Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

 
 

Quotes of the Day:


"Intelligent individuals learn from every thing and every one; average people learn from their experiences. The stupid already have all the answers."
– Unknown (but misattributed to Socrates)

"Those who are able to see beyond the shadows and lies of their culture will never be understood, let alone believed, by the masses."
– Plato

"Nothing strengthens authority so much as silence."
– Leonardo da Vinci



1. General Bryan P. Fenton named 47th recipient of Omar N. Bradley Spirit of Independence Award

2. Mystery Drones Swarmed a U.S. Military Base for 17 Days. The Pentagon Is Stumped.

3. America’s New Millionaire Class: Plumbers and HVAC Entrepreneurs

4. Captured documents reveal Hamas’s broader ambition to wreak havoc on Israel

5. Strategic Paralysis: The Biden Administration's Strategic Miscalculation in Israel's War on Hezbollah

6. The Future is Nano: Trends, Innovations, and Implications for SOF

7.  Johnny Micheal Spann: A Legacy of Courage in Clandestine Service: A Life Lost, But Not Forgotten

8. Four Ways Ukraine’s Drone Innovations Are Changing Warfare

9. How Russia, China envision nuking US satellites: from above and below

10. New Gmail Security Alert For 2.5 Billion Users As AI Hack Confirmed

11. How Bookworms Beat the Nazis: The Unlikely Spies of the OSS

12. How many drones does the Army need? A lot more.

13.NATO’s Indo-Pacific Aspirations

14. Industry ‘hamstrung’ by Space Force-intel community’s turf war

15. Experts warn 'crazy busy' Atlantic hurricane season is far from over

16. What I Didn’t Learn In Special Forces

17. What International Law Says About Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon

18. There’s a solution to the Army’s enduring gap in its extended-range artillery fire

19. 'A lot ... at once': Army cyber and network officials take stock 1 year after organizational shuffle

20. The CIA is openly recruiting foreign spies in other countries





1.  General Bryan P. Fenton named 47th recipient of Omar N. Bradley Spirit of Independence Award


Congratulations to General Fenton. And at a bowl game for the honor as well! Probably a good way to ensure TV viewership as I know there will be an audience of at least 70,000 members of USSOCOM watching the Independence Bowl on December 28th whichever teams are playing. (note attempt at humor)


He joins a distinguished group of recipients.


Since the award’s inception, this honor has been bestowed upon outstanding American citizens and organizations. Some past recipients include John Wayne, Bob Hope, President Ronald Reagan, Vietnam and World War II Veterans, 9/11 Heroes, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital and more recently – the Tuskegee Airmen, Berlin Airlift Veterans, Veterans of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, retired Marine Corporal Jacob P. Schick, Brigadier General Jeannie M. Leavitt, retired Air Force General James M. Kowalski, retired Army Lieutenant General Joseph M. Cosumano, the Veterans of Operation Senior Surprise and the Women Airforce Service Pilots.
...
“The Omar N. Bradley Spirit of Independence Award was created to honor some of our country’s most outstanding men and women and recognize them for their dedication to helping others and symbolizing freedom, and General Fenton embodies what this award stands for,” said 2024 Independence Bowl Foundation Chair Claire Rebouche. “He has dedicated his life to serving this nation and protecting our freedoms, and we are proud to honor him as the 47th recipient of this prestigious award.”


https://bossierpress.com/general-bryan-p-fenton-named-47th-recipient-of-omar-n-bradley-spirit-of-independence-award/?utm


General Bryan P. Fenton named 47th recipient of Omar N. Bradley Spirit of Independence Award

written by Russell Hedges October 10, 2024 0 comments

By Erik Evenson, Radiance Technologies Independence Bowl Director of Communications

The Radiance Technologies Independence Bowl honors one of our nation’s most outstanding and decorated citizens or groups each year with the Omar N. Bradley Spirit of Independence Award, and General Bryan P. Fenton has been named the 47th recipient of the prestigious award. GEN Fenton will be honored at halftime of the Radiance Technologies Independence Bowl on Saturday, December 28.

“I’m extremely grateful, honored and humbled to accept this award on behalf of the 70,000 men and women of U.S. Special Operations Command,” said General Fenton.

General Fenton currently serves as the 13th Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), located at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. where he oversees all Special Operations for the U.S. Department of Defense with 70,000 Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Special Operations personnel.

An extremely decorated Special Forces (Green Beret) Officer, General Fenton’s awards and recognitions include the French Commando Badge, Cruz de la Victoria Medal from Chile, Princess of Thailand awarded Thai Jumpmaster Wings, University of Notre Dame’s Moose Krause Service Award and Rev. William Corby Award for Distinguished Military Service, and the Business Executives for National Security Eisenhower Award.

“The Omar N. Bradley Spirit of Independence Award was created to honor some of our country’s most outstanding men and women and recognize them for their dedication to helping others and symbolizing freedom, and General Fenton embodies what this award stands for,” said 2024 Independence Bowl Foundation Chair Claire Rebouche. “He has dedicated his life to serving this nation and protecting our freedoms, and we are proud to honor him as the 47th recipient of this prestigious award.”

Before assuming command of USSOCOM, General Fenton was the Commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and prior to that, he was the Senior Military Assistant for two U.S. Secretaries of Defense.

He has held a multitude of general officer assignments in his career, including Deputy Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Commander of U.S. Special Operations – Pacific, and Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii.

Throughout his long military career, General Fenton has deployed numerous times. He participated in Operation Joint Force in Bosnia, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Africa, Operations Iraqi Freedom and Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Operation Pacific Eagle in the Phillipines. He has also served in Areas of Responsibility – including U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. 

The Omar N. Bradley Spirit of Independence Award was established during the Independence Bowl’s second year in 1977 to honor an outstanding citizen or organization who symbolizes the spirit of freedom upon which the United States of America was founded. General Omar N. Bradley, the nation’s only living 5-star general at the time, was the first recipient of the Spirit of Independence Award in 1977.

Since the award’s inception, this honor has been bestowed upon outstanding American citizens and organizations. Some past recipients include John Wayne, Bob Hope, President Ronald Reagan, Vietnam and World War II Veterans, 9/11 Heroes, St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital and more recently – the Tuskegee Airmen, Berlin Airlift Veterans, Veterans of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, retired Marine Corporal Jacob P. Schick, Brigadier General Jeannie M. Leavitt, retired Air Force General James M. Kowalski, retired Army Lieutenant General Joseph M. Cosumano, the Veterans of Operation Senior Surprise and the Women Airforce Service Pilots.

The 48th Radiance Technologies Independence Bowl kicks off on Saturday, December 28 at 8:15 p.m. CST. Tickets start at $20 and are on sale now at RadianceTechnologiesIndependenceBowl.com/Tickets/. There are a bevy of ticket packages available – including individual tickets, group tickets, Pizza Hut Family 4-Packs, Small Business Fan Packs, premium options and more. For ticketing questions, fans can email info@independencebowl.org or call the Radiance Technologies Independence Bowl office at (318) 221-0712.


2. Mystery Drones Swarmed a U.S. Military Base for 17 Days. The Pentagon Is Stumped.


UAS/Drones are changing the game.



Mystery Drones Swarmed a U.S. Military Base for 17 Days. The Pentagon Is Stumped.

U.S. officials don’t know who is behind the drones that have flown unhindered over sensitive national-security sites—or how to stop them


https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/drones-military-pentagon-defense-331871f4?mod=hp_lead_pos8

By Gordon LuboldFollow, Lara SeligmanFollow and Aruna ViswanathaFollow

Oct. 12, 2024 9:00 pm ET

U.S. Air Force Gen. Mark Kelly wasn’t sure what to make of reports that a suspicious fleet of unidentified aircraft had been flying over Langley Air Force Base on Virginia’s shoreline.

Kelly, a decorated senior commander at the base, got on a squadron rooftop to see for himself. He joined a handful of other officers responsible for a clutch of the nation’s most advanced jet fighters, including F-22 Raptors. 

For several nights, military personnel had reported a mysterious breach of restricted airspace over a stretch of land that has one of the largest concentrations of national-security facilities in the U.S. The show usually starts 45 minutes to an hour after sunset, another senior leader told Kelly.

The first drone arrived shortly. Kelly, a career fighter pilot, estimated it was roughly 20 feet long and flying at more than 100 miles an hour, at an altitude of roughly 3,000 to 4,000 feet. Other drones followed, one by one, sounding in the distance like a parade of lawn mowers.

The drones headed south, across Chesapeake Bay, toward Norfolk, Va., and over an area that includes the home base for the Navy’s SEAL Team Six and Naval Station Norfolk, the world’s largest naval port.


A view of the Langley base in Virginia. Photo: Kristen Zeis for WSJ

Officials didn’t know if the drone fleet, which numbered as many as a dozen or more over the following nights, belonged to clever hobbyists or hostile forces. Some suspected that Russia or China deployed them to test the response of American forces.

Federal law prohibits the military from shooting down drones near military bases in the U.S. unless they pose an imminent threat. Aerial snooping doesn’t qualify, though some lawmakers hope to give the military greater leeway.

Reports of the drones reached President Biden and set off two weeks of White House meetings after they first appeared in December last year. Officials from agencies including the Defense Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Pentagon’s UFO office joined outside experts to throw out possible explanations as well as ideas about how to respond.

Drone incursions into restricted airspace were already worrying national-security officials. Two months earlier, in October 2023, five drones flew over a government site used for nuclear-weapons experiments. The Energy Department’s Nevada Nuclear Security Site outside Las Vegas detected four of the drones over three days. Employees spotted a fifth. 

U.S. officials said they didn’t know who operated the drones in Nevada, a previously unreported incursion, or for what reason. A spokeswoman said the facility has since upgraded a system to detect and counter drones.

The sightings revealed the dilemma of defending against drones on U.S. soil compared with the ease of deploying or battling them abroad. Drones have become a deadly and cost-effective tool of war, capable of carrying surveillance gear, explosives or lethal chemicals. Yet shooting down suspicious aircraft over the U.S. risks disrupting or endangering the lives of Americans the military is sworn to protect. 

Early last year, a suspected Chinese spy balloon crammed with electronic surveillance gear floated across the country for eight days, while military leaders waited for it to reach a spot isolated enough to shoot it down safely. After the balloon made it to the Southeast coast, an F-22 jet from Langley punctured it with a missile.

Ten months later, the phalanx of drones appeared at Langley.

Over 17 days, the drones arrived at dusk, flew off and circled back. Some shone small lights, making them look like a constellation moving in the night sky—or a science-fiction movie, Kelly said, “‘Close Encounters at Langley.’” They also were nearly impossible to track, vanishing each night despite a wealth of resources deployed to catch them. 

Gen. Glen VanHerck, at the time commander of the U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, said drones had for years been spotted flying around defense installations. But the nightly drone swarms over Langley, he said, were unlike any past incursion.


Gen. Glen VanHerck arriving for a closed-door briefing for lawmakers about the suspected Chinese spy balloon on Feb. 9 last year in Washington. Photo: Drew Angerer/Getty Images

VanHerck, who led the military response to the Chinese balloon, ordered jet fighters and other aircraft to fly close enough to glean clues from the drones. He recommended that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin authorize a full menu of electronic eavesdropping and spycraft to learn more, though the Pentagon is limited in what it can do on U.S. soil.

“If there are unknown objects within North America,” VanHerck said, the job is “to go out and identify them.” 

Solving that mystery, even for the world’s pre-eminent superpower, proved easier said than done. Local police were among the first to try.

For two nights, starting on Dec. 6, Hampton, Va., officers chased the drones, by patrol car and on foot, relaying momentary sightings along with information from Langley over police radios: One was seen in the area of Marshall Street or Gosnold’s Hope Park.

Three more appeared to land but returned to the air before officers could reach them. Another looked like it landed offshore. Police finally gave up.

Gen. Kelly, now retired, said the Pentagon was stumped, too.

What would the U.S. do, he asked, “if this happens over the National Mall?” 

This account is based on interviews with more than two dozen government officials and other people familiar with the events, as well as police records, court documents and photographs of the drones.


Gosnold’s Hope Park in Hampton, Va., where police believe some of the drones briefly landed. Photo: Kristen Zeis for WSJ

Flying blind

The drone swarm was reported to the Pentagon office of the National Military Command Center, which is responsible for dispersing emergency messages to U.S. military commanders worldwide. 

A report went to the White House Situation Room, and the president learned about it in his daily briefing.

U.S. officials didn’t believe hobbyists were flying the drones, given the complexity of the operation. The drones flew in a pattern: one or two fixed-wing drones positioned more than 100 feet in the air and smaller quadcopters, the size of 20-pound commercial drones, often below and flying slower. Occasionally, they hovered.

They came from the north around 6 p.m. to traverse the base, which sits on a peninsula at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay, and continued south, beyond the reach of radar. They repeated the pattern and then disappeared, typically by midnight.

Homeland Security Advisor Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall convened the White House brainstorming sessions. One official suggested using electronic signals to jam the drones’ navigation systems. Others cautioned that it might disrupt local 911 emergency systems and Wi-Fi networks. 

One suggestion was to use directed energy, an emerging technology, to disable or destroy the drones. An FAA official said such a weapon carried too high a risk for commercial aircraft during the December holiday travel season.

Others suggested that the U.S. Coast Guard shoot nets into the air to capture the drones. An official pointed out that the Coast Guard might not have the authority to use such a weapon in this instance. Besides, the drones were too difficult to track closely.


The shipyard where advanced Navy vessels are built in Newport News, Va., less than a dozen miles from Langley Air Force Base. Photo: Kristen Zeis for WSJ

Langley officials had called on U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships to keep a watch out for the drones with little luck. They were much smaller than military aircraft and didn’t always show up on radar. Military personnel had to recalibrate their radar systems, which were set to ignore anything that resembled a bird.

Analysts learned that the smaller quadcopters didn’t use the usual frequency band available for off-the-shelf commercial drones—more evidence that the drone operators weren’t hobbyists.

Langley officials canceled nighttime training missions, worried about potential collisions with the drone swarm, and moved the F-22 jet fighters to another base. Base residents shared their sightings at the local Starbucks and posted blurry photos of the drones on private Facebook groups.

Intelligence officials spotted a vessel floating in international waters off the coast of Virginia and suspected a connection. Coast Guard crews boarded the vessel but found no computers or other gear to support the hunch.

On Dec. 23, the drones made their last visit.

In January, authorities found a clue they hoped would crack the case. 


A photo taken last December of drones that flew over the Langley base, provided by an eye witness. Photo: Uncredited

‘Worst spy ever’

During a rainy morning on Jan. 6, Fengyun Shi parked a rented Tesla near 65th Street and Huntington Avenue in Newport News, Va., 11 miles from the Langley base. The car was outside a shipyard run by HII, the company that builds nuclear submarines and the Navy’s newest generation of the Ford Class aircraft carrier.  

Shi, a student at the University of Minnesota, told nearby residents around midmorning that he was flying a drone that got stuck in a tree. As he tried to free it using his controller, a neighbor called Newport News, Va., police. Officers asked Shi why he was flying it in such foul weather, and they told him to call the fire department for help. 

Shi instead returned his rental car an hour later and took an Amtrak train to Washington, D.C. The following day, he flew to Oakland, Calif. By chance, the drone fell to the ground that same day and ended up with federal investigators. FBI agents found that Shi had photographed Navy vessels in dry dock, including shots taken around midnight. Some were under construction at the nearby shipyard.


A photo from the SIM card recovered from the drone operated by Fengyun Shi. Photo: US District Court, Norfolk, VA.


Fengyun Shi at a recent court appearance in Norfolk, Va. Photo: Kristen Zeis for WSJ

On Jan. 18, federal agents arrested Shi as he was about to board a flight to China on a one-way ticket. Shi told FBI agents he was a ship enthusiast and hadn’t realized his drone crossed into restricted airspace. Investigators weren’t convinced but found no evidence linking him to the Chinese government. They learned he had bought the drone on sale at a Costco in San Francisco the day before he traveled to Norfolk.

U.S. prosecutors charged Shi with unlawfully taking photos of classified naval installations, the first case involving a drone under a provision of U.S. espionage law. The 26-year-old Chinese national pleaded guilty and appeared in federal court in Norfolk on Oct. 2 for sentencing.

Magistrate Judge Lawrence Leonard said he didn’t believe Shi’s story—that he had been on vacation and was flying drones in the middle of the night for fun. “There’s significant holes,” the judge said in court.

“If he was a foreign agent, he would be the worst spy ever known,” said Shi’s attorney, Shaoming Cheng.

“I’m sorry about what happened in Norfolk,” Shi said before he was sentenced to six months in federal prison.

U.S. officials have yet to determine who flew the Langley drones or why. 

“This isn’t a tomorrow problem, this is a today problem,” said Tom Karako, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a national-security think tank in Washington. “It’s not an over-there problem—it’s an over-there, over-here and everywhere problem.”

U.S. officials confirmed this month that more unidentified drone swarms were spotted in recent months near Edwards Air Force Base, north of Los Angeles. 


The end of N 1st Street in Hampton, Va., where police believe some of the drones passed after leaving the Langley base. Photo: Kristen Zeis for WSJ

Write to Gordon Lubold at gordon.lubold@wsj.com, Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com and Aruna Viswanatha at aruna.viswanatha@wsj.com



3. America’s New Millionaire Class: Plumbers and HVAC Entrepreneurs



Small businesses drive our economy.


