Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“It is foolish to be convinced without evidence, but it is equally foolish to refuse to be convinced by real evidence.“

– Upton Sinclair

"A memorandum is written not to inform the reader but to protect the writer."

– Dean Acheson

"If my doctor told me I had only six minutes to live, I wouldn't brood. I'd type a little faster."

– Isaac Asimov

1. China aggression renews question of whether Trump would defend Taiwan with US military

2. The US Is Not Built For War Or Peace

3. The devil you know is better than the one you don’t: Proponents still fail to detail benefits of Beijing-led order

4. What the West Got Wrong About Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Understanding Russian Unconventional Activities Will Determine Future Strategies and the Resilience of Europe

5. Analysis: As a parade of US allies rattled by Trump visit China, Beijing claims a win for its new world order

6. U.S. Army Quietly Stands Up Rotational Force in the Philippines

7. Ruptures in China’s Leadership Could Be Due to Paranoia and Power Plays

8. NATO’s Asia-Pacific Engagement Does Not Impress China

9. China’s Cheap Oil Strategy Is Becoming a Geopolitical Liability

10. Consolidation Is Not Flattening: Why the “Department of War” Needs a JSOC Model

11. Russia Resumes Strikes on Ukrainian Energy Sites

12. Opinion | Vladimir Putin Isn’t Winning in Ukraine

13. The Clash of Civilizations at 30: Huntington was right to highlight the West's civilizational achievement.

14. America’s Critical-Minerals Strategy Looks Increasingly Chinese

15. Hegemony and the Chinese Grand Strategy: Continuity in the CCP’s Political Lexicon

16.Engineering Options to Intercept “A House of Dynamite” Attack

17.

1. China aggression renews question of whether Trump would defend Taiwan with US military

Summary:

China’s latest blockade style rehearsals around Taiwan revived the oldest question in U.S. policy: would POTUS actually order U.S. forces into a fight. It contrasts tough rhetoric and record arms sales with strategic ambiguity, uneven signals from the White House, and a 2026 National Defense Strategy that stresses homeland and Western Hemisphere priorities while still framing China as the long term pacing threat. It also reviews the legal and policy scaffolding, like the Taiwan Relations Act, that supports arms and deterrence without a treaty guarantee.

Cronkite Fellowship News| The Latest

China aggression renews question of whether Trump would defend Taiwan with US military

by George Headley

02.03.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/03/china-aggression/

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense monitors People’s Liberation Army aircraft and naval activity operating near Taiwan’s airspace and surrounding waters as part of routine regional security tracking operations. Image credit: Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND/ROC) on X. The image was originally posted on December 29, 2025.

WASHINGTON – In a two-day operation in December, dozens of Chinese ships and aircraft surrounded Taiwan in what looked like a rehearsal for a blockade.

Taiwan’s military counted 90 aircraft sorties that crossed the center line of the Taiwan Strait on Dec. 29. Four amphibious assault ship formations were detected in international waters and 19 Chinese ships entered the island’s 24-mile buffer zone.

Small Wars Journal is pleased to introduce a new partnership with ASU’s Cronkite School of Journalism, launching the SWJ Cronkite Fellowship—a semester-long placement that embeds a Cronkite student journalist in Washington, DC to cover defense and national security with rigor and independence. Each term, the selected fellow reports from the center of U.S. policy debates, bringing on-the-ground journalism to the SWJ audience. Our inaugural fellow, George Headley, opens the program with a timely examination of Beijing’s escalating military pressure on Taiwan and the strategic uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy. This piece sets the standard for what the fellowship aims to deliver: serious reporting on consequential issues, minus the fluff and talking points.

The exercise continued the next day with more incursions by air and sea. Ten long-range rockets landed within 24 miles of the coast – the closest live projectiles China had ever fired, according to the Global Taiwan Institute.

“Justice Mission 2025” was one of China’s largest exercises ever around Taiwan, and the biggest since 2022, when it lashed out after Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the House, became the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit the self-governing island in 25 years.

The Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council called December’s exercise “provocative” and a threat to regional stability. The Chinese PLA Eastern Theater Command described the exercise as a success as it continues to “resolutely thwart the attempts of `Taiwan Independence’ separatists and external intervention.”

President Donald Trump downplayed the show of force. “They’ve been doing naval exercises for 20 years in that area,” he said at a White House news conference with Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.

What would Trump do in case of invasion or an actual blockade? Can Taiwan count on his backing in a crisis? His trade skirmishes with rivals like China and friends like Canada, on and off support for Ukraine, efforts to bully Denmark into selling Greenland, and antagonism towards NATO add to the uncertainty.

Two months before Justice Mission 2025, after a meeting with President Xi Jinping, Trump had issued a vague but firm threat in case China tried to take back Taiwan by force. “I can’t give away my secrets,” he said on CBS’s “60 Minutes.” “You’ll find out if it happens, and he understands the answer to that.”

Two previous presidents declared outright that they would use the U.S. military to defend Taiwan.

Trump has not, hewing instead to the longstanding U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity – trying to deter a forceful takeover of Taiwan while refraining from recognizing its independence or explicitly promising a U.S. military response in a crisis, either of which would provoke Beijing.

An updated National Defense Strategy published Jan. 23 by the Department of Defense makes no mention of Taiwan. While it still describes China as the biggest long-term threat to U.S. security, it identifies the Western Hemisphere, “narco-terrorists” and border security as the top current priorities.

“Trump is far too untraditional to be predictable, which makes predicting his actions – and therefore assessing his reliability with regards to defending Taiwan – especially difficult,” said J. Michael Cole, a senior non-resident fellow with the Global Taiwan Institute.

Trump has issued enough tough talk towards China to provide some reassurance to Taiwan. That includes some strong hints at a U.S. military response in case of invasion.

Xi “would be very unhappy if he did,” Trump told The New York Times in early January, shortly after the two-day exercise.

But he has remained vague enough to allow anxiety to persist in Taiwan and in Congress, where support for the island is widespread and bipartisan.

“I don’t know that you could easily predict what Trump’s reaction would be,” Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., a member of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, said in an interview.

Things Trump has said

Trump’s warnings in early January stand in contrast to uproars he caused shortly after winning the White House in 2016.

A month after his election, Trump spoke by phone with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen. Their 10-minute call was the first direct conversation between Taiwan’s leader and a U.S. president or president-elect since 1979, when President Jimmy Carter normalized relations with China.

China’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal complaint with the U.S. over the Trump-Tsai call, demanding the U.S. “avoid causing unnecessary interference to the overall China-U.S. relationship.”

Tsai’s office said she congratulated Trump on his election and they discussed security. There were no hints as to any commitments he may have made.

Vice President-elect Mike Pence downplayed the conversation as a “courtesy call,” as did Trump.

“Interesting how the U.S. sells Taiwan billions of dollars of military equipment but I should not accept a congratulatory call,” Trump posted on X.

The president-elect further stirred the pot two weeks later by suggesting that once he took office, he would use China’s insistence on a “one China” policy as leverage.

“I fully understand the ‘one China’ policy, but I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘one China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade,” Trump said on “Fox News Sunday.”

Outgoing President Barack Obama chastised Trump for comments that could push U.S.-China relations into “full conflict mode.”

“The idea of ‘One China’ is at the heart of their conception as a nation,” Obama said in a news conference a month before leaving office, “and so if you are going to upend this understanding, you have to have thought through what are the consequences.”

To Beijing, the “One China Principle” is non-negotiable. Nationalists fled to Taiwan after losing a civil war and took control in 1949. China sees Taiwan as a renegade province that it will eventually reabsorb.

The U.S. calls its own approach to the delicate issue the “One China Policy,” acknowledging the People’s Republic of China’s stance while also aiding Taiwan.

Days after taking office, after a call with Xi, Trump backtracked.

“President Trump agreed, at the request of President Xi, to honor our `one China’ policy,” the White House said.

It wasn’t the last time Trump would strain and then smooth out U.S.-China relations.

In 2018, Trump sparked a trade war, eventually pushing tariffs on Chinese imports to 21%. He turned to tariffs again in his second term. For about a month last spring, tariffs on Chinese goods hit 145%.

In the past year, the U.S. and China have also clashed over artificial intelligence, access to rare earths and semiconductors.

Although the U.S. condemned China’s massive military exercise in December, Trump’s own response didn’t sit well with Yuki Tatsumi, a senior director at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security, a think tank focused on curbing China’s regional hegemony.

“Those statements condemning Beijing’s behavior have mostly come out of the State Department or the Pentagon,” she said. “That is a bit concerning to me.”

Previous Presidents

The two presidents who overtly vowed to deploy the U.S. military if necessary were Joe Biden and George W. Bush.

Three months after taking office in 2001, Bush told ABC News the U.S. would do “whatever it takes” to ensure Taiwan’s security.

Biden pledged repeatedly and unequivocally that the U.S. would defend the island militarily.

In an August 2021 interview with ABC’s “This Week,” he likened the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan to the “sacred commitment” to mutual self-defense among the U.S. and its NATO allies – even though the U.S. has no such treaty with Taiwan.

Those statements, though, were more a departure than the norm. And aides to both presidents tried to walk back or soften their bluntness.

In June 2023, national security adviser Jake Sullivan deflected questions about Biden’s apparently ironclad pledge by insisting that “our policy hasn’t changed. … We do not support Taiwan independence. What we support is an effort to ensure that there are not unilateral changes to the status quo by Taiwan or by the PRC.”

That’s in line with strategic ambiguity – leaving open the possibility of U.S. military intervention while avoiding any formal alliance with Taiwan or explicit promise that would anger and provoke China.

“China always wanted us to declare that Taiwan was a province of China, and they wanted us to break our treaty agreement with Taiwan and stop all our military assistance,” Carter said in a guest lecture at Emory University in 2018. “I also insisted that we continue to provide defensive assistance to Taiwan and that the differences between China and Taiwan be resolved peacefully.”

His successor, President Ronald Reagan, maintained the policy of remaining vague on whether and how the U.S. would defend the island. He also resisted China’s demands to cut arms sales.

In a 1982 memo that was declassified in 2019, Reagan wrote: “The U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC differences.”

Formalities of U.S.-Taiwan relations

Under a 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. promised for decades to come to the island’s defense. Carter notified Taiwan in late 1978 that the U.S. was canceling the treaty effective at the end of 1979.

But other formal and informal U.S. policies offer security assurances, in particular the Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances and the Three Communiqués with China.

The Taiwan Relations Act: Congress approved the TRA three months after Carter normalized relations with China in early 1979. The law made it explicit that the U.S. was no longer obliged to defend the island but still pledged to “provide Taiwan with the arms of a defensive character,” and to continue to protect Taiwan through military and economic deterrence.

The TRA also codified the expectation that Taiwan’s future would be determined “by peaceful means” rather than force.

The Six Assurances: These are promises articulated by Reagan aides in congressional testimony and other public appearances in 1982: The U.S. will not mediate the dispute, pressure Taiwan to negotiate with China, halt arms sales, consult with Beijing about arms sales, take a position on China’s claim of sovereignty over the island, nor revise the TRA.
The Three Communiqués: In the first, signed in 1972, the U.S. acknowledged the Chinese position that there is only one nation of China and that Taiwan is part of it. The U.S. also agreed to withdraw its forces from Taiwan.

The second, signed in 1979, reflects a mutual commitment to avoid military conflict, and both agree not to seek hegemony in the region.

The third, signed in 1982, effectively sidestepped the unresolved issue of arms sales to allow the U.S. and China to focus on other issues.

Arms Sales and foreign assistance

Few presidents have sold more military equipment to Taiwan than Trump.

In his first term, the U.S. sold more than $18.7 billion of missiles, tanks, aircraft and other materiel to Taiwan.

That compares to about $8 billion worth under Biden and around $14 billion during Obama’s two terms.

