​Quotes of the Day:

"The learned man knows that he is ignorant."

- Victor Hugo

"If the freedom of speech is taken away then dumb and silent we may be led, like sheep to the slaughter."

– George Washington

There are risks and costs to action. But they are far less than the long range risks of comfortable inaction.

– John F. Kennedy

1.  Are Drones the Future of War? by Sir Lawrence Freedman

2. How Israel-Aligned Hackers Hobbled Iran’s Financial System

3. Iran Update, June 28, 2025

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2025

5. Largest Patriot Missile Salvo In U.S. Military History Launched Defending Al Udeid Air Base Against Iranian Attack

6. Army unveils plans to acquire two different sizes of autonomous launchers

7. Europe Is Recruiting Academics Disenchanted With America

8. Do most Iranians really hate their regime?

9. The ‘special relationship’: Preparing Britain and America for a new era

10. Gen. Wesley Clark: This is the moment for American leadership in Middle East. We can't miss it.

11. John J. Waters and Adam Ellwanger: Donald Trump succeeds because he understands power and how to use it

12. US Army tailoring Pacific commands for Multi-Domain force

13. How Not to Do Multipolarity

14. EU–Canada Pact: A Quiet Reshaping of the Western Strategic Order

15. Russia Is Ready to Begin Its Summer Offensive

16. Political Violence Is Part of the American Story. It Is Also Changing.

17. China purges senior military official Miao Hua from top ruling body

1. Are Drones the Future of War? by Sir Lawrence Freedman

​Excerpts:

The pace of innovation and the range of military tasks covered is remarkable. To extend their range, large drones have now been developed to serve as motherships for many smaller drones which can be released close to the target. In addition to aerial drones, ground drones attack enemy positions as well as scatter land mines, carry ammunition and help evacuate the wounded. Recently the Ukrainians reported shooting down two Russian SU-fighters with a new homemade system, known as the Magura V7, that launches antiaircraft missiles from a remote-controlled speedboat. An earlier version was reported to have shot down two helicopters last December. Ukraine claims that sea drones have already sunk or damaged 16 Russian warships since the start of the war. Inevitably drones are now fighting other drones, increasingly playing a role in air defences.

Drones are, however, far from unstoppable. There is a constant and intense offence-defence duel. For much of the war defence has involved electronic warfare, jamming the radio signals used to control them. Methods to overcome jammers include rapid switching of signals and using artificial intelligence to allow systems to guide themselves. One of the most effective means is attaching long and thin fibre-optic cables, removing the need for any radio communication, although the wire limits maneuverability and can get caught up in trees or buildings. Here Russia has taken the lead, largely because of its ability to mass produce these ‘fly-by-wire’ drones. There is now a race to develop the next generation drones with AI and machine learning capabilities.

The impact of drones, in all shapes and sizes, performing an extraordinary variety of military tasks, is inescapable. But we also need to be careful. The ‘lessons’ of war are context dependent. Circumstances may flatter certain systems and obscure the role of others.

...

Wherever there is conflict drones are now to be found. Drawing on the experience of the Russo-Ukraine War established military powers are building up their inventories. For this reason alone, drones will increasingly become more capable and continue to provide military options that not would otherwise be available. The ease with which they can be produced, and the attractions of reducing the risks to humans, will continue to compensate for their limited range and payload. But three lessons emerge from the experience in Ukraine thus far. First, their current role in Ukraine is a function of a situation close to deadlock along slow-moving front lines that have been that way for some time. More fluid fronts during the early stages of a future war are unlikely to be quite so saturated with drones. Second, away from the front-line slow long-range drones struggle to penetrate well defended targets and so their impact depends on finding relatively unprotected targets or catching the enemy by surprise. Third, when used in battle, drones are not a substitute for traditional military capabilities – aircraft, armoured vehicles, and artillery – but instead work best when integrated with them....

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Are Drones the Future of War?

Lessons from Ukraine

https://samf.substack.com/p/are-drones-the-future-of-war?

Lawrence Freedman

Jun 29, 2025

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The prominent role of Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, in the Russo-Ukraine War has led to suggestions that we are witnessing a transformational moment in the conduct of war, and can now look forward towards futuristic robotic conflicts fought between machines, loosely controlled by distant humans. Before we get quite that far we can expect to see drones performing an increasing range of military tasks, as a relatively inexpensive way of finding and hitting distant targets.

Drones have been around for almost as long as manned aircraft, but gained attention early in this century as the Americans began to use them as part of the ‘war on terror.’ By the time of President Obama’s first term there were used regularly for targeted assassinations, notably in Afghanistan and Pakistan, justified as a means of reducing threats without having to put troops in harm’s way. Eventually Obama worried about the ethical and legal implications of these attacks. Too often the intelligence was poor and innocents were killed because they suddenly moved into the line of fire without any reason to know they were in danger.

The easy availability of inexpensive commercial drones allowed them to be used by rebels and insurgents to fight stronger armies. During the Syrian civil war repurposed civilian drones began to appear as a simple means of dropping grenades on enemy units in close encounters in urban environments. When Hamas launched its attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, it used off-the-shelf drones to hit cameras and communication towers along the Gaza border to enable its men to advance undetected into Israel.

Once Israel, a pioneer in the development of drones, and with long experience of using them to operate in hostile areas, got the upper hand it used them to survey and increasingly attack Palestinian targets, as well as support ground operations. There have been reports of the use of ‘sniper’ drones, which carry lightweight firearms that can shoot at targets when triggered by remote operators. These have been blamed for many civilian casualties. Robotic versions of other vehicles, including bulldozers, have also been reported.

What makes drone warfare in the Russo-Ukraine War different is that this is a fight between two regular armies. It has been going on long enough to have encouraged innovation in technology and tactics. After the full-scale invasion of February 2022, large drones, essentially unmanned aircraft, such as the Turkish Bayraktar, made a mark until the Russians learned how to deal with them. They were full of expensive equipment yet vulnerable to enemy defences. As they faded away from the front-line there was a shift to smaller and ever more versatile drones that could be mass produced and were sufficiently cheap to be expendable.

Some drones can be used a number of times, often more for surveillance than attack, but most now are used only once. They can be configured for a variety of ranges, so that some can attack targets well to the rear. Support of front-line operations is now dominated by FPV (First Person View) Drones. These have a distinctive square shape, with a propeller at each corner, flying directly into targets, where they can detonate an explosive charge of up to 1.5 kg. Last year both sides produced about a million of these. This year both expect to produce three to four million.

The front-line in Ukraine in now saturated with drones. They make it much harder for any large military units to move in the open without being identified and hit. In the conditions prevailing at the front lines in Ukraine, with a high density of forces on both sides, this has made an enormous difference. Their presence has required changes in tactics, making any forward movement in the open hazardous. Drones have become the major causes of death and injury in battle.

The pace of innovation and the range of military tasks covered is remarkable. To extend their range, large drones have now been developed to serve as motherships for many smaller drones which can be released close to the target. In addition to aerial drones, ground drones attack enemy positions as well as scatter land mines, carry ammunition and help evacuate the wounded. Recently the Ukrainians reported shooting down two Russian SU-fighters with a new homemade system, known as the Magura V7, that launches antiaircraft missiles from a remote-controlled speedboat. An earlier version was reported to have shot down two helicopters last December. Ukraine claims that sea drones have already sunk or damaged 16 Russian warships since the start of the war. Inevitably drones are now fighting other drones, increasingly playing a role in air defences.

Drones are, however, far from unstoppable. There is a constant and intense offence-defence duel. For much of the war defence has involved electronic warfare, jamming the radio signals used to control them. Methods to overcome jammers include rapid switching of signals and using artificial intelligence to allow systems to guide themselves. One of the most effective means is attaching long and thin fibre-optic cables, removing the need for any radio communication, although the wire limits maneuverability and can get caught up in trees or buildings. Here Russia has taken the lead, largely because of its ability to mass produce these ‘fly-by-wire’ drones. There is now a race to develop the next generation drones with AI and machine learning capabilities.

The impact of drones, in all shapes and sizes, performing an extraordinary variety of military tasks, is inescapable. But we also need to be careful. The ‘lessons’ of war are context dependent. Circumstances may flatter certain systems and obscure the role of others.

Land Operations

Although Russia has been on a constant offensive since late 2023, it lacks the capacity to conduct a classic armoured manoeuvre. It relies on small units moving forward on motorbikes, buggies, and foot, along a broad front. The extraordinarily heavy casualty rate would be considered alarming by most armies but Russia’s generals do not seem to worry so long as they have a continuing supply of recruits.

Ukraine’s problem is that it does not have enough troops. Even as a defender it is hard to survive in the front line. It is not just drones. Glide bombs, which Russia now produces in large numbers, when released from a distance, can have devastating effects, as well as artillery fire. It means that Ukrainian troops must stay dispersed and, as much as possible, concealed. But dispersed forces leave gaps, and these can be exploited by any Russian troops who make it through the Ukrainian fire. If these small salients combine to become something more substantial, then Ukrainian forces need to withdraw to more secure defensive lines.

They have sought to identify likely Russian attack routes to mine them and subject them to intensive fire when troops appear. This requires preventing Russian surveillance drones from spotting their positions, often by taking them out with their own drone interceptors. Russia has, however, realised that if they can take out the radar stations and pilots who are working these drones then Ukrainian positions will become more vulnerable. The Economist describes one elite Russian unit called Rubikon that:

‘strikes deep by using large “mothership” drones that deploy smaller ones controlled by fibre-optic cables, along with wireless drones that operate on hard-to-intercept frequencies.’

In an analysis of last year’s warfare for RUSI, Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds explain why context must be kept in mind when talking about drones. Drone operations can be affected by the weather, jamming, and the difficulty of mounting complex operations with multiple vehicles. They note that between 60% and 80% of Ukrainian FPV drones failed to reach their targets, and if their targets were armoured vehicles they were often not destroyed. They were still accounting for 60–70% of damaged and destroyed Russian systems, with enemy infantry suffering the most, but that reflected shortages of other forms of firepower, and in particular artillery, as much as the superior quality of drones. They cite Ukrainian officers emphasising that:

‘UAVs alone were inadequate and that they were most effective when used in combination with artillery. For example, artillery was effective at suppressing or displacing EW [electronic warfare] and air defences or suppressing infantry protecting key targets from bomber UAVs. Artillery was also able to defend the front in poor weather and was generally more responsive. Combined UAV and artillery operations often maximised the destruction achieved with, for example, an FPV immobilising a vehicle and artillery killing dismounts as they emerged.’

Although these combined strikes were most effective, Ukrainian officers noted that they were rarely able to achieve this effect because of a scarcity of artillery.

A similar, though even more sceptical verdict, comes from Jakub Jajcay, until recently a member of a Ukrainian FPV drone team. Often their apparent successes involved no more than hitting targets that had already been hit by other systems, such as a mortar or a munition dropped from a re-usable drone. They were ‘finicky, unreliable, hard to use, and susceptible to electronic interference’, and most lacked a night-vision capability. Not enough time was spent training the operators. While FPV drones were relatively cheap ($500 a sortie) a mortar shell or a grenade dropped from a reusable drone was cheaper ($100), and mortars, like artillery, ‘can’t be stopped by bad weather, jamming, or crowded frequencies. Nor can they be impeded by the dark.’ But this restates the problem. Ukraine didn’t have enough artillery pieces and ammunition so drones filled a gap.

The point is not that FPV drones are better than classical forms of firepower - they are just more available. More of the classic forms and they play less of a role. The most transformational aspect of drones may turn out to be the close surveillance of the front lines. The resultant transparency is what makes it hard for enemy forces to advance without being seen and then struck. But drones cannot win wars on their own and have not rendered armoured vehicles, let alone artillery, obsolete. Their value grows the more they can be integrated with other systems.

Russian Long-Range Drones

The importance of context and supporting systems is also evident when we look at the role being played by drones in long-range strikes.

The Russians have been attacking civilian targets in Ukraine from early in the war and this has been stepped up this year. From the start of 2025 to early June, according to President Zelenskyy, the Russian military attacked Ukraine with nearly 27,700 aerial bombs, almost 11,200 Shahed drones, about 9,000 other attack strike drones, and more than 700 missiles.

In previous years, campaigns began in late autumn and continued through the winter, concentrating on critical infrastructure and in particular electricity supplies. At times these campaigns appeared close to success. There was a moment in late 2022 when there were concerns that cities such as Kyiv might become uninhabitable and would need to be evacuated. The recent winter was survived, despite regular blackouts, largely because of was quite mild and Ukrainian ingenuity in repairing broken facilities.

As can be seen from the chart below, taken from the Institute for the Study of War, the attacks were daily and relentless until the spring. Then they subsided in April, but picked up in May (the break was Putin’s unilaterally-declared ceasefire to allow his 9 May victory parade to take place). Since then the most significant feature has been the sheer scale of these strikes.

This largely reflects the numbers of One Way Attack (OWA) drones that they are now able to produce. Mark Urban notes that the production of Geran-2 drones (derived from the Iranian Shahed) with a range of up to 1,500 km, has been raised to 5,200 units a month, of which about half are decoys. It could go higher. In April 2024 they used 400 of these in a month. Now that happens on a regular if not quite daily basis. On 10 June the BBC reported that Russia had fired an average of 256 projectiles every 24 hours so far that month. Thus 472, 407, 479, and 379 drones were used in raids on 1, 5, 8, and 9 June respectively. The figures for accompanying ballistic and cruise missiles were much smaller - 7, 42, 20, and 7 respectively. An attack involving 440 drones, 30 Kh-101 cruise missiles and two Kinzhal ballistic missiles hit Kyiv on 17 June, killing 30 and injuring 172.

These attacks come from multiple directions against a wide range of targets, across many locations, complicating the challenge for air defences. Ukraine is not helpless in the face of these attacks. They have a system of acoustic detection, linking mobile phones that pick up the noise of the incoming engines, and then, as Urban notes, using ‘jammers, planes, and thousands of very old fashioned-looking anti-aircraft guns to bring them down.’ Very few reach their targets, although they can cause damage when they do, along with debris from those shot down. Although the size of the attacks means that the defences are stretched, most drones fail to reach their targets.

It is the missiles – in particular Russian Iskander-M and North Korean KN-23 Ballistic-Missiles, along with air- and sea-launched cruise-missiles, that do the most damage. Although Patriot batteries protect Kyiv, elsewhere air defences can normally do little against ballistic missiles. Inevitably these strikes cause loss of life and are disruptive. The damage is rarely so extensive that it cannot be repaired, although that is less the case with specialist facilities. In this respect Iskander-M production moving from 40 to 60/70 a month, and Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile doubling, is more concerning than drone production numbers.

The Russians do target military sites, such as air bases. Ukraine (unusually) acknowledged one attack on 1 June had hit an army training area, killing at least 12 soldiers and wounding many more. (This led to the ground forces commander Mykhailo Drapaty accepting responsibility and offering his resignation). But they are largely geared to weakening civil society and the economy.