America’s New Millionaire Class: Plumbers and HVAC Entrepreneurs

Private equity is pouring money into skilled-trade small businesses; ‘Next thing you know, you’re running an empire’

https://www.wsj.com/business/entrepreneurship/plumbers-hvac-skilled-trades-millionaires-2b62bf6c?mod=hp_lead_pos9


By Te-Ping ChenFollow | Photographs by Cassidy Araiza for WSJ

Oct. 12, 2024 9:00 pm ET

Aaron Rice has two logos tattooed on his left leg: one from the plumbing business he co-founded more than a decade ago, and another from the private-equity-backed company that recently bought it.   

Few businesses are as vital to their customers as local plumbing, heating or air-conditioning companies—especially in places like Tucson, Ariz., where Rice works and residents sweltered in 100-degree heat most days this summer.

For years, Rice, 43 years old, was skeptical when out-of-state investors offered to buy his company. He assumed most of them knew little about skilled-trade work or his customers. They were just looking to make a buck. But in 2022, when approached by a local HVAC company backed by private equity, he changed his mind, figuring that they knew the business.

“The trades are hard work. A lot of today’s society, picking up a shovel is foreign to them,” he says. 

Private equity, however, is no foreign player in the skilled trades these days. PE firms across the country have been scooping up home services like HVAC—that is, heating, ventilation and air conditioning—as well as plumbing and electrical companies. They hope to profit by running larger, more profitable operations. 

Their growth marks a major shift, taking home-services firms away from family operators by offering mom-and-pop shops seven-figure and eight-figure paydays. It is a contrast from previous generations, when more owners handed companies down to their children or employees.

The wave of investment is minting a new class of millionaires across the country, one that small-business owners say is helping add more shine to working with a tool belt. 

“You don’t need to go to Silicon Valley to have a successful career and entrepreneurial opportunities,” says Brian Rassel, a partner at the Detroit-based Huron Capital, which focuses on investments in service companies. 


Aaron Rice says he plans to retire in seven years. Though he originally would have been reluctant to sell, the move has given him greater peace of mind for his wife and children.

The paydays

If you live in a big metro area, chances are one of the service trucks you have seen drive by has recently changed hands. Private-equity investors have purchased nearly 800 HVAC, plumbing and electrical companies since 2022, according to data from PitchBook. And those are just the biggest deals—plenty of smaller-scale purchases aren’t tracked, and sellers are reluctant to share exact details about their PE payouts.

“Everybody and their uncle owns an HVAC business in the private-equity space today,” says Adam Hanover, chairman of Redwood Services. The PE-backed home-services company bought Aaron Rice’s business in 2022 and merged it with Rite Way, a larger Tucson-based HVAC operation that Redwood acquired the year before.

Redwood has acquired 35 companies in the past four years. They range from smaller outfits (such as Rice’s), which Redwood says it buys outright for an average of $1 million, to more sizable companies (such as Rite Way), with an average valuation around $20 million, in which it takes majority stakes.

The trades have long offered solid hourly wages for workers without college degrees. They are also springboards for those with bigger entrepreneurial ambitions. 

In Rice’s case, he struggled with addiction and had spent five years in prison for selling meth before co-founding his plumbing business in 2012 with his business partner, Mike Nagal. It specialized in sewer inspections and repair. At the time that they sold the company, it had 18 employees and was bringing in about $3 million in revenue a year. 

Though the duo hadn’t planned to sell, they liked the fact that the company would become part of Rite Way, another local outfit, and that Redwood wanted owners to continue holding a stake and have a major say in management. 

Rice continues to work as a sewer department manager at Rite Way, and plans to stay with the company until he retires in seven years at age 50—something he’s looking forward to. His co-founder has remained with the company, too. 



After years in rehab and prison, Aaron Rice turned his life around by co-founding a plumbing company, and has since sold it to private equity—an act he commemorated in a tattoo.

“I want to hunt, fish, drink beer and cook meat,” Rice says, adding that selling his company has given him greater peace of mind for his family.

For private-equity investors, the strategy is one that has been put to use in industries as varied as carwashes and nursing homes: Roll up businesses to create larger players and improve their margins by adding managerial know-how, back-office efficiency and beefed-up marketing and recruiting budgets. Critics of the PE model say that it can mean higher prices for consumers and less competition, but others say it can improve service quality and boost the bottom line.

Building an empire

New ownership has paid off for Rite Way. Under Redwood, the company has gone from $30 million in annual revenue to around $70 million.

Along the way, Rite Way acquired companies to expand beyond HVAC, with plumbing and electrical services. More capital helps it tap a wider customer base. It also helped add dozens of additional service trucks, increased head count, started an apprenticeship program to train new workers and increased sales training for technicians. Redwood also brought in accountants to scrutinize the bottom line.

Small-business owners are often too busy to juggle such an array of tasks, or they charge prices that are years out of date, says Richard Lewis, chief executive of Redwood Services. Redwood’s home-services businesses examine their prices on a quarterly basis to ensure they are in line with the market. 

If the cost of a screw goes up, it gets passed on to the customer, Lewis adds. 

“It’s taken a lot of stress out of the business,” says Rick Walter, Rite Way’s former owner. Walter, 67, retains a 25% stake in the company and has agreed to stay on as president for a few more years. After that, he plans to enjoy his retirement with his wife and family—and their Colorado vacation home purchased with proceeds from his company’s sale. 


Rick Walter, in dark shirt, at a summit earlier this year convened by Redwood Services. Photo: REDWOOD SERVICES

“This business has been 60 to 70 hours a week for years,” Walter says. “I’d be out till 9 or 10 p.m., selling heating and cooling systems, and she stood behind me the whole time.” 

A decade ago, nine out of 10 small-business owners in the skilled trades looking for a buyout wanted to retire and be done, says Ted Polk, a managing director at Capstone Partners, a Boston-based investment banking firm. These days, a growing number of them don’t want to ride off into the sunset. Around a third are entrepreneurs who want to stay with the company and find ways to grow.

“They see what they can do on their own is a fraction of what they could if they had somebody behind them, saying, ‘I’ll help you buy these guys and those guys,’” says Polk, who has done deals in the skilled trades ranging from $30 million to more than $200 million. “Next thing you know, you’re running an empire.”

Workers benefit financially, too, says Graham Weaver, founder of private-equity firm Alpine Investors, based in San Francisco. Alpine, an early investor in HVAC companies, says technicians at the HVAC businesses it acquires get a 20% pay bump in the first year after a company is sold, mostly through a combination of higher wages, bonuses and commission. The company has rolled up more than 200 companies across 43 states into a larger service platform, Apex, which did a combined $2.2 billion in business in the past year. 



Rice is part of a growing class of entrepreneurs in the skilled trades who have sold their companies but aren’t yet ready to retire.

Given the surging investor interest, Weaver says, anyone with entrepreneurial ambitions should take a second look at the trades, which offer steady income via unclogging toilets, fixing boilers and installing new air-conditioning units.  

“You can build a business that’s going to be worth $10-30 million and have a ready list of buyers to sell it to,” he says. “Ten years ago, there was no one to sell it to.” 

Still, some workers say that when private equity buys up their companies, they wind up pushing new systems on customers, rather than simply fixing what’s not working. The pressure to make sales is less satisfying than doing real repair work, some sounding off in online forums say.

Grit and the American dream

Selling can also be bittersweet. Dana Spears co-founded an HVAC company in Land O’Lakes, Fla., in 2006, later buying it outright in 2008, when it had 14 employees, leaving her with $4,000 in the bank. When Covid hit, outside investors woke up to the importance of essential businesses like hers. More than 100 offers to buy the company have poured in since 2020. 


Dana Spears and her husband at a banquet where her HVAC business was being honored—a decade before she sold the business. Photo: Dana Spears

Spears, 51, resisted selling because she worried about her 100 employees.

“I have employees who’ve worked for me for 16 years,” she says. “I don’t want this to be an overnight flip and they don’t have a job.” 

But around her, private equity was buying her peer companies, and she felt outgunned. Her newly acquired competitors could negotiate better pricing and deals on everything from equipment to workers’ health insurance.

With larger fleets, they could offer faster response times and higher wages, too. 

Earlier this year, after much deliberation and meeting with numerous buyers, she settled on a firm she felt she could trust, P1 Service Group.


Exiting the business was a wrenching decision, but the opportunity also felt too good to pass up, says Spears, who declined to disclose how much the company sold for.

She is taking a year off to spend with her family, and is already thinking of founding another home-services business.

“It’s like we’re finally seen and recognized,” Spears says. “The trades are one of the businesses that, if you have the grit, you can go and do the American dream.”


Rice is part of a new breed of entrepreneurs in the skilled trades who are being hotly courted by private equity.

Write to Te-Ping Chen at Te-ping.Chen@wsj.com


4. Captured documents reveal Hamas’s broader ambition to wreak havoc on Israel


Excerpts:


In the letters written in 2021, Hamas’s Gaza leader Yahya Sinwar mounts a vigorous appeal to several senior Iranian officials — including the country’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei — for additional financial and military support, pledging that, with Iran’s backing, he could destroy Israel completely in two years.


“We promise you that we will not waste a minute or a penny unless it takes us toward achieving this sacred goal,” states a June 2021 letter with apparent signatures by Sinwar as well as five other Hamas officials.


In the letters, Sinwar does not provide details of how he intended to destroy Israel. Israeli and other Middle Eastern officials say Tehran was surprised by the attack on Oct. 7, and angry at Sinwar for not revealing his intentions in advance. But they contend that both Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah knew that Hamas was making preparations for a major assault. “It was their shared strategy to attack Israel,” one analyst said. U.S. and Israeli analysts believe that Iran provided hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas’s military wing and increased its support in 2023.


Tehran declined to involve itself directly in Hamas’s fight after the Oct. 7 assault on southern Israel. Since then, as the conflict expanded to include Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel and IDF strikes on Lebanon, Syria and Yemen — and, in recent weeks, a land invasion of southern Lebanon — Iran has been pulled ever deeper into the conflict, including with two massive aerial assaults on the Jewish state.
...

“It became more and more aggressive,” he said of Iran’s oversight. “The Iranians found a way to be more influential on Sinwar and the Hamas leadership in Gaza.” The documents shed no new light on if or how Iranian money was delivered to Gaza, but the typical channels include informal money exchanges and cryptocurrencies, Levi said.

The documents obtained by The Post include detailed notes from meetings where Hamas officials apparently discussed routine governmental responsibilities and expenditures, such as sanitation and fuel shortages.

But they also describe what analysts and intelligence officials have seen as a potential motive for the surprise Oct. 7 assault. Minutes from an October 2023 politburo meeting depict Hamas leaders bemoaning the improvement in relations between Israeli and Arab Gulf states, a trend that would “open the door for Arab and Islamic countries to descend on the same path, and will increase the complications of the resistance project,” the document notes.





Captured documents reveal Hamas’s broader ambition to wreak havoc on Israel

Dozens of pages found by Israeli troops in Gaza detail a potential Hamas plan far bigger than the Oct. 7, 2023, attack, and show how militant leaders wanted Iranian funds and training.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/10/12/exclusive-hamas-documents-sinwar-planning-iran/

14 min

5887


Palestinians celebrate the capture of an Israeli Merkava battle tank on Oct. 7, 2023. (AFP/Getty Images)

By Joby Warrick, Souad Mekhennet and Loveday Morris

October 12, 2024 at 3:37 p.m. EDT


Years before the Oct. 7, 2023, attack, Hamas’s leaders plotted a far deadlier wave of terrorist assaults against Israel — potentially including a Sept. 11-style toppling of a Tel Aviv skyscraper — while they pressed Iran to assist in helping achieve their vision of annihilating the Jewish state, according to documents seized by Israeli forces in Gaza.


Electronic records and papers that Israeli officials say were recovered from Hamas command centers show advanced planning for attacks using trains, boats and even horse-drawn chariots — though several plans were ill-formed and highly impractical, terrorism experts said. The plans anticipate drawing in allied militant groups for a combined assault against Israel from the north, south and east.


The trove of documents includes an annotated, illustrated presentation detailing possible options for an assault as well as letters from Hamas to Iran’s top leaders in 2021 requesting hundreds of millions of dollars in funding and training for 12,000 additional Hamas fighters. It is unclear whether Iran knew of the planning document or responded to the letters, but Israeli officials view the requests as part of a larger effort by Hamas to draw its Iranian allies into the kind of direct confrontation with Israel that Tehran has traditionally sought to avoid.


The 59 pages of letters and planning documents in Arabic obtained by The Washington Post represent a fraction of the thousands of records that Israel Defense Forces say they have seized since Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza began Oct. 27.


The decision to release the documents comes at a time when Israeli leaders are weighing a possible retaliatory strike after Iran launched more than 180 ballistic missiles against Israel on Oct. 1, in response to Israel’s Sept. 27 killing of Hasan Nasrallah, the Shiite cleric and leader of Lebanon’s Hezbollah militant group.


“Hamas is so determined to wipe Israel and the Jewish people off the map that it managed to drag Iran into direct conflict — under conditions that Iran wasn’t prepared for,” said an Israeli security official who has reviewed the letters and planning documents. The official, like others interviewed, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive documents seized by Israeli forces in Gaza.



(Obtained by The Washington Post)

Translation:
Strategy to build an appropriate plan to Liberate Palestine
• What are the appropriate fronts for liberation, and where will each front move?
• If other forces intervened and participated with us, what would the battle and coordination look like?
• What are the targets that we should occupy, neutralize, or destroy?
— Translation of title page and bullets 4-6 from documents obtained by The Washington Post, shown above.

President Joe Biden on Wednesday said the United States supports Israel’s right to defend itself “against Iran and all its proxies — Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis.”



Following World news

Following


“We’re doing everything we can to ease the suffering of all the people from this war against Hamas and that Hamas started,” Biden said at a White House meeting with Jewish religious leaders.


In the letters written in 2021, Hamas’s Gaza leader Yahya Sinwar mounts a vigorous appeal to several senior Iranian officials — including the country’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei — for additional financial and military support, pledging that, with Iran’s backing, he could destroy Israel completely in two years.


“We promise you that we will not waste a minute or a penny unless it takes us toward achieving this sacred goal,” states a June 2021 letter with apparent signatures by Sinwar as well as five other Hamas officials.


In the letters, Sinwar does not provide details of how he intended to destroy Israel. Israeli and other Middle Eastern officials say Tehran was surprised by the attack on Oct. 7, and angry at Sinwar for not revealing his intentions in advance. But they contend that both Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah knew that Hamas was making preparations for a major assault. “It was their shared strategy to attack Israel,” one analyst said. U.S. and Israeli analysts believe that Iran provided hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas’s military wing and increased its support in 2023.


Tehran declined to involve itself directly in Hamas’s fight after the Oct. 7 assault on southern Israel. Since then, as the conflict expanded to include Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel and IDF strikes on Lebanon, Syria and Yemen — and, in recent weeks, a land invasion of southern Lebanon — Iran has been pulled ever deeper into the conflict, including with two massive aerial assaults on the Jewish state.


Israel’s war in Gaza meanwhile has killed more than 42,000 people, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, which does not distinguish between civilians and combatants but says the majority of the dead are women and children. In Lebanon, the death toll is more than 2,000 and growing.


While the documents’ authenticity could not be definitively established, the contents are broadly consistent with U.S. and allies’ post-Oct. 7 intelligence assessments about Hamas’s long-range planning and complex relations with Iran. U.S. intelligence agencies have seen some of the captured Hamas documents, and The Post shared copies of its documents with several U.S. officials, none of whom expressed concern about their authenticity but declined to comment publicly. The Post also spoke to Israeli officials at other agencies that were not involved in acquiring the documents, who independently assessed that they were genuine.


Iran’s mission to the United Nations, in response to questions from The Post, did not address specific allegations but accused Israel of spreading disinformation.


“We regard the Israeli regime as a mendacious criminal, anti-human entity and place no credence in their illusions,” a spokesman for the mission said. “They have a long history of spreading falsehoods, fabricating already-counterfeit documents, and conducting deceptive psychological operations.”


Basem Naim, a senior Hamas official, declined to comment on the contents of the letters and records but said that Israel has a history of fabricating documents.


Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack, planned over many months amid extreme secrecy, called for simultaneous breachings of the Gaza perimeter wall by an estimated 6,000 fighters who rampaged nearby Israeli military bases, towns and kibbutzim, killing more than 1,200 people and taking some 250 hostages. The attack, the brainchild of Sinwar and other leaders of Hamas’s Gaza military wing, was the deadliest assault against Jewish civilians since the Holocaust.


(Obtained by The Washington Post)

Translated:
The railway line is designated for transporting fuel, which is a weak point in the event of a train explosion after moving inside one of the cities (a moving bomb).
— Translation, upper left, from documents obtained by The Washington Post, shown above.


But, in the months preceding the attack, Hamas envisioned going much further, a planning document suggests. A 36-page computer slide presentation created in late 2022 and discovered at a Hamas outpost in northern Gaza on Nov. 10 lays out options and scenarios for attacking Israel across multiple fronts, with targets ranging from military command centers to shopping malls.


The Arabic document, titled, “Strategy to build an appropriate plan to Liberate Palestine,” contains dozens of maps, photographs and schematics depicting the movement of Hamas fighters against Israeli targets, and a possible sequence for attacks.


“We present to you this vision, which talks about the appropriate strategy for liberation in the near future, God willing,” the presentation’s preamble states.


Intelligence from thousands of photos, maps


According to the presentation, the attack plans were based on a “large database” that included more than 17,000 photographs — from satellite images to photos of Israeli cities and landscapes taken by drone cameras or gleaned from social media postings. Among the images displayed are the layouts of Israeli air bases and military installations and diagrams showing the flight patterns of commercial aircraft using Ben Gurion International Airport outside Tel Aviv.


