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Quotes of the Day:
“A poem cannot stop a bullet. A novel can’t defuse a bomb. But we are not helpless. We can sing the truth and name the liars.”
– Salman Rushdie
“Much of what are called ‘social problems’ consists of the fact that intellectuals have theories that do not fit the real world. From this they conclude that it is the real world which is wrong and needs changing.”
– Thomas Sowell
“We believe politics is the way you live your life not who you support.”
– Abbie Hoffman
1. FM Cho says S. Korea's engagement with China aligns with U.S. interests
2. S. Korea, China hold maritime talks amid tensions over steel structures in Yellow Sea
3. Acting president visits joint warfighting headquarters between S. Korean, U.S. forces
4. Han Duck-soo’s Risky Negotiation With Donald Trump
5. S. Korea's new gov't may have to deal with U.S. 'strategic flexibility' over USFK: U.S. expert
6. Trump Jr. to visit S. Korea next week at invitation of Shinsegae chairman
7. UNC contacted N. Korea over repatriation of 2 aboard drifting boat: minister
8. Bessent calls for allies' stronger defense commitments ahead of trade talks with S. Korea
9. Rubio describes N. Korea as 'nuclear armed' country
10. Dismissal of U.S. envoy for North Korean human rights signals State Department overhaul
11. Ex-US intel official softens stance on ROK nuclear armament amid growing threats
12. The New North Korea: How Geopolitical Advantages and Growing Middle Class Prosperity Challenge the Next South Korean President
13. U.S. military WMD response team conducts first-ever exercise in Korea
14. Breaking point: School expenses spark rare public complaints from N. Korean parents
15. U.S. delivering 'more forward' Indo-Pacific force posture to deter China: Pentagon chief
16. How Japan’s plan for single Asian theater risks overlooking North Korean threats
17. South Korea launches spy satellite from US space base
1. FM Cho says S. Korea's engagement with China aligns with U.S. interests
But South Korea has already (and always) chosen the US because it has a mutual defense treaty with the US. Not with China. And China showed its true colors in 2017 with its intensive economic warfare campaign against the ROK which it successfully defeated.
And we must not forget China's disrespect for ROK sovereignty due to the subversive activities of the United Front Work Department
FM Cho says S. Korea's engagement with China aligns with U.S. interests | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 23, 2025
SEOUL, April 23 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul said Wednesday South Korea's engagement with China aligns with the United States' interests in many ways, and no country wants to see U.S.-China strategic competition become a "zero-sum game."
The minister made the remarks in his congratulatory speech at the Asan Plenum, a security forum hosted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, as the Donald Trump administration ramps up competition with China, including through the imposition of hefty tariffs.
South Korea maintains high-profile relations with both countries, upholding a military alliance with Washington while maintaining its largest trade relationship with Beijing.
"It is no secret that countries in the region don't want to be in a position of having to choose between Washington and China," Cho said, adding that South Korea is no exception.
"Nor do they want to see U.S.-China strategic competition become a zero-sum game," he noted, stressing that "in many ways, I believe our engagement with China aligns with U.S. interests."
The minister said South Korea's foreign policy priority lies first and foremost in the robust alliance with the U.S., and China does not contest this.
In dealing with China, however, South Korea will seek candid dialogue and openly express differences on issues where the two countries hold divergent views, such as those concerning the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea, he said.
Speaking on ways to prevent a lapse in the momentum of advancing South Korea-Japan relations, the minister said both countries should seriously reflect on what went wrong in the past.
The best way to open up a better future is to change one's own perception and attitude, encouraging the other side to follow suit, rather than waiting for the other party to change first, he said.
Delivering a separate speech during the forum, Japanese envoy to South Korea Koichi Mizushima stressed the growing importance of South Korea-Japan cooperation, citing increasing international security uncertainties in the region, as Seoul is scheduled to elect a new president in June.
Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul delivers congratulatory remarks during the Asan Plenum, hosted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul on April 22, 2025. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 23, 2025
2. S. Korea, China hold maritime talks amid tensions over steel structures in Yellow Sea
A physical example of China encroaching on ROK sovereignty.
(LEAD) S. Korea, China hold maritime talks amid tensions over steel structures in Yellow Sea | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 23, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES with latest info throughout)
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, April 23 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and China held a working-level maritime dialogue in Seoul on Wednesday, diplomatic sources said, as tensions are building up over a set of steel structures Beijing has installed in their overlapping waters in the Yellow Sea.
The talks come after the two countries engaged in a standoff in February in the Provisional Maritime Zone (PMZ) near South Korea's southwest coast, when Chinese authorities blocked a South Korean ship from inspecting a steel structure China installed in the area.
The PMZ covers an overlapping sea zone in their maritime boundaries, known as the Exclusive Economic Zones. The two countries signed an agreement in 2000 to allow their fishing vessels to operate there and jointly manage marine resources, while prohibiting any activities beyond navigation and fishing.
China insisted it was a commercial fish farm that Seoul had no right to search.
China installed two semi-submersible buoys in 2018 and 2024 in the PMZ. It also built a fixed steel structure in 2022, believed to be a repurposed decommissioned oil rig.
Participants of the Korean Veterans Association hold a rally in Seoul calling for the demolition of Chinese steel structures in the overlapping waters in the Yellow Sea on April 21, 2025. (Yonhap)
Beijing claims the two floating installations are fish farms to grow salmon, and the fixed structure, equipped with a helicopter landing pad, was built as an aquaculture management facility.
However, China's installations of the structures, potentially in violation of the agreement, has prompted Seoul to address the issue more assertively, given China's track record of territorial disputes with the Philippines in the South China Sea and with Japan in the East China Sea.
At Wednesday's talks, Seoul was expected to raise the issue to reinforce its calls for ensuring stability in the PMZ. Seoul has stressed that no Chinese activities in the overlapping waters should affect its "legitimate and lawful" maritime rights.
On Monday, Oceans Minister Kang Do-hyung said that relevant government agencies are reviewing all possible options, including reciprocal measures, to address the issue.
"We are taking this matter very seriously, especially from the standpoint of the importance of the issue and the need to defend our maritime territory," Kang said in a press briefing.
"We are reviewing a wide range of possible responses, including proportional measures ... that can be effectively implemented," he said.
Kang said earlier that the government will begin the process to allocate a budget to install an aquaculture facility as a countermeasure.
On Monday, Kang said that no decision has been made yet.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 23, 2025
3. Acting president visits joint warfighting headquarters between S. Korean, U.S. forces
As he should because he is a part of both countries National Command and MIlitary Authorities (NCMA) that provides the strategic guidance and control (through the Military Committee) of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. The ROK/US CFC belongs equally to the ROK and the US. It is NOT a US warfighting headquarters. It is a ROK and US warfighting HQ.
Acting president visits joint warfighting headquarters between S. Korean, U.S. forces | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · April 23, 2025
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, April 23 (Yonhap) -- Acting President Han Duck-soo visited a joint warfighting headquarters between South Korean and U.S. military forces Wednesday and emphasized the allies' unwavering combined defense posture, Han's office said.
Han held a meeting with U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson during his visit to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, about 65 kilometers south of Seoul, where the allies' Combined Forces Command is located, according to the office.
Han also expressed gratitude to the South Korean and U.S. soldiers who assisted efforts to put out the deadly wildfires that ravaged the country's southeastern regions last month.
Acting president visits S. Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command
Acting President and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo (5th from L, front) poses for a group photo with South Korean and U.S. troops during a visit to the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command at U.S. Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, about 60 kilometers south of Seoul, on April 23, 2025, in this photo released by Han's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
"I came here to encourage the South Korean and U.S. forces committed to safeguarding peace on the Korean Peninsula, but seeing your passion and dedication, I find myself to be the one who is truly comforted and uplifted," he said, introducing himself as a "former Army sergeant of the Republic of Korea."
