Quotes of the Day:

"Certain things catch your eye, but pursue only those that capture the heart." 

– Ancient Indian Proverb

"A critic is a man who knows the way but can't drive the car." 

– Kenneth Tynan

"How vain it is to sit down to write when you have not stood up to live."

– Henry David Thoreau

1. Exit polls project landslide victory for DP

2. N.K. leader's unification goal abandonment 'desperate' attempt to control internal info: U.S. envoy

3. Trump’s ‘Love’ Affair With Kim Looms Over U.S.-Japan Summit

4. In new movie, the South started the Korean War, as Pyongyang has always claimed

5. Full support needed for AI development (Korea)

6. U.S., Japan to launch military industrial council on arms co-production: official

7. Sullivan stresses 'synergies' in trilateral cooperation among S. Korea, U.S., Japan

8. Blinken renews concerns over support for Russia's defense industrial base from N. Korea, Iran, China

9. White House official reaffirms openness to N. Korea dialogue on 'wide' range of issues

10. S. Korea, Canada, New Zealand under consideration for AUKUS Pillar II partners: U.S. official

11. How South Korea can aid Ukraine

12. North Korean newborn dies after local hospital refuses care

13. America’s Best Friend in Asia: The Case for Elevating the U.S. Alliance With Japan

1. Exit polls project landslide victory for DP

This does not bode well for President Yoon. And we will have to see how this affects the alliance. We might expect a DP president to follow the current administration.

(LEAD) Exit polls project landslide victory for DP | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · April 10, 2024

(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES with more info throughout)

By Kim Han-joo

SEOUL, April 10 (Yonhap) -- The main opposition Democratic Party (DP) and its affiliated party are expected to win a massive victory in Wednesday's general elections, exit polls showed.

The DP and the Democratic United Party, the DP's so-called satellite sister party that only targets proportional representation seats, are expected to secure a combined 178-196 seats in the 300-member National Assembly, according to a poll conducted by public broadcaster KBS.

The ruling People Power Party (PPP) and its affiliated People Future Party are likely to win 87-105 seats, the poll showed.

Another poll by major broadcaster SBS showed the DP and its ally sweeping 183-197 seats, and the PPP and its affiliated party securing 85-100 seats, while a poll by broadcaster MBC showed the DP and its affiliate party winning 184-197 seats, with the PPP and its affiliated party securing 85-99 seats.

The poll conducted by cable broadcaster JTBC showed the DP and its satellite party winning 168-193 seats, and the PPP and its sister likely to win 87-111 seats.

Up for grabs are 300 seats, with 254 of them to be selected through direct elections and the remaining 46 proportional representation seats to be allocated to parties according to the number of votes they receive overall.

Final results of the race are expected early Thursday.

A voter puts a ballot for South Korea's parliamentary elections into a ballot box at a polling station in Daegu, 237 kilometers south of Seoul, on April 10, 2024. (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · April 10, 2024

2. N.K. leader's unification goal abandonment 'desperate' attempt to control internal info: U.S. envoy

I think Kim is trying to gain control over the information environment because he feels threatened from within.

An interesting diplomatic tactic - to discuss our own human rights and shortcomings. The regime will attack our human rights regardless. Making this statement may reduce the effects of their attacks on us.

Excerpts:

"Kim Jong-un's recent abandonment of reunification goals, the shift and rhetoric towards Seoul should be seen less as a strategic shift signaling his confidence in his ties with Russia and its weapons program and more as a desperate attempt to get control of the internal information environment," she said at a form hosted by the Korea Society.

...

During the forum, Turner reiterated Washington's readiness to resume diplomacy with Pyongyang.

"The U.S. is ready to engage in a transparent and outcome-oriented discussion with the DPRK on human rights," she said, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

"In such discussions, we are prepared to have a frank conversation about our own human rights record and actions we are undertaking to address our own shortcomings," she added.

N.K. leader's unification goal abandonment 'desperate' attempt to control internal info: U.S. envoy | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's abandonment of unification goals should be seen as a "desperate" move to control internal information, the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights said Tuesday.

Ambassador Julie Turner made the remarks as she underlined that the human rights situation in the North has worsened in a post-pandemic period marked by what she called increased repression, greater restrictions on freedom of movement and tightened surveillance to name a few.

"Kim Jong-un's recent abandonment of reunification goals, the shift and rhetoric towards Seoul should be seen less as a strategic shift signaling his confidence in his ties with Russia and its weapons program and more as a desperate attempt to get control of the internal information environment," she said at a form hosted by the Korea Society.

U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean human rights Julie Turner speaks during a forum hosted by the Korea Society on April 9, 2024 in this photo captured from a YouTube account of the Korea Society. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

She did not elaborate further, but appears to be referring to Pyongyang's perceived efforts to curb the inflow of information from South Korea and elsewhere, which could lead to North Koreans being awakened to a better future outside their impoverished, tightly controlled home country.

The North Korean leader has scrapped a decadeslong policy of seeking unification with South Korea, a legacy of his grandfather, and defined inter-Korean ties as those between "two states hostile to each other."

The move raised concerns that Pyongyang could engage in provocative acts amid the absence of meaningful diplomatic engagements between the two Koreas and between the United States and the North.

The North's hostile approach to the South also came amid Pyongyang's burgeoning military cooperation with Moscow against the backdrop of Russia's war in Ukraine.

During the forum, Turner reiterated Washington's readiness to resume diplomacy with Pyongyang.

