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Quotes of the Day:
"Dictatorships foster oppression, dictatorships foster servitude, dictatorships foster cruelty, more abominable is the fact that they fost idiocy."
– Jorge L Borges
"It is the duty of every man, as far as his ability extends, to detect and expose delusion and error."
– Thomas Paine
"There is no reason why good cannot triumph as often as evil. The triumph of anything is a matter of organization, If there are such things as angels, I hope that they are organized along the lines of the Mafia."
– Kurt Vonnegut
1. Pentagon plan calls for major power shifts within U.S. military
2. UNC objects to South Korea bill on civilian DMZ access
3. S. Korea, U.S. share that latest talks on N. Korea different from past 'working group': Seoul official
4. Defector group to honor N. Korea rights conference organizers in Seoul
5. N. Korea's Kim pays respects to late father at family mausoleum on death anniversary
6. Unification minister urges reopening of inter-Korean exchanges, cooperation
7. Top security adviser meets Rubio for talks on post-summit measures
8. Seoul, Washington may discuss using U.S. investment fund for Korea Zinc refinery: minister
9. U.S. military commemorates 75th anniversary of operation rescuing Korean War orphans
10. Breach at South Korea’s Equivalent of Amazon Exposed Data of Almost Every Adult
11. Ask a North Korean: How did North Koreans react to Kim Jong Il’s death?
12. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Hospitals rebuilt on Kim Jong-un's orders, but... "Not a single proper bed. X-ray machine broken due to voltage issues" — Musan County
13. ＜Super-telephoto Report＞Border Guards Look Healthier with Improved Uniforms "Since the Chinese are watching us, selecting robust soldiers, issuing special uniforms" Residents also ordered not to appear shabby Hyesan (6 photos)
14. South Korean Defense Ministry confirms leaflet drops into North ahead of Yoon's martial law bid
15. Why is abolishing South Korea's National Security Act a point of ideological contention?
16. Fault Lines Daily Summary - December 17, 2025 (Korea Plus)
1. Pentagon plan calls for major power shifts within U.S. military
Summary:
Pentagon leaders are developing a Unified Command Plan overhaul to consolidate combatant commands, cut four star billets, and speed decision making. The leading option would place CENTCOM, EUCOM, and AFRICOM under a new U.S. International Command, while NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM would merge under U.S. Americas Command. A proposed Arctic command under Americom appears dropped. The structure would shrink commands from 11 to 8, retaining Asia-Indo-Pacific, Cyber, Special Operations, Space, Strategic, and Transportation commands. Approval requires Secretary Hegseth and POTUS. Congress demands a cost, alliance impact blueprint before funds release. Alternatives ranged from six commands to models; critics warn expertise erosion.
Comment: It is time for a radical change to the Unified Command Plan.
But will the plan be radical enough?
I recommend that it include establishing a Northeast Asia Combatant Command. Here are my proposals (and there will be another soon as well).
When Korea's next war will not stay in Korea
Here's why the Republic of Korea--U.S. alliance needs a Northeast Asia combatant command.
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/11/21/perspective-new-military-command-proposed/7291763740526/
Strategic Concept: Establishing a Combined Northeast Asia Combatant Command (NEACOM) in Seoul
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/strategic-concept-establishing-a-combined-northeast-asia-combatant-command-neacom-in-seoul/
Here is an excerpt from a forthcoming paper that is germane to this proposal:
A Low-Cost, High-Impact Structural Reform
Skepticism in Washington often centers on cost and bureaucracy. A Northeast Asia Combatant Command answers both concerns. It can be established largely with existing resources by consolidating and realigning headquarters functions already present in Korea. One headquarters can be eliminated, and personnel and equipment from U.S. Forces Korea, Eighth Army, and related structures can be repurposed to form a single operational command for the region.
This approach aligns with the National Security Strategy’s emphasis on prioritization and efficiency. The United States does not need more layers. It needs fewer seams. Properly designed, a Northeast Asia Combatant Command simplifies command relationships, shortens decision cycles, and improves readiness without expanding overhead. It is reform, not expansion, and it delivers strategic return disproportionate to its cost.
Pentagon plan calls for major power shifts within U.S. military
Washington Post · Dan Lamothe
If adopted, the changes would complement other efforts by the Trump administration to move resources away from the Middle East and Europe.
December 15, 2025 at 5:55 p.m. ESTYesterday at 5:55 p.m. EST
By Dan Lamothe, Tara Copp, Noah Robertson and Alex Horton
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/12/15/military-command-plan-caine-hegseth/
Senior Pentagon officials are preparing a plan to downgrade several of the U.S. military’s major headquarters and shift the balance of power among its top generals, in a major consolidation sought by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, people familiar with the matter said.
If adopted, the plan would usher in some of the most significant changes at the military’s highest ranks in decades, in part following through on Hegseth’s promise to break the status quo and slash the number of four-star generals in the military. It would reduce in prominence the headquarters of U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command by placing them under the control of a new organization known as U.S. International Command, according to five people familiar with the matter.
Joint Chiefs Chairman Dan Caine is expected to detail the proposal, which has not previously been reported, for Hegseth in the coming days. Such moves would complement other efforts by the administration to shift resources from the Middle East and Europe and focus foremost on expanding military operations in the Western Hemisphere, these people said. Like others interviewed for this report, they spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the effort before it is conveyed to the secretary.
Hegseth’s team said in a statement that they would not comment on “rumored internal discussions” or “pre-decisional matters.” Any insinuation that there is a divide among officials over the issue is “completely false — everyone in the Department is working to achieve the same goal under this administration,” the statement said.
Hegseth arrives at the U.S. Capitol for a meeting with House and Senate leaders on Dec. 9. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
The Pentagon has shared little to no details with Congress, a lack of communication that has perturbed members of the Republican-led Senate and House Armed Services committees, according to two people familiar with how the panels have prepared for the proposal. Top officers at the commands involved are awaiting more details as well, officials said.
The plan also calls for realigning U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command, which oversee military operations throughout the Western Hemisphere, under a new headquarters to be known as U.S. Americas Command, or Americom, people familiar with the matter said. That concept was reported earlier this year by NBC News.
Pentagon officials also discussed creating a U.S. Arctic Command that would report to Americom, but that idea appears to have been abandoned, people familiar with the matter said.
Combined, the moves would reduce the number of top military headquarters — known as combatant commands — from 11 to eight while cutting the number of four-star generals and admirals who report directly to Hegseth. Other remaining combatant commands would be U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Space Command, U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Transportation Command.
Those familiar with the plan said it aligns with the Trump administration’s national security strategy, released this month, which declares that the “days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.”
U.S. and Lithuanian troops participate in a military exercise in Germany in March. (Sean Gallup/Getty Images)
The proposal was organized by the Pentagon’s Joint Staff under the supervision of Caine, and is due to be shared with Hegseth as soon as this week as the preferred course of action among senior military officials. It grew from a request made by Hegseth in the spring to look for ways to improve how troops are commanded and controlled, a senior defense official familiar with the discussion said, adding that Hegseth has kept in touch with Caine about the issue over the past several months.
Any changes would need the approval of Hegseth and President Donald Trump. The moves would come in the Pentagon’s Unified Command Plan, which lays out the roles of the military’s major headquarters.
Lawmakers have taken the extraordinary step of requiring the Pentagon to submit a detailed blueprint that describes the realignment’s potential costs and impacts on America’s alliances. The measure, included in Congress’s annual defense policy bill, would withhold money to enact the effort until at least 60 days after the Pentagon provides lawmakers with those materials.
The bill has cleared the House and is expected to pass the Senate this week.
The senior defense official said the proposed realignment is meant to speed decision-making and adaptation among military commanders. “Decay” had been observed in how the U.S. military commands and controls troops, he added, suggesting that the need for sweeping change is urgent.
“Time ain’t on our side, man,” the senior defense official said, describing internal conversations around the plan. “The saying here is, ‘If not us, who, and if not now, when?’”
The potential reorganization comes as Hegseth has begun broader efforts to cull the total number of generals and admirals across the military. He also has fired or otherwise forced out more than 20 senior officers, threatened others with polygraph tests to determine whether they have leaked information to the news media, and told those remaining that if they do not like the administration’s policies they should “do the honorable thing and resign.”
Chuck Hagel, who served as defense secretary during the Obama administration and as a Republican member of the Senate before that, expressed concerns about the Trump administration’s ambitions. There are different dynamics, needs and security threats throughout the globe, he said.
“The world isn’t getting any less complicated,” Hagel said in an interview. “You want commands that have the capability of heading off problems before they become big problems, and I think you lose some of that when you unify or consolidate too many.”
Senior military officials considered about two dozen other concepts, the senior defense official said. At least one discussion called for a reduction to six total combatant commands. Under that plan, Special Operations Command, Space Command and Cyber Command would be downgraded and placed under the control of a new U.S. Global Command, said other officials familiar with the discussion.
Caine is expected to share at least two other courses of action with Hegseth, people familiar with the matter said. One concept calls for creating two commands to house all of the others, with all major geographic organizations such as Central Command and European Command placed under the control of an entity that would be called Operational Command. Other major headquarters, such as Transportation Command and Space Command, would fall under an organization called Support Command.
One proposal suggested the creation of a new headquarters unit, Joint Task Force War, to be based at the Pentagon. It would focus on planning and strategy when the United States was not at war, and be capable of controlling forces anywhere in the world when there was a conflict, people familiar with the matter said.
The idea didn’t “test well” in exercises with military officials and appears unlikely to be adopted, the senior defense official said. Top military officials expressed concerns that such an organization would not possess the same regional expertise and relationships inherent to the military’s current construct.
Even if you have “some of your best people” in such a task force, the senior official said, “you don’t have a fingertip feel” for what is occurring in a region. A second official said it seemed “very confusing” to have top commanders in a region prepare for a conflict there, only to hand those plans over to another commander when something occurred.
Another plan sought to reorganize the military by domain, with operations organized and led by whether they occurred on land or in air, sea, space or cyberspace, people familiar with the matter said. The idea had supporters in the Space Force but had few other proponents, people familiar with the matter said. It also limited the Marine Corps’ influence, with it falling under the control of the Navy Department even as the other branches of service were elevated.
Military officials involved in the reorganization effort also considered whether to elevate the chairman’s role to allow him to command forces, rather than serving as the senior military adviser to both the president and the defense secretary. That could have occurred through the Joint Task Force War framework, two officials said, but the concept seemed murky.
The idea also could have been complicated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, landmark legislation that reorganized the military and defined the chairman’s role. Under the law, the chairman is considered the “principal” military adviser to the president, the defense secretary and other senior officials. Operations are controlled through a chain of command that runs from combatant commanders, to the defense secretary, to the president.
Washington Post · Dan Lamothe
2. UNC objects to South Korea bill on civilian DMZ access
Summary:
The United Nations Command issued a rare public objection to a South Korean bill that would let Seoul approve civilian entry into the DMZ without prior UNC authorization. UNC reaffirmed it administers the DMZ under the 1953 Armistice and said no one, civilian or military, may enter without specific permission through the UNC Military Armistice Commission. The debate has intensified as Unification Minister Chung Dong-young argues current rules constrain South Korea’s sovereignty and “peaceful use,” citing denied access cases. Seoul’s defense and foreign ministries warn the change could complicate armistice management and coordination. UNC noted the ROK military’s major role and later approved a DMZ briefing visit.
Comment: In recent years we seemed to have reduced the near ever present friction over the United Nations Command. It seems like it will again become a lightning rod for elements in the ROK administration.
Although it would break the ROK/US alliance, the ROK government could order the UN Command to leave Korea. It is a sovereign country and the UN Command cannot remain if the ROK government does not want it on its sovereign territory.
But Korean policy makers, pundits, the press, and the public must be informed about the importance of the UNC to deterrence and defense. It is a coalition of member states that will back up the ROK defense of its freedom should the worst happen and Kim Jong Un makes the decision to initiate his attack to dominate the peninsula. It will provide not only military capabilities to meet ROK/US CFC requests for forces, it will provide political, diplomatic, and humanitarian assistance for any conflict with north Korea or "third parties" in the region.