For Ukrainians these mass attacks are exhausting and frightening but there is no evidence that they are having much effect on Ukraine’s willingness and ability to conduct the war. This would fit in with the history of comparable campaigns. However unpleasant for the population they make little difference to the outcome of wars. The evidence from the mass air raids of the Second World War, from the London Blitz, though the devastation of Hamburg and Dresden, and on to the fire-bombing of Tokyo, all on a far, far greater scale than the attacks on Ukraine, confirms that people are adaptable and resilient.

These attacks demonstrate that drones certainly complicate the challenges for air defences but by themselves have only a limited impact, certainly when compared to cruise and ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian attacks and Spiderweb

What then of Ukraine’s efforts to use drones to attack targets deep into Russia?

The Ukrainians argue that compared with Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian cities, which cause limited damage, they have used their long-range drones more strategically to attack targets that are more likely to affect the course of the war. Hence they claim (and I can’t verify):

‘targeted Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries in spring 2024 dealt a blow equivalent to more than two years of sanctions. These operations also significantly reduced Russian artillery shelling by disrupting ammunition depots, cutting the intensity of attacks by 1.5 times.’

​Over the first 11 months of 2024, of the1.2 million UAVs delivered to Ukrainian armed forces, 6,000 were long-range OWA drones. In December Zelenskyy directed that Ukraine must manufacture no fewer than 30,000 of these over the coming year. On 6 May Ukraine unveiled one of these, already in production. The FP-1 uses commercially available parts, with a range of up to 1,600 km that can carry a warhead of up to 120 kg. (There is a trade-off between reach and payload). It was described as a means to attack Russia’s staging areas, logistic hubs, and command centres, all well to the rear and beyond the range of conventional artillery or shorter-range drones.

Ukraine has repurposed its Neptune anti-ship missile (used in April 2022 to sink the Russian cruiser Moskva), into a cruise missile with an operational range of 1,000 km and an explosive payload of 300 kg (compared with no more than 50 kg for long-range drone). They are also working on a family of weapons that are a cross between a conventional cruise missiles and drones, with small turbojet engine to enable it to cover significant distances, although less than the Neptune. According to Defence Minister Rustem Umerov a decision was taken in early June, presumably in response to the mass Russian attacks against Kyiv and other Russian cities,

‘to increase the number of operations severalfold, and new contracts for tens of thousands of long-range drones are already being prepared to ramp up the intensity and scale of strikes.’

Ukrainian OWA drone attacks only began in late 2022. They picked up during 2023. By 1 September 2023 more than 190 had been confirmed, mostly in adjacent regions in Russia, as well as Crimea. These included about a dozen sea drone attacks on Russian targets in the Black Sea, including on naval bases and on the Crimean bridge, a few, largely symbolic attacks in the Moscow region (about 450km from the border), and the sustained campaign against oil depots and refineries. Early in 2024 there were strikes against oil and gas terminals to impede oil exports. They have since attacked weapons factories, electrical substations, arms depots and command centres with varying degrees of success.

Through all this period there were regular attempts to hit air bases and parked aircraft. There is one very important feature that distinguishes the successful from the unsuccessful attacks.

With long-range drones there has been only limited impact. In a particularly ambitious attack on 5 April 2024, four airbases in western Russia were attacked with a barrage of drones. Despite Ukrainian claims of significant damage to military aircraft at all bases, this was not only denied by the Russians but the Institute for the Study of War found no visual evidence of Russian aircraft being hit. More successful was a strike on 8 June 2024 when one modern Su-57 fighter jet was damaged at the Akhtubinsk air base (although it is not clear by how much). In other attacks that year fuel and munitions do seem to have been set ablaze on occasion but no aircraft.

There have, however, been other drone strikes which were more successful in destroying aircraft. In these cases the attacks were launched from inside Russia. The first reported drone attack on Russian territory, using a type of drone left over from the Soviet era, was in December 2022 against the Engels and Dyagilevo air bases. This reportedly caused damage to a couple of TU-95s. As these bases were some distance from the border there was speculation that this could only have been achieved if launched from within Rusia.

The Ukrainians claimed that an attack on 19 August 2023 which left a Tupolev Tu-22 (Backfire) bombers ablaze at an airbase south of St Petersburg had been launched by agents from inside Russia. The same claim was also made about an attack on 1 September 2023 on an airbase in Pskov, which led to two Ilyushin cargo planes being destroyed with another two damaged. (Russia confirmed only damage). Then on 18 September 2023 Ukrainian military intelligence reported that individuals managed to detonate explosives on aircraft and a helicopter at a base near Moscow. On 3 January 2024, there was another report of a saboteur setting a Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber set on fire at Chelyabinsk Shagol Airport.

Significantly two Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the Olenya air base in Murmansk Oblast, some 1,800 km from the Ukrainian border, damaging two Tu-22M3s. When asked about how this operation was carried out and with what weaponry, Defence Intelligence replied: ‘Some good people used some good drones.’

The ingenious ‘Spiderweb’ operation of 1 June 2025, which also included Olenya airbase, therefore, was not so much a novel and unique development but a much more ambitious version of an approach that had already been followed for some time. The limitations of long-range drones as a means of attacking distant air bases meant that there was more chance of causing real damage by getting up close, and this required special forces infiltrating the drones into Russia.

The story of how a fake freight business was established to hire trucks and drivers, parts of drones smuggled in to be reassembled, put into containers that looked like mobile wooden cabins, and then transported on flatbed trucks, is now well known. Once the trucks were parked the lids of the containers were opened remotely (one appears to have opened even while the truck was still in motion) and the drones were released and guided to their targets by distant operators. There was nothing remarkable or innovative about the actual drones. Their payloads were quite small (3.23 kg) and they were guided using an open-source software ArduPilot, which supports navigation via dead reckoning so there was no need for satellite navigation. SIM cards may have enabled local telephone networks to be used to control them.

One of the attacks failed because the truck carrying the drones caught fire and exploded. With another no targets of any importance were hit. And in a third the domes of two A-50 airborne and early warning aircraft were hit, which may not have been as significant as first supposed as these aircraft were no longer operational. The main damage was done at Olenya and the Belaya airbase in Irkutsk, with eight bombers destroyed, plus four possible, and one transport plane. In another attack, on 28 June, about which details are still sketchy, drones were used by special forces against the Marinovka airfield in Russia's Volgograd Oblast, with a claim that two Su-34 fighter jets were destroyed and two others damaged.

All the ingenuity was necessary to turn short-range drones into long-range. As more and better long-range drones and missiles become available this may no longer be required. Nonetheless, it will be difficult for some time to regularly hit targets well away from the border. Russia’s problem is that it offers too many targets and not all can be defended against what may still seem to be improbable threats. For now, the further they must travel the more likely theta OWA drones will be detected and brought down.

The current limitations of drones for long-range strikes were confirmed by the recent exchanges between Israel and Iran. Iran struggled with both missiles and drones. Iran launched between 500 and 550 ballistic missiles, about half the number planned. Between 80 and 90% of these were intercepted. Of those that hit Israeli territory only a few hit military sites and a couple struck energy infrastructure. Most hit civilian areas. Of all the drones launched, only one had an impact. (Although most of their drone strikes were also unsuccessful, one from the Yemeni Houthis caught Israel by surprise, and hit Tel Aviv on 19 July 2024, resulting in one fatality and ten injuries). Another comparison to note is that Israel smuggled weapons and special forces into Iran to a drone base close to Teheran, from which weapons were launched on 12 June.

Wherever there is conflict drones are now to be found. Drawing on the experience of the Russo-Ukraine War established military powers are building up their inventories. For this reason alone, drones will increasingly become more capable and continue to provide military options that not would otherwise be available. The ease with which they can be produced, and the attractions of reducing the risks to humans, will continue to compensate for their limited range and payload. But three lessons emerge from the experience in Ukraine thus far. First, their current role in Ukraine is a function of a situation close to deadlock along slow-moving front lines that have been that way for some time. More fluid fronts during the early stages of a future war are unlikely to be quite so saturated with drones. Second, away from the front-line slow long-range drones struggle to penetrate well defended targets and so their impact depends on finding relatively unprotected targets or catching the enemy by surprise. Third, when used in battle, drones are not a substitute for traditional military capabilities – aircraft, armoured vehicles, and artillery – but instead work best when integrated with them.

2. How Israel-Aligned Hackers Hobbled Iran’s Financial System

​Excerpts:

Predatory Sparrow, which operates anonymously and posts updates of its activities on X, said this past week that it crippled Iran’s state-owned Bank Sepah, which services Iran’s armed forces and helps them pay suppliers abroad, knocking out its online banking services and cash machines. Iranian state media acknowledged the damage.

The group also breached Nobitex, Iran’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, popular with locals for transferring money overseas. The hackers extracted about $100 million in funds and forced the platform to shut down, according to the exchange.

Iran’s government pulled the plug on much of the country’s online activities to prevent further attacks and keep a lid on dissent. Non-Iranian websites were blocked. Citizens were warned against using foreign phones or messaging platforms that it claimed could collect audio and location data for Israeli spies. Government officials were banned from using laptops and smartwatches.

Predatory Sparrow said the two hacks were directed against the “financial lifelines” of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the most powerful faction of Iran’s military that also controls swaths of the economy. “Noble people of Iran! Withdraw your funds before it is too late,” it tweeted.

Both targeted companies remain hobbled. Nobitex said it faced serious challenges in restoring services and was aiming to relaunch trading this coming week. Some Bank Sepah users say online they still aren’t receiving deposits.

How Israel-Aligned Hackers Hobbled Iran’s Financial System

Broken cash machines, halted payments and a crippled crypto exchange were all the result of pro-Israeli efforts

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-israel-aligned-hackers-hobbled-irans-financial-system-fb1b0376

By Angus Berwick

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Updated June 29, 2025 12:01 am ET

Iranians faced restrictions on internet access this month as their government sought to prevent cyberattacks. Photo: Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images

Key Points

What's This?

• Israel and a pro-Israeli hacking group targeted Iran’s financial infrastructure as the two countries exchanged fire.
• Predatory Sparrow claimed responsibility for hacking Bank Sepah and crypto exchange Nobitex, causing significant disruptions.
• Iran faces economic challenges due to U.S. sanctions, with crypto emerging as a vital workaround for international payments.

While Israel and the U.S. were bombing Iran’s nuclear sites, another battlefield emerged behind the scenes: the financial infrastructure that keeps Tehran connected to the world.

Israeli authorities, and a pro-Israeli hacking group called Predatory Sparrow, targeted financial organizations that Iranians use to move money and sidestep the U.S.-led economic blockade, according to Israeli officials and other people familiar with the efforts. U.S. sanctions, imposed off-and-on for decades due to Tehran’s nuclear program and support for Islamist groups, have aimed to cut Iran off from the international financial system.

Predatory Sparrow, which operates anonymously and posts updates of its activities on X, said this past week that it crippled Iran’s state-owned Bank Sepah, which services Iran’s armed forces and helps them pay suppliers abroad, knocking out its online banking services and cash machines. Iranian state media acknowledged the damage.

The group also breached Nobitex, Iran’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, popular with locals for transferring money overseas. The hackers extracted about $100 million in funds and forced the platform to shut down, according to the exchange.

Iran’s government pulled the plug on much of the country’s online activities to prevent further attacks and keep a lid on dissent. Non-Iranian websites were blocked. Citizens were warned against using foreign phones or messaging platforms that it claimed could collect audio and location data for Israeli spies. Government officials were banned from using laptops and smartwatches.

Predatory Sparrow said the two hacks were directed against the “financial lifelines” of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the most powerful faction of Iran’s military that also controls swaths of the economy. “Noble people of Iran! Withdraw your funds before it is too late,” it tweeted.

Both targeted companies remain hobbled. Nobitex said it faced serious challenges in restoring services and was aiming to relaunch trading this coming week. Some Bank Sepah users say online they still aren’t receiving deposits.

At Iran’s state-owned Bank Sepah, many cash machines stopped working when the cyberattacks hit. Photo: atta kenare/AFP/Getty Images

The group didn’t say if it was acting on behalf of Israeli authorities. “The group’s sophistication, target selection and geopolitical messaging fit the profile of an Israel-aligned, state-sponsored cyber actor,” said Deddy Lavid, chief executive of Cyvers, a Tel Aviv-based cybersecurity firm.

Predatory Sparrow didn’t respond to requests for comment sent to the administrator of its Telegram group.

The cyberattacks hit an economy already battered by U.S. sanctions that bar the purchase of Iran’s oil or interactions with its banks. Iran’s economy is highly dependent on a select few trading partners, notably China. Annual inflation runs above 40%, according to the World Bank. A constant flight of skilled workers has also throttled Iran’s economic growth.

Israel confirmed a cease-fire with Iran on Tuesday. But cybersecurity experts and Israeli officials expect the cyberwarfare to continue. “Israel will likely keep launching precision cyberstrikes against the regime’s power centers,” said Lavid.

Officials at Israel’s National Bureau for Counter-Terror Financing said they didn’t have information on links between Predatory Sparrow and Israeli authorities. They said Israel was broadly targeting the economic infrastructure that allowed Iran to finance its military and proxies, imposing sanctions earlier this month on its central bank and other banks used by the IRGC.

The NBCTF, which is overseen by the defense ministry, plans to issue orders to exchanges outside Iran to help it seize more of Nobitex’s crypto holdings. It has identified a further $150 million in funds held by Nobitex, the officials said.

Pro-Iran cyber groups have hit back, targeting Israeli government websites with denial-of-service attacks, in which hackers aim to overwhelm computers that route internet traffic with a flood of requests, and sending phishing messages to Israelis in a bid to compromise their phones. The Israel National Cyber Directorate said Iran’s cyberattacks hadn’t caused damage in recent weeks.

Paranoia swept through the Iranian population as the attacks, both physical and cyber, mounted. “It’s better to cut [the internet] off. Israel can see everything,” said Mohammad Ghorbaniyan, a Tehran-based money changer whom the U.S. sanctioned several years ago for allegedly aiding Iranian hackers, an accusation he denies.

As Iranians feel the effects of international banking sanctions, some have turned to crypto as a workaround. Photo: Getty Images

The Bank Sepah hack last Tuesday halted payments, including salaries owed to military retirees, according to Fars News Agency, which is controlled by the IRGC. Many of its cash machines stopped working. The U.S. Treasury Department said last year that Bank Sepah, which has branches on Iranian military bases, helps Iran’s defense ministry pay foreign suppliers via a sprawling shadow-banking network.

Nobitex went offline the next day. The Tehran-based crypto exchange has processed transactions in excess of about $22 billion for users since its 2017 launch, according to blockchain research firms and the officials from Israel’s NBCTF. 

“This attack had political motives to create emotional distress and damage the Iranian people’s property,” Nobitex’s chief executive, Amir Rad, said in a video posted on its Telegram channel.