"The U.S. is ready to engage in a transparent and outcome-oriented discussion with the DPRK on human rights," she said, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

"In such discussions, we are prepared to have a frank conversation about our own human rights record and actions we are undertaking to address our own shortcomings," she added.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

3. Trump’s ‘Love’ Affair With Kim Looms Over U.S.-Japan Summit

Excerpts:

Similarly, an early agreement to make South Korea a full member of the Asian Security “Quad” alongside Japan, India, Australia and the U.S., would be a major step forward. Such a move would be important politically and economically, soothing nerves in Southeast Asia about feared (albeit nonexistent) ulterior Japanese motives. Moreover, both Seoul and Tokyo should be invited to participate in Aukus, the Australia-U.S.-U.K. effort to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, or similar mechanisms that could both enhance allied cooperation and produce significant increases in defense spending all around.

No one believes these actions amount to a mini-North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as Mr. Biden’s White House is at pains to emphasize publicly. Nonetheless, enhanced collective defense programs against Chinese and North Korean belligerence are necessary and urgent. Each additional measure helps solidify growing operational coordination on matters of mutual security, and makes it harder for Mr. Trump, if re-elected, to roll them back.

Trump’s ‘Love’ Affair With Kim Looms Over U.S.-Japan Summit

Biden and Kishida should use this week’s meetings to lock in security accords a successor can’t easily undo.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-love-affair-with-kim-looms-over-u-s-japan-summit-kishida-biden-96b0b77e?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By John Bolton

April 9, 2024 3:21 pm ET

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida meets the press at the premier's office in Tokyo, April 8. PHOTO: KYODONEWS/ZUMA PRESS

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Washington this week coincides with the re-emergence of a familiar threat: North Korea. On March 28, Russia vetoed what should have been a routine U.N. Security Council reauthorization of a panel monitoring sanctions on Pyongyang. Moscow’s veto reflected both unhappiness with the panel’s recent findings and a general fraying of relations between Russia and the U.S.

While the committee’s demise is unfortunate, the veto signaled something far more important: that the strengthening China-Russia axis is firmly resolved to protect its interests and those of its outriders, North Korea and Iran. China and Russia never fully shared the U.S. desire to keep the North from acquiring nuclear weapons. Getting them to agree to incremental sanctions required endless palavering, “full and frank exchanges,” and several near-shouting matches. But even that marriage of convenience is now gone.

Mr. Kishida’s visit highlights the stakes in a presidential election year. Unfortunately, neither Joe Biden nor Donald Trump is fit to deal with Kim Jong Un’s rogue regime. Mr. Biden has followed Barack Obama’s “strategic patience” policy, increasing neither economic nor political pressure on Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear aspirations, nor otherwise seriously challenging the regime, nor even engaging in negotiations. As a result, North Korea has simply continued advancing its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. After more than a decade of “strategic patience,” we now know what such diplomatic jargon really means: doing nothing. While Washington has played the idle bystander, Mr. Kim has profited from the growing Russia-China collaboration, strengthening his relations with Moscow and better positioning himself to secure tangible benefits from both poles of the new axis.

On North Korea, a second Trump term would be as bad as the first. Three summits between the two leaders produced nothing concrete apart from Mr. Trump’s claims that he and Mr. Kim “fell in love.” As with all nuclear proliferators, time is on the side of the rogue state. With Mr. Trump in office, Pyongyang got four years closer to being able to deliver a nuclear weapon.

There is no sign Mr. Trump has wised up while out of office. Every indication is that he will hasten to arrange a fourth summit with Mr. Kim, perhaps traveling to Pyongyang itself rather than merely tiptoeing across Panmunjom’s armistice line. Unfortunately, Mr. Kishida has opened the door for another Trump-Kim meeting by continuing to seek his own bilateral summit, even after the North Korean leader rejected his first offer. Former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi twice visited Pyongyang in the early 2000s, seeking unsuccessfully to repatriate Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean agents. His successor Shinzo Abe offered the North a summit only after Mr. Trump’s first meeting with Mr. Kim in 2018.

With perhaps only nine months left to serve, Mr. Biden should drop “strategic patience” and pick up the pace. Much of what needs to be done directly involves South Korea. Fortunately, Mr. Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol have considerably improved relations between their countries. Mr. Biden should again strongly reaffirm that the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella extends to both Japan and South Korea. He should also work to lock in and significantly expand last year’s agreement on trilateral military cooperation, including by scheduling major joint exercises. That will signal continuing resolve to Beijing and Pyongyang, while raising the political costs to Mr. Trump if he tries to cancel these war games as he did in 2018 with the bilateral U.S.-South Korean exercises, a move that surprised his advisers and delighted Mr. Kim, who laughed at the negotiating table on hearing the news.

Similarly, an early agreement to make South Korea a full member of the Asian Security “Quad” alongside Japan, India, Australia and the U.S., would be a major step forward. Such a move would be important politically and economically, soothing nerves in Southeast Asia about feared (albeit nonexistent) ulterior Japanese motives. Moreover, both Seoul and Tokyo should be invited to participate in Aukus, the Australia-U.S.-U.K. effort to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, or similar mechanisms that could both enhance allied cooperation and produce significant increases in defense spending all around.

No one believes these actions amount to a mini-North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as Mr. Biden’s White House is at pains to emphasize publicly. Nonetheless, enhanced collective defense programs against Chinese and North Korean belligerence are necessary and urgent. Each additional measure helps solidify growing operational coordination on matters of mutual security, and makes it harder for Mr. Trump, if re-elected, to roll them back.

Mr. Bolton served as White House national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06. He is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.”