The presentation outlines three possible attack vectors, and suggests tactics to deceive Israeli security officials and confuse their response. The plans include a mix of low-tech operations, some of which were used on Oct. 7, and others that appear to be more aspirational.


Among the latter was a plan to destroy a Tel Aviv skyscraper. The document identifies as possible targets the Moshe Aviv Tower, a 70-story building that is Israel’s second tallest, as well as the Azrieli Center complex which comprises three skyscrapers, a large shopping mall, train station and cinema. The plan notes the nearby presence of the IDF headquarters building and suggests that the collapse of a nearby high-rise could crush the military facility as well.



(Obtained by The Washington Post)

Translated:
If this tower is destroyed in one way or another, an unprecedented crisis will occur for the enemy, similar to the crisis of the World Trade Center towers in New York.
— Translation, lower right, from documents obtained by The Washington Post, shown above.


But Hamas had apparently not figured out exactly how the buildings might be taken down, the document acknowledges. “Working to find a mechanism to destroy the tower,” it states.


A more practical target, Hamas believed, was Israel’s rail system. The document describes several variations of a plan to use railways to transport fighters and powerful explosives — including fuel tankers that could be detonated with small bombs — in Israel’s largest city. “The railway line is designated for transporting fuel, which is a weak point in the event of a train explosion after moving inside one of the cities (a moving bomb),” it states.


Other plans called for modifying vehicles so they could travel on rails, and turning fishing vessels into high-speed attack boats to carry fighters and explosives into Israeli ports. Referring to the boats-as-bombs plan, the document said Hamas had already “found a mechanism that works.”

Perhaps the most unusual proposal was a plan to resurrect the horse-drawn carriages of antiquity as modern conveyances for fighters and weapons. The presentation includes photographs and descriptions of a three-man chariot drawn by horses that can cross rugged terrain with ease. A chariot would offer a “fast and light mechanism” that emits little heat or sound compared with a motorcycle — a vehicle that Hamas fighters used in abundance in the Oct. 7 attack.


“It carries three people, one of whom is free to drive and the other two to shoot and fight,” the document says of the chariots.


Implicit in the plan is the conviction that Hamas’s closest allies would fully join the fight after noting the successes of the group’s initial forays into Israel. U.S. and Israeli officials believe that Sinwar, who declined to share details of the Oct. 7 plan with Hezbollah or Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in advance of the attack, convinced himself that a Hamas attack on Israel would spark a broader war that both groups eventually would be compelled to join.


An essential part of any operation, the document says, would be “linking and preparing the external fronts (Lebanon, Syria, and Sinai) and agreeing on mechanisms for communicating peacefully and in war.”

Hezbollah did begin firing rockets into northern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, barrages that inflicted hundreds of casualties and prompted the evacuation of nearly 100,000 Israeli civilians. But the militant group — assessed to have tens of thousands of fighters and up to 100,000 missiles before the fighting commenced — declined to launch a full-scale assault.


Seeking Iran’s buy-in, and more


Sinwar, renowned for his paranoia about leaks, apparently opted to refrain from sharing his ultimate attack plans with Hamas’s chief benefactors in Beirut and Tehran. But the Hamas leader was crystal clear about his ultimate intention: the destruction of the state of Israel. He repeats the point multiple times in the captured letters and asks Iranian officials to help him in his quest.


A series of letters dated in June 2021 are essentially pleas to Iran’s leaders to send more money and provide training for a division’s worth of new fighters.


The letters, signed by Sinwar and other Hamas leaders in Gaza, are addressed to Khamenei as well as Ismail Qaani, the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force — an elite unit that oversees Iran’s far-flung network of proxy militias — and Sayed Izadi, the Quds Force’s Beirut-based head of Palestinian operations. Izadi was one of three Iranian officials killed in an Israeli military strike on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus, Syria, on April 1. The letters were found in January in Sinwar’s command bunker in Khan Younis, Israeli officials said.


In the letters, Sinwar describes the extensive damage sustained by Hamas during clashes with Israel in May 2021, and asks the Iranians to make up for the losses and help the group prepare for much larger battles to come.


“We are in dire need of your standing with us with all strength, determination, support and backing; first to restore our strength and what has been exhausted in this confrontation or what has been targeted, and to develop our capabilities many times over,” he writes in the letter to Qaani.



(Obtained by The Washington Post)

Translated:
When thinking about the liberation plan, a fast and light vehicle must be found that you can use infantry weapons from it in order to preoccupy the military sites and vehicles along the borders as a secondary attack. The Pharaohs’ chariot can be used for this mission.
— Translated, bottom left, from documents obtained by The Washington Post, shown above.


The details of the request are laid out in two of the letters: financial assistance for Hamas, totaling $500 million, paid in monthly installments over two years, and Iranian training and equipment to support an additional 12,000 Hamas fighters.


If Hamas receives the aid, “we are confident that we and you, by the end of these two years or during them, if God wills, we will uproot this monstrous entity,” meaning Israel, Sinwar writes to Qaani.


“We, and you, will change the face of the region and end, God willing, this dark era of the history of our Islamic nation,” he writes.


Iranian officials have publicly supported Hamas’s avowed goal for the destruction of Israel, and they expressed no reservations about the methods used on Oct. 7, noted Farzin Nadimi, an Iran expert and senior fellow with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank.

“Iran trained Hamas and encouraged them to do exactly the things they did on Oct. 7,” Nadimi said. “Their goal was to get to the core of the Israeli state and crush it.”


At the same time, Tehran has generally sought to use proxy forces to carry out operations against Israel, rather than risking a direct attack that might lead to a military confrontation with a technologically superior foe.


“Iran’s goal is to delegitimize Israel, not to help Hamas achieve an impossible military victory,” said Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran analyst and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington think tank. “Horrific images of Palestinian suffering is precisely how they’ve sought to delegitimize Israel.”


Hamas’s relations with Iran have always been complex. A Sunni Islamist group, Hamas sought for years to buffer the influence of Shiite-ruled Iran, said Udi Levi, an expert on Hamas financing who has examined around 100 documents seized by the Israeli military inside Gaza over the course of the war. Since 2014, documents show a shift in the relationship, with Hamas courting more Iranian support. Iran in turn showed more interest in directing how money was spent, Levi added.


“It became more and more aggressive,” he said of Iran’s oversight. “The Iranians found a way to be more influential on Sinwar and the Hamas leadership in Gaza.” The documents shed no new light on if or how Iranian money was delivered to Gaza, but the typical channels include informal money exchanges and cryptocurrencies, Levi said.


The documents obtained by The Post include detailed notes from meetings where Hamas officials apparently discussed routine governmental responsibilities and expenditures, such as sanitation and fuel shortages.


But they also describe what analysts and intelligence officials have seen as a potential motive for the surprise Oct. 7 assault. Minutes from an October 2023 politburo meeting depict Hamas leaders bemoaning the improvement in relations between Israeli and Arab Gulf states, a trend that would “open the door for Arab and Islamic countries to descend on the same path, and will increase the complications of the resistance project,” the document notes.


Cate Brown, Hazem Balousha and Mohamad El Chamma contributed to this report.



5. Strategic Paralysis: The Biden Administration's Strategic Miscalculation in Israel's War on Hezbollah


Excerpts:


 Conclusion: The Moment for Action is Now
The Biden administration’s hesitancy to fully support Israel’s strikes on Hezbollah is a strategic miscalculation that could have long-term consequences for the Middle East. Iran’s proxy network has gone too far, and the opportunity to severely degrade these forces should not be missed. The alternative—a return to the status quo—would leave Israel vulnerable and allow Iran to continue its campaign of regional disruption through its proxies.
 
This is not a time for hand-wringing or cautious diplomacy. The opportunity to reshape the region’s strategic landscape is at hand, and it must be seized. The Biden administration needs to step up its support for Israel and recognize that peace negotiations with groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are not viable. A new strategy is needed, focusing on degrading Iran’s offensive capabilities and creating a regional coalition through the Abraham Accords. Only by taking decisive action now can the United States and its allies hope to achieve a lasting peace that benefits the entire region.


Strategic Paralysis: The Biden Administration's Strategic Miscalculation in Israel's War on Hezbollah

 

The Biden Administration’s Short-Sighted Diplomatic Strategy regarding Israel’s strikes on Hezbollah is Puzzling.

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/strategic-paralysis-the-biden-administration-s-strategic-miscalculation-in-israel-s-war-on-hezbolla?postId=11b22395-428f-4539-b829-76cc37f057aa&utm


For and By Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth, October 13, 2024

Introduction

As the Middle East experiences yet another protracted conflict, the Biden administration’s strategy—or lack thereof—regarding Israel’s strikes on Hezbollah is puzzling. Iran’s long-term investment in proxy forces such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis has created a well-oiled machine for regional disruption. This shadow war is designed to degrade Israel’s military, distract its leadership, and prevent a full focus on Tehran’s broader ambitions. The October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas, this past year-long barrage of over 8,000 missile strikes from Hezbollah, and shipping attacks by the Houthis appear to be part of a broader strategy to weaken Israel by overwhelming its defenses. Iran claims that the proxies they helped train, fund, arm, and support acted on their own. While there is evidence to support Iran’s attempts to call off proxy activities, they remain responsible for setting the conditions for violence evidenced across the region.

 

The Biden administration has responded with cautious diplomacy, pushing for de-escalation and peace negotiations that, at this point, seem destined to return the region to a fragile and unsustainable status quo. At the same time, Iran finishes its nuclear weapons programs. The strategic imperative, however, should be clear: Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, as extensions of Iran’s offensive capabilities, must be severely degraded if there is any hope of lasting peace in the region. This would necessitate destroying Iran’s nuclear capability as well. This moment, however fraught, presents a critical opportunity to reshape the Middle East’s balance of power by reducing Iran's proxy forces to irrelevance, denying Iran the nuclear threat, and paving the way for a new and more favorable regional order.

 

 

 Iran’s Proxy Strategy: Decades in the Making

Iran’s sponsorship of proxy groups has been a cornerstone of its regional strategy for decades. Hezbollah, which operates out of southern Lebanon, has become one of the most heavily armed non-state actors in the world, with an arsenal that rivals many national militaries. Hamas, often seen as the junior partner to Hezbollah but even more rabidly focused on the destruction of Israel, is deeply dependent on Iran’s strategic network. Meanwhile, the Houthis have turned Yemen into another front in Iran’s regional proxy war. Each of these groups serves Iran’s strategic objectives by keeping Israel off balance and constantly on the defensive.

 

Iran’s goal has always been to avoid direct confrontation with Israel, instead opting for asymmetric warfare carried out by proxies. Hezbollah’s missile stockpile has grown to a point, an estimated 150,000 until the IDF recently cut that number in half, can still inflict substantial damage on Israeli cities and military installations. Hezbollah has demonstrated a consistent willingness to do so, with its most recent attacks—on a scale not seen in years—evidence they are willing to push the envelope. Tehran was betting that Israel’s focus on defending against these immediate threats would prevent it from confronting Iran directly or taking broader military action against Hezbollah and Hamas. Israel’s pager attacks, killing top Hezbollah officials and destroying roughly half of Hezbollah’s weapons cache, pushed Iran to launch its largest missile and rocket attacks on Israel. With Hamas devastated and much of Hezbollah degraded Israel must press the attack on the proxies and confront Iran’s nuclear threat.

 

The Biden administration’s response has largely been to urge restraint and encourage a return to negotiations. This approach, however, fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the threat. Neither Iran nor its proxies are seeking peace or compromise with Israel; they aim to degrade Israel’s military capabilities while remaining insulated from direct retaliation. This strategy has worked for decades, but it has now reached a point where Israel can no longer tolerate the level of risk posed by these proxies. Washington's continued push for diplomacy without promoting a truly deterrent component like denying Iran its offensive capability will only embolden Iran and its allies. In short, a cease fire today is just an operational pause for Iran and its proxies to regroup for continued attacks in the future.

 

 

 The Opportunity Israel Cannot Afford to Miss

Even as critics argue that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may be using military operations to delay legal proceedings against him, there is no denying that Israel now has a unique opportunity to degrade Hezbollah and Hamas severely. The attacks of October 2023 were not just acts of terror; they were part of a Hamas (and likely Iran) strategy to push Israel into a war in Gaza that would see Israel become an international pariah and ultimately ground down in the immoral act of killing Palestinian civilians put in harm’s way by Hamas. The narrative war is certainly not working out for Israel; however, the just cause and opportunity to inflict lasting damage on Iran’s proxy forces is unfolding before our eyes.

 

The argument for continued peace negotiations at this point seems naive. Hamas and Hezbollah have shown little interest in serious talks, using each ceasefire as an opportunity to rebuild and rearm. A return to the status quo, which the Biden administration seems intent on facilitating, would only serve Iran’s interests, allowing it to continue its regional strategy of proxy warfare while avoiding direct confrontation. The status quo has never provided lasting security for Israel, and it won’t do so now.

 

Instead, the strategic imperative is clear: Iranian proxies must be effectively destroyed to "de-fang" Iran. Israel cannot afford to leave these groups intact, as doing so would only invite future attacks and embolden Iran to continue its proxy war. Tehran has invested heavily in these groups, both financially and militarily, and degrading their capabilities would send a clear message that Israel will not tolerate continued aggression. Additionally, destroying Iran’s nuclear capability should be on the table. Deny Iran the sum total of its offensive capability for the foreseeable future, of which Israel is moving close to achieving. This is not just a matter of Israeli security; it is about reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East and preventing Iran from using its proxies or nuclear threats to dominate the region.

 

 

 The Nuclear Question: The Next Strategic Imperative

While degrading Iran’s proxy forces is essential, it is not enough. Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities poses an existential threat not only to Israel but to the entire region. The Biden administration has been focused on reviving the 2015 nuclear agreement, but this approach ignores the broader context. Iran’s proxies have created a strategic buffer that allows Tehran to pursue its nuclear ambitions with minimal interference. The October 2023 attacks and the ongoing missile barrage from Hezbollah are not isolated events—they are part of a broader strategy designed to distract Israel from Iran’s nuclear program.

 

Destroying Iran’s offensive capabilities, including its nuclear infrastructure, must be the next strategic imperative. Israel has the military capabilities to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, but such an operation would require international support, particularly from the United States. The Biden administration’s reluctance to fully commit to Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah suggests that Washington is not prepared to take the necessary steps to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. This hesitancy is dangerous. Allowing Iran to maintain its proxy network while advancing its nuclear program would create an untenable situation in which Israel faces an ever-growing threat on multiple fronts.

 

 

The Tempting—but Dangerous—Notion of Regime Change

There is a tempting argument for pursuing regime change in Iran, particularly given the widespread dissatisfaction with the regime both domestically and internationally. However, such a move would be fraught with risks and could lead to greater instability. While there is little doubt that Iran’s leadership is committed to its regional ambitions and proxy warfare strategy, removing the regime could create a power vacuum that would be difficult to manage.

 

Regime change is not necessary to achieve the strategic objectives outlined here. Destroying Iran’s offensive capabilities—both its proxies and its nuclear program—would be sufficient to change the regional dynamic. Once Iran’s ability to project power through its proxies is eliminated, the regime may be more willing to negotiate a lasting peace. The focus should be on reducing Iran’s military capabilities, not on regime change, which could have unpredictable and destabilizing consequences. The deterrence message this would send to Russia, China, and other U.S. rivals would be more valuable than any short-term cease-fire.

 

 

The Role of the Abraham Accords: Boxing in Iran

One of the most promising developments in recent years has been the Abraham Accords, which have opened the door to closer relations between Israel and several Arab states. These agreements represent a crucial element in boxing in Iran and creating a regional coalition that can counter Tehran’s influence. Renewing and expanding the Abraham Accords should be a priority for the Biden administration. By forging closer ties between Israel and the ruling elites across the region, the United States and its allies can create a united front that isolates Iran and prevents it from using its proxies to destabilize the region.

 

The Abraham Accords also offer a model for a new kind of peace in the Middle East—one that is based on mutual security and economic cooperation rather than on fragile ceasefires. A renewed focus on the Accords could help create the conditions for a more enduring period of stability, even if permanent peace remains elusive. The Middle East has a long history of violence fueled by old grudges, and it is unlikely that any agreement will permanently resolve all of the region’s conflicts. However, by reducing Iran’s ability to wage proxy wars, the Accords can create a more stable and secure Middle East framework than initially conceived.

 

 

 Conclusion: The Moment for Action is Now

The Biden administration’s hesitancy to fully support Israel’s strikes on Hezbollah is a strategic miscalculation that could have long-term consequences for the Middle East. Iran’s proxy network has gone too far, and the opportunity to severely degrade these forces should not be missed. The alternative—a return to the status quo—would leave Israel vulnerable and allow Iran to continue its campaign of regional disruption through its proxies.

 

This is not a time for hand-wringing or cautious diplomacy. The opportunity to reshape the region’s strategic landscape is at hand, and it must be seized. The Biden administration needs to step up its support for Israel and recognize that peace negotiations with groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are not viable. A new strategy is needed, focusing on degrading Iran’s offensive capabilities and creating a regional coalition through the Abraham Accords. Only by taking decisive action now can the United States and its allies hope to achieve a lasting peace that benefits the entire region.

 

Notes

 

1. Banco, Erin. "Inside the Break Between the US and Israel Over How to Handle Hezbollah." Politico, September 24, 2024. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/09/24/us-israel-hezbollah-diplomacy-00180860.

 

2. Reisinezhad, Arash. "Iran’s Israel Strategy Has Already Changed." Foreign Policy, October 11, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/11/irans-israel-strategy-has-already-changed/.