Han urged the troops to "remain united" as they are now, calling Camp Humphreys a "symbol of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and its unwavering combined defense posture."
Acting President Han Duck-soo stresses the importance of maintaining a strong combined defense posture during his visit to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, about 65 kilometers south of Seoul, on April 23, 2025, in this photo provided by Han's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · April 23, 2025
4. Han Duck-soo’s Risky Negotiation With Donald Trump
Excerpts:
The South Korean ministers of finance and trade are heading to Washington to meet their counterparts this week. Although it is the administration’s responsibility to tackle the significant issues such as the tariff war launched by the U.S., the current unelected ministers should coordinate Seoul’s approach on the issue with the elected lawmakers in the National Assembly – especially those in the main opposition Democratic Party, considering the high chance of that former DP leader Lee Jae-myung will become the next president of South Korea. If so, it will be Lee’s decision, not Han’s, how to negotiate with Trump.
If Han is considering running in the presidential election, he should immediately resign and pull out of the tariff negotiations with the Trump administration. Unelected Cabinet members whose government has officially been impeached should not rush to sign a deal with the United States but should use their resources fully in activating the communication channels in Washington. This would help the next administration work with the second Trump administration smoothly as the 90-day pause on the reciprocal tariffs draws to a close.
Han Duck-soo’s Risky Negotiation With Donald Trump
Han and his ministers are rushing to sign a trade deal with Washington, but their primary job as an acting government is to maintain a status quo.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/han-duck-soos-risky-negotiation-with-donald-trump/
By Mitch Shin
April 22, 2025
South Korean Acting President Han Duck-soo holds a phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump on Apr. 8, 2025.
Credit: Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Republic of Korea
Both times Donald Trump assumed office as the president of the United States, he could not immediately work with his counterpart in South Korea. In 2017, Park Geun-hye, the first conservative president who was removed from office, was in the midst of the impeachment process when Trump took the presidency. In an eerie case of deja vu, the same was true when Trump took the oath a second time, only this time the conservative president undergoing an impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court was Yoon Suk-yeol. In April, Yoon officially became the second president to be removed from office in South Korea’s history due to his illegitimate declaration of martial law.
With Yoon’s government scrapped, South Korea could not effectively respond when Trump launched a massive tariff war against countries around the world, including U.S. allies.
Against this backdrop, South Korea’s Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who is now the acting president of the country, had a 28-minute call with Trump on April 8 – the first contact between Trump 2.0 and a South Korean leader. In the call, Han showed his willingness not to “fight back” against U.S. tariffs. However, within South Korea there is mounting criticism toward Han’s U.S. diplomacy, due to his current role and capacity.
Han is not an elected official; he was appointed to the prime minister post by Yoon. South Korea will hold a snap presidential election on June 3. Whoever wins the election will assume office immediately – meaning it is the new president, not Han, who will deal with Trump’s tariff war.
In an effort to cut the U.S. trade deficit, Trump announced on April 2 that he will impose “reciprocal tariffs” against countries that have supposedly undermined the U.S. for decades and have stolen the country’s wealth. Among the slate of reciprocal tariffs imposed on more than 60 countries (including China and Japan), South Korea was hit with a 25 percent rate. However, a week later Trump announced a pause on all the reciprocal tariffs (except for those on China) for 90 days, but maintained 10 percent “universal” tariffs on all U.S. imports.
South Korea has a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States, meaning it does not charge a substantial levy on U.S. products. Even so, the country’s trade surplus with the U.S. reached a record $55 billion last year.
In an interview with the Financial Times published on April 20, Han said he will not fight back against U.S. tariffs. In doing so, he effectively laid down some of Seoul’s bargaining chips in the negotiations with Washington. Instead, Han expressed appreciation for the support South Korea received from the United States in the wake of the 1950-53 Korean War, noting that the U.S. helped South Korea become a wealthy country in the past decades.
The opposition has criticized Han for overstepping his authority. Kim Hyun-chong, the former trade minister who is now a special adviser on foreign affairs and national security for the Democratic Party, demanded that Han not rush to seal a deal and instead let the next administration handle it.
Critics say that Han should focus on managing the elections and maintaining the status quo – the crucial task for an acting president who will leave office soon. However, his interview with the Financial Times only snowballed concerns over Han’s authority to negotiate with the Trump administration. Han has limited the next president’s options by saying that he will not fight back against U.S. tariffs.
But perhaps the more worrisome part is Han’s political ambitions.
Upon his interview with the Financial Times, Han would not rule out the possibility of running for the June 3 presidential election. Asked whether he would run, Han said he had not yet made a decision and replied “no comment” to a reporter pushing him on whether he was considering a bid. This has fueled the anger among the public as the primary task for the acting president is managing the snap presidential election as a “referee,” meaning Han should have clearly drawn a line between him and the election. But he rather chose to hold open the possibility of joining the race himself. In that light, his moves to negotiate with Trump can be seen as efforts to achieve political outcomes before running for the election.
The primary elections of the ruling People Power Party kicked off last week. Han missed the window for registering as a PPP candidate, but it is possible that Han could register to run for the presidential race as an independent, with the goal of becoming the unified conservative candidate. According to polls, Han is among the top presidential candidates who is supported by the conservatives. This idea has been floated by the conservative side, and some of the PPP’s preliminary presidential candidates have welcomed the notion of a unity bid.
The South Korean ministers of finance and trade are heading to Washington to meet their counterparts this week. Although it is the administration’s responsibility to tackle the significant issues such as the tariff war launched by the U.S., the current unelected ministers should coordinate Seoul’s approach on the issue with the elected lawmakers in the National Assembly – especially those in the main opposition Democratic Party, considering the high chance of that former DP leader Lee Jae-myung will become the next president of South Korea. If so, it will be Lee’s decision, not Han’s, how to negotiate with Trump.
If Han is considering running in the presidential election, he should immediately resign and pull out of the tariff negotiations with the Trump administration. Unelected Cabinet members whose government has officially been impeached should not rush to sign a deal with the United States but should use their resources fully in activating the communication channels in Washington. This would help the next administration work with the second Trump administration smoothly as the 90-day pause on the reciprocal tariffs draws to a close.
Authors
Contributing Author
Mitch Shin
Mitch Shin is a chief correspondent for The Diplomat, covering the Korean Peninsula.
5. S. Korea's new gov't may have to deal with U.S. 'strategic flexibility' over USFK: U.S. expert
We have to deal with the world as it really is and not as we wish it would be. The US has multiple challenges that it must address and it requires the flexible US of all its instruments of power to include all of its military force whenever and wherever they are required. Stovepiping and segregating the challenges is the path to failure. We must be able to take a holistic approach to strategic planning to include with our allies against mutual threats.
Strategic flexibility is not in any way a reduction of the US commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty. It is a recognition of reality and the facts of life. It is in fact an embodiment of the Mutual Defense Treaty (it never mentions north Korea, only threats in the Pacific region).
S. Korea's new gov't may have to deal with U.S. 'strategic flexibility' over USFK: U.S. expert | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 23, 2025
By Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, April 23 (Yonhap) -- The next South Korean administration will likely have to deal with the United States' "strategic flexibility" over American troops stationed in the country as Washington seeks to reorient defense capabilities for a possible Taiwan contingency, a U.S. expert said Wednesday.
Victor Cha, Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, raised the possibility of South Korea's next administration potentially being faced with the U.S. troops in Korea being used for contingencies outside of the country as it did during the 2003 Iraq war.
"I think the hard thing for the next administration is they'll have to deal with strategic flexibility again," he said at a news conference on the sidelines of a security forum in Seoul.