World News Dec. 17, 2025 / 5:40 AM
UNC objects to South Korea bill on civilian DMZ access
By Thomas Maresca
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/17/korea-UNC-objects-South-Korea-bill-DMZ-civilian-access-control/1551765966987/
The United Nations Command on Tuesday issued a statement underscoring its role as administrator of the DMZ, amid debate over a South Korean bill that would allow Seoul to regulate non-military access to the buffer zone. In this file photo, a South Korean military guard post is seen through a fence near the DMZ in Paju in February 2021. File Photo by Thomas Maresca/UPI | License Photo
SEOUL, Dec. 17 (UPI) -- The United Nations Command objected to a legislative effort in South Korea that would transfer authority over non-military access to the Demilitarized Zone from the UNC to Seoul, as debate grows over control of one of the world's most sensitive border areas.
The UNC's rare public statement follows renewed calls by Unification Minister Chung Dong-young and ruling party lawmakers for a bill that would allow the South Korean government to approve civilian entry into the DMZ without prior UNC authorization.
In a press release issued Tuesday, the U.S.-led UNC reiterated its authority to implement and enforce the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, including control over access to the DMZ.
"Since 1953, UNC has been the successful administrator of the Demilitarized Zone, a role that has been essential in maintaining stability, especially amid periods of heightened inter-Korean tensions," it said.
Related
Citing provisions that assign "civil administration and relief" within the zone to the UNC commander and grant the UNC Military Armistice Commission exclusive jurisdiction over entry approvals, the command stressed that no person, military or civilian, may enter the DMZ without specific authorization.
"Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command," the statement said.
The release added that the UNCMAC reviews access requests under established procedures designed to avoid actions that could be perceived as provocative or that could endanger safety.
The issue resurfaced earlier this month after Chung publicly backed legislation that would allow South Korea to grant access for "peaceful use" without UNC approval, arguing that current restrictions undermine Seoul's sovereignty and the civilian use of the DMZ.
Chung cited recent cases in which Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Hyun-jong and Cardinal Lazzaro You Heung-sik were denied access to the buffer zone.
Seoul's defense and foreign ministries have expressed reservations about the proposal, however, warning that separating civilian access from UNC procedures could complicate armistice maintenance and military coordination.
The UNC statement noted that the South Korean military already carries out "critical tasks such as policing, infrastructure support, medical evacuation [and] safety inspections," highlighting what it described as Seoul's sovereignty and primary role in its own defense.
In a follow-up release Wednesday, the UNC said it had granted Kim access to the DMZ for a briefing on North Korean military activities and South Korea's response measures, as well as discussions on preventing accidental clashes.
"UNC is committed to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and actively supports measures that reduce the risk of miscalculation between military forces near the Military Demarcation Line," it said.
3. S. Korea, U.S. share that latest talks on N. Korea different from past 'working group': Seoul official
Summary:
A South Korean foreign ministry official said Seoul and Washington agree their latest North Korea policy talks are not a revival of the 2017–19 “working group” under the Moon Jae-in government. The comment followed the Unification Ministry’s decision to skip the meeting, warning it could impede outreach to Pyongyang, and criticism from former unification ministers who argued the channel resembles U.S. “screening” of inter-Korean initiatives. The foreign ministry framed the session as “follow-up talks” to implement the allies’ joint fact sheet and to exchange views on a tougher geopolitical environment. The official said both sides emphasized urgency in restoring dialogue with north Korea and aligning denuclearization approaches.
Comment: This split in the ROK foreign affairs and national security community may cause significant friction in the ROK/US alliance.
In 2004 I proposed this construct (recall the alliance friction at that time following the 2002 tragedy of the Highway 56 incident and he election Roh Moo Hyun on and anti-American sentiment platform):
(3) Establishment of a combined planning group (Korea Strategy Group (KSG)) with permanent NSC level members that meet on a rotating basis in Washington and Seoul.
Reunification is the only acceptable long term outcome that can ensure stability on the Peninsula. The goal is noble and right but the path to get there is literally and figuratively a minefield and it will take a concerted and coordinated effort by the alliance to get there. Therefore a structure is required for the development and management of the strategy for navigating the minefields. Both nations at the National Security Council level should establish a Korea Strategy Division (KSD) to develop, refine and adjust their country’s strategies as well as manage their respective nations’ actions within the strategic framework. Together these Divisions will form the Korea Strategy Group (KSG). This will have permanently assigned members from each KSD co-chaired by each nation’s senior member and will meet on a quarterly basis rotating between both capitals. Most important is that the members will have direct communications capability to maintain close coordination in all areas.
The KSG will be chartered to manage and ensure synchronization of all elements of national power in the pursuit of the established end state. Together they will manage strategic level Peninsula crises and seek opportunities for implementing elements of the strategy. Each KSD will serve as the focal point for their respective nation in which to ensure synchronization of all actions by its elements of national power. One of the subtle purposes of the KSG is to bring together ROK and US national security professionals in a disciplined process that will allow transparency and prevent misunderstanding between the allies. The process of developing and managing the strategy will cause issues to be thoroughly staffed and coordinated and the increased contact will create an environment more conducive to cooperation and understanding.[1]
ROK and US individual policies are not intended to be identical. In fact, it is probably better that they are different as the differences may be able to be exploited to create opportunities with the North. At times the combination of hard line and engagement (“good cop, bad cop”) may be the right way to create opportunities.” The most important thing is for the actions to be synchronized.
Beyond the Nuclear Crisis:
A Strategy for the Korean Peninsula
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B513_sp6wSItQldmdVZ4cWFudWM/view?usp=sharing&resourcekey=0-KR5LR-AJfuIC8qPAHnPNGw
World News Dec. 17, 2025 / 4:06 AM
S. Korea, U.S. share that latest talks on N. Korea different from past 'working group': Seoul official
By Kim Seung-yeon, Yonhap News Agency
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/17/S-Korea-US-share-that-latest-talks-on-N-Korea-different-from-past-working-group-Seoul-official/3861765961919/
Jeong Yeon-doo (R), vice minister for diplomatic strategy and intelligence at the foreign ministry, poses with acting U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Kevin Kim ahead of their talks on North Korea policy in Seoul on Tuesday. Pool Photo by Yonhap
South Korea and the United States share the understanding that their latest talks on North Korea policy are not the same as a now-defunct dialogue channel under the former Moon Jae-in government, a foreign ministry official said Wednesday.
The official made the remarks after the unification ministry handling inter-Korean affairs decided not to join Tuesday's dialogue between the foreign ministry and relevant U.S. agencies, saying the talks could hinder Seoul's peace efforts toward Pyongyang.
The rift between the two ministries has emerged after several former unification ministers issued a statement claiming that the talks with the U.S. mirror the "working group" channel that operated in 2017-19 and that it would only serve as a stumbling block in efforts to improve inter-Korean relations.
The working group was launched with an aim to coordinate on matters related to the sanctions in place against Pyongyang in order to expedite the process for inter-Korean exchanges and other cooperation.
Related
But it gradually came to be seen as an obstacle in the eyes of those who prioritized engagement with the North, being labeled by them as a channel for U.S. "screening" of what items can reach the North or not.
"There is a clear, shared understanding on both the South Korean and U.S. sides that this meeting, which is aimed at implementing the joint fact sheet, is fundamentally different from the past working group in terms of its purpose, nature and background," the official told reporters.
"We understand that there is some painful criticism," the official said of the statement by the former ministers. "We should take them seriously and respond in a way that avoids misunderstanding and criticism."
The foreign ministry has named Tuesday's meeting as "follow-up talks on the joint fact sheet," apparently pointing out that the discussions are focused on implementing the summit agreements reached between the allies regarding North Korea issues.
The official said the latest talks took place to exchange general positions of the two sides on the current geopolitical environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula.
"It provided an opportunity for us to closely exchange views on how to open the door to dialogue at a time when talks have stalled and the international landscape has become more challenging than in the past," he said.
"We shared the view that it is urgent to bring North Korea back to dialogue and ease the current grave situation ... We explained our concept of denuclearization and approach to advancing that," the official said.
Asked about the unification ministry's comment that it could hold separate talks with the U.S. on North Korea issues, the official said the ministry "is free to provide any explanations it considers necessary to the U.S. side."
"The unification ministry remains one of the ministries with which we work and communicate very closely," he added.
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4. Defector group to honor N. Korea rights conference organizers in Seoul
Summary:
The World North Korean Diaspora Council, led by defector and former diplomat Thae Yong-ho, will honor organizers of the 2025 Seoul North Korean Human Rights World Conference. At a Dec. 17 year-end gathering in Seoul, it will present appreciation plaques to Lim Chang-ho and Son Kwang-joo for elevating defectors as human-rights actors. Representatives from 24 countries selected recipients and funded gifts. The council also says it is supporting legal protection and safe, voluntary repatriation of north Korean soldiers detained in Ukraine.
Comment: We should keep in mind that we need a human rights up front approach to dealing with north Korea despite the fact that both the ROK and US administrations have seemed to remove any focus on human rights in north Korea. Please remember the 26 million Koreans in the north.
World News Dec. 17, 2025 / 2:32 AM / Updated at 2:32 AM
Defector group to honor N. Korea rights conference organizers in Seoul
By Asia Today and translated by UPI
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/12/17/korea-defector-human-rights/1071765955220/
Thae Yong-ho, former North Korea's deputy ambassador to Britain, speaks during a press conference in Seoul, South Korea, 19 February 2019. Thae defected with his family to South Korea in August 2016. File Photo by JEON HEON-KYUN /EPA
Dec. 16 (Asia Today) -- The World North Korean Diaspora Council, an international network of North Korean defectors chaired by Thae Yong-ho, said it will present plaques of appreciation Wednesday to contributors to the 2025 Seoul North Korean Human Rights World Conference.
The council said the awards will be presented at a year-end gathering for North Korean defectors on Dec. 17. Recipients include Lim Chang-ho, organizing committee chair of the conference, and Son Kwang-joo, conference chair, the council said.
In a statement, the group said Lim and Son planned and led the conference and helped connect defectors through the event "not merely as subjects of testimony but as agents of human rights" taking action in the international community.
The council said the recipients were selected through a joint resolution by representatives of North Korean diaspora councils in 24 countries, including South Korea, the United States, Canada, Europe, Asia, Oceania and South America. It said plaques and commemorative gifts were funded through voluntary contributions from representatives in each country.
The organization also said it is carrying out international solidarity efforts focused on legal protection and the safe repatriation of North Korean soldiers detained in Ukraine. It said those efforts include coordination with local Ukrainian civil society and international human rights organizations, calls for protective intervention by international bodies and promotion of the principle of respecting detainees' free will.
- Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI
© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.
5. N. Korea's Kim pays respects to late father at family mausoleum on death anniversary
Comment: Here were my thoughts in 2011 with the death of Kim Jong Il.
The Death of a Dictator: Danger, Opportunity or Best Timing Possible?
https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-death-of-a-dictator-danger-opportunity-or-best-timing-possible
(Article text pasted below)
And I will ask the questions I have been asking policy makers and strategists for the past 14 years:
What would we do if we learned TODAY that Kim Jong Un is dead?
Have we conducted sufficient preparation for the environment to influence a successor?
How are we going to address the very possible internal instability in the north if a successor has not been designated?
Are we ready to act immediately when we learn he is dead?
(LEAD) N. Korea's Kim pays respects to late father at family mausoleum on death anniversary | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · December 17, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251217000751315?section=nk/nk
(ATTN: UPDATES with more info in last 4 paras, photos)
SEOUL, Dec. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un paid his highest tribute to late state leader and his father Kim Jong-il at the family mausoleum Wednesday, marking the 14th anniversary of his death, state media reported.
Accompanied by government and party officials, Kim visited the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang at midnight, paid tribute to the late leader and prayed "for his immortality," the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
The Kumsusan Palace of the Sun serves as the family mausoleum, where the embalmed bodies of the North's founder Kim Il-sung -- Kim Jong-un's grandfather -- and Kim Jong-il are enshrined.
Kim Jong-il died on Dec. 17, 2011, at the age of 70, passing on the leadership he had inherited from his father, North Korean founder Kim Il-sung, to his youngest son, Kim Jong-il.