As in Russia and other countries cut off from international finance, cryptocurrencies, in particular dollar-pegged stablecoins such as tether, have emerged as a vital workaround in Iran, providing a medium through which users can shift money between local and foreign banks.

Nobitex’s 11 million customers use the platform to swap Iranian rials for tether, which they can convert into other traditional currencies abroad. Rad has said on his LinkedIn account that Nobitex’s goal is to allow Iranians to trade crypto despite “the shadow of sanctions.”

“Nobitex has been the main option for the Iranians to skip the sanctions,” said Amit Levin, a former Israeli prosecutor and ex-investigator at the Binance crypto exchange who now advises companies on financial-crime compliance.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had also turned to Nobitex for international payments, according to the Israeli officials and blockchain researchers. Crypto analytics firm Elliptic has found that two IRGC operatives, whom the U.S. accused of conducting ransomware attacks on American companies, used Nobitex to make transfers.

Rad said he didn’t believe that the IRGC was moving money through Nobitex because he operated a transparent platform that was closely monitored.

Predatory Sparrow has been wreaking havoc on Iran since at least 2021. In earlier hacks, the group disabled gas-station payment systems across the country and triggered a fire at an Iranian steel plant. 

For their operation against Nobitex, the hackers managed to obtain the keys for the exchange’s cryptocurrency wallets, which were held by key personnel within the company, said Rad.

Predatory Sparrow then “burned” the stolen $100 million by sending the tokens to other digital wallets the group itself couldn’t access. These wallets’ addresses, which are made up of long strings of numbers and letters, contained profane phrases like “F—IRGCterrorists.”

Nobitex’s initial investigation into the breach indicated that Israel’s government had likely supported it, Rad said, though he declined to provide proof of his claim. He said Nobitex was a private, independent company with no affiliation to the Iranian state, including the IRGC.

Write to Angus Berwick at angus.berwick@wsj.com

3. Iran Update, June 28, 2025

Iran Update, June 28, 2025

Jun 28, 2025 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-28-2025

Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells,

Ria Reddy, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Click here to view ISW–CTP's interactive control-of-terrain map of Syria.

Click here to view ISW's complete portfolio of interactive maps.

US and Israeli airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) between June 12 and 24 reportedly destroyed components of Iran’s nuclear program that would be necessary for weaponization. The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization. This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on June 24 that the plant was not operational before it was struck. Israel launched an air campaign on June 12 with the stated objective of degrading, disrupting, and removing the threat of the Iranian nuclear program. The destruction of Iran’s metallization process and the loss of several Iranian nuclear scientists would hinder Iran’s ability to turn weapons-grade uranium, or 90 percent enriched uranium, into a usable nuclear weapon. The Israeli campaign has also “effectively destroyed” Iran’s enrichment capacity.

Key Takeaways:

• US and Israeli airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) between June 12 and 24 reportedly destroyed components of Iran’s nuclear program that would be necessary for weaponization. The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization. This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb.

• Iran may have begun repair operations at the Natanz Enrichment Complex. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 shows that Iran has filled in a crater that was formed by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. The imagery shows what appears to be two tents and a truck present at the impact site.

• Israeli strikes targeted senior Iranian military and security officials across multiple branches, likely in an effort to degrade Iran’s command and control structure. Iranian media confirmed on June 28 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed 56 Artesh members, including at least three Artesh generals and 16 conscript soldiers. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on June 28 that Israeli strikes killed Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Intelligence Organization Deputy Director Brigadier General Mehdi Nemati. Nemati reportedly fought alongside former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Iraq and Syria for several years.

• Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani called on regime officials to resolve “disputes” with the Iranian population through “mutual understanding” in an interview on June 28. Shamkhani claimed that nuclear negotiations with the United States are a “deceptive plan” that seeks to “provoke unrest” and “prepare the atmosphere inside Iran” for protests. Shamkhani’s statements come as the Iranian regime has taken steps to securitize the country since the Iran-Israel ceasefire went into effect on June 24.

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2025

Support ISWOlivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan



June 28, 2025, 3:15 pm ET 

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.

Click here to view our special reports since 2025.

Click here to read the biweekly "Russian Occupation Update."

Click here to read the weekly "Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update."

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on June 28 that the SBU conducted a drone strike that destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system and three combat helicopters — Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28 — at the Kirovske Air Base in occupied Crimea on the night of June 27 and 28. The SBU noted that the strike also caused a secondary explosion at the airfield. A local Crimean source reported on June 28 that the strike caused five to six explosions and likely damaged an ammunition depot, warehouses, and air defense facilities, and set at least one combat helicopter on fire. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 27 that Ukrainian Special Forces and the SBU struck the Marinovka Air Base in Volgograd Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27 and damaged four Su-34 aircraft and a technical maintenance facility. The Ukrainian General Staff is conducting ongoing battle damage assessments (BDA). An unspecified intelligence source told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted several drone strikes targeting facilities linked to the 120th arsenal of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) in Bryansk Oblast and that Ukrainian authorities are conducting BDA. An unspecified intelligence source reported on June 26 that the GUR conducted a drone strike against a fuel and lubricants depot located at the GRU's 1061st MTZ Center in Bryansk Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27. Residents reported heavy gunfire and a series of explosions and noted that the oil depot was on fire.

Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on June 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb on the outskirts of Dnipro City. A local Ukrainian air defender in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Russian forces may have deployed an experimental KAB guided glide bomb as part of ongoing efforts to increase the range of KAB bombs. The local source stated that Russia has long used jet engines on the bomb to increase its range and likely used a bomb with a lighter warhead against Dnipro City to decrease the weight and increase the range of the bomb. The source also stated that Russian forces may have launched the bomb from a plane as close to Dnipro City as possible. Ukrainian political scientist and design engineer at satellite and rocket design enterprise Pivdnenne Design Office Oleksandr Kochetkov told Suspilne on June 28 that Russia created the Grom-1 as part of an effort to increase the range and accuracy of KAB bombs in order to preserve Russian aircraft that launch the bombs. Kochetkov stated that Grom-1 is a hybrid of a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile and uses the Kh-38 missile’s engine, which gives the bomb a range of 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov noted that Russian forces used the Grom-1 possibly for the first time in August 2024 during a strike against Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, and that Russia is not yet mass producing Grom-1 missile-bombs.

Ukrainian outlet New Voice assessed on June 27 that satellite imagery from early October 2024 and June 2025 shows that Russia is expanding its Shahed factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan. The imagery shows that Russia has built four new sites at the Alabuga SEZ spanning about 163 hectares between October 2024 and June 2025, and that another 30-hectare site is currently under construction. New Voice reported that the new construction includes dormitories for factory workers and that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously assessed in June 2025 that laborers are Russia's main need to increase its drone production. New Voice noted that the GUR reported on June 21 that Russia produces up to 170 Shahed and decoy drones daily and that production rates may increase to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025. Japanese outlet NHK reported on June 19, citing unspecified Western and Russian diplomatic sources, that North Korea is “considering” sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ, and dormitory construction may be related to this possible influx of workers in the future.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28.

• Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.

5. Largest Patriot Missile Salvo In U.S. Military History Launched Defending Al Udeid Air Base Against Iranian Attack

​When the US Patriots units return to Korea and Japan their soldiers will be proven in combat.

Note the US strategic agility to deploy forces where they are needed around the world.

Excerpts:

The Patriot crews defending Al Udeid at this point were deployed from Korea and Japan “as part of our U.S. forces there to ensure that we had the most capable missiles in the CENTCOM area of responsibility,” Caine added. This was part of a much larger move to boost U.S. forces in the region as tensions with Iran over its nuclear program mounted. As we reported before, that included the influx of Navy vessels and Air Force F-16, F-22 and F-35 fighters and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers.

Largest Patriot Missile Salvo In U.S. Military History Launched Defending Al Udeid Air Base Against Iranian Attack

The Pentagon's top officer offered new details about how air defense crews at Al Udeid Air Base knocked down incoming Iranian missiles.

Howard Altman

Updated Jun 26, 2025 3:24 PM EDT

twz.com · by Howard Altman

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

As Iranian ballistic missiles were flying toward a nearly empty Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar on Monday, a small crew of air defenders stayed behind to protect the largest American military installation in the Middle East. Thursday morning, Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered new details about that effort, which he said resulted in the largest single-event launch of Patriot interceptors in U.S. military history. You can read more about that attack in our initial reporting here.

Monday morning, three days after the Operation Midnight Hammer attack by U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bombers dropping 14 30,000-pound GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker buster bombs on Iran’s Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities, “we began to receive indications and warnings that Iran intended to attack U.S bases in the region that morning,” Caine told reporters, including from The War Zone.

As a result, in consultation with U.S. CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered Al Udeid and other bases around the region to “assume a minimum force posture,” said Caine. As we previously noted, satellite images showed that most aircraft had left Al Udeid days before, and Navy ships departed from their base in Bahrain in anticipation of an Iranian response to any U.S. actions. You can see satellite imagery indicating the departure of aircraft from Al Udied below.

Very interesting: Low-res satellite images show Qatar’s Al-Udeid Air Base nearly empty, with aircraft parking areas cleared.

U.S., UK, and Qatari jets appear to have been relocated over fears of possible Iranian strikes. pic.twitter.com/HsGTOHPzHh

— Clash Report (@clashreport) June 18, 2025

“Most folks had moved off the base to extend the security perimeter out away from what we assessed might be a target zone,” Caine explained. “Except for a very few Army soldiers at Al Udeid.”

At that point, “only two Patriot batteries remained on base, roughly 44 American soldiers responsible for defending the entire base, to include CENTCOM forward headquarters in the Middle East…and all the U.S. forces there,” said Caine.

The oldest soldier was a 28-year-old captain,” Caine pointed out. “The youngest was a 21-year-old private who’s been in the military for less than two years.”

WATCH: @thejointstaff Chairman Gen. Dan 'Raizin' Caine tells the story of the brave Patriot missile defense crews who led the defense of Al Udeid air base from Iran's counter strikes:

"The oldest soldier was a 28-year-old captain. The youngest was a 21-year-old private who had… pic.twitter.com/mxg6HXysn6

— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) June 26, 2025

Caine tried to offer some insights into what it must have been like for those troops waiting for the Iranian barrage.

“So let’s put ourselves out there for a second,” Caine posited. “Imagine you’re that young First Lieutenant. You’re 25 or 26 years old, and you’ve been assigned as the tactical director inside the command and control element. Sitting next to you is the early warning operator, whose job is to notify you of an imminent attack. There’s five people inside a vehicle and five people outside of a vehicle around these for a total of, as I said, of 44. By the way, you’ve sat in the Middle East for years, deployed over and over again, extended multiple times, always being prepared but unsure of when that particular day will come that you must execute your mission and not fail at doing it.”

Pfc. Michael Schultz, 1-62 Delta Battery Air Defense Artillery Regiment Patriot station launcher operator and maintainer from Tampa, Fla., raises the launching station catwalks on a Patriot missile battery in preparation for reload operations during an operational readiness exercise at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, March 4. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. James Hodgman/Released) Tech. Sgt. James Hodgman

The Patriot crews defending Al Udeid at this point were deployed from Korea and Japan “as part of our U.S. forces there to ensure that we had the most capable missiles in the CENTCOM area of responsibility,” Caine added. This was part of a much larger move to boost U.S. forces in the region as tensions with Iran over its nuclear program mounted. As we reported before, that included the influx of Navy vessels and Air Force F-16, F-22 and F-35 fighters and KC-135 aerial refueling tankers.

“As the day continues, you start to hear more and more chatter in the information space about an impending attack. And, as the sun starts to set in the west, you get orders from your higher headquarters to make sure that your missile batteries are pointed to the north,” Caine further explained. “There are just a few other teammates. It’s hot. You’re getting nervous, and you expect an attack outside of those Patriot vehicles. Your hot crew, which is one NCO and four additional soldiers, turns a key and relinquishes control of those missiles to that young lieutenant inside the vehicle. And you wait, you know that you’re going to have approximately two minutes, 120 seconds to either succeed or fail.”

Adding to that stress on the troops is that their air defense battery would be at the top of Iran’s targeting list in a ballistic missile attack. Taking out the Patriots would have enabled a much easier path for the rest of the missiles and left the base vulnerable for follow-on attacks.

Pfc. James Weaver, 1-62 Delta Battery Air Defense Artillery Regiment Patriot station launcher operator and maintainer from Steelville, Mo., unlocks torque tubes behind a PAC-2 missile interceptor during an operational readiness exercise at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, March 4. The Patriot missiles at AUAB protect the base from a variety of airborne threats including tactical ballistic missiles and drones. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. James Hodgman/Released) Tech. Sgt. James Hodgman

At about 7:30 PM local time (12:30 Eastern), “as the sun sets in the west, Iran attacks as the targets were detected,” Caine told reporters. “Round after round of Patriot missiles are ejected from their canisters by an initial launch charge. Then the main solid rocket motor ignites. You can feel this in your body if you’ve ever been around a Patriot taking a shot. And round after round goes out and guides against those missiles coming in.”

The defense, said Caine, was historic.

“We believe that this is the largest single Patriot engagement in US military history,” Caine posited. “And we were joined in this engagement by the Qatari Patriot crews.”

Caine declined to say how many interceptors were fired, “but it was a bunch.”

Based on Army doctrine and the early warning, David Shank, a retired Army colonel and former commandant of the Army Air Defense Artillery School at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, told us he estimated that there were between two and four interceptors fired per incoming missile. Trump previously said that Iran warned that it would launch 14 missiles at Al Udeid, a symbolic response to the number of MOPs dropped by the U.S. on its nuclear facilities.

LMAO…WATCH: Trump on the Iranian launches at the American base in Qatar: The Iranians asked us if one o'clock (US time) was convenient for us? I replied that it was okay… pic.twitter.com/sxHu33DDEN

— Raylan Givens (@JewishWarrior13) June 25, 2025

Caine went on to explain how much material was falling as the interceptions were taking place.

“What we do know is there was a lot of metal flying around between attacking missiles being hit by Patriots, boosters from attacking missiles being hit by Patriots, the Patriots themselves flying around, and the debris from those Patriots hitting the ground,” Caine stated. “There was a lot of metal flying around, and yet our U.S. air defenders had only seconds to make complex decisions with strategic impact.”

Those troops, he added, are awesome humans [who] along with their Qatari brothers and sisters in arms, stood between a salvo of Iranian missiles and the safety of Al Udeid. They are the unsung heroes of the 21st-century United States Army. And I know a lot of you have seen the videos online and the excitement as those Patriots departed their launchers and went up… This really demonstrates the combat capability and capacity of our Army air defenders. Simply stated, they absolutely crushed it.”

