Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Political views were irrelevant to the director (General Donovan). He valued creative intelligence, a love of adventure, and a willingness to fight the enemy."

– Noel Fitch Riley

The cave you fear to enter holds the treasure you seek.

– Joseph Campbell

"I do not believe that sheer suffering teaches. If suffering alone taught, all the world would be wise. To suffering must be added mourning, understanding, patience, love, openness and the willingness to remain vulnerable."

– Anne Morrow Lindbergh

1. US Department of Labor: “North Korea Produces 7 Items Using Forced Labor… Forced Labor in China and Russia Too”

2. U.S. says 'only viable path' for peace is 'complete' Korean Peninsula denuclearization

3. U.S. stresses reconnaissance efforts for Korean Peninsula after N.K. uranium enrichment site disclosure

4. First Look at North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Capabilities

5. The Next Big Thing? Possibilities for North Korea’s Longer Mobile Missile Launcher Chassis

6. N.K. leader meets top Russian security official on 1st anniv. of Vostochny summit: KCNA

7. StratBot AI: SOF and north Korea

8. Military replacing Chinese-made surveillance cameras around bases, border (South Korea)

9. In pictures: Kim Jong Un, military man

10. What to know about North Korea's unveiling of its uranium enrichment facility

11. This year, UN member states are expected to conduct the highest-ever 'maritime surveillance of North Korea'

12. 'Class Struggle Consciousness' in the Works of North Korean Writers

13. North Korean defectors in China face 'difficulty' in applying for refugee status overseas amid increased crackdowns

14. US: “Concerns over Increase in Public Executions in North Korea∙∙∙Will to Accept Defectors Still Remains”

15. Interview: Former US security adviser "Moon's North Korea stance was overly optimistic"

16. Ganghwa county residents struggle with mysterious noises from N. Korean broadcasts

17. Supreme Guard Command officer ousted after ghosting pregnant girlfriend

1. US Department of Labor: “North Korea Produces 7 Items Using Forced Labor… Forced Labor in China and Russia Too”

Again, additional rationale for a human rights up front approach. And more excellent comments from HRNK's Director Greg Scarlatoiu.

And let me remind everyone of these important points about HRNK and the incredible work it does and underscore the fact that the US government is funding other organizations, to include foreign ones, yet the Biden administration has chosen not to continue to provide grants to it.

Please note that the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) made significant contributions to the Commission of Inquiry and every year has provided detailed input to the State Department or the UN Universal Periodic Review as well as other US State Department Human RIghts reports. I mention this because funding for HRNK comes from private donations and grants and continues to face funding challenges since the Department of State (DOS) of the Biden administration has disapproved every grant request from HRNK.

I state this because DOS funded HRNK's satellite imagery project investigation of North Korea's political prison camps, its research of North Korean workers officially dispatched overseas, and its scrutiny of North Korea's information environment for nine years, from 2014 until 2023. HRNK received about $800,000 in DOS support under the Obama administration, and about $1.2 million in DOS support under the Trump administration. The Biden administration has completely defunded HRNK, while providing no debriefings or just pro forma debriefings on the rejected proposals or rather flimsy reasons for those rejections.. DOS is currently funding groups from Canada and South Korea, but not HRNK, America's premier NGO focused on North Korean human rights. Yet DOS has continued to use HRNK research and data to inform its annual human rights reports.

For full transparency, I am a member of the Board of Directors of HRNK. I feel that it is important to raise this issue and ask why DOS refuses to fund HRNK during the Biden admiration.. It is difficult to understand how the United States cna have a human rights upfront approach to north Korea and yet deny modest funding requests from HRNK.

The following is a Google translation of a VOA report.

US Department of Labor: “North Korea Produces 7 Items Using Forced Labor… Forced Labor in China and Russia Too”

https://www.voakorea.com/a/7773213.html?utm

2024.9.6

An Jun-ho

The U.S. Department of Labor pointed out that North Korea continues to produce seven types of goods, including bricks, through forced labor. It also said that North Korean workers are being mobilized for forced labor in mainland China and Russia. Meanwhile, it pointed out that raw materials made by child labor were used in indium produced in South Korea. Reporter Ahn Jun-ho reports.

Embed

US Department of Labor: “North Korea Produces 7 Items Using Forced Labor… Forced Labor in China and Russia Too”

Produced by: VOA Korean

Embed

The code has been copied to your clipboard.

The URL has been copied to your clipboard

No media source currently available

0:00

4:34

0:00

Download

Play with pop-up player

The U.S. Department of Labor pointed out in its report, “2024 List of Goods Produced by Child or Forced Labor,” released on the 5th that North Korea continues to produce goods through forced labor.

It explains that North Korea continues to produce seven types of goods, including bricks, cement, coal, gold, iron, textiles, and wood, through forced labor.

The Ministry of Labor also said that more than 1,000 Uyghurs and other persecuted minorities are being forced into labor at squid processing facilities in mainland China, and that North Korean workers are also being used in such labor.

“Squid processing companies and government agencies often engage in coercive recruitment, restrict workers’ freedom of movement and communication, and conduct continuous surveillance of workers,” it added.

[보고서] “Furthermore, workers from North Korea have also been transferred to work at squid processing facilities. Squid processing companies and government entities frequently engage in coercive recruitment, limit workers’ freedom of movement and communication, and subjected workers to constant surveillance.”

The report also noted that forced labor from North Korean workers was also used in Russia's timber production.

The Ministry of Labor publishes a related report every two years, and in the 10th report released two years ago, it was pointed out that North Korea was producing seven types of goods through forced labor.

Forced labor means any labor or service performed involuntarily under threat of punishment.

The international community strictly prohibits forced labor as a form of modern slavery.

In a report on the state of forced labor in North Korea published in July, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of the United Nations pointed out that “North Korea’s institutionalized forced labor constitutes a serious violation of human rights.”

The report also noted that “North Koreans are controlled and exploited through a vast and multi-layered system of forced labor that serves the interests of the state rather than the people.”

[보고서] “People in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are controlled and exploited through an extensive and multi-layered system of forced labour. The system is directed towards the interests of the State rather than the people. Forced labour provides a source of free labour for the State, and acts as a means for the State to control, monitor and indoctrinate the population.”

He added that “forced labor serves as a source of free labor for the state and as a means for the state to control, monitor, and brainwash its population.”

The report urges the North Korean government to eliminate all forms of forced labour contrary to international law and to abolish all forms of slavery and similar practices.

It also called on the international community to investigate and prosecute those suspected of committing international crimes to ensure accountability and urged the UN Security Council to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

“The problem of forced labor in North Korea is catastrophic,” Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), a Washington-based group that works on North Korean human rights, told VOA by phone. “The regime relies on the oppression and exploitation of its own people to fund its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, and to enable its elite to obtain hard currency and luxury goods from the outside world.”

“This is undoubtedly for a regime that relies on forced labour,” he added.

[녹취: 스칼라튜 사무총장] “Forced labor in North Korea is extraordinarily serious. The North Korean regime relies on repressing, oppressing, and exploiting its own people in order to procure the funding needed to develop nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and to keep the elites of North Korea happy through access to hard currency and luxury goods from the outside world. So it's a very serious issue definitely. So this is for a regime that relies on forced labor no doubt about it.”

Secretary-General Scallatu pointed out that forced labor in North Korea occurs not only domestically but also overseas, mainly in three places: China, Russia, and the Middle East, and that they are mainly dispatched to construction sites, logging sites, and the textile industry.

He also pointed out that “the international community must closely examine whether products using forced labor from North Korea are being imported in order to eradicate forced labor in North Korea.”

In its 11th report, the U.S. Department of Labor found that 204 product categories were produced in 82 countries and territories using child labor and forced labor.

In particular, this report newly adds 37 product categories where labor exploitation was not previously confirmed, including lead, nickel, polyvinyl chloride, and squid, as well as four countries, including Korea, Belarus, the Netherlands, and Mauritius.

The report stated that there is reason to believe that indium produced in Korea used child labor when producing zinc, a raw material for indium, in Bolivia.

South Korea imported $385 million worth of zinc concentrate from Bolivia in 2022, including zinc produced by child labor and used to produce indium, the report said.

This is Ahn Jun-ho from VOA News.

2. U.S. says 'only viable path' for peace is 'complete' Korean Peninsula denuclearization

It is time we rethink our approach. The only path to peace and denuclearization is through the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

US government spokesmen get it half right with their statements. They are correct in that we must reaffirm (and sustain) our ironclad commitment to the security of South Korea and Japan. We must have the strongest foundation for deterrence and defense. That will allow us to execute a new strategy that is focused on support for the 8.15 Unification Doctrine as the only way forward that will bring an end to the nuclear threat and the crimes against humanity.

We need to make some radical changes to our policies and strategy and I hope the next president will do so.

I will keep beating the horse:

Next U.S. president needs radical reset on North Korea policy

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2024/09/09/next-US-president-reset-North-Korea-policy/6491725896564/

(4th LD) U.S. says 'only viable path' for peace is 'complete' Korean Peninsula denuclearization | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · September 14, 2024

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES throughout)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Sept. 13 (Yonhap) -- The "only viable path" toward lasting peace is through the "complete" denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a State Department spokesperson said Friday, after North Korea made a rare disclosure of a uranium enrichment facility this week.

The spokesperson made the remarks, renewing calls for Pyongyang to return to "constructive" dialogue and reaffirming America's "ironclad" security commitment to South Korea and Japan.

The North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Friday (Korea time) that leader Kim Jong-un visited a uranium enrichment base and called for increasing the number of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal -- a move ahead of the Nov. 5 presidential election in the United States.

"The DPRK's advancement of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs directly undermines the global non-proliferation regime. The only viable path toward lasting peace is through the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," the spokesperson said in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"We call on the DPRK to fully comply with its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions and return to constructive dialogue without delay," the official added.

The spokesperson stressed that to the extent that the North continues to threaten the region and the world, Washington will continue to strengthen its security relationships with its allies and partners.

"The U.S. commitments to the defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan remain ironclad," the official said.

Earlier in the day, White House National Security Communications Adviser John Kirby highlighted the U.S. has "devoted" more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets for security on the peninsula.

"I am not able to get into an intelligence analysis one way or the other here. I would simply say that we continue to monitor North Korean progression in their nuclear ambitions, as well as their ballistic missile technology and program," Kirby said in an online press briefing.

This file photo, taken June 4, 2024, shows White House National Security Communications Adviser John Kirby speaking during a press briefing at the Foreign Press Center in Washington. (Yonhap)

"That is exactly why or one of the reasons why President Biden has worked so hard to revitalize a network of alliances and partnerships in the region. It is also why he has devoted more, in particular, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, prioritizing those for the area on and around the Korean Peninsula," he added.