Except in 2022, Kim Jong-un has paid tribute to his father at the family mausoleum every year on his death anniversary.
The incumbent leader bowed before the statues of both late leaders "as an expression of noble respects" and flower baskets were laid before the statues, the KCNA said.
"All the visitors made a firm pledge to remain true, with their whole heart and loyalty, to the ideology and leadership of Kim Jong Un who is glorifying the patriotic exploits of Kim Jong-il by opening up a new glorious history of comprehensive national rejuvenation," the KCNA said.
Those who accompanied Kim on Wednesday's visit included members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the ruling party, officials from the party's Central Committee, members of the cabinet and army service members, the agency said.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C), at the head of a procession, visits the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun in Pyongyang on Dec. 17, 2025, to mark the 14th anniversary of his father and late leader Kim Jong-il's death, in this image captured from Korean Central Television. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
North Korean media also reported that a host of public gatherings were held the previous day to remember the late leader and hail his accomplishments, while China, Russia and other foreign institutions sent flower baskets to his statue in Pyongyang.
The Rodong Sinmun, the most widely read newspaper in North Korea, also highlighted Kim Jong-il's policy achievements in an editorial on Wednesday, urging heightened allegiance to the current leader ahead of a party congress set for early next year.
The newspaper touted Kim Jong-il for "laying the solid foundation for self-driven prosperity," urging readers to "not spare patriotic zeal in the fully charged march toward the ninth party congress."
North Korea is expected to unveil another five-year national economic development plan and set its policy stance toward Seoul and Washington at the upcoming party meeting, the first to be held since the eighth in 2021.
This file photo from the Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 17, 2025, shows the statues of North Korean founder Kim Il-sung (L) and late leader Kim Jong-il at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · December 17, 2025
The Death of a Dictator: Danger, Opportunity or Best Timing Possible? | Small Wars Journal
archive.smallwarsjournal.com
When assessing the North Korean succession process the “Korean Hands” will remind us that Kim Jong-il had 21 years to consolidate power and eliminate all political opposition and that the longer that Kim Jong-il lived the greater the chances of a smooth succession from the North Korean perspective. Everything changed on December 17, 2011 at 8:30 in the morning aboard a train in north Korea when Kim Jong-il died of fatigue and overwork according to the Korean Central News Agency. The questions are many but can be boiled down to what next for the Kim Family Regime, the ROK, the US and Northeast Asia?
There are two scenarios that are likely to play out within North Korea. The first scenario depends on the strength and power of Jang Song-taek who, along with his wife and the late Kim Jong-il’s sister, is the de facto “regent” for the young Kim Jong-un. Has he been able to help Kim Jong-un establish sufficient legitimacy within the Regime and will they be able to consolidate power? It is very likely that if Kim has sufficient strength and control of the security apparatus there are very likely arrests and purges taking place even as we try to figure out what is happening.
The second scenario is that he has not been able to consolidate sufficient power and will be faced with internal threats from other senior members of the regime who are unwilling to allow a 27 year old four star general rule the party and the military. If there is a power struggle many scenarios can play out ranging from internal chaos, civil war, and “implosion” to an external “explosion” – e.g., spillover of the effects of chaos and civil war into China and the ROK or the worst case: the desperate execution of the regime’s campaign plan to reunify the peninsula as the only means left to ensure survival of the Kim Family Regime. Finally, regime collapse will occur when there is the loss of the ability of the regime to centrally govern and the loss of control and support of the military and security apparatus. We have seen cracks in the system like hairline cracks in a dam. The recently reported alleged defection of eight armed guards is but one indication of such cracks with water slowly dripping from through the regime’s dam - the question is are those cracks repairable or will they cause the dam to crumble and collapse; unleashing such a torrent on the peninsula that will make 1950-53 look like a minor skirmish in terms of scale of potential conflict and devastation.
Either scenario will ensure the continued suffering of 23 million north Korean people and the second scenario will expand the tragedy to the Republic of Korea and its 46 million citizens and significantly affect the other countries in Northeast Asia as well as have global effects.
This should be a wake-up call for the ROK, the US and the international community. For 61 years the international community has been reacting to the Kim Family Regime. While the ROK and US have conducted contingency planning for various scenarios in the north, the question that needs to be asked now is whether the ROK-US Alliance and the international community have sufficiently prepared for such contingencies? Since 1994 when it was assessed that we could accept the political risk of the Agreed Framework because we assumed that the regime would soon collapse, we have written plans but we have not laid the groundwork to actually prepare for collapse. Here are just two small examples of the preparation not conducted. We have not executed an aggressive influence campaign targeting the second tier military leadership and the population to prepare them for collapse. We have not aggressively targeted the external regime mechanisms around the world such as Department 39 – the lifeline of illicit activity that sustained the regime that if cut would cause the regime to strangle on its own incompetence. If collapse occurs plans may be executed without sufficient preparation.
Serious dangers have been laid out above. However, what is the likely outcome following the death of one of the world’s worst human rights violators and dictators?
Fortunately or unfortunately, depending on one’s perspective, the timing of Kim Jong-il’s death probably came at the most opportune time. With elections and a leadership transition in the ROK and US and China respectively, it is likely that there is going to be a major “strategic pause” on the Korean Peninsula.
Just from a US perspective, the Administration is not going to be able to make any effective overtures toward Kim Jong-un in an attempt to influence him. It will be interesting to see if agreements at the recent meetings in Beijing at which allegedly the US agreed to provide 240,000 tons of food aid and the north agreed it would return to the Six party talks, actually plays out (though there is precedence for agreements to be worked out during leadership transition as the Agreed Framework was completed after the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994). However, any action by the US Administration is likely to be exploited by the President’s political opponents. Even such a seemingly simple condolence statement is likely being hotly debated at the White House. If it is too conciliatory then it will be attacked as being too soft. If it is too strong then it will have no chance to have a positive influence effect on Kim Jong-un. The Administration is in a no win situation because even it makes a conciliatory statement the regime will interpret the attacks by the US political opposition as an indication of the real American position toward the north.
The ROK election season was not expected to have north Korea as a dominant issue. While the political opposition will attack the ruling party on Korean policy, both parties are more likely to focus on economic and social issues. Neither side will want to make the north the dominant issue.
The Chinese Communist Party also undergoes its leadership transition in 2012. More than any other country, save the ROK, it wants to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula and does not want the distraction of the leadership transition in the north. It has its own internal complications with such events as protests in Wuken and other internal domestic political stability issues.
What the US, ROK, and China have in common is that they do not want collapse or war on the Peninsula. China in particular, will do what is necessary to assist the regime to maintain the status quo. We are likely to see food and fuel aid and protection from international political pressure on the regime to allow it to conduct its leadership transition in the hopes of preventing implosion or explosion.
This is going to lead to “peninsula paralysis” for the next two years at least. None of the major powers in the region want collapse or war so we are likely to see overt (China) and tacit (US) support to the north in order to ensure stability on the peninsula. While some will see the potential danger as outlined above there are others who will see this as an opportunity for regime change (beyond a Kim Family Regime transfer of power). However, it is unlikely that there has been sufficient preparation made to be able to orchestrate or at least influence such a change and the foundation has not been laid from a military, economic, diplomatic, and influence perspective to either effect change or deal with the potential fall-out. The bottom line is we are not prepared to exploit the current opportunity; however, the “peninsula paralysis” that we are about to experience may present the window of opportunity to conduct the necessary preparations to deal with the likely collapse of the regime because, as one Korea Hand recently opined, the regime cannot indefinitely defy the laws of economic and political gravity.
The real opportunity is not to exploit the current events to cause a regime change for which no one is prepared, but to exploit the opportunity over the next two or more years to conduct the effective preparations necessary to deal with regime collapse on terms that the ROK and US desire. Hasty and ill-advised calls for regime collapse are made only by those who do not understand the nature of the regime and the likely scenarios that will emanate from the final collapse of the Kim Family Regime. They are made by those who do not understand the preparation that is necessary to mitigate the fallout from regime collapse. At this time of potential crisis it is time to take a longer view to allow us to be proactive rather than reactive. The peninsula is likely to weather this storm for a period of time. But this should be the wake-up call that drives the ROK-US alliance to make the realistic preparations to deal with the only outcome on the Korean Peninsula that is necessary for both denuclearization and ultimate regional stability – the end of the Kim Family Regime and the solution to the lingering “Korea Question” that was supposed to be solved following the 1953 Armistice.
The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's alone
archive.smallwarsjournal.com
6. Unification minister urges reopening of inter-Korean exchanges, cooperation
Comment: I fear the Unification Minister's vision is one of strategic fantasy.
Unification minister urges reopening of inter-Korean exchanges, cooperation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · December 17, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251217007800315
SEOUL, Dec. 17 (Yonhap) -- Unification Minister Chung Dong-young on Wednesday urged the reopening of stalled inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, pledging the government's full efforts to reengage North Korea.
Chung made the remarks during a meeting with Na Sang-ho, executive leader of Won Buddhism, a modern homegrown Buddhist path, as North Korea remains unresponsive to Seoul's overtures for talks.
"(The government) is going to make extraordinary efforts to turn 2026 into a starting point for peaceful coexistence (with North Korea)," Chung told Na, noting that Wednesday marks the seventh year since the two Koreas last held talks, during a sports-related meeting on Dec. 18, 2018.
"The history of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation should be wide open again," he said.
Na expressed hope that inter-Korean ties would see a breakthrough during Chung's term, pledging efforts to open engagement with North Korean religious entities to help drive inter-Korean relations.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young (L) talks to Na Sang-ho, executive leader of Won Buddhism, during a meeting in Seoul on Dec. 17, 2025, in this photo provided by the unification ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · December 17, 2025
7. Top security adviser meets Rubio for talks on post-summit measures
Summary:
South Korean National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac met U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington to discuss follow-up measures from the late-October Lee Jae Myung–POTUS summit. Wi said he will explore a separate bilateral agreement, akin to Australia’s Section 91 pathway, to enable nuclear-powered submarines. He will also press consultations on uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing, and exchange views on reopening channels with north Korea. Wi is also scheduled to meet Energy Secretary Chris Wright before returning via New York.
Comment: Wi Sung Lac is the right man to lead national security policy and engagement with the US.
(LEAD) Top security adviser meets Rubio for talks on post-summit measures | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · December 17, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251217000651315
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES with more info in paras 2-4, 14; ADDS photo)
WASHINGTON, Dec. 16 (Yonhap) -- National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Tuesday, diplomatic sources said, with the two sides expected to discuss follow-up measures to the summit between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump in late October.
Wi held talks with Rubio, who doubles as national security adviser, as he arrived in Washington for discussions on a range of key issues, including South Korea's push to develop nuclear-powered submarines, and secure uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities.
The visit came about a month after the allies released a joint fact sheet outlining trade and security agreements reached during the second Lee-Trump summit, held on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.
South Korea's National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac (L) shakes hands with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who concurrently serves as the U.S. national security adviser, during their meeting in Washington on July 7, 2025, in this file photo released by the South Korean presidential office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Speaking to reporters upon his arrival at an airport near Washington earlier in the day, Wi said he will navigate the possibility of establishing a separate bilateral agreement with Washington for Seoul's drive to build nuclear-powered submarines.
"In the case of Australia, an exception was granted in accordance with Section 91 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which requires a separate bilateral agreement," Wi told reporters. "Since we may also need that, I will discuss such a possibility."
Wi's remarks were seen as referring to how Australia and the United States signed a bilateral agreement based on the U.S. law that paved the way for them to circumvent an existing bilateral nuclear energy agreement to back Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.
Currently, South Korea is banned from using nuclear material for military purposes under a bilateral civil nuclear energy cooperation pact.
National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac answers reporters' questions at Dulles International Airport, near Washington, D.C., on Dec. 16, 2025. (Yonhap)
On whether a separate consultative body will be launched to support Seoul's nuclear-powered submarine bid, Wi said he will seek ways to accelerate consultations.
"There are preparations from our side, and I will see what is going on with the U.S. side," Wi said. "While there have not yet been talks on launching consultative bodies for different issues, I will look for ways to expedite consultations."