Early in Trump’s second term, the U.S. sold Taiwan about $330 million in arms. In December, the administration announced an $11.1 billion deal – the largest U.S. arms sale to Taiwan ever, according to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

This package included missile systems, drones and helicopter parts.

Yet the backlog for arms sales continues to increase. The most recent package pushed the backlog to $32 billion in December, though once the sales are approved, deliveries could be swift, according to the Taiwan Security Monitor.

Trump paused $400 million in military aid to Taiwan during trade talks with China in September, despite commitments under the 2022 Taiwan Enhanced Relations Act. The law drastically increased such aid, up to $2 billion annually from 2023 to 2027.

In 2024, the U.S. provided $1.5 billion, according to federal data.

“In the past,” Cole said, the heightened pace of arms sales “could very well have frayed bilateral relations. Recognition that Taiwan needed a new defense posture, one that includes the ability to strike targets in China, has occurred gradually and silently.”

What Trump advisers say

Apart from Trump’s own statements and actions, statements from his top advisers also provide clues to how the U.S. might respond to a military threat to Taiwan.

As senators, both Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio were staunch critics of China.

During the 2024 campaign, Vance warned that the U.S. was effectively weakening Taiwan by shifting arms sales to Ukraine. He has kept a low profile on Taiwan since being sworn in as vice president.

In February 2025, Rubio told Fox News the U.S. needs to have the military capabilities to respond to a Chinese invasion but did not specify how he thinks the U.S. should or would respond besides honoring its “existing commitments.”

He gave a more forceful reassurance during trade talks with China in October.

“What people are worried about is we’re going to get some trade deal where we’re going to get favorable treatment on trade in exchange for walking away from Taiwan,” Rubio said. “No one is contemplating that.”

The National Defense Authorization Act signed into law in December directs the Pentagon to step up joint operations with Taiwan and to provide drone and anti-drone technology, and authorizes up to $1 billion for Taiwan’s defense.

Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called Justice Mission 2025 a wake-up call that justified accelerated arms sales to Taiwan.

“These increasingly complex short-notice rehearsals are designed to demonstrate the PLA’s ability to implement a blockade of Taiwan and allow the Communist Chinese Party to coerce Taipei,” he said in an X post.

At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in November, chair Sen. James Risch, R-Idaho, called China ”the greatest long-term threat to American interests” – a view that’s common among leading national security voices in both parties, though not necessarily official administration policy.

“We all know, for Xi Jinping, asserting China’s control over Taiwan is a legacy-defining issue,” Risch said. “His population is aging. His economy is faltering. China needs a victory, and Xi has set his sights on Taiwan. This is deeply troubling.”

Skepticism and Confidence in Trump amid recent international conflicts

A poll conducted in August from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that only 51% of the island’s residents are confident the U.S. would provide boots on the ground – and only 43% of Americans would support sending troops.

Just 41% of Taiwanese expect U.S. Navy intervention in case of a Chinese blockade, though 47% of Americans surveyed would support that.

One reason for doubts about Trump’s follow-through on formal commitments to Taiwan and other assurances is his history of setting aside alliances and treaty obligations.

Trump critics point to his berating of Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office last February and his inconsistent support for Ukraine’s war to repel the Russian invasion; his threats of trade wars with Mexico and Canada despite a North American trade deal; and his threats of force against Denmark – a NATO ally – over its refusal to turn over or sell Greenland.

Canada’s recent bilateral trade deal with China underscores the fear that Trump’s threats against U.S. allies have only strengthened China.

In the New York Times interview in early January, Trump asserted that only his “own morality” limits his foreign policy authority, regardless of international law.

“Trump’s responses to Ukraine and Greenland raise concerns about his administration’s fundamental view on U.S. commitment to its allies and partners,” Tatsumi said in a statement. “In particular, Trump’s approach to Greenland, threatening NATO allies, raises grave concern.”

Sando also sees Trump’s actions in Greenland as a problem because he has fractured trust with key U.S. allies.

“If Europe is less inclined to cooperate with Washington, the two sides may not be able to agree on a strategy for punishing China with economic means,” Sando said by email. “A lack of alignment will raise China’s incentive to invade, believing it will face fewer penalties.”

Tags: Indo-Pacific security, National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy, strategic ambiguity, U.S. foreign policy

About The Author

George Headley
George Headley is a student at Arizona State University's Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication. He is the Washington correspondent for Small Wars Journal, and he has worked with numerous media outlets, such as KJZZ, the Arizona State Press and the Howard Center for Investigative Journalism.

2. The US Is Not Built For War Or Peace

Summary:

This essay argues the United States confuses continuity with wartime resilience. A small blackout that stalled autonomous vehicles becomes a metaphor for how interdependent systems fail together, from cloud services to ports to munitions supply. The authors say “resilience” talk often means restoring services after shock, while real strategic resilience is regeneration speed: the ability to replace losses and surge production under pressure. Ukraine and pandemic shortages expose a defense plan built on lean inventories, offshore inputs, and thin skilled labor. A fair counterpoint is that markets innovate fast, but only if capacity exists to scale.

Comment: If time, not money, is the binding constraint, what is the measure of readiness? Who owns blame when “just in time” becomes “too late”?

Tomorrow our organization CAPS (https://apstrategy.org/) Is hosting the Potomac Service Dialogue which seeks to answer this question: Are we aligning strategy,

acquisition, and capital fast enough to deter the wars we hope never to fight?

Here is an excerpt from prepared remarks that is relevant to this essay:

The Asia-Indo-Pacific is not a future theater. It is the pacing challenge now. Distance is unforgiving. Logistics are decisive. Communications will be contested. Deterrence will fail if our forces cannot operate at scale, under pressure, and alongside allies from the first hour of crisis. For the U.S. Army, readiness in this theater is not abstract. It is measured in sustainment across oceans, command and control under fire, and formations that can survive long enough to fight and win.

This is why today matters. Army acquisition reform is not a bureaucratic exercise. It is operational and strategic. Faster pathways from concept to fielding are not about convenience. They are about relevance. In the Asia-Indo-Pacific, a system that arrives five years late may as well not arrive at all. The Army understands this.

But the Army cannot do this alone. One of the four lines of effort in the NDS is to “supercharge the defense industrial base.” American industry and business are not adjuncts to national defense. They are central to it. Every investor in this room, every founder, every engineer, is part of the deterrence equation. Capital allocation shapes timelines. Business models shape resilience. Software updates, supply chains, and manufacturing depth determine whether formations endure or fail in a protracted fight. In the Asia-Indo-Pacific, deterrence is built long before the first unit deploys.

The US Is Not Built For War Or Peace

substack.com · Feb 03, 2026

America’s Industrial Resilience Gap

Feb 03, 2026

https://behindthefront.substack.com/p/the-us-is-not-built-for-war-or-peace?isFreemail=

A minor power outage in San Francisco offered a quiet preview of a strategic vulnerability hiding in plain sight. As traffic signals went dark, dozens of autonomous Waymo vehicles stalled, unable to read the roadway. With hazard lights blinking, they gridlocked intersections and slowed large parts of the city to a crawl until tow trucks arrived.

That episode is a stark warning for military logistics. The same cascading failure that paralyzed civilian mobility could halt the movement of forces from fort to port. Friction emerges not from a single event, but from interdependent systems degrading in unison. Yet, American policymakers assume the industrial base is resilient, when it is actually brittle, optimized for just-in-time supply chains and just-enough capacity. When shocks hit (e.g., pandemics, wars, political instability, cyber incidents, or weaponized supply chains), Washington responds with emergency authorities and surge funding, confusing endurance with readiness. A system that merely limps through disruption is optimized for continuity, not crisis.

Over the past decade, resilience has meant restoring services after a shock. While this approach may prevent catastrophe, it does not prepare a country to compete, deter, or fight. The US economy has been engineered for peacetime efficiency and consumption, not sustained production under pressure.

Recent crises make this gap impossible to ignore. The war in Ukraine exposed how rapidly munitions deplete and how slowly industry regenerates. Pandemic-era shortages of everything from medical supplies to semiconductors exposed fragile dependencies across sectors. Digital infrastructure is just as vulnerable, as disruptions to cloud services can cascade into breakdowns of logistics and military command and control. The problem is not a lack of innovation or capital; it is the decay of the industrial ecosystem, which is responsible for translating economic strength into strategic power. Until that changes, American resilience will remain conceptual, not operational; credible on paper, but brittle under pressure.

In many Washington and Pentagon circles, “resilience” has become a comforting abstraction. Slap some “resilience” initiatives on a PowerPoint or tout it in a speech, and the resilience fairies will solve it. Resilience also appears in national strategy documents, appropriations bills, and executive orders as a catch-all solution to uncertainty. Infrastructure must be resilient. Infrastructure must be resilient. But when applied so broadly to infrastructure, supply chains, and the economy, the concept becomes diffuse and unaccountable. This rhetorical sleight of hand results in a policy focused on managing disruption rather than building the capacity to surge and scale.

Most resilience initiatives rightly prioritize continuity to prevent systemic collapse after a shock. Such efforts do matter because emergency authorities, continuity planning, and redundancy can buy time when systems are stressed. But while America can endure disruption, it has minimal capacity to regenerate what was lost. Endurance is not resilience.

Strategic resilience is more than just systems staying online; it also means how quickly they regenerate capability at scale. Regeneration speed (not uptime) is the key variable determining deterrence, endurance, and wartime effectiveness. Systems designed only for functionality may seem stable in peacetime, yet they fail decisively once losses outpace replacement. This flaw is clear in how the United States treats industrial capacity, assuming production will materialize on demand. But this market-driven assumption breaks down under stress, when supply chains seize and specialized inputs cannot be sourced.

The same problem appears across critical infrastructure. A Department of Energy report warns that “blackouts could increase 100 times in 2030” due to unreliable power sources. Systems lacking modularity and surge capacity perform reliably in peacetime, only to prove brittle under stress. The resilience debate must therefore shift from keeping systems operating to ensuring they can regenerate and scale. Without industrial depth, resilience is nothing more than a defensive posture; useful for avoiding collapse, but insufficient for competition or conflict.

The Defense-Industrial Disconnect

The costs of this resilience gap are no longer theoretical. They are visible in the disconnect between US defense planning and the industrial capacity to sustain it. American strategy assumes access to advanced systems and ample munitions, but those assumptions crumble against an industrial base built on lean inventories, globalized inputs, and minimal surge capacity.

The war in Ukraine made this mismatch obvious. Allied artillery supply fell short not from a lack of political willpower or money, but because industrial systems optimized for peacetime proved incapable of scaling at wartime speed. Even with funding, expanding US artillery production has taken years, constrained by shortages of energetic materials, equipment, and trained labor. The binding constraint was time, not money.

This exposes a deeper planning failure. Defense strategy implicitly treats industrial capacity as elastic, something to be summoned with increased demand. In reality, capacity is path-dependent, built over decades of investment in workforces, supplier networks, and tooling. When these foundations are whittled, surge capacity becomes an aspiration, not a capability.

Modern defense systems rely on specialized components from narrow, often overseas, supplier bases. This concentrates risk deep in the supply chain, far below the prime contractors visible to Pentagon oversight. A Government Accountability Office report noted the Department of Defense has limited visibility into these lower-tier suppliers, where single points of failure hide.

Treating these supply chains as market artifacts (not strategic infrastructure) has predictable results: Vulnerabilities are found only after disruption, and recovery takes years. This creates a dangerous asymmetry. The United States has exquisite military capabilities but lacks the industrial depth to regenerate them in a prolonged conflict, turning a technical edge into a strategic liability.

How Efficiency Ate Resilience

During the post-Cold War era, the US industrial system was optimized for peacetime efficiency, not great-power competition. As geopolitical risk receded, economic policy rewarded globalization and cost minimization. The resulting industrial base was not dismantled by neglect; its efficient design was a natural peace dividend.