4. In new movie, the South started the Korean War, as Pyongyang has always claimed

Another indication of the priority that the regime is putting on in controlling the information environment. Making the South the main enemy is. result of the threat from the South to the regime - not the military threat. But the idea and example of the South - it is the idea, the values, and the example of the ROK that is the number one existential threat to the Kim family regime. We need to understand that and shape our policies and strategies with that understanding.

In new movie, the South started the Korean War, as Pyongyang has always claimed

Higher quality of propaganda film ‘72 Hours’ is making it a blockbuster in North Korea.

By Kim Ji Eun for RFA Korean

2024.04.09

rfa.org

Early on June 25, 1950, 75,000 Korean People’s Army troops attacked, catching the South Korean Army by surprise and starting the Korean War. Three days later, Seoul fell to the Communist North.

But the new hit North Korean movie, “72 Hours,” tells a different story of how the three-year-long conflict started.

Produced by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the country’s Central Committee, the film has the South attacking first, and the North’s advance to Seoul is part of a counter offensive, a resident of the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

This account falls in line with Pyongyang’s official version of events – that it was the South that provoked the war under the orders of the United States, and that Washington wanted the war as an excuse to send troops to Korea to “conquer” the entire peninsula.

The movie is proving popular, largely because its production quality is higher than most made in North Korea, the resident said.

“People know it is ideological, but it is very entertaining,” the resident said.

Viewers seem enthused about the film even though they know it is propaganda, a resident of the northwestern province of North Pyongan told RFA.

Rare homegrown hit

It was in production for more than two years, and it was made specifically to paint the South Koreans as the enemy, he said.

RFA was not able to confirm the plot or other details about the film, which was released in February.

The movie is proving a rare homegrown hit for North Koreans, many of whom secretly watch South Korean TV shows and movies.

“There are not many North Korean movies worth watching, so residents usually prefer South Korean and foreign movies,” the first resident said.

South Korean and foreign media are smuggled into the country on SD cards and USB flash drives, but distributing or viewing the media is illegal, and citizens have been punished, or even executed, for getting caught watching or selling it.

An estimated 2-3 million Koreans died in the war, and the North ended up with slightly less territory than it had at the start, but North Korea claims it was victorious in what it now refers to as the “Great Fatherland Liberation War.”

At the beginning, though, the rapid advance of the Korean People’s Army suggested that the Communist forces would swiftly defeat the South.

As depicted in the film, Seoul’s first fall – the capital changed hands four times – is an inspiring story of brave men fighting a fierce three-day battle to “liberate” the city, the first resident said.

Pricey tickets

But not everyone can afford to see the movie, he said.

Authorities originally set ticket prices at 18,000 won (US$2.12) when the film was released, he said, an enormous sum that equals about half a month’s salary for the lowest paid government-assigned jobs. The price was later cut to 5,000 won (59 U.S. cents).

The exact production costs are not known, but rumors are spreading among residents that the film’s long run in theaters is because it hasn’t yet recouped those costs, the second resident said.

Those who can’t afford to watch are eagerly awaiting the film’s TV release, as that’s what usually happens to all North Korean propaganda films, the sources said. But rumors are circulating that “72 Hours” will be sold on VCD before that, yet another way to generate revenue.

“Even though the ticket price was lowered to 5,000 won … it is more important for residents to buy a kilogram (2.2 pounds) of rice for 6,000 won (70 U.S. cents) than to spend 5,000 on a movie ticket,” the North Pyongan resident said.

Authorities are also taking measures to prevent people from taking videos or pictures of the movie on their cell phones, saying that the ban is to prevent people from taking videos of national founder Kim Il Sung, even though the role is portrayed by an actor, he said.

“Residents who watched the movie left the theater wondering, ‘If we had won the war and occupied South Korea back then, what would Korea be like now?’”

Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

5. Full support needed for AI development (Korea)

Full support needed for AI development

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-04-10/opinion/editorials/Full-support-needed-for-AI-development/2022582

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration is doubling down on its backing for Korean chipmakers in the battlefield over AI. In a Cabinet meeting in the presidential office on Tuesday to closely check issues with the development of AI technology, President Yoon proposed the AI Chip Initiative to make Korea one of the world’s top three powers in AI technology.

To support the initiative, the administration promised that it will scale up government investments in research and development for cutting-edge AI chips and create a large-scale fund to bolster the growth of semiconductor producers.

Yoon also pledged to set up a presidential commission presided over by the president himself to coordinate government-private cooperation in producing advanced AI chips to help lead the market.

Since the center of the chip market is moving fast toward AI chips, the president’s pledges translate into a determination to follow in the footsteps of the memory chip sector to now create a new chip legend for the country. We welcome the government’s dash to take part in the fierce global chip race to take the chip leadership.

Governments around the world have been vying with subsidies and various incentives to strengthen their chip manufacturing capability on their home turf. Japan is subsidizing a whopping 1.2 trillion yen ($7.9 billion) for Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC)’s next-generation chip facilities in Kumamoto prefecture with an ambition to revitalize its chip production habitat.

The United States is also spending astronomically to rebuild its own chipmaking infrastructure. It pledged to provide $19.5 billion to Intel’s new foundry, followed up by a $6.6 billion subsidy and a $5 billion low-interest loan for TSMC’s facility in the U.S. Samsung Electronics which also promised to build new facilities in Texas is expected to get $6 billion to $7 billion in subsidy for its chipmaking projects in America.

In the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, President Yoon emphatically said, “We must go all-out as if in a wartime and come up with a bold support measure compatible with our conditions.” In a meaningful step earlier, the president promised that he himself will take charge of the power and water supply needed for the 622-trillion-won ($459 billion) mega chip cluster in Yongin, Gyeonggi.