He also stressed that Washington continues to make clear to Pyongyang that it is willing to "sit down without preconditions and talk about the denuclearization of the peninsula."

State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said that he saw a video on the uranium enrichment facility, and that it does not change the overall U.S. policy on North Korea.

"New video ... I don't know that it represents any new capability by the North Korean regime," he said during a press briefing.

"We are going to continue to make clear that we will defend our South Korean and Japanese allies, and will continue to work for the full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

Asked if a North Korean nuclear test is imminent, Miller said he does not want to make any predictions on that.

The North's disclosure of the nuclear facility, coupled with its short-range missile launches this week and other acts, has added to concerns that Pyongyang could engage in major provocations near the U.S. presidential election in a move to bolster its leverage.

In its Friday report, the KCNA said that Kim visited the Nuclear Weapons Institute and the "production base of weapon-grade nuclear materials." The dispatch did not elaborate on where that facility is located or when Kim had visited the site.

Highly enriched uranium and plutonium are essential nuclear materials for the production of nuclear warheads.

South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies believe North Korea operates uranium enrichment facilities in Kangson on the outskirts of Pyongyang and at the Yongbyon nuclear site, north of its capital.

In 2010, the North invited Siegfried Hecker, a renowned American nuclear scientist, to inspect its uranium enrichment facility in Yongbyon.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (in black suit) visits the Nuclear Weapons Institute and the production base of weapons-grade nuclear materials, in this image provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 13, 2024. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · September 14, 2024

3. U.S. stresses reconnaissance efforts for Korean Peninsula after N.K. uranium enrichment site disclosure

We must keep in mind that all our regional combatant commands must compete for scarce ISR resources.

(3rd LD) U.S. stresses reconnaissance efforts for Korean Peninsula after N.K. uranium enrichment site disclosure | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · September 14, 2024

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; RECASTS paras 2, 6)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Sept. 13 (Yonhap) -- The United States on Friday highlighted it has "devoted" more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets for security on the Korean Peninsula, after North Korea made a rare disclosure of a uranium enrichment facility this week.

White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby commented on the North's nuclear facility, saying that the U.S. continues to monitor developments in the recalcitrant regime's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The North's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Friday (Korea time) that leader Kim Jong-un recently visited a uranium enrichment base and called for increasing the number of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to bolster its nuclear weapons arsenal.

"I am not able to get into an intelligence analysis one way or the other here. I would simply say that we continue to monitor North Korean progression in their nuclear ambitions as well as their ballistic missile technology and program," Kirby said in an online press briefing.

This photo, taken on June 4, 2024, shows White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby speaking during a press briefing at the Foreign Press Center in Washington. (Yonhap)

He also stressed that Washington continues to make clear to Pyongyang that it is willing to "sit down without preconditions and talk about the denuclearization of the peninsula."

State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said that he saw a video on the uranium enrichment facility, and that it does not change the overall U.S. policy on North Korea.

"New video ... I don't know that it represents any new capability by the North Korean regime," he said during a press briefing.

"We are going to continue to make clear that we will defend our South Korean and Japanese allies, and will continue to work for the full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

Asked if a North Korean nuclear test is imminent, Miller said he does not want to make any prediction on that.

Highly enriched uranium and plutonium are essential nuclear materials for the production of nuclear warheads.

South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies believe North Korea operates uranium enrichment facilities in Kangson on the outskirts of Pyongyang and at the Yongbyon nuclear site, north of its capital.

In 2010, the North invited Siegfried Hecker, a renowned American nuclear scientist, to inspect its uranium enrichment facility in Yongbyon.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · September 14, 2024

4. First Look at North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Capabilities

Photos at the link: https://www.38north.org/2024/09/first-look-at-north-koreas-uranium-enrichment-capabilities/

Excerpts:

The Location

This is one of the biggest questions and difficult to answer from the images alone, particularly because the visual clues available are few. What is clear is that at least two different rooms are depicted.

The first is potentially at the UEP at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.

The two halls at the UEP measure approximately 120 meters by 15 meters each, but based on commercial satellite imagery, interior walls subdivide this space, so the actual length of the open floor space is approximately 93 meters.

It is unclear where the second room is located. It is possible it is within the annex that was added in 2021 or 2022 to the centrifuge hall at Yongbyon, or it may be offsite at one of the suspected uranium enrichment facilities North Korea is yet to disclose.

First Look at North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Capabilities

By: Olli Heinonen, Jack Liu, Peter Makowsky, Jenny Town and Martyn Williams

September 13, 2024

https://www.38north.org/2024/09/first-look-at-north-koreas-uranium-enrichment-capabilities/

On Friday, North Korean state media reported that Kim Jong Un visited uranium enrichment facilities to learn more about the country’s fissile material production process and capabilities. During the visit, Kim was accompanied by Hong Sung Mu, one of the country’s leading nuclear scientists, and the head of the country’s Nuclear Weapons Institute, whose name is unclear.

The North Korean media coverage of this site visit is the first time images of the country’s centrifuge program have been shown. While only five photos were provided, it is clear that the uranium enrichment program has advanced significantly since it was first revealed.

The centrifuges shown are not the P-2 equivalents observed by Dr. Siegfried Hecker during his delegation’s visit to the main Uranium Enrichment Plant (UEP) facility in Yongbyon in 2010, but a more advanced design. The size of the cascades and hall shown also signify substantial capacity, perhaps not to the level of “exponential growth” as Kim has mandated, but significant growth, nonetheless. And finally, it is probable that these centrifuges are North Korean designed and manufactured; however, they likely use at least some imported materials despite decades of increasingly harsh sanctions imposed to hinder the country’s nuclear development.

These images send a strong message that the country has ample capacity and continued will to expand its nuclear program.

Figure 1. Kim Jong Un with Hong Sung Mu (right) and the head of the country’s Nuclear Weapons Institute (behind him). (Source: Rodong Sinmun)

The Centrifuges

The centrifuges in the image are not the P-2 centrifuge equivalents seen in 2010 when Sig Hecker visited North Korea but appear to be a more advanced design.

Based on the images, the cooling coils appear to be around the centrifuge motors inside a centrifuge housing. Centrifuges spin at incredibly high speeds and are subject to enormous stress that can lead to a mechanical failure. In such a case, the centrifuge housing serves as a barrier for blocking damage to nearby centrifuges caused by shrapnel.

Another important protection measure is the fast-acting valves on the feed, product and tailpipes of each individual centrifuge, together with vibration sensors. The valves isolate the ailing centrifuge, blocking pressure impulses or dust that damages other centrifuges. Such valves are subject to export controls and are both hard to obtain and difficult to manufacture.

The centrifuges are also secured by heavy footings to limit collateral damage in case of failures.

The size of the cascade hall shows that North Korea’s enrichment program has taken substantial steps forward.

What is shown in the images is probably of North Korean design, but likely required at least some imported materials to produce.

Figure 2. Images from Kim Jong Un’s visit to an uranium enrichment facility showcase the layout of the cascade hall. (Source: Rodong Sinmun)

Configuration

In the first image, Kim Jong Un is seen standing alongside many centrifuges. There are approximately 70 visible in each row. There are two rows positioned close to each other and two more rows on the other side of the central piping. Added together, that makes approximately 280 centrifuges per section.

The image appears to show three sections, and additional centrifuges are visible past some support columns. These seem to be the same columns in the second image, which is taken from the same platform but on the other side of the room.

Figure 3. Images from Kim Jong Un’s visit highlight three sections of the photographed centrifuge hall. (Source: Rodong Sinumn)

From this angle, we can see an additional three sections of centrifuges, so together, the hall could hold an estimated 1,680 centrifuges.

A third image shows hundreds more centrifuges in a different room, which is determined from the different floor covering, lower ceiling and different walls.

In this image, some of the centrifuges are not connected, providing visual proof of Kim’s intention to keep building up the country’s enrichment capability.

Taken together, the two rooms likely account for over 2,000 centrifuges, although it should be noted that it is impossible to determine if they are all functioning.

Figure 4. Some centrifuges are not connected, as shown in images from Kim Jong Un’s visit. (Source: Rodong Sinmun)

The Location

This is one of the biggest questions and difficult to answer from the images alone, particularly because the visual clues available are few. What is clear is that at least two different rooms are depicted.

The first is potentially at the UEP at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.

The two halls at the UEP measure approximately 120 meters by 15 meters each, but based on commercial satellite imagery, interior walls subdivide this space, so the actual length of the open floor space is approximately 93 meters.

It is unclear where the second room is located. It is possible it is within the annex that was added in 2021 or 2022 to the centrifuge hall at Yongbyon, or it may be offsite at one of the suspected uranium enrichment facilities North Korea is yet to disclose.

5. The Next Big Thing? Possibilities for North Korea’s Longer Mobile Missile Launcher Chassis

Conclusion:

It remains to be seen whether the new vehicle makes it out of the factory, and what ICBM or SLV system it may end up being associated with. But if it is a “new-type” system, there will be plenty of time to assess that system once it begins flight testing. At a minimum, the new chassis indicates North Korea’s continuing commitment to road-mobile missile deployment and further suggests Pyongyang is able to produce its own TELs.

The Next Big Thing? Possibilities for North Korea’s Longer Mobile Missile Launcher Chassis

https://www.38north.org/2024/09/the-next-big-thing-possibilities-for-north-koreas-longer-mobile-missile-launcher-chassis/

By: Vann H. Van Diepen

September 13, 2024

Source: Korean Central News Agency

On September 8, North Korea released an undated photo of Kim Jong Un standing next to an apparent road-mobile missile launcher (transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL) chassis that had at least 12 axles, compared to the previous 11-axle TEL of the large, liquid-propellant Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Based on the additional axle(s), it is reasonable to assume the new TEL is longer than the Hwasong-17 TEL, and thus that the new chassis is associated with a longer new ICBM or a space-launch vehicle (SLV).

However, the limited information to date does not allow confirmation that the vehicle in the photo is genuine, as opposed to an engineering or propaganda mock-up, and provides no solid basis to associate it with a specific type of ICBM or SLV. Assuming the new vehicle is associated with an ICBM or SLV, the main possibilities are:

Longer follow-ons to the solid-propellant Hwasong-18 or liquid Hwasong-17 ICBMs, of which the new photo would be the first indication. The missiles’ longer stages (with or without also having larger diameters) would probably be used to boost heavier payloads, most likely to more easily accommodate multiple warheads.
A mobile launcher for the North’s latest “Chollima-1” SLV, which would improve space-launch responsiveness and survivability, or use in transporting stages of the larger SLV North Korea is probably developing.
Use with an existing ICBM system, which cannot be ruled out. For example, using more axles on the Hwasong-17 TEL would further distribute its substantial weight and reduce its ground pressure, opening up the areas to which it could field-deploy while limiting the road curves that such a vehicle could traverse.