Footage of a US/Qatari PATRIOT surface to air missile system conducting a large ballistic missile engagement over Al-Udeid this evening, salvoing out dozens of PAC-3 interceptors at incoming Iranian ballistic missiles. pic.twitter.com/a7OHrs9svr

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 23, 2025

More footage of US Patriot batteries intercepting Iranian ballistic missiles fired at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

These ballistic missiles, fired by Iran, were directly targeting US personnel and assets in the middle-east, for clarity. https://t.co/E9jdpF6pwf pic.twitter.com/mcukeYqZVt

— FUNKER530 (@FunkerActual) June 23, 2025

Patriot PAC-3 Air Defence Systems intercepting incoming Iranian missiles aimed at Al-Udeid Base in Doha, Qatar. pic.twitter.com/iehXnWuZsv

— Javed Iqbal (@JavedIqbalReal) June 23, 2025

The success of the Al Udeid interceptions follows unprecedented experience garnered by Ukraine in defending against complex attacks from Russia with the Patriot system. Saudi Arabia’s fight against the Houthis prior to the Ukraine war also provided a lot of real-world data. These previous experiences have been used to update software, refine tactics, and develop improvements to the Patriot system that have significantly enhanced its capabilities and helped dictate its future growth pathway. This future will include the LTAMDS (Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor), a new radar that the Army is working to field now, primarily as an upgrade for the Patriot surface-to-air missile system. Among many other improvements, it will feature 360-degree coverage in a single radar system, something the Patriot lacks now.

Patriot batted 1000 today. A lot of software improvements for Patriot have come out of the war in Ukraine. Saudi's defense against the Houthis as well, but I have been told Ukraine was a huge leap. Mounds of constant data from real engagements used to tweak the system.

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) June 23, 2025

The Iranian barrage on Al Udeid came as air defense crews are among the most overly taxed in the U.S. military. The service only has 17 Patriot battalions in total, and they are heavily deployed, especially to the Middle East. That is in addition to many other obligations around the globe. Though this reflects the immense ability of the U.S. military to project power worldwide, it also underscores the stark limitations of its existing ground-based air and missile defense capacity. Concerns about what this means for the prospect of adequately defending U.S. forces deployed overseas, as well as the U.S. homeland, is something senior U.S. military leaders, as well as The War Zone, have been drawing attention to for some time.

In previous statements, U.S. officials said there were no casualties from the Iranian barrage.

Though Trump engineered a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, the region remains tense and officials have not ruled out another U.S. strike against Iran should it continue its nuclear weapons development.

Caine did not say when or if the troops and diverse collection of aviation assets normally at Al Udeid, will return. We will keep an eye on this and provide updates if new information is presented.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Howard Altman

Senior Staff Writer

Howard is a Senior Staff Writer for The War Zone, and a former Senior Managing Editor for Military Times. Prior to this, he covered military affairs for the Tampa Bay Times as a Senior Writer. Howard's work has appeared in various publications including Yahoo News, RealClearDefense, and Air Force Times.

• twz.com · by Howard Altman

6. Army unveils plans to acquire two different sizes of autonomous launchers

​Seems like modern warfare is going to rely heavily on long range precision fires, missile defense, drones, and cyber operations. The Army is moving out smartly with its Army Transformation Initiative. It is preparing for the next war rather than trying to refight the past ones.

Army unveils plans to acquire two different sizes of autonomous launchers - Breaking Defense

The heavy variant would be based on a Palletized Loading System and fire either Tomahawk or PAC-3 missiles, while the medium-class launcher would use an FMTV to fire Multiple Launch Rocket System munitions or AIM-9X interceptors.

breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · June 27, 2025

The US Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Aviation & Missile Center and Ground Vehicle Systems Center’s combined Autonomous Multi-domain Launcher team conducted a live fire of a Reduced Range Practice Rocket fired from the AML at Yuma Proving Ground. (US Army photo)

WASHINGTON — The US Army is interested in acquiring two new autonomous platforms under a new initiative it’s calling the Common Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher (CAML).

In a “request for solutions brief” posted today, the service announced that its Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office is leading the charge to find two separate CAML variants — a heavy and a medium — on a “rapid timeline.”

“CAML is an autonomous/optionally crewed, highly mobile, air transportable, cross domain fires launcher with the potential to augment or replace existing Army launchers,” the service said.

“CAML reduces emplacement and displacement times, provides improved crew survivability, adds cross-country mobility, increases overall effectiveness, and allows commanders to weight the force appropriately during both offensive and defensive operations,” the Army later added.

For the CAML-H variant, the Army wants to integrate a launcher onto a M1075 Palletized Loading System tactical vehicle — or similar 15-ton class chassis — that can then fire the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile or the Patriot Advanced Capabilities Three (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement interceptor. However, the service did not specify how many rounds each launcher should be able to hold.

“The CAML-H variant will be an Autonomous Self Resupplying System capable of autonomously reloading cannisters of missiles onto the CAML-H with minimal to no human intervention,” the Army added.

As for the smaller, CAML-M variant, the service is interested in using a Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle (FMTV) as the base to launch Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Family of Munitions or the new Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) with AIM-9X interceptors.

“The CAML-M will be supported by an Autonomous Resupply Vehicle (ARV) capable of autonomously reloading pods/cannisters of missiles onto the CAML-M with minimal to no human intervention,” the service explained.

For now, the Army is open to selecting different vendors for each project, and envisions picking one company or team to rapidly prototype the CAML-M combo — to include an IFPC launcher, a separate one for the MLRS rounds and the ARV. Prototype evaluations are expected to take place between 18 and 36 months after the contract is awarded.

Then for CAML-H, the service is eyeing to asses four Tomahawk prototypes within 18 months and one PAC-3 configuration in 24 months of award.

Movement on the new CAML program comes at a time when the Army has been internally developing the Autonomous Multi-domain Launcher — an uncrewed M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System — while also looking at industry offerings, including one from Lockheed Martin under development and another from a Raytheon-led industry team dubbed DeepStrike.

In February, then Long-Range Precision Fires Cross Functional Team leader Brig. Gen. Rory Crooks told Breaking Defense the service would likely have to look to industry for a tenable solution. The Army, he added, was inking an abbreviated capability development document that essentially validates the need for a capability and could lead to a competitive rapid prototyping competition.

“I don’t see DEVCOM [Army’s Combat Capabilities Development Command] as being the way to introduce larger numbers into formations in the near future: That will be how we leverage industry,” Crooks said. “But it starts with refining that requirement, which we’re in the process of [doing].”

7. Europe Is Recruiting Academics Disenchanted With America

​Our brain drain? Can we stop the bleeding?

Excerpts:

Universities across Europe, meanwhile, are offering grants and the promise of academic freedom to U.S. scholars. Aix-Marseille University in the south of France said it received some 300 applications within three weeks for its Safe Place for Science program, including from researchers at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia and Stanford.

...

Three-quarters of the 1,600 scientists who responded to a poll the journal Nature published in March said they were thinking of leaving the U.S. and that Europe was among their top choices for relocation.

Europe Is Recruiting Academics Disenchanted With America

U.K., France, among others have set up funds to help U.S. researchers relocate to the continent

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europe-is-recruiting-academics-disenchanted-with-america-c4bae422

By Noemie Bisserbe

Follow

 and Nidhi Subbaraman

Follow

June 28, 2025 8:00 pm ET

Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, a California professor, is considering a permanent post in Paris. Photo: Laura Stevens for WSJ

PARIS—French President Emmanuel Macron has a message for American academics like Nathan Perl-Rosenthal: Forget the U.S., come to France! 

Perl-Rosenthal, a history professor at the University of Southern California, met Macron at a conference in Paris in May, weeks after the U.S. government canceled a grant funding his research on maritime history. Perl-Rosenthal was impressed by Macron’s commitment to defend l’esprit critique and academic freedom. 

“He winked at me when I said I worked on the rise of mass politics,” Perl-Rosenthal said. He is considering a permanent post in Paris.

Macron and his European peers are angling to turn President Trump’s overhaul of U.S. academia into their gain. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in May said she would establish a fund of about $575 million “to make Europe a magnet for researchers.” The U.K. in June said it would spend about $75 million over five years to cover relocation costs and research for foreign scientists moving to the U.K.

Macron, at the Paris conference, pledged another $115 million to help foreign researchers relocate to France. “If you love freedom, come and help us remain free, conduct research here, help us become better, invest in our future,” Macron said.

French President Emmanuel Macron, speaking in Paris last month, pledged $115 million to help foreign researchers relocate to France. Photo: Gonzalo Fuentes/AP

Europe, once home to Louis Pasteur and Albert Einstein, for centuries led the world in discoveries that explained the natural world. The U.S. took the lead after World War II, as European émigrés went to work alongside Americans in university labs flush with federal funding.

The U.S. still outspends any other country on research and development. But since returning to office, the Trump administration has cut or frozen billions of dollars of government research grants to universities, citing investigations into diversity programs and antisemitism. 

The Trump administration is cutting waste, fraud and abuse in federal research funding, according to spokesman Kush Desai. He said the administration would deliver on Trump’s pledge to “cement America’s dominance in cutting-edge technologies like AI, crypto, and space exploration while addressing our chronic disease epidemic.” 

Universities across Europe, meanwhile, are offering grants and the promise of academic freedom to U.S. scholars. Aix-Marseille University in the south of France said it received some 300 applications within three weeks for its Safe Place for Science program, including from researchers at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia and Stanford.

Aix-Marseille University in Marseille has received applications from researchers at Ivy League universities. Photo: Jeremy Suyker/Bloomberg News

Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel aims to support a dozen postdoctoral scholars, especially from the U.S., with fellowships of about $3 million each. The research council of Norway in April established a $10 million fund for U.S. scientists. 

“There is a war on talent going on globally, and it’s intensifying,” said Eppo Bruins, minister of education, culture and science in the Netherlands, who has proposed spending about $30 million to draw dozens of scientists from countries including the U.S. to Dutch universities.

Most of the programs are too small or short-term to fundamentally change Europe’s academic competitiveness, said James Wilsdon, professor of research policy at University College London.

“What science responds well to is stability and predictability and long-term planning,” he said. 

Researchers earn significantly less in Europe than in the U.S. To move to France for instance, researchers typically need to be willing to earn half or even a third of what they would in America. But the cost of living in much of Europe is lower and governments pay more for healthcare and education.

Rachel Beatty Riedl, a political scientist at Cornell University who studies democracy and authoritarianism, has accepted a one-year position at Sciences Po in France to research what she describes as a global retreat for democracy. She plans to move to France with her family in the fall. 

Beatty Riedl said conducting research had become more complicated since Trump returned to office and directed the federal government to remove support for research on some topics. “That permeates every decision that academics are making around what they’re willing to say publicly and what kinds of research they want to publish,” she said. 

Perl-Rosenthal, in Paris, saw his U.S. government grant canceled. Photo: Laura Stevens for WSJ

Three-quarters of the 1,600 scientists who responded to a poll the journal Nature published in March said they were thinking of leaving the U.S. and that Europe was among their top choices for relocation.

Perl-Rosenthal, the history professor, said the Trump administration has created a climate of fear in U.S. academia. “Frankly, all the university leaders in the U.S. are by and large cowering in closets,” he said. 

Perl-Rosenthal has been in Paris for two years conducting research on privateers—ships that governments allowed to attack and seize enemy ships at sea. His National Endowment for the Humanities grant was canceled months before he was expected to return from leave to USC, which he joined nearly 15 years ago.

“Figuring out how to live in a foreign country, it’s hard, it requires a whole series of efforts,” Perl-Rosenthal said. “People are going to need a lot of help to figure out this stuff and it’s going to take time.”

Write to Noemie Bisserbe at noemie.bisserbe@wsj.com and Nidhi Subbaraman at nidhi.subbaraman@wsj.com

8. Do most Iranians really hate their regime?

​Excerpts:

Over the past few years, political identities and societal divisions seem to have become harder and clearer. This means there is an increasing perception among many Iranians of a gulf between the state and Iranian society. This is the case both inside Iran, and especially in the Iranian diaspora.

Decades of intermittent protests and civil disobedience across the country also show that for many, the current system no longer represents the hopes and aspirations of many people. This is especially the case for the youth, who make up a large percentage of the population.

I am not an Iranian, and I strongly believe it is up to Iranians to determine their own futures. I also do not aim to excuse the Islamic Republic – it is brutal and tyrannical. But its brutality should not let us shy away from asking complex questions.

If the regime did fall tomorrow, Iran’s diversity means there is little unanimity of opinion as to what should come next. And if a more pluralist form of politics is to emerge, it must encompass the whole of Iran’s diversity, without assuming a uniform position.

It, too, will have to wrestle with the difficult questions and sometimes ambivalent relations the Islamic Republic has created.

Do most Iranians really hate their regime? - Asia Times

Views inside the Islamic Republic are more complex and nuanced than many care to recognize

asiatimes.com · by Simon Theobald · June 27, 2025

From 2015 to 2018, I spent 15 months doing research work in Mashhad, Iran’s second-largest city.

As an anthropologist, I was interested in everyday life in Iran outside the capital Tehran. I was also interested in understanding whether the ambitions of the 1979 Revolution lived on among “ordinary” Iranians, not just political elites.

I first lived on a university campus, where I learned Persian, and later with Iranian families. I conducted hundreds of interviews with people who had a broad spectrum of political, social and religious views. They included opponents of the Islamic Republic, supporters, and many who were in between.

What these interviews revealed to me was both the diversity of opinion and experience in Iran, and the difficulty of making uniform statements about what Iranians believe.

Measuring the depth of antipathy for the regime

When Israel’s strikes on Iran began on June 13, killing many top military commanders, many news outlets – both international and those run by the Iranian diaspora – featured images of Iranians cheering the deaths of these hated regime figures.

Friends from my fieldwork also pointed to these celebrations, while not always agreeing with them. Many feared the impact of a larger conflict between Iran and Israel.

Trying to put these sentiments in context, many analysts have pointed to a 2019 survey by the GAMAAN Institute, an independent organisation based in the Netherlands that tracks Iranian public opinion. This survey showed 79% of Iranians living in the country would vote against the Islamic Republic if a free referendum were held on its rule.

Viewing these examples as an indicator of the lack of support for the Islamic Republic is not wrong. But when used as factoids in news reports, they become detached from the complexities of life in Iran.

This can discourage us from asking deeper questions about the relationships between ideology and pragmatism, support and opposition to the regime, and state and society.

A more nuanced view

The news reporting on Iran has encouraged a tendency to see the Iranian state as homogeneous, highly ideological and radically separate from the population. But where do we draw the line between the state and the people? There is no easy answer to this.

When I lived in Iran, many of the people who took part in my research were state employees – teachers at state institutions, university lecturers, administrative workers. Many of them had strong and diverse views about the legacy of the revolution and the future of the country.

They sometimes pointed to state discourse they agreed with, for example Iran’s right to national self-determination, free from foreign influence. They also disagreed with much, such as the slogans of “death to America.”