If the president had simply reiterated the promise with just a blueprint of the chip cluster, it could have been seen as a rhetoric only to win votes from voters in the chip belt in Suwon and Yongin. The government must not forget that only radical, determined and effective support to buttress Korea’s chip edge can reap the fruits of strengthened national competitiveness, economic growth, and job increases.

6. U.S., Japan to launch military industrial council on arms co-production: official

U.S., Japan to launch military industrial council on arms co-production: official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 10 (Yonhap) -- The United States and Japan will launch a military industrial council to discuss co-production of defense weapons, a senior U.S. official has said, in another sign of stepped-up security cooperation amid China's assertiveness, Russia's war in Ukraine and North Korea's military threats.

The official previewed Wednesday's summit between President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, which he said would produce an array of agreements, including the first-ever change in the alliance's force structure and cooperation in lunar exploration and artificial intelligence research.

"We're going to have a military industrial council that will evaluate where we can co-produce defense weapons," the official said during an online press briefing Tuesday.

The plan for the council came after Japan eased its restrictions on military equipment exports amid its continued push for a greater role in global security -- a move that created an opening for deeper defense industrial cooperation with the U.S.

Japan had long hewed strictly to the export curbs due to its post-war exclusively defense-oriented principles and war-renouncing constitution.

This photo, released by AFP, shows U.S. President Joe Biden (R) and first lady Jill Biden welcoming Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and his spouse Yuko Kishida at the South Portico of the White House in Washington on April 9, 2024. (Yonhap)

"Japan's industrial capacity and strength that had always been on the sidelines will come to bear on one of the weak points right now that we have, which is we don't have really the bandwidth of the defense production capacity that we need for strategic obligations," the official said.

"There will also be pieces as related to the integrated missile defense system with Australia, the United States and Japan."

The official also noted that on the occasion of the summit, the two sides will announce the first-ever change in the alliance's force structure to "make the most" of Japan's new joint operations center.

He was apparently referring to ongoing efforts to modernize the alliance's force structure to ensure seamless coordination between the U.S. Forces Japan and the joint operations command, which Japan's Self-Defense Forces seek to launch reportedly at the end of the year.

The official also touched on expected summit agreements on lunar exploration with Japan being a "full" partner in the domain, research on artificial intelligence between the two countries' private institutes and a scholarship program for Japanese students to study in the U.S.

Another senior U.S. official touted the Biden-Kishida summit as a "remarkable and historic" one.

"I do want to underscore the progress and future-oriented stance of our alliance that is on display in Haiti, in Ukraine, in Southeast Asia, in the Pacific," the official said. "Everywhere that American purpose is being put to the test, Japan is by our side. You will see that clearly animated in our deliverables."

On Thursday, Kishida is set to deliver a speech to a joint meeting of Congress and attend the first-ever trilateral summit with Biden and Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

7. Sullivan stresses 'synergies' in trilateral cooperation among S. Korea, U.S., Japan

We must sustain (and grow) trilateral cooperation in perpetuity (or as long as it is in our. mutual national security).

Sullivan stresses 'synergies' in trilateral cooperation among S. Korea, U.S., Japan | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 9 (Yonhap) -- U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan highlighted "synergies" in trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the United States and Japan in security, technology and other fields on Tuesday, the eve of a summit between President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

Sullivan made the remarks as he previewed the White House summit on what he called issues "across the board," including defense, space cooperation and research partnerships on critical technologies, including artificial intelligence and semiconductors.

"I believe I don't necessarily like to use the word synergies very often, but I do believe that there are synergies on a trilateral basis in terms of our technological, industrial, economic capacity, as well as our security and military cooperation," Sullivan told a press briefing.

"We want to build on that. For tomorrow, what we are announcing will be bilateral measures in this space. And then of course, we will be open in the future to discussing things more (on trilateral cooperation)," he added.

This Reuters file photo, shows U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan speaking during a press briefing at the White House in Washington on March 12, 2024. (Yonhap)

He was responding to a question about the future of defense industry cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan amid speculation that Biden and Kishida will announce bilateral collaboration on joint development and production of military equipment.

Asked about the U.S. position on Japan's diplomatic outreach to Pyongyang, Sullivan underscored the importance of "principled diplomacy."

"Speaking from the U.S. perspective, we believe that principled diplomacy is a good thing. It's a necessary component of an overall strategy to confront the North Korean threat," he said. "We ourselves have indicated we are prepared to engage in diplomacy with North Korea. Of course the North Koreans have not shown any interest in that.

He went on to highlight that Pyongyang has only tried to "move down the track of further development of their missile and nuclear programs."

"So, we, the United States, have pulled closer together with our allies to enhance our capacity and posture in the Indo-Pacific, and we will continue to do that," he said.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

8. Blinken renews concerns over support for Russia's defense industrial base from N. Korea, Iran, China

Blinken renews concerns over support for Russia's defense industrial base from N. Korea, Iran, China | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 9 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated concerns Tuesday over military support for Russia's defense industrial base from North Korea, Iran and China, as Moscow continues its protracted war against Ukraine.

Blinken made the remarks during a joint press conference with his British counterpart, David Cameron, in Washington, where they dealt with a range of bilateral and global issues, including what he termed, the "imperative" to get assistance to a war-ravaged Ukraine.

"We talked about ways to strengthen efforts to prevent the transfer of weapons of material to Russia for use in Ukraine. And this is an ongoing challenge," Blinken said.

"We see weapons. We also see technologies to support the defense industrial base in Russia coming from North Korea, from Iran, from China. This is an area of particular concern for not only the United States and the United Kingdom, but many of our allies and partners throughout Europe," he added.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken (R) speaks during a meeting with British Foreign Secretary David Cameron at the State Department in Washington on April 9, 2024 in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)

Washington has continued to shine a light on arms transactions between Moscow and Pyongyang due to its profound security implications in Europe, on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere.