It remains to be seen whether the new vehicle makes it out of the factory and what ICBM or SLV system it may end up being associated with. At a minimum, the new chassis indicates North Korea’s continuing commitment to road-mobile missile deployment and further suggests Pyongyang is able to produce its own TELs.

Information to Date

On September 8, the North Korean press reported an undated visit by Kim Jong Un to a “defence industrial enterprise.” Analysis of the accompanying photographs indicates Kim visited the March 16 Factory in Phyongsong, North Korea’s main production facility for road-mobile missile launchers (TELs), which Kim previously visited in January and May of 2024.

One of the photographs showed Kim standing next to an apparent TEL chassis with at least 12 axles. The overall length, width and number of axles could not be discerned, however. The top of the vehicle was not shown, no missile erector arms or other equipment were seen protruding above the vehicle’s side, and it was not carrying a missile, missile canister, or associated cradles. As noted elsewhere, an apparent lifting arm (presumably intended to help erect a missile) and other associated features were seen at the side rear of the vehicle that resemble those on the nine-axle TEL used for the Hwasong-18 solid-propellant ICBM.

What Could It Be?

The vehicle’s layout, green military paint job and presence at North Korea’s main TEL production facility all suggest the chassis is intended to be used as the basis of a new type of ballistic missile TEL. Based on the vehicle’s length as suggested by the number of axles, such a TEL would almost certainly be used with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or space-launch vehicle (SLV) system. (The Hwasong-18 and the liquid-propellant Hwasong-15 ICBM use nine-axle TELs; the liquid-propellant Hwasong-17, North Korea’s largest ICBM, uses an 11-axle TEL.)

But the limited information to date does not allow confirmation that the vehicle in the photo is genuine, as opposed to an engineering or propaganda mock-up, and provides no solid basis to associate it with a specific type of ICBM or SLV. Assuming the vehicle is associated with an extant or developmental ICBM or SLV system, the four main possibilities are discussed below.

1) and 2) A Longer ICBM

Although the vehicle’s overall length and even total number of axles is unknown, it is reasonable to assume the 12-plus-axle TEL is longer than the 11-axle Hwasong-11 TEL, and, thus that the new chassis would be associated with an ICBM system longer than the Hwasong-11. If such a system is under development, the photo released by the North Koreans is the first indication. Probably the two main contenders for a longer ICBM would be:

A larger solid-propellant ICBM. The similarities between the rear of the new TEL and that of the Hwasong-18 may indicate there is a follow-on to that ICBM using longer booster stages. Longer stages of the current diameter could be used to provide more range, but the current missile has already demonstrated the capability to carry its flight tested payloads (weight unknown) to about 15,000 kilometers (km), easily enough to reach anywhere in the continental United States. Therefore, longer stages, with or without a diameter increase, would more likely be used to increase the amount of payload the missile could deliver to 15,000 km—a range flagged by Kim Jong Un in January 2021. Because the new vehicle’s width and overall length are unknown, there is no current basis to decide whether any new system uses larger-diameter booster stages; however, diameter increases would permit greater payload increases than length increases alone.

Any increased payload would presumably be used to carry multiple warheads—if North Korea is confident that multiple reentry vehicles small enough in diameter to fit on the new solid missile’s final booster stage would survive reentry at operational ranges. More payload also could be used to carry decoys and other ballistic missile penetration aids. Pyongyang claimed to have conducted a flight on June 26 of a solid-propellant test booster releasing three reentry vehicles and a decoy, although the test apparently failed prior to actual payload release.

A longer liquid-propellant ICBM. The similarities between the new TEL and the Hwasong-18 TEL do not rule out use with a longer follow-on to the Hwasong-17 liquid ICBM. Such a missile also presumably would use longer stages (with or without larger diameters) to achieve greater payload capability at current ranges, since the current Hwasong-17 also can reach targets anywhere in the US with its flight tested payloads. Because the current missile already has a very large payload capability due to its large size, the North would seem to have less of a need for a larger Hwasong-17 follow-on compared to a follow-on solid ICBM. But Pyongyang may have decided it needs an ICBM with even more payload capacity than the Hwasong-17 in order to carry multiple warheads large and heavy enough to confidently survive reentry at operational ranges without full-range flight testing—which the North has yet to perform and may wish to continue to avoid for political or other reasons. More payload weight also would permit more or larger decoys.

3) An SLV

The use of the new chassis with an SLV cannot be ruled out. A mobile SLV launcher could be attractive to North Korea by allowing launches away from fixed facilities, thus varying launch and orbital locations, potentially increasing response time, and improving wartime survivability. The US and China, in particular, have been developing road-mobile SLV launchers for these reasons.

North Korea’s latest SLV, the “Chollima-1,” uses a first stage based on the Hwasong-17 ICBM and is estimated to be about 29 meters long, three to four meters longer than the ICBM. That increased length might be compatible with the new, longer chassis. Although the green paint job of the new chassis would seem to suggest a military subordination, the North has thus far claimed the white-painted Chollima is under the civilian National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA). It may become the case that some Chollimas will be controlled by the military for mobile launch, NATA may just use green TELs for its white missiles, or there may end up being both white/NATA and green/military mobile SLV launchers.

Another possible SLV-related use of the new chassis would be as a stage transporter for the larger SLV North Korea is apparently developing, as suggested by activities at its Sohae Satellite Launching Ground since 2022. Depending on the size of the new SLV, the new chassis could be useful in moving its first stage, in particular, around and between production, final assembly and launch facilities.

4) A current ICBM

Although a longer TEL intuitively suggests a longer missile, it is possible that the new TEL is associated with an existing ICBM system. If so, the best candidate would probably be the large Hwasong-17 liquid missile, where the addition of one or more axles would further distribute its 100,000-150,000 kg weight and reduce the ground pressure exerted when using its existing 11-axle TEL. Use of a longer TEL could thus open up more roadways and off-road locations to help better move and conceal field-deployed Hwasong-17 units, but would also limit the road curves that such a vehicle could traverse.

Outlook

It remains to be seen whether the new vehicle makes it out of the factory, and what ICBM or SLV system it may end up being associated with. But if it is a “new-type” system, there will be plenty of time to assess that system once it begins flight testing. At a minimum, the new chassis indicates North Korea’s continuing commitment to road-mobile missile deployment and further suggests Pyongyang is able to produce its own TELs.

6. N.K. leader meets top Russian security official on 1st anniv. of Vostochny summit: KCNA

Half the Dark Quad in action.

N.K. leader meets top Russian security official on 1st anniv. of Vostochny summit: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · September 14, 2024

SEOUL, Sept. 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has met with the head of Russia's Security Council in Pyongyang and vowed to deepen the bilateral ties between the two countries, state media said Saturday.

The meeting came on the anniversary of a rare summit between Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin last year at the Vostochny Cosmodrome space center in Russia's Amur region, during which Kim pledged his "full support" for Moscow.

During their talks Friday, Kim and Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Moscow's Security Council, had a "wide exchange of views on the issues of steadily deepening the strategic dialogue between the two countries and strengthening cooperation to defend the mutual security interests and on the regional and international situation," according to the KCNA.

The two sides reached a "satisfactory consensus" on the presented issues, it added.

Kim also stressed their bilateral relations in politics, economy and culture were developing dynamically following his summit talks with Putin in June.

He vowed to continue expanding cooperation with Russia in the spirit of a partnership treaty signed between the two leaders during their June summit, which includes a mutual defense clause.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) talks with Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Russia's Security Council, in Pyongyang on Sept. 13, 2024, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) shakes hands with Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Russia's Security Council, in Pyongyang on Sept. 13, 2024, in this photo carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · September 14, 2024

7. StratBot AI: SOF and north Korea

StratBot AI

Have a question about military strategy? You are in the right place!

https://www.strategycentral.io/

How should we employ US SOF in north Korea to counter the irregular warfare threats that will take place during and after large scale combat operations?

When considering the employment of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in North Korea to counter irregular warfare threats during and after large-scale combat operations, a strategic approach is essential. Here are some key considerations:

Strategic Integration: SOF should be integrated into a broader strategic framework that aligns with U.S. objectives and the geopolitical context. This involves coordination with interagency partners and allies to ensure a unified approach.
Capacity Building: Focus on building the capacity of local forces and institutions. This can be achieved through training, advising, and equipping local security forces to handle irregular threats independently, thereby fostering long-term stability.
Intelligence and Reconnaissance: Utilize SOF's capabilities in intelligence gathering and reconnaissance to gain a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment. This will aid in identifying and neutralizing irregular threats effectively.
Civil-Military Operations: Engage in civil-military operations to win the support of the local population. This can help undermine the influence of insurgent groups and promote stability.
Low-Visibility Operations: Conduct low-visibility operations to disrupt insurgent networks and prevent the escalation of irregular warfare. These operations should be carefully planned to minimize collateral damage and avoid provoking wider conflict.
Interagency Collaboration: Collaborate with other U.S. government agencies and international partners to leverage a wide range of capabilities and resources, ensuring a comprehensive approach to countering irregular threats.

By focusing on these strategic elements, U.S. SOF can effectively counter irregular warfare threats in North Korea, contributing to a stable post-conflict environment.

Sources

fm3-24.pdf

CJCSI 3210.06A.pdf

8. Military replacing Chinese-made surveillance cameras around bases, border (South Korea)

I wonder what information China was able to glean from these cameras (assuming they were monitoring and tapping into the feeds).

Military replacing Chinese-made surveillance cameras around bases, border

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-09-13/national/defense/Military-replacing-Chinesemade-surveillance-cameras-around-bases-border/2134608

Published: 13 Sep. 2024, 12:12

Ministry of National Defense emblem [YONHAP]

The military has recently taken down more than 1,300 surveillance cameras installed at various bases, including those near the border with North Korea, after discovering that they were made in China, a military official said Friday.

In late July, military and intelligence authorities found out the surveillance cameras supplied by a South Korean company were produced in China during military equipment examinations, according to the official.

The military has uninstalled all of the equipment in question and is replacing it with equipment made domestically due to security concerns. Currently, about 100 of them have been installed.

"The CCTVs at issue were found to be designed to be able to transmit recorded footage externally by connecting to a specific Chinese server," the official said, while offering assurances that "no data has actually been leaked."