 

3. Nasr, Vali. "Iran-Israel Conflict: Will Biden Restrain Netanyahu?" Foreign Policy, October 3, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/03/iran-israel-hezbollah-biden-netanyahu-war/.

 

4. Stephens, Bret. "Why We Need to Escalate in Iran." The New York Times, October 1, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/01/opinion/we-absolutely-need-to-escalate-in-iran.html.

 

5. Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran’s Proxies: A Strategic Necessity,” Foreign Affairs, July 2024.

 

6. Michael Knights, “The Missile Threat: Hezbollah’s Arsenal and Israel’s Response,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2024.




6.  The Future is Nano: Trends, Innovations, and Implications for SOF


Excerpts:


Conclusion

The future of nanotechnology is filled with promise, and its impact will be felt across multiple domains, from healthcare to energy to defense. For Special Operations Forces, in particular, nanotechnology stands to transform not only how missions are carried out but also the level of safety, efficiency, and success that can be achieved. As we move towards 2050, embracing these innovations will be key to staying ahead in a rapidly changing global landscape.



STRATEGY CENTRAL PODCAST EPISODE #1- The Future is Nano: Trends, Innovations, and Implications for SOF

Updated: Oct 3

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/strategy-central-podcast-episode-1-the-future-is-nano-trends-innovations-and-implications-for-s

 

Listen to the Podcast Here...



Nanotechnology is at the forefront of modern innovation, shaping the future across diverse fields such as medicine, energy, and defense. As this cutting-edge technology advances, it offers unprecedented opportunities to solve some of humanity's greatest challenges. From the development of precision medicine to enhancing energy efficiency, nanotech is revolutionizing industries and everyday life. This article explores the current trends in nanotechnology, projects its expected breakthroughs by 2050, and examines the significant impact these developments could have on Special Operations Forces, highlighting how this technology can provide strategic advantages on the battlefield.


Current Trends in Nanotechnology: A Glimpse into the Future


In the ever-evolving landscape of technology, nanotechnology is emerging as a transformative force across numerous industries. From healthcare to materials science, nanotechnology is making strides that promise to reshape our future. Today, nanotech is primarily focused on enhancing the capabilities of various sectors, including medicine, energy, and computing. Key developments include the use of nanoparticles for targeted drug delivery, nanocoatings to improve energy efficiency, and nanosensors to enhance data collection in both civilian and military contexts.

 

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The integration of nanotechnology into the arsenal of SOF would not only enhance individual soldier capabilities but also provide a decisive edge, making missions more successful while minimizing risks.

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In the healthcare sector, nanotechnology is driving innovations like smart drug delivery systems, capable of transporting medication directly to affected cells, thereby improving treatment efficiency while reducing side effects. In energy, researchers are using nanomaterials to develop more efficient solar panels and energy storage solutions, addressing the increasing demand for clean energy. Furthermore, nanotech is being employed to create lighter, stronger materials that could revolutionize industries like aerospace and construction.


Anticipated Developments by 2050: The Nanotech Revolution


Looking forward to 2050, experts anticipate that nanotechnology will become more deeply integrated into everyday life, pushing the boundaries of what we can achieve in science and engineering. Breakthroughs in nanorobotics, for instance, could revolutionize medicine, allowing tiny robots to perform precise surgeries or target specific disease-causing cells, potentially making invasive procedures a thing of the past.

 

 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Looking forward to 2050, experts anticipate that nanotechnology will become more deeply integrated into everyday life, pushing the boundaries of what we can achieve in science and engineering.

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In manufacturing, nanotech is expected to pave the way for advanced materials with unprecedented properties—lightweight, ultra-strong, and self-healing. These materials will likely find applications in everything from consumer electronics to infrastructure, contributing to more resilient and adaptable urban environments. Moreover, advancements in nanotechnology could enhance energy production and storage solutions, enabling greater adoption of renewable energy by increasing efficiency and making technologies like solar power more accessible and economical.


Quantum computing could also see major advancements by 2050, thanks in part to nanotechnology. Quantum processors, built using nanoscale components, could lead to leaps in computational power, solving complex problems that are currently beyond the capabilities of classical computers. This could revolutionize industries such as finance, logistics, and cryptography.


The "So What" for Special Operations Forces: Harnessing Nanotech for Military Superiority


For Special Operations Forces (SOF), the advancements in nanotechnology could be a game-changer, providing significant operational advantages in both combat and non-combat situations. By 2050, wearable nanomaterial suits could offer enhanced protection, adapting to various environmental threats while being lighter and less cumbersome compared to current body armor. This would allow SOF to operate more effectively, even in challenging terrains.

 

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For SOF, the advancements in nanotechnology could be a game-changer, providing significant operational advantages in both combat and non-combat situations.

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Nanotechnology could also revolutionize communication and intelligence gathering. Advanced nanosensors embedded in uniforms or deployed in the field could enhance situational awareness, providing real-time data on environmental conditions, enemy positions, and potential threats. Such capabilities would enable more informed decision-making, reducing risks during missions.


Additionally, nanotechnology-enhanced medical treatments could make a significant impact on battlefield healthcare. Nanobots capable of clotting blood, fighting infections, or even delivering pain relief could dramatically improve survival rates in hostile environments, allowing medics to stabilize injured personnel more effectively.


The integration of nanotechnology into the arsenal of SOF would not only enhance individual soldier capabilities but also provide a decisive edge, making missions more successful while minimizing risks. The ongoing research and anticipated developments in nanotechnology signal a future where the extraordinary becomes the standard—one where advanced technology provides a critical edge in maintaining tactical superiority on the battlefield.


Conclusion


The future of nanotechnology is filled with promise, and its impact will be felt across multiple domains, from healthcare to energy to defense. For Special Operations Forces, in particular, nanotechnology stands to transform not only how missions are carried out but also the level of safety, efficiency, and success that can be achieved. As we move towards 2050, embracing these innovations will be key to staying ahead in a rapidly changing global landscape.


 




7. Johnny Micheal Spann: A Legacy of Courage in Clandestine Service: A Life Lost, But Not Forgotten




Johnny Micheal Spann: A Legacy of Courage in Clandestine Service

A Life Lost, But Not Forgotten

 

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/johnny-micheal-spann-a-legacy-of-courage-in-clandestine-service



For and By Practitioners


Introduction

Johnny Micheal "Mike" Spann was the first American killed in combat during the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, serving as a CIA paramilitary officer. His death on November 25, 2001, during a prison uprising at Qala-i-Jangi fortress, marked a sobering moment early in the Global War on Terror, symbolizing the inherent risks faced by those in clandestine services. Spann’s dedication to his country, his courageous actions during his final mission, and the legacy he left behind continue to inspire those who serve in the shadows of U.S. national security.

 

 

 Early Life and Path to the CIA

Born in 1969 in Winfield, Alabama, Johnny Micheal Spann was raised with a strong sense of duty and commitment. He grew up on a family farm, and from an early age, his leadership qualities and athletic prowess were evident. Spann attended Auburn University, where he earned a degree in criminal justice. He was also a commissioned officer in the United States Marine Corps, excelling as a field artillery officer. His strong work ethic and discipline earned him a promotion to the rank of captain.

 

During his time in the Marine Corps, Spann's desire to serve on the front lines of protecting his nation became increasingly clear. After his honorable discharge from the Marines, Spann joined the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1999, drawn to the challenge of protecting the U.S. from unseen threats. He joined the CIA's Special Activities Division, which is responsible for covert and paramilitary operations in some of the world’s most dangerous environments.

 

 

Spann’s Role at the CIA

Spann’s background as a Marine officer made him a natural fit for the CIA’s Special Activities Division (SAD), which recruits from among the best in the U.S. military. The SAD is tasked with carrying out covert missions, including paramilitary operations, intelligence gathering, and working in cooperation with U.S. and allied special operations forces. Spann was trained to operate in hostile environments where traditional military forces could not openly function.

 

In his role at the CIA, Spann worked closely with operatives engaged in high-risk missions to neutralize threats to U.S. national security. This included missions related to counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and intelligence gathering, often conducted in places where U.S. involvement was neither acknowledged nor easily confirmed. As a paramilitary officer, Spann was not just an intelligence analyst but also a combatant and leader in the field, regularly putting his life on the line to accomplish the mission.

 

 

 The Mission to Afghanistan

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. government immediately mobilized its resources to dismantle Al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. The CIA, along with special operations forces, was among the first to enter Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Spann was one of those early operatives deployed to Afghanistan in October 2001, shortly after the U.S. began its air campaign.

 

The CIA's role in Afghanistan was multifaceted, with a primary focus on intelligence gathering and liaison operations with anti-Taliban forces, particularly the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance was a coalition of Afghan warlords opposed to the Taliban regime, and the CIA sought to leverage their local knowledge and fighting capabilities to undermine Taliban control and hunt down key Al-Qaeda operatives, including Osama bin Laden. Spann’s mission was not merely to observe but to actively assist in the overthrow of the Taliban and provide tactical and strategic support to the Northern Alliance fighters.

 

Spann and his team worked to coordinate airstrikes, gather intelligence on enemy movements, and facilitate communications between the U.S. military and Northern Alliance leaders. He played a critical role in advising anti-Taliban forces and helping to secure victories that ultimately led to the fall of the Taliban regime.

 

 The Uprising at Qala-i-Jangi

On November 25, 2001, Spann was part of a CIA team interrogating Taliban and Al-Qaeda prisoners at Qala-i-Jangi, a 19th-century fortress near Mazar-i-Sharif that had been converted into a prison. These prisoners had been captured during the Northern Alliance’s military operations. Spann, along with other CIA officers, was tasked with identifying potential high-value Al-Qaeda operatives among the detainees. His particular focus was on finding intelligence that could help locate Osama bin Laden and other key leaders of the terrorist organization.

 

As Spann began interrogating the prisoners, what appeared to be a routine debriefing soon turned into a deadly rebellion. The detainees, many of whom were hardline fighters, launched a violent uprising, attacking their guards and seizing weapons that had been hidden in the fortress. Chaos quickly erupted, and the prisoners attempted to overrun the fortress. Spann, armed with his rifle, fought back with courage and determination. Footage later captured by news crews showed Spann in the moments before his death, calmly interrogating prisoners while remaining vigilant.

 

During the uprising, Spann engaged the attackers in combat, firing his weapon and attempting to hold off the overwhelming wave of armed detainees. His efforts allowed other U.S. personnel to escape the initial onslaught, but Spann himself was overpowered in the melee. Despite being outnumbered and under fierce attack, he continued to fight until he was killed. His bravery under fire was noted by his fellow CIA officers and Northern Alliance allies, who later recounted how his actions likely saved lives that day.

 

The uprising at Qala-i-Jangi continued for several days, with heavy casualties on both sides. Eventually, Northern Alliance forces, supported by U.S. airstrikes, regained control of the fortress. The prison riot, which started with the uprising in the interrogation room where Spann was killed, became one of the deadliest confrontations of the early war in Afghanistan. Spann’s death during the revolt was a stark reminder of the dangerous and unpredictable nature of clandestine operations in hostile environments.

 



 The Legacy of Johnny Micheal Spann

Johnny Micheal Spann’s death was a profound loss for his family, his CIA colleagues, and the nation. He was posthumously awarded the Intelligence Star, a medal for extraordinary heroism in intelligence operations. Spann's name was also inscribed on the CIA Memorial Wall at the agency's headquarters in Langley, Virginia, which honors those who have made the ultimate sacrifice in service to the United States.

 

Spann’s story resonates deeply not only because he was the first American casualty in the war in Afghanistan but also because of the courage and selflessness he exhibited in the line of duty. He left behind a wife and three children, and his family continues to honor his legacy by supporting veterans and intelligence officers through various organizations. Spann's bravery and dedication are remembered as a testament to the sacrifices made by those who serve in the shadows, often without recognition or accolades.

 

 

The Inherent Dangers of Clandestine Service

Spann’s death highlights the inherent dangers of clandestine work, especially in a conflict zone like Afghanistan. CIA officers operating in such environments often face peril without the same support systems available to traditional military personnel. Paramilitary officers like Spann engage in high-risk missions, often working in isolation and relying on their training, instincts, and courage to survive in hostile territories. Unlike soldiers in uniform, these officers blend into their environments, often operating with little to no visible protection, and yet they face the same or even greater dangers than conventional forces.

 

Spann's mission in Afghanistan exemplified the covert and often perilous nature of CIA operations in conflict zones. His role required not just intelligence expertise but also combat readiness and the ability to navigate complex, dangerous situations. The uprising at Qala-i-Jangi, while a tragic loss, also demonstrated the unpredictable and volatile conditions under which paramilitary officers operate.

 

Johnny Micheal Spann was fully aware of the risks associated with his mission in Afghanistan, yet he chose to face those dangers head-on. His courage in the face of overwhelming odds is a reminder of the bravery required by those who serve in clandestine roles, protecting the nation from threats that are often unseen and unacknowledged. Spann’s legacy is one of valor, commitment, and sacrifice—an enduring symbol of the brave men and women who work in the shadows to ensure the safety and security of the United States.

 

 

 Conclusion

Johnny Micheal Spann’s life and death serve as a powerful reminder of the courage and sacrifice required in clandestine service. The risks taken by CIA officers, often operating behind enemy lines and in hostile environments, are immense. Spann’s bravery, both in life and in his final moments at Qala-i-Jangi, reflects the spirit of dedication that defines America’s intelligence community. His legacy continues to inspire current and future generations of officers who willingly step into the shadows to protect the nation, knowing the dangers ahead. Johnny Micheal Spann’s story is a testament to the extraordinary courage required in the fight for freedom, even when that fight occurs far from the public eye.


8. Four Ways Ukraine’s Drone Innovations Are Changing Warfare


Note this WSJ article is similar to the NYT article I forwarded yesterday. Both were published on 12 OCT at 12:02am and 12:01am.


The NYT article: "Rise of the Dragons: Fire-Breathing Drones Duel in Ukraine" https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/12/world/europe/ukraine-russia-dragon-drones.html


Four Ways Ukraine’s Drone Innovations Are Changing Warfare

Aerial craft can intercept Russian spy drones, plant mines and spew molten metal


By Isabel ColesFollow and Ievgeniia Sivorka | Photographs by Svet Jacqueline for WSJ

Updated Oct. 12, 2024 12:02 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/four-ways-ukraines-drone-innovations-are-changing-warfare-e6425b7d?st=aS9Z6V&utm

The cutting edge of drone warfare is the front line of Ukraine’s defense against Russia, where soldiers and manufacturers are innovating to counter Moscow’s battlefield advantages.

In recent months, Ukraine has launched drones that intercept Russian flying machines or incinerate tree lines by dropping molten metal. Also in testing: drones that carry automatic rifles and grenade launchers.

With a smaller military and fewer resources, Ukraine is relying on tech to combat Russia’s might. Once limited to dropping bomblets, Ukraine’s drones now do everything from planting mines to delivering supplies.

Forged in the furnace of battle, the drone innovations are focused on attaining an edge over Russia cheaply, quickly and for as long as possible. Ukrainian drone hacks are often rapidly copied and mass produced by the Russians, eroding any tactical advantage.

First-Person-View Drone

FPV drones, which can be manufactured for a few hundred dollars each from parts mostly available on the commercial market, are one of the most important weapons in Ukraine.

Battery sling

Battery

Antenna

Camera

Propeller

Motor

Carbon frame

Rocket-propelled grenade

Flight controller

Zip tie

Note: Diagram is schematic

Source: Sparrow Avia

Jemal R. Brinson/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Drone manufacturers, who now enjoy tax breaks, are churning out hundreds of thousands of small, cheap, strong and agile quadcopters. They also maintain close contact with soldiers, so designs are battle-ready. “That’s how we evolve,” said a founding member of drone manufacturer Wild Hornets.

The increasingly sophisticated devices are the basis for the following Ukrainian innovations that are changing the battlefield.

Drone-on-drone warfare

Ukraine has found the solution to a problem that has vexed Western defense companies for more than a decade: how to combat cheap aerial drones. 

Instead of fighting Russian reconnaissance drones with lasers, jammers or even nets, Ukraine uses its own drones. 

Ukrainians use small craft—quadcopters and fixed-wing—that fly faster and higher than standard first-person-view drones to destroy Russia’s spy drones.

The Ukrainian drones use a digital communication system that relays better quality images, helping to find a target, said Ukrainian activist Serhiy Sternenko, who raises funds to buy drones for the military.

Sternenko dubs the drone-on-drone attacks “Russia-slaying in the skies,” and says the tactic has also taken out two Russian helicopters. 

Russian reconnaissance drones have all but vanished over some cities, he added. On the front line, too, the impact is noticeable. “There is much less reconnaissance flying in the air than three months ago,” said a Ukrainian platoon commander. “They can’t use their artillery as effectively as before.”

Eliminating Russian eyes-in-the-sky could make it less risky for Ukraine to deploy precious Western antiaircraft systems closer to the front line where they could shield infantry against Russian glide bombs.

Still, Russia is adapting too, disguising its spy drones as Ukrainian, fitting them with additional rearview cameras and flying them higher to evade detection, Sternenko said.

Success in downing reconnaissance drones is driving development of drones to intercept Iranian-made Shahed drones, which Russia has used alongside missiles to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.

“We already have some prototypes,” Sternenko said. “At this very moment we are building a fully-fledged air-defense system to cover Ukrainian cities.”

‘Dragon’s Breath’

A Ukrainian Dragon’s Breath drone attacking Russian positions.

108th Territorial Defense Brigade

The war in Ukraine is being waged from tree line to tree line, with troops using the canopy to hide from drones swarming overhead.