Pyongyang has shipped over 10,000 containers of munitions or munition-related materials to Russia since September, as well as several dozen ballistic missiles, according to the U.S. government, as Moscow strives to replenish its weapons stockpile for use in Ukraine.

Seoul officials have voiced concerns that the use of North Korean weapons in Ukraine could provide the North with technical and military insights, while accusing Pyongyang of using the war-torn nation as a "test site" for its weapons.

During their talks, the two sides also touched on issues concerning efforts to ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula, where Blinken said Washington and London are "aligned."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

9. White House official reaffirms openness to N. Korea dialogue on 'wide' range of issues

As we have been since the Agreed Framework in 1994. How has that worked out for us?

White House official reaffirms openness to N. Korea dialogue on 'wide' range of issues | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, April 9 (Yonhap) -- A White House official on Tuesday reiterated America's openness to dialogue with North Korea on a "wide" range of topics "without preconditions," after her mention last month of possible "interim steps" towards the North's denuclearization raised questions over a potential U.S. policy shift.

During a press briefing, Mira Rapp-Hooper, the National Security Council senior director for East Asia and Oceania, elaborated on her earlier remarks about Washington's openness to considering interim steps for a path toward the North's denuclearization.

In the negotiation lexicon for the North, interim steps usually involve such measures as Pyongyang's freeze of its nuclear weapons development in return for sanctions relief or other incentives -- a reason why her remarks spawned speculation about a potential U.S. policy change.

"That comment about interim steps is often being interpreted in a strict arms control sense of the definition of what interim steps might mean," she said during the briefing at the Foreign Press Center.

"We are open to talking about a wide range of topics with the DPRK should they wish to talk to us about things that can make the Korean Peninsula and the Indo-Pacific safer," she added. DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mira Rapp-Hooper, the National Security Council senior director for East Asia and Oceania, speaks during a press briefing at the Foreign Press Center in Washington on April 9, 2024. (Yonhap)

She also highlighted that the idea of interim steps is "totally consistent" with the policy approach that the administration of President Joe Biden has been articulating.

"As you know, we have reached out to the DPRK many times and have not had any response," she said. "The message that was articulated there is that we would like them to come to the table and tell us what they want to talk about and we will be ready to talk."

To some critics in South Korea, the idea of interim steps with Pyongyang struck a sour note as it can be construed as a possible distraction from the ultimate goal of the North's complete denuclearization.

But other experts have viewed interim steps as a needed step to create momentum in what could be a time-consuming process to keep the North on track towards the end state of its denuclearization.

Commenting on an upcoming visit to the North by China's top legislator, Zhao Leji, Rapp-Hooper expressed hopes that during the trip, the Chinese official will raise issues about North Korea's worrisome rhetoric and actions and its military cooperation with Russia.

"We hope that they will raise these issues in the interest of making the region more peaceful and stable," she said.

On the summit between Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida set for Wednesday, Rapp-Hooper said that she is not expecting any North Korea-specific announcement from their meeting.

"But we are excited about continuing to further the progress that we make on regional defense, regional missile defense integration more broadly," she said.

On trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, the official said that progress in the three-way partnership will be noted in joint statements from the Biden-Kishida summit.

Asked if the U.S. sees any possibility of South Korea joining Pillar II of the AUKUS security partnership that consists of the U.S., Britain and Australia, she said the defense chiefs of the AUKUS members will discuss potential partner countries in addition to Japan.

"They will be talking to a range of highly capable partners who would be good fits for these projects. I will leave those consultations to the defense ministers," she said.

On Monday, AUKUS defense ministers issued a joint statement, noting that they are considering Japan on Pillar II advanced capability projects.

Launched in September 2021 in an apparent move to counter China's regional influence, AUKUS consists of two key pillars. Pillar I is to support Australia in acquiring conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, while Pillar II is for cooperation on high-tech areas, including quantum computing, artificial intelligence and hypersonics.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

10. S. Korea, Canada, New Zealand under consideration for AUKUS Pillar II partners: U.S. official

Our alliance hub and spoke system might be described as evolving to a web of friends, partners, and allies with a web being much stronger than hubs and spokes.

S. Korea, Canada, New Zealand under consideration for AUKUS Pillar II partners: U.S. official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

By Song Sang-ho and Kang Byeong-cheol

WASHINGTON, April 9 (Yonhap) -- The United States, Britain and Australia are considering South Korea, Canada and New Zealand as potential partners for cooperation on advanced capability projects of their AUKUS security partnership, a senior U.S. official said Tuesday.

The remarks came a day after the defense chiefs of the three countries issued a joint statement noting their consideration of Japan as a partner for Pillar II projects of the partnership.

Launched in September 2021 in an apparent move to counter China's assertiveness, AUKUS consists of two key pillars. Pillar I is to support Australia in acquiring conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, while Pillar II is for cooperation in high-tech areas, including quantum computing, artificial intelligence and hypersonics.

"The AUKUS partners are considering a range of additional partners who may bring unique strengths to Pillar 2, including the ROK, Canada and New Zealand, in addition to Japan," the official said in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency. ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

"Additional partners will only be added with full consensus, however, and through a consultation process that will take some months," the official added.

In their joint statement, the AUKUS defense chiefs highlighted their confidence that "engaging like-minded partners in the work of Pillar II will only strengthen" their pursuit of the shared objective to deliver advanced capabilities in support of regional stability.