Over time, efficiency became synonymous with strength. “Just in time” replaced “just in case,” while redundancy and domestic overcapacity (once a strategic hedge), were treated as waste. These choices generated economic gains by externalizing risk. Markets performed as intended, allocating capital for cost and speed, not strategic sufficiency. Because supply chains were optimized for price, resilience became someone else’s future problem, and the slack required for surging was eliminated.

Washington’s policy responses reflect this misalignment. When fragility is exposed, the instinct is to compensate with stockpiles, emergency authorities, and targeted subsidies. These actions may blunt immediate shocks, but they cannot rebuild regenerative capacity. Stockpiles are static and subsidies episodic—neither creates an industrial system designed to surge.

A deeper erosion occurred in the economy’s least visible layers. For decades, industrial capacity thinned not just at the prime-contractor level, but in the “boring” foundations of production: machine tooling, foundries, and skilled trades. Such losses are difficult to reverse, reflecting cumulative decisions about workforce pipelines, supplier locales, and capital investment. In offshoring factories, the United States also offshored the very industrial ecosystem that enables production to surge and adapt. Emergency measures became a substitute for industrial design, leaving resilience a mere slogan.

The Missing Middle: Ecosystems, Not Stockpiles

Resilience policy fails when it treats the economy, infrastructure, and defense production as separate domains. The missing link is the industrial ecosystem: A web of suppliers, logistics, and labor that determines if production can surge under stress. This is where resilience and readiness converge. The ability to replace a transformer or scale munitions output depends less on emergency authorities, and more on mobilizing materials and skilled labor at the speed of relevance. Without this industrial ecosystem focus, resilience remains conceptual and readiness aspirational.

The Department of Defense also has a “missing middle” —only 6 percent of suppliers have complete visibility over their own supply chains. These opaque, lower-tier suppliers provide the materials and components essential for production. When these hidden nodes fail, production basically stops abruptly.

Such opacity creates a false sense of security. Resilience measured at the prime-contractor level masks the brittleness of the underlying ecosystem where disruption actually originates. The Waymo outage illustrates this logic of cascading failure in miniature. A simple power outage disrupted the vehicles’ sensors; this sensing disruption stalled their autonomous decision-making, translating digital caution into physical immobility. Crucially, no single component failed catastrophically. Instead, the whole system simply ceased to function. Scaled to the national level, a similar cascading failure would obstruct force flow, military mobilization and cripple US power projection in a crisis.

Achieving ecosystem resilience requires a new analytical posture. Planners must ask not if individual firms can survive, but if the system can regenerate capability faster than it degrades. This demands forward-looking industrial intelligence to map dependencies and identify chokepoints before they fail. Without this shift, resilience efforts remain purely rhetorical.

A Strategy That Produces: Forging Industrial Resilience

Treating supply chains as critical infrastructure is a necessary first step, but recognition alone produces no strategic effect. Governance reforms and mapping exercises are insufficient if resilience remains a matter of oversight, not productive capacity. Resilience that cannot generate output under pressure does not deter; it merely absorbs.

A durable US resilience strategy therefore requires alignment across three domains that remain institutionally and conceptually fragmented: national security planning, industrial policy, and infrastructure governance. Absent that alignment, the United States will continue to manage risk episodically rather than shape capability deliberately.

First, defense-relevant industrial capacity must be treated as strategic infrastructure, not as a peripheral economic concern. This does not imply nationalization or permanent subsidies. It requires identifying and prioritizing bottlenecks the way the federal government already does for ports, rail corridors, pipelines, and air traffic control. What matters most is assured access and scalability.

Second, resilience must be measured by surge capacity and regeneration time, not just continuity. Time, not funding, is the binding constraint. If it takes years to replace systems or rebuild critical components, then strategic resilience is a fiction, even if basic services remain online. For instance, much of the modern American economy and military is increasingly dependent on the physical infrastructure that underpins digital infrastructure (i.e., data servers), and yet the process of actually building a server farm can take three to six years due to the high demands for minerals, electricity, and specialized metals and chips.

Third, visibility must extend below prime contractors to the weakest links in the supply chain. Insights from supply chain risk analyses show that the system is only as resilient as its weakest supplier. Reverse engineering supply chains without holistic, real-time data does not solve this. There needs to be forward-looking industrial intelligence that identifies chokepoints before they fail. Techniques like reverse stress testing could be helpful in moving defense-industrial base solutions left-of-boom. What is required instead is forward-looking industrial intelligence that identifies chokepoints before disruption occurs.

Finally, stop pretending that emergency tools like the Defense Production Act are substitutes for industrial design. These can accelerate output at the margins, but they cannot conjure missing capacity, skilled labor, or supplier density on demand. Surge mechanisms work only when something exists to surge. Without a deliberately structured ecosystem beneath them, emergency powers become reactive stopgaps rather than strategic instruments.

The United States does not lack plans or ingenuity; it lacks production systems designed for sustained competition under stress. Until resilience policy is anchored in industrial ecosystems that can regenerate capability at scale and speed, Washington will continue to confuse continuity with readiness, improvisation with resilience, and emergency response with strategic power.

Jesse R. Humpal, Ph.D ., (@JesseHumpal) is an active-duty US Air Force officer whose work focuses on the policy implications of national security spending, with an emphasis on critical infrastructure resilience.

Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek, Ph.D., (@JaharaMatisek) is a US Air Force command pilot and nonresident research fellow at the US Naval War College and Payne Institute for Public Policy. He is a visiting scholar at Northwestern University and has published over 150 articles on national defense issues.

The views expressed are their own.

substack.com · Feb 03, 2026

3. The devil you know is better than the one you don’t: Proponents still fail to detail benefits of Beijing-led order

Summary:

The essay argues that critics of the U.S. alliance have not shown how a Beijing-led regional order would protect Australia’s sovereignty, security, or long-term prosperity. It traces how U.S. power underwrote deterrence and autonomy, while China delivered economic growth at the cost of leverage and vulnerability. The core claim is blunt. Discomfort with Washington, even under POTUS, does not equal a viable alternative strategy. Economic interdependence without credible security guarantees risks dependence, not autonomy, in the Asia-Indo-Pacific. The devil Australia knows has rules, constraints, and counterweights. The alternative remains undefined.

Comment: But I think we know the devil in the Asia-Indo-Pacific: (once I against I provide my assessment) China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan).

The devil you know is better than the one you don’t: Proponents still fail to detail benefits of Beijing-led order

Geopolitics & Policy

04 February 2026

By: Stephen Kuper

https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/geopolitics-and-policy/17606-the-devil-you-know-is-better-than-the-one-you-dont-proponents-still-fail-to-detail-benefits-of-beijing-led-order?utm

As the United States continues to emphasise locking down the western hemisphere, Beijing continues to expand its reach across the Indo-Pacific, with some claiming a Chinese-led region is preferable to a pseudo-imperial US-led order, but what does that look like?

Since the end of the Second World War, Australia’s economic, political and strategic outlook has been shaped above all by two external relationships: its longstanding alliance with the United States and its increasingly consequential and complex relationship with the People’s Republic of China.

Together, these relationships have underpinned Australia’s prosperity and security while also generating the central strategic tensions confronting the country today.

The Australia–United States relationship emerged directly from the experience of the Pacific War. The fall of Singapore and Britain’s inability to defend Australia decisively ended any lingering reliance on the United Kingdom as Australia’s principal security guarantor.

In its place, Australia turned to the United States, a shift formalised in the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. Throughout the Cold War, this alliance was reinforced by shared democratic values, deepening intelligence cooperation, and Australia’s participation alongside the US in major conflicts, including Korea and Vietnam.

Politically, the alliance became a bipartisan pillar of Australian foreign policy, while strategically, it embedded Australia within a US-led regional and global order.

Economically, the US has long been a major investor in Australia and a critical source of technology, capital and innovation. Although never Australia’s largest trading partner in pure volume terms, the United States has exerted outsized influence through foreign direct investment, financial markets, defence industry integration and education.

In the post-Cold War era, the alliance broadened further, encompassing joint military operations in the Middle East, expanded intelligence sharing, and deep cooperation in space, cyber and advanced defence technologies. The alliance remains central to Australia’s strategic planning and deterrence posture.

By contrast, Australia’s relationship with China followed a very different trajectory. For the first decades after 1949, relations were distant and often adversarial, shaped by the Cold War, Australia’s alignment with the US, and China’s revolutionary politics.

Diplomatic recognition in 1972 marked a turning point, but it was the economic reforms launched under Deng Xiaoping from the late 1970s that fundamentally transformed the relationship.

Over the following four decades, China became Australia’s largest trading partner, driving unprecedented growth through demand for iron ore, coal, gas and other commodities, and later through education, tourism and services.

This economic interdependence delivered immense benefits to Australia, helping to sustain growth through the Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis.

However, it also created new vulnerabilities. As China’s economic weight translated into growing political and strategic influence, differences in political systems, values and regional ambitions became more pronounced.

In recent years, bilateral relations have been strained by disputes over foreign interference, trade coercion, human rights, technology and regional security, even as trade volumes have remained substantial.

Contemporary Australia now faces the challenge of navigating between its principal security partner and its largest economic partner at a time of intensifying great-power competition.

Maintaining national sovereignty, economic resilience and strategic autonomy while remaining deeply integrated into global markets and alliance structures is no longer a theoretical question, but a practical and pressing policy dilemma.

How Australia manages these competing pressures will shape its prosperity, security and international role for decades to come.

Enter the critics of Australia’s longstanding relationship with the United States and their increasingly vocal criticism of the United States, particularly under Donald Trump, amid claims of pseudo-imperialism. Conversely, these same critics advocate and argue that Australia would benefit far more from a region dominated by Beijing than under the existing order that has served us well for nearly a century.

Highlighting this growing chorus of voices is Andrew Forrest, a former policy adviser on China in the international division of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, writing for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in a piece titled Critics of US need to explain Australia’s place in a China-dominated region, in which he articulated the evidence (or lack thereof) for claims of a better outcome for Australia.

To understand why Forrest’s argument resonates with many policymakers and why critics see it differently, we need to unpack the assumptions and stakes embedded in this argument.

Walking a tightrope – balancing giants

First and foremost, it is important to understand and accept that one central question sits at the heart of Australia’s foreign policy tension in 2026: how to balance security imperatives anchored in the US alliance with economic realities tied to China, the world’s second-largest economy and Australia’s largest trading partner.

Forrest’s piece begins with a challenge: he claims he cannot envision “a flourishing future for Australia in a region dominated by China (and without a US presence)”.

He suggests that many proponents of disengagement from the US alliance fail to articulate such a vision in clear, long-term terms.

This frames the debate around sovereignty and strategic agency. Forrest warns that Australia risks losing both if it finds itself in a region where Chinese power is unchallenged and the United States, Australia’s principal security partner since 1951 – withdraws or recedes. Implicitly, here are two linked assumptions:

That China seeks to remove or diminish US influence in Asia as a strategic objective.
That a region shaped by Chinese primacy would inevitably be less hospitable to Australian sovereignty and independent decision making.

These assumptions reflect a broadly realist view of geopolitics: major powers pursue material advantage and influence and smaller states must anchor themselves where their security is best assured.

In this view, China’s economic rise is not merely a market phenomenon but a strategic shift with implications for regional balance and national autonomy. For critics of this line of thinking which are found across academia, media and parts of the strategic community, the assumptions warrant interrogation. They argue that:

US reliability as a security guarantor is no longer certain: With periodic gyrations in Washington’s domestic politics, scepticism about US commitments has grown among some Australian commentators. Polling data shows Australians are divided on deepening ties with China, with significant minorities open to closer economic engagement, even as defence ties with the US remain valued.
Being too closely aligned with the US may drag Australia into conflicts not of its choosing: Some scholars and former officials have argued that Canberra could be pulled into a US–China confrontation, particularly over Taiwan, because of alliance obligations. While Forrest acknowledges this as a concern, he insists that the right response is not decoupling from the US but deepening strategic thinking about long-term structural challenges.