To break through that cover, Ukraine’s Dragon’s Breath drone showers enemy positions with thermite—a mixture of finely powdered aluminum and iron oxide that produces a very high temperature on combustion.

Typically used in welding, the incendiary mixture burns through equipment, provisions and cover, exposing enemy troops to attack from rearguard drones.

Soon after the Dragon’s Breath drone appeared on the front lines, Russian forces deployed drones with similar capabilities.

“A good gauge of what’s effective is if the Russians try to copy it,” said weapons analyst Matthew Moss.

‘Queen of Hornets’



Ukrainian servicemembers and some of the drones their unit works with at a command center in eastern Ukraine.

On the edge of a field behind the front line with Russia, a Ukrainian soldier fastened a grenade launcher to the underside of a Queen of Hornets quadcopter.

Drone pilot Mykhailo Kudliak donned his vision goggles, flew the drone toward the wreckage of a vehicle and fired.

The test run was a success.

Conventional armed drones detonate on impact with a target or must drop their munitions from above, making them vulnerable to electronic-jamming devices. The drone-mounted grenade launcher can fire at a distance, enabling it to get through the antidrone force field that jammers create around targets. Locking onto a target is a challenge—particularly if it is moving—but using artificial intelligence to assist with aim might increase the hit rate, Moss said.



Ukrainian soldiers testing a drone that can fire a rocket-propelled grenade in eastern Ukraine.

Other experiments include mounting an assault rifle on a drone with a trigger mechanism to fire it midflight. The weapon is crude, imprecise and can fire only as many bullets as in a single magazine, but it could be used to harass and suppress enemy fire.

The aim is to preserve scarce infantry by limiting exposure to close combat. “The dream is to sit in a lounge somewhere, open up our laptops and start fighting,” said Ukrainian drone platoon commander Serhiy Ihnatuka.

Mother ship drones

In the early days of the war, drones carried small weights over a short distance. Today, some models like the Vampire transport up to 20 pounds of explosives.

The increased strength has widened drone capabilities to include resupplying troops in trenches and laying mines behind enemy lines.

Vampire Night Bomber Drone

Ukraine's heavy-duty Vampire drones perform tasks such as delivering supplies, laying mines and carrying smaller drones.

Max speed: Up to 25 mph

Flight range: Up to 6.2 miles

Payload: Up to 33 lbs

Source: United24

Jemal R. Brinson/WSJ

The Queen of Hornets quadcopter can hover at a height of 2 meters (6.6 feet), enabling it to deposit a load without damage.

A drone’s range is limited by its battery life. To overcome that, both Russia and Ukraine are using larger drones with longer range, like the Vampire, as mother ships to drop off smaller FPVs with one-way munitions.

“If you can fly a larger drone undetected…and hit targets that aren’t expecting to be hit, that’s very valuable,” said Moss, the weapons analyst.



'The dream is to sit in a lounge somewhere, open up our laptops and start fighting,' said Serhiy Ihnatuka, a Ukrainian drone platoon commander.

Write to Isabel Coles at isabel.coles@wsj.com



9. How Russia, China envision nuking US satellites: from above and below


Excerpts:

How likely are China and Russia to implement such an extreme and treaty-breaking plan for weaponizing space?
After China’s 20th Party Congress in 2022, party leaders directed its military to “construct a strong strategic deterrence force structure,” and face down the “myriad cross-domain challenges of a networked space force.” To create this new deterrence force structure, the People’s Liberation Army was directed to go beyond traditional thinking and use both nuclear and conventional forces in new ways.
In Russia, Vladimir Putin revealed novel nuclear doomsday devices in 2018 and has since repeatedly rattled his nuclear sabers during his invasion of Ukraine. Prominent Russia analyst Masha Gessen concluded that Putin is determined to foist new nuclear doctrine on the world.
One aspect that is still unclear about either mode of nuclear ASAT is whether the warhead would be a thermonuclear or fission bomb. Fusion detonations are more efficient at producing prompt radiation effects, while a fission bomb might be more effective at contaminating the space environment with persistent radioactive flux. After Starfish Prime detonated a thermonuclear warhead 400 km up, Apollo program engineers were particularly concerned about an explosion doped with uranium-238, which would generate a higher concentration of beta particles and other fission debris, pumping the Van Allen radiation belts “a hundredfold.” A specially designed warhead could optimize the destructive advantages of both.
In April 2024, the international community called upon Russia and China to recommit to their obligations as signatories to the Outer Space Treaty and its prohibition against deploying nuclear weapons in space. Tellingly, Russia vetoed the UN Security Council resolution and China abstained. For the sake of the global commons, the urgency to forestall and reverse the weaponization of space has rarely been higher.


How Russia, China envision nuking US satellites: from above and below

As the Pentagon builds huge constellations to shrug off conventional ASAT weapons, potential adversaries are taking things to a terrifying new level.

By David D. Chen and Peter W. Singer

October 11, 2024

defenseone.com · by David D. Chen

Nearly six decades after the Outer Space Treaty banned military activities in space, its norms appear to be losing their power.

In May, U.S. officials from the Defense and State Departments disclosed the possibility of Russia deploying a nuclear-detonation device into space, and that a suspected testbed satellite had already been in orbit for two years.

China, meanwhile, has embarked on a campaign to expand its strategic nuclear forces beyond the numbers required for “minimum deterrence” and develop new delivery platforms, including a fractional orbital bombardment system.

Chinese and Russian interest in space nukes derives from their expressed anxiety over the U.S. strategy of deploying large and widely dispersed satellite constellations, such as the Space Development Agency’s “Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture,” as well as commercial networks such as SpaceX’s Starlink communications satellites. SDA Director Derek Tournear has described his agency’s “proliferation” as a game-changing strategy of resilience, using numbers and architecture to keep U.S. space networks working despite single-point attacks via kinetic, directed-energy, or electromagnetic means. However, this has threatened the sense of “space deterrence” gained by China and Russia through their own investments in anti-satellite weapons. Using nuclear effects to hold entire orbital regimes at risk offers an alternative way to counter such proliferated constellations.

Yet not all nuclear detonations in space are equal. Understanding the different Russian and Chinese concepts for nuclear ASAT weapons, so far as they are understood in the public realm, will be crucial to any multilateral efforts to secure the space domain.

Russia aims high...

In early May, Assistant Secretary of State Mallory Stewart said Russia had not yet deployed an operational nuclear device in space, and, even if they had, it would not directly threaten human life. She did disclose, however, that Russia had launched a test satellite. “Russia has publicly claimed that their satellite is for scientific purposes,” Stewart said. “However, the orbit is in a region not used by any other spacecraft—that in itself was somewhat unusual – and the orbit is a region of higher radiation than normal lower-Earth orbits.”

Amateur observers quickly identified the satellite as Cosmos-2553 and its unusual orbit to be 2,000 km up, at the upper edge of low-Earth orbit, or LEO. Ostensibly carrying a synthetic aperture radar payload, Cosmos-2553 may have secondary payloads or otherwise be used to help understand the radiation and electromagnetic environment relevant to a nuclear ASAT program.

In Congressional testimony, then-Assistant Defense Secretary John Plumb revealed a rationale for why that might be important.

“Some [satellites] would be caught in an immediate [nuclear] blast, which they would not be able to survive the flux of that. And then others could be damaged over time…if [the] Van Allen belts are pumped,” Plumb told lawmakers.

Plumb was referring to the Van Allen radiation belts that surround Earth. Cosmos-2553 orbits within the inner Van Allen belt—much higher, incidentally, than the infamous 1962 Starfish Prime nuclear detonation by the United States that damaged or disabled one-third of the satellites in orbit at the time. U.S. analysts appear to believe that the Russian nuclear ASAT intent is to rapidly “pump” the inner Van Allen radiation belt and transform areas of low-Earth orbit and some higher altitudes into high-exposure zones.

Most satellites in LEO are designed to operate in a relatively benign radiation environment, given the natural protection of Earth’s magnetic field. Satellites in higher orbits are generally built to withstand higher radiation exposure, so they would be less susceptible than their more numerous compatriots closer to Earth. A nuclear blast 2,000 km up would likely not cause much immediate damage, but repeated passes through artificially augmented radiation belts could quickly degrade satellite electronics. Sun-synchronous satellites and any others with inclinations taking them through energized field lines would be the first to fail.

This effect would also linger. Plumb indicated that the effects of a Russian attack might last a year. High-energy particles released by Starfish Prime stayed in orbit for at least five.

...while China goes low

Beijing appears to have different ideas about nuclear detonation in space.

China’s leading military technologists and strategic thinkers have identified space as the linchpin for U.S. military operations, with a remarkably close reading of U.S. military concepts and verbiage.

For example, Wu Mingxi, chief scientist at one of China’s largest military conglomerates and author of an influential book on the future of warfare, writes, “In space-based information network construction and space-based information applications, the United States is the leader.…Through the practice of war, they have accelerated space-based information applications and increased the pace of progress…greatly decreasing the time of their ‘Observe, Orient, Decide, Attack’ (OODA) loop.”

Col. John Boyd defined the final segment of his OODA loop as “act,” but here Wu rendered it as “攻击” or “attack.” The central thesis of Wu’s vision is not to overmatch the United States in a correlation-of-forces contest, but to change the terms of conflict by unleashing a networked system-of-systems powered by AI to react exponentially faster than an opponent.

Using nuclear detonation to strike a critical blow to U.S. space assets would severely hamper the operational tempo of U.S. forces, despite the SDA’s proliferated networks.

A review of literature of PRC papers on nuclear detonation in space has shown a steady progression from relatively crude simulations of burst-shell dynamics to fine-tuning the parameters of a detonation to achieve different shapes and effects. Advancements in AI and supercomputing also allow research and planning that was not possible back in the Cold War. China has the capacity to model these nuclear detonations precisely without the need for real-world testing, which is prohibited by international treaties.

In contrast to the apparent Russian model of pumping the Van Allen belts from above, PRC research has focused on using atmospheric effects from below LEO, generating ionizing radiation and high-energy particles closer to Earth. Such effects could be more finely modulated with yields as low as one kiloton.

One potential delivery means might be the FOBS-Hypersonic Glide Vehicle hybrid platform that China demonstrated in 2021. It could carry a warhead to any point around the Earth, but in a different path than traditional ballistic missile delivery, making it less likely to be perceived as a strategic nuclear attack.

A detonation from below LEO would produce immediate radiation effects on any satellites within line-of-sight. A localized augmented artificial radiation belt and a plume of radioactive debris might persist for weeks or longer.

Such a weapon would still be indiscriminate and affect any satellite passing through the region. Closer to Earth, such a device would also generate an electromagnetic pulse propagating downward through the atmosphere to affect any unshielded terrestrial electronics, particularly long-distance wires such as power lines or telecom cables. Still, a single shot would be less global in scale and shorter in duration than the above apparent Russian nuclear ASAT.

Intentions matter

How likely are China and Russia to implement such an extreme and treaty-breaking plan for weaponizing space?

After China’s 20th Party Congress in 2022, party leaders directed its military to “construct a strong strategic deterrence force structure,” and face down the “myriad cross-domain challenges of a networked space force.” To create this new deterrence force structure, the People’s Liberation Army was directed to go beyond traditional thinking and use both nuclear and conventional forces in new ways.

In Russia, Vladimir Putin revealed novel nuclear doomsday devices in 2018 and has since repeatedly rattled his nuclear sabers during his invasion of Ukraine. Prominent Russia analyst Masha Gessen concluded that Putin is determined to foist new nuclear doctrine on the world.

One aspect that is still unclear about either mode of nuclear ASAT is whether the warhead would be a thermonuclear or fission bomb. Fusion detonations are more efficient at producing prompt radiation effects, while a fission bomb might be more effective at contaminating the space environment with persistent radioactive flux. After Starfish Prime detonated a thermonuclear warhead 400 km up, Apollo program engineers were particularly concerned about an explosion doped with uranium-238, which would generate a higher concentration of beta particles and other fission debris, pumping the Van Allen radiation belts “a hundredfold.” A specially designed warhead could optimize the destructive advantages of both.

In April 2024, the international community called upon Russia and China to recommit to their obligations as signatories to the Outer Space Treaty and its prohibition against deploying nuclear weapons in space. Tellingly, Russia vetoed the UN Security Council resolution and China abstained. For the sake of the global commons, the urgency to forestall and reverse the weaponization of space has rarely been higher.

David D. Chen is a Senior Analyst for BluePath Labs. He focuses on aerospace, cyber, and cross-domain emerging technologies and China’s military modernization.

P.W. Singer is Strategist at New America and the author of multiple books on technology and security, including Wired for War, Ghost Fleet, Burn-In, and LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media.

defenseone.com · by David D. Chen


10. New Gmail Security Alert For 2.5 Billion Users As AI Hack Confirmed



We all need to read and heed this.


New Gmail Security Alert For 2.5 Billion Users As AI Hack Confirmed

Forbes · by Davey Winder · October 13, 2024



Davey Winder

Senior ContributorOpinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.

Davey Winder is a veteran cybersecurity writer, hacker and analyst.

Following

Oct 13, 2024,07:35am EDT

  • A new and dangerous AI threat for all Gmail users is seen in the wild

SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images

Update, Oct. 13, 2024: This story, originally published Oct. 11, includes details of a new Google anti-scam alliance initiative, a new warning about legitimate-looking support scams and details of Google’s Advanced Protection Program to protect high-risk accounts.

Google has implemented increasingly sophisticated protections against those who would compromise your Gmail account—but hackers using AI-driven attacks are also evolving. According to Google’s own figures, there are currently more than 2.5 billion users of the Gmail service. No wonder, then, that it is such a target for hackers and scammers. Here’s what you need to know.

The Latest AI-Driven Gmail Attack Is Scary Good

Sam Mitrovic, a Microsoft solutions consultant, has issued a warning after almost falling victim to what is described as a “super realistic AI scam call” capable of tricking even the most experienced of users.

It all started a week before Mitrovic realized the sophistication of the attack that was targeting him. “I received a notification to approve a Gmail account recovery attempt,” Mitrovic recounts in a blog post warning other Gmail users of the threat in question. The need to confirm an account recovery, or a password reset, is a notorious phishing attack methodology intended to drive the user to a fake login portal where they need to enter their credentials to report the request as not initiated by them.

ForbesGmail Hackers Have Control Of 2FA, Email And Number? Here’s What To DoBy Davey Winder

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Unsurprisingly, then, Mitrovic wasn’t falling for this and ignored the notification that appeared to originate from the U.S. and a missed phone call, pertaining to be from Google in Sydney, Australia, some 40 minutes later. So far, so relatively straightforward and easy to avoid. Then, almost exactly a week later, the fun started in earnest—another notification request for account recovery approval followed by a telephone call 40 minutes later. This time, Mitrovic didn’t miss the call and instead picked up: an American voice, claiming to be from Google support, confirmed that there was suspicious activity on the Gmail account.

“He asks if I’m traveling,” Mitrovic said, “when I said no, he asks if I logged in from Germany, to which I reply no.” All of this to engender trust in the caller and fear in the recipient. This is when things turned dark fast and really rather clever in the overall scheme of phishing things. The so-called Google support person informed Mitrovic that an attacker had accessed his Gmail account for the past 7 days, and had already downloaded account data. This rang alarm bells as Mitrovic recalled the recovery notification and missed call from a week earlier.

Googling the phone number he was being called from while speaking, Mitrovic discovered that it did, indeed, lead to Google business pages. This alone is a clever tactic likely to fool plenty of unsuspecting users caught up in the panic of the moment, as it wasn’t a Google support number but rather about getting calls from Google Assistant. “At the start of the call, you'll hear the reason for the call and that the call is from Google. You can expect the call to come from an automated system or, in some cases, a manual operator,” the 100% genuine page helpfully informs the reader.

ForbesGoogle Confirms New Gmail Security Boost For 2.5 Billion UsersBy Davey Winder

Another Google Support Scam Driven By AI Sparks Warning To Gmail Users

Garry Tan, the founder of venture capital firm and startup accelerator Y Combinator, has taken to X, formerly known as Twitter, to issue a warning about another phishing scam that he described as being “pretty elaborate” which also leverages AI so as to present itself as believable. Once again, as with the scam that almost fooled Sam Mitrovic, a security consultant remember, this latest warning concerns contact from a so-called Google support technician. I wouldn’t go as far as one commenter on X who suggested the giveaway was that Google doesn’t have any support for users, but it’s not that too far from the truth when it comes to these scams: Google support will not contact you out of the blue like this. “Do not click yes on this dialog,” Tan warned, “you will be phished.”

Don't be knee-jerked into clicking yes

Google

In the case of the scam that targeted Tan, the supposed Google support person claimed that the company had received a death certificate and a family member was attempting to recover his account. The caller, in other words, and only AI could be this stupid, was checking that the person answering was alive. “It's a pretty elaborate ploy to get you to allow password recovery,” Tan went on to warn, but spotted that the account recovery screen he was presented with had a device field that displayed the name of a Google support worker rather than an actual device used to access the account. Tan suggested that whoever designed the interface for recovery should be employing some pretty basic regular expression checks, or even AI-based fraud detection, on the text field in question. “It's trivial to check the device name for this,” he concluded. Part of the scam involved getting Tan to re-add his cellphone number as part of the verification process to trigger an account recovery dialog. Tan was, however, wise to this: “I’ve been SIM swapped, so know not to have my cell on my accounts ever,” Tan explained.