"Given the way the Trump administration has talked about repositioning U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific to be able to win a fight in Taiwan against China, this is, I think, going to raise the question of strategic flexibility again on the Korean Peninsula."
Victor Cha, Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, attends a security forum hosted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies at a hotel in central Seoul on April 23, 2025. (Yonhap)
Meanwhile, Cha also said that the biggest strategic dilemma for South Korea is to be entrapped between the U.S. and China in a war, citing a possible conflict over Taiwan as an example.
"There is a lot of ambivalence among Koreans about a war in Taiwan, so that makes it sound like a binary choice, but in my mind the best way to avoid that outcome of a war in Taiwan is to ensure that China is deterred from ever considering a war in Taiwan."
"The best way to do that is for the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii -- for the allied position to be strong enough that China is deterred."
When asked about concerns over South Korea being sidelined if Trump seeks another summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Cha said Trump's goal appears to be clear in that he wants to meet Kim and eventually make a peace agreement.
"The danger for South Korea is that the nuclear issue may not be resolved after the summit meeting between Trump and Kim," he said. "President Trump has referred to North Korea several times as a nuclear power, which suggests that denuclearization is maybe a very far off objective."
Trump held summit meetings with Kim three times during his first term, which included their first-ever talks in Singapore in June 2018.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 23, 2025
6. Trump Jr. to visit S. Korea next week at invitation of Shinsegae chairman
South Korea is taking a whole-of-society approach to dealing with President Trump.
Trump Jr. to visit S. Korea next week at invitation of Shinsegae chairman | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 23, 2025
SEOUL, April 23 (Yonhap) -- Donald Trump Jr., the eldest son of U.S. President Donald Trump, will visit South Korea next week at the invitation of Shinsegae Group Chairman Chung Yong-jin, a group official said Wednesday.
The junior Trump plans to meet with key business officials during his visit to the country, the official said, without disclosing the exact date or other details of his trip.
This will be Trump Jr.'s first visit to South Korea since the inauguration of his father in January.
It will come as South Korea businesses have been grappling with a series of new tariffs the Trump administration has imposed on imports to the United States, including those from South Korea.
Chung and Trump Jr. are known to be close.
In December, Trump Jr. invited the Shinsegae chairman to his father's Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, which led to a meeting between Chung and then President-elect Trump.
South Korean business circles reportedly asked Chung to facilitate Trump Jr.'s visit to South Korea as a way to establish contact with the Trump administration.
Shinsegae Group Chairman Chung Yong-jin (C) and his wife, Han Ji-hee (R), meet with Donald Trump Jr. in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 18, 2025, in this file photo provided by the group. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 23, 2025
7. UNC contacted N. Korea over repatriation of 2 aboard drifting boat: minister
This is sad. Obviously the men are asking to be repatriated and did not ask for asylum. They likely believe that they must return to protect their families in the north. The sad tragedy is that they and their families will likely still be punished for their "failure" in getting captured and because of their exposure to the reality of South Korea.
UNC contacted N. Korea over repatriation of 2 aboard drifting boat: minister | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 23, 2025
SEOUL, April 23 (Yonhap) -- The U.N. Command (UNC) has contacted North Korea multiple times and is waiting for a response regarding the repatriation of two North Koreans found aboard a drifting boat in the Yellow Sea last month, Seoul's point man on Pyongyang said Wednesday.
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho made the remark during a session of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, referring to the North Korean men taken into South Korean custody following the discovery of their boat in waters south of the de facto inter-Korean maritime border on March 7.
"The U.N. Command is waiting for North Korea's response agreeing to the repatriation," he said. "We are working to swiftly and safely repatriate them on humanitarian grounds."
The UNC, which oversees the cease-fire that ended the 1950-53 Korean War, appears to have contacted the North as all communication channels between the Koreas are currently severed.
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho (R) attends a session of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee in Seoul on April 23, 2025. (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · April 23, 2025
8. Bessent calls for allies' stronger defense commitments ahead of trade talks with S. Korea
I hope someone briefs him on the great extent of South Korean commitments to its own defense, to the support of US troops, and its partnership in the arsenal of democracy. There is likely no other US ally who is doing as much for itself, the US, and allies in the free world than the Republic of Korea.
We need to help President Trump and his cabinet to resist the influence of the isolationists whose policy recommendations will endanger America. President Trump is NOT an isolationist but he has an isolationist faction within his administration.
Bessent calls for allies' stronger defense commitments ahead of trade talks with S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 24, 2025
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 23 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent called Wednesday for allies to strengthen their commitments to "shared defense," stressing that economic partnerships should reflect security relations, as he is set to attend high-profile trade talks with South Korea later this week.
Bessent made the remarks during a forum hosted by the Institute of International Finance, a day before he and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer are set to join South Korea's Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok and Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun for "two-plus-two" consultations over tariffs and other issues.
"I believe global economic relationships should come to reflect security partnerships. Security partners are more likely to have compatible economies structured for mutually beneficial trade," Bessent said.
"It's (that) the United States continues offering security guarantees and open markets (and) then, our allies must step up with stronger commitments to shared defense," he added.
This Getty Images-AFP photo shows U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent delivering remarks during the Institute of International Finance Global Outlook Forum in Washington on April 23, 2025. (Yonhap)
He made the remarks as he asserted the need for Europe to make greater security contributions. But his speech was keenly watched by South Korea and other allies amid lingering speculation that U.S. President Donald Trump might seek a "package" deal that includes defense cost-sharing matters in addition to trade issues.
Trump has cast his negotiation approach as "one-stop shopping" -- an expression that has raised the prospects of his administration seeking a broad-based deal that would go beyond trade issues.
During Thursday's trade talks between Seoul and Washington, the two sides are expected to discuss new U.S. duties, including 25 percent "reciprocal" tariffs on South Korea, among other issues.
The Trump administration started imposing reciprocal tariffs on April 9, only to place a 90-day pause on them hours later -- a reprieve that has given time for countries to negotiate over the new U.S. import taxes and what Trump called "non-tariff cheating" by trading partners.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 24, 2025
9. Rubio describes N. Korea as 'nuclear armed' country
Again, we have to deal with the world as it really is and not as we would wish it to be. north Korea possesses nuclear arms.
That does not negate the need for a policy to denuclearize the north. We just have to address the strategic assumption that states that Kim will never negotiate away his nuclear weapons. That must drive our strategy. It is not denuclearization negotiations (only leads to failure). It is not arms control negotiations (only leads to the success of Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy and the retention of nuclear weapons. We need an overarching strategy that is embodied in 12 words:
"Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through human rights."
We need a radical new "2 plus 3" strategy:
•“Two Plus Three”
•The two traditional strategies remain critically important:
–Foundation: Deterrence and Defense – prevent war; prepare for conflict and collapse
–Counter global illicit activities: proliferation to counterfeiting/money laundering to overseas slave labor to cyber attacks and more (i.e., strategic strangulation of the regime)
•Radical New Three (in essence this is political warfare):
–Human Rights Upfront Approach:
•Empower North Koreans with knowledge of universal rights
•Address moral and security imperatives
–Information Campaign:
•Spread truth about regime failures
•Practical information to create conditions for change
•Use technology to penetrate North Korean censorship
–Pursuit of a Free and Unified Korea:
•Promote liberal democracy and prosperity
•Focus on regime transformation
Rubio describes N. Korea as 'nuclear armed' country | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 24, 2025
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 23 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has described North Korea as a "nuclear-armed" country in an apparent recognition of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons capabilities, despite the Trump administration's stated commitment to the "complete denuclearization" of the North.
Rubio used the expression in a podcast interview released Wednesday, as he pointed to a series of security challenges facing the United States, including those from China, Russia and Iran.