This dispute is not just about policy preferences but how each camp interprets the trajectory of great-power competition and the likely behaviour of the United States and China over coming decades.

Confronting our ’new’ strategic reality

The Australia–US alliance, formalised in the ANZUS Treaty, has been the bedrock of Canberra’s defence strategy for 75 years.

It binds Australia to coordinated security cooperation with the United States and through arrangements such as Five Eyes intelligence sharing embeds Canberra in a broader Western security architecture. This alliance has shaped Australian strategic culture and defence planning through multiple eras of shifting geopolitics.

In recent years, this has translated into cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, expansion of joint military exercises, integrated force posture arrangements, and deeper defence industrial ties such as AUKUS, the pact with the US and UK that will see Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines.

While AUKUS is designed to boost regional deterrence, it also accentuates Australia’s dependence on US technologies and strategic guarantees.

For proponents of the alliance, its value lies in deterrence against coercive revisionism, particularly by an assertive China. Forrest’s article takes this as a given: without US power as a balancing force, he argues, the structural pressures of China’s rise would work against Australian sovereignty.

Meanwhile, at the same time, China’s rise has reshaped Australia’s economic landscape. China is Australia’s largest trading partner by value and this trade underpinning has served as a critical engine of growth for commodities, education and tourism sectors. That economic reality is why Canberra continues to pursue stable relations with Beijing even as strategic tensions rise.

Yet as experts have emphasised, economic ties coexist uneasily with geopolitical friction. Chinese military modernisation, expanding naval capabilities and coercive conduct in the South China Sea have alarmed Western partners and regional states alike.

Australia’s engagement in freedom of navigation operations alongside allies and deeper ties with regional frameworks like the Quad reflect these strategic concerns.

Australia’s policymaking thus faces a dual imperative: safeguard economic interests tied to China while maintaining strategic linkages that deter coercion, a balancing act that Forrest suggests is better anchored in alliance with the United States.

The counter argument

Many argue that Canberra should cultivate greater strategic autonomy by diversifying partnerships and developing independent defence capabilities that do not rely excessively on a single great power.

Some propose strengthening ties with regional powers such as Japan, India and ASEAN states to form a broader balance of influence that dilutes the risk of unilateral dominance by either Washington or Beijing.

This view aligns with academic research portraying Australia as a “balancer” in a multipolar Asia rather than a straightforward client of US strategy.

Others, including strategic realist voices like Professor Hugh White, have questioned whether Australia’s deep investment in AUKUS and reliance on US security guarantees actually enhances, rather than undermines, long-term autonomy.

White’s work, which has drawn both criticism and praise, suggests that Australia’s foreign policy establishment has yet to fully reckon with the structural transformation of the international order and what that means for middle powers.

There is also a domestic dimension to this debate. Polling data from the 2025 federal election campaign referenced by the ABC showed that Australians were split on whether ties with China should deepen, with around a third supporting closer engagement and a similar proportion opposed. Meanwhile, votes on defence spending signalled broad backing for increased military capability.

This suggests a public that is neither wholly comfortable with pivoting away from the US nor eager to decouple from China, reflecting broader anxieties about economic stability, security risk and national identity in a contested regional order.

Our core question – security v strategic choice

Forrest’s critique centres on one uncomfortable question for some analysts: Can Australia genuinely envision a future in which China’s primacy shapes the regional order and Canberra remains both prosperous and sovereign without deep ties to the United States?

If so, what are the institutional, military and diplomatic strategies that would underpin such a future?

His article insists that critics of the alliance must go beyond rhetoric about neutrality or middle power status and offer detailed answers to these questions.

To simply argue against the status quo without delineating a viable alternative, he suggests, is insufficient given the magnitude of the strategic shifts under way.

This is a fundamentally analytical challenge: articulating a strategic vision for Australia that accounts for economic interdependence, geopolitical competition and the inherent uncertainty of great-power relations.

It requires not just normative assertions about autonomy or balance but credible assessments of military capability, alliance reliability, regional perceptions and the economic levers that shape national power.

Final thoughts

Australia’s place in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific remains contested terrain. Forrest’s analysis, simple in its rhetorical device but profound in implication highlights a core dilemma: as China’s influence grows and the United States recalibrates its global posture, what strategic architecture best preserves Australia’s security and prosperity?

At one level, this is a debate about the value and future of alliance. At another, it is about how Australia perceives its own agency as a sovereign middle power in an era of great-power competition.

Resolving this tension will require more than slogans; it demands sustained intellectual effort, transparent policy choices and a willingness to articulate the often uncomfortable trade-offs inherent in any grand strategy.

Australia’s leaders may not agree on every aspect of this debate, but the underlying questions about sovereignty, alignment, deterrence and economic integration will define the country’s foreign policy priorities for decades.

As Forrest and others have underscored, what Canberra decides now will shape not just diplomatic posture but the very contours of national security and identity in a contested regional order.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at Stephen.kuper@momentummedia.com.au or at editor@defenceconnect.com.au.

4. What the West Got Wrong About Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Understanding Russian Unconventional Activities Will Determine Future Strategies and the Resilience of Europe

Summary:

Russia’s non-military operations in Europe have risen alongside its full-scale war in Ukraine, mixing espionage, disinformation, cyberattacks, sabotage, and deniable proxies. Western analysis often frames this as “hybrid warfare” in Frank Hoffman’s sense, but the authors argue Moscow’s conceptual baseline is different. Russia’s tradition of “active measures” and its concept of “Gibridnaya Vonya” emphasize subversion that erodes legitimacy, culture, values, and stability while avoiding open battle, using covert political, information, and economic tools. Since 2022, Russian services have coordinated these methods more tightly, yet effects on Ukraine’s war outcome and Europe’s policy have been limited. Still, interference likely persists after any ceasefire.

Excerpts:

The Conceptual Rediscovery of Unconventional Warfare

During the Cold War the Soviet Union used “active measures” to pursue its political objectives: covert operations involving everything from disinformation and propaganda to agents of influence, subversion and sabotage, even kidnapping and assassinations. These actions, which coincided with an uptick in internal conflict across the globe, compelled Western strategists to grapple with the blurring of lines between military and civilian entities. Eventually, strategic theorist and defense analyst Frank Hoffman coined the term ‘hybrid warfare’, arguing that nations, not just rebel or terrorist groups, can combine irregular tactics and covert operations to achieve their goals both on and off the battlefield. While not the first to do so, Hoffman conceptually linked unconventional means with conventional practices of warfare in a way that came to dominate Western security conversations. This was especially the case during the War on Terror, when Hoffman’s model seemed to address the fluidity and interweaving of warfighting techniques that characterized political conflict the modern era. Consequently, this framework has been used to contextualize and interrogate Russia’s behavior towards the West with little consideration for Moscow’s own understanding of what can be achieved through covert measures below the threshold of war.

...

Despite these adjustments of theory and practice, however, their impact on Russia’s war objectives in Ukraine remains modest. Ukrainian cultural identity as an independent nation is stronger than ever, both at home and internationally. In most other European states, too, Russia’s covert operations have failed to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Neither has it succeeded in mobilizing effective favorable political movements, nor in orchestrating significant unrest or even achieving political control in public discourse through digital disinformation campaigns. Nevertheless, Moscow’s means of interference continue to generate significant political uncertainty in Western societies.

The Kremlin has demonstrated a high degree of flexibility in its conceptual and practical approach to warfare. This in turn means that even in the event of achieving a ceasefire or indeed a peace agreement, one cannot necessarily expect an end to interventions or interference through covert means. A return by Russia to the tried and tested practices of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ is equally likely. The extent to which Russia will be able to revert to this practice depends on the sensitivity and resilience of Europe and North America on the one hand, but also on the future design of relations between Russia and the West on the other.

After all, it was a reflection of weak relations with the West that Russia expanded its practice of ‘active measures’, deployed ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ as a counterstrategy to Western foreign policy, and ultimately adopted and aggressively implemented our own concept of ‘hybrid warfare’.

Comment. Russian New Generation Warfare. Non-Linear Warfare. "Little Green Men." "Gibridnaya Vonya." How is this concept evolving and what comes next?

What the West Got Wrong About Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Understanding Russian Unconventional Activities Will Determine Future Strategies and the Resilience of Europe - PRIF BLOG

· Sascha Hach, Austin Wright · February 3, 2026

https://blog.prif.org/2026/02/03/what-the-west-got-wrong-about-russian-hybrid-warfare-understanding-russian-unconventional-activities-will-determine-future-strategies-and-the-resilience-of-europe/

Alongside Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, non-military operations across Europe have also been on the rise, blending methods of espionage, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks and sabotage with other unconventional means of attack. These events have given new impetus to analyses on how to address the issue of ‘hybrid warfare’. The ongoing negotiations on a ceasefire and an end to the war have also raised the question of how Moscow’s employment of hybrid warfare can be curbed, or whether we must prepare for it to continue even after the fighting ends. In this context, it is important to understand the evolution of Russia’s unconventional methods of international interference and the conceptual reasoning behind them.

The Conceptual Rediscovery of Unconventional Warfare

During the Cold War the Soviet Union used “active measures” to pursue its political objectives: covert operations involving everything from disinformation and propaganda to agents of influence, subversion and sabotage, even kidnapping and assassinations. These actions, which coincided with an uptick in internal conflict across the globe, compelled Western strategists to grapple with the blurring of lines between military and civilian entities. Eventually, strategic theorist and defense analyst Frank Hoffman coined the term ‘hybrid warfare’, arguing that nations, not just rebel or terrorist groups, can combine irregular tactics and covert operations to achieve their goals both on and off the battlefield. While not the first to do so, Hoffman conceptually linked unconventional means with conventional practices of warfare in a way that came to dominate Western security conversations. This was especially the case during the War on Terror, when Hoffman’s model seemed to address the fluidity and interweaving of warfighting techniques that characterized political conflict the modern era. Consequently, this framework has been used to contextualize and interrogate Russia’s behavior towards the West with little consideration for Moscow’s own understanding of what can be achieved through covert measures below the threshold of war.

As the Rapprochement Ended, Covert Actions Resumed

Following several years of cordial relations, Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 signaled an end to the fragile friendship between Russia and the West. He expressed disappointment in the unfulfilled hopes of rapprochement, criticizing the US-dominated unipolar world order, NATO’s eastward expansion, the neglect of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and Washington’s excessive use of military force. This dynamic further deteriorated when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. Having fallen far behind technologically and militarily, Russia lashed out, relying increasingly on unorthodox means of warfare. In addition to deploying troops and occupying South Ossetia, the Kremlin cooperated with separatists and continued to recognize the autonomy of Abkhazia to further destabilize Georgia. This tried-and-tested practice was revived in 2014, when unmarked Russian forces partnered with local militias to seize the Crimean Peninsula and subsequently annex the territory from Ukraine. Around this time, Russia also began using extensive cyber operations to meddle in the infrastructure and affairs other European nations. One of the most prominent examples was a a series of cyber-attacks on Estonian authorities and organizations in 2007, which included the parliament, banks, ministries, and media. When a cyber-attack struck the German Parliament in 2015, the European Union attributed it to Russian state-sponsored actors. In 2017, concentrated information campaigns attempted to discredit the Armenian elections.