Using Google Forms To Make Contact Appear Legitimate

Fraudsters have also been seen abusing Google Forms, a free online tool that is part of Google Workspace, to create legitimate looking documents sent as part of support scams. By sending a copy of the form to the target address, using the response receipt option of Google Forms, the document is sent via genuine Google servers which adds legitimacy to the scam. Checking the email will show it as being from workspacesupport@google.com for example, which acts to lower any red flags the recipient might have had. One such scam used such a form to mimic an account recovery password reset form, telling the target they would get a SMS notification from a named support agent and giving them the number to check. This double-legitimacy method is enough to fool plenty of people, lots of the time. In this case, the slip-up, and only then if the person on the receiving end was savvy enough to realize, was a confusingly complex and overlong password reset process.

Lessons To Be Learned From These Google Support Hack Near Misses

Mitrovic did the right thing, or at least the next best thing to hanging up, and asked the supposed support guy to send an email confirmation—an email which arrived soon after, from a Google domain and looking for all intents and purposes genuine. AT this point he noticed the to field contained a cleverly disguised address that wasn’t actually a Google domain but could, once again, easily fool those not of a technical bent.

The real giveaway for Mitrovic, however, was when the caller said hello and after no response said hello again. “At this point I released it as an AI voice as the pronunciation and spacing were too perfect,” Mitrovic said.

It’s well worth reading the original blog from Mitrovic as it contains much more technical detail and detective work that I don’t have the space to cover in this report. Knowledge is everything, and the threat intelligence provided by this consultant is genuinely invaluable for anyone who might find themselves in a similar situation: forearmed is forewarned.

ForbesGoogle Announces New Gmail Security Move For MillionsBy Davey Winder

It’s almost a certainty that the attacker would have continued to a point where the so-called recovery process would be initiated, in truth this would be a cloned login portal capturing user credentials and likely the use of some kind of session cookie stealing malware to bypass two-factor authentication if that was in place.

Google Launches The Global Signal Exchange To Fight Scammers

Google has announced that it has joined forces with the Global Anti-Scam Alliance and the DNS Research Federation to form a new initiative in the battle against scammers. The Global Signal Exchange will act as an intelligence-sharing platform when it comes to scams and fraud, providing real-time insight into the cybercrime supply chain. As the first founding member of the Global Signal Exchange, Google hopes that the platform will become, in effect, a global clearinghouse for the kind of intelligence signals that are connected to bad actors and their attacks.

Amanda Storey, senior director of trust and safety at Google said that the collaboration “leverages the strengths of each partner.” With GASA having an extensive existing network of interested stakeholders and the DNS Research Foundation a data platform with more than 40 million existing signals, “GSE aims to improve the exchange of abuse signals, enabling faster identification and disruption of fraudulent activities across various sectors, platforms and services.”

The ultimate goal, Google confirmed, is to create a solution that not only operates at the almost unthinkable scale of the internet itself but does so in an efficient and, above all, user-friendly way. This means that qualifying organizations will be able to use it to hit back at scammers. Google already has plenty of experience in this field, with a long-established history of entering into partnerships to help fight fraud. Indeed, as part of the testing of the new Global Signal Exgcnage, Google shared more than 100,000 malicious URLs and consumed a staggering million scam signals for analysis. “We'll start by sharing Google Shopping URLs that we have actioned under our scams policies,” Nafis Zebarjadi, Google’s account security product manager said, “and as we gain experience from the pilot, we will look to add data soon from other relevant Google product areas.”

ForbesIt’s 2024 And Your Laptop Can Be Hacked With A BBQ LighterBy Davey Winder

The Global Signal Exchange, or at least the engine that drives it, runs on the Google Cloud to enable all participants to share and consume intelligence signals while “benefiting from Google Cloud Platform's Al capabilities to find patterns and match signals smartly,” Storey concluded.

Staying Safe From The Most Advanced Of Gmail Scams

AI deepfakes are not just used for porn and politics, they are used to perpetrate seemingly straightforward account takeovers such as in this case. Stay calm if you are approached by someone claiming to be from Google support, they won’t phone you so there’s a massive red flag right away, and no harm will come to you if you hang up. Use the tools at your disposal, ironically Google search itself and your Gmail account, to make checks during the call if you are concerned its could be genuine and ignoring it could cause harm. Search for the phone number, see where it’s really coming from. Check your Gmail activity to see what, if any, devices other than your own have been using the account. Take note of what Google says about staying safe from attackers using Gmail phishing scams. Most importantly, never let yourself be rushed into making a knee-jerk reaction, no matter how much urgency is injected into a conversation. It’s that sense of urgency that the attackers rely upon to swerve your normal good judgement and click a link or give up credentials.

ForbesAndroid, Chrome And Play Store For Sale? 32 Pages Of Google Doom Raises Security ConcernBy Davey Winder

Use Google’s Advanced Protection Program—Now With Passkey Support

I would also advise considering enrolment into Google’s Advanced Protection Program, designed for users such as journalists, activists and politicians who may be thought of as high-risk account holders. One of the downsides of the Advanced Protection Program had always been that it required the purchase of not one, but two hardware security keys to use when signing into the account. The financial burden was lifted recently earlier in the year when Google announced that passkey support was coming to Advanced Protection Program users.

Google's Advanced Protection Program keeps phishing scams at bay

Google

The combination of the protections brought by both of these technologies makes it something of a no-brainer for most people with a Google account, including all Gmail users. Here’s why. Signing into Google on any device requires the passkey when first used, which means that even if a hacker had got your username and account, without the device that passkey is stored on (your smartphone) and your biometrics needed to verify it, they could not sign in. Using this in conjunction with Advanced Protection Program enrolment, which restricts most non-Google apps and services from accessing your Gmail account data, also makes phished password and account recovery much harder to pull off. “If anyone tries to recover your account,” a Google spokesperson said, “Advanced Protection takes extra steps to verify your identity.” This means that it can take a few days to verify that you are who you say and get access to your Google account back. But it means that hackers can’t just scam their way into it either.

Follow me on Twitter or LinkedIn. Check out my website or some of my other work here. 

Davey Winder

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Forbes · by Davey Winder · October 13, 2024






11. How Bookworms Beat the Nazis: The Unlikely Spies of the OSS


I am looking forward to this documentary.


We have to outthink our enemies as much as we have to outfight them.


As T.E. Lawrence said "Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." (But in reality all warfare requires a superior intellect - it is always the thinking person who prevails). And there is a time and place for being smart enough to know when a bayonet charge is necessary as Colonel (Professor) Joshua Chamberlain or Colonel (then Capt) Lewis Milllet would tell us.


And just for a note of accuracy, the OSS was the "precursor" to both the CIA (and the entire IC) and the US Special Operations Command as well.


How Bookworms Beat the Nazis: The Unlikely Spies of the OSS

https://www.si.edu/events/detail/?trumbaEmbed=view%3Devent%26eventid%3D176406800&utm


WhenWednesday, October 16, 2024, 6:45 – 8 PM EDTSponsorSmithsonian AssociatesEvent LocationThis online program is presented on Zoom.Online Linksmithsonianassociates.org…CostClick here to view pricesGet Tickets/Registersmithsonianassociates.org…CategoriesAfter Five, Webcasts & OnlineDetailsAt the start of World War II, the newly formed Office of Strategic Services, a precursor to today’s CIA, turned to academia to fill its ranks with experts. Suddenly, literature professors, librarians, and historians were training to perform undercover operations and investigative work. Historian Elyse Graham profiles the unlikely spies who helped lay the foundations of modern intelligence and transformed American higher education when they returned after the war.




12. How many drones does the Army need? A lot more.



If a little is good a lot is better. But this is why we need mass production of low cost USA/drones. Hopefully the defense community can make their profits on high volume of low cost drones rather than the most expensive (but few) systems that it can produce. And of course the right balance across the spectrum of capabilities and expense must be found.


How many drones does the Army need? A lot more.

The experience of two brigades suggests that the number is far larger than it’s buying—and that’s just for training.


defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

The Army is buying hundreds of small drones as it starts to equip its infantry with warfare’s latest must-have weapon, but that’s not nearly enough. The experience of current units suggests the service will need to buy thousands per year just to meet training objectives, let alone go to war.

In February, Army Chief of Staff Randy George announced the “transforming-in-contact” effort, in which would send new kit to three infantry brigades that would evaluate it. The strategy focuses on technologies the Army sees as important for the future of warfare, including improved communications, electronic warfare capabilities, and small drones.

The three units are the 101st Airborne’s 2nd Brigade, the 25th Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade, and 10th Mountain 3rd Brigade. The Army may yet add more; the 3rd Infantry Division, for example, is hastening to apply lessons from these brigades’ experience.

Alongside the new tech have come new formations designed to use the drones for maximum effectiveness.

In the 101st Airborne, drone-focused units include the Multifunctional Reconnaissance Company, or MFRC, a formation designed to dwell deep behind an enemy's lines and observe their movement. The company consists of three reconnaissance platoons, as well as an electronic warfare platoon and a robotics and autonomous systems, or RAS, platoon.

Each reconnaissance unit comes with up to six short-range drones, while the robotics and autonomous systems platoon fly heavier, longer-range drones like Performance Drone Works C100. The drones are used for reconnaissance, artillery fire correction, and light bombing.

In addition to the MFRC, the 101st’s three battalions also have one new drone platoon apiece. The platoons are staffed by seven operators for their 12 short-range drones, or a little under two drones per operator.

In total, that’s as many as 54 short-range drones, plus the heavier systems used by the RAS platoon. That’s much more than units previously fielded, but even more may be needed to make up for losses in training.

During intensive training, like that seen during rotation in a combat training center, one drone platoon commander said he expected that at least one drone every other day would fall victim to operator or mechanical error. While sturdy, drones are prone to any number of accidents: an operator may accidentally clip a tree branch, the drone could lose signal, or the battery could drain before the drone gets back to base.

Other brigades are fielding similarly large numbers of drones, and are also grappling with malfunctions.

In 2022, the Army’s 25th Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade began experimenting with drone training and acquisition even before it was selected as a “transforming-in-contact” brigade this year.

After months of effort, the unit’s rifle platoons are now “fully fielded” with between five and seven small drones per platoon, said brigade commander Col. Graham White by email in August. That’s a total of over a hundred small drones.

White said that it was a “safe assumption” that around 25 percent of drones would irretrievably break or or be lost during intensive training missions, like those in a combat training center. White is now chief of staff of the 25th Infantry Division. Overall, he said he expected that all of a platoon’s drones would “break, crash or require minor repair” over an expected five year life cycle.

White added that 3D printing and in-house repair systems and technicians were therefore key for keeping drone units operational. He said they were “gaining ground in both areas.” At an September event held by think tank CSIS, Army acquisition head Doug Bush said that the service had recently gotten approval from Congress to reprogram money to give units 3D printers to print drone parts.

The numbers deployed by the 101st Airborne Division and 25th Infantry Division, in turn, suggests the Army will need to start buying drones by the thousands.

If all 59 of the Army’s active and National Guard brigades follow the lead of the 101st Airborne, for example, over 3,000 short-range drones would be required to equip their platoons. To make up for training losses, the Army will also need to regularly buy replacements. Assuming a rate of 25 percent lost per year during intensive training, the Army might need to purchase another 1,000 drones or so per year.

This number may vary by brigade type, which could increase or decrease drone needs. An armored brigade, for example, can more easily take advantage of tethered drones, which can be connected to a vehicle and therefore less easily lost.

That number does not include a number of other drones the Army is buying or considering.

In September, the Army chose Anduril’s Ghost X and Performance Drone Works’ C-100 to field as their company-level drone. The Army is also working on plans to acquire long-range drones, first-person-view loitering munitions, and tethered drones.

It also does not include the number of drones needed in an actual war. Russia and Ukraine both lose thousands of drones per month to electronic warfare, bullets, and missiles.

Industry observers could see some concrete steps in the coming months. In December and January, Teal and Skydio, respectively, announced they were competing for the second tranche of the Army’s Short Range Reconnaissance program.

The Army is moving relatively swiftly to buy drones. The requirement for the company-level drone, for example, was approved in June 2023, with an award for tranche one in September 2024.

And the Army has signaled it wants to buy in quantity. Speaking at a Defense News event in September, Bush said that the Army was seeking to buy drones in the same quantity it buys ammunition.

“We need them potentially at a very large scale and very quickly,” Bush said.

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove




13. NATO’s Indo-Pacific Aspirations


Rather than a pivot to Asia perhaps we are better served by the coordination, collaboration, and synchronization and orchestration of activities of our friends, partners, and allies to mutually support each other across all theaters? 


Or another way to ask the question is are regional theaters still a way to organize for national security or are they obsolete and should be reconsidered? Do we need theater or regional combatant commands at all? ( A heretical statement/question I know).






NATO’s Indo-Pacific Aspirations


As China, North Korea, and Russia move into closer alignment, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are concluding that European and Indo-Pacific security are not divisible.


Blog Post by David Sacks

via East-West Center

October 10, 2024 10:44 am (EST)


cfr.org · by Thomas J. Bollyky

With China, North Korea, and Russia moving into closer alignment, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have concluded that European and Indo-Pacific security are not divisible. China’s provision of dual-use items to Russia has provided a vital lifeline to its defense industrial base, while North Korea’s shipment of munitions and ballistic missiles has helped Russia replenish its weapons stocks. Countries in the Indo-Pacific are thus enabling Russia to prosecute the largest war in Europe since World War II.

These dynamics will, in turn, affect Indo-Pacific security. In exchange for the support it has received, Russia will likely provide technical assistance to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, closely back Beijing and Pyongyang’s positions on the main geopolitical fault lines in Asia, and may even intervene directly on behalf of its partners during a contingency.

If a war breaks out in the Indo-Pacific, the economic costs to NATO members would likely surpass those associated with the war in Ukraine. In addition, direct involvement in a regional contingency would force the United States to draw down its forces in Europe, which may court further Russian aggression. Thus, NATO has an interest in contributing to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and preventing China from providing even greater military assistance to Russia.

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At the same time, NATO’s potential contributions of hard power to the Indo-Pacific are limited. NATO should focus more narrowly on deterring a Russian attack on members and preparing for the day the United States might have to fight a direct conflict in Asia. Its most helpful contributions to Indo-Pacific security, therefore, are in spelling out to China the economic costs of aggression, exploring defense industrial cooperation with countries in the region, and pursuing discrete projects on cyber threats, economic coercion, and disinformation.

NATO Turns to the Indo-Pacific

NATO has begun to signal its growing worry about China’s assertiveness and its growing partnership with Russia. The 2019 London Declaration marked the first time that China was mentioned in an official NATO statement. References to China have since become more pointed, especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the Madrid Summit in 2022, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept, which said that China’s “ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” For the first time, leaders from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea (known as the Indo-Pacific Four, or IP4) joined a NATO summit. The Washington Summit Declaration of 2024 used the sharpest language to date, calling out China for becoming a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine” and warning Beijing that it “cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation.”

When Two Become One

Two potential flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific are animating NATO’s focus on the region. First, NATO members are concerned that if China uses force against Taiwan and the United States comes to its direct defense, Washington would have to make difficult trade-offs that would compel its NATO allies to shoulder more of the burden in deterring Russia. In addition, if deterrence in the Taiwan Strait fails, the economic consequences for Europe would be devastating. Supply chains across Europe would be severely disrupted, with a conflict over Taiwan estimated to shave up to $10 trillion off global GDP.

Second, a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would bring about similar dynamics. Whereas it remains unknown whether the United States would defend Taiwan, there is no doubt that it would defend South Korea against North Korean aggression. Such a contingency would likely draw U.S. forces from Europe and harm European economies, with a recent analysis estimating that a war on the Korean Peninsula would reduce global GDP by $4 trillion.

Growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean alignment exacerbates this strategic dilemma. China and Russia are increasing their military cooperation, including joint naval exercises in the South China Sea, a first-ever joint coast guard patrol in the Arctic, and a first-ever joint patrol near Alaska. Russia, for its part, fully supports China’s position on Taiwan, including any actions it takes “to protect its own sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to unify the country.” In June 2024, Russia and North Korea revived their Cold War alliance, which includes a mutual defense pledge. In exchange for providing Russia with valuable artillery shells, North Korea has likely secured assistance with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

A Path Forward

NATO will not expand to include any countries from the Indo-Pacific as members. There is no consensus within NATO that the alliance should become more active in the Indo-Pacific, and divisions remain on the extent to which China poses a fundamental challenge to European security. With war raging in Europe and many NATO members struggling to build up their defenses, now is not the time to take on additional obligations.

Nonetheless, NATO can contribute to Indo-Pacific security. First, NATO should begin to reckon with the potential that a conflict in the Indo-Pacific could force the United States to shift military assets from Europe to the Pacific, pushing NATO members to shoulder the burden of conventional deterrence and defense in Europe. As a practical matter, this would entail NATO members boosting defense spending, rebuilding defense industrial bases, and conducting operational planning accounting for a major U.S. military engagement in another region and a reduced presence in Europe.

Second, NATO members and Indo-Pacific partners should pursue tailored cooperation, heavily focusing on industrial cooperation. NATO, having come to recognize the importance of a healthy defense industry, should seek to improve interoperability and interchangeability in munitions and air and missile defense with its IP4 partners. Technology sharing and coproduction are also important. Greater compatibility would allow NATO members to assist the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies during a regional contingency, even if they were to refrain from direct involvement, and would similarly allow countries in the Indo-Pacific to bolster European security.

Third, NATO should publicly express the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and privately warn China that if it were to use force against Taiwan, its economic relationship with Europe would be permanently changed. The leaders of NATO countries can outline to their Chinese counterparts the crippling sanctions that would be imposed during a Taiwan contingency and the long-term technology and other export controls that would be put in place, regardless of the duration or outcome of a war.