This photo, released by Reuters, shows U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio looking on upon his arrival at the Quai d'Orsay, France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before a bilateral meeting with his French counterpart in Paris on April 17, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
"We live in a world with a nuclear-armed North Korea, with a nuclear-ambitious Iran," the secretary said in the podcast hosted by The Free Press, according to a transcript provided by the State Department.
He made the remarks as he compared the current contours of security with what they used to be 20 years ago, when the U.S. was what he called a "unipolar power."
President Donald Trump has called North Korea a "nuclear power," noting that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has "a lot of nuclear weapons."
The "nuclear power" expression has raised concerns that it could be construed as official U.S. recognition of Pyongyang's possession of nuclear weapons -- something that could help Kim enhance his regime's legitimacy.
Some observers said the reference to the North as a nuclear power might be intended to help draw the North back to the negotiating table.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 24, 2025
10. Dismissal of U.S. envoy for North Korean human rights signals State Department overhaul
Human rights are not only a moral imperative, they are a national security issue.
Kim Jong Un denies human rights to remain in power.
We need a human rights upfront approach to help create the conditions for change in north Korea.
Hopefully when the reorganization dust settles we will have a team at State and within the US government that can focus on human rights in north Korea.
Until then we can depend on the US Committee for Human Rights (https://www.hrnk.org/) to be a voice for the oppressed in north Korea and contribute to US national security by addressing the worst crimes against humanity since World War II. Please contribute to HRNK 's work. (https://www.hrnk.org/donate/)
Wednesday
April 23, 2025
dictionary + A - A
Dismissal of U.S. envoy for North Korean human rights signals State Department overhaul
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-23/national/northKorea/Dismissal-of-US-envoy-for-North-Korean-human-rights-signals-State-Department-overhaul/2291943
Published: 23 Apr. 2025, 16:35
Updated: 23 Apr. 2025, 19:44
Korea JoongAng Daily
Dismissal of U.S. envoy for North Korean human rights signals State Department overhaul
3 min
Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI
Julie Turner, former U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights and current acting deputy assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor, speaks during a panel talk session at an event held at Seoul City Hall in Jung District, central Seoul, on July 11, 2024. [NEWS1]
Julie Turner, the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights, has been dismissed from her position in a move that appears to be part of a sweeping downsizing of the State Department’s democracy and human rights operations under U.S. President Donald Trump.
Turner’s dismissal was belatedly confirmed on Tuesday, with no successor named, effectively eliminating the role responsible for North Korea’s human rights policy.
Related Article
Turner had been serving as acting deputy assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor since Jan. 24, shortly after Trump’s inauguration, according to the State Department. She had previously been appointed as special envoy for North Korean human rights in October 2023.
The special envoy role was created under the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 and carries an ambassador-level rank, requiring nomination by the president and confirmation by the Senate. It plays a key role in shaping U.S. policy on North Korean human rights issues.
However, Trump did not appoint a successor after then-Special Envoy Robert King stepped down in January 2017 during Trump’s first term, leaving the position vacant for six years until Turner was appointed in the third year of the Biden administration.
With Turner’s dismissal, the position is again vacant, and it is unclear whether it will be filled in the near future.
U.S. President Donald Trump holds a signed executive order after delivering remarks on reciprocal tariffs during an event in the Rose Garden entitled ″Make America Wealthy Again″ at the White House in Washington on April 2. [AFP/YONHAP]
Turner’s dismissal from the post appears to be tied to broader restructuring efforts reflecting the Trump administration’s policy direction.
On the same day, the State Department unveiled a reorganization plan that includes eliminating the under secretary for civilian security, democracy and human rights — significantly shrinking the department’s democracy and human rights-related infrastructure.
Three eliminated under secretary positions will be replaced by a new coordinator responsible for foreign aid and humanitarian affairs. Offices previously reporting directly to the secretary — such as those handling global women’s issues and diversity and inclusion — have also been dissolved.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said of the overhaul in a statement that the current State Department is “bloated, bureaucratic, and unable to perform its essential diplomatic mission in this new era of great power competition,” adding, “the sprawling bureaucracy created a system more beholden to radical political ideology than advancing America's core national interests.”
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio attends a meeting of the Eradicating Anti-Christian Bias Task Force at the Justice Department in Washington on April 22. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
“Non-statutory programs that are misaligned with America's core national interests will cease to exist,” Rubio added, and further ordered senior officials to submit plans to reduce the department’s U.S.-based staff by 15 percent.
Although recent reports indicated the department was considering closing 10 embassies and 17 consulates worldwide — including the U.S. consulate in Busan — no such closures were included in the restructuring plan announced on Tuesday.
However, Reuters quoted a State Department official as saying the current reorganization only applies to the Washington headquarters, and overseas missions may undergo separate adjustments in the future.
The seal of the U.S. Department of State is seen in Washington on Jan. 26, 2017. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
BY KANG TAE-HWA [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]
11. Ex-US intel official softens stance on ROK nuclear armament amid growing threats
Again, I know I am a broken record but we have to deal with the world (north Korea) as it really is and not as we would wish it to be.
The funny thing is that the isolationists in the Trump administration will be the most vocal in support of ROK nuclear armament. But that is only because they see it as a path to withdrawing troops from the Korea and the region.
But I do agree with Syd that we must take a holistic approach to deterrence and that includes allied contributions. Certainly South Korea should consider nuclear latency. But we must continue to ask the fundamental questions of what deters Kim Jong Un from attacking the South and using nuclear weapons? And what ways and means can the US, ROK, and our allies employ to deter Kim?
Ex-US intel official softens stance on ROK nuclear armament amid growing threats
Sydney Seiler says North Korean nuclear development and Russia ties raise need for South to play larger deterrence role
https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/ex-us-intel-official-softens-stance-on-rok-nuclear-armament-amid-growing-threats/
Jooheon Kim April 23, 2025
Sydney Seiler speaks during an interview at the Asan Plenum in Seoul on April 23, 2025. | Image: Asan Institute for Policy Studies
North Korea’s continued advancement of its nuclear capabilities and strengthened ties with Russia have nudged a former U.S. intelligence official toward accepting South Korea’s need for its own nuclear deterrent, a sign of shifting thinking in Washington about a proposal considered beyond the pale for decades.
Speaking ahead of his panel at this year’s Asan Plenum in Seoul, former National Intelligence Officer for North Korea Sydney Seiler told reporters he’s now “less opposed” to the idea of ROK nuclear weapons than he was five years ago, reflecting deepening concern that Pyongyang has no intention of giving up its own weapons of mass destruction.
“We need to move to an approach toward deterring North Korea that takes into account the unlikelihood that they’re going to move down the path of denuclearization,” he said.
Talk of South Korea going nuclear first began to pick up in Seoul in mid-2022, with President Yoon Suk-yeol even broaching the possibility the following January. The Biden administration acted quickly to try to nip the debate in the bud through the 2023 Washington Declaration, under which the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to extended deterrence to defend Seoul and the ROK recommitted to nuclear nonproliferation.
But while the U.S. officially remains committed to that agreement, domestic calls for South Korea to develop its own independent nuclear arsenal have only grown louder in recent years, and Donald Trump’s pick for a top defense position has expressed openness to ROK nukes.
Seiler pointed to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement as a potential model, proposing that a similar system using dual-capable aircraft and U.S.-controlled warheads could allow South Korea to play a more active role as a “mature partner” in deterrence — without crossing the line into direct nuclear proliferation.
“I wish we lived in a world where there are no nuclear powers,” he said. “But we don’t.”
Seiler characterized Pyongyang’s approach as one of “deliberate isolation” and ideological resistance to any normalization that requires relinquishing its nuclear weapons.
He also argued that North Korea has little interest in improving ties with the U.S., dismissing hopes of returning to the diplomatic engagement seen in 2018-2019 as unrealistic.