Intensification in the Context of the War against Ukraine

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, these unconventional means of warfare have become increasingly coordinated by the Russian state, which has historically relied heavily on decentralized covert operations and deniable proxy actors to undermine the political stability of other nations. From espionage and offensive cyber operations to disinformation and sabotage of transport and energy infrastructure, campaigns are now coordinated between the GRU military intelligence service, the SVR civilian foreign intelligence service, and the FSB domestic security service. Particularly sensitive attacks are authorized by the National Security Council of the Russian Federation. This coordination has come to highlight the centrality of these methods to Russian foreign policy objectives.

However, despite the intensification, the feared paralysis of Ukraine’s digital, energy, and transport infrastructure by means of cyber operations did not materialize, while disinformation campaigns and acts of sabotage in Europe have had no significant impact on the course of the war or European foreign policy. These results have led Russia to employ even more unorthodox methods. After hundreds of Russian intelligence agents with diplomatic passports were expelled from European countries, Moscow increasingly resorted to cheap and untrained “disposable agents”, many of whom were quickly exposed and convicted. Drones presumed to be controlled by Russia circled over European air bases and industrial zones. Submarine cables and pipelines in the Baltic Sea were repeatedly damaged by Chinese cargo ships with Russian crews. Yet even as Russia’s traditional avenues for subversion were counteracted they continued to harass their Western adversaries, probing for weaknesses and points of friction. However, what Western strategists have often categorized as a nuisance is a foundational element of Russian strategic thinking.

Russian Understanding of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’

From the Russian perspective, the essence of war in the modern era is being redefined. General Makhmut Gareev, the former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has made it clear that Russia does not see modern conflict in the way put forth by Hoffman. Even outside of the conventional battlefield, Gareev sees the utilization of subversive actions and the creation of controlled chaos—as was done in Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine before—as the central method of violating states’ internal stability and the essential modus operandi of war today. This interpretation of war carries over into the Russian understanding of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’, which differs significantly from Western ‘hybrid warfare’ in both meaning and execution.

In the eyes of Western strategists, ‘hybrid warfare’ reflects the complexity of integrated warfare in the 21st century, where conventional and unconventional methods are combined and centrally coordinated to achieve the objectives of war. ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’, by contrast, focuses on ways political actors can undermine their adversaries by eroding domestic and international political legitimacy and stability without resorting to conventional means of fighting. This term is closer to the notion of subversion rather than ‘hybrid warfare’ as defined by the West.

Russian strategists emphasize two elements of modern conflict. First, the goal of breaking a nation by eroding its culture, values, and self-esteem. Second, the employment of covert political, information, and economic instruments, rather than overt military force. While interpretations within Russia vary, proponents of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ take care to separate the term from its Western counterpart. Some argue that, unlike hybrid warfare, ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ aims to avoid the battlefield entirely and destroy the adversary via a hybrid of ideological, informational, financial, political, and economic methods that dismantle the socio-cultural fabric. Others see information warfare as the core of the term, noting that intensive informational subversion is a central and long-standing instrument of Russian state power.

Differences and Convergence with Western Thinking

This understanding was particularly shaped by Moscow’s perception of Western non-military influence, which was often labeled as ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ by Russian elites. In response to the sanctions imposed after Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov publicly alleged that Russia faces continuous, large-scale information warfare and that Western sanctions would aim to destroy the economy, raise popular protests, and ultimately result in regime change. Putin employed similar rhetoric in 2021,when stating that unlawful street protests and open propaganda—such as hostility in social networks—were all part of Western efforts to strike a blow at Russia’s constitutional base.

So-called “color revolutions”, inspired by the Arab Spring, were framed as being provoked by the West, while similar claims were made regarding mass protests during the 2012 Russian presidential election. Public criticism from Western governments against the repressive measures of Russian authorities encouraged Putin to voice his belief that foreign involvement prompted the unrest. This suspicion was seemingly confirmed by linking Russian opposition leaders to the 2004 Ukrainian Orange Revolution. Similar assumptions suggested that Ukrainian NGOs organized EU- and US-funded seminars with Russian youth groups, with the goal of destabilizing Russia. Ukraine’s pivotal Euromaidan protests and the fall of former President Yanukovych increased the regime’s fear of Western ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’. In 2014, Lavrov accused the United States of trying to defeat Russia through these unconventional actions and to provoke regime change to suit Washington’s interests. These accusations were repeated throughout the course of the full-scale war against Ukraine, especially in relation to Western economic sanctions against Moscow and military support for Kyiv. In turn, this framing served to reframe Russia’s imperialist invasion as a strategic conflict with the West.

Observing the development of the concept and practice of ‘hybrid warfare’ versus ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ since the 2000s, striking differences and convergences become apparent. While the American conceptual understanding always merged conventional and unconventional activities, the Russian concept seemed to keep the two separate in order to identify and condemn Western non-military influence. Consequently, the Kremlin increasingly adopted a mirroring strategy in practice and engaged in a range of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ activities without translating them directly into open military confrontation. This changed for the first time, but only temporarily, with Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008, and again when invading Crimea in 2014. Since the full-scale invasion in 2022, we have seen a complete convergence of Russian practice in terms of coordinated ‘hybrid warfare’ in the Western sense. Of course, there are differences on the battlefield, yet Russia’s military aggression and non-military interventions are carried out in an integrated manner in Ukraine. Further, Russia has expanded its non-military measures against Europe and is currently testing the limits of this approach.

Limited Effectiveness, but Likely Continued Use

Despite these adjustments of theory and practice, however, their impact on Russia’s war objectives in Ukraine remains modest. Ukrainian cultural identity as an independent nation is stronger than ever, both at home and internationally. In most other European states, too, Russia’s covert operations have failed to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Neither has it succeeded in mobilizing effective favorable political movements, nor in orchestrating significant unrest or even achieving political control in public discourse through digital disinformation campaigns. Nevertheless, Moscow’s means of interference continue to generate significant political uncertainty in Western societies.

The Kremlin has demonstrated a high degree of flexibility in its conceptual and practical approach to warfare. This in turn means that even in the event of achieving a ceasefire or indeed a peace agreement, one cannot necessarily expect an end to interventions or interference through covert means. A return by Russia to the tried and tested practices of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ is equally likely. The extent to which Russia will be able to revert to this practice depends on the sensitivity and resilience of Europe and North America on the one hand, but also on the future design of relations between Russia and the West on the other.

After all, it was a reflection of weak relations with the West that Russia expanded its practice of ‘active measures’, deployed ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’ as a counterstrategy to Western foreign policy, and ultimately adopted and aggressively implemented our own concept of ‘hybrid warfare’.

Autor*in(nen)

Sascha Hach

Dr. Sascha Hach ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am PRIF und arbeitet zu Europäischer Sicherheit, Rüstungskontrolle und Vereinte Nationen. Er ist Teil der Forschungsgruppe „PATTERN“ sowie der „Arms Control Negotioation Academy (ACONA)“. // Dr. Sascha Hach is a Researcher at PRIF and his interests include European Security, arms control and the United Nations. He is part of the research group “PATTERN” and the “Arms Control Negotiation Academy (ACONA)”.

Austin Wright

Austin Wright is a Deputy Director and Policy Advisor, Deputy Administrator’s Action Group for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Programs. In his role, Austin leverages his substantial international experience and technical knowledge to coordinate all activities across weapons activities and alignment of strategic messaging, as well as advise leadership and provide recommendations on nuclear security policies proposed by the National Security Council. Previously, Austin supported the Nuclear Weapons Council, coordinated strategic messaging for the newly announced B61-13 gravity bomb, and aided in the development of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. Austin earned his MA in International Security from the Institut d’études politiques de Paris (SciencesPo), and his MSc in International Political Economy from the London School of Economics in 2019.

blog.prif.org · Sascha Hach, Austin Wright · February 3, 2026

5.Analysis: As a parade of US allies rattled by Trump visit China, Beijing claims a win for its new world order

Summary:

The article argues that POTUS’ volatile approach to allies is opening space for Beijing. A stream of Western leaders has gone to see Xi Jinping to reset ties or deepen cooperation, including leaders from the United Kingdom, Canada, Finland, France, and soon Germany. Beijing reads this as proof that talk of decoupling is fading and that China can pose as the steadier partner. Europe still mistrusts China on security, trade, and human rights, and keeps tightening safeguards, but Beijing sees real gains in tech, trade, and influence as the US-led order looks weaker.

Comment: If allies hedge toward Beijing while insisting security comes first, what concrete thresholds would force them to trade market access for strategic risk?

If Beijing frames this moment as “inevitable,” what leverage does it seek most: high-tech dominance, trade terms, or political legitimacy?

If Europe drifts even slightly, how does that reshape deterrence and alliance cohesion in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, where China also tests limits?

Analysis: As a parade of US allies rattled by Trump visit China, Beijing claims a win for its new world order | CNN

CNN · Simone McCarthy · February 3, 2026

https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/02/china/china-us-europe-allies-analysis-hnk-intl

As US President Donald Trump takes a sledgehammer to longstanding alliances with a volatile foreign policy that’s included threats to take control of Greenland and a spiraling feud with Canada, he’s also creating a significant opening for China.

Look no further than the revolving door of Western leaders hosted by Xi Jinping in recent weeks aiming to reset relations or deepen cooperation with the world’s second-largest economy.

That procession includes the leaders of some of the US’ closest traditional allies: Britain’s Keir Starmer and Canada’s Mark Carney last month, as well as NATO ally Finland’s Petteri Orpo. French President Emmanuel Macron made a visit in December, while German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is expected soon.

Viewed from Beijing, that list is a powerful sign that an era of talking about economic separation from China is waning, and Western leaders are finally seeing China as a reliable partner – in contrast to the US under President Donald Trump.

Visiting leaders have praised relations with China as key to international stability or their own national security – a far cry from the recently prevailing orthodoxy among G7 leaders that China was a challenge to the rules-based international order.

And in broader conversations taking place across gatherings like the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Western leaders are openly acknowledging that the US-backed post-1945 order is being eclipsed – a view not completely out of step with China’s.

The European Union “has really been bullied by the US and it’s only human nature to seek outside support when you’re being pushed around. That’s why Europe is actually open to the idea of strengthening ties with China,” Jin Canrong, an international relations expert at Renmin University in Beijing, said in a recent analysis.

Chinese foreign policy thinkers are under few illusions that American allies are about to wipe clean a list of ongoing concerns about China – from trade to human rights to security – or mount a sweeping shift to Beijing at the expense of ties with Washington.

But as leader Xi Jinping continues to push to forge a more China-friendly world, Beijing seems well aware of the major potential benefits from the seismic shift underway.

That’s especially true when it comes to ensuring its aims to dominate high-tech – and expand its global trade, clout and military might – meet less resistance.

People wait for the arrival of French President Emmanuel Macron at the University of Sichuan for a meeting with students in China's Chengdu in December.

Pedro Pardo/AFP/Getty Images

The end of ‘collective confrontation’?

Already the recent diplomatic parade in the Chinese capital has amounted to an opportunity to repair relations with key Western economies.

Carney in his visit – the first from a Canadian prime minister since 2017 – relaxed stringent tariffs on China-made electric vehicles that Canada had imposed in lockstep with the US in exchange for an easing of barriers on Canadian agricultural goods.

Separately, Beijing and the European Union (EU) last month came to an agreement to replace tariffs on Chinese EVs with commitments to sell at minimum prices – easing a longstanding friction based around Europe’s concern that artificially cheap cars from China, far-and-away the leader of global production, would devastate its domestic auto industry.

Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited Beijing and then Shanghai during his four-day trip last month.

Carl Court/AFP/Getty Images

Starmer, making the first trip by a British leader in eight years, praised business opportunities in China for the UK, days after his government green-lighted plans for China to build a controversial “mega” embassy close to London’s financial district.

“Realism” is at work in European leaders’ recent diplomacy toward China, according to Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS China Institute in London.

“Mistrust of China remains deep, particularly over Chinese support for Russian war efforts in Ukraine … (but) European states cannot ignore China, particularly when the US is going ‘rogue’ from their perspective.”