Fourth, NATO should seek to counter China’s narrative that the alliance is fomenting conflict in the region, which has the potential to alienate NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners should it gain traction. In April 2024, China’s state-run media published an article that argued, “Where NATO goes, war is most likely.” China’s foreign ministry spokesman recently stated, “Wherever NATO shows up, turmoil and chaos will follow.” Beijing is attempting to link a greater NATO presence in the Indo-Pacific with the growing likelihood of conflict so that it can blame its aggressive actions on NATO, just as Russia sought to pin responsibility for its invasion of Ukraine on the alliance. NATO should explain that it has no plans to include countries in the region in the alliance. At the same time, its secretary-general should regularly meet with senior Chinese officials and explain how China’s actions are driving the alliance’s activities in the region.

A version of this piece originally appeared in the East-West Center’s Asia-Pacific Bulletin.

Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.

This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.

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cfr.org · by Thomas J. Bollyky



14. Industry ‘hamstrung’ by Space Force-intel community’s turf war


How can there be a turf war if we are fighting about space? (apologies for the attempt at humor).


Seriously, the only way to stop these turf wars is through leadership. Who is going to adjudicate this "war" and bring it to an end? Can there be an armistice between space and the IC? Someone is going to have to put their foot down (SECDEF wears large shoes I thnk).


Industry ‘hamstrung’ by Space Force-intel community’s turf war

Commercial firms say NGA-centric acquisition can’t move fast enough to help combatant commands or foster innovation.

defenseone.com

Industry ‘hamstrung’ by Space Force-intel community’s turf war - Defense One Skip to Content


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By Audrey Decker

Staff Writer

October 9, 2024

The space industry is waiting for the Space Force and intelligence community to come to an agreement over buying commercial satellite imagery and related analysis—a fight, some say, that is preventing troops from making the fullest use of orbital capabilities. 

Currently, the National Reconnaissance Office is in charge of buying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance imagery from commercial space providers, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in charge of purchasing analytic products. But in the five years since the Space Force was created, the young service has increasingly pushed for funds and leeway to work directly with commercial firms, arguing that it can more quickly get important information to combatant commands.

Earlier this year, Space Force launched a $40 million pilot program to show just how fast it could move information and insights from orbiting sensors to troops on ground. It began soliciting bids for “tactical surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking,” or TacSRT, through a “marketplace,” Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman told reporters last month. 

“What TacSRT is doing with this pilot in particular is: we simply ask a question into the marketplace: ‘Hey, what generally does it look like around Air Base 201? Are there any items of interest, trucks, that are massing? Is there a huge parking lot? Do we see people milling around?’ We simply ask the question. And commercial industry provides us products that try to help us answer the question,” he said.

Saltzman has emphasized that the pilot program buys analysis based on imagery but not images themselves, carefully skirting NRO’s territory.  

Executives with commercial space companies that have participated in the pilot’s marketplace call it revolutionary. Some jobs have moved from a work statement announcement to the start of a mission in as little as 24 to 72 hours. 

But these executives say that unless TacSRT gets more funding, and the intel community gives more leeway to the Space Force, commercial companies and combatant commands could suffer. 

Under the current NGA-centric process, it can take weeks for military analysts in a relatively quiet command—i.e., anywhere that’s not China, Ukraine, or the Middle East—to hear back on a request for satellite imagery, said Joe Morrison, the vice president of remote sensing at Umbra, which operates a synthetic aperture radar constellation and provides data to analytics firms in the TacSRT program. 

Morrison said the current system was designed to manage requests for a scarce number of very-high-quality, very-much-in-demand “national assets”—not to draw efficiently on commercial offerings to make sure all needs are met in timely fashion. He said this has discouraged analysts from even putting in a request for imagery or insights, which has artificially depressed apparent demand for them and has “hamstrung” Umbra’s ability to demonstrate its utility.

“If there's one way in which the inability for us as a nation to come to terms on Title 10 versus Title 50 has probably hurt Umbra—and really the commercial remote sensing industry in the United States more generally—is that we haven't been able to show how effective we can be as quickly as we were able technically because of the vestigial bureaucratic processes that are set up in order to avoid government waste, which is a good reason to set them up, but the reality on the ground is changing faster than those policies can change,” Morrison said. 

NGA officials have recently pushed back on allegations that the agency moves too slowly: “My inbox would be full of emails if we were failing in this regard—and it is not. I do not get negative reports from the COCOMs on our timelines,” NGA director Vice Adm. Frank Whitworth told reporters in August. 

Decision time

While officials in the intelligence community and Space Force generally agree that they will need to use commercial capability, especially in wartime, the entities still have to draw lines over who has tasking authority for specific situations and who is in charge of the COCOMs’ needs. And it’s not easy to change the culture of the intel community, which for decades has only been trusting systems made in-house.  

“It's only natural for an entity in the IC that's used to building really badass systems and is anointed on behalf of the entire government to do it, to bristle at the fact that someone else is going to come in and say they have a new way of doing things. For sure, there will be resistance when Space Force tries to scale it, if for nothing else other than it's going to require moving someone's cheese,” said Eric Jensen, CEO of ICEYE U.S., a subsidy of a Finnish SAR imagery provider that participates in the Space Force’s TacSRT program. 

Despite this reticence, Jensen said, there has to be policy change so the Space Force can provide surge capacity to the COCOMs when they need it—and to support commercial-space companies like his. 

“The question is: is the government going to continue to support the crossing of the chasm where these companies are able to truly operationalize their capabilities in a way that is well defined? I think that that's been painful for companies that, like us, can move very quickly, but are somewhat beholden to the government's bureaucratic timelines,” Jensen said.  

Programs like TacSRT are key to incubating space startups that can work quickly, said Derek Tishler, founder of analytics provider BoxMica, a five-person company whose 2024 revenue has largely come from TacSRT jobs.

“With a few million dollars, a half dozen or more companies like ours would flourish and imagine if it's a little bigger budget when it comes to things like TacSRT,” Tishler said. “The NRO might not be working at such a small contract level, or a lot of those organizations, so I really hope there's a place for both, and then they can meet in the middle ground where everyone gets a little bit more money and a little bit more opportunities.” 

He said he hopes the Space Force gets “a lot more leeway” to work directly with commercial firms. 

A potential compromise would see the NRO keep the high-resolution, exquisite capability and hand the tactical ISR mission to the Space Force, said Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. But that would likely require intervention by higher levels of government.

“I would think that is something the next administration should tackle and the National Space Council, but I'm not optimistic that they're going to reach any kind of a consensus on how to do this going forward in the near future, so I think we're going to be stuck in this bureaucratic paralysis where what's suffering is the Space Force's ability to do its job and the warfighters ability to leverage commercial space to the fullest extent,” Harrison said.

NEXT STORY: The D Brief: Baltics raise defenses; Israel orders hospital evacuations; Another Russian arms dump struck; New polls on Taiwan; And a bit more.

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defenseone.com




​15. Experts warn 'crazy busy' Atlantic hurricane season is far from over



Which means the conspiracy theorists will be 'crazy busy'. But who needs to listen to experts anyway (apologies for the sarcasm – these are serious threats – both the hurricanes and the disinformation from conspiracy theorists) ).



Experts warn 'crazy busy' Atlantic hurricane season is far from over

AP · October 11, 2024

Experts warn ‘crazy busy’ Atlantic hurricane season is far from over


1 of 7 |A USPS worker inspects trucks that had been relocated to protect them from wind but which are now underwater as intense rain from Hurricane Milton caused the Anclote River to flood, Friday, Oct. 11, 2024, in New Port Richey, Fla. (AP Photo/Mike Carlson)


AP · October 11, 2024


16. What I Didn’t Learn In Special Forces



Yes this is from the NRA journal so it will be panned by some. And others will pan this former SF soldier's analysis and exposure of myths.




An Official Journal Of The NRA | What I Didn’t Learn In Special Forces

shootingillustrated.com · by National Rifle Association

On the internet, where we debate anything and everything gun and self-defense related, a common refrain one will encounter is, “I know what I’m talking about. I served X amount of years in the service as such and such in wherever.” As a boy in the ‘80s and ‘90s, I took the advice of Special Operations veterans especially seriously and favored their insight above all others. I grew up and joined the Army and was privileged to serve most of my 20-year career as a Special Forces Soldier, often referred to as a Green Beret. Now that I’m retired and teaching private citizens and writing articles myself, I’ve got a different perspective than I did when I was a wide-eyed youth. I learned a great deal in my Special Forces career, but as I spent my off-duty time stateside as an armed private citizen, and especially once I retired and began training private citizens, I was struck by all the important knowledge I didn’t learn in Special Forces.

Self-Defense and the Law


If I were to teach and write based exclusively on my Special Forces training and experience, self-defense law in the US would be by far the largest gap in my relevant knowledge. Unfortunately, it is also among the most important areas of study for an armed citizen, second only to the fundamentals of safe gun handling. The first Special Operations Forces (SOF) Imperative is “Understand the operational environment.” In an overseas deployment, part of this was understanding the “rules of engagement” regarding under what conditions we were permitted to use what levels of force. In the US, we need to understand our operational environment in part by knowing our state and local laws and the general legal principles of self-defense. Not only will this keep us from overreacting and facing charges, but this will help us to recognize when the legal threshold for justifiable force has been met so we don’t underreact and put ourselves at a disadvantage when we need to protect ourselves.

In my Special Forces career I never received training on legal use-of-force for self-defense in the US. Fortunately, I recognized the need for it, and in addition to paying attention in my license-to-carry course, I sought out as much information as I could from relevant subject matter experts (SMEs). I read books and attended seminars from SMEs such as Massad Ayoob and others, spoke to my local peace officers and prosecutors within the district attorney’s office when the opportunity arose and worked very hard to gain an understanding of my unique operational environment as an armed private citizen.

If you’re seeking information about self-defense and use-of-force law, then it is important to understand that just because someone has Special Operations experience, that alone does not make their advice sound on this topic. If you ask them for the sources of their advice and they cite relevant, respected sources, then you can probably take their guidance seriously. If you ask them for sources and they reply with, “I was Special Forces/Force Recon/whatever, so I know what I’m talking about,” you probably should consider looking elsewhere for more reliable information.

Broad Weapons Expertise

This is the one many will find the most surprising. My Special Forces training and experience provided me with expertise, or at least familiarity, with an astoundingly broad range of military weaponry. I spent considerable time in my career using U.S. and foreign military rifles, handguns, sniper rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, mortars and just about everything else you can think of. However, almost none of those are relevant to the private citizen interested in personal protection, and the areas which are most relevant are probably the most limited.

A common sight on the battlefield. Thankfully, not a common sight in America.

Take handguns for example. In my career I carried and shot the Beretta 92, the 1911 and the Glock 26 and 19. That’s it. While special operations units typically put far more emphasis on pistol marksmanship than conventional units (which shoot pistols very little), the only types of pistols Special Forces taught me about were the ones it provided me to carry. So while my level of pistol shooting skill during my career was better than the typical gun owner, I was no more qualified to answer the question “What concealed carry pistol should I get?” than any other layman, if I was solely relying on my Special Forces training. This is worth remembering when soliciting advice about the strengths and weaknesses about specific guns from someone simply because they’re a Special Operations veteran. They may just recommend the handgun they know, which is the one issued to them, as I confidently did as a very young man (and cringe at the memory).

When I retired and wanted to begin teaching, I asked myself, “What don’t I know?” Two gaps I immediately identified in my knowledge base were revolvers and shotguns. My only exposure to shotguns in my military career was using short-barreled shotguns for breaching doors, and I had zero exposure to revolvers. Candidly, my Special Forces training had biased me to think, “Shotguns and revolvers are dumb, and everybody needs an AR-15 and a semi-automatic pistol that holds 15 to 18 rounds.”

Realizing that some people would come to me for private lessons with the shotguns and revolvers they already owned, I began taking as many open-enrollment shotgun and revolver classes as I could from relevant SMEs. I quickly realized that for the mission of the armed citizen, shotguns and revolvers are more than up for the task. It’s true I would not want to go into the mountains of Afghanistan with a 12-gauge pump shotgun and a six-shot .357 Mag. revolver, but that’s not what a private citizen arms themselves for, is it? If someone is sufficiently skilled and has a pump shotgun for home defense and a K-frame revolver for concealed carry out and about, they’ll be able to handle their business.

I’ve seen fellow special operations veterans make sweeping generalizations on the internet such as, “It’s a lot harder to teach someone to use a shotgun or a revolver than an AR-15 pattern rifle or a semi-auto pistol.” I used to think the same thing, but that was just because I didn’t know how to use them expertly myself, much less teach others to do so. It would have been easy for me to think, “As a Special Forces Soldier I don’t have any experience with these guns, therefore they’re dumb and useless for everyone, everywhere, all the time.” Fortunately, I’d collected quality mentors from various backgrounds over the years, who helped me see that Special Forces training and experience is only a slice of what’s out there, rather than being the final word on best practices for private citizens in Iowa, Oregon, or Georgia. So while a Special Operations veteran might know more than you about certain topics, that professional experience alone does not make someone an encyclopedic expert on all things guns in every area.

Concealed Carry… Sort Of

Yes, there is a gun in this photo.

In U.S. Army Special Forces, we frequently deploy to uncertain environments that are not combat zones, but where there is heightened risk. In some of these places we might carry concealed. At certain points in my career, this manifested itself as an authorization to carry in civilian clothes, but with no specific training and an expectation that we just figure it out. At other points in my career when I was doing more specialized work, I did receive quality training in how to carry concealed and learned a lot about quality gear and techniques through trial and error. That said, the vast majority of U.S. military troops don’t get any training or even professional experience at carrying concealed on the job. Even within Special Operations, it is something on which only a certain percentage of personnel are going to get training and experience.

Conclusion

Ultimately, I learned a great deal during my career that’s been helpful to me and to my students regarding concealed carry and the armed citizen lifestyle. I learned risk management, contingency planning, a decent level of pistol marksmanship, medical skills, training plan development and many other helpful skills. “Special Forces veteran” doesn’t translate to “expert at everything,” however. Don’t be afraid to ask a Special Operations veteran to explain the specific source of their knowledge, particularly when it comes to advice on non-Special Operations-specific topics like self-defense law, handgun selection, or concealed carry best practices. If they’re competent they’ll likely answer your questions without hesitation. If they fall back on the general, “I was in XYZ special operations unit,” and refuse to elaborate further, you might want to look elsewhere.

shootingillustrated.com · by National Rifle Association



​17. What International Law Says About Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon


Hopefully these issues are being thoroughly and objectively debated in PME institutions and graduate schools and undergraduate schools as well as within government policy making circles.


But the conclusion leads to the fundamental questions: Can "international law" be enforced? If so, how?


Excerpts:


It is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce international laws of war when nations disagree on how, or even whether, to act against violations.


The International Court of Justice allows lawsuits to be brought against states that are accused of violating specific treaties, like the genocide charges that South Africa has lodged over Israel’s military operations in Gaza.


Were a case to be referred to the international court over its military operations in Lebanon, Judge Ambos said, Israel could refuse to comply with the outcome. That would potentially send the legal dispute to the Security Council to be enforced.

The U.N. General Assembly could also be asked to seek a resolution, said Professor Hathaway. But it does not have the authority to take action against Israel except to call on member states to do so.


“The question is, who will enforce this?” Judge Ambos said.


That doesn’t mean international law is without value. The laws, he said, impose moral standards to protect civilians that no state would admit to have willingly violated. “Are we better off or worse off with these mechanisms, even if they are not enforced?” Judge Ambos said. “Without these laws, we would be worse. The law is there, and the state must at least justify its actions.”


What International Law Says About Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon

Explaining the issues of sovereignty, self-defense and humanitarian safeguards.


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The aftermath on Friday of an overnight strike in the Ras el-Nabaa neighborhood in central Beirut that killed at least 22 people and wounded more than 100.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times


By Lara Jakes

Lara Jakes writes about global conflicts and diplomacy.

Oct. 12, 2024



Since the start of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon last month, debate has swirled regarding the wisdom of Israel’s two-front strategy amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza, the threat that the fight against Hezbollah poses to civilians and the risk it could ignite a regional war with Iran.

But perhaps even more fundamental is the question of whether Israel’s invasion is legal under international law.

Israel says that it has the right to defend itself, citing a year of rocket attacks by Hezbollah from Lebanese territory. Some of its critics disagree.

“Legality is very much in the eye of the beholder,” said Hugh Lovatt, an expert on international law and armed conflict at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Does Israel’s right to self-defense trump Lebanon’s right to sovereignty? We can go around and around this circle.”

Additionally, some experts say, self-defense has its legal limits, especially if Israel’s use of force in Lebanon is disproportionate to the threat it faces or if it fails to prioritize the protection of civilians.

“You have a right to self-defense, but you have to exercise this self-defense in a certain way,” said Judge Kai Ambos, a law professor at the University of Göttingen in Germany, who serves on a special tribunal at The Hague that prosecutes war crimes committed in Kosovo during the 1990s. “It’s not limitless.”

Determining the legality of Israel’s invasion can be murky, the experts said, allowing for a wide range of interpretation that, in most cases, would have to be settled by a court or the United Nations Security Council. But it is rare for courts or the Security Council to address these types of questions, and if they did, the process would be unlikely to yield a swift conclusion — or any at all.

Here is a look at some of the legal questions surrounding Israel’s invasion.

Image


An Israeli Army vehicle near the country’s northern border with Lebanon on Thursday. Some experts say self-defense has its legal limits.Credit...Amir Levy/Getty Images

What does international law say?