This ambivalence was evident in one of my Persian teachers. An employee of the state, she refused to attend the annual parades celebrating the anniversary of the revolution. “We have warm feelings towards America,” she said. On the other hand, she happily attended protests, also organised by the government, in favour of Palestinian liberation.

Or take the young government worker I met in Mashhad: “We want to be independent of other countries, but not like this.”

In a narrower sense, discussions about the “state” may refer more to organisations like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij, the paramilitary force within the IRGC that has cracked down harshly on dissent in recent decades. Both are often understood as being deeply ideologically committed.

Said Golkar, a US-based Iranian academic and author, for instance, calls Iran a “captive society”. Rather than having a civil society, he believes Iranians are trapped by the feared Basij, who maintain control through their presence in many institutions like universities and schools.

Again, this view is not wrong. But even among the Basij and Revolutionary Guard, it can be difficult to gauge just how ideological and homogeneous these organisations truly are.

For a start, the IRGC relies on both ideologically selected supporters, as well as conscripts, to fill its ranks. They are also not always ideologically uniform, as the US-based anthropologist Narges Bajoghli, who worked with pro-state filmmakers in Tehran, has noted.

As part of my research, I also interviewed members of the Basij, which, unlike the IRGC proper, is a wholly volunteer organization.

Even though ideological commitment was certainly an important factor for some of the Basij members I met, there were also pragmatic reasons to join. These included access to better jobs, scholarships and social mobility. Sometimes, factors overlapped. But participation did not always equate to a singular or sustained commitment to revolutionary values.

For example, Sāsān, a friend I made attending discussion groups in Mashhad, was quick to note that time spent in the Basij “reduced your [compulsory] military service.”

This isn’t to suggest there are not ideologically committed people in Iran. They clearly exist, and many are ready to use violence. Some of those who join these institutions for pragmatic reasons use violence, too.

Looking in between

In addition, Iran is an ethnically diverse country. It has a population of 92 million people, a bare majority of whom are Persians. Other minorities include Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baloch, Turkmen and others.

It is also religiously diverse. While there is a sizeable, nominally Shi’a majority, there are also large Sunni communities (about 10-15% of the population) and smaller communities of Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Baha’is and other religions.

Often overlooked, there are also important differences in class and social strata in Iran, too.

Iranian women mourn during the funeral ceremony of an Iranian soldier killed in Israeli airstrike in Tehran. Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA via The Conversation

One of the things I noticed about state propaganda was that it flattened this diversity. James Barry, an Australian scholar of Iran, noticed a similar phenomenon.

State propaganda made it seem like there was one voice in the country. Protests could be dismissed out of hand because they did not represent the “authentic” view of Iranians. Foreign agitators supported protests. Iranians supported the Islamic Republic.

Since leaving Iran, I have followed many voices of Iranians in the diaspora. Opposition groups are loud on social media, especially the monarchists who support Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah.

In following these groups, I have noticed a similar tendency to speak as though they represent the voice of all Iranians. Iranians support the shah. Or Iranians support Maryam Rajavi, leader of a Paris-based opposition group.

Both within Iran, and in the diaspora, the regime, too, is sometimes held to be the imposition of a foreign conspiracy. This allows the Islamic Republic and the complex relations it has created to be dismissed out of hand. Once again, such a view flattens diversity.

Over the past few years, political identities and societal divisions seem to have become harder and clearer. This means there is an increasing perception among many Iranians of a gulf between the state and Iranian society. This is the case both inside Iran, and especially in the Iranian diaspora.

Decades of intermittent protests and civil disobedience across the country also show that for many, the current system no longer represents the hopes and aspirations of many people. This is especially the case for the youth, who make up a large percentage of the population.

I am not an Iranian, and I strongly believe it is up to Iranians to determine their own futures. I also do not aim to excuse the Islamic Republic – it is brutal and tyrannical. But its brutality should not let us shy away from asking complex questions.

If the regime did fall tomorrow, Iran’s diversity means there is little unanimity of opinion as to what should come next. And if a more pluralist form of politics is to emerge, it must encompass the whole of Iran’s diversity, without assuming a uniform position.

It, too, will have to wrestle with the difficult questions and sometimes ambivalent relations the Islamic Republic has created.

Simon Theobald is postdoctoral researcher, Institute for Ethics and Society, University of Notre Dame Australia

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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asiatimes.com · by Simon Theobald · June 27, 2025

9. The ‘special relationship’: Preparing Britain and America for a new era

I am on my way to London for the next couple of days. I expect we will hear about this.

The 60 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/app/uploads/2025/06/No.-2025.14-The-special-relationship-Preparing-Britain-and-America-for-a-new-era.pdf

The ‘special relationship’: Preparing Britain and America for a new era

https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/research/preparing-britain-and-america-for-a-new-era/

Forewords

Defence is at the heart of the relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). We fought two world wars together, and we have been side by side in most conflicts since. Our shared values helped to create the open international order, under which world trade has grown and democracies have flourished since the end of the Cold War.

Differences of view across the Atlantic are not new. Challenges closer to home shape each of our priorities, and there have long been American concerns about the equitable sharing of the defence burden between allies. Today, Britain rightly sees Russia as the main threat to the Euro-Atlantic area; America is unsurprisingly concerned with the growing military and economic power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Indo-Pacific. Both of us must deal with the increasingly hostile coalition between the PRC, Russia, Iran and North Korea.

The UK and US have long had a deeper and broader military and security partnership than other allies. Britain needs to be ready to increase its commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) if and when any American troops and assets are more urgently required to defend their own homeland. We should also collaborate more closely with the US on emerging technologies, critical minerals and munitions.

This valuable Report from the Council on Geostrategy reviews the state of the UK-US relationship today. It pulls no punches about what needs to be done to reinforce that relationship and make it fitter for purpose in the new geopolitical age that we must face together. I hope that His Majesty’s (HM) Government will seriously consider each of its recommendations.

The Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Fallon KCB

Secretary of State for Defence (2014-2017)

Member of the Advisory Board, Council on Geostrategy

The relationship between the US and UK, often referred to as the ‘special relationship’, has long been a cornerstone of international diplomacy. It has weathered numerous challenges and celebrated many shared triumphs, particularly throughout the 20th century and the first quarter of the 21st century.

This timely Report accurately captures many of the challenges confronting the alliance today, as well as what keeps the two countries so closely tied together. Without agreeing with everything in the Report, I do agree with many of the important facts raised and the recommendations which follow, although I do want to emphasise that I am writing this foreword in a personal capacity.

The US is focusing more and more on the Indo-Pacific and the PRC’s global hegemonic aspirations. That is a fact, and an uncomfortable one for the UK, which continues to downgrade the importance of that threat as it spends less and less on defence. For London, Washington’s concerns are of secondary importance to Russia, while the PRC only seems to be considered – if at all – as a source of investment and trade to London.

The strategic importance of the alliance cannot be overstated. Yet, it is crucial to recognise that the world is undergoing rapid transformations. Geopolitical shifts, technological advancements and economic realignments are reshaping the international landscape. These changes necessitate a reassessment of the traditional dynamics between America and Britain.

Specifically, this Report recommends:

• Interests over values: The two nations must consider what geostrategic factors bring them together and check to see that they are still aligned. 
• Trade: The two must ensure that a new trade order supports their principles and their national interests while dealing with distortions in the global economy caused by the PRC.
• Converging interests: The two countries are increasingly concerned with rebuilding capability in their defence industrial base.
• Diverging interests: The two powers must take note that they are increasingly focused on different regions.

I think the Council on Geostrategy has provided a balanced and insightful perspective, acknowledging both the enduring strengths of the special relationship and the new challenges which must be navigated. I hope that governmental readers on both sides of the Atlantic will take note of the points raised here to ensure that the alliance is both fortified for these challenges and embracing of these opportunities. Let us no longer take this very special relationship for granted.

Adm. (rtd.) Harry Harris

24th Commander, United States Pacific Command

United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (2018-2021)

Executive summary

Context:

• While historical foundations and ties have helped to reinforce the ‘special relationship’ between the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US), it was common geopolitical interests which bound the two nations together. Chief among these has been to prevent others from dominating the most industrialised and productive regions of Eurasia.
• As a result, both countries have co-constructed the prevailing international order. Their strength, determination and foresight after the Second World War created alliances and institutions which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the enlargement of that order and the offshoring of manufacturing have empowered adversaries while weakening UK and US strategic industries.
• Geopolitical changes, especially growing Russian and Chinese aggression, as well as political and strategic changes in Britain and America, have led to fresh questions being asked about the future of the special relationship.

Questions this Report addresses:

• What were the fundamental interests which brought the UK and US together, and do they remain cogent?
• How can the two reinforce convergent interests while simultaneously managing divergent interests?
• How can policymakers within the two countries redefine the alliance for a new era of geopolitics and revision of the international order?

Key findings:

• In the 2020s, areas of converging interests include:
• Accepting limits on globalisation: This convergence is currently implicit rather than explicit, though both countries recognise the need to rectify the negative impacts which globalisation has had on their own economies and societies.
• Rising to the geopolitical challenge: Both countries express aspirations of leadership and have shown the will to address systemic challenges, although to differing degrees in their respective theatres.
• Rebuilding the defence industrial base: Both nations have identified an urgent need to rebuild production capacity and invest in future technologies.
• Areas of diverging interests include:
• Theatre priority: For the first time in decades, there is a strong possibility that the UK and US will prioritise different regions, with Britain focused primarily on the Euro-Atlantic and America on the Indo-Pacific, though both also retain an interest in the Middle East.
• Threat precedence: The UK’s stance towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) frustrates Washington, while London worries about a softer US approach towards Russia.
• Cooperation preference: The two countries are somewhat divided on their approach to multilateral institutions, including on climate change and trade arrangements.
• These areas of divergence notwithstanding, Britain and America have made similar diagnoses of the geopolitical problems they face, even if they are starting to focus on them from different directions. The two nations also share clarity of purpose in many areas: they require closer and continued strategic dialogue to realign growing divergences. 
• One problem, particularly for the UK, is that while US power has surged ahead, the UK, like many other allies, has fallen behind. Britain has a special interest in strengthening itself – economically, diplomatically and militarily – otherwise its voice will weaken in Washington.
• However, each country is likely to remain the other’s most powerful ally well into the 21st century. This necessitates closer cooperation. While the US has other important allies and partners, none of these look set to be more powerful than the UK by the early 2030s, especially if British naval and deterrence capabilities are regenerated.

Recommendations:

To repurpose the special relationship, the UK and US should:

• Create a new vision of the future of the international order: Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should:
• Review the level of rival co-option occurring in existing geoeconomic organisations in order to create new ones where necessary, to deal with trade abuses and to coordinate sanctions more effectively;
• Explore ways of establishing a new geoeconomic order, designed to reinforce the prosperity and resilience of free and open countries, which seeks to limit the ability of adversaries to compete at the geoeconomic level;
• Strengthen the alignments between the UK and US scientific and technological bases to generate collaboration on regulations for emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Quantum technologies, behind which like-minded partners can follow.
• Plan for a modulated multi-theatre posture: There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain’s primary theatre, the two governments should:
• Work together – and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – to create a clear timeline for the move of key US assets from Europe to the Indo-Pacific theatre over the next five to ten years. The aim should be to allow the UK and other allies to replace those assets in an orderly manner, rather than during a geopolitical emergency in the future;
• Prepare for the UK to provide leadership and enhanced deterrence in Europe;
• Reinforce UK support for US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in the Indo-Pacific;
• Develop strategic dialogues on the most pressing issues to foster alignment on key national priorities;
• Forge a better understanding of how and where both nations could contribute to a simultaneous multi-front crisis if one were to materialise.
• Coordinate military production: There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should:
• Commit to spend at least 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence by 2030, with 3.5% on military capabilities and 1.5% on strategic infrastructure, as per the recommendation of Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO;
• Ensure that there is clear direction and prioritisation for transatlantic defence industrial collaboration;
• Prioritise rare earth metal supply chain cooperation; continued PRC control over this vital supply chain is simply not sustainable for future UK-US military industrial expansion and operations;
• Support efforts which contribute to leadership in critical technologies;
• Build up the production and co-production of munitions at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels;
• Cooperate more on co-sustainment, particularly to enable British shipyards to support the US Navy.

DOWNLOAD PDF

About the authors

William Freer is Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy.

Dr John Hemmings is Deputy Director (Geopolitics) at the Council on Geostrategy.

James Rogers is Co-founder (Research) at the Council on Geostrategy.

Disclaimer

This publication should not be considered in any way to constitute advice. It is for knowledge and educational purposes only. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Council on Geostrategy or the views of its Advisory Council.

Image credit: Britain and America, media photos, Canva Pro licence

No. 2025/14 | ISBN: 978-1-917893-05-3

10. Gen. Wesley Clark: This is the moment for American leadership in Middle East. We can't miss it.

​Excerpts:

In the Middle East, the issues are deeper and more complex, but certainly among the principles, Iran must renounce its efforts, overt and covert, to destroy the state of Israel, and Israel must respect the rights of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to govern and develop their own self-governing state.

Terrorism against Israel must be halted. Countries in the region must participate in rebuilding the Palestinian homeland in the West Bank and Gaza.

Sanctions against Iran should be lifted, and Iran would be provided the materials it needs for peaceful nuclear energy.

Progress must be phased and accompanied by confidence-building measures. Perhaps the Abraham Accords could be fully implemented, and the United States would provide a security umbrella for all in the region. International organizations will no doubt remain part of the solution. Perhaps Russia and China, and other interested parties, could be invited as observers.

Iran today is a wounded tiger. Maybe 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium is still available, maybe some other country will provide nuclear weapons or materials. Revenge will be sought. We cannot permit the next conflict – it could well go “nuclear.” So neglect or failure are not options. 

This is the moment for American leadership. It is the moment for President Trump to exercise his broader vision for strategic realignment of the region, and in so doing, to end the Middle East as a cockpit for continuing conflict.

Gen. Wesley Clark: This is the moment for American leadership in Middle East. We can't miss it.

Iran's long-standing quest for nuclear weapons was at least set back for many months, and probably several years. This is the moment for American leadership.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2025/06/28/iran-israel-ceasefire-us-middle-east-stability/84356762007/

Wesley K. ClarkOpinion contributor

0:26

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0:38

After 12 days of Israeli air strikes, Iran's air defenses were largely disabled, above-ground nuclear facilities destroyed, and much of its ballistic missile production and launch capacity wrecked. Nevertheless, Iranian retaliation caused destruction and loss of life in Israel. Then the United States entered the fight on the evening of June 21.

Iran's three principal, known nuclear enrichment sites were pounded and penetrated with 14 of the 30,000 Massive Ordnance Penetrators and more than two dozen sea-launched cruise missiles. By the early morning of June 24, Tuesday, Iran and Israel had agreed to a ceasefire in the destructive campaign each was waging against the other.