European governments in recent years ramped up scrutiny of China’s role in areas from telecoms networks and critical infrastructure to education – and followed US cues to restrict the sale of advanced semiconductor technology over national security concerns.

They’ve also grown increasingly alarmed by China’s gaping trade surplus and are working on ways to protect their industries, some of which analysts say face an existential threat from an influx of heavily subsidized Chinese goods. (Macron, during his December visit to China, said he threatened EU tariffs if the trade surplus isn’t addressed.)

French President Emmanuel Macron speaks at Sichuan University during a meeting with students in the city of Chengdu in southwestern China on December 5, 2025.

Sarah Meyssonnier/AFP/Getty Images

It remains to be seen how willing the EU and its member countries are to downplay these concerns or reorient their policies on China (which the bloc has described as an “economic competitor and a systemic rival”), even in the face of Trump’s on-again, off-again tariff threats and his rattling of NATO.

European leaders including Starmer, who had pushed for tighter UK-China ties prior to Trump’s election, have insisted they don’t have to come at the expense of security.

And the EU appears to be keeping its foot on the pedal. Last month it released a new proposal to phase out components and equipment from “high-risk” suppliers in critical sectors, expected to affect Chinese telecoms giant Huawei, after late last year ramping up screening of foreign investments. Addressing the trade surplus and reducing dependence on China’s critical minerals also remains high on the EU agenda.

Still, voices within China are optimistic.

“Some Western countries, under US leadership, have attempted and advocated collective confrontation against China and decoupling from China,” Wang Wen, a professor at Renmin University in Beijing, wrote in a recent commentary, referring to efforts to separate supply chains from China.

“However, reality has repeatedly proven that the ‘decoupling theory’ and the ‘new Cold War’ are not only unpopular but also difficult to truly implement.”

A new world order

Other Chinese analysts have suggested that with the US exit from more than two dozen United Nations bodies – and Trump’s effort to set up a parallel “Board of Peace” – Europe will simply need China more as an international counterweight.

“In order to maintain the multilateral system, (Europe) may need to compromise with China on trade and economic issues,” Ye Weimian, a researcher at the Chinese University of Hong Kong wrote in an analysis, pointing to areas like tariffs, technology access restrictions, and even a stalled China-EU investment agreement.

Honor guards prepare for a welcome ceremony for Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing last week.

Kin Cheung/AFP/Getty Images

Nonetheless, Beijing has pushed back against a narrative that it aims to “take advantage” of a rift between the US and its allies. Instead, it frames the warming of relations as proof of the appeal of its own market – and its vision for the world.

“This is an inevitable result of China’s development benefiting the world and continuously injecting stability and certainty into the international community,” an editorial in the state-backed outlet Global Times said last month.

Chinese analysts have also pointed to the US’ own climb-down on frictions with China as part of this recognition. The two sides reached an agreement to de-escalate trade tensions last fall. That was after Beijing played its trump card of stopping the flow of the rare earth minerals, waking up the world to its outsized control over their supply chains.

More importantly for Beijing, the US has moved away from framing China as an ideological challenger, to simply a competitor in an economic and strategic sense.

That shift dovetails with China’s broader vision for the world order: one no longer dominated by what it sees as American values and alliances, where countries aren’t bound to one another in ideological or security blocs, but instead make calculations based on shared economic and strategic interests.

And at a time when European voices are acknowledging that a “new world order” is taking shape, Beijing wants to frame its own vision for that order as one whose time has come.

“It’s less about these countries choosing China,” the Global Times editorial read. “And more about them choosing to follow the trend of the times.”

CNN · Simone McCarthy · February 3, 2026

6. U.S. Army Quietly Stands Up Rotational Force in the Philippines

Summary:

The U.S. Army has quietly established Army Rotational Force-Philippines, revealed after a meeting in Manila with Marine Rotational Force-Southeast Asia. Details on its start date, capabilities, and mission remain unclear, but it is led by a lieutenant colonel and includes a liaison to Task Force-Philippines. Task Force-Philippines was unveiled in October by Secretary of Defense/War Pete Hegseth to improve coordination with Manila against Chinese coercion. The new formation signals a larger U.S. footprint as the Army spreads activity across Mindanao, Luzon, and Palawan, and sustains advanced systems and drills tied to South China Sea frictions and Taiwan spillover concerns.

Comment. Excellent initiative.

Optimizing U.S. and Allied Forces for Deterrence and Defense Throughout Indo-Pacom: From Korea to Australia and Everywhere in Between

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/24/us-allies-deterrence-indo-pacific/

U.S. Army Quietly Stands Up Rotational Force in the Philippines - USNI News

news.usni.org · Aaron-Matthew Lariosa

Aaron-Matthew Lariosa

February 2, 2026 2:51 PM

https://news.usni.org/2026/02/02/u-s-army-quietly-stands-up-rotational-force-in-the-philippines

Two U.S. Army soldiers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, hold a security posture on the firing line with a M249 Machine Gun in a Counter Landing live-fire exercise, in support of Exercise Balikatan 25, at Aparri, Cagayan Valley, Philippines, May 3, 2025. US Army photo

The U.S. Army has stood up a rotational force in the Philippines, according to recently released defense media.

Army Rotational Force-Philippines, a previously unknown formation, was revealed for the first time Thursday following a meeting last month between the ground service and Marine Rotational Force-Southeast Asia in Manila.

While details regarding the rotational force’s formation date, capabilities and mission remains unclear, the force is headed by a lieutenant colonel and has assigned a liaison officer with Task Force-Philippines. Task Force-Philippines was unveiled in October by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as a method to enhance coordination with Manila against Chinese coercion, USNI News previously reported.

The existence of Army Rotational Force-Philippines demonstrates an expanded American military footprint in the Philippines, one that has increased following a renewed defense relationship in response to Chinese actions in the South China Sea and aspirations over Taiwan.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command did not immediately respond to a request for comment from USNI News.

The U.S. Army maintains a scattered footprint across the Philippine islands to assist Manila in internal and external security matters. Army Grey Eagle drones have been deployed to Mindanao, which has seen decades of American security assistance against radical Islamic insurgents. In 2023, one of the drones appeared over Second Thomas Shoal in a show of force against Chinese forces deploying against Philippine Coast Guard cutters.

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to the 5th Battalion, 3rd Artillery Regiment, 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, staged with a U.S. Army M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System for a training iteration in support of Exercise Balikatan 25, in Palawan, Philippines, April 28, 2025. US Army photo

In Luzon, American ground forces have oriented their focus on land defense operations in the country’s northern reaches, an area of increasing concern amid Philippine concerns of a potential Taiwan contingency spillover. Army exercises over the summer saw Philippine and U.S. troops practice strategic deployments from Central Luzon to Northern Luzon.

Additionally, the ground service stepped up its efforts in the Southeast Asian nation following a string of incidents between Chinese and Philippine forces over disputed maritime features in the South China Sea.

Since 2022, the Army deployed some of its most capable formations to the archipelago for increasingly complex and maritime-focused drills, including High Mobility Rocket Artillery Systems (HIMARS), expeditionary Patriot air defense units and Mid-Range Capability – a ground-based Mark 41 vertical launching system.

Chinese diplomatic channels have reacted negatively to the deployment of long-range missile systems across the archipelago. Philippine defense officials stated the deployment of the Typhon missile system during Balikatan 2024 was for defensive and training purposes. The system also has the capability to strike targets in China with its Tomahawk cruise missiles. Following the Balikatan deployment, the Army kept Mid-Range Capability in the Philippines.

Manila has repeatedly stated its intention to procure the missile system to the ire of Beijing. The Philippine Army stood up its first land-based missile battalion last fall.

news.usni.org · Aaron-Matthew Lariosa

7. Ruptures in China’s Leadership Could Be Due to Paranoia and Power Plays

Summary:

U.S. intelligence analysts see Xi Jinping as unusually fearful and prone to purges. It highlights the January 24 announcement that Gen. Zhang Youxia and Gen. Liu Zhenli are under investigation for “grave violations,” a move that surprised Washington because Zhang was long seen as loyal. U.S. officials cannot find a clear cause and weigh paranoia, a real political challenge, or anti-corruption. The purges have hollowed out senior People's Liberation Army leadership and may affect planning, including around Taiwan, by creating distrust and hesitation.

Comment: If Xi’s fear is driving repeated removals of senior commanders, does that make China’s use of force more likely through miscalculation, or less likely through paralysis?

If corruption and faction control are the stated rationale, what should U.S. planners treat as the leading indicator of real instability: missing elites, sudden disciplinary cases, or shifts in PLA operational tempo in the Asia-Indo-Pacific?

How can we exploit these conditions?

Ruptures in China’s Leadership Could Be Due to Paranoia and Power Plays

NY Times · Julian E. Barnes · February 3, 2026

News Analysis

U.S. intelligence analysts say that Xi Jinping, China’s leader, has a remarkable level of fear. He has carried out mass purges, and surprised many by removing his top general.

By Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes

Edward Wong has written a book on China, and Julian E. Barnes reports on intelligence. They have covered U.S.-China espionage for years.

Feb. 3, 2026

Updated 12:17 p.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/03/us/politics/china-xi-military-purge.html?

Xi Jinping during a military parade in Tiananmen Square in Beijing last year.

Since taking the reins of the world’s most populous superpower nearly 14 years ago, Xi Jinping has ravaged the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party.

He has taken down ruling officials, security chiefs and children of the party’s “red aristocracy.” But even by those standards, his latest purge was remarkable.

The Chinese defense ministry’s announcement on Jan. 24 that the country’s top military leader, Gen. Zhang Youxia, and an associate, Gen. Liu Zhenli, were under investigation for “grave violations” startled officials and analysts in Washington. General Zhang is a venerated war veteran long believed to be loyal to Mr. Xi.

U.S. officials have been trying to sift through the murky waters of elite politics in Beijing to figure out why China’s leader took such a dramatic step. They say it is critical for the U.S. government to get a handle on Mr. Xi’s state of mind because his policies, like those of President Trump, affect everything from the global economy to the operations of one of the world’s most powerful militaries.

But current and former U.S. officials say that no obvious reason has emerged behind Mr. Xi’s latest actions. The Chinese leader could be acting out of paranoia, defending himself against a real political challenge, or genuinely attempting to address high-level corruption in the People’s Liberation Army, they say.

U.S. intelligence analysts have concluded in assessments in recent years that Mr. Xi has an extreme level of paranoia, the officials say.

Since the start of his rule in 2012, Mr. Xi, now 72, has consolidated authority through purges, and by deploying so-called anti-corruption campaigns, becoming the most powerful Chinese leader in decades.

He has now removed all but one of the six generals he appointed to the Central Military Commission in 2022. Mr. Xi is the chairman of the commission, which controls the People’s Liberation Army. The purges have left a leadership vacuum at the top of the world’s largest military.

And of the 30 generals and admirals who ran theater commands or specialized operations at the start of 2023, almost all have been expelled or have disappeared, according to a New York Times analysis.

Marcel Dirsus, a German political scientist who wrote a book about the erosion of dictatorships, said that autocrats view people in their inner circles — rather than protesters or dissidents — as the greatest threats to their power.

“As an autocrat, you have to be paranoid. You’re constantly at risk,” he said. “Everyone around you is lying all the time. You never know who is authentically loyal and who is lying to you.”

Purges of military commanders are common in such systems. “Being a general in an autocracy is a thankless job,” Mr. Dirsus said. “If you are seen as effective and your subordinates like you, you develop an alternative power center, and the autocrat feels threatened by you. But if you perform poorly, the autocrat also doesn’t like you.”

Gen. Zhang Youxia, known for his loyalty to Mr. Xi, commanded respect from officers and troops beneath him.