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter “prohibits the threat or use of force and calls on all members to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of other states.” But Article 51 of the charter also makes clear that member states have a right to defend themselves from armed attacks.

There are more complications. Lebanon is a sovereign state, but Israel says it is fighting against Hezbollah, which is both a militant group and an influential player in Lebanon’s government. (Israel and the United States consider it a terrorist organization.)


Hezbollah was founded in the 1980s, with help from Iran, to fight Israel’s occupation of Lebanon at the time. Israel and Hezbollah have been in violent conflict ever since, including a bloody war in 2006 that also saw Israel invade Lebanon.

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Most recently, after Hamas led the Oct. 7 terrorist attacks on Israel last year, Hezbollah began firing rockets and missiles at Israel in solidarity with Hamas, its ally. Israel returned fire, and the two sides carried out nearly a year of tit-for-tat exchanges. Civilians and combatants in Israel and Lebanon were killed, and between Oct. 7 and the Israeli invasion more than 150,000 people were displaced on both sides of the border.

Some experts say the invasion is legal because Lebanon allows Hezbollah to use its territory to strike Israel.

In light of the Hezbollah rocket and missile attacks, “Israel has the legal right to take self-defense measures against Hezbollah, and probably also against the Lebanese State,” Amichai Cohen and Yuval Shany, two Israeli law professors, wrote in an essay published on Friday for the Lieber Institute for Law and Warfare at the United States Military Academy.


In an email to The New York Times, Mr. Shany said that the United States and its allies had used similar reasoning to “operate in Syria against ISIS and in a number of other countries who had Al Qaeda presence.”

“As we note in our piece," he added, “the case for self-defense in Lebanon is even stronger.”

Image


Taking cover in Metula, Israel, on Thursday after sirens warned of rockets fired from Lebanon. Credit...Sergey Ponomarev for The New York Times

The U.N. charter says that the right to self-defense is valid only “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” The Council has tried — and largely failed — to secure a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah since 2006, the previous time Israel launched a ground invasion in Lebanon.

A Security Council resolution that year prohibited foreign forces from entering Lebanon without the government’s consent. Some U.N. officials have declared the current ground invasion a “violation of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and a panel of U.N. experts said it amounted to “Israel’s latest breach of international law.”

But that same 2006 resolution also ordered Hezbollah to leave a buffer zone in southern Lebanon where the United Nations deployed peacekeepers to prevent further conflict with Israel. Hezbollah did not leave, and the U.N. peacekeepers have been unable to stop its frequent rocket attacks on Israel over the past year.

(A U.N. peacekeeping mission operating along Lebanon’s border has come under Israeli fire twice this past week, U.N. officials have said.)

Humanitarian legal protections

Separate from questions about the legality of Israel’s invasion, every country has a legal obligation to safeguard civilians during warfare.

Even if Hezbollah places military targets in civilian buildings, for example, experts say Israel must consider the safety of the noncombatants inside when it conducts airstrikes. (International law does not distinguish between ground invasions and airstrikes — the measure is “use of force,” according to Oona A. Hathaway, a professor of international law at Yale University.)

The United Nations says more than 1,500 people have been killed in Lebanon by the Israeli military in the past two weeks, including hundreds of deaths in a single day in September, during one of the most intense air raids in recent warfare.

“While it is difficult to make definitive legal assessments of individual attacks from far away,” said Janina Dill, the co-director of the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, in an email, “the use of heavy explosives in densely populated areas of Lebanon and attacks against residential buildings where Hezbollah militants are suspected to hide, which have caused hundreds of casualties, many of them women and children civilians, raise very serious concerns about compliance with these rules.”

Nearly one million people have been forced to flee their homes in Lebanon, a humanitarian crisis that many fear will soon rival the one in Gaza.

Humanitarian laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions, require military forces to give civilians ample warning to flee before attacking. Israel has issued evacuation alerts for large sections of south Lebanon, though, in some cases, it has given people as little as two hours to leave their homes before striking.

Israel is also required to consider whether displaced people can be relocated safely. For example, the United Nations says more than 250,000 people have fled from Lebanon to Syria, which is still ravaged from a civil war that began in 2011.

Image


Relatives and friends at the funeral of Fatima Abdullah, 9, in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, after she was killed in pager explosions last month.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times

Enforcing the law

It is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce international laws of war when nations disagree on how, or even whether, to act against violations.

The International Court of Justice allows lawsuits to be brought against states that are accused of violating specific treaties, like the genocide charges that South Africa has lodged over Israel’s military operations in Gaza.

Were a case to be referred to the international court over its military operations in Lebanon, Judge Ambos said, Israel could refuse to comply with the outcome. That would potentially send the legal dispute to the Security Council to be enforced.

The U.N. General Assembly could also be asked to seek a resolution, said Professor Hathaway. But it does not have the authority to take action against Israel except to call on member states to do so.

“The question is, who will enforce this?” Judge Ambos said.

That doesn’t mean international law is without value. The laws, he said, impose moral standards to protect civilians that no state would admit to have willingly violated. “Are we better off or worse off with these mechanisms, even if they are not enforced?” Judge Ambos said. “Without these laws, we would be worse. The law is there, and the state must at least justify its actions.”

Image


Multiple airstrikes targeted the southern suburbs of Beirut last Sunday.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times

Lara Jakes, based in Rome, reports on diplomatic and military efforts by the West to support Ukraine in its war with Russia. She has been a journalist for nearly 30 years. More about Lara Jakes

A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 13, 2024, Section A, Page 8 of the New York edition with the headline: Is Israel’s Lebanon Invasion Legal? Here’s What International Law Says.. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

See more on: Israel-Hamas War News, Hezbollah



18. There’s a solution to the Army’s enduring gap in its extended-range artillery fire



A 5 page report from Rheinmetall can be downloaded here: "Outgunned, outranged: The Ukraine was shows hwere fires modenization is neeededf https://info.breakingdefense.com/hubfs/GAMECHANGER_Artillery_Rheinmetall_Breaking_Defense.pdf 


Consider this commercial report along with "Time to Move Beyond Cannons,"  by L. Lance Boothe (ACCESS HERE) Do the math.



There’s a solution to the Army’s enduring gap in its extended-range artillery fire - Breaking Defense​

Less artillery range is always going to be a losing proposition against an adversary with longer-range firepower.

breakingdefense.com · by Breaking Defense · October 11, 2024

It’s not often that anyone would think of the U.S. as being outgunned in this day and age, but in the realm of artillery it’s likely true. While most NATO countries, much of Europe, and near-peer adversaries like Russia and China went to longer L52 cannon barrels years ago that provide greater range, the U.S. Army still uses and only manufactures the smaller L39 barrel that provides what can only be called “last-generation” capability for 155mm field guns.

Download this Game Changer article to read how the DoD’s artillery gap can be addressed with a system in production today that can also be manufactured in the U.S.


breakingdefense.com · by Breaking Defense · October 11, 2024



19. 'A lot ... at once': Army cyber and network officials take stock 1 year after organizational shuffle


It is all about the network. It is arguably one of the keys or foundational elements to current and future warfighting.





'A lot ... at once': Army cyber and network officials take stock 1 year after organizational shuffle - Breaking Defense

Last year, PEO C3T and PEO IEW&S absorbed several programs from the PEO Enterprise Information Systems (EIS), in hopes of better orienting the land forces for the fights of the future.

breakingdefense.com · by Carley Welch · October 11, 2024

Gen. Ed Barker (PEO IEW&S) and Mark Kitz (PEO C3N) speak on an AUSA Global Force panel in March 2024. (Photo by US Army – PEO IEW&S/ Facebook)

WASHINGTON — It’s been a little over a year since the Army took its three network and cyber Program Executive Offices, rearranged their teams, and emerged with two new offices, ideally set to meet the requirements of modern warfighting.

In Pentagon bureaucracy terms, a year isn’t actually that long. But speaking to Breaking Defense in recent weeks, the leaders of the two offices say the reorganization has helped the service create a more holistic environment where warfighters can better communicate with each other — though not without a few bumps in the road.

“It really kind of tested a lot of our theories and a lot of our premises on our organizational agility and our talent management. It probably stressed them to the point where we realized that we’re doing the right thing,” Gen. Ed Barker, program executive officer of the Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors told Breaking Defense.

“But, man, it was a lot to throw at us at once,” he said.

As of Oct. 1 of last year, Program Executive Office C3-Tactical (PEO C3T) and PEO IEW&S absorbed several programs from the PEO Enterprise Information Systems (EIS), which was slimmed down and now is officially known as PEO Enterprise.

(As a sign of how things are still fluid, PEO C3T this week rebranded as the Program Executive Office for Command, Control and Communications-Networks, PEO C3N, which is how the office will be referred to in this story.)

PEO C3N absorbed the Integrated Enterprise Networks program from PEO Enterprise and its four product management offices: base emergency communications system, global enterprise network modernization-Americas, global enterprise network modernization-OCONUS and wideband enterprise satellite systems. The office also took charge of the enterprise service’s enterprise identity, credential and access management (ICAM) and allied information technology, the latter being part of the EIS’s defensive cyber operations (DCO) portfolio.

Meanwhile, the PEO IEW&S took over the rest of the DCO portfolio: the technology application office, the cyber analytics and detection program and the cyber platforms and systems program.

Basically, IEW&S now houses all of the Army’s cyber efforts from a PEO standpoint, while C3N houses all of the Army’s network efforts. It’s a streamlining that, both men say, better reflects how the service actually operates.

C3N Closer to Standing up an Army Unified Network

A year in, Mark Kitz, program executive officer of C3N, said that his office has seen real movements towards the Army’s goal of creating a unified network — breaking down the dozens of siloed legacy networks, mostly separated by tactical and enterprise portions, to create a more cohesive singular network.

Or, as Kitz describes it, “having the enterprise network and the tactical network integrated into one organization so we can gain efficiencies and deliver a better product to our army customer.”

Kitz is open, however, that the direction from here is not always clear, especially when identifying and creating new opportunities to uphold this unified network.

“This vision of a unified network is very ambitious. For a very long time, the Army has been building tactical and enterprise infrastructure in two very different ways,” he said. “And so how do we identify those opportunities? How do we identify the challenges, and how do we identify the roadblocks?”

Another challenge in creating this unified network is the geographic distance between soldiers. Kitz said he is working on “improving how my organization is geospatially dispersed, how we build a culture that incentivizes getting after one Army network,” which includes both enterprise and tactical elements.

While the unified network is his major overarching focus, Kitz pointed to a number of efforts his office has helped guide over the last year that he sees as wins. Those include pushing forward on software-defined networking, where networks are put together digitally instead of relying on hardware, like switches and routers, to manage the system.

“This software-defined network capability could really be a potential game changer for not just how the enterprise solution interfaces with DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency) and the DODIN (DoD Information Network) and our network, but how tactical users can now really diversify the way they enter into the network,” Kitz said.

“As we deliver this capability, over the next year, we’ll be able to integrate not just the enterprise users, but also our tactical systems, our tactical users,” he added.

This should allow users to access their usual network regardless of their geographic location, he said.

One other area of improvement Kitz has seen since the reorganization is with the C3N’s ICAM project, which is a capability designed to help build the Army’s unified network by creating a secure environment for authorized users to access the data they need when they need it.

“This is one of those programs where we have a separate material solution for tactical and enterprise. And so by consolidating under one organization, now we have an integrated approach on how we plan to deliver access management,” Kitz said. “Whether that’s a tactical user who may or may not have a persistent network, or an enterprise user leveraging the enterprise capabilities delivered by PEO EIS. That is one sort of example where the enterprise and tactical network are converging on a single architecture.”

IEW&S Developing Stronger Relationships

As the IEW&S has become the PEO responsible for the Army’s entire cyber portfolio, the office has developed stronger communications with Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) and the joint force’s Cyber Command. The IEW&S was responsible for the offensive cyber operations in the service, and is now also responsible for defensive cyber operations after the reorganization.

Barker added that he’s “really realized efficiencies of having [the] offensive and defensive cyber operations under one PEO, and how that relates to our relationship with Cyber Command [and] ARCYBER as well.”

The “integration of [defensive cyber operations] is going, going really, really smooth, and they’re just really part of the family now. The offense, you know, informs the defense, and defense informs offense,” he said.

There was no “terrible surprise” during the transition process, Barker said, but he acknowledged one wrinkle that was more work than expected: learning to work defensive operations with ARCYBER while CYBERCOM was also undergoing its own major effort in standing up the Joint Cyber Warfare Architecture.

“When you’re juggling that level of change internally to us, that level of change — when it comes to Cyber Command and bracing their new authorities, and, oh, by the way, operating in the cyberspace, both from an offensive and defensive standpoint, and the pace associated with the threat in those spaces — it is dynamic,” Barker said.

Still, aside from the stress it put on the system, Barker sees positives from the relationship between his PEO shop and CYBERCOM, and the fact they went through a transition together.

“We’ve been able to help Cyber Command as they’ve kind of navigated this new mission and growth and what they want things to look like when it comes to the different joint capabilities that they have to provide,” Barker said. “Then the other part of that is that continued relationship with Army Cyber because while Cyber Command is standing up, there’s going to be, think of it in terms of putting a ‘j’ for ‘joint’ in front of, you know, a lot of programs, like the joint development environment and things like that.”

‘Joined At The Hip’

Barker said as the Army moves forward in adopting its unified network plan and its Next Generation Command and Control initiative — the service’s plan to create an integrated C2 structure focusing on data centricity “at every echelon,” which will serve as the data transport portion of the unified network — his office and the C3N must stay in constant communication with each other.

“Anything we do on this, on the cyber, on the defensive cyber front, specifically, is tightly linked with PEO C3N,” Barker said. He said that IEW&S and C3N are “joined at the hip when it comes to making sure that anything we’re doing in, kind of, the day-to-day space matches to where they need to go from a future standpoint.”

Kitz echoed the importance of this relationship between the two offices, but also made the bigger point of being in close contact with other forces as well, especially when it comes to standing up the DoD’s sprawling Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) program, which works to create an all-seeing, all-connected battle network.

“I have very close relationships with the Navy and the Air Force, and specifically on how we interoperate data. How are we sharing data? How are we defining how we’re going to share data? Because in the end, that network is going to provide a pathway, but if I get a pathway to a data that I can’t use or consume, that’s meaningless, right?” Kitz said.

“So really trying to foster these joint relationships between the PEOs and CDAO (Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office) has become a big part of this conversation. How do I meaningfully understand the situation between the joint forces? So the PEOs are really trying to define and ensure that we can interoperate,” he added.

breakingdefense.com · by Carley Welch · October 11, 2024



​20. The CIA is openly recruiting foreign spies in other countries


As our adversaries are trying to do in the US.


Spy vs Spy


For those of us who recall Mad Magazine:

​




The CIA is openly recruiting foreign spies in other countries

theweek.com · by Justin Klawans, The Week US

The CIA is openly recruiting foreign spies in other countries | The Week



"We want to make sure individuals in other authoritarian regimes know that we're open for business"


By Justin Klawans, The Week US

published 11 October 2024

Secrecy and security are hallmarks of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but the organization has now started performing one of its key duties out in the open: recruiting foreign spies. The agency has now released instructions in non-English languages for people in other countries who want to work as CIA informants.

The instructions are an attempt by the CIA to solicit information from authoritarian countries without putting American spies at risk or jeopardizing the lives of people living in these nations. But the success of this recruiting program could depend on a variety of international factors.

What are the CIA's new recruiting instructions?

The agency provided online instructions on "how to securely contact CIA via our public and Dark Web sites," the CIA said in a press release, advising people to use either a virtual private network (VPN) or the anonymous browser Tor. The instructions are available in Farsi, Mandarin and Korean. The agency is posting these instructions on Telegram, a social media network often used in authoritarian countries, as well as Facebook, X, Instagram, LinkedIn and YouTube. It asks for people to send any useful information to the CIA, though it also cautions not to use any names associated with real identities.

These instructions are "just one way in which CIA is adapting to a new global environment of increased state repression and global surveillance," the agency said. Recruiting efforts of this nature have been "successful in Russia, and we want to make sure individuals in other authoritarian regimes know that we're open for business."

The instructions' three languages are widely used in countries under authoritarian regimes; Farsi is "spoken by more than 100 million people in Iran and nearby countries, while Mandarin, with more than 1 billion speakers, is the majority language in China," according to NBC News. Additionally, providing the instructions in Korean will potentially allow people in North Korea to contact the CIA.

How could this affect authoritarian regimes?

The United States' push for foreign intelligence is unsurprising as China "expands cooperation with Russia and Iran and flexes its regional military muscle," said Reuters. In particular, Russia, Iran, North Korea and China — countries that are all being targeted by the CIA's recruiting efforts — are "known within the U.S. intelligence community as 'hard targets' — countries whose governments are difficult to penetrate." At the same time, the U.S. is "grappling with Iran's conflict with Israel, its nuclear program, its growing links with Russia and its support for militant proxies."

The most notable of the intelligence-gathering efforts might be in China, where the "CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies have faced questions about their broader collection capabilities," said Bloomberg, citing a 2017 report from The New York Times claiming that China had broken up several CIA spying operations. China has "ramped up efforts in recent years to warn the public, government workers and even university students about foreign espionage efforts," practices that have also been seen in Russia.

It is unclear how useful these U.S. efforts will be in all of these authoritarian countries — particularly North Korea. The CIA is "basing this off the success they had in Russia — but I would question how effective this will be considering most North Koreans don't have access to the internet," Mason Richey, an international politics professor at South Korea's Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, said to the BBC.

Explore More

Government CIA Spy United States Russia china





De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 


De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com



If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:


"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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