It was a triumphant moment for President Donald J. Trump, under whose direction the U.S. armed forces had launched the largest, most complex stealth bomber and Tomahawk strikes ever undertaken.

Iran's long-standing quest for nuclear weapons was at least set back for many months, and probably several years. 

Many parties had much to gain from the ceasefire:

Need a break? Play the USA TODAY Daily Crossword Puzzle.

• For Israel, a relief from the imminent threat of Iran, and from the punishment of the Iranian missiles.
• For Iran, an end to Israeli efforts at regime change; for the neighbors in the region, a relief from the fear of a widening conflict.
• For Russia, the preservation of its strategic partner, Iran.
• For China, an end to the imminent threat to its fuel and gas transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
• For President Trump, a validation of his judgment that overwhelming American power could be effective in ending a conflict without embroiling us in a "forever war," an end to the split of his MAGA supporters and wide acknowledgement of his personal role in creating the ceasefire.

Crown prince of Iran: Israel weakened Iran regime. World must help finish the job | Opinion

What happens now for Iran and the rest of the world?

But now what?

Israel has been highly successful in the use of military force over many decades in the region – from the 1948 war of independence, through the 1956 war in Sinai, the 1967 preemptive war against Egypt, Jordan and Syria, the 1973 war, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, strikes against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunisia in 1985, and later operations in Lebanon and Gaza.

U.S. military action in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were also highly successful. At this time, Israel, with U.S. help, has stripped Iran of its protective shields of Hezbollah and Hamas, and Iran, without effective air defenses, is laid bare.

But outstanding military operations are not sufficient – they must be followed by successful work to end the roots of the conflict. Not once has this happened in the Middle East. Hatred, resentment, anger, terrorism and war have become endemic to the region.  

This is the moment to end the pattern of continuing conflict. But that requires new appreciation among the leaders in the region of the realities underscored by this latest bout of conflict.

Iran, you're not going to have a nuclear bomb, no matter what. And if you continue to seek it, your regime will be defeated along with the destruction of your country. Israel, you cannot continue to use force with impunity – even with the best technology, your own people are vulnerable.

To others in the region: Israel and the Palestinians are both permanently in the region; and with all due respect to the different religion, sects and ethnicities at play, and the pain of history, both must be accommodated, accepted and, ultimately, embraced as part of a thriving and prosperous Middle East.

If there was ever a moment for fundamental change within the region, this is it. The world has come face to face with the potential of a spiraling conflict. Many of the Gulf states have achieved unprecedented wealth and are on the path to world-leading economic, social and technical advances. The region is still and will likely remain the center of global energy production, distribution and investment. There is everything to gain from seizing this moment.

Gen. Wesley Clark: Trump needs to push Putin hard to end war in Ukraine – now | Opinion

This is the moment for American leadership

But how to proceed?

Based on the model followed by President Bill Clinton in dealing with the Balkans in the 1990s, it is best to start with a set of principles agreed upon objectively, by those outside the conflict but with the influence and will to deal with the respective parties.

The principles must be fair and practicable. It required many weeks of shuttle diplomacy for the much simpler issues in the Balkans, and then, ultimately a 78-day air campaign by NATO in parallel with presidential-level mediation by outside parties. In all, it entailed more than five years of continuous effort by the United States.  

In the Middle East, the issues are deeper and more complex, but certainly among the principles, Iran must renounce its efforts, overt and covert, to destroy the state of Israel, and Israel must respect the rights of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to govern and develop their own self-governing state.

Terrorism against Israel must be halted. Countries in the region must participate in rebuilding the Palestinian homeland in the West Bank and Gaza.

Sanctions against Iran should be lifted, and Iran would be provided the materials it needs for peaceful nuclear energy.

Progress must be phased and accompanied by confidence-building measures. Perhaps the Abraham Accords could be fully implemented, and the United States would provide a security umbrella for all in the region. International organizations will no doubt remain part of the solution. Perhaps Russia and China, and other interested parties, could be invited as observers.

Iran today is a wounded tiger. Maybe 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium is still available, maybe some other country will provide nuclear weapons or materials. Revenge will be sought. We cannot permit the next conflict – it could well go “nuclear.” So neglect or failure are not options. 

This is the moment for American leadership. It is the moment for President Trump to exercise his broader vision for strategic realignment of the region, and in so doing, to end the Middle East as a cockpit for continuing conflict.

Wesley K. Clark is a retired four-star general who served as commander of U.S. Southern Command and then as commander of U.S. European Command/Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

11. John J. Waters and Adam Ellwanger: Donald Trump succeeds because he understands power and how to use it

​Excerpts:

Though the U.S. strikes on Iran resulted in a ceasefire and perhaps negotiation of a peace deal, this outcome will not be permanent on the larger international scene. There will be more attacks, more violence — more opportunities for political leaders to practice their craft with strength and foresight.

Carlson’s “peace first” politics will keep the moral high ground, but Trump’s exercise of power affirms his political legitimacy. As Machiavelli famously wrote: “It is better to be feared than loved.”

Right now, Donald Trump is both.

John J. Waters and Adam Ellwanger: Donald Trump succeeds because he understands power and how to use it

 John J. Waters and Adam Ellwanger

RealClearWire

https://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/op-ed/2025/06/27/trump-power-machiavelli-john-waters-adam-ellwanger/stories/202506270037

 Jun 27, 2025 8:15 AM

24

A progressive friend said something insightful weeks ago: “Trump doesn’t feel like he’s in power unless someone is getting hurt.”

My friend owes some of his prescience to his undergraduate study of Niccolo Machiavelli. In both “The Prince” and “Discourses,” Machiavelli grounded his theory of politics in his understanding of human nature.

Because people are motivated by a capricious self-interest, he believed, people will fight with one another to realize their goals. Men, he wrote, “are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous,” and compete incessantly for power, resources, and more.

Trump follows Machiavelli

The regime that tries to placate rivals, whether internal dissidents or foreign enemies, will descend into chaos. To prevent collapse, the strong leader must exert force.

Force that suppresses, punishes, or destroys the weak. Force that he uses not occasionally or whenever a problem materializes, but constantly.

This is Machiavelli’s central paradigm: politics is battle. Not a battle between good and evil, or right and wrong. Just a battle, ongoing and continuous, to defend the principles on which the regime operates.

Trump uses force because conflict — not consensus-building, cooperation, or governance for the common good — is the nature of political leadership.

This is a reality that pundits and commentators passionately decry, especially when their preferred party isn’t in power. But from the very beginning of his campaign for president, Trump openly embraced the battle metaphors.

We are fighting against the corrupt establishment, he said. We are fighting to win the battle against illegal immigration. We are in a battle for the soul of our country.

“If you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore,” Trump said on January 6, 2021. In the game of politics, Trump embraced conflict, and was determined to win on all counts — for himself, and for the country.

His foreign policy supports this point.

Speaking after the military strike on ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in late 2019, Trump was unequivocal in his statement of victory. “Last night was a great night for the United States and for the world,” he said.

“He will never again harm another innocent man, woman, or child. He died like a dog. He died like a coward. The world is now a safer place. God bless America.”

Both hawks and doves celebrated the win. Republican Senator Lindsey Graham called it a “game changer.” Conservative pundit Tucker Carlson counted Baghdadi’s death a “victory for civilization itself.”

Tucker vs. Trump

A few months later, a fault line appeared on the Right when a drone fired missiles at Qasem Soleimani, killing the Iranian Quds Force commander. Carlson criticized Trump for goading Iran into a military conflict that would weaken America.

“There are an awful lot of bad people in this world,” Carlson said on his television program in early 2020. “You can’t kill them all.”

This month, the fault line widened. As Trump prepared to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, Carlson cried out for more public decision-making.

He spoke about the “real divide” on the Right, a line that separates people like Carlson and Steve Bannon from the interventionists and neoconservatives in the modern conservative movement. “The real divide is between those who casually encourage violence, and those who seek to prevent it — between warmongers and peacemakers,” Carlson posted on X.

Carlson warned against foreign entanglements as distractions from the problems at home, but the violence itself seemed to offend him.

In one conversation with Bannon, Carlson paraphrased a story found in all four Gospels, where the apostle Peter draws his sword against the arresting party in the Garden of Gethsemane. Jesus scolds Peter, saying: “Put your sword back into its place. For all who take the sword will perish by the sword.” Carlson interpreted that passage as meaning people who espouse violence will suffer in the end.

But one biblical reference always calls to mind another. In the Gospel of Saint Luke, a passage about the Last Supper contains a comment from Jesus to the disciples that “the one who has no sword [should] sell his cloak and buy one.”

The disciples tells him they have two. Jesus offers a cryptic response: “It is enough.” Perhaps Jesus is chiding them for taking him too literally, as if to say “That’s enough of this talk.” But equally possible he is saying that two swords is enough, that physical conflict is necessary but should serve the interests of defense rather than conquest.

More attacks

Though the U.S. strikes on Iran resulted in a ceasefire and perhaps negotiation of a peace deal, this outcome will not be permanent on the larger international scene. There will be more attacks, more violence — more opportunities for political leaders to practice their craft with strength and foresight.

Carlson’s “peace first” politics will keep the moral high ground, but Trump’s exercise of power affirms his political legitimacy. As Machiavelli famously wrote: “It is better to be feared than loved.”

Right now, Donald Trump is both.

John J. Waters, a lawyer, served as a deputy assistant secretary of Homeland Security from 2020-21. Follow him at @JohnJWaters1 on X. Adam Ellwanger is a professor at University of Houston-Downtown. Follow him at @1HereticalTruth on X.

First Published: June 27, 2025, 8:15 a.m.

12. US Army tailoring Pacific commands for Multi-Domain force

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I recommend developing a Multi Domain Task Force Korea - one that would be a combined ROK/US MDTF (in addition to and separate from the ROK/US 2d Combined Infantry Division) capable of deployment throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific as well as conducting operations on the pensinals to contribute to deterrence and defense.

US Army tailoring Pacific commands for Multi-Domain force

Defense News · by Jen Judson · June 27, 2025

The U.S. Army in the Pacific has begun working through how it will build two Multi-Domain Commands in the theater to oversee and direct the service’s Multi-Domain Task Force units as it continues to expand and refine its presence as part of an overall effort to deter China’s increasing aggression in the region, Gen. Ronald Clark, U.S. Army Pacific commander, told Defense News.

The new Multi-Domain Commands are coming as part of the Army’s new transformation initiative.

According to an Army execution order issued in May, the service plans to build four. Indicative of the Army’s desire to continue to prioritize building up capability in the Pacific theater, two will be focused there: Multi-Domain Command — Pacific and Multi-Domain Command — Japan.

Two others, Multi-Domain Command — Europe and Multi-Domain Command — Army, are taking shape, as well.

The Army is working on sizing the force for the commands “in a way that’s different,” Clark said in a Friday interview.

With the rise of the MDTF capability in the Pacific, “the authorities associated with that, in some cases are to the [Indo-Pacific Command] commander and above,” Clark said.

“So, to be able to ensure that we have the authorities associated with the right level of command and the staffs associated with the tasks required to plan, synchronize, train those assets, a two-star level headquarters is where that will reside.”

The service’s first MDTF was experimental, but since then the Army has operationalized that first unit and will ultimately build four more.

The Army established the initial unit at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state around 2018. U.S. INDOPACOM theater exercises, with MDTF participation, helped inform the Army’s Multi-Domain Operations warfighting concept, which has now evolved into doctrine.

The Army stood up the second MDTF in Europe in 2021 and the third in Hawaii in 2022. A fourth MDTF will also be devoted to the Pacific, and a fifth, based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, will be able to deploy rapidly as needed. All five MDTFs will be established by 2028.

The units are designed to operate across all domains — land, air, sea, space and cyberspace — are equipped with the Army’s growing capabilities, such as the Precision Strike Missile, the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon and the Mid-Range Capability Missile.

MDTFs will also have units devoted to the critical sourcing of intelligence across domains and spectrums and information sharing with the joint force to enable targeting.

The MDTF units’ presence in the Pacific in recent years have been credited with effective deterrence. For instance, the MRC resident with the 1st MDTF has drawn the ire of China since being deployed to the Philippines as part of the last two cycles of U.S. Army exercises with the country.

Recent assessments through exercises and warfighter experimentation have shown the need to operationalize such commands and create a higher level of command authority for the MDTFs, according to Clark.

The new commands are “additive to what we currently have in the Indo Pacific and in U.S. Army Pacific, so with that comes additional tasks and funding,” Clark said.

The Army’s fiscal 2026 budget request reflects some additional funding in order to execute the establishment of the commands.

The 1st and 3rd MDTF will fall under the Multi-Domain Command — Pacific, and the 4th MDTF will be associated with Multi-Domain Command — Japan.

According to the Army’s execution order for the transformation initiative, the Pacific command combines the 7th Infantry Division headquarters with the 1st and 3rd MDTFs. The command in Japan combines U.S. Army Japan’s headquarters with the 4th MDTF.

“The Multi-Domain Task Force is a theater-level capability,” Clark said. “It has inherent capabilities ... cyber, space, electronic warfare, long-range precisions first, it’s ability to be able to conduct integrated air and missile defense in its own defense and in a point defense kind of way, those capabilities ... go beyond an area of joint area of operations.”

MDTFs are commanded by colonels,“which is great,” Clark said, but adding they will now plug into a two-star command structure that can report to U.S. Army Pacific, for example.

“We need to up-gun the level of staff and command,” he said.

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

13. How Not to Do Multipolarity

​Excerpts:

The only aspect left is the idea of Iran threatening the United States. Currently, they do not. The argument is that this would change if Iran got a bomb, but this too is questionable. After all, Iran’s regime has long been very careful to talk tough while not actually doing things which could get them in trouble. After America’s attack they even warned the United States ahead of time exactly where and when they would be counter-striking. Would Iran really throw caution to the wind, develop an ICBM, and immediately lob a nuke at New York or Washington, knowing full well that any American response would wipe them off the map? It’s unlikely.

What a nuclear Iran would do, however, is permanently take regime change off the table. This change would hardly inhibit America in a multipolar world. While in multipolarity it’s better to have lots of options, one does not need all options, all the time.

There are plenty of ways America could act in a multipolar world. But focusing on the Middle East, and Iran specifically, is—at best—a distraction from our real national interests. We should turn our attention elsewhere. 

How Not to Do Multipolarity

By Anthony J. Constantin​i

June 28.2025

https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2025/06/28/how_not_to_do_multipolarity_1119488.html

The Trump administration’s recognition that the world is now multipolar was groundbreaking. No presidential administration since before the Cold War saw the world in such a light, and many post-Cold War administrations actively pretended not to see it. This recognition has helped pave the way for new twenty-first century strategies and toward the adoption of new geopolitical goals.

Which makes the recent focus on Iran all the more confounding.