General Zhang is the former: a veteran of the 1979 China-Vietnam war who, while known for his loyalty to Mr. Xi, also commanded great respect from officers and troops beneath him.

The U.S. assessments about Mr. Xi’s paranoia raise questions about whether he is being rational in his purges.

“Paranoia is more of a feature of his leadership than a bug,” said John Culver, a former C.I.A. analyst on China who retired in 2020, before the most recent assessments. “He would not have lasted this long or this strong given the powerful elders and institutions he has politically eviscerated.”

The C.I.A. compiles profiles of foreign leaders that include psychological portraits. Analysts have tried for many years to better understand Mr. Xi, a party “princeling” who was pegged in a 2007 party conclave as a likely leader of China. Within weeks of taking power in 2012, he began an anti-corruption campaign that shook up the entire party.

The Wall Street Journal reported last week that some Chinese military officers were told that General Zhang was a spy for the U.S. government and had passed it nuclear secrets. Such an act would be considered among the most treasonous crimes by a Chinese official.

Current and former U.S. officials, however, said that they were unaware of General Zhang having been a U.S. intelligence asset or having handed over nuclear information. They also said they had not detected an internal campaign in Beijing to spread the word among officials that General Zhang was a spy for the United States.

In recent years, Mr. Xi and China’s main intelligence agency, the Ministry of State Security, have carried out a campaign to warn the public of national security threats from spies for foreign powers. At the same time, the C.I.A. is on a drive to recruit agents and assets in China, and says the effort is showing signs of success.

On Saturday, the Liberation Army Daily, the official newspaper of the military, hailed the punishment of General Zhang and General Liu as a “major achievement” in the anti-corruption struggle, and said that all officers and soldiers had to support the decision of the party’s Central Committee, with “Comrade Xi Jinping at its core in thought, politics and action.”

Liu Pengyu, a Chinese embassy spokesman in Washington, said in a statement that the Central Committee had opened investigations into the two generals “on suspicion of serious violations of discipline and law,” which reflected a “zero-tolerance approach to combating corruption.”

Analysts say Mr. Xi’s long-running anti-corruption campaign is aimed at forcing the party’s 100 million members to become more disciplined — corruption has indeed been rampant throughout the ranks for decades — and at destroying political rivals and factions.

Analysts have tried for many years to better understand Mr. Xi, a party “princeling” who was pegged in a 2007 party conclave as a likely leader of China.Credit...Pool photo by Jessica Lee

A recent report by the Asia Society Policy Institute noted that less than 84 percent of the 376 members and alternates of the party’s Central Committee had attended a political conference last October, a record low — and a sign of the sweep of Mr. Xi’s purges.

Mr. Xi’s targeting of top military commanders has drawn the most attention in recent years and has raised questions about the extent of corruption. The purges have also ignited debate among analysts about whether there are differences among Mr. Xi and his top generals over their approaches to the democratic island of Taiwan, which the Chinese leader has said must come under party rule, by force if necessary.

In any case, the expulsions could have a deep impact on military planning.

“It’s possible that distrust between the party and its army could produce hesitation toward any significant operations, at least in the near term,” said Rush Doshi, a scholar at Georgetown University and the Council on Foreign Relations.

China’s military operations, especially around Taiwan, could be a topic of discussion at a Beijing summit between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi planned for April.

China’s rapidly growing military and intelligence budgets have allowed ample room for corruption. Like in the United States, the People’s Liberation Army gives out lucrative contracts to Chinese firms across a range of industries. Corrupt officers can get paid to steer contracts to specific firms, easily doubling their salaries, U.S. officials said.

Because General Zhang was considered Mr. Xi’s most trusted commander by far, his purge has been likened by some scholars of China to Mao’s split in 1971 with Lin Biao, a top commander and party vice chairman. Mr. Lin died in a mysterious plane crash in Mongolia that year while fleeing to the Soviet Union.

The Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung, center, with Lin Biao, right, in Tiananmen Square in 1966.

Yun Sun, a China analyst at the Stimson Center in Washington, said the urgency of Mr. Xi’s actions could mean that he was trying to head off any potential challenge to his power ahead of the next party congress, in 2027.

At the last party congress, in 2022, Mr. Xi took the remarkable step of extending his power for a third five-year term. That fueled anxiety among Chinese citizens, including some party officials, who thought he could become a Mao-like tyrant.

Mr. Xi might have decided to go for a fourth term rather than anoint a successor at next year’s congress, Ms. Sun said, and General Zhang’s removal could be an attempt to head off a potentially influential critic.

If the general disagreed with Mr. Xi “on this most important political question,” she said, “that makes Zhang incredibly dangerous.”

Edward Wong reports on global affairs, U.S. foreign policy and the State Department for The Times.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades.

NY Times · Julian E. Barnes · February 3, 2026

8. NATO’s Asia-Pacific Engagement Does Not Impress China

Summary:

China’s official rhetoric on NATO has hardened, accusing it of “bloc confrontation” in the Asia-Indo-Pacific and attacking its legitimacy. Yet the authors say Chinese scholars and think tank analysts are not impressed by NATO’s regional engagement because they see NATO as divided and European members as lacking hard power to shift the regional balance. Chinese observers still dislike NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept language on China and NATO’s outreach to partners such as Japan and South Korea. POTUS’ strains with Europe further reduce Beijing’s need to court Europeans.

Comment: So what would impress China?

NATO’s Asia-Pacific Engagement Does Not Impress China

Chinese analysts talk tough but see NATO as divided and European states as lacking hard power – and Trump is making it worse.

By Rebekka Åsnes Sagild and Henrik Stålhane Hiim

February 04, 2026

https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/natos-asia-pacific-engagement-does-not-impress-china/

U.S. President Donald Trump participates in a press conference during the 2025 NATO Summit at the World Forum in The Hague, Netherlands, June 25,2025.

Credit: Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok

China’s official rhetoric about NATO has hardened in recent years. China accuses NATO of stirring up “bloc confrontation” in Asia and has labeled the organization a “Cold War remnant.” Chinese spokespeople have further attacked NATO’s legitimacy, alleging that the alliance has “bypassed the U.N. Security Council and waged wars against sovereign states, creating huge casualties and leaving tens of millions displaced.”

Despite the tough talk, China is not that concerned about NATO. As we document in a new article in International Affairs, Chinese scholars and think tank analysts believe NATO’s Asia-Pacific engagement will have a limited impact on China’s security. The reason is twofold: They see NATO as divided and believe European member states lack the hard power to affect the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.

The crisis in transatlantic relations has eased China’s concerns even further. In the past, many Chinese analysts argued openly in favor of engaging European states to keep the alliance divided. With U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to power, China sees less need to make such efforts. The chaos Trump has unleashed – most recently with his threats against Greenland – is a strategic gift, undermining NATO free of charge to China.

Plenty to Dislike…

NATO’s increasing Asia-Pacific engagement began in earnest with the publication of the new Strategic Concept in June 2022, which claimed that China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” NATO has been bolstering ties to its Asia-Pacific partners, including by inviting leaders from Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia to its summit meetings.

In addition, several European states have deployed naval vessels to the region in recent years. These deployments have not been NATO operations, but Chinese scholars sometimes misleadingly label them as such.

Like their leaders, Chinese scholars and think tank analysts find much to dislike about these developments. Many regard the United States as the real architect of the Asia-Pacific engagement policy and see this policy as one cog in a greater U.S. plan to contain China’s rise. They further claim the United States used Russia’s war in Ukraine as pretext to strengthen transatlantic unity over China policy. Chinese analysts worry the shift in NATO policy may damage Beijing’s relations with European states (albeit without much reflection on how China’s own support for Russia has contributed to this).

Chinese observers also dislike NATO’s deepening ties to Japan. Through cooperation in research and development and stronger defense industrial ties, they worry that Japan can bolster its military power. They see the United States as actively promoting a “remilitarization” of Japan to keep China in check, while reducing the U.S. strategic burden.

South Korea’s growing ties to NATO and European countries more broadly are also viewed with suspicion, as both South Korean arms sales and industry and technology collaboration may strengthen South Korean capabilities.

…But Less to Fear

Unlike government spokespeople, Chinese observers openly debate the shortfalls of NATO’s Asia-Pacific engagement. They find much less to fear than the official rhetoric would suggest. Being steeped in a deeply realpolitik paradigm, their assessments are frequently centered on how NATO may affect the balance of power in the region. This influence, they find, is ultimately limited.

The first constraint facing NATO – and European member states – is simply a lack of hard power. According to one group of scholars, “Even Britain, France and Germany, which are at the forefront of strength, find it difficult to project sufficient military power in the Indo-Pacific region.” Moreover, many believe that Europe will need to prioritize its limited capabilities on deterring Russia, which will further impede both European states’ willingness to operate in the region, and possibly also NATO’s Asia-Pacific engagement.

More broadly, they indicate that European members have lacked foresight by ignoring the importance of military might. In a particularly harsh analysis, a researcher from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argued that “the Ukrainian crisis exposed the huge drawbacks of the European countries’ power model based on normative power.”

The second constraint is a lack of alliance cohesion. Chinese observers recognize how divided alliance members have been in terms of their China policy. They highlight that many European states want to maintain their economic relationships to China, and that U.S. and European views of the threat originating from Beijing frequently diverge. In addition, they see weaknesses in NATO’s ties to partners in Asia and claim China has leverage to limit particularly South Korea’s security alignment with the alliance. As long as the alliance cannot agree on threat perceptions, there is, from Beijing’s perspective, less need for concern.

Trump-inflicted Wounds

In the not-so-distant past, many analysts suggested that China should take active efforts to keep NATO divided. Several claimed that economic and trade engagement of select European countries could ensure that transatlantic (as well as inter-European) perspectives on China would continue to differ. Others called for influencing European narratives. Through carrots, charm offensives, and potentially manipulation, China could continue to drive wedges into the alliance.

During the last year, however, Chinese leaders do not seem to have listened to this advice. The China-EU summit in July 2025 had no significant deliverables and did little to improve relations with Europe. Xi Jinping snubbed an invitation to Brussels. Clearly, Chinese leaders did not see a need for a charm offensive toward Europe.

A crucial reason for the lack of a charm offensive is the Trump administration’s disdain or even open contempt for Europe, and the chasm in transatlantic relations. For China, there is simply no longer much need to bribe Europeans – the United States is giving Beijing the divisions it wants for free. As the former secretary general of the European Parliament, Klaus Welle, stated back in February 2025, “This is what they have always wanted – to see the transatlantic alliance divided. I am just surprised they did not bring cake to celebrate.”

Seen through this lens, the U.S. president’s calls for obtaining control over Greenland give Beijing even more room for celebration. Trump is justifying his demands in part by pointing to China as a threat, including by making false statements about major Chinese (and Russian) naval activity around the island. Ironically, these falsehoods and the ruptures the Greenland debacle has created within the alliance strengthen China’s hand. As Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, stated after Trump threatened to impose tariffs against Denmark’s supporters, “China and Russia must be having a field day.”

Speaking the Language of Power

A seemingly obvious way to address the current predicament would be to foster greater transatlantic unity. For European states, the prospect of greater coordination with the United States over China policy could also provide leverage over Beijing. Unfortunately, with the Trump presidency, such a suggestion appears detached from reality. The Trump administration is clearly uninterested in working with allies in a pragmatic manner, having instead chosen to repeatedly attack them. Moreover, Chinese leaders regard European leaders as weak and would likely view any coordination on China policy as the result of U.S. pressure alone.

Some European states may find it tempting to disengage from the Asia-Pacific. Although one can certainly debate whether it is a good idea to spend scarce resources by deploying European military forces to the region, continued engagement is in Europe’s interest. A Europe that must rapidly rearm needs defense industry partnerships, which both South Korea and Japan can provide. As the United States looks increasingly less reliable, purchasing weapons from other states – and reducing dependence on the U.S. – is beneficial. In addition, European states can collaborate with partners in the Asia-Pacific to build more resilient value chains.