Beijing has criticized AUKUS, arguing that "bloc confrontation and exclusive groupings" go against "the trend of the times" and worsen an arms race in the region.

This file photo, released by Reuters, shows U.S. President Joe Biden, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak delivering remarks on the AUKUS partnership after a trilateral meeting at Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego, California, on March 13, 2023. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 10, 2024

11. How South Korea can aid Ukraine

Excerpts:

One U.S. think tank has suggested South Korea provide 105mm howitzer shells. South Korea currently has more than 3.4 million 105mm shells in stock. Since less than a third of South Korean howitzers fire the 105mm shell, this would have little impact on South Korea’s own defense needs.

There are other steps Seoul can take. South Korea recently announced the development of a new extended-range 155mm artillery shell. While production estimates for this year are only 2,000 shells, transferring some of those shells to Ukraine could provide benefits to South Korea. For example, sending a limited supply of extended 155mm artillery to Ukraine would allow South Korea to test the weapon in real-world conditions and potentially help spur orders from other countries.

...

Lastly, South Korea could contribute through NATO itself. NATO is developing a five-year, $100 billion military support package for Ukraine. As one of four Indo-Pacific countries that now regularly attend NATO’s annual meetings, Korea could take the lead in developing an additional support package among willing Indo-Pacific countries through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.

How South Korea can aid Ukraine

The Korea Times · April 10, 2024

North Korea, Russia military ties pose imminent challenge

By Troy Stangarone

In March, Russia vetoed a routine resolution to extend the mandate of the U.N. Panel of Experts. Moscow’s decision to end the primary U.N. body responsible for investigating U.N. sanctions violations should erase any doubt about Russia’s willingness to violate sanctions to aid its war effort in Ukraine. It should also end any belief that Moscow is a partner for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

Since the Kim-Putin summit in September 2023, North Korea has shipped over 6,700 weapons containers to Russia in violation of U.N. sanctions. According to South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, these containers could hold approximately 3 million rounds of 152mm artillery shells or 500,000 rounds of 122mm multiple rocket launchers. North Korean ballistic missiles have also been found on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Estimates suggest that Russia is firing five times as many artillery rounds as Ukraine, with North Korean supplies a significant contributor to Russia’s advantage. NATO estimates that Russia is producing 250,000 artillery rounds a month, or around 3 million a year. In less than six months, North Korea doubled what Russia can produce in a single year. Without North Korean support, Russia’s battlefield advantage would be closer to 2.5 times that of Ukraine.

North Korea is supplying munitions to Russia with the clear calculation that it will in turn benefit from Russian sanctions violations. Reports suggest that Russia has provided technical assistance for North Korea’s satellite launch, is helping Pyongyang evade financial sanctions and is allowing North Korean ships to load petroleum directly at Russian ports. This is likely only the beginning of Russian support for North Korea.

While North Korea is playing a critical role for Russia, South Korea has taken steps to aid Ukraine. Last year, Seoul indirectly provided between 300,000 to 500,000 155mm artillery rounds to Ukraine. However, with the war at a critical stage with Ukraine facing artillery shortages, it is important to find creative solutions for providing Ukraine with additional artillery rounds.

One U.S. think tank has suggested South Korea provide 105mm howitzer shells. South Korea currently has more than 3.4 million 105mm shells in stock. Since less than a third of South Korean howitzers fire the 105mm shell, this would have little impact on South Korea’s own defense needs.

There are other steps Seoul can take. South Korea recently announced the development of a new extended-range 155mm artillery shell. While production estimates for this year are only 2,000 shells, transferring some of those shells to Ukraine could provide benefits to South Korea. For example, sending a limited supply of extended 155mm artillery to Ukraine would allow South Korea to test the weapon in real-world conditions and potentially help spur orders from other countries.

Ukraine is working to strengthen its own domestic arms industry to provide supplies separate from international aid. However, it is having difficulty licensing the rights and importing the raw materials needed for domestic production of 155mm artillery. By licensing Ukraine the rights to produce 155mm artillery shells and providing raw materials, South Korea could help Ukraine produce its own artillery rounds.

A related option would be the establishment of South Korean joint defense industry ventures in Ukraine. French, Turkish and other defense firms are working to build facilities in Ukraine. The establishment of South Korean production in Ukraine would allow Seoul to implement a policy of “lend and replace.” South Korea would lend existing artillery rounds to Ukraine on the understanding that after the war they would be replaced by any Ukrainian domestic production from South Korean or other Ukrainian defense contractors.

Lastly, South Korea could contribute through NATO itself. NATO is developing a five-year, $100 billion military support package for Ukraine. As one of four Indo-Pacific countries that now regularly attend NATO’s annual meetings, Korea could take the lead in developing an additional support package among willing Indo-Pacific countries through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.

Some might argue that Ukraine isn’t South Korea’s concern, but the war has a direct impact on South Korean security. Early assumptions about Russia’s relationship with North Korea have proven incorrect. Most experts suggested that North Korea would only supply Russia with old munitions that it no longer needed. Recovered ballistic missiles, however, include Western parts produced within the last three years. Newly produced North Korean equipment is heading to Russia and Kim Jong-un has encouraged arms producers to increase production. There are fewer limits than initially believed on what North Korea is willing to provide Russia and how long it can sustain those supplies.

While Russia is unlikely to provide North Korea with its most advanced technology, we should not assume that Moscow will not provide Pyongyang with technology that would materially weaken South Korea’s own national security. Aiding Ukraine would not directly stop Russia providing new technology to North Korea, but it would deepen South Korea’s ties with NATO, help a fellow democracy, mitigate long-term Russia-North Korea ties and lessen the chances of China taking similar action against Taiwan. These outcomes would directly strengthen South Korea’s security.