In regards to uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing capabilities, Wi said follow-up measures are necessary, noting that agreements have been made in broader terms.
Asked whether the issue of accelerating dialogue between the two Koreas, as well as that between Washington and Pyongyang, will also be discussed during his visit, Wi said he plans to exchange opinions over the agenda and possibly meet officials from the United Nations.
"It is true that a favorable atmosphere has been established in the South Korea-U.S. alliance, among other alliances of the U.S., which could be an opportunity," Wi said. "Under such an atmosphere, North Korean relations should be handled well, and for that, South Korea-U.S. coordination is important."
When asked about whether North Korea issues have taken a back seat for the U.S., Wi said he does not completely agree with such a view, adding that Seoul has so far focused more on stabilizing relations with key countries near the Korean Peninsula but looks forward to improvements in inter-Korean ties.
Wi is set to meet with U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright in Washington on Thursday before returning home via New York.
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · December 17, 2025
8. Seoul, Washington may discuss using U.S. investment fund for Korea Zinc refinery: minister
Comment: National security and national prosperity - mutual security and mutual prosperity.
Seoul, Washington may discuss using U.S. investment fund for Korea Zinc refinery: minister | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Na-young · December 17, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251217005900320
SEOUL, Dec. 17 (Yonhap) -- The use of South Korea's special U.S. investment fund for Korea Zinc Co.'s plan to build a critical metals refinery in America's southern region is "a matter to be discussed" with Washington, Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan said Wednesday.
Kim made the remarks at a press briefing held shortly after the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources' policy briefing to President Lee Jae Myung, when asked if there are any concerns over the financial pressure on Korea Zinc from the company's investment plan in the U.S.
"As I understand, Korea Zinc has calculated the costs and returns of this business," Kim said, noting that Seoul and Washington can discuss using Korea's special fund for U.S. investment in this case.
"But we have not held such discussions at this point."
Earlier this week, Korea's biggest zinc smelter said the company and the U.S. government are seeking to jointly invest around 10 trillion won (US$6.8 billion) to construct a critical metals refinery in Clarksville, Tennessee.
Kim said Korea Zinc's plan will not only help the company but also help South Korea secure supply chains for rare earths and critical minerals.
"It is also a project widely welcomed by the U.S. Department of Commerce as it involves investment in the U.S.," he added.
Seoul plans to set up the Korea-U.S. strategic investment fund for its $200 billion investment commitment made in exchange for lower U.S. tariffs under the finalized tariff deal between the two countries.
Meanwhile, Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo told reporters that Korea and the U.S. are seeking to hold a joint free trade agreement (FTA) committee early next year to discuss non-tariff issues, including those related to agriculture, online platforms and intellectual properties.
Industry Minister Kim Jung-kwan (R) speaks to reporters at the government complex in the administrative city of Sejong after a policy briefing to President Lee Jae Myung on Dec. 17, 2025. (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Na-young · December 17, 2025
9. U.S. military commemorates 75th anniversary of operation rescuing Korean War orphans
Summary:
The U.S. military marked the 75th anniversary of Operation Kiddy Car, a 1950 humanitarian airlift that saved more than 1,000 Korean War orphans and caretakers as communist forces threatened Seoul. Led by chaplain Lt. Col. Russell Blaisdell and Staff Sgt. Merle Strang, U.S. airmen gathered children, provided shelter and food, then moved them from Incheon to Gimpo for flights to Jeju Island on Dec. 20, 1950. At Osan Air Base, Air Force chief of chaplains Maj. Gen. Trent Davis said the mission became a shared act of compassion that still defines the ROK-U.S. alliance and its hope today.
Comment: Remember. This history is what keeps our alliance strong. And soon we will also remember the Miracle at Hungnam on Christmas Day.
U.S. military commemorates 75th anniversary of operation rescuing Korean War orphans | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · December 17, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251217005800315
By Kim Hyun-soo
OSAN AIR BASE, South Korea, Dec. 17 (Yonhap) -- The U.S. military on Wednesday commemorated the 75th anniversary of an operation rescuing Korean children orphaned in the winter of 1950, when North Korean communist troops threatened to take Seoul.
Under Operation Kiddy Car, more than 1,000 children and caretakers were airlifted to safety to the southern island of Jeju from Seoul on Dec. 20, 1950, thanks to the humanitarian operation led by chaplain Lt. Col. Russell Blaisdell and Staff Sgt. Merle Strang.
The U.S. airmen initially rescued lost children from the streets and worked to provide them with shelter and food. But as communist forces threatened U.N. troops and forced a retreat southward, Blaisdell and others loaded the orphans onto trucks at the port of Incheon and transported them to an air base in Gimpo, from where they were flown to safety.
"I love the fact that it really was a reminder of this great partnership that we have between the Republic of Korea and the U.S.," Maj. Gen. Trent Davis, the chief of chaplains at the U.S. Department of Air Force, told reporters.
"And it is that partnership ... it's really a partnership united by a shared heart that I think this ceremony speaks to," he added.
This photo shows chaplain Maj. Gen. Trent Davis (3rd from L) and other participants posing next to a plaque during an event marking the 75th anniversary of Operation Kiddy Car at Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek, some 65 kilometers south of Seoul, on Dec. 17, 2025. (Yonhap)
In his speech reflecting on the operation of 1950, Davis said Operation Kiddy Car had become "more than an air force operation."
"It became a shared act of compassion, an action that linked nations and a shared heart, a partnership that still defines our alliance today," he said.
When asked about the significance of the rescue operation 75 years after the devastating war in Korea, Davis underscored the importance of the S. Korea-U.S. partnership in bringing hope.
"Hope to me is really lived out in this common partnership and an opportunity to me to serve," he said, referring to the compassion that American airmen exhibited during the rescue operation. "I think it's that heart and that compassion that gives us hope today ... that same heart that they have exists in airmen today."
The event was attended by some 100 personnel, including Col. Ryan Ley, the commander of the 51st Fighter Wing, and Park Ki-un, a Korean War survivor.
Meanwhile, the South Korean air force has held a separate remembrance ceremony since 2016 for the late American fighter pilot Col. Dean Hess, who took part in the airlift operation.
This photo, taken Dec. 17, 2025, shows a plaque carrying photos from Operation Kiddy Car, when the U.S. Air Force conducted rescue operations for more than 1,000 orphans in Seoul, during the 1950-53 Korean War. (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · December 17, 2025
10. Breach at South Korea’s Equivalent of Amazon Exposed Data of Almost Every Adult
Summary:
A major breach at Coupang, South Korea’s dominant e-commerce platform, exposed personal data from as many as 34 million accounts, more than 90% of the country’s working-age population. The leak, which included names, phone numbers and even residential building entry codes, went undetected for nearly five months and was discovered only after a customer reported suspicious activity on Nov. 18. Investigators say a former developer, described as a Chinese national, allegedly retained an internal authentication key after leaving the company and used overseas servers to access systems starting June 24. Coupang says payment-card and ID numbers were not accessed; leadership resigned and probes continue.
Comment: It could happen to all of us at Amazon as well. All part of Chinese "unrestricted warfare?" Or just criminal activity? Data is king and China is seeking to acquire as much as possible from all sources (remember the US OPM hack?)
Breach at South Korea’s Equivalent of Amazon Exposed Data of Almost Every Adult
WSJ · DELOITTE
Tens of millions of South Koreans saw their names, phone numbers and other sensitive information leaked in a breach that went undetected for months
By Jiyoung Sohn
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and Timothy W. Martin
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Dec. 16, 2025 5:30 am ET
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/breach-at-south-koreas-equivalent-of-amazon-exposed-data-of-almost-every-adult-ba8d9ebd?mod=Searchresults&page=1&pos=1
A Coupang delivery center in Seoul. Seongjoon Cho/Bloomberg News
SEOUL—The alleged perpetrator had improper access to virtually every South Korean adult’s personal information: names, phone numbers and even the keycode to enter residential buildings.
It was one of the biggest data breaches of recent years and it has sent the company it targeted—Coupang, South Korea’s equivalent of Amazon—reeling, generating lawsuits, government investigation and calls to toughen penalties against such leaks.
The leak went undetected for nearly five months, hitting Coupang’s radar on Nov. 18 only after a customer flagged suspicious activity.
At first, Coupang, which was founded by a Korean-American entrepreneur, said it had experienced a data “exposure” affecting roughly 4,500 customer accounts. But within days, the e-commerce firm revised the figure: The leak exposed up to roughly 34 million user accounts in South Korea—a sum representing more than 90% of the country’s working-age population. Coupang started calling the incident a “leak” after Korean regulators took issue with the company’s prior word choice.
“The Whole Nation Is a Victim,” read one local news headline.
A worker pulls a trolley loaded with Coupang delivery bags. Anthony Wallace/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
An investigation has found that the alleged perpetrator had once worked in South Korea as a software developer for authentication systems at Coupang, which is known for its blockbuster U.S. initial public offering a few years ago. The suspected leaker is believed to be a Chinese national who has moved back to China and is now on the lam, South Korean officials say. They haven’t named the person.
Even after leaving the firm roughly a year ago, the suspect secretly held on to an internal authentication key that granted him unfettered access to the personal information of Coupang users, South Korean authorities and lawmakers say. The infiltration, using overseas servers, started on June 24. By using the login credentials, the suspect was able to appear as if he were still a Coupang employee when accessing the company’s systems.
The alleged perpetrator didn’t access other sensitive areas, such as credit-card numbers or government-issued identification numbers, according to Coupang.
The saga at Coupang led to the resignation last week of the CEO overseeing operations in South Korea, where the company generates the overwhelming bulk of its revenue. Multiple government investigations remain ongoing. Investigators haven’t publicly disclosed the suspect’s whereabouts or motives.
Park Dae-jun, who oversaw Coupang’s operations in South Korea, apologized for the leak last month. He later resigned. Yonhap News Agency/Yonhap News Agency/Reuters
Coupang has offered an apology and vowed to work with investigators. “We will significantly enhance our information security to prevent recurrences and will do everything we can do to recover trust,” it said.
On Wednesday, the interim CEO of Coupang’s South Korea operations, who had previously served as the general counsel of the parent company, is expected to attend his first legislative hearing in his new role.
Lee Kyo-re, 25, is one of millions of Koreans who have left Coupang. With her personal information leaked, Lee said she has received several unwelcome calls a day from firms trying to sell her insurance, credit cards and red ginseng. She feels like Coupang hasn’t shown remorse.
“I lost trust after the incident,” Lee said.
Coupang headquarters are raided as part of a probe into the breach. Yonhap News/Press pool/Zuma Press
Local police raided Coupang’s Seoul office last week in hopes of unearthing more details about the leak’s origins. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said Friday that penalties for personal-data breaches need to go further because they don’t deter violations enough.
“If things go wrong, the companies could go bankrupt. We must make them think like this,” Lee told officials working at the country’s personal data-safety commission.
Coupang was founded in 2010 as a daily-deals business like Groupon by the Harvard-educated Bom Kim, a Korean-American. The company pivoted into e-commerce, won major backing from SoftBank Group and in 2021 enjoyed one of the biggest foreign-company debuts on the New York Stock Exchange in years.
The firm is now based in Seattle and incorporated in Delaware. Coupang has sought to expand outside South Korea to Taiwan, Japan and elsewhere. Kim, who routinely appears on the parent company’s earnings calls, won’t attend this week’s legislative session despite lawmaker demands to appear. Kim, in a letter to legislators, cited official business commitments as the reason.
Coupang’s “WOW” membership costs about $5.50 a month in South Korea, and includes access to overnight grocery deliveries, as well as a streaming platform and food-delivery service.
SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS
Would you continue to use a favorite site if your personal information was leaked from it? Join the conversation below.
Under South Korea’s personal-information protection laws, Coupang could face a fine of up to 3% of the average annual revenue generated during the prior three years. That would equate to roughly $750 million, a record for the country. Separately, Korea’s Fair Trade Commission is looking into whether Coupang made its account-deletion process difficult after customers raised complaints last month once the leak became public.
Some Coupang users like Jang Ji-hee, 34, find it difficult to make a break with Coupang despite disappointment over the data leak. At home with a 1-year-old child, she said that finding time to go out shopping is difficult and that she buys nearly everything on Coupang.