More broadly, Chinese analysts’ thinly veiled disdain for weakness should be a lesson for European leaders. We are entering a world where might make right and where appeals to shared norms and values do not take you very far. Xi Jinping and Donald Trump are very different leaders – the former is shrewd; the latter is mercurial or even incoherent – but a trait they share is respect for power. To avoid being the prey in a world of strongmen, Europe needs to step up. It needs to learn to speak the language of power.

Authors

Guest Author

Rebekka Åsnes Sagild

Rebekka Åsnes Sagild is associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, where she is head of the Center for International Security. Her research focuses on Chinese domestic and foreign policy, with a particular focus on China-Russia relations and Chinese elite politics. Her work has been published in journals such as International Affairs, Journal of Contemporary China, and China Perspectives.

Guest Author

Henrik Stålhane Hiim

Henrik Stålhane Hiim is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College. His main research interests are Chinese foreign and security policy, as well as nuclear strategy and nonproliferation. His work has appeared in outlets such as International Security, International Affairs, Journal of Strategic Studies, War on the Rocks, and Foreign Affairs.

9. China’s Cheap Oil Strategy Is Becoming a Geopolitical Liability

Summary:

Beijing’s dependence on discounted crude from sanctioned or isolated suppliers is shifting from clever arbitrage to strategic liability. China built an alternative supply chain anchored in Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, using relabeling and shadow shipping to evade sanctions and capture steep discounts, especially on Venezuelan heavy crude. After the U.S. removal of Nicolás Maduro, the author contends regime risk, not scarcity, is now China’s main energy vulnerability. The immediate shock may be limited because Venezuela is a small share of imports, but “teapot” refineries in Shandong that rely on cheap heavy crude face margin stress. Larger risks come from potential instability in Iran and future leadership change in Russia.

Comment: The fundamental question: How can we exploit this? If nearly 40 percent of China’s crude imports hinge on politically exposed suppliers, what is Beijing’s real center of gravity: the physical flow of barrels, or the political continuity of the regimes that make the discounts possible?

If Venezuela is “the first fracture,” what is the more dangerous second fracture for China’s economy: a sudden loss of Iranian barrels through unrest and Hormuz risk, or a Russian leadership transition that ends the sanctions-discount structure China has baked into refinery economics?

China’s Cheap Oil Strategy Is Becoming a Geopolitical Liability

Beijing’s reliance on discounted crude from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela is colliding with political reality, and the strains are starting to show.

By Nik Foster

February 02, 2026

https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/chinas-cheap-oil-strategy-is-becoming-a-geopolitical-liability/

Credit: Depositphotos

The U.S government’s removal of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro last month is upending broader geopolitics as we know it. Informed by the second Trump administration’s focus on the Western Hemisphere, and codified in the November 2025 National Security Strategy, which calls for direct action against regimes Washington deems destabilizing or hostile to U.S. interests, the action signals that Venezuela’s future will likely be tied closely to the whims of Washington, D.C.

Venezuela has the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves, as well as an abundance of gold, diamonds, and other natural resources. As Western sanctions on Venezuela have dramatically curtailed its oil exports to the United States and Europe, the country has found a reliable buyer for its crude oil in China, which has purchased up to 80 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports in recent years at discount rates.

Venezuela is not the only questionable source of China’s crude. Over the years, Beijing quietly built an alternative supply system, anchored in the political isolation of pariah states, including Iran and Russia. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russian crude oil became China’s largest single source of imports. Iranian oil, responsible for about 14 percent of China’s crude oil imports, continues to slip through global sanctions enforcement, often relabeled and rebranded as Malaysian oil. And Venezuelan oil found its way to Chinese ports by shadow tankers, sometimes labeled as crude oil from Brazil.

Purchasing pariah state oil at discount prices benefited China considerably, helping to fuel its industrial growth strategy. Yet, with the removal of Maduro, this model now looks fragile. What began as a clever circumvention of Western sanctions is poised to become a liability for China, exposing the reality that regime risk, not supply scarcity, is now its primary energy vulnerability.

China is the world’s second largest country by population, home to over 300 million passenger cars, and the world’s second largest consumer of oil. In 2024, China imported about 11.1 million barrels of crude oil per day (b/d) while domestic production averaged about 4.3 million b/d. China’s domestic resources are thus not enough to cover the country’s demand for crude oil, setting it up for a structural reliance on imported crude.

This helps explain China’s determined strategies to electrify transportation and other parts of the economy. Demand growth for crude slowed in 2024, driven by Chinese drivers switching to battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids, as well as a broader slow down in the property sector and related decreased demand for diesel.

The China National Petroleum Corporation and Sinopec, two major Chinese state-owned oil and gas firms, have predicted that oil consumption for China will peak in 2025 and 2027, respectively. But even so, China will for the foreseeable future be dependent upon imported crude oil to fulfill domestic consumption.

The Pariah Discount Model

China buys crude from dozens of countries, but imports are concentrated in a handful of major suppliers. In 2024, the largest sources cited in official data included Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, and “Malaysia.” As the quotation marks suggest, that last country is misleading. China imported more oil from Malaysia in 2024 than Malaysia itself produces – evidence of the country’s role in transshipment and the relabeling of sanctioned barrels from Iran and Venezuela.

Over $1 billion of Venezuelan crude has also arrived in China with fake certificates rebranding the oil as from Brazil, indicating the extent of sanction evasions and China’s willingness to take advantage of fake certificates to acquire discounted oil.

China has taken full advantage of cheap oil available from pariah states, including Russia, Iran, and Venezuela that have been sanctioned for various violations of international laws, including invasion of sovereign countries (Russia), being a state sponsor of terrorism and accumulating highly enriched uranium stockpiles (Iran), and broader human rights violations (Venezuela).

For China, purchasing from these countries means access to discounted oil. Russian crude cargoes, for example, have been sold for about $5 to $6 per barrel below Brent when delivered to Chinese ports. The discount is even larger with Iranian crude, which comes with a $6 to $8 per barrel below Brent discount. China receives the largest discount, however, from Venezuela. Its flagship Merey heavy crude has been delivered with a discount of about $14–$15 per barrel below Brent, with occasional discounts as high as $21 below Brent.

For China, this strategy of purchasing discounted oil from sanctioned states has led to several economic benefits. Even a $5 to $6 discount on Brent-scale pricing can add up to hundreds of millions in savings annually when multiplied by the total volume of China’s crude imports. Occasionally, China has even been able to play one pariah state against the other, such as in the case of China substituting Iranian crude for Russian oil when tightening sanctions made Iranian crude more competitive.

Venezuela: The First Fracture

The toppling of Maduro shows that these arrangements of purchasing discount oil from pariah states are inherently risky. For China’s broader oil market, the impacts of the Trump administration’s removal of Maduro will likely be negligible in the short term. Venezuela accounted for only around 4 percent of oil imported by China in 2025. There is also a glut of crude in storage and weak global demand, which will soften the near-term blow of the Venezuelan oil moving away from the Chinese market.

Yet in China, there is a small, albeit important sector of the economy that could become the first victim of the ongoing regime change in Venezuela. Most of Venezuela’s heavy crude fed so-called “teapot” refineries – independent, non-state-owned refiners, mostly located in Shandong Province. These smaller refineries, known as teapots, purchase crude oil at discount prices as they are purchasing sanctioned goods. Teapot refineries typically operate on thin margins, lack long-term supply contracts, depend on spot cargoes, and provide fuel fare. That leaves them the most exposed to sanctioned-barrel volatility because their economics often depend on access to discounted oil.

Teapots are critical to China’s downstream economy, refining diesel for trucking firms, logistics companies, farmers, and construction, jet fuel for the domestic aviation market, petrochemical feedstock for fertilizers, textiles, plastics, and lubricants, and fuel oil for infrastructure, shipping, and heavy industry end users.

When teapot refineries get hit by the loss of discount oil from Venezuela, the fallout will ripple into increased transportation costs and construction prices, and, ultimately, local employment. Shandong Province alone accounts for about 30 percent of China’s independent refining capacity and employs hundreds of thousands of the more than 700,000 workers in China’s oil and gas sector.

For China, access to cheap crude from Venezuela is now turning into a liability. As the political crisis unfolds, China will likely lose privileged access to discounted heavy crude, which is poised to be redirected toward U.S. and European refiners after the crisis and sanctions regimes end, leaving China to compete on open market terms.

Iran and Russia: The Real Stress Test

While Venezuela accounts for only a small, albeit important fraction of China’s oil imports, the broader strategy of purchasing a significant amount of oil from pariah states – including Venezuela, Iran and Russia – should give China’s energy planners pause. Nearly 40 percent of China’s crude imports come from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela combined. This is a significant share, especially given that these are sources associated with sanctions, political instability, and broader geopolitical risk.

Iran is in the midst of one of the largest and most widespread periods of unrest in years. Driven by a deep economic crisis marked by soaring inflation, economic foundering, and a collapsing currency, protesters have taken to the streets in urban centers as well as smaller cities as well as calling out Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and broader clerical rule amid heavy security crackdowns. The protests reflect an ongoing tension between the rulers of the country and the population, highlighted by discontent with the rising cost of living and broader inflation.

They also come at a moment of particular weakness for the country’s leadership, which just lost a military exchange with Israel and the United States, setting back its nuclear ambitions. At the same time, Iran finds itself in a situation where many of its regional proxies, from Bashar Assad to Hezbollah and Hamas, are in exile, diminished, or on their back foot.

It is unclear how this conflict will end, but if the regime does not manage to successfully contain dissent through a combination of concessions and force, deeper instability could force political and/or economic reforms, or even lead to a substantial transformation of Iran’s leadership, including a breakdown in state authority. If that is the case, China would temporarily lose around 1 million b/d of discounted supply, tightening crude availability for teapot refineries and increasing replacement costs by forcing China to purchase more from other suppliers.

There likely would also be a dramatic knock-on effect from Iran’s collapse, increasing prices for all oil and gas deliveries traversing the Strait of Hormuz. While by no means a given, a chaotic transition in Iran could disrupt exports of crude oil to China and any post-conflict normalization would likely mean the end of sanctions, as well as the discounted oil supply that China has come to depend on.

Even Russia, the most stable of the pariah states, carries latent risk for China. Russia continues to be China’s largest supplier by volume of discounted crude oil, and, unlike Venezuela and Iran, faces no imminent threat of collapse. Its oil and gas connections to China run deeper every year, with connections moving eastwards driven by the sanctions-imposed decoupling from the European market.

Yet China’s Russian energy strategy depends on the lifespan of the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin. Any leadership transition will likely involve a recalibration of Russia’s energy exports. Russia is already in dire need of Western capital and know-how to upgrade and improve its fossil exploration and production infrastructure. The end of Putin could mean an end of Russia’s eastward energy gaze and, crucially, an end to the sanctions regime that underpins China’s discount oil based refining economics.

Policy Implications for Beijing

The changing geopolitical environment is now impacting the energy calculus in Beijing. While there is plenty of oil supply in the world, Beijing’s bet on instability and geopolitical pariah states is adding political risk to the supply calculus. The formerly shrewd exploitation of discounted crude oil now appears like a strategic liability.

What can Beijing do about this?

In the short term, China needs to expand stockpiles and proactively work with vulnerable refineries, especially the teapots, to improve efficiencies, and consolidate or close inefficient producers. With ample supply from the Gulf States available, as well as Brazil, it can redirect purchases, albeit at a higher cost.

In the medium term, China needs to dilute or end its dependence on discounted oil from pariah states. Broader diversification as well as expanding parallel financial and shipping infrastructure that is less exposed to Western enforcement could shield it