The official said the surveillance cameras were not used to monitor the border with North Korea but for military training grounds and base fences.

The company that supplied the cameras is suspected to have falsified the equipment's country of origin, and the military is considering taking legal action against it.

Yonhap

9. In pictures: Kim Jong Un, military man

For those who may need some photos of the Dear, Great, Supreme Leader AKA little rocket man.

35 PhotosSeptember 13, 202410:28 AM EDT

In pictures: Kim Jong Un, military man

A look at North Korean leader Kim Jong Un giving guidance on military tactics as he visited a uranium enrichment facility and called for more weapons-grade material to boost the arsenal.

https://www.reuters.com/pictures/pictures-kim-jong-un-military-man-2024-09-13/

10. What to know about North Korea's unveiling of its uranium enrichment facility

Excerpts:

North Korea’s progress in its uranium enrichment programme is a major concern for rivals and neighbours. Highly enriched uranium is easier than plutonium to engineer into a weapon. And while plutonium facilities are large and produce detectable radiation, making them easier for satellites to detect, uranium centrifuges can be operated almost anywhere, including small factories, caves, underground tunnels or other hard-to-reach places.

Yang said it’s estimated that North Korea could be operating around 10,000 uranium centrifuges across multiple sites, which account for the core of the country’s nuclear programme that likely produces enough fuel to make around 12 to 18 bombs a year. By 2027, North Korea would possibly amass enough fuel to produce about 200 bombs, he said.

In a report this week, Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said his agency has monitored continued activities at both Yongbyon and Kangson facilities.

Grossi said that at Yongbyon, IAEA had observed water outflows from the cooling water system of the light-water reactor and other indications consistent with the operation of 5-megawatt reactor and the reported centrifuge enrichment facility. The light-water reactor could be an additional source of weapons-grade plutonium along with the widely known 5-megawatt reactor, observers say.

What to know about North Korea's unveiling of its uranium enrichment facility

13 Sep 2024 06:18PM

channelnewsasia.com

SEOUL, South Korea: In a significant show of defiance against the United States, North Korea on Friday (Sep 13) provided the outside world with a rare view into a secretive facility built to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs as leader Kim Jong Un called for a rapid expansion of his nuclear weapons programme.

Here’s a look at what we know about the facility and North Korea’s capabilities for producing bomb fuel.

WHAT ARE WE SEEING?

North Korea’s official Rodong Sinmum newspaper published several photos showing Kim talking with scientists and military officials in a hall tightly packed with grey centrifuge tubes that were about the height of his shoulders. The North didn’t specify where the facility is located or when Kim went there.

Experts say the North Korean photos likely disclosed a centrifuge room at one of its two known plants in the towns of Yongbyon and Kangson, both near Pyongyang, which had been linked to uranium enrichment activities. While North Korea is believed to have other hidden uranium sites, it was unlikely that they were showcased publicly through visits by Kim, whose activities are closely monitored and analysed by the outside world.

Yang Uk, an analyst at South Korea’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said the number of centrifuges shown in the North Korean photos would be about 1,000. That happens to be roughly the number of centrifuges it would take to produce enough uranium for a single bomb - about 20-25kg - when the devices are fully operated year-round.

It was the first time the North has disclosed a uranium enrichment facility since 2010, when it allowed a group of Stanford University scholars led by nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker to tour its centrifuge facility in Yongbyon.

HOW WORRIED SHOULD WE BE?

As foreign experts and government officials closely scrutinised the reports and visuals from North Korea, it wasn’t immediately clear whether the country was communicating something significantly new about its bomb fuel technologies.

But the news was a stark reminder of a known but growing threat, as Kim continues to speed up the expansion of his nuclear weapons and missile programmes amid halted diplomacy with Washington and Seoul.

In this undated photo provided on Sep 13, 2024, by the North Korean government, its leader Kim Jong Un, centre right, inspects what they say is test-firing from their new launch vehicle of 600mm multiple rockets at an undisclosed location in North Korea. (Photo: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)

Kim in recent months has repeatedly called for an “exponential” expansion of his country’s nuclear arsenal to counter what he perceives as external US-led threats. The photos released on Friday were likely intended to demonstrate that the country has the bomb fuel capacity to match the ambitions of its leader, experts say.

Kim has since 2022 been accelerating the expansion of his nuclear-capable missile systems, which include weapons designed to strike both the US mainland and American allies in Asia.

North Korea’s progress in its uranium enrichment programme is a major concern for rivals and neighbours. Highly enriched uranium is easier than plutonium to engineer into a weapon. And while plutonium facilities are large and produce detectable radiation, making them easier for satellites to detect, uranium centrifuges can be operated almost anywhere, including small factories, caves, underground tunnels or other hard-to-reach places.

Yang said it’s estimated that North Korea could be operating around 10,000 uranium centrifuges across multiple sites, which account for the core of the country’s nuclear programme that likely produces enough fuel to make around 12 to 18 bombs a year. By 2027, North Korea would possibly amass enough fuel to produce about 200 bombs, he said.

In a report this week, Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said his agency has monitored continued activities at both Yongbyon and Kangson facilities.

Grossi said that at Yongbyon, IAEA had observed water outflows from the cooling water system of the light-water reactor and other indications consistent with the operation of 5-megawatt reactor and the reported centrifuge enrichment facility. The light-water reactor could be an additional source of weapons-grade plutonium along with the widely known 5-megawatt reactor, observers say.

He said that in 2024, a new annex to the main building in the Kangson complex was built, expanding the available floorspace.

WHERE DO WE STAND ON NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY?

Former US President Donald Trump’s administration had an opportunity to slow the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear programme while he engaged in high-stakes diplomacy with Kim starting in 2018. However, the talks broke down after their second summit in 2019, when the Americans rejected North Korean demands for major sanctions relief in exchange for the dismantling of the Yongbyon complex, which was seen as just a partial surrender of its nuclear capabilities.

Nuclear talks remain stalled as Kim vows to push his nuclear ambitions further in the face of deepening confrontations with Washington. Experts say Kim’s long-term goal is to force the United States into accepting the idea of the North as a nuclear power and negotiating economic and security concessions from a position of strength.

Some have speculated that he might try to drum up pressure in a US election year, possibly with a long-range missile demonstration or a nuclear test detonation.

Kim’s visit to the nuclear facility was somewhat reminiscent of highly public visits by former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the country’s Natanz uranium enrichment plant, after the country declared in 2006 that it was resuming enrichment that had been suspended for three years.

After years of difficult negotiations, Iran and six world powers led by the United States announced a comprehensive nuclear agreement in 2015 that outlined long-term restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme and the removal of many international sanctions.

However, the deal collapsed in 2018 when Trump unilaterally withdrew Washington from the agreement, calling it the "worst deal ever". The West has struggled to find a new deal with Iran, whose advancing nuclear programme now enriches uranium closer than ever to weapons-grade levels.

channelnewsasia.com

11. This year, UN member states are expected to conduct the highest-ever 'maritime surveillance of North Korea'

Good. The international community (of like minded democracies) are demonstrating support for enforcement of sanctions.

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

This year, UN member states are expected to conduct the highest-ever 'maritime surveillance of North Korea'

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/unsc-north-korea-sanctions-enforcement-expansion-germany-09132024140524.html

WASHINGTON-Cho Jin-woo choj@rfa.org

2024.09.13

German Navy's corvette FGS Baden-Württemberg (left) and supply ship FGS Frankfurt am Main (right).

/German Ministry of Defense

00:00 / 00:00

Anchor : The German Navy has been conducting surveillance activities against North Korean sanctions in the waters near Japan . As the international community continues its efforts to enforce sanctions against North Korea , it is expected that this year will see the largest number of surveillance activities ever . Reporter Jinwoo Cho reports .

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in a press release on the 13th , “ The German Navy’s corvette FGS Baden-Württemberg and supply ship FGS Frankfurt am Main conducted surveillance of illegal maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers between North Korean vessels prohibited by United Nations Security Council ( UNSC ) resolutions, in waters around Japan from late August to mid - September . ”

This is the second time since 2021 that a German naval vessel has taken part in such activities .

Japan's Foreign Ministry said it " welcomes these German activities from the perspective of ensuring the effectiveness of UN Security Council resolutions and maintaining international solidarity for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges . "

He added, “ Japan has been conducting intelligence gathering activities on ships suspected of violating UN resolutions , and is cooperating closely with relevant countries and international organizations, including Germany . ”

In September 2017 , in response to North Korea's sixth nuclear test, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2375 , which prohibited ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean vessels to prevent smuggling of banned items from North Korea, such as coal, oil , and seafood .

To implement this UN Security Council resolution, the United States, Japan , the United Kingdom , Canada , Australia , New Zealand, and others are conducting maritime surveillance activities to detect illegal transshipment of North Korean vessels .

Italian Navy Conducts First Surveillance of Illegal Ship Transfers to North Korean Ships

New Zealand launches second UN North Korea sanctions monitoring operation this year

This year, such surveillance activities have increased significantly .

UN member states, which had carried out 11 rounds of monitoring activities on North Korea sanctions last year, have already conducted 10 rounds of maritime monitoring activities on illegal transshipment of North Korean vessels as of September this year .

UN member states carried out the largest number of surveillance activities in 2021 , a total of 13 , and considering that they had carried out eight activities through September , this year is likely to be the largest year-on-year .

Experts analyzed that after Russia's veto was used to suspend the activities of the UN North Korea Sanctions Committee Expert Group in May of this year, there was an increase in monitoring activities among UN member states for violations of maritime sanctions against North Korea .

He also explained that North Korea is well aware that it is being watched, and is desperately trying to avoid it .

These are the words of former Commissioner Neil Waltz, who served as a maritime expert on the UN North Korea Sanctions Committee Expert Group from 2013 to 2018 .

[ Neil Watts ] North Korea frequently uses deception tactics, such as using technology to disguise the physical or digital identities of its vessels . They also try to turn the ships around quickly , so that they are less exposed to transferring illicit petroleum products .

North Korea strongly opposes maritime surveillance activities by UN member states .

In a statement last April , the director of the North Korean Foreign Ministry's Foreign Policy Office claimed that Germany , France , New Zealand, and others were sending warships and military aircraft to the waters around the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region, violating the security interests of regional countries and heightening military tensions in the region .

Editor Park Jeong-woo , Web Editor Han Deok-in

12. 'Class Struggle Consciousness' in the Works of North Korean Writers

Some interesting history of Korea.

MC: I mentioned this briefly earlier , but today, I would like to talk about writers who defected to North Korea or writers from the KAPF . First, I am curious about the scale of the number of writers who defected to North Korea . Sir , how many are there ?