“It’s just too convenient, and there aren’t better alternatives,” Jang said.
Write to Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com and Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com
Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the December 17, 2025, print edition as 'Coupang Breach Affected Millions of Users'.
WSJ · DELOITTE
11. Ask a North Korean: How did North Koreans react to Kim Jong Il’s death?
Summary:
"Rose" says public grief for Kim Jong Il in December 2011 was far less genuine than the shock and sorrow many felt when Kim Il Sung died in 1994. In her memory, Kim Il Sung’s death felt unimaginable, even “eternal,” and people cried in real disbelief, including her mother. By contrast, when Kim Jong Il died, electricity was briefly provided so everyone could watch the announcement, then citizens were ordered to mourn at statues. Her mother later admitted she felt no sadness and could not cry. Rose’s strongest memory is the brutality of a 10-day memorial in bitter cold, with people standing outside for hours and suffering frostbite, while “strong and prosperous nation” promises rang hollow.
When I saw photos at the time (and in 1994 and when I still see such photos) my thought is always wonderment that Koreans in the north seem to be able to cry on command. Photos at the link.
Ask a North Korean: How did North Koreans react to Kim Jong Il’s death?
While Kim Il Sung’s death triggered shock and sorrow, citizens could muster little more than crocodile tears for his son
Rose December 17, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/12/ask-a-north-korean-how-did-north-koreans-react-to-kim-jong-ils-death/
North Koreans mourning after Kim Jong Il’s death | Image: Uriminzokkiri (Dec. 28, 2011)
“Ask a North Korean” is an NK News series featuring interviews with and columns by North Korean defectors, most of whom left the DPRK within the last few years.
Readers may submit their questions for defectors by emailing ask@nknews.org and including their first name and city of residence.
Today’s question is about how North Koreans responded when they learned about Kim Jong Il’s sudden death on Dec. 17, 2011.
Rose — who was born and raised in North Korea and lived there until she defected in 2019 — writes about citizens’ genuine sorrow at Kim Il Sung’s passing in 1994, their relative indifference to his son’s death and why her most abiding memory of Kim Jong Il’s funeral is the bitter cold.
Got a question for Rose? Email it to ask@nknews.org with your name and city. We’ll be publishing the best ones.
I find myself thinking how impossible it is to predict the world. How could I have known that I, who once praised the Kim family in North Korea, would now be here in South Korea talking about the Kim family’s dictatorship and its abuses?
One thing that is certain is that we will all die someday. Whether we’re born poor or rich, a commoner or a president, everyone eventually meets the same predetermined fate.
This truth is unchanged, even in North Korea: Kim Il Sung, who seemed like he would rule North Korea forever, finally met his end on a summer day in 1994.
When news of Kim Il Sung’s death broke, some in North Korea, shocked by the news, died of heart attacks, according to defectors. It revealed just how much of a figure he had been in our hearts and minds.
To be honest, my mother cried for three straight days when she heard he had died. I cried as well. But the difference between my mother and I was that I cried in shock.
Because of Kim Il Sung’s deification during my childhood, I truly thought he was different from us — that he was someone who would live forever. It rained for three consecutive days and people said the heavens were crying in sorrow.
Kim Jong Il’s body lies in state at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun. | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Dec. 21, 2011)
REALITY STRIKES TWICE
Years later, we once again faced another death — this time our second ruler, Kim Jong Il.
On that winter day in 2011, homes that were usually without electricity were unexpectedly provided with power so that state TV could broadcast the news of Kim Jong Il’s death.
Everyone was overjoyed with suddenly having power during the cold winter but then learned the news when they turned on their televisions. His death was too early and sudden, and as directed by the authorities, we went to Kim Jong Il’s statue to mourn.
Later, my mother — a warm-hearted person who cries when the elderly neighbor passes away — confessed her feelings to me. She was very upset because she wasn’t sad at all due to the leader’s death and wasn’t able to cry.
Somehow, Kim Jong Il had become less important to my mom than the old lady next door. I wondered whether only my mother felt this sentiment.
North Korean residents protect flowers from the snow during the mourning period of Kim Jong Il. | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Dec. 26, 2011)
A BRUTAL WINTER
I still remember Kim Jong Il’s extended memorial service. Two days, three days and then four. It continued for 10 days.
Residents commemorated and honored Kim Jong Il by standing next to his statue for days on end. I, along with others, stood next to a statue at 2 a.m. in December, stamping my feet in the cold. I thought to myself at the time: “I feel like I’m going to freeze to death.”
What kind of absurdity is this, where the living must suffer for the dead?
My friend who was standing guard next to me asked innocently: “Why did the General pass away in winter?” She must have been thinking the same thing as me.
State media also broadcasted stories showcasing Kim Jong Un’s love for the people: “Our Supreme Leader, concerned about the people standing guard outside, has sent hot sandbags.”
But Dec. 2011 was so bitterly cold that many memorial service attendees suffered frostbite.
North Koreans cry in a snow-covered road while mourning the death of Kim Jong Il. | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Dec. 29, 2011)
A STRONG NATION
The summer of 1994 and the winter of 2011 were different in many ways, including the weather, sincerity of tears and public sentiment.
People in North Korea who experienced the Kim Il Sung era had several sayings: “We lived well then,” “There were plenty of fish” and “At least we didn’t worry about hunger.”
But what about those who lived through the Kim Jong Il era? Their biggest worry was their next meal.
To these people, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) proclaimed that if we just get through today’s hardship, the gates to a “strong and prosperous nation (강성대국)” would soon open.
A strong and prosperous nation!
North Korean residents’ understanding of this can be seen through a story.
During a visit to North Korea, a South Korean official reportedly asked a question to Kim Jong Il. “There are slogans about a ‘strong and prosperous nation’ everywhere on the streets,” the official said. “What exactly is it?”
Kim Jong Il supposedly replied, “Combining South Korea’s economic power with North Korea’s military power. That’s a strong and prosperous nation.”
It really seemed as if waves of happiness would surge after the gates of this strong and prosperous nation opened. There’s even a song in North Korea explaining it.
But somehow, those gates never opened.
Someone joked that the gates to this strong and prosperous nation hadn’t opened for so long that when they peeked inside, they found “Grandfather Self-Reliance” sitting there. The North Korean people, abandoned by a state that espoused the principles of self-reliance, could only rely on themselves to survive.
North Korean students grieving after Kim Jong Il’s death | Image: Uriminzokkiri (Dec. 29, 2011)
HOPE LINGERS
Still, there were some people who held onto hope: “Wasn’t there a reason for the government to make such bold claims,” they would ask. “How could they say such things without anything to back it up?
Rumors spread the flames of hope: The most common was that thousands of tons of rice were piled up at Wonsan and Rajin ports.
Just as people began to hope again amid growing public doubt over their government, news came of Kim Jong Il’s death. Through his death, we realized that nothing had been prepared for the so-called strong and prosperous nation.
There wasn’t even a single grain of rice at Rajin port, let alone tons.
Some people had their own narratives of Kim Jong Il’s demise. They said that because he had told so many lies to people, he died from the stress of being unable to deal with the consequences.
This was the honest feeling residents had after his death.
I believe that a person’s life can be assessed by how people react to their death. In that sense, I think Kim Jong Il’s life was shameful and undignified.
There was a time when North Korean residents had to act out their sorrow, especially right after Kim Jong Il’s death. But for me, that period was little more than a war against the cold.
Edited by David Choi
About the Author
Rose
Rose is a pseudonym for a North Korean defector writer. She was born in the city of Chongjin and lived in North Korea until she defected with her family in 2019, resettling in South Korea in Jan. 2020. She previously worked as a video producer in North Korea, specifically in wedding production, and now works in the marketing department of an advertising company.
12. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ Hospitals rebuilt on Kim Jong-un's orders, but... "Not a single proper bed. X-ray machine broken due to voltage issues" — Musan County
Summary:
ASIAPRESS reports that Musan County Hospital in north Hamgyong was renovated under Kim Jong Un’s 2025 “healthcare revolution” order, but remains functionally broken. Rooms were rebuilt, yet there is not a single proper bed and little equipment. A used Chinese X-ray machine arrived, then failed within a month due to unstable voltage. The nearby Musan Mine hospital is worse, lacking even surgical scalpels. With no state funding, the party pressures donju, officials, and trading firms to donate, often 10 million won or more. Care is no longer free; fees and referral permits are required. Pyongyang gets better imported gear too.
Commentary: The truth about the Socialist Workers Paradise. Free medical care?
＜Inside N. Korea＞ Hospitals rebuilt on Kim Jong-un's orders, but... "Not a single proper bed. X-ray machine broken due to voltage issues" — Musan County
https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2025/12/society-economy/hospitals-rebuilt/
2025.12.12
(FILE PHOTO) An inpatient room at a hospital in Pochon County, Ryanggang Province. One patient lies on a shabby bed. Photographed in April 2015 by ASIAPRESS.
"Make 2025 the inaugural year of the healthcare revolution." This was Kim Jong-un's declaration in February 2025. It was an order to construct modern medical and healthcare facilities not only in Pyongyang but also in the provinces. The construction plans that came to light included the large Pyongyang General Hospital, Kusong City Hospital, and Kangdong County Hospital in Pyongyang, and it's been reported that medical facility renewal projects have been proceeding one after another in other provinces as well. What's the reality of this "healthcare revolution"? We asked a reporting partner in North Hamgyong Province to investigate the situation on the ground. (ISHIMARU Jiro / KANG Ji-won)
◆Provincial hospitals lack proper surgical scalpels
Reporting partner A lives in Musan County, North Hamgyong Province—a border city with China that's home to North Korea's largest iron ore mine. The population is estimated at around 100,000.
—— Is the renewal of medical facilities also proceeding in Musan County?
Since last fall, there's been a directive from the central government to modernize the medical and healthcare sector, and orders came down to rebuild Musan County Hospital in a modern fashion. They renovated the existing building and reconstructed the inpatient rooms, examination rooms, testing rooms, and so on. The problem is that proper medical equipment isn't coming in. When I actually went into the hospital, there wasn't a single proper bed.
—— In Pyongyang, they're widely publicizing the completion of a magnificent general hospital.
I hear that places like Pyongyang and Samjiyon have received a lot of good Chinese medical equipment imported through Sinuiju and Nampo. But the provinces have no money. All that came to Musan County Hospital was a used Chinese X-ray machine.
Even that secondhand X-ray machine broke down after just one month because they were using unstable voltage instead of the rated voltage, so I heard it's actually unusable.
—— Are there other hospitals in Musan?
There's also a mine hospital at the Musan Mine, but the medical facilities are even worse there—they don't even have proper surgical scalpels. Besides that, there are small clinics in each district.
◆No funding, so they make officials and the wealthy pay
—— Why do the provinces have no money?
Because the government doesn't give them any. The Workers' Party is demanding that the donju contribute funds and donate equipment and materials. There were people who contributed materials and money for the interior construction of the county hospital. Most are officials or people from trading companies, contributing around 10 million won. Among them, some have contributed hundreds of millions of won.
※ 10,000 North Korean won equals approximately US$0.29. The average worker's wage is around 35,000-50,000 won.
—— Is medical service still free?
No. It's shifted to a social insurance system for workers belonging to state enterprises and wage-receiving units (organizations). Workers pay 2,000 won for medical treatment. Regular people pay 5,000 won. To receive treatment at the county hospital, you must bring an examination permit issued by the mine hospital or a district clinic.
The Kim Jong-un regime has recently been actively publicizing factory and housing construction in the provinces. State-run media publish photos of their splendid exteriors daily. However, needless to say, what's important isn't the appearance but the practicality of the facilities.
※ ASIAPRESS maintains communication with its reporting partners in North Korea through smuggled Chinese mobile phones.
