Force and Coast Guard -- all saw success in 2024 as well, although their story and challenges were different from their larger service brethren.
The Space Force -- the smallest of all the services and under the Department of the Air Force -- passed its goal of 659 new Guardians, signing up 716 recruits. The Space Force, though, is often in a position of having to turn people away due to its small size.
Meanwhile, the Marine Corps -- along with the small Space Force -- has been one of the only branches to meet its goals consistently amid the recent recruiting crisis. The service again achieved its goals this year, but surpassed some enlistment categories by slim margins.
Including the reserve and prior enlisted components, the Marine Corps brought in 36,286 new Marines, passing its overall goal by 29 people. Last year, the service recruited 351 people over its total goal, a difference made up of mostly prior service reserve accessions, according to 2023's numbers, which were provided to Military.com by the Marine Corps.
Unlike the other services, the Marine Corps has not made any significant changes to its enlistment standards or policies to help civilians more easily try and earn the title of Marine.
"The Marine Corps benefits from tougher standards in that there might be individuals who are interested in joining the military, and they may want to join the Marine Corps, but they don't meet the Marine Corps standards," Katherine Kuzminski, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security think tank who specializes in military recruiting, said in a recent Military.com interview. "And the question of 'how much over they beat it by' is in some ways irrelevant, because they can be more selective in meeting that number."
Also, 98% of the recruits came from high school graduates, and over two-thirds of those recruited into the service scored in the top three tiers of the ASVAB, officials told Military.com late last month.
"This success is directly attributed to the hard work of our Marine recruiters and Officer Selection Officers working diligently in a competitive and challenging environment," Jim Edwards, a spokesperson for the Marine Corps, told Military.com last month of the service passing its 2024 goals.
Uniquely, the Marine Corps also saw success with the number of prior service members it brought in this year through its Prior Service Enlistment Program, or PSEP, Edwards said.
Part of the success for the Marine Corps is that it has the institutional credibility to be selective with the service members it recruits, Kuzminski, the expert who studies military recruitment, told Military.com.
"I don't know that the Marine Corps competes with the other services in the way that they compete with each other," Kuzminski said. "We don't know how many people they turned away, who met the standard and who wanted to join because they were not as competitive as other candidates. Whereas the Army is not in a position to turn people away if they meet all the standards and they're willing to serve."
Coast Guard Finds Success
Finally, the Coast Guard also made its recruiting goals for the first time since 2018, exceeding its active-duty enlisted target by 5% and reserve target by 2% -- an achievement that they attributed to an aggressive recruiting campaign that included opening new recruiting stations and a dedicated talent acquisition force.
The service recruited 4,442 active-duty enlisted personnel and 737 reservists in fiscal 2024, with a goal to bring in 4,200 new active-duty and 725 reserve personnel, respectively.
In 2023, it recruited just 3,126 active-duty members, failing to reach a goal of 4,200. However, it exceeded its reserve target of 650 in 2023 by 18 members.
Capt. Ben Keffer, commander of Coast Guard Recruiting Command, said that investment by the service, including new recruiting stations and emphasis on building a professional recruiting cadre, helped the service across the finish line.
"We have in the service about 370 recruiters right now in the field, and they, along with the support staff that we have here at recruiting command, get all the credit because they are the ones out there doing the hard work of raising awareness of the service," Keffer told Military.com during an interview Wednesday.
military.com · by Konstantin Toropin,Steve Beynon,Drew F. Lawrence,Thomas Novelly · October 10, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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