When it comes to bipolarity, the goal is to balance with or defeat the other pole. In unipolarity, the goal is to maintain hegemony for as long as possible, as post-Cold War American presidents attempted for decades.

Multipolarity, however, requires a more dexterous policy. It requires three things: one, for each “pole” to maintain dominance in its given sphere. Secondly, to balance against the other poles. And thirdly, protecting national security interests to allow for the successful completion of the first two goals.

These interests vary. A nation needs to ensure it has a steady energy supply. It also must produce key products or, barring that, secure trade routes. It can also involve ensuring that no foreign power gets close enough to upset one’s dominance of their own sphere.

When the above is applied to America, one finds that the country is in relatively good shape for multipolarity. America clearly dominates its sphere, the New World. In the Americas, there is no power which comes close to the United States; the next largest economy is Brazil’s (substantially smaller than America’s). And no other power has a sustained military presence anywhere in the Americas, a result of the Monroe Doctrine.

When it comes to the second goal – balancing against the other poles – America has been less successful. Its military might means that this issue is not as crucial for it as other, weaker poles (such as Russia), but the path America is taking in the Russo-Ukrainian War helped push Russia and China, the other two poles, together. This is not to say that the United States should have sought a close friendship with Russia; but pushing them together did not help with balancing.

On the third – securing national interests – America has done an effective job. It is energy independent. And President Donald Trump’s reshoring strategy is a direct attempt to help keep America from relying on other countries for key industries.

By and large – aside from pushing Russia and China together – this is all good news. Which makes the decision to re-engage heavily in the Middle East a puzzling one, as it does not mesh with any of the above goals.

For starters, Iran is far from America’s sphere. Which does not necessarily rule out action, but it’s unclear how striking Iran helps America balance against Russia and China. American influence has already substantially grown in the Middle East over the past months, as relations with Syria have warmed. It does not need to have influence in Iran. In the past age of empire, a colony in Iran may have been well-placed to keep an eye on China; but that will not happen today and should not be a goal. Nor should regime change, as there is no guarantee that Iranians liberated from the mullahs will vote for a pro-American government.

What about national interest? Perhaps Iran has key resources America needs?

Not really. The United States, energy independent, does not rely on Iran for oil. Only a small fraction of oil comes to the United States through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran can threaten to close. Over 80 percent of the oil passing through that strait goes to Asia, with a plurality going to China.

What about trade? President Trump called for Iran to become “a great trading nation,” but it’s unclear what America needs trade-wise from Iran. Factory jobs did not move to Tehran, nor did other key industries.

The only aspect left is the idea of Iran threatening the United States. Currently, they do not. The argument is that this would change if Iran got a bomb, but this too is questionable. After all, Iran’s regime has long been very careful to talk tough while not actually doing things which could get them in trouble. After America’s attack they even warned the United States ahead of time exactly where and when they would be counter-striking. Would Iran really throw caution to the wind, develop an ICBM, and immediately lob a nuke at New York or Washington, knowing full well that any American response would wipe them off the map? It’s unlikely.

What a nuclear Iran would do, however, is permanently take regime change off the table. This change would hardly inhibit America in a multipolar world. While in multipolarity it’s better to have lots of options, one does not need all options, all the time.

There are plenty of ways America could act in a multipolar world. But focusing on the Middle East, and Iran specifically, is—at best—a distraction from our real national interests. We should turn our attention elsewhere. 

Anthony Constantini is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.

14. EU–Canada Pact: A Quiet Reshaping of the Western Strategic Order

​Excerpts:

The EU–Canada pact does not signal a rejection of the United States. Rather, it reflects a growing recognition that American reliability can no longer be assumed. The Trump administration’s skepticism of alliances is forcing many Western partners to think beyond legacy structures.

For Washington, this shift presents both a challenge and an opportunity. On one hand, it may dilute US influence over the coordination of defense priorities. On the other, it could strengthen the West as a whole by building capacity, spreading risk, and enhancing resilience. US policymakers would be wise to interpret this development not as a rebuke, but as a reinforcement.

Moreover, this new pact underscores the shared commitment between Europe and Canada to defend the rules-based international order. Explicit references to Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, arms control, and cyber norms indicate a unified front against authoritarian revisionism. In this sense, the pact represents not only a strategic alignment but also a normative reaffirmation.

...

As the global balance of power continues to shift, the transatlantic community must evolve in kind. Canada and the EU are showing what that evolution looks like, not by abandoning traditional alliances, but by complementing and modernizing them. If implemented effectively, this pact could become a model for 21st-century security cooperation – flexible, values-driven, and fit for a multipolar age.

EU–Canada Pact: A Quiet Reshaping of the Western Strategic Order

Opinion - June 26, 2025

https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/eu-canada-pact-a-quiet-reshaping-of-the-western-strategic-order/

By Noah M.

On June 23, the European Union and Canada signed a landmark security and defense cooperation pact in Brussels. Hailed as a “historic step” by both sides, the agreement covers a wide array of strategic priorities: cyber and space security, arms control, defense procurement, crisis response, and stronger support for Ukraine. While the agreement has rightly received praise as a practical step forward in transatlantic cooperation, its broader significance is underappreciated.

This pact represents a quiet but deliberate recalibration of the Western security architecture away from a US-anchored model toward a more distributed, multipolar strategic order. It suggests that key US allies are no longer content to rely solely on Washington’s leadership in an era of global volatility and internal American ambivalence. Instead, they are proactively building alternative partnerships that embed resilience, diversify defense dependencies, and modernize how the West collectively manages geopolitical risk.

Beyond NATO: Strategic Hedge or Complementary Layer?

One of the most striking aspects of the EU–Canada agreement is that it is distinct from NATO, even as it reinforces many of the alliance’s goals. NATO remains the bedrock of transatlantic defense, but its internal politics have grown increasingly fractious. Divergences over burden-sharing, ambiguous US commitments, and different threat perceptions have led some allies to seek additional platforms for cooperation.

For Canada, the rationale is clear. According to Prime Minister Mark Carney, 75% of Canada’s defense procurement spending is currently directed toward US manufacturers. In an era of increasing global instability and political unpredictability in Washington, Canada seeks to diversify both its defense partnerships and its supply chains. In practical terms, this agreement could open new channels for joint procurement, R&D, and military-industrial collaboration with European defense firms.

For the EU, the pact strengthens its evolving ambition for strategic autonomy. While full independence from NATO or the U.S. remains politically unfeasible and strategically undesirable for most member states, the EU is moving toward greater defense capability and cohesion. Initiatives such as the SAFE (Security and Arms for Europe) program, the European Defense Fund, and now the pact with Canada illustrate a bloc seeking not to supplant NATO, but to supplement it with a more autonomous European pillar.

A Multipolar West: Rethinking the Post-WWII Security Template

The agreement also reflects a deeper transition in the international system. The post-WWII security order was defined by a unipolar West, anchored by US hegemony. That model is now eroding. Great power rivalry, hybrid warfare, and technological disruption have revealed the limits of centralized leadership in managing contemporary threats.

Instead, what is emerging is a multipolar West, a networked alliance system with multiple centers of gravity. Canada’s deepening ties with the EU exemplify this. So does the recently expanded EU–Japan defense dialogue, the Franco-British defense renewal, and Australia’s parallel pivot toward defense ties with France and Germany. The result is not fragmentation, but diversification, a pragmatic adjustment to a world in which the U.S. cannot, and will not, carry the burden alone.

Implications for US Leadership and Global Norms

The EU–Canada pact does not signal a rejection of the United States. Rather, it reflects a growing recognition that American reliability can no longer be assumed. The Trump administration’s skepticism of alliances is forcing many Western partners to think beyond legacy structures.

For Washington, this shift presents both a challenge and an opportunity. On one hand, it may dilute US influence over the coordination of defense priorities. On the other, it could strengthen the West as a whole by building capacity, spreading risk, and enhancing resilience. US policymakers would be wise to interpret this development not as a rebuke, but as a reinforcement.

Moreover, this new pact underscores the shared commitment between Europe and Canada to defend the rules-based international order. Explicit references to Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, arms control, and cyber norms indicate a unified front against authoritarian revisionism. In this sense, the pact represents not only a strategic alignment but also a normative reaffirmation.

Economic and Technological Dimensions

The agreement also reflects the growing convergence of economic and security policy. Defense is no longer just about tanks and troops, it is about technology, standards, and industrial resilience. In an era where cybersecurity, AI, and space are central to national security, collaborative innovation is essential.

Crucially, Canada and the EU have agreed to pursue a joint digital standards agreement, ensuring compatibility across key domains such as 5G infrastructure, AI regulation, and critical technology supply chains. This effort signals an emerging tech alliance, one that could become a powerful counterweight to both Chinese and US digital ecosystems.

Still, obstacles remain. Canada continues to face trade barriers within the EU due to the incomplete ratification of CETA. Ten EU member states have yet to approve the agreement, limiting Canadian firms’ access to European defense contracts. Until these issues are resolved, the full potential of this new security partnership will remain constrained.

Recommendations for Strategic Consolidation

To ensure the EU–Canada pact delivers lasting value, both parties should strategically consolidate efforts across key areas. Establishing a joint EU–Canada security council would institutionalize coordination, align priorities, and enable annual evaluations of strategic progress. Deepening industrial integration through harmonized defense procurement standards and co-development of next-generation technologies would strengthen mutual capabilities. Expanding digital cooperation by finalizing and implementing a shared digital standards pact is essential to ensure interoperability in emerging security domains. Additionally, addressing trade barriers by pushing for full ratification of CETA across all EU member states would unlock reciprocal market access and foster defense-sector investment. Finally, enhancing public communication is vital, both sides must clearly articulate the benefits of the partnership to domestic audiences to build enduring political support.

Looking Ahead

The EU–Canada security agreement is more than a diplomatic milestone; it is a strategic signal. It illustrates how Western allies are adapting to a less predictable world by creating new partnerships, diversifying their defense strategies, and strengthening their capacity to act independently and cooperatively.

As the global balance of power continues to shift, the transatlantic community must evolve in kind. Canada and the EU are showing what that evolution looks like, not by abandoning traditional alliances, but by complementing and modernizing them. If implemented effectively, this pact could become a model for 21st-century security cooperation – flexible, values-driven, and fit for a multipolar age.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

15. Russia Is Ready to Begin Its Summer Offensive

Russia Is Ready to Begin Its Summer Offensive

The National Interest · by David Kirichenko

Topic: Security

Region: Europe

Tags: Donald Trump, Drone Warfare, Russia, Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin

June 27, 2025

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Russia’s summer offensive signals Putin’s determination to overwhelm Ukraine using mass drone warfare, motorcycle assaults, and Chinese tech support, while betting on scale, endurance, and Western hesitancy to act.

Vladimir Putin appears increasingly confident that Russia will ultimately prevail on the battlefield in Ukraine as Moscow wages a bloody summer offensive. Just as Putin claimed in his 2021 essay that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” and that Ukraine’s sovereignty hinges on Moscow’s approval, he reiterated in late June: “I’ve said it before, Russians and Ukrainians are one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours. There’s an old rule that wherever a Russian soldier sets foot, that’s ours.”

Moskovsky Komsomolets noted that that phrase captured the essence of Putin’s “political faith and long-term strategy.”

Putin’s and Trump’s Strained Relationship

US President Donald Trump has been repeatedly disregarded by the Kremlin, despite issuing vague ultimatums, often invoking his signature “two-week” timeline, which has yielded no tangible results. This isn’t “peace through strength,” but rather “weakness through appeasement” that Trump has been demonstrating with Russia.

The Trump administration has resorted to engaging with the Lukashenko regime in Minsk, hoping to revive any momentum with peace talks. To Trump’s credit, he finally got both sides to start talking to each other. But the Russians’ message in the meetings has been that they are intent on finishing this war and subjugating Ukraine. Vladimir Medinsky, Putin’s aide leading the delegation, said, “We’re prepared to fight forever.”

However, Moscow continues to distance itself from peace negotiations, instead doubling down on its goal of fully subjugating Ukraine. Russia has nearly 700,000 troops inside Ukraine to support Moscow’s battlefield aims. Since January 2024, Russia has gained less than 1 percent of Ukrainian territory despite suffering record post-WWII losses.

What Are Russia’s Summer Offensive Plans?

Russia has recently opened a new front in Sumy, likely tied to its rhetoric about establishing a buffer zone following Ukraine’s surprise 2024 incursion into Kursk. The Institute for the Study of War noted that the Kremlin is also using the pretext of “buffer zones” to justify expanding Russia’s territorial ambitions in Ukraine.

On the battlefield, the primary aim appears to be stretching Ukrainian forces thin across multiple fronts to increase pressure on Donetsk Oblast, which is Moscow’s primary objective. This is reflected by Russia’s decision to deploy its top drone units to the area.

Nonetheless, Ukraine has held steady and has been working to drive back the Russians from Sumy after Moscow suffered heavy losses. Recent reports reveal increasing numbers of Russians voluntarily surrendering to Ukrainians, likely viewing Ukrainian captivity as a better place to be than being sent to the meatgrinder to die by their commanders. Russian soldiers have been openly commenting on Ukrainian aviation, saying their pilots fly “like Jews in Iran,” are without fear, and are far more accurate than before.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin has watched its key ally, Iran, face relentless humiliation, doing nothing to defend it. Instead, Moscow has pointed to the fine print of previous agreements to avoid stepping in and to prevent “inflated expectations” of Russian support. Still, Russia stands to benefit from the surge in oil prices triggered by market turmoil after Israel launched its bombing campaign.

Throughout 2025, Ukraine worked on strengthening its expanding drone wall to contain Russia’s constant meatgrinder assaults. Good mining, digging new trenches not in open fields, and scaling drone production will be key to sustaining the drone wall. This drone wall should continue to evolve into a technological shield to increase the rate of Russian losses and drive down Ukrainian losses.

As a result, the Russians have evolved their tactics and how they attempt to probe Ukrainian lines. In Mad Max fashion, Russia’s primary vehicle of choice has become the motorcycle, or the 21st-century Dragoon. A Russian soldier must drive as fast as possible with no mistakes to avoid getting hit by a drone. Most motorcycles used are Chinese-made, such as the Sharmax Sport 280, and are sourced through state procurement, volunteer networks, and personal purchases.

This tactic is costly but calculated. Oleksandr Solonko, a Ukrainian soldier and communications specialist, observed that even if just one in five motorcycle assaults succeeds, the enemy is willing to expend all that human life to sustain its offensives. “These motor-assault units move fast. Our drone operators and artillery have less time to react,” wrote Solonko.

What Are Russia’s Recent Successes in the War?

However, Kyiv has recently made critical mistakes that make its drone wall vulnerable. In Russia’s latest offensive near Sumy, Ukraine failed to establish proper fortifications, a recurring issue throughout the war. Without adequate defenses and mining, Russian forces can advance more quickly, which makes it harder for Ukrainian defenders. Russian KAB-guided bombs continue to strike Ukrainian positions at the same rate as they did a year ago.