Troy Stangarone (ts@keia.org) is the senior director of congressional affairs and trade at the Korea Economic Institute. He is also a guest editorial writer at The Korea Times.

The Korea Times · April 10, 2024

12. North Korean newborn dies after local hospital refuses care

The socialist workers paradise promises free medical care for all.

As an aside, one of the biggest threats to unification through any path (peaceful, war, regime collapse, or internal leadership change) is the medical and health environment in north Korea. This is one of the areas that should be addressed in inter-Korean engagement (should the regime ever allow it) as well as civil society from the international community (international organizations and NGOs). Any improvement in the medical and health situation in the north can contribute to the future unification process.

North Korean newborn dies after local hospital refuses care - Daily NK English

Many women in North Korea still give birth at home because of the country's poor medical environment

By Jong So Yong - April 9, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jong So Yong · April 9, 2024

A doctor at a hospital in Pyongyang. (Roan Harak, Flickr, Creative Commons)

A newborn died during childbirth in South Pyongan Province when its mother tried to give birth at home after being refused care at a hospital.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source in South Pyongan Province said Monday that the mother, who lives in Anju, was in her ninth month of pregnancy. She rushed to the hospital when her water suddenly broke, but returned home as she was unable to pay what the hospital charged for the operation. In the end, the baby died during delivery at home, and the mother became critically ill.

The mother had suffered two previous miscarriages due to ectopic pregnancies, so when she finally conceived last year, her entire family was looking forward to a safe delivery.

However, when the mother’s water suddenly broke in her ninth month of pregnancy, she quickly made her way to the city hospital.

The city hospital looked at her condition and said she needed to be hospitalized immediately because she and her baby were in danger. However, they also told her that she could only be hospitalized if her family could secure payment for the hospitalization, surgery, and medicine.

Unable to afford the payments, the family decided against hospitalization and returned home. When the mother went into labor, she had no choice but to give birth at home.

A local doctor and neighbors with midwifery experience gathered to help, but the baby was stillborn and the mother was in critical condition from excessive bleeding.

With the mother’s life in danger, family members ran into the street, stopped a passing taxi, and took her to the provincial hospital.

While the provincial hospital examined and treated the woman, it also investigated what had happened at the city hospital. It acknowledged that the city hospital had erred in refusing to admit a pregnant woman who needed urgent care because she could not pay for it herself, but it also understood that it was difficult for the city hospital to cover the costs when it did not receive government support.

However, the woman’s family and people who witnessed what happened criticized the hospital, saying that “a hospital that puts money before the life of a pregnant woman and a baby needs to get its act together.”

Many women in North Korea still give birth at home because of the country’s poor medical environment. People have criticized the government over this, accusing authorities of “showing no interest in and providing no support for pregnancy and childbirth,” the source said.

Meanwhile, the woman has regained consciousness and is recovering, he added.

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jong So Yong · April 9, 2024

13. America’s Best Friend in Asia: The Case for Elevating the U.S. Alliance With Japan

Some might want to compete with this headline. (but there should not be competition within the web of alliances) 

America’s Best Friend in Asia

The Case for Elevating the U.S. Alliance With Japan

By Jeffrey W. Hornung

April 10, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Jeffrey W. Hornung · April 10, 2024

Alliances are a bit like families: you may not have a favorite member, but there is always one you depend on most. Throughout the Cold War, NATO was the collective ally that the United States depended on most in its global effort to stop Soviet expansionism. But in the twenty-first century, with the growing slate of traditional and nontraditional security issues, many of which center on China, the United States’ new go-to ally is Japan.

Today, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will arrive at the White House for a state visit with U.S. President Joe Biden—the first such visit by a Japanese leader since 2015. The relationship has changed over the past decade but in ways that most Japan analysts could not have envisioned. Japan is now committed to spending close to two percent of its GDP on defense. This increase in funding is helping the country beef up its cybersecurity and acquire counterstrike capabilities to respond to enemy attacks. Japan has authorized the transfer of Patriot missiles to the United States and the export of advanced fighter jets abroad, and it is focusing on areas of national security that the country has long neglected. Altogether, these efforts demonstrate Japan’s determination to do more for its own defense and for the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

Meanwhile, the U.S.-Japanese relationship continues to change and deepen, including by expanding outside Northeast Asia—for example, aligning their foreign policy strategies to not just support a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” but to support what both countries now call a free and open international order based on the rule of law. The Biden administration should build on this momentum by elevating the U.S.-Japanese alliance to an even more central status in U.S. strategy. Unlike Europe, where the United States is one country in the multinational NATO alliance, U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific are separate, bilateral partnerships. Historically, this has been referred to as a hub-and-spoke system, in which the United States is the hub to each of its five treaty alliances (Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand), but those alliances, in turn, do not interact.

This structure no longer reflects reality and is a suboptimal way to deal with today’s security landscape. Given the central role Japan plays in U.S. thinking, Washington should seek out new methods of not just cooperating with Japan but leveraging its centrality to U.S. strategy to help promote the security and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region. It is time to make the U.S.-Japanese alliance the hub of a growing confederation of regional groupings.

FROM PACIFICSM TO POWER

Just ten years ago, there was still an active debate over Japan’s strategic significance. Its economy was struggling, and its defense budget was limited. But developments over the past decade have laid these concerns to rest. After the United States abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation trade deal negotiated under President Barack Obama, Japan took the lead on the successor agreement, called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Tokyo has also promoted the rules and norms underpinning the international order through its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, which other countries—including the United States—later adopted as their own. In these ways, Japan has not only picked a side in the geopolitical competition unfolding between China and the United States; it has put itself front and center.