Seiler stressed that Kim Jong Un’s regime is now primarily focused on securing recognition as a legitimate nuclear state, having abandoned even the appearance of willingness to denuclearize — a concept that Pyongyang increasingly portrays as an infringement on its sovereignty.
The former intelligence official’s remarks come amid growing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, and according to the expert, this partnership is likely facilitating Pyongyang’s missile development, nuclear command and control capabilities and potentially reconnaissance satellite technology, the elements necessary to build a fully operational nuclear force.
“These are troubling developments,” he warned, “and they are reshaping the threat matrix on the Korean Peninsula.”
Donald Trump’s return to office and long-standing skepticism of alliances has rekindled fears in Seoul about the U.S. commitment to its defense, especially as Washington increasingly focuses its attention on countering China.
A reported Japanese proposal to create a single joint theater with the U.S. and its allies in the Indo-Pacific appears to be another effort to reconfigure the regional security architecture around Chinese threats, potentially placing greater onus on the ROK to deter the DPRK.
Addressing concerns that the U.S. may repurpose its South Korea-based ground forces to deal with Chinese threats at the expense of DPRK deterrence, Seiler said the situation isn’t entirely black-and-white and Washington will have to consider “multiple scenarios.”
However, he acknowledged that the U.S. will determine its course of action based on its priorities at the time, with China currently its main source of concern.
“We want to not have to worry about deterring North Korea if there is a scenario in the Taiwan Straits going on,” he said. “If Kim were to be encouraged by the apparent lack of ability by the U.S. to dedicate its resources, ROK forces need to be ready.”
Shreyas Reddy contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Alannah Hill
12. The New North Korea: How Geopolitical Advantages and Growing Middle Class Prosperity Challenge the Next South Korean President
Interesting conclusion.
I am not sure about the middle class prosperity in the north.
Excerpt:
The evolving geopolitical landscape benefits North Korea by undermining sanctions and increasing support from China and Russia, while simultaneously threatening to weaken South Korea’s position. The growing purchasing power of North Korea’s middle class further reduces the country’s dependence on external economic cooperation and the regime’s willingness to accept risky people-to-people exchanges. The new South Korean president, even if he should have a pro-engagement background, may conclude that now is not the time for an active North Korea policy and may choose to deprioritize the relationship.
The New North Korea: How Geopolitical Advantages and Growing Middle Class Prosperity Challenge the Next South Korean President
https://www.38north.org/2025/04/the-new-north-korea-how-geopolitical-advantages-and-growing-middle-class-prosperity-challenge-the-next-south-korean-president/
On June 3, the Republic of Korea (South Korea or ROK) will hold a snap presidential election, prompted by the impeachment and removal of President Yoon Suk Yeol. The new president will be inaugurated on June 4. Current polling and political analysis indicate that Lee Jae-myung, leader of the main opposition Democratic Party (DP), is the clear front-runner and as of now, most likely to win.
The next ROK president will confront what is, in many respects, a “New” North Korea, one that has both an enhanced strategic position in regional and global geopolitics, an evolving posture toward South Korea, and a domestic situation that is relatively more resilient to external pressures than ever before. Substantial purchasing power is now found not only among the elite but also within a growing and diverse middle class. This fact has largely escaped mainstream attention, overshadowed by persistent images of poverty, backwardness, and inefficiency. North Korean producers now face a sizable private domestic market—a fundamentally new situation in the country’s economic history.
These conditions prepare Pyongyang better for the possible return of global anarchy and a new imperial age while posing significant risks for South Korea’s new leadership and will have major implications for the incoming administration in Seoul, especially given the DP’s longstanding pro-engagement policies.
The New North Korea: Geopolitics
Kim Jong Un’s policies have shifted in recent years, influenced by the failed rapprochement with the US after the 2019 Hanoi summit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the emergence of a new geopolitical landscape following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
North Korea’s alleged delivery of arms and munitions to Russia, as well as reports of sending combat troops to Kursk, have raised significant concerns in South Korea. It is feared that these developments could generate new income for Pyongyang’s regime, increase the likelihood of military technology transfers from Russia, further erode the international sanctions regime, and provide North Korean troops with practical experience in modern warfare.
For inter-Korean relations, Kim Jong Un announced a dramatic shift at the end of 2023: the abandonment of unification as a policy goal, along with the associated concepts developed by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. For the first time, North Korea has officially relinquished the idea of a single Korean nation, replacing it with a doctrine of two separate states on the peninsula and designating the Republic of Korea as permanently hostile.
The geopolitical transformation is ongoing and hence often obscured by singular dramatic events, making it difficult to discern the broader trends. Under such circumstances, historical analogies can be instructive. While a new Cold War structure may eventually emerge—with blocks forming around rival hegemons and defined by clear ideological boundaries—such an order will likely be preceded by a period reminiscent of the late 19th-century imperial age. For the next decade, global affairs are likely to be characterized by what I call multipolar anarchy.
Multipolar anarchy describes a transitional phase in the international system characterized by the coexistence of regional order and global disorder. In this phase, multiple power centers shape relatively stable regional environments governed by localized rules and norms. However, at the global level, no overarching consensus on rules exists, resulting in a fragmented system marked by the assertive and often coercive pursuit of national interests. Multipolar anarchy lacks a stable hierarchy or dominant hegemon. It features a plurality of actors—including traditional great powers, regional middle powers, and non-state entities—operating in an environment of normative ambivalence and strategic competition. This condition is not permanent but transitional: a liminal stage between the waning liberal international order and the possible emergence of a new systemic configuration, such as a renewed bipolarity or a contested multipolar equilibrium. Especially for states founded after 1945, such as the two Koreas, this will be a fundamentally new situation.
During the original Cold War, hegemons provided global public goods: an “international order” of norms, economic exchange, and security guarantees. International organizations facilitated negotiations within and between the antagonistic blocs. After China’s tacit retreat from this system in the late 1970s and the Soviet Union’s collapse in the late 1980s, the United States continued to provide these public goods unilaterally. However, as becoming apparent in these first few months of Donald Trump’s second term, the US is no longer willing to shoulder this burden. The world is now entering a period of dynamic geopolitical realignment that may eventually stabilize into a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar order. For now, however, the rules governing foreign policy, economic exchange, and defense will increasingly be negotiated on a case-by-case basis with allies and adversaries alike.
This new “imperial age” brings both opportunity and risk. East Asia’s history offers a cautionary tale: In the 19th century, China, once the unchallenged regional hegemon, saw its influence wane rapidly, leading to Korea’s colonization and Japan’s meteoric rise as a regional power. History rarely repeats itself, but it often rhymes. Today, the two Koreas face challenges reminiscent of those confronting the Korean kingdom 150 years ago: declining old hegemons, emerging new powers, shifting balances, and changing rules. Trust in alliances is eroding, and national power is becoming more important than ever.
Somewhat ironically, North Korea appears better positioned to navigate this uncertainty, not least thanks to its longstanding pursuit of autarky. Its economy has low trade dependency, it is not part of any formal defense alliance, and it possesses nuclear weapons. Much of what European leaders now discuss under the banners of “decoupling” and “indigenous defense capabilities” strikingly echoes North Korea’s Juche ideology.
For South Korea, the traditional alliance structure is under strain. Pyongyang is emboldened by the silent collapse of international opposition and renewed support from Moscow and Beijing. Meanwhile, Seoul faces multiple threats: structural issues like demographic decline, the potential reduction or withdrawal of US military presence (possibly restoring the Acheson Line of 1950), and challenges to its export-oriented economic model due to US tariffs. Under these conditions, South Korea may find it increasingly difficult to resist China’s overtures for closer cooperation. If the new president seeks greater strategic independence by pursuing nuclear weapons in violation of or even by withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonprolifreation Treaty (NPT), South Korea risks international isolation and triggering a regional arms race.