Russia claims that 65 percent of Ukrainian losses occur during troop rotations or resupply, and 35% on the front line. Fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones make any surface movement within 20km of the front extremely dangerous. However, Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief, highlighted that Russia is ahead in the fiber-optic drone race “in terms of both quantity and range of application.”

The Russians are betting on scale, believing that sheer mass and the full mobilization of state resources will ultimately secure victory. The China-Iran-Russia axis is accelerating Russia’s technological advancement, with its partnership with Iran enabling the domestic production of Iranian-designed Shahed drones. Chinese companies and the supplies they provide are key reasons Russia can sustain its war.

Russia’s Kalashnikov has also partnered with Ushkuynik, a volunteer-run tech accelerator that developed the country’s first fiber-optic drone, to produce drones jointly. The deal reflects a broader shift in Russia’s defense industry toward integrating fast-moving, frontline-tested innovations from startups into mass production, as Moscow pushes for quicker development-to-deployment cycles. In essence, Russia is learning important lessons from the war.

“While Russia benefits from its ongoing relationship with Iran and China, Ukraine has also demonstrated that it can use its domestic and allied tech to press the Russians in return,” said Samuel Bendett, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Moscow’s war effort leans heavily on its partnership with China, which supplies about 80 percent of the world’s fiber-optic components. “Russia isn’t technically ahead; both sides are ordering the same parts from the same Chinese suppliers,” said Heiner Philipp, an engineer with Technology United for Ukraine.

These drones were a key factor in Russia’s success in Kursk. The same strategy is being employed across the front in Ukraine: launch quick assaults using motorcycles, pressure Ukrainian flanks, attempt to encircle defenders, and use fiber-optic drones to target incoming Ukrainian logistics and vehicles.

Entire forest lines are now covered in fiber-optic wires. Now, even drones have become effective “anti-sniper” tools, targeting individuals with high-value equipment like snipers and ATGM operators.

As a result of these drone attacks, Ukraine faces an acute shortage of trucks, pickups, and armored transport, which are increasingly destroyed by drones. Volunteer groups and charities have stepped in to supply thousands of vehicles, but demand far outpaces supply.

The most practical solution has become to focus efforts on eliminating Russian drone pilots. Disrupting drone operations weakens Russian assaults and interferes with enemy command and control.

Ukraine’s new Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, “Madyar,” prioritizes targeting these operators, awarding 25 points for a kill, more than for tanks or regular soldiers. Units can trade verified kills for drones and equipment through an online marketplace. Russian sources confirmed that under the revised points system, attacks on drone crews, especially fiber-optic FPV operators, have intensified. Pilots are being urged to deploy decoy antennas on the front.

China and North Korea Assist Russia’s War in Ukraine

China is deepening military cooperation with Russia despite claiming neutrality and supporting peace talks. Ukrainian intelligence reports that Moscow will host around 600 Chinese military personnel in 2025 to train at Russian bases, learning from Russia’s battlefield experience and focusing on countering Western weaponry. Reuters also previously reported that Chinese military officers have been in Russia, learning from the war in Ukraine.

The Kremlin is now also bringing in 25,000 North Korean industrial workers to staff drone production lines in Tatarstan, in addition to the thousands of troops that have been fighting in Kursk.

Mick Ryan, a retired Australian Army Major-General, noted, “The Russians have a significant advantage over Ukraine in their ability to recruit soldiers, generate forces, and replace their casualties.” Both sides are looking abroad to recruit more soldiers.

But not all is going well for Russian forces, which increasingly rely on recruits driven by the promise of cash bonuses, if they survive. In one gruesome example, leaked audio from Ukraine’s military intelligence alleges that a Russian soldier killed and ate his comrade.

As long as the West assumes Russia is merely seeking land under the guise of exaggerated security concerns, it will fail to grasp the deeper threat. Moscow is prepared to fight to restore its imperial past, dragging the world backward. In a recent broadcast, one Russian military official openly discussed plans to attack NATO over alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers in the Baltic and to capture Kharkiv by 2030.

But Russia can’t fight on forever, and the cracks are growing. The country’s economy minister recently admitted that Russia is on the brink of recession, as surging war spending collides with inflation, labor shortages, and tight monetary policy.

If Trump were to apply real economic pressure, he might break Moscow’s resolve and bring it to the negotiating table. Until then, Russia believes it holds the upper hand and will continue preparing to challenge Europe in a future war.

With little to offer its people for the future, the Kremlin instead sells a vision of returning to the supposed glory days of the Russian Empire.

About the Author: David Kirichenko

David Kirichenko is a freelance journalist and an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based think tank. His research focuses on autonomous systems, cyber warfare, irregular warfare, and military strategy. His analyses have been widely published in outlets such as the Atlantic Council, the Center for European Policy Analysis, the Irregular Warfare Center, Military Review, and The Hill, as well as in peer-reviewed journals.

Image Credit: Shutterstock/Jonas Petrovas.

The National Interest · by David Kirichenko

16. Political Violence Is Part of the American Story. It Is Also Changing.

Political Violence Is Part of the American Story. It Is Also Changing.

Attacks, such as an assassination in Minnesota, are on the rise. Their motives are often hard to parse.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/28/us/political-violence-minnesota-assassination.html

Mourners gathered at the Minnesota State Capitol for a vigil for State Representative Melissa Hortman, who was fatally shot at her home this month alongside her husband, Mark.Credit...Jenn Ackerman for The New York Times

By Shaila Dewan

June 28, 2025

Updated 1:53 p.m. ET

Minnesotans awoke on a recent Saturday to reports that an assassin had spent the night ticking his way down a list of Democratic targets, wounding one state lawmaker and his wife and then, just as the police closed in, killing another, along with her husband and their dog.

It was shocking. But it quickly seemed to become just another episode in a recent spate of political violence. Since last July, two people have tried to assassinate Donald J. Trump, an arsonist set fire to the Pennsylvania governor’s mansion while the family slept, an assailant fatally shot a couple leaving the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington and a man was charged with attempting to kidnap the mayor of Memphis.

The result is a troubling sense that political violence has become more brazen, and its motives more difficult to comprehend. The increase is not just public perception; experts agree that attacks on political figures have been increasing.

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data project, a nonprofit that tracks conflicts around the globe, has recorded 21 acts of violence against politicians, their families or their staffs in the United States since it began counting them in 2020. A vast majority have occurred since 2022.

The rise comes as vicious and dehumanizing language and images become common in American politics. Online culture is a potent vector, seeming to only amplify rather than calm or contextualize, while offering plenty of encouragement to would-be imitators. And guns have been deregulated in many states, becoming easier to acquire.

Political violence can encompass a broad range of actions, from torching Tesla charging stations to premeditated sniper attacks, making it difficult to quantify.

And violence motivated by racial, ethnic and partisan differences has been part of the American story line from the beginning. Those annals include the terror campaigns of the Ku Klux Klan, the anarchist bombing of Wall Street in 1920 and the gunning down of police officers by the Black Liberation Army in the ’70s — all violence that had societal or even revolutionary aims.

In contrast, American political violence today is more likely to be carried out by someone acting alone, in despair and deeply dosed on the steroidal forms of extremism offered by the internet.

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The aftermath of the bombing on Wall Street on Sept. 16, 1920.Credit...Library of Congress/Corbis, via VCG, via Getty Images

Such attacks can seem infused with futility from the outset, said Shuki Cohen, who studies terrorism and political violence at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice. The new ideology is nihilism itself, he said, “just a vague doomsday mentality of burn it all down and go out in a blaze of glory.”

Perpetrators exhibit “learned helplessness,” he said, a sense that the political system is incapable of averting the jumble of apocalyptic scenarios cited in their manifestoes: climate change, unregulated artificial intelligence, concentrated wealth, nuclear threat and society’s moral collapse.

More on the Shooting in Minnesota

•  Senator Tina Smith: The Minnesota Democrat, who was on the suspect’s target list, attributed what she said was a political environment awash in violent threats and actions to a toxic atmosphere created by President Trump. Here’s how political violence in America is changing.
•  Posing as a Police Officer: When the gunman in the shootings of two Minnesota lawmakers approached their homes, he arrived in a black S.U.V. with flashing police lights and wore a badge and tactical vest.
•  Close Calls: The suspect drove to the homes of two additional politicians with the intent to kill them, the authorities said. In both of those cases, they said, the man, Vance Boelter, was thwarted.
•  Republican Senator Draws Outrage: Scarcely 24 hours after a Democratic lawmaker in Minnesota was assassinated in her home, Senator Mike Lee, Republican of Utah, posted a pair of politically charged messages mocking the attack and blaming “Marxists.”
•  Balance of Power: The murder of Melissa Hortman, the top Democrat in the Minnesota House, left a legislative chamber that had been evenly divided between the parties with a one-vote Republican majority.

Sometimes it is possible to draw a straight line between ideology and action. Vance Boelter, the man accused in the Minnesota attacks, was a conservative Christian who opposed abortion and targeted liberals. Luigi Mangione, accused in the shooting of a health insurance executive on a Manhattan street last year, was a critic of the American health care system. And there’s Guy Edward Bartkus, who officials say detonated a bomb outside a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, Calif., in May, in the apparent belief that humans should voluntarily become extinct.

But the motive of Thomas Crooks, who attempted to assassinate Mr. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pa., last July, was a riddle. He had done internet searches for both Mr. Trump and Joseph R. Biden Jr., seeming to have chosen his target almost at random. He had no “definitive ideology,” the F.B.I. concluded, but he did have an AR-15-style rifle. Does that count as political violence, or just American violence?

“Those sorts of incidents, where we can’t figure out why they did it, are becoming more common,” said Katherine Keneally, the director of threat analysis and prevention at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a nonprofit that works to combat extremism.

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The entrance to the Capitol Jewish Museum was cordoned off by law enforcement last month after an assailant fatally shot two Israeli Embassy employees.Credit...Allison Robbert for The New York Times

Of course, America’s legacy of political violence is littered with all manner of motives. John Wilkes Booth was part of an organized conspiracy that opposed President Abraham Lincoln’s views, but the killer of President James A. Garfield, less than 20 years later, became a landmark case for the insanity defense, said Adam Goodheart, the director of the Starr Center for the Study of the American Experience at Washington College.

Sirhan Sirhan said he killed Senator Robert F. Kennedy to block him from aiding Israel against Palestinians if he were elected president. John Hinckley Jr., on the other hand, tried to assassinate President Ronald Reagan to impress the actress Jodie Foster.

“Almost every president of the past century has been the target of a serious assassination attempt,” Mr. Goodheart said.

The United States has long glamorized violence. It has a higher homicide rate than other developed Western nations, and mass shootings have become routine. Recently, threats against public officials have soared. The number investigated each year by the Capitol Police, who protect federal lawmakers, has more than doubled, rising to 9,474 last year from 3,939 in 2017. Threats against judges have spiked dramatically since Mr. Trump returned to office, according to data from the U.S. Marshals Service.

On the other hand, experts say the threat of violence by right-wing extremist groups, which have long been behind most domestic terror attacks, began to recede before Mr. Trump won the election, in part because their leaders were prosecuted after the Jan. 6 invasion of the Capitol, and in part because of expectations that Mr. Trump would win.

“In some periods, you don’t need political violence,” said Dan Byman, the director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The Klan, strangely enough, was weaker in Mississippi in the ’60s than it was in North Carolina. Which might seem odd, but the reason is if you were racist, the government of Mississippi was doing exactly what you wanted.”

At times, political violence is intended to accelerate social change, like the abolitionist John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry, spurred by a belief that the antislavery movement wasn’t radical enough.

Other times, it is a reactionary attempt to stave off the future. The Civil War, Mr. Goodheart said, could be thought of as “a massive act of extralegal political violence that killed three-quarters of a million Americans.”

More recently, experts like Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have suggested that the current turbulence is related to America’s demographic transformation into a country where white people are the minority and to the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. Right-wing provocateurs have played on that fear with conspiracy theories like the Great Replacement, which suggests that liberal elites are encouraging immigration to bolster their political power.

Where once extremist content was shared in print magazines or books, and people had to pass initiation rites to join groups like the Klan, social media has removed barriers to even the most violent fantasies, offering anonymity and specialized echo chambers for ever more baroque grievances.

Everything now is amplified, including word of political violence when it happens. In the past, such acts could be obscured. Digging through a clergyman’s diary, Mr. Goodheart recently came across what may be the only surviving account of violent conflicts in Chestertown, Md., in the 1860s, over the exclusion of Black people from religious gatherings.

“Today, of course, it would be all over social media if there were an armed clash between whites and African Americans in an American town,” he said. “But at the time, it made barely a ripple.”

A correction was made on June 28, 2025: An earlier version of this article misstated the aftermath of Thomas Crooks’s assassination attempt on Donald Trump in Butler, Pa. Mr. Crooks was not charged; he was killed by the Secret Service that day.

​17. China purges senior military official Miao Hua from top ruling body

China purges senior military official Miao Hua from top ruling body

27 Jun 2025 04:34PM

channelnewsasia.com

BEIJING: China's top legislature has voted to remove senior military official Miao Hua from the Central Military Commission, its highest-level military command body, according to a statement published on Friday (Jun 27) by state news agency Xinhua.

Miao, 69, was put under investigation for "serious violations of discipline" in November. The former political ideology chief of the People's Liberation Army was also suspended from his post.

The Xinhua statement did not contain any other details, but the move marks another stage in President Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption purge of China's military, in which over a dozen PLA generals and a handful of defence industry executives have been implicated.

Miao's photo had been removed from the senior leadership page of the Chinese defence ministry's website in recent weeks. He was also removed from China's national legislature for "serious violations of discipline and law", according to a communique released by the legislature last month.

"The Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission held a military representative conference on Mar 14 this year and decided to remove Miao Hua from his position as a representative of the 14th National People's Congress," the statement said.

Miao was stationed in the coastal province of Fujian when Xi worked there as a local official, according to his official biography. Xi personally elevated Miao to the Central Military Commission.

Another Central Military Commission member and China's second-ranking general, He Weidong, has not been seen in public since the Mar 11 closing ceremony of the annual parliamentary sessions in Beijing. Since then, he has not appeared at a series of high-level Politburo and military public engagements.

He is the third-most powerful commander of the People's Liberation Army and is considered a close associate of President Xi Jinping, the army's commander-in-chief.

China's defence ministry said in March it was "unaware" of reports he had been detained. His photo remains on the defence ministry's website.

Two former Chinese defence ministers have been removed from the Communist Party for corruption. One of them, Li Shangfu, was suspected of corruption in military procurement, Reuters has reported.

Last year, the defence ministry denied reports that Defence Minister Dong Jun was being probed on suspicion of corruption. Dong has continued to appear at public events, attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation defence ministers' meeting in Qingdao this week.

Source: Reuters/fh

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com