Do Myung-hak : I don't know the exact scale . I have never seen any data on the scale of North Korean writers, either when I was in North Korea or when I came to South Korea . Also, if I had lived right after liberation or during the Korean War, I would have had a rough idea, but I was born in the mid- 1960s , so I don't know .

However, I know that a considerable number of writers and artists defected to North Korea after the liberation on August 15 , and that at the time, there were almost no talented writers and artists in North Korea . Since Seoul south of the 38th parallel was the political, economic, and cultural center, most writers and artists from North Korea were active in the South . Because of this, Kim Il-sung felt a sense of urgency to bring writers and artists from the South to Pyongyang , and the possibility was also high . This is because most of the famous writers at the time were from the KAPF and had socialist tendencies, so they would have easily gone to the North if the North offered them a carrot . In fact, Kim Il-sung gave special treatment to writers and artists who defected to North Korea, providing them with houses and guaranteeing their livelihoods . So even those who had been watching the situation with mixed feelings heard news of their colleagues who had gone to the North first and began defecting, creating a domino effect . There were also people who went to the North during the Korean War . However, during the war, most of the writers , artists , and scholars who went to the North are said to have been kidnapped , or forcibly taken to the North . As far as I know , there were more people who went voluntarily than those who went by force. Most of the people I knew in the North who were called Southerners were influenced by the South Korean Labor Party, and when the North Korean army occupied Seoul, they hurrahed and waved the North Korean flag, voluntarily enlisted in the volunteer army, or followed the retreating People's Army after the Incheon Landing Operation . I think I mentioned this once, but according to a story I heard directly from the famous Korean novelist Lee Mun-yeol, his father, who was an intellectual, voluntarily followed the retreating People's Army to the North, and he said that he didn't know why he went alone instead of taking his family with him in the truck he rode in, even though there were plenty of seats . His father, who went to the North, became a professor at Kim Il-sung University, and his son from his remarriage there was Lee Mun-yeol's half-brother. The story of how he met him in China is in the novel " Meeting with My Younger Brother , " which is quite a famous work .

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

'Class Struggle Consciousness' in the Works of North Korean Writers

https://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/b3c4ba85d559c758-b0a8bd81bb38d559ae30d589/literaturesnk-09132024150351.html

WASHINGTON-Hong Albot honga@rfa.org

2024.09.14

The People's Study House stands tall above citizens crossing the street in Pyongyang. 10.12.2015

/AP

00:00 / 15:00

MC: Hello, everyone . This is 'Do Myung-hak's South-North Literature Journey' where we look into the literary worlds of South and North Korea with Do Myung-hak, a defector novelist living in Seoul . I am Hong Al-beot from Washington, D.C. and the host .

Starting this week, we will be talking about the works and creative activities of writers who defected to North Korea or writers from KAPF . Hello, Professor Do Myeong-hak .

Do Myeong-hak : Hello .

MC: I mentioned this briefly earlier , but today, I would like to talk about writers who defected to North Korea or writers from the KAPF . First, I am curious about the scale of the number of writers who defected to North Korea . Sir , how many are there ?

Do Myung-hak : I don't know the exact scale . I have never seen any data on the scale of North Korean writers, either when I was in North Korea or when I came to South Korea . Also, if I had lived right after liberation or during the Korean War, I would have had a rough idea, but I was born in the mid- 1960s , so I don't know .

However, I know that a considerable number of writers and artists defected to North Korea after the liberation on August 15 , and that at the time, there were almost no talented writers and artists in North Korea . Since Seoul south of the 38th parallel was the political, economic, and cultural center, most writers and artists from North Korea were active in the South . Because of this, Kim Il-sung felt a sense of urgency to bring writers and artists from the South to Pyongyang , and the possibility was also high . This is because most of the famous writers at the time were from the KAPF and had socialist tendencies, so they would have easily gone to the North if the North offered them a carrot . In fact, Kim Il-sung gave special treatment to writers and artists who defected to North Korea, providing them with houses and guaranteeing their livelihoods . So even those who had been watching the situation with mixed feelings heard news of their colleagues who had gone to the North first and began defecting, creating a domino effect . There were also people who went to the North during the Korean War . However, during the war, most of the writers , artists , and scholars who went to the North are said to have been kidnapped , or forcibly taken to the North . As far as I know , there were more people who went voluntarily than those who went by force. Most of the people I knew in the North who were called Southerners were influenced by the South Korean Labor Party, and when the North Korean army occupied Seoul, they hurrahed and waved the North Korean flag, voluntarily enlisted in the volunteer army, or followed the retreating People's Army after the Incheon Landing Operation . I think I mentioned this once, but according to a story I heard directly from the famous Korean novelist Lee Mun-yeol, his father, who was an intellectual, voluntarily followed the retreating People's Army to the North, and he said that he didn't know why he went alone instead of taking his family with him in the truck he rode in, even though there were plenty of seats . His father, who went to the North, became a professor at Kim Il-sung University, and his son from his remarriage there was Lee Mun-yeol's half-brother. The story of how he met him in China is in the novel " Meeting with My Younger Brother , " which is quite a famous work .

MC: So what kind of organization was KAPF ?

Do Myeong-hak : KAPF was a socialist literary organization founded in August 1925 and dissolved on May 20 , 1935 , with the aim of organizing proletarian literature and class revolutionary movements based on class consciousness . Its official name was the “ Korean Proletarian Artists’ Alliance , ” but the name I knew in North Korea was slightly different, the “ Korean Proletarian Literature and Arts Alliance . ” I may be remembering incorrectly .

MC: So who is the author you will be introducing today ?

Do Myeong-hak : Yes , they are writers Lee Ki-young and Han Seol-ya , both from KAPF .

MC: First , let’s talk about author Lee Ki-young . I looked it up and it says that author Lee Ki-young is a North Korean novelist . So , teacher, can you tell us a little bit about who author Lee Ki-young was and what kind of works he wrote ?

Do Myeong-hak : In fact, author Lee Gi-yeong was such a famous author that there must be many people in South Korea who know about him . However, let’s recall that author Lee Gi-yeong was born in 1895 in Asan, Chungcheongnam-do. His pen name was Minchon , and his pen names were Seonggeosan-in , Yangsimgok-in , and Yangsimhak-in . He dropped out of Tokyo Seisoku School and debuted in 1924 when his work “Oppa’s Secret Letter” won the Hyunsang Literary Contest . After that, he published “ Seohwa ,” “ Human Class ,” “ Hometown ,” “ Land ,” and “ Duman River ,” and his plays include “ Their Siblings ” and “ Wolhee . ” After liberation, he went to North Korea and served as the chairman of the Joseon Literature and Arts Federation and as the head of various organizations .

Author Lee Ki-young

MC: Then , what was author Lee Ki-young’s literary world like ?

Do Myeong-hak : If we talk about his literary world, we can divide it into before and after defecting to North Korea . Before defecting to North Korea , that is, during the Japanese colonial period, his literary world was open to relating the poor life he experienced to the totality of the reality of the time , and especially by showing outstanding achievements in description , he was evaluated as the highest level of the proletarian literary world of the time. In novels such as “ Farmer Jeong Do-ryong ,” “ Minchon ,” “ Flood, ” and “ Seohwa ,” he showed the possibility of a realistic novel that embodies the totality of rural reality by creating a new form of peasant literature through the discovery of rural reality and the creation of new character types . This authorial ability was comprehensively and completely expressed through an internal maturation process in the masterpiece “ Hometown , ” which is evaluated as a “ monumental work of the tendency novel . ” This work was evaluated as a work that successfully created the image of a typical peasant during the colonial era .

After defecting to North Korea, the literary world of author Lee Ki-young has not changed much from before . He wrote about the reality of rural areas in North Korea , and his creative techniques, such as description and composition, do not seem to have changed much . The only difference is that his works after defecting to North Korea have a stronger sense of class struggle, and he portrays Kim Il-sung and the North Korean regime as saviors . In fact, this is not something he did out of his own will, but rather something he had no choice about because of his situation in North Korea .

In fact, Lee Ki-young has not written many works that directly glorify the North Korean leader . In particular, Sung Hye-rim, Kim Jong-il's live-in girlfriend and Kim Jong-nam's biological mother, was originally Lee Ki-young's eldest daughter-in-law, but Kim Jong-il divorced her and took her away . Lee Ki-young, who suddenly lost his eldest daughter-in-law, hardly did any creative work since then .

MC: This time, let’s talk about Han Seol-ya, a writer from KAPF . When I first heard her name, I thought she was a female writer . Please introduce her .

Do Myeong-hak : Yes , Han Seol-ya, like Lee Gi-yeong, was a well-known figure among the KAPF members, and was a major writer who contributed greatly to the development of North Korean literature . Han Seol-ya was born in Hamheung , and in 1915 , she attended Gyeongseong First High School in Seoul before returning to her hometown of Hamheung and graduating from Hamheung High School . After studying abroad in China and Japan, Han Seol-ya debuted in 1925 with her first work, “ That Night ,” upon the recommendation of Lee Gwang-su . She joined KAPF from its founding in 1927 and took the lead in the theoretical establishment and literary practice of class literature . In his works, he directly addressed the problem of poverty, a reality in rural areas at the time, and depicted the declining rural society . Then, in 1934 , he was arrested by the Japanese police along with other KAPF writers . This was a turning point for his works, which displayed a more pronounced tendency toward class struggle, and in his representative work, the long novel “ Twilight ,” he portrayed the lives of contemporary capitalists and workers in contrast . During the Japanese colonial period, Han Seol-ya was imprisoned twice .

First edition of Han Seol-ya's novel 'Tower' / Yonhap News

MC: Have you ever met these two writers ? How do North Korean people and readers evaluate these two writers ?

Do Myeong-hak : The generation gap between us is so big that we never had the chance to meet . Even among North Korean residents, not many young people know about Lee Ki-young and Han Seol-ya . Lee Ki-young and Han Seol-ya are already old people, so only those in their 50s or 60s can remember them, but there is no disagreement that both writers were great talents .

MC: Why should we pay attention to North Korean writers and writers from KAPF and their works ?

Do Myeong-hak : Through writers who defected to North Korea and KAPF writers, we can look into our modern history , especially the ideological confrontation and competition between the South and the North after the division , and the twisted lives they lived through . Also, the works and lives of writers who defected to North Korea and KAPF writers occupy a large part that cannot be left out of the larger category of Korean literature . Conversely, the same goes for writers who defected to South Korea and their works, including writers who defected to North Korea .

MC: Among these two authors, is there a work you would like to recommend to South Korean readers? Please introduce it and explain why .