The New North Korea: Middle Class and Domestic Demand
North Korea’s improved geopolitical position is matched by growing internal resilience. The country is less reliant than ever on cooperation with its adversaries for economic survival.
Despite the lack of comprehensive reforms, North Korea’s domestic economy has been transformed since the collapse of the socialist system and the “Arduous March” of the 1990s. Limited market reforms, the rise of informal markets, and pragmatic adaptation by the regime have given rise to a middle class capable of sustaining modest domestic demand for goods and services.
Defining and measuring North Korea’s “middle class” is challenging, given opaque data, a hybrid economy, and a unique socio-political classification system. Typically, the term refers to a social stratum with moderate income, economic security, access to education, and discretionary spending. North Korea’s middle class includes two broad groups: the “old” middle class of state-affiliated officials in administration, the party, and the military, who have leveraged their positions for economic gain especially since the 1990s; and the “new” middle class of market entrepreneurs, traders, and educated professionals who have capitalized on the semi-tolerated private sector, investing in ventures from transportation to retail. Their influence extends to financing state-sanctioned projects, reflecting a symbiotic relationship with the regime reminiscent of the state-Chaebol connection in South Korea during the military dictatorship.
Numerous indicators point to this transformation. The middle class has for years become more and more visible, especially in urban centers, where shopping malls, coffee shops, and leisure facilities cater to new consumer preferences. Ownership of goods such as refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners, and electric bicycles has grown, reflecting enhanced purchasing power and consumerism. There is a marked increase in private spending on education, healthcare, and leisure activities. The proliferation of private tutoring, beauty salons, and entertainment venues in urban areas underscores this shift.
Cell phone subscriptions have risen to around 7 million—close to one-third of the population. This figure is noteworthy, since it can serve as a useful proxy for the size of North Korea’s middle class. Many of these devices are smartphones, and mobile payment systems are now in use.
Despite these advances, cash still dominates North Korea’s private economy. Higher-value banknotes, such as recently introduced 50,000 won bills or vouchers, have appeared. The sharply rising won-dollar exchange rate, especially since 2024, may indicate large cash holdings among a significant segment of the population. Following a major wage increase in late 2023, mid-level managers reportedly earn 80,000–120,000 won per month.
While not exhaustive, these examples illustrate the availability of significant disposable income among North Koreans, transforming them from passive recipients of state support into active consumers.
Excess liquidity in the economy poses risks, including inflationary pressures. Moreover, the denial of consumption opportunities can foster politically dangerous discontent, as East Germany’s experience demonstrated. From this perspective, the North Korean government’s development of attractions like the Masikryong Ski Resort and Yangdok Hot Springs Resort over the Kim Jong Un years appears less misguided—they help absorb excess liquidity and cater to the middle class’s desire for leisure.
The soon-to-open Wonsan-Kalma Beach Resort will be a telling test of this middle-class hypothesis. Its scale suggests that Western tourists are not the primary target. While Chinese visitors could theoretically fill its 10,000–20,000 beds, it is plausible but rarely considered that the resort will mainly serve paying domestic tourists, in addition to model workers granted a resort vacation and a handful of occasional foreign guests.
A key consequence of the expanding domestic market is reduced dependence on external inputs. While foreign engagement remains welcome, the regime’s willingness to take political risks for economic gain has clearly diminished. This affects areas central to past inter-Korean relations, such as tourism, trade, humanitarian aid, joint ventures, and infrastructure projects. The latter were often facilitated by performative “soft” exchanges, including summits, family reunions, joint sports events, or cultural activities. These will become less necessary, dampening hopes for gradual change from within through cultural infiltration.
Conclusion: A Double Challenge for South Korea
The evolving geopolitical landscape benefits North Korea by undermining sanctions and increasing support from China and Russia, while simultaneously threatening to weaken South Korea’s position. The growing purchasing power of North Korea’s middle class further reduces the country’s dependence on external economic cooperation and the regime’s willingness to accept risky people-to-people exchanges. The new South Korean president, even if he should have a pro-engagement background, may conclude that now is not the time for an active North Korea policy and may choose to deprioritize the relationship.
13. U.S. military WMD response team conducts first-ever exercise in Korea
Good initiative. I am surprised this has never been conducted before.
Wednesday
April 23, 2025
U.S. military WMD response team conducts first-ever exercise in Korea
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-04-23/national/defense/US-military-WMD-response-team-conducts-firstever-exercise-in-Korea/2291838
Published: 23 Apr. 2025, 13:55
Updated: 23 Apr. 2025, 19:41
A UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter takes off from Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi, during the joint Korea-U.S. Freedom Shield military exercise on March 10. [YONHAP]
A U.S. military unit specializing in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) response has conducted its first-ever training session in Korea to prepare for potential nuclear attack scenarios, according to U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) on Wednesday.
The U.S. Army Nuclear and Countering WMD Agency (Usanca) held the exercise on April 15 and 16 at the Republic of Korea Strategic Command. The session was attended by Korean and U.S. military personnel and focused on building the knowledge and skills necessary for operating in environments where nuclear weapons have been used or are at risk of being used.
Related Article
Specific details of the training were not disclosed. However, it reportedly covered education and instruction for conducting military operations in nuclear threat scenarios.
Participants included two instructors from Usacna’s Nuclear Operations Advisory Group, six personnel from the Korean Strategic Command, two from the Ministry of National Defense, and five from the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command.
The session also included discussions on the role of the Korean military in Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) operations — a concept that seeks to integrate U.S. nuclear capabilities with Korea’s advanced conventional forces.
“The contents of this training are directly applicable to tabletop exercises (TTX) and war games focused on the CNI concept,” said USFK.
CNI remains an evolving framework without a fully defined operational concept on the Korean Peninsula, but a clear operational concept on how to implement it on the Korean Peninsula has not yet been established.
Korea and the U.S. plan to continue tabletop exercises to refine and develop the concept into formal operational plans.
Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
BY JEONG JAE-HONG [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]
14. Breaking point: School expenses spark rare public complaints from N. Korean parents
We must watch for the indicators of potential resistance.
Breaking point: School expenses spark rare public complaints from N. Korean parents - Daily NK English
"Parents are particularly upset that schools discriminated in textbook distribution, since students didn't pay because their families couldn't afford it," a source told Daily NK
By Jeong Seo-yeong - April 22, 2025
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · April 22, 2025
Parents of school children in North Korea have begun openly complaining about the endless expenses since the beginning of the new semester, questioning whether they are “truly receiving the free education” the government claims to provide.
A source in North Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently that with the start of the new semester, “parents have been forced to cover school uniform costs, facility repairs, and the collection of recycling materials, leaving many deeply frustrated.”
The North Korean authorities had announced before the semester that they would distribute uniforms at state-subsidized prices—supposedly at minimal cost—to reduce the financial burden on families. However, the actual prices proved shockingly expensive.
“The government promised to provide uniforms at state prices, but they adjusted these prices based on the recently increased official salaries,” the source explained. “These salaries exist in name only—hardly anyone actually receives their full salary, and even when they do, the amount is significantly reduced after arbitrary deductions for various state projects. And since the state prices increased tenfold alongside the nominal salary increases, everyone is outraged.”
With uniform costs supposedly provided at “state prices” now more than ten times higher than in previous years, parents of school-aged children have expressed bitter resentment.
Parents are also frustrated by schools openly demanding financial contributions from students to improve educational facilities at the start of the new semester.
Schools have required students to pay for remodeling revolutionary history research rooms, physics and chemistry labs, repairing fences, walls, and windows damaged during winter, and purchasing cleaning supplies—costs that inevitably fall on parents.