Map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)
13. ＜Super-telephoto Report＞Border Guards Look Healthier with Improved Uniforms "Since the Chinese are watching us, selecting robust soldiers, issuing special uniforms" Residents also ordered not to appear shabby Hyesan (6 photos)
Summary:
ASIAPRESS reports that North Korean border guards opposite China in Hyesan appear healthier and better uniformed, but locals say it is selective presentation, not broad supply improvement. Units reportedly deploy only robust soldiers to the most visible Gwangan-dong area and prioritize their uniforms and provisions because Chinese tourists watch from a nearby Changbai observation deck. Authorities also tighten social control on residents, banning shabby dress, loud behavior, waving to China, or any conduct deemed to harm “the Republic’s prestige.” Toilets were ordered moved or screened from view. Checkpoints enforce appearance rules, including mandatory yellow vests. Officials plan to replace visible low-rise housing with new apartments to hide poverty from Chinese sightlines.
Comment: I remember meeting with Thae Yong Ho after he defected. One of the reasons (besides his sons not wanting to return to Pyongyang) for their defection was that he could no longer explain the contradictions of the Kim family regime - the image the regime attempts to projects and the real truth.
＜Super-telephoto Report＞Border Guards Look Healthier with Improved Uniforms "Since the Chinese are watching us, selecting robust soldiers, issuing special uniforms" Residents also ordered not to appear shabby Hyesan (6 photos)
https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2025/12/military/improvement/
2025.12.16
1. Border guard officers and NCOs sitting together eating wild grapes from a cap.
Last September, ASIAPRESS used a super-telephoto camera to photograph the Wiyeon-dong area of Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, from an observation deck in Changbai County, China, across the border. This observation deck offers the closest view of North Korea anywhere along the China-North Korea border. The North Korean border guards captured on camera appeared better nourished and more neatly dressed than before. ASIAPRESS asked a reporting partner residing in Hyesan in mid-November about whether this change signified an overall improvement in military supplies. (JEON Sung-jun / KANG Ji-won)
2. Soldiers in work clothes moving to a work site. They're wearing wristwatches, including smartwatches.
◆ Chinese people stare at us as if we were animals in a zoo
-- The border guards' uniforms and nutritional condition looked good from the Chinese observation deck. Has military supply improved?
"(The overall situation) is the same. However, I heard that the border guard brigade specially selected robust and healthy soldiers for deployment there, and their supplies are somewhat different. I heard from a family I know with someone in the military that only 'strong kids' go to that area. They say uniforms and everything are given priority."
3. North Korean soldiers forming ranks inside the barracks. All appear relatively robust and their uniforms look new.
-- Is it because it's clearly visible from the observation deck?
"That's right. That neighborhood is 'Gwangan-dong,' which is closest (to China), and if you speak loudly, everything can be heard. Our side (North Korean authorities) strongly opposed (the installation of the observation deck) to the Chinese side, but (the Chinese) said it was a private investment they couldn't stop, so they just built it anyway.
Since Chinese people watch (North Korea) like they're looking at a zoo (from the observation deck), the authorities don't allow going out in shorts or underwear even in summer. They especially ordered that public toilets and private (outdoor) toilets be moved or made invisible."
※ The observation deck in question is a major tourist attraction in Changbai County, China, with construction beginning in 2020 and officially opening around 2022. Through transparent glass floors protruding over a cliff, visitors can look down on Hyesan in North Korea, with clear views of barracks and people's daily lives.
4. The observation deck in Changbai County, Jilin Province, China. The North Korean cityscape is visible beyond.
Next Page： ◆ Don't damage the Republic's prestige... Controlling border residents' behavior
◆ Don't damage the Republic's prestige... Controlling border residents' behavior
-- Are there special guidelines for ordinary people too?
"The people's unit exercises heavy control, saying that acts damaging 'the Republic's prestige' in border areas will be punished no less severely than river-crossers (defectors). It's difficult to go to the river, and they strictly prohibit all acts like waving hands toward the Chinese side, conversing, fighting, or brawling."
5. Soldiers moving a hand tractor stop to talk with a soldier leading a goat in the middle of the road.
-- Who conducts the crackdowns and how?
"Security guards at people's unit checkpoints crack down on people whose dress is improper. Everyone wears 'yellow vests,' and you must comply when the checkpoint questions or inspects you.
The plan is that once the apartments currently under construction are completed, all the low-rise housing in the Gwangan-dong area (visible from the observation deck) will be demolished. Ultimately, (they) won't even show (us living poorly)."
6. A North Korean soldier on duty carrying an automatic rifle. Appears to be in his early 20s. His uniform is neat.
The sight of robust soldiers in neat uniforms paradoxically reveals what North Korea government fears most: the controlled and hidden reality just behind this façade. The reporting partner's self-deprecating remark that Chinese tourists watch "like looking at a zoo" offers a sharp observation about North Koreans trapped in what amounts to a giant stage set.
※ ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.
※ All photos were taken by the ASIAPRESS reporting team in September 2025 of Hyesan, Ryanggang Province, from the Chinese side of the border.
Map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)
14. South Korean Defense Ministry confirms leaflet drops into North ahead of Yoon's martial law bid
Summary:
South Korea’s Defense Ministry confirmed a probe found the military conducted leaflet drops into north Korea under Yoon Suk Yeol administration orders. The decision was made at an Oct. 12, 2023 Security Council meeting and followed a court ruling voiding a leaflet ban. A verbal order on Nov. 8, 2023 restarted operations. Investigators logged 23 drops in 17 missions from Feb. 18 to Nov. 15, 2024, targeting 35 sites such as Pyongyang and Wonsan. Command and approvals ran through the Joint Chiefs via secure phones, and units were told to leave no paperwork. Former defense ministers also provided cash incentives.
Comment: Yes, but... Shouldn't the ROK and the ROK/US alliance be conducting active psychological warfare against the nKPA? Will any future PSYOP now be tainted by a perceived connection to the martial law debacle? PSYOP is a routine military operation and must be conducted as part of any effort to prepare the information for future conflict.
A Psychological Operations Strategy for the Korean Peninsula from Lessons Learned in Ukraine
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/a-psychological-operations-strategy-for-the-korean-peninsula-from-lessons-learned-in-ukraine/
Two fundamental primary objectives should drive this PSYOP campaign during the Armistice:
- Deter KPA soldiers from following orders to attack South Korea
- Encourage KPA forces to refuse orders suppressing domestic political resistance
South Korean Defense Ministry confirms leaflet drops into North ahead of Yoon's martial law bid
Published: 17 Dec. 2025, 13:14
Updated: 17 Dec. 2025, 20:48
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-12-17/national/socialAffairs/South-Korean-Defense-Ministry-confirms-leaflet-drops-into-North-ahead-of-Yoons-martial-law-bid/2479800
Leaflets aimed at North Korea flutter from a large balloon during a ceremony hosted by an assocation of families of abductees held in North Korea at Imjingak in Paju, Gyeonggi, on April 23. [NEWS1]
The Defense Ministry confirmed that the military carried out leaflet drops into North Korea under orders of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration ahead of the former president's martial law bid, an internal investigation showed for the first time on Wednesday.
The finding links the Yoon administration’s resumption of leaflet operations to prosecutors’ claims that the former president used the campaign to help justify his controversial imposition of martial law by provoking a response from Pyongyang through unusual military actions.
Related Article
The findings emerged after the ministry questioned officers involved in the chain of command at the Defense Psychological Operations Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), according to Rep. Choo Mi-ae of the Democratic Party, a member of the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judiciary Committee.
Investigators found that the Yoon administration decided to restart the operations at the 34th National Security Council standing committee meeting on Oct. 12, 2023. The agenda focused on an assessment of a historic inter-Korean military agreement — concluded between then-President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on Sept. 19, 2018, — and possible response measures.
Then Defense Minister Shin Won-sik, Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho and National Intelligence Service Director Kim Kyou-hyun took part in the deliberations.
The outcome of the meeting was classified as a presidential record, leaving the Defense Ministry unable to confirm specific details such as the reasons for resuming the leaflet campaign.
Members of a civic group representing families of abductees in North Korea prepares to launch eight leaflet balloons toward the North on April 27 in Paju, Gyeonggi. [ASSOCIATION OF THE FAMILIES OF THOSE ABDUCTED BY NORTH KOREA]
The decision to resume the leaflet operations came shortly after the Constitutional Court ruled the ban on anti–North Korea leaflets unconstitutional under the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act.
Shin later issued a verbal order on Nov. 8, 2023, directing the military to resume leaflet drops. The instruction passed through the JCS to the Defense Psychological Operations Group.
The Defense Psychological Operations Group carried out at least 23 leaflet drops in 17 operations from Feb. 18 through Nov. 15, 2024, the investigation found. Targets included 35 locations across North Korea, including Pyongyang, Wonsan and key military and urban areas.
Command and control ran from field commanders through the JCS operations planning director, the operations chief and the JCS chair. All reporting and approvals took place via secure phones.
Units involved deleted records related to the operations during routine monthly cyber and security inspections. At the JCS, superiors instructed staff not to leave any documents tied to the leaflet campaign, investigators said.
The investigation concluded that allegations claiming the Defense Psychological Operations Group acted independently without higher-level approval were unfounded.
The probe also confirmed that the former defense ministers under Yoon provided cash incentives to encourage the operations. Shin gave 2 million won ($1,350) in payments to the Defense Psychological Operations Group on July 26, 2024, during a face-to-face briefing on loudspeaker broadcasts. His successor, Kim Yong-hyun, provided 3 million won on Oct. 23 that year during a briefing on three psychological warfare operations, including leaflet drops.
Residents of Tongilchon, a village inside a restricted area near the inter-Korean border, stage a protest at Imjingak in Paju, Gyeonggi, on April 23, denouncing an attempt by a group of families of abductees to send anti-North Korea leaflets across the border. [YONHAP]
North Korea accused the South of initiating the leaflet campaign and began launching large numbers of trash balloons toward the South from May 2024. The Yoon administration cited those actions when it suspended the entire Sept. 19 inter-Korean military agreement on June 9 and later resumed loudspeaker broadcasts and live-fire drills near the border.
A special prosecutor investigating alleged insurrection by Yoon charged the former president and Kim Yong-hyun last month with general aiding-the-enemy offenses.
Prosecutors argue that Yoon pursued abnormal military operations to provoke a North Korean response and create justification for declaring martial law on Dec. 3, 2024. The leaflet campaign resumed in October 2023, the same period the special prosecutor has identified as when preparations for martial law intensified.
Around that time, the military appointed a series of commanders who later played key roles during the short-lived imposition of martial law, including then Army Chief of Staff Gen. Park An-su, as well as the heads of the Special Warfare Command, the Defense Counterintelligence Command, and the Capital Defense Command.
The Defense Ministry’s special investigation unit plans to conduct further inquiries into the background of the decision to resume leaflet drops, potential links to Yoon's martial law declaration and whether the operations violated the law.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY JEONG JAE-HONG [kim.juyeon2@joongang.co.kr]
15. Why is abolishing South Korea's National Security Act a point of ideological contention?
Summary:
A bill to abolish South Korea’s National Security Act (NSA) becomes ideological because it sits on the fault line between two core narratives about the Republic of Korea. Liberals tend to frame the NSA as a Cold War instrument that can chill speech and association, especially through Article 7’s “praise, incite, or propagate” language, which critics argue is vague and therefore vulnerable to politicized enforcement. They also argue other statutes can handle espionage and hostile-state activity without criminalizing thought or debate on inter-Korean issues. Conservatives treat the NSA as a necessary legal firewall in an unresolved war, where north Korea is still organized, active, and able to recruit, direct, or exploit domestic networks. They point to real cases involving clandestine links to Pyongyang and stress that courts, including the Constitutional Court, have repeatedly upheld key provisions, so repeal is seen as weakening deterrence and counterintelligence. Because both sides can credibly cite history, law, and ongoing security risk, the fight is less about one statute than about how South Korea defines democratic resilience under armistice conditions.
Comment: Certainly a complex issue. The question is what does South Korea need to protect its nation?
Why is abolishing South Korea's National Security Act a point of ideological contention?
Published: 16 Dec. 2025, 07:00
Liberal activists call for the abolition of the National Security Act during a press conference at the National Assembly in western Seoul on Dec. 1. [NEWS1]
[EXPLAINER]
Earlier this month, 31 liberal lawmakers from the ruling Democratic Party (DP) and four minor parties introduced a bill to officially abolish the National Security Act, reigniting a political clash.