Do Myeong-hak : For author Lee Ki-young's work, I think the long novel " Duman River " written in North Korea would be good , and in the case of author Han Seol-ya, most of her works disappeared after she was purged, so it's difficult to find her works written in North Korea. So I'd like to recommend her long novel " Twilight " , which is considered her masterpiece that allows us to glimpse into her literary world and tendencies, although it's an old work written before liberation . However, author Lee Ki-young's " Duman River " has a story about the main characters finding hope in Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese guerrillas after going through all sorts of twists and turns and heading to their guerrilla base. I think you should keep in mind that this is how it had to be written in North Korea . Other than that, " Duman River " is a work worth reading .

MC: It's almost time to finish . Thank you for your hard work, teacher .

Do Myung-hak : Yes , thank you for your hard work . Thank you to all the listeners who joined us . We will see you again next week . Goodbye .

Editor Lee Jin-seo, Web Editor Hin Deok-in

13. North Korean defectors in China face 'difficulty' in applying for refugee status overseas amid increased crackdowns

Excerpts:

There have been cases before ( of people trying to obtain refugee status in China ) , and there are people who escape from China and go to Thailand and apply for refugee status in the United States . However , the period for those people to be accepted ( as refugees ) in the United States used to be 6 months, but now it takes 1 year and 5 months or even 2 years, so some people give up . It's difficult in the middle .

In reality, the process of being recognized as a refugee overseas in countries that accept refugees, such as the United States , the United Kingdom, Canada , and Australia, is not that simple or easy .

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

North Korean defectors in China face 'difficulty' in applying for refugee status overseas amid increased crackdowns

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/human_rights_defector/north-korean-defectors-in-china-refugee-09132024134201.html

WASHINGTON-JIN MINJAE chinm@rfa.org

2024.09.13

This photo taken on February 29 shows North Korean soldiers on the banks of the Yalu River in Junggang County, Chagang Province, North Korea, as seen from Linjiang, Jilin Province, China.

/AFP

00:00 /04:59

Anchor : Recently, as conditions for North Korean defectors in China to travel to South Korea have become particularly difficult , it has been reported that an increasing number of them are considering applying for refugee status overseas in countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom . However, as the Chinese government still does not recognize North Korean defectors as refugees, it seems difficult for them to find a way to be recognized as refugees . Reporter Jin Min-jae has the story .

Mr. Park ( name changed and voice altered to protect his safety ) , who has been doing business in China's three northeastern provinces for decades , told RFA on the 4th that there seems to be an increasing number of North Korean defectors living in nearby areas who are considering applying for refugee status overseas, such as in the United States or the United Kingdom .

[ Park ( name changed and voice altered for security reasons ) ] I think that the North Koreans who have been living in China for a long time are in a semi-defector state . In fact , they have no intention of returning ( to North Korea ) . However, I have heard that many people think that it is not easy to go to South Korea , so if their status is guaranteed, they can go anywhere ( by applying for refugee status overseas ) .

In recent years, as China has been mobilizing manpower, equipment , and even AI technology to crack down on North Korean defectors, North Korean defectors in China are increasingly cowering as they try to avoid the tight surveillance net .

Given this situation, it is reported that North Korean defectors who have been staying in China for a long time and have been waiting for a chance to defect to South Korea are turning their attention to countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which they had hesitated to do due to language and cultural barriers .

In other words , if I can escape North Korea by applying for refugee status overseas, I will have the courage to do so .

However, those familiar with the situation of rescuing North Korean defectors have raised their voices in concern .

Activist Kim ( name changed and voice altered for safety reasons ) , who has been working in China for decades to rescue North Korean defectors, said there have been several precedents like this in the past , but he told the stories of those who had no choice but to give up each time .

[ Mr. Kim ( pseudonym and voice changed for personal protection ) ] There have been cases before ( of people trying to obtain refugee status in China ) , and there are people who escape from China and go to Thailand and apply for refugee status in the United States . However , the period for those people to be accepted ( as refugees ) in the United States used to be 6 months, but now it takes 1 year and 5 months or even 2 years, so some people give up . It's difficult in the middle .

In reality, the process of being recognized as a refugee overseas in countries that accept refugees, such as the United States , the United Kingdom, Canada , and Australia, is not that simple or easy .

North Korean defectors tremble in fear of China's AI ... Detections continue

Last year, there were '0' North Korean defectors who entered the U.S. as refugees

Starting with 'writing refugee application documents ' , you must pass several stages of document screening and interviews before finally passing the final stage . Above all, in order to write refugee application documents, which is the first step of refugee application , you must receive a recommendation from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) .

However, it is nearly impossible for North Korean defectors in China to even obtain the ‘ recommendation from the UNHCR ’ required in advance to take this first step .

In order to receive a recommendation from the UNHCR, applicants must undergo a document screening and an interview , but the UNHCR Beijing office itself is surrounded by tight security and is inaccessible .

In this photo taken on February 29, a man is seen walking along the Yalu River in Linjiang city, Jilin province, China, bordering Junggang County in northern North Korea's Chagang province. /AFP

In response, Lee Young-hwan, head of the Transitional Justice Working Group, a South Korean North Korea human rights group, criticized the UNHCR's feeble attitude in failing to respond strongly to the Chinese government's refusal to recognize North Korean defectors as refugees .

[ Lee Young-hwan, Head of the Transitional Justice Working Group ] In order to apply for refugee status, an interview is required, so defectors have to go to the UNHCR in person , and when ( Chinese police ) wait on the way and arrest or detain them, the UNHCR does not take active measures such as calling them back or demanding protection . The problem is that the UNHCR is powerless to take any action or stop them even though ( North Korean defectors ) could be arrested at the UNHCR main gate . In principle , if the UNHCR were operating normally, it should receive reports ( on refugee applications from North Korean defectors in China ) .

Ultimately, unless China recognizes North Korean defectors in China as refugees, it is by no means easy to apply for refugee status overseas through the UNHCR within China .

On the other hand , it is known that it takes an average of 3 to 4 weeks for North Korean defectors in China to escape to South Korea from Southeast Asia .

Moreover, they are considered Korean citizens, not refugees, and are treated the same as other Korean citizens as soon as they enter Korean territory .

That is why Cho Han-beom, a senior researcher at the Institute for Unification Studies, sympathized with the position of North Korean defectors in China who are considering applying for refugee status overseas , but pointed out that realistically, there is currently no other way besides South Korea .

[ Cho Han-beom, Senior Researcher, Institute for Unification Studies ] Most of the people in China right now are defectors . This is because they decided to defect and have been exposed to China for a long time . Therefore, they are largely localized in China and are familiar with Korean culture . In that sense, we can compare when they entered Korea with when they entered overseas . There are many cases where conditions are better when entering through a third country . However , the problem is that it is very difficult to accept refugee applications in a third country . So, while they may choose the United States or Europe as their preferred destination, the realistic choice for most people is Korea .

As North Korean defectors in China, the country closest to North Korea, struggle to escape , calls for a more active role for the UN Refugee Agency are also growing .

Editor Park Jeong-woo , Web Editor Han Deok-in

14. US: “Concerns over Increase in Public Executions in North Korea∙∙∙Will to Accept Defectors Still Remains”

This is one reason why we need a human rights up front approach.

Important comments from Greg Scarlatoiu who heads the COmmittee for Human Rights in North Korea.

Excerpts:

Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), a Washington-based North Korea human rights group, told VOA in a telephone interview that the executions of officials in flood-stricken areas of North Korea “are simply looking for a scapegoat.”

[녹취: 스칼라튜 사무총장] “Just looking for scapegoats for 희생양, that's all, so you know that's how North Korea works. The regime, the Supreme leader never assumes responsibility they always find scapegoats and this is what's happening right now. So they've suffered very severe environmental damage they're simply looking for scapegoats that's how it goes.”

He then criticized that this is how North Korea operates, saying, “The top leader of the regime never takes responsibility and always looks for a scapegoat.”

The explanation is that North Korea suffered a serious natural disaster, and that the party officials were not responsible for it, but they were executed as scapegoats to appease the discontent of the North Korean people.

Secretary-General Scalatu also said the executions of high-ranking North Korean officials without a fair trial were a clear violation of human rights.

“The North Korean Human Rights Committee has documented the executions of high-ranking officials,” he said, adding that “high-ranking officials were executed with ZPU4 anti-aircraft guns.”

[녹취: 스칼라튜 사무총장] “The execution of senior officials you know we have documented this here at HRNK. Senior officials have been executed using ZPU4 anti aircraft machine guns. That is clearly a violation. There is clearly no proper due process there's clearly no proper trial. We have tried hard to document this execution, so yes, you know these executions may amount to crimes against humanity to human rights violations indeed.”

He continued, “This is a clear violation of human rights, as there was no due process or proper trial,” and emphasized, “This kind of execution is a crime against humanity and a violation of human rights.”

This is a Google translation of a VOA report.

And I cannot empshsize the following enough:

And let me remind everyone of these important points about HRNK and the incredible work it does and underscore the fact that the US government is funding other organizations, to include foreign ones, yet the Biden administration has chosen not to continue to provide grants to it.

Please note that the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) made significant contributions to the Commission of Inquiry and every year has provided detailed input to the State Department or the UN Universal Periodic Review as well as other US State Department Human RIghts reports. I mention this because funding for HRNK comes from private donations and grants and continues to face funding challenges since the Department of State (DOS) of the Biden administration has disapproved every grant request from HRNK.

I state this because DOS funded HRNK's satellite imagery project investigation of North Korea's political prison camps, its research of North Korean workers officially dispatched overseas, and its scrutiny of North Korea's information environment for nine years, from 2014 until 2023. HRNK received about $800,000 in DOS support under the Obama administration, and about $1.2 million in DOS support under the Trump administration. The Biden administration has completely defunded HRNK, while providing no debriefings or just pro forma debriefings on the rejected proposals or rather flimsy reasons for those rejections.. DOS is currently funding groups from Canada and South Korea, but not HRNK, America's premier NGO focused on North Korean human rights. Yet DOS has continued to use HRNK research and data to inform its annual human rights reports.

For full transparency, I am a member of the Board of Directors of HRNK. I feel that it is important to raise this issue and ask why DOS refuses to fund HRNK during the Biden admiration.. It is difficult to understand how the United States cna have a human rights upfront approach to north Korea and yet deny modest funding requests from HRNK.

The following is a Google translation of a VOA report.