In Chongjin, some homeroom teachers withheld textbooks from students who failed to contribute to school repair funds, further angering parents.
While schools have abundant supplies of revolutionary history textbooks, they lack sufficient textbooks for core subjects like mathematics and English—not even enough for half the students. Teachers prioritized distributing these limited resources to students whose families had paid for school repairs.
“Parents are particularly upset that schools discriminated in textbook distribution, since students didn’t pay because their families couldn’t afford it, not because they were unwilling,” the source said. “Some teachers even punished children, confiscated their bags, or prevented them from going home. Parents had to hold back tears seeing their children dejected over this treatment.”
Parents have also openly criticized school campaigns to collect recycling materials after the semester began, complaining they were forced to “pay money instead of non-existent recycling materials.”
“People are saying that the government boasts about providing free education, but this isn’t truly free education at all,” the source said. “They feel it would be better if the state simply stopped making such false claims.”
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · April 22, 2025
15. U.S. delivering 'more forward' Indo-Pacific force posture to deter China: Pentagon chief
Good news.
My recommendation:
America Must Stop Treating Taiwan and Korea as Separate Security Issues
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/04/america-must-stop-treating-taiwan-and-korea-as-separate-security-issues/
U.S. delivering 'more forward' Indo-Pacific force posture to deter China: Pentagon chief | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 24, 2025
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 23 (Yonhap) -- The United States is delivering a "more forward" force posture in the Indo-Pacific to help deter an increasingly assertive China, the Pentagon chief said Wednesday, calling on allies and partners to "step up" to be "true force multipliers for freedom."
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made the remarks during a speech at the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania, reaffirming America's security commitment to the Indo-Pacific region and stressing that U.S. President Donald Trump's America First policy does not mean "America alone."
"Most importantly, we are deterring Communist China in the Indo-Pacific and around the world to deliver peace in this region," Hegseth said.
"We are delivering a more forward regional force posture. We are supporting allies and partners ... Allies and partners are our force multipliers as they strengthen their own capabilities, including in Taiwan," he added.
This Getty Images-AFP photo shows U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth delivering remarks at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania on April 23, 2025. (Yonhap)
The secretary did not elaborate on the forward force posture efforts, but his remarks helped ease concerns to a certain degree that under Trump's America First credo, the U.S. might seek to cut back on its costly overseas military involvement.
However, Hegseth reiterated calls for U.S. allies to do more for their own security, noting that in three "strategically important regions" -- the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East, the U.S. is increasing allies' "burden sharing."
"America first doesn't mean America alone," he said. "It means we expect our allies to step up to be true force multipliers for freedom. This approach ensures we achieve peace through strength."
In particular, the secretary urged Europe to step up militarily and lead the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Trump has demanded that NATO member nations spend 5 percent of their gross domestic product on defense -- well above the current 2 percent guideline.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 24, 2025
16. How Japan’s plan for single Asian theater risks overlooking North Korean threats
I think the premise is wrong. It should not be to refashion regional security to counter China, be should be embrace the challenge of all the threats. We need to take a holistic approach to the threats throughout the Asia-Pacific (Indo-Pacific).
Again, my recommendation:
America Must Stop Treating Taiwan and Korea as Separate Security Issues
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/04/america-must-stop-treating-taiwan-and-korea-as-separate-security-issues/
How Japan’s plan for single Asian theater risks overlooking North Korean threats
Experts warn Tokyo’s reported proposal to refashion regional security to counter China could weaken DPRK deterrence
https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/how-japans-plan-for-single-asian-theater-risks-overlooking-north-korean-threats/
Shreyas Reddy April 23, 2025
The defense ministers of Japan and the U.S. ahead of talks in Tokyo | Image: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs via X (March 30, 2025)
Japan has reportedly proposed a new “one-theater” concept to the U.S., aiming to unify security strategy across the entire Indo-Pacific with a sharper focus on China. But this new approach raises concerns that the allies could take their eye off another challenge — North Korea.
The unconfirmed proposal, reported by Japanese newspaper The Asahi Shimbun last week, appears to align with President Donald Trump’s overt emphasis on the need to counter Beijing’s influence above all other adversaries, and also reflects Tokyo’s own concerns about Chinese activities.
However, there are still no concrete details regarding the plan that supposedly combines different combat theaters into a single region of coordinated military coverage, raising questions about what’s to come of U.S.-led deterrence efforts against Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats.
The report has exacerbated existing fears in South Korea — which faces the most direct threat from North Korea — that it may be frozen out entirely from regional security coordination as Washington pivots direction under Trump.
While North Korea may also be eyeing the new strategy with caution, experts believe it will carry on with its own military development and work with its own partners to counter its enemies’ evolving approach.
CHANGING PRIORITIES
Japan’s rumored one-theater proposal to the U.S. is still in its early stages, with Asahi reporting that Tokyo has yet to settle on an official term and is hesitant to use the “strong word of theater” until the details have been worked out.
The plan reportedly seeks to combine the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and nearby areas into a single wartime theater, but Japan has yet to determine the regions where its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) — historically restricted to homeland defense — can participate in military activities.
The proposal follows Tokyo’s establishment of a new Joint Operations Command late last month to oversee SDF operations, and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth subsequently announced that the U.S. Forces Japan administrative command would be upgraded to a joint force headquarters with “more warfighting and operational responsibilities.”
During a press conference on March 30, Hegseth emphasized the importance of upgrading the Washington-Tokyo alliance’s capabilities to deter China’s growing threat in the Indo-Pacific region, with Japan “on the front lines” of such contingencies.
The China focus also appears central to Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani’s push for a more proactive approach to dealing with regional risks with allies across a single theater, according to Asahi.
“What Japan proposed is actually what the U.S. might have wanted,” Yang Uk, a military analyst at Seoul’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies told NK News, suggesting that the two countries may have already been discussing the idea.
However, Yang views the “radical” proposal as the product of the Japanese government’s “naive thinking,” which could risk opening up gaps in countering disparate threats.
“If you want to have one theater, you have to define the threat first as a whole,” he said.
“A Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a North Korean nuclear provocation are quite different things. They are two totally different enemies,” he added.
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani | Image: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs via X (March 30, 2025)
IMPACT ON US ALLIES
The possible shift to an integrated China-centric theater will likely suit the needs of the Trump administration, which advocates redirecting military and economic resources into countering Beijing’s influence while calling on allies to deal with other threats.
However, Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, an associate professor at Tokyo International University’s Institute for International Strategy, told NK News that the approach does not entirely preclude the need for U.S.-led efforts against the DPRK.
“Although North Korea will be a part of the theater, the nature of the U.S.-led deterrence against North Korea will depend much on how Washington works with Seoul, and how the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral mechanism continues to develop,” he said.
But Yang expressed concerns that a potential theater shift and reallocation of military resources could leave South Korea to fend for itself against DPRK threats.
Citing U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby’s comments last month, the expert stated that Washington will now expect allies like South Korea to take the lead in “conventional deterrence” against regional threats such as North Korea.
If the U.S. withdraws its ground forces from South Korea as Trump desires, or even follows through on Colby’s idea of repurposing the same troops to deal with China instead, Yang believes Seoul may be left with little choice but to push for nuclear-sharing agreements with Washington.
Through the Nuclear Consultative Group established in 2023, the two countries already have a mechanism in place to discuss potential strategic weapons use related to the Korean Peninsula, but the decision to push the nuclear button lies squarely with Washington.
If the U.S. takes its eye off the DPRK nuclear threat, Yang said Seoul should seek nuclear deployment agreements similar to NATO pacts, but also suggested South Korea could propose an arrangement to fit ROK ballistic missiles with U.S. nuclear warheads.
“There will be a lot of complications about who controls the launch or what’s the target list, but that’s the surest way, even if the U.S. is pursuing this one-theater concept,” he said.