While the National Security Act appears politically neutral, with no explicit mention of particular ideological orientations, it has long served as an anti-espionage measure, blocking pro-Pyongyang influence on South Korean soil.
The liberal legislators argue that the law undermines individuals’ freedom of thought and their freedom to exchange views on inter-Korean relations. They likened the security act to “suppression” that violates the South Korean Constitution, which upholds democracy and peaceful unification.
Related Article
The bill to abolish the National Security Act is under review by a subcommittee under the National Assembly's Legislation and Judiciary Committee.
Despite its 77 years of standing, the National Security Act is now facing an existential crisis in the name of universal human rights and a peaceful future on the Korean Peninsula.
Why are lawmakers trying to abolish the National Security Act?
Protesters burn a North Korean flag during a rally to keep the National Security Act in an undated file photo. [JOONGANG ILBO]
The National Security Act — legislated in 1948 — criminalizes “anti-state organization,” which is defined as a domestic or overseas group “fraudulently using the title of the South Korean government or aiming at a rebellion” with their own chain of command.
South Korea’s Constitution defines the national territory as the entire Korean Peninsula, rendering North Korea an illegitimate and anti-state organization. Accordingly, those who act on behalf of the North or in its favor are considered to have violated the National Security Act.
The liberal bloc argues that the National Security Act is a "by-product of the Cold War” that undermines the values of democracy, constitutional values and human rights.
Article 7 of the act penalizes those who "praise, incite or propagate" anti-state activities. However, a more detailed explanation of which actions constitute such behaviors is missing.
The 31 liberal lawmakers contended that the concepts of “praise” and “incite” are ambiguous. They also noted that acts cannot be punished unless their legal definitions are established under the principle of legality — or in other words, no act can be a crime without a law defining it so.
Specifically, they argued that the current Criminal Act and the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act can replace the National Security Act.
Indeed, the Criminal Act governs acts of espionage, helping the enemy and foreign aggression, including preparations, conspiracy and propaganda activities. Its punitive clause for spying allows courts to impose the death penalty, life imprisonment or imprisonment for seven years or longer — comparable to the National Security Act.
What is the ideological war behind the National Security Act?
Footage aired by local broadcaster MBC shows the moment when philosopher Song Du-yul meets ex-North Korean leader Kim Jong-il when regime founder Kim Il-sung died in 1994. [JOONGANG ILBO]
The law was enacted in the aftermath of the Yeosu and Suncheon incident of Oct. 19, 1948, led by soldiers who disobeyed an order to suppress a leftist uprising on Jeju Island.
On the evening of Oct. 19, 1948, soldiers stationed in South Jeolla’s Yeosu revolted under the leadership of senior sergeant Ji Chang-soo, who was aligned with the communist Workers' Party of South Korea, and killed some 150 right-leaning police officers and their families. In turn, the South Korean government launched a counterinsurgency operation and massacred thousands of civilians, some of whom were merely suspected of being leftists.
At the time, President Syngman Rhee prioritized the eradication of communism on South Korean soil. The newly enacted National Security Act was employed as a legal basis to suppress leftist activity.
Initially, the act was supposed to be temporary. Then-Justice Minister Gwon Seung-ryeol said that the National Security Act "is not legislation for peacetime but a measure for times of emergency; therefore, in such circumstances, even if there is some infringement on the protection of human rights, it must inevitably contribute to the founding of the state,” according to an archive run by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism.
Some 13 years later, in 1961, then-President Park Chung Hee, who rose to power through a military coup, legislated a separate bill named the “Anti-Communist Act.” The law viewed communist activity as a threat to South Korea’s security.
The Anti-Communist Act saw communism-based organizations as anti-state groups and stipulated imprisonment of seven years or less for those who joined such groups.
In 1980, about a year after Park was assassinated, the Anti-Communist Act was absorbed into the National Security Act. The integration came after the legislature found that the two laws were similar with repetitive clauses. However, explicit mentions of “communism” were omitted.
Over the decades, the law has become associated with political persecution, especially of those considered friendly toward Pyongyang, leading to the suppression and even arrests of perceived dissenters of incumbent governments.
In one case, German-South Korean philosopher Song Du-yul was found guilty of visiting North Korea multiple times between 1991 and 1993 before his naturalization as a German citizen. In 2008, the Seoul High Court and Supreme Court ruled that his visits when he was a South Korean national constituted "defection" to join anti-state activities. The appellate court handed him a 30-month prison sentence, which was suspended for five years.
Four other individuals spent 14 years facing charges under the National Security Act. They were indicted in 2011 for distributing digital documents containing the North’s juche, or self-reliance, ideology. The Suwon District Court cleared them of charges in October, noting that simple possession of the materials was insufficient to establish that they had a motive to benefit North Korea.
What attempts have been made to change the law?
Protesters demand a complete abolition of the National Security Act during a rally held in 2005. [JOONGANG ILBO]
In line with liberal lawmakers’ arguments, human rights advocacy groups also demanded the scrapping of the National Security Act.
In 2004, the National Human Rights Commission advised the Ministry of Justice and the National Assembly to abolish the act, particularly regarding the seventh and 10th provisions, which criminalize failure to report violators to state authorities.
The state-run rights watchdog said the provisions could “curtail essential constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression and [individual] conscience relating to freedom of speech and of the press, intellectual freedom and expression in the arts.”
In 2021, Amnesty International recommended either a fundamental reform or a complete abolition of the act. In its statement published in 2010, the rights group accused the law of being a “form of censorship” and a "tool to silence dissent and to arbitrarily prosecute individuals […] exercising their rights to freedom of expression and association.”
The law has undergone several amendments to prevent misappropriation.
A 1987 revision guaranteed suspects’ rights to seek the court’s judgment on the legality of their arrest. It also upheld their rights to have their families notified if they are taken into custody.
Under another amendment in 1991, those who were unaware that their behavior might jeopardize South Korea’s democratic order before their actions became non-punishable. The amendment also required law enforcement officials to guarantee defendants' fundamental human rights.
Why is the issue still divisive?
Conservative People Power Party lawmakers participate in a seminar about the National Security Act at the National Assembly in western Seoul on Dec. 10. [NEWS1]
The National Security Act remains divisive to this day, with some liberal lawmakers pushing for its swift abolishment, while conservatives still vehemently defend it.
Ousted conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol often used the term “anti-state forces” throughout his term. After his first mention in October 2022, he used the expression to support his imposition of martial law on Dec. 3 last year, adding that he would normalize the country by eradicating the “anti-state forces.”
To this day, hundreds of thousands of people believe the National Security Act is still necessary.
A public petition opposing the abolition had gained 162,894 signatures as of Monday. A civil rights group filed complaints against the 31 liberal lawmakers with the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency earlier this month, alleging abuse of power and insurrection, and added that they should have called for stricter security measures as lawmakers.
On Dec. 8, conservative People Power Party (PPP) lawmakers condemned the liberals’ attempt to abolish the bill, saying it would give further ammunition to pro-North spies. The DP leadership has so far maintained that the bill isn't the party's official position.
During a seminar on the National Security Act at the National Assembly last Wednesday, PPP floor leader Song Eon-seog said society should consider who would benefit most if the act were abolished. He additionally noted a recent case in which a former labor union official was convicted.
National Intelligence Service officers walks out of the headquarters of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions in central Seoul after their raid for a National Security Act violation case in 2023. [NEWS1]
Seok Kwon-ho, a former director of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, was sentenced to 9 years and 6 months in prison by an appellate court earlier this year for receiving orders from Pyongyang to instigate anti-American sentiment. He also sent South Korean lawmakers’ phone numbers to the North Korean regime through encrypted correspondence between 2018 and 2022.
Song stressed that the National Security Act is "constitutional," as the Constitutional Court has sided with the seventh provision — the clause on praise and incitement of anti-state activities — eight times since 1991.
Yet, some legal experts seem to favor a more nuanced approach to minimize the risk of human rights violations while maintaining the act, given the special situation between the South and the North.
In a 2017 academic paper, Chae Seong-joon, a professor of public administration and law at Dankook University, said the National Security Act should be amended to foster better relations with Pyongyang and protect human rights.
“To a degree that does not harm the fundamental value of the National Security Act, there are reasons to improve the law to resolve unreasonable points that impede basic human rights and hinder improving inter-Korean relations,” Chae wrote.
BY LEE SOO-JUNG [lee.soojung1@joongang.co.kr]
16. Fault Lines Daily Summary - December 17, 2025 (Korea Plus)
Comment: Just a reminder about George Hutchinson's excellent daily analysis. Our schedules do not always align so I do not forward this every day. But I do read it everyday and so should you. He provides unique and expert insights that I do not find anywhere else.. Access it at the link below and subscribe.
Fault Lines Daily Summary - December 17, 2025
Daily news and analysis tracking the cracks and shifts at the fault lines of global power — with Korea at the epicenter.
https://hutchinsong.substack.com/p/fault-lines-daily-summary-december-bb0?utm
George Hutchinson
Dec 17, 2025
Surface Scan
Over the past 24 hours, Seoul’s strategic environment revealed a pattern of parallel contradictions rather than a unified direction. Within the alliance apparatus, South Korea used managed political theater to probe flexibility on North Korea policy. Economically, currency weakness and regional frictions unexpectedly opened space for selective stabilization with China through tourism, cultural signaling, and trade. Regionally, Seoul’s expanding nuclear propulsion and export ambitions unfolded against a hardening security backdrop shaped by China–Japan tensions over Taiwan. Globally, U.S. escalation against Venezuelan oil exports injected fresh volatility into energy markets, interacting with sanctions evasion and Chinese stockpiling to cloud supply visibility. Together, these developments underscored a day defined less by decisive shifts than by careful maneuvering across increasingly unforgiving fault lines.
Epicenter
Summary:
• Alliance coordination on North Korea policy becomes managed political theater. What appeared publicly as discord between the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over newly launched ROK–U.S. North Korea consultations increasingly reflects managed political theater rather than policy breakdown. The Unification Ministry’s decision not to participate in a follow-up bilateral session—while separately briefing the diplomatic corps—projected autonomy and engagement intent, prompting the Foreign Ministry to clarify that the new consultative channel is not a revival of the 2018 working group criticized for allowing Washington to slow or screen inter-Korean cooperation. In response to concerns, the National Security Office, Unification Ministry, and Foreign Ministry emphasized that the government would “speak with one voice,” even as a Foreign Ministry official acknowledged that the Unification Ministry remains free to provide its own explanations to the U.S. side. This signaling unfolded alongside a sharp reminder of alliance constraints, as the U.N. Command objected to proposed legislation granting Seoul greater authority over DMZ access. Together, the episode underscores how Seoul is testing alliance flexibility—seeking greater latitude on engagement with Pyongyang—while operating within increasingly visible structural limits at a time when analysts warn the U.S.–ROK alliance faces mounting strain from regional security deterioration, rising U.S. burden-sharing expectations, and more transactional U.S. trade tactics.
Sources: The Korea Times — Discord at helm of North policy; Korea JoongAng Daily — Unification Ministry’s absence at South Korea-U.S. talks raises questions on government coordination efforts; The Korea Post — Seoul, Washington launch regular talks on N. Korea policy; Unification Ministry holds briefing for diplomatic corps; Korea Herald — Allies agree North Korea policy channel not ‘working group’ redux; UPI — S. Korea, U.S. share that latest talks on N. Korea different from past ‘working group’; UPI — S. Korea ministries stress “one team” on N. Korea policy amid concerns; Yonhap News Agency — (2nd LD) U.N. Command objects to push to grant S. Korea control over DMZ access; The Korea Times — UNC opposes legislative move to allow S. Korean authority over DMZ access; Korea Economic Institute of America — The U.S.-South Korea Alliance Faces Uncertain Future
• Economic and regional crosscurrents align—ironically—to reopen space in South Korea–China relations. A weakening won—hitting an eight-month low amid persistent foreign stock outflows—has sharpened Seoul’s sensitivity to external demand and capital flows, coinciding with signs of a modest warming in China-facing tourism, cultural exchange, and trade diplomacy. As Chinese travelers redirect budget tourism toward South Korea amid political friction with Japan, Seoul has quietly welcomed the inflow while Chinese media signal a possible thaw in Beijing’s informal freeze on Korean cultural content. Against this backdrop, South Korea’s ambassador to China publicly urged deeper bilateral cooperation and exchanges, while the government weighed an early-January K-pop concert in China and highlighted youth exchange events as confidence-building measures. At the policy level, Seoul moved to revive momentum by pushing for a services-sector free trade agreement with China and advancing CPTPP affiliation, framing market access and cultural exchange as parallel stabilizers at a moment when currency weakness and export uncertainty are narrowing Korea’s economic margin for error.