US: “Concerns over Increase in Public Executions in North Korea∙∙∙Will to Accept Defectors Still Remains”

2024.9.6

An Jun-ho

https://www.voakorea.com/a/7773077.html?utm

The U.S. government has expressed serious concerns over the recent news that North Korea executed several officials for responsibility for the flood damage. It has also reaffirmed its intention to accept North Korean refugees recommended by the UNHCR. Human rights experts have pointed out that North Korea is shifting responsibility for the flood damage to scapegoats, and that the executions without fair trials are a clear violation of human rights. Reporter Ahn Jun-ho reports.

On the 5th, a U.S. State Department spokesperson expressed concern regarding the South Korean National Intelligence Service’s announcement that North Korea has recently been executing a number of high-ranking officials for responsibility for the flood damage, saying, “As the number of public executions in North Korea continues to increase, the environment of fear and oppression is deepening.”

In response to VOA’s inquiry that day, a State Department spokesperson said, “We remain gravely concerned about the lack of transparency, fairness, and accountability in North Korea’s judicial system,” and pointed out that “North Korea systematically denies individuals the right to due process, including a fair trial.”

[국무부 대변인] “A continuing rise in the number of public executions in the DPRK has heightened an environment of fear and repression. We remain gravely concerned about the lack of transparency, fairness, and accountability within the DPRK’s judicial system, which systematically denies individuals the right to due process, including fair trials.”

The National Intelligence Service announced on the 4th that it was closely monitoring the trend of North Korea executing a number of high-ranking officials in late July in the North Pyongan Province and Chagang Province, holding them responsible for the flood damage. It has been suggested that this may include Kang Bong-hun, the secretary of the Chagang Province Workers' Party.

North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un announced on July 31 at an emergency expanded meeting of the Political Bureau of the Workers' Party of Korea that "those who have grossly neglected the responsible performance of their duties assigned to them by the Party and the state, thereby causing unacceptable casualties, will be severely punished," foreshadowing punishment of those responsible.

Continued concerns about North Korea's judicial system and human rights abuses

There has been no specific news regarding punishment of those responsible, but according to testimonies from defectors and reports from UN agencies, arbitrary detention, torture, and public executions are known to be carried out in North Korea without fair trials.

The State Department spokesperson also noted that “while elite defections have increased over the past year, North Korean law criminalizes defection and attempted defection, particularly for government officials,” adding that “family members of defectors can also face similar punishment.”

[국무부 대변인] “While there has been an increasing number of reported elite defections over the past year, DPRK law criminalizes defection and attempted defection, especially for government officials. Family members of defectors face these punishments as well. When North Korean escapees, including defectors, make it safely to other countries, we encourage host countries to take steps to provide protection, ease suffering, uphold human dignity, and provide critical assistance.”

It also recommended that when North Korean defectors arrive in other countries, those countries provide them with protection, relief from suffering, and the necessary support to ensure that they maintain their human dignity.

US reaffirms willingness to accept North Korean refugees

A State Department spokesperson reiterated the United States' willingness to accept North Korean refugees.

“We are willing to accept North Korean defectors into the U.S. refugee program through recommendations from the UNHCR,” the spokesperson said.

[국무부 대변인] “We remain willing to accept North Koreans to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program through UNHCR referrals. We continue to work with the international community to raise awareness of DPRK human rights issues; document violations and abuses; counter DPRK transnational repression; and increase the flow of independent information into, through, and out of the DPRK.”

“We will continue to work with the international community to raise awareness of North Korean human rights issues, document human rights violations and abuses, and work to counter North Korea’s transnational repression while increasing independent information flows into and out of North Korea,” he added.

Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), a Washington-based North Korea human rights group, told VOA in a telephone interview that the executions of officials in flood-stricken areas of North Korea “are simply looking for a scapegoat.”

[녹취: 스칼라튜 사무총장] “Just looking for scapegoats for 희생양, that's all, so you know that's how North Korea works. The regime, the Supreme leader never assumes responsibility they always find scapegoats and this is what's happening right now. So they've suffered very severe environmental damage they're simply looking for scapegoats that's how it goes.”

He then criticized that this is how North Korea operates, saying, “The top leader of the regime never takes responsibility and always looks for a scapegoat.”

The explanation is that North Korea suffered a serious natural disaster, and that the party officials were not responsible for it, but they were executed as scapegoats to appease the discontent of the North Korean people.

Secretary-General Scalatu also said the executions of high-ranking North Korean officials without a fair trial were a clear violation of human rights.

“The North Korean Human Rights Committee has documented the executions of high-ranking officials,” he said, adding that “high-ranking officials were executed with ZPU4 anti-aircraft guns.”

[녹취: 스칼라튜 사무총장] “The execution of senior officials you know we have documented this here at HRNK. Senior officials have been executed using ZPU4 anti aircraft machine guns. That is clearly a violation. There is clearly no proper due process there's clearly no proper trial. We have tried hard to document this execution, so yes, you know these executions may amount to crimes against humanity to human rights violations indeed.”

He continued, “This is a clear violation of human rights, as there was no due process or proper trial,” and emphasized, “This kind of execution is a crime against humanity and a violation of human rights.”

North Korea is known to have used an anti-aircraft gun in December 2013 when it executed Jang Song-thaek, Kim Jong-un's uncle and the second-highest official in the regime at the time, and in April 2015 when it publicly executed Minister of the People's Armed Forces Hyon Yong-chol for allegedly dozing off in front of Kim Jong-un.

However, it has not yet been revealed how those responsible for this flood disaster were executed.

This is Ahn Jun-ho from VOA News.

15. Interview: Former US security adviser "Moon's North Korea stance was overly optimistic"

I do hope Koreans heed this assessment of the Moon administration

Interview: Former US security adviser "Moon's North Korea stance was overly optimistic"

Herbert R. McMaster, former U.S. National Security Adviser, speaks of his tenure during the Trump administration

https://www.chosun.com/english/long-reads-en/2024/09/15/Y6725I3AE5B6TC6ICYUNCEUII4/

By Lee Min Seok (Washington D.C.),

The Chosun Daily

Published 2024.09.15. 00:10

Former U.S. National Security Adviser Herbert R. McMaster at the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., in March 2018. / Getty Images Korea

“Former President Moon Jae-in’s claim that North Korea amasses nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes did not make any sense to me,” former U.S. National Security Adviser Herbert Raymond McMaster, 62, said in a video interview with the Chosunilbo on Sept. 4. “Just look at the record of aggression on the Korean Peninsula since June of 1950 - every act of aggression has been from the North.”

He noted that President Moon bought into the idea that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s nuclear ambitions were for deterrent purposes and ended up conveying “overly optimistic” and misguided information to the U.S.

McMaster, a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General who served as the second National Security Adviser in the Trump administration from February 2017 to March 2018, recently published ‘At War with Ourselves: My Tour of Duty in the Trump White House,’ a revealing account of his thirteen months in the Trump administration.

In the book, he wrote that during the first U.S.-South Korea summit in June 2017, five months after Trump took office, President Moon stated that Kim Jong Un viewed his nuclear arsenal as “necessary for defense,” leading to a disagreement between McMaster and then-Vice President Mike Pence. He also stated that South Korean and U.S. security officials have repeatedly clashed over how to respond to North Korea’s provocations and the direction of denuclearization.

“The Moon administration was telling North Korea what North Korea wanted to hear and was telling President Trump and our administration what we wanted to hear, he said. “They were playing the role of matchmaker.” He argued that in the end, the message Moon delivered to the U.S. - suggesting that Kim Jong Un was willing to give up his nuclear weapons - was unrealistic and overly optimistic.

During his tenure as national security adviser, McMaster was the key architect behind the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy, which aimed to increase sanctions and apply more pressure on North Korea to achieve denuclearization. However, he was dismissed in March 2018 after confronting Trump about managing relations with U.S. adversaries like Russia. He was succeeded by hardliner John Bolton.

His expression turned tense when asked about the potential implications for the Korean Peninsula if Trump were to be re-elected in the upcoming U.S. presidential election in November. McMaster said Trump would likely seek another summit with Kim Jong Un. “I hope what he will try to achieve [in any further negotiations] is complete and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.”

McMaster's new memoir, 'At War with Ourselves: My Tour of Duty in the Trump White House.'

McMaster is widely regarded as an exceptional war strategist. During the early days of the Trump-Kim Jong Un exchanges, he played a stabilizing role within the White House National Security Council (NSC). “Scaling back U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises for negotiations with North Korea was a major mistake by Trump,” he said. “I don’t think Trump always made reckless decisions. His disruptive personality actually helped implement a pressure strategy that kept North Korea uncertain about his next move.” According to McMaster’s memoir, while Trump initially pushed his team to apply strong pressure on North Korea, he later shifted to seeking dialogue with Kim Jong Un.

What caused Trump to change direction in his North Korea policy?

“I think what changed Donald Trump’s perspective was Donald Trump himself. In ‘At War with Ourselves,’ I discuss how President Trump is predisposed toward disrupting policies. Initially, I think that was a good thing, because it was clear that the Obama administration’s policy of strategic patience wasn’t working with North Korea. So, Trump’s disruptive nature helped in implementing the maximum pressure strategy.

However, he often had a great deal of confidence in his ability to make a deal. I don’t think he fully understood the extent to which multiple summits with Kim Jong Un—and some of the things he said about him, you know, like falling in love with him—would alleviate the pressure on the North and give those who were already predisposed to not enforcing sanctions an excuse not to do so.”

If Trump is re-elected, do you think he would try to meet with Kim Jong Un again?

“I think he will try to have another summit. And I hope what he aims for is the complete and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea, because that’s what the world needs.

I outlined for the President three key principles: Don’t rush to the negotiating table, don’t view diplomacy and military options separately, and don’t lift sanctions prematurely. I think he followed my suggestions for a while.

I hope that if President Trump gets re-elected, he will return to recognizing those principles. I believe they still hold true today.”

Do you think Kim Jong-un is waiting for Trump to regain power?

“I believe so. What Kim Jong-un hopes for from Trump is a ‘weak agreement.’ While he might give up some long-range missiles, he is likely to hold onto his existing nuclear weapons and short-range missiles aimed at South Korea. After that, he could try to take advantage of Trump’s skepticism about stationing U.S. troops overseas and make an effort to withdraw U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula. However, I believe all of Kim Jong-un’s efforts will ultimately fail, as Trump is unlikely to be deceived by him again, as he was during his first term. Despite this, Kim Jong-un will continue to pursue these goals. His recent anti-unification declaration and the increased level of missile provocations may very well be laying the groundwork for another summit with Trump.”

Herbert R. McMaster, the former National Security Advisor of the United States. /Chosun DB

Your memoir mentions that former President Moon Jae-in told Vice President Pence that Kim Jong-un believes he needs nuclear weapons for defense. What are your thoughts on President Moon’s statement?