Japan also started spending more on its own defense and focusing on areas it had ignored, such as munitions stockpiles, long-range missiles, and active cyber defense. It also began to exercise with militaries other than the United States’ and transfer military equipment abroad. In addition to signing bilateral security agreements with Australia and the United Kingdom—which enable these countries to conduct military exercises on each other’s soil—Japan also exported an advanced radar system to the Philippines and relaxed its defense export rules to allow the stealth fighter jet it is developing with the United Kingdom and Italy to be sold to other countries. Japanese leaders now talk more publicly about security issues far outside their own region, including Ukraine, but they also talk openly about possible roles Japan could play in a conflict brought about by a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

This Japan, one much more willing to involve itself in security affairs beyond its own defense, is exactly the kind of ally the United States needs in this moment of geopolitical competition. That reality is reflected in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in 2022, which says that the United States “will support and empower allies and partners as they take on regional leadership roles themselves.”

THE SPOKES

The United States says it is focusing on “three pillars” in its alliance with Japan. First, it plans to modernize the alliance’s roles, missions, and capabilities by working with Japan to acquire the most modern equipment possible and train alongside U.S. forces to ensure greater interoperability. Second, it will optimize U.S. force posture in the region as each military service implements changes based on new operational concepts it has been developing. Third, it will emphasize multilateral networking in the region. It is that last item that arguably needs the most attention from Washington.

There is nothing equivalent to NATO in the Indo-Pacific, but the United States has successfully established several “mini-lateral” agreements in the region that are rooted in U.S. treaty alliances and a shared concern about China. None of these deals are collective security agreements like NATO’s North Atlantic Treaty; instead, they include diplomatic groupings such as the Quad (composed of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and technological partnerships such as AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). There are also economic arrangements such as the Chip 4 semiconductor grouping, which links Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. Washington and Tokyo together also belong to trilateral groups with Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea, respectively, as the third party. The benefit of these groupings is their agility and adaptability, which allow like-minded countries to address a specific issue quickly if needed.

Japan is central to all these relationships in ways that other Indo-Pacific countries are not. For example, Japan is the only country that can boast economic prowess on a global scale, varying degrees of defense ties with all other U.S. mini-lateral partners, widespread diplomatic influence, and advanced capabilities for all three services of the Self-Defense Forces (Ground, Maritime, and Air) that are now enjoying increased funding. And as Kishida’s visit to Washington shows, although Japan is not a formal member of AUKUS, it is now poised to take part in the second pillar of the agreement, which focuses on advanced capability development, by promising closer ties with Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States on developing a variety of advanced capabilities and sharing technology. Japan is also one of NATO’s “partners across the globe,” which means it participates in the alliance’s discussions of mutual security concerns and cooperates in numerous security areas, such as arms control, maritime security, and space. No other U.S. Indo-Pacific ally plays such a key role in so many groupings of allies.

REINVENT THE WHEEL

It makes sense that the next evolutionary step in U.S. strategy should be to formalize this central role that Japan plays in the broader U.S. global network of like-minded partners. In lieu of an Asian NATO, networking existing mini-lateral relationships built around the U.S.-Japanese alliance offers a possible way forward. In other words, the U.S.-Japanese alliance should be the hub, and the rest of the Indo-Pacific countries and their many mini-laterals should be the spokes.

The U.S.-Japanese alliance hub could provide a focal point to discuss current security challenges—such as China, North Korea, and Russia—with U.S. allies and partners to help coordinate policies to deal with these actors, both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Although the growing patchwork of mini-laterals is convenient for the United States, it does not lend itself to coordination. To avoid disjointed approaches that could result in fragmented action or diluted outcomes, the United States should encourage other allies toward greater alignment in their regional strategies through reinforcing the main pillars of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. And to avoid duplication and inefficiency in countries’ security and development assistance programs, like-minded countries should coordinate more fully with the United States and Japan to make the most of their collective efforts.

Members in this network of relationships can also do a better job of sharing information to boost everyone’s situational awareness. The United States and Japan are the only two allies capable of providing regular regional reach with their defense capabilities without detriment to their own national defenses. But other allies could share relevant information from their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets with the U.S.-Japanese alliance to ensure greater situational awareness among the collective whole. Improved coordination can also help partners address concerns in emerging domains such as space and cyberspace. The U.S.-Japanese efforts in these domains are already advanced and therefore provide a good road map for other allies. Over the long term, the United States and Japan could also work to weave today’s separate trilateral military exercises into bigger multinational exercises.

This new “super grouping” should not jump into collective security arrangements or form a NATO-like defense pact. And other countries wouldn’t need to subordinate their independent foreign policy strategies or bilateral alliance relationships to the U.S.-Japanese alliance hub. A confederated approach would complement bilateral alliances, not replace them. The goal of this new alignment would be to better rationalize and align strategies to collectively cope with the challenges brought on by state and nonstate actors. Someday, there could be a joint security declaration, an agreement among like-minded partners that defines, in a nonbinding manner, broad areas of common interests and cooperation. But there are too many political and diplomatic issues that would have to be resolved to get to that step.

Many describe NATO as the United States’ indispensable alliance—and it remains a top priority. But given the geopolitical shift to the Indo-Pacific, it is time to make the U.S.-Japanese alliance far more central to American grand strategy.

• JEFFREY W. HORNUNG is the Japan Lead for the National Security Research Division and a Senior Political Scientist at RAND. He is also an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University.

Foreign Affairs · by Jeffrey W. Hornung · April 10, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com