Sources: South China Morning Post — Why South Korea is becoming China’s new bargain travel hotspot amid Japan spat; Bloomberg — South Korean Won Hits Eight-Month Low as Stock Outflows Persist; Korea JoongAng Daily — Korean ambassador to China urges deeper bilateral cooperation, exchanges; Korea JoongAng Daily — China’s freeze on Korean culture may be thawing, Hong Kong newspaper says; Asia News Network — South Korean government weighs early January K-pop concert in China amid thaw speculation; The Korea Post — [Opinion] China-South Korea Youth Friendship Exchange event successfully held in Jiangsu Province; Korea JoongAng Daily — Korea to push for service sector FTA with China, CPTPP affiliation for export momentum
• South Korea’s North Korea information debate exposes a bidirectional policy irony. Revelations that the South Korean military sent propaganda leaflets into North Korea at least 23 times last year—confirmed by the Ministry of National Defense and tied to the period preceding former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s martial law bid—have resurfaced questions about state control over information escalation. The disclosures coincide with a renewed push, led by the ruling progressive camp, to lift longstanding bans on access to North Korean state media inside South Korea, even as that same camp has sharply criticized the prior administration’s leaflet operations and moved to outlaw future leaflet launches. The juxtaposition highlights an ironic role reversal: conservatives previously defended outbound information operations while restricting inbound DPRK media, while progressives now champion inbound openness while tightening controls on outbound messaging. Together, the episode underscores how information—long treated as both a coercive tool and a democratic principle—remains governed by shifting political priorities rather than a stable framework for escalation control and openness.
Sources: Anadolu Agency — South Korean military sent propaganda leaflets to North Korea 23 times last year: Lawmaker; Korea JoongAng Daily — South Korean Defense Ministry confirms leaflet drops into North ahead of Yoon’s martial law bid; South China Morning Post — South Korea reopens bitter debate on lifting ban on North Korean state media; The Korea Times — Ruling party pushes to lift ban on North Korean media
Impact:
Seoul’s odd juxtaposition: alliance political theater, serendipitous China alignment, and propaganda policy reversals. On North Korea policy, the appearance of inter-ministerial discord is best understood as deliberate political theater aimed at nudging Washington toward a more flexible posture on engagement—one that avoids recreating a formal screening mechanism that could block inter-Korean initiatives—without openly confronting the United States. That maneuver, however, runs into firm limits where armistice authority applies, as the U.N. Command’s objection to expanded South Korean control over DMZ access underscored. Separately, economic conditions are producing an unintended opening with China, where a weaker won and a China–Japan spat have redirected tourism toward South Korea and coincided with tentative signals of a cultural thaw, giving Seoul low-cost opportunities to stabilize ties without a strategic reset. At home, the renewed debate over North Korea information policy exposes a different irony, with progressives pressing to allow inbound DPRK media while outlawing outbound leaflet operations they now condemn from the previous administration. Taken together, today’s developments show Seoul advancing engagement, stabilization, and control along parallel tracks—each shaped by different incentives and limits—rather than through a single, unified policy logic.
Shifting Plates
Summary:
• South Korea pushes deeper into nuclear propulsion and SMR exports as scrutiny rises. Seoul is openly exploring an Australia-style, standalone agreement with Washington to pursue nuclear-powered submarines, with senior national security officials preparing to raise the issue directly with U.S. counterparts as part of a broader push to enhance undersea deterrence capabilities. At the same time, South Korea’s growing footprint in nuclear technology is expanding beyond defense, as Korean-designed floating small modular reactors (SMRs) receive certification and Samsung C&T signs an SMR cooperation agreement with Poland, reinforcing Korea’s role as an emerging nuclear exporter. Yet these advances are unfolding against a backdrop of heightened sensitivity over technology control, underscored by the jailing of South Korean contractors involved in Taiwan’s submarine program for leaking classified documents. Taken together, the developments highlight a strategic tension: Seoul is seeking greater capability and influence in nuclear propulsion and civil nuclear exports while navigating stricter alliance oversight and international scrutiny over proliferation, trust, and technology security.
Sources: Hankyoreh — South Korea eyes separate Australia-style pact with US for nuclear submarines; Bloomberg — South Korea Eyes Standalone US Deal to Build Nuclear Submarines; Yonhap News Agency — Top security adviser to discuss possibility of deal with U.S. for S. Korea’s push for nuclear-powered subs; The Standard (HK) — South Korean contractors on Taiwan submarines jailed for leaking documents; World Nuclear News — Korean floating SMR design certified; NucNet — Poland’s SGE Signs Small Modular Reactor MOU With South Korea’s Samsung C&T
• China–Japan tensions over Taiwan harden rhetorically even as both sides preserve controlled diplomatic off-ramps. Beijing sharply escalated pressure on Tokyo by demanding that Japan’s prime minister retract remarks linking Taiwan contingencies to Japan’s security, while Chinese officials and state media accused Japanese politicians and commentators of spreading “false narratives” on Taiwan and regional militarization. Tokyo, for its part, sought to clarify—rather than retreat from—its position, with Japan’s foreign minister spelling out Tokyo’s Taiwan stance in an effort to manage escalation without conceding core security views. Senior Japanese political figures, including Sanae Takaichi, emphasized that Japan remains open to dialogue and committed to continued talks with China, underscoring an effort to compartmentalize rhetoric from diplomatic channels. Even so, the deterioration in atmospherics was made tangible through symbolic rupture, as Japan prepared to part with its remaining pandas amid the deepening row. Taken together, the episode illustrates a familiar but tightening pattern: sharper public confrontation over Taiwan paired with deliberate signaling on both sides to prevent rhetorical escalation from foreclosing diplomacy altogether.
Sources: Newsweek — China Escalates Dispute with Japan; Reuters — China reiterates demand that Japanese PM retract Taiwan remarks; China Daily — China again asks Japanese individuals to stop peddling false narratives; South China Morning Post — Tokyo spells out position on Taiwan, in part, in bid to ease tension with Beijing; The Japan Times — Takaichi says Japan ‘always open’ to dialogue with China; Nippon.com — Takaichi Vows to Continue Talks with China; Financial Times — Japan bids farewell to pandas as row with China deepens
Impact:
South Korea’s expanding nuclear and undersea footprint is colliding with a more fragile regional security environment. Seoul’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines alongside growing SMR export activity signals a bid to expand both deterrence capacity and industrial reach, but it also places greater weight on how Korea manages sensitive technologies across military and civilian lines. The case involving leaked submarine program documents tied to Taiwan underscores that trust and information security are not secondary issues, but central risks as Korea’s role in advanced naval and nuclear projects grows. At the same time, escalating China–Japan tensions over Taiwan are sharpening regional fault lines, creating a security climate in which technological moves are more likely to be interpreted politically. Even as Beijing and Tokyo preserve diplomatic off-ramps, the harder rhetoric and symbolic frictions point to a more brittle equilibrium in Northeast Asia. For Seoul, this means advances in capability and exports will unfold in an environment where missteps carry higher strategic costs. The challenge ahead is not constraint management, but perception management—ensuring that expansion in one domain does not inadvertently narrow room for maneuver in another.
Global Ripples
Summary:
• Trump’s Venezuela oil blockade jolts energy markets and revives sanction-driven supply risk. President Donald Trump escalated U.S. pressure on Caracas by designating the Venezuelan regime a foreign terrorist organization and ordering a “total and complete blockade” of sanctioned oil tankers entering or leaving the country, dramatically raising enforcement stakes beyond prior sanctions regimes. The move triggered an immediate market reaction, with oil prices jumping amid uncertainty over how aggressively the blockade will be enforced and whether it could disrupt broader shipping lanes or provoke retaliatory action. Venezuela condemned the order as “warmongering,” while international observers warned that the combination of terrorism designation and naval-style interdiction blurs lines between economic sanctions and coercive force. Together, the developments reintroduce geopolitical risk into global energy markets at a time when supply buffers remain thin, reinforcing the sensitivity of prices to U.S. unilateral action and signaling that energy policy is once again being weaponized as a tool of strategic pressure.
Sources: Fox News — Trump declares ‘Venezuelan regime’ a foreign terrorist organization, orders oil tanker blockade; CNN — Trump orders ‘total and complete blockade’ of sanctioned oil tankers coming to and leaving Venezuela; Reuters — Trump orders ‘blockade’ of sanctioned oil tankers leaving, entering Venezuela; Reuters — Oil jumps 2% as Trump’s Venezuela blockade stokes uncertainty; BBC News — Venezuela denounces Trump’s order for ship blockade as ‘warmongering threats’; The Guardian — Venezuela condemns ‘warmongering threats’ as Trump orders oil blockade
• As Washington tightens enforcement on Venezuelan oil, sanctions evasion and Chinese stockpiling are reshaping global supply dynamics. Following the U.S. decision to impose a blockade on sanctioned Venezuelan oil tankers, attention has turned to the “ghost ships” Caracas has relied on to keep crude moving—vessels that disable tracking systems, obscure ownership, and conduct ship-to-ship transfers to evade sanctions and reach buyers, including intermediaries linked to Asian markets. These shadow fleets highlight how enforcement escalation does not remove sanctioned oil from the market so much as reroute it through opaque channels, complicating supply visibility and risk pricing. At the same time, China is accelerating crude stockpiling amid weaker global prices, taking advantage of discounted barrels and softer demand to build inventories at a faster pace. The timing suggests Beijing is exploiting market uncertainty—driven in part by U.S. sanctions pressure and volatile geopolitics—to secure energy supplies at lower cost while insulating itself from future disruption. Together, the developments underscore how sanctions escalation, evasion tactics, and strategic stockpiling are interacting to add volatility and opacity to global oil markets.
Sources: BBC News — What are the ‘ghost ships’ Venezuela is using to evade oil sanctions?; Reuters — China accelerates crude stockpiling amid weaker oil price trend
Impact:
Energy markets are being reshaped by blockades, evasion, and strategic stockpiling. The U.S. decision to impose a blockade on Venezuelan oil tankers has reintroduced hard geopolitical risk into oil pricing, not because supply disappears outright, but because enforcement uncertainty raises fears of spillover into shipping lanes, insurance, and retaliation dynamics. At the same time, the persistence of Venezuela’s “ghost ship” network demonstrates that sanctions escalation tends to reroute oil flows rather than eliminate them, increasing opacity and making price discovery more fragile. China’s accelerated crude stockpiling exploits this uncertainty, allowing Beijing to absorb discounted barrels and build buffers while prices remain relatively soft and enforcement risks rise elsewhere. The result is a two-speed market: heightened volatility at the margin combined with quiet accumulation by major consumers able to arbitrage uncertainty. For import-dependent economies, this environment is more dangerous than a simple supply shock, as prices can swing sharply with policy signals while true availability becomes harder to assess. The broader implication is that energy policy is again functioning as a strategic instrument, amplifying instability even in the absence of an immediate physical shortage.
Convergence
Across alliance, regional, and global layers, Seoul is dealing with developments that pull in different directions at the same time. On North Korea policy, Seoul is probing within the alliance to seek greater flexibility on inter-Korean engagement. Regionally, South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines and SMR exports is unfolding as China–Japan tensions over Taiwan intensify. At the same time, a weakened Korean won and Beijing’s coercive moves toward Tokyo are pushing Seoul toward expanded economic relations with China through tourism, cultural exchange, and trade. Globally, renewed volatility in energy markets—driven by U.S. blockades, sanctions evasion, and strategic stockpiling—is adding uncertainty to South Korea’s currency, shipping, and inflation outlook. Together, these dynamics increase the risk that actions taken in one domain generate unintended consequences in another.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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