“Since the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, every act of military aggression on the Korean Peninsula has been initiated by North Korea. North Korea possesses not only nuclear weapons but also conventional weapons systems that place Seoul within striking range. The claim that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is purely for defense, as stated by President Moon, does not make sense. At the time, we even joked among ourselves that the Moon administration seemed like a revival of the Sunshine Policy from the Kim Dae-jung government. President Moon’s belief was in stark contrast to the views of Trump and then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which was frustrating. When there are divisions between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, the only beneficiaries are North Korea and China.”

Why did former President Moon make that assessment?

“The Moon administration was acting as a matchmaker between the U.S. and North Korea. Moon would tell Kim Jong-un that Donald Trump was eager for a summit, and then he would tell President Trump that Kim Jong-un really wants to solve denuclearization issues through a summit. He was essentially telling both sides what they wanted to hear. Moon’s motivation was good. He was trying to get some kind of diplomatic breakthrough. But he was overly optimistic about North Korea’s intentions. It gives North Korea hope that there could be another far-left government that has long maintained a strange affinity for the North and a strain of anti-Americanism. This is a very small minority on the left in South Korea—a minority that gives Kim Jong-un hope.”

During his term, Trump held three summits with Kim Jong-un. After their first summit in Singapore in June 2018, Trump made some relatively favorable decisions for Kim Jong-un, such as unilaterally canceling joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises. However, Trump’s distrust of Kim Jong-un grew over time, and ultimately, the U.S.-North Korea summits did not lead to any substantial outcomes.

What signal did the cancellation of the U.S.-South Korea joint exercises send to Kim Jong-un?

“I think that was a big mistake to suspend the exercises after the Singapore Summit. If I had been still in the White House at that time, I would tell Trump not to curtail the exercises. Kim Jong-un will say these exercises are provocative, but they are not. They are important for ensuring we are prepared to defend against a country that has sunk ships, shot down aircraft, conducted guerrilla attacks, and attacked the Blue House.”

Herbert R. McMaster, the former National Security Advisor of the United States. /AP-Yonhap News

Many are concerned that if Trump is reelected, there will be no more officials who, like you, would try to curb his hasty and sometimes reckless decisions.

“I don’t think President Trump made reckless decisions. He made informed decisions based on reports from his advisors. If a second Trump administration comes into power, I expect that strong figures will be appointed to support him, and there will be strong voices in foreign policy. If Mike Pompeo were to return, he would provide a solid center. Bill Hagerty, who served as Ambassador to Japan, is well-acquainted with the North Korean threat. Senators Tom Cotton and Dan Sullivan have also been vocal about the North Korean threat. Within the Republican Party, there are individuals who, while trusted by Trump, do not have illusions about Kim Jong-un and the intentions of the Kim regime.”

In his book, McMaster voiced concerns that the North Korean nuclear threat could lead South Korea and Japan to lose faith in the U.S. ‘nuclear umbrella’ and consider developing their own nuclear weapons. He also noted the rising public support in South Korea for independent nuclear armament, adding, “It’s undeniable that the North Korean nuclear issue has become more serious.”

What are your thoughts on South Korea moving toward nuclear armament?

“I believe there are ways to reassure South Korea without it going nuclear. First, it’s crucial to make it clear to North Korea that any use of nuclear weapons against South Korea would be suicidal. Strengthening trilateral military exercises between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan is also essential. We could explore options like sharing U.S. nuclear weapons with South Korea and Japan, similar to the arrangements some NATO countries have, or even redeploying long-range nuclear missiles on the Korean Peninsula. The priority should be reinforcing deterrence against North Korea.”

How would a second Trump presidency affect South Korea?

“Trump’s favorite words are ‘reciprocity’ and ‘burden sharing’—his top two priorities. While he can sometimes be inconsistent, he remains firm on these points. South Korea needs to emphasize the importance of its investment in the U.S., the deep connection between their economies, and the geopolitical significance of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Above all, it’s essential to highlight that the relationship benefits both sides. I believe Trump understands all this.”

☞ Who is Herbert R. McMaster

McMaster (born July 24, 1962), a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, served as the 25th National Security Advisor from 2017 to 2018 during the early part of Donald Trump’s first term. Time Magazine once recognized him as the Army’s leading “warrior-thinker” of the 21st century. He graduated from West Point in 1984 and later earned a Ph.D. in American history from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His dissertation, which took a critical look at the failures of American strategy and leadership during the Vietnam War, became the foundation for his book “Dereliction of Duty,” a staple within the U.S. military. A seasoned veteran of the Gulf War, Iraq War, and Afghanistan War, McMaster was dismissed from his position after disagreements with President Trump over policy on North Korea and Russia.

16. Ganghwa county residents struggle with mysterious noises from N. Korean broadcasts

I wonder if the nKPA is trying something out of the SERE broadcast playbook with sounds meant to upset people.

Will they hear the screaming babies and children ask for for their father to come home? I will never forget those sounds from SERE school. (and Boots,... https://www.businessinsider.com/freaky-recording-of-boots-poem-is-used-in-sere-2015-1#:~:text=The%20poem%20is%20about%20the,boots%20in%20front%20of%20them.)

Ganghwa county residents struggle with mysterious noises from N. Korean broadcasts

https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/09/13/W4COD7LEDFBHVHGBEXTBUNGKPI/

By Lee Hyun Joon (Incheon),

Lee Jung-soo

Published 2024.09.13. 15:46

North Korean soldiers were seen working near what is presumed to be a loudspeaker structure for anti-South broadcasts in Gaepung County, North Hwanghae Province, as viewed from the Odusan Unification Observatory in Paju, Gyeonggi Province on July. 24, 2024. /Yonhap News

Residents of Ganghwa County, Incheon, near the North Korean border, have been enduring months of mysterious and disruptive noises from North Korea’s broadcasts, sparking growing frustration and health concerns in the affected communities.

“Even my seven-year-old granddaughter asked if she could write a letter to the president because the noise is so unbearable.”

On Sept. 12, Ahn Hyo-chul, a 67-year-old resident of Dangsan-ri, Songhae-myeon in Ganghwa County, Incheon, made this statement, expressing his frustration. “My grandchildren have said they want to leave Ganghwa Island because of the strange noises,” he added.

He continued, “Last night, I woke up around 11 p.m. and couldn’t fall back asleep until nearly 3 a.m. due to the bizarre sounds coming from North Korea’s broadcasts. Some neighbors have even started going to the hospital because of the stress.”

Residents of the Songhae-myeon area in Ganghwa County, which is near the North Korean border, have been suffering from mysterious noises coming from North Korea’s anti-South propaganda broadcasts. It’s been going on for three months now.

According to local authorities in Ganghwa County, since July, strange noises like rapid tapping, screeching metal sounds, and even siren-like noises have been heard in the northern parts of Songhae-myeon and Yangsa-myeon.

Residents believe these noises began after South Korea started its own loudspeaker broadcasts towards the North from speakers located in Yangsa-myeon. In response to North Korea’s use of balloons carrying waste material, the South Korean military began its broadcasts on July 21.

Residents reported that the strange North Korean broadcasts last for two to three hours at a time, followed by a 10-20 minute break, only to resume for another two to three hours. These broadcasts are relentless, day and night, and the sound becomes louder when the wind blows from the north.

Ahn noted, “In the past, we could hear North Korea’s broadcasts criticizing our government or playing songs, but this bizarre noise is new. Despite filing numerous complaints with the county office, nothing has changed.”

The areas most affected by the noise include Dangsan-ri, Sungnae-ri, Yango-ri, and Cheolsan-ri in Yangsa-myeon, with populations ranging from 250 to 400 people per village. Among these, Dangsan-ri is reportedly the hardest hit.

Jong In-seon, the head of Songhae-myeon, said, “We measured the noise levels using a sound meter app, and it reached as high as 80 decibels. Residents are complaining about the continuous noise, and we have reported the situation to the relevant authorities, asking them to come up with a solution.”

Shin In-kyun, head of the Korea Defense Network, commented, “This seems to be a countermeasure by North Korea in response to our broadcasts, aiming to create conflict and unrest in the South.”

On Sept. 12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, “Since late July, the North Korean military has been transmitting unidentified noise in response to our loudspeaker broadcasts,” but the South Korean government has yet to develop a concrete countermeasure.

North Korea

Kim Jong-un

17. Supreme Guard Command officer ousted after ghosting pregnant girlfriend

I guess nKPA soldiers are human too and do evil things just like people in free countries.

Supreme Guard Command officer ousted after ghosting pregnant girlfriend - Daily NK English

Military authorities sometimes dishonorably discharge personnel for sex scandals if they lead to complaints, a source told The Daily NK

By Eun Seol - September 13, 2024

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · September 13, 2024

Jonwi Street, which is located in northern Pyongyang. (Rodong Sinmin, News1)

An officer of the Supreme Guard Command in Pyongyang’s Samsok district was dishonorably discharged and forced to return to his hometown after his girlfriend filed a complaint against him. The officer had cut off contact with her after learning of her pregnancy, causing a scandal that led to his expulsion from the service early last month.

According to a source in South Pyongan province recently, the man, who is in his 30s, began a relationship with a woman in her 20s who lives in Pyongsong after a friend introduced them in early 2022.

Pyongyang’s Samsok district, where the Supreme Guard Command is based, and Pyongsong border each other, so the man was given leave every weekend to visit the woman.

Earlier this year, the woman learned that she was pregnant and immediately told the man. But he cut off all contact with her, even blocking her phone calls.

The woman’s angry parents visited the man’s base several times, but were unable to meet with him. Finally, the woman’s family complained to the political department of the military unit.

The unit’s political and cadre departments later decided to dishonorably discharge the man.

While military law does not make it explicit, military authorities sometimes dishonorably discharge personnel for sex scandals if they lead to complaints, the source said.

Dishonorable discharges make it difficult to become an upstanding member of society and hurt job placement.

“If you’ve served in the Supreme Guard Command, you usually have a good chance of being placed in a much better job than other people, but he lost that advantage because of his dishonorable discharge,” the source said.

With that in mind, North Koreans familiar with the incident find it odd that the man would ignore his pregnant girlfriend and even take the political hit.

Some people blasted the man for shirking his responsibility, saying that someone so evil should have suffered worse than simply being kicked out of the army, and that he should have been expelled from the ruling party and sent to a forced labor camp.

Meanwhile, the woman is faced with raising a child alone. While some find it hard to understand the woman’s refusal to give up the child, many encourage her choice, saying that nowadays “raising a child alone isn’t a mistake,” the source said.

The Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · September 13, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website