A U.S. aircraft carrier (center) flanked by Japanese (left) and South Korean Aegis destroyers during the trilateral “Freedom Edge” drills in waters south of the ROK’s Jeju Island | Image: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (Nov. 13, 2024)
BOLSTERING CAPABILITIES
If the Asahi report is accurate, Japan’s push to establish and play an active role in a new integrated wartime theater could demonstrate its increased willingness to take the SDF beyond limits mandated by the country’s war-renouncing constitution.
The military largely remains restricted to purely defensive operations, despite the ruling party’s persistent attempts to revise the constitution, but Japan has made moderate increases in its defense budget in recent years and sought to bolster its weapons capabilities.
Asahi reported that critics of the plan, supposedly drafted by senior SDF and defense ministry officials, have argued that it could get Japan entangled in “military emergencies” in other parts of the world.
While the proposal appears out of sync with the Japanese military’s principle of not participating in anything that goes further than homeland defense, the idea actually builds on Tokyo’s ongoing efforts to augment its military capabilities to counter China and other regional threats, according to Hinata-Yamaguchi.
“Japan has been working to operate in the mentioned areas for some years, hence it is better to say it is re-emphasizing the concept to bolster the alliance with the U.S. and coordination with likeminded states,” he explained.
However, Yang expressed concern that Japan’s approach appears to be partly based on a misplaced perception of regional threats beyond China, unlike South Korea’s heightened awareness of its nuclear neighbor.
The analyst stated that Tokyo appears to have lost interest in deterring Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats amid concerns about potential Chinese attacks against Taiwan, seemingly convinced that the U.S. will protect it from a North Korean attack.
Japanese troops deploy after a helicopter landing | Image: Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) via Facebook (Nov. 29, 2022)
THE VIEW FROM PYONGYANG
North Korea has often slammed U.S.-led military activities in and around the Korean Peninsula as a direct threat to its sovereignty and security, but may have to reconsider its calculus if Washington and Tokyo dilute their regional focus to prioritize China.
As geopolitical divides get firmly entrenched in the region, Hinata-Yamaguchi said Pyongyang will likely look at how its allies Russia and China respond to the U.S., Japan and South Korea before deciding on its course of action.
However, at the same time, he emphasized that the DPRK will likely “pursue the same old strategies and continue to push forward with its military modernization plan” to deal with the security uncertainties in its neighborhood.
Pyongyang will likely take umbrage with Japan’s apparent interest in extending its military coverage across the Indo-Pacific, having previously condemned its former colonial ruler’s attempts to boost defense development as an attempt to restore its position as an “aggressive military power.”
Kim Jong Un inspecting Hwasong-18 ICBM launch vehicles | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Jan. 5, 2024)
With North Korea swearing off diplomacy with the U.S. and its allies and repeatedly affirming its “irreversible” nuclear status in recent years, Yang agreed that the overall situation may not necessarily change from Pyongyang’s perspective during the first Trump presidency.
However, he added that Trump is “stalling for time” on the DPRK as his attention remains elsewhere.
“[Trump] doesn’t care if Kim Jong Un has more than 200 or 300 warheads,” he said. “He just doesn’t want to care about North Korea when dealing with China.”
Edited by Alannah Hill
17. South Korea launches spy satellite from US space base
Two points:
First, the South Korean government continues to function well despite the political turmoil with the presidency.
Second, this will contribute to the continued development of independence warfighting capabilities by the ROK.
South Korea launches spy satellite from US space base
Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · April 22, 2025
South Korea has successfully launched a fourth spy satellite from a U.S. military base, Seoul's military said.
Why It Matters
South Korea has doubled down on its efforts to bolster its space footprint in an attempt to stay ahead of its northern neighbor, which has veered away from long-held policy of reconciliation with the south, casting Seoul as its "principal enemy" and upping military programs.
In this photo provided by South Korea Defense Ministry, South Korea's second military spy satellite lifts off from the Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida, on Sunday April 7, 2024. In this photo provided by South Korea Defense Ministry, South Korea's second military spy satellite lifts off from the Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Florida, on Sunday April 7, 2024. South Korea Defense Ministry via AP
What To Know
South Korea's Defense Ministry said Seoul had launched a new military spy satellite from the U.S. space base at Cape Canaveral, Florida, using a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket, according to South Korea's Yonhap news agency.
The satellite is a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite, which works by sending microwave signals to Earth that are then bounced back to create a detailed radar image, although it looks different from how we are used to seeing satellite images coming out.
Unlike satellites that use optical cameras, SAR satellites don't need a light source like the sun, so they can operate at night. They are impervious to weather conditions that can shroud optical satellite images.
It is the fourth of five satellites Seoul plans to launch this year to track North Korean activity under a deal with billionaire entrepreneur and U.S. presidential confidant Elon Musk's SpaceX firm.
SpaceX said it had launched a Falcon 9 rocket from Cape Canaveral at 8:48 p.m. ET on Monday carrying a satellite belonging to South Korea's Agency for Defense Development.
South Korea launched the first of its five planned spy satellites in late 2023 from the Vandenberg Space Force Base in California, followed by two more in 2024.
Once the fifth satellite is operational, Seoul will be able to carry out reconnaissance of key North Korean sites every two hours, according to the country's Hankook Ilbo daily newspaper.
The South Korean military says the satellites will beef up Seoul's ability to launch pre-emptive strikes on sensitive North Korean military sites deemed a threat to the south, the newspaper reported.
Seoul's "kill chain" strategy includes planning for preemptive attacks on North Korea's nuclear and broader missile facilities if there are signs its northern neighbor is intending to use them. Seoul also has its Korea Air and Missile Defense System to intercept incoming attacks, paired with its Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) plan to hit back at North Korea for any attack on the south.
South Korea said in July 2023 it had examined pieces of a North Korean spy satellite that had crashed into the sea earlier in the year, deeming it had "no military utility as a reconnaissance satellite at all."
North Korea, which is deeply hostile to South Korea's alliance with the U.S, then successfully launched a spy satellite in November 2023, quickly saying it had captured "detailed" images of sensitive U.S. sites like the Pentagon, the White House, and facilities housing U.S. nuclear aircraft carriers.
This was condemned by the United Nations, which levels sanctions aimed at limiting Pyongyang's access to missile technology. The U.S. targeted North Korea with fresh sanctions after the satellite launch.
North and South Korea are still technically at war and have been since an armistice marked the end of the Korean War in 1953.
What People Are Saying
Seok Jong-geon, head of the launch management unit at South Korea's Agency for Defense Development, said in comments reported by South Korea's Hankook Ilbo newspaper: "In order to further enhance our space operation capabilities, we will continue to build domestic ground-based launch sites and work to launch satellites using launch vehicles developed with our own technology."
What Happens Next
The fifth South Korean satellite is expected to launch from the U.S. by the end of the year.
About the writer
Ellie Cook is a Newsweek security and defense reporter based in London, U.K. Her work focuses largely on the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. military, weapons systems and emerging technology. She joined Newsweek in January 2023, having previously worked as a reporter at the Daily Express, and is a graduate of International Journalism at City, University of London. Languages: English, Spanish.You can reach Ellie via email at e.cook@newsweek.com.
Writers Page
Ellie Cook
Ellie Cook is a Newsweek security and defense reporter based in London, U.K. Her work focuses largely on the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. military, weapons systems and emerging technology. She joined Newsweek in January 2023, having previously worked as a reporter at the Daily Express, and is a graduate of International Journalism at City, University of London. Languages: English, Spanish.You can reach Ellie via email at e.cook@newsweek.com.
Ellie Cook is a Newsweek security and defense reporter based in London, U.K. Her work focuses largely on the Russia-Ukraine ...
Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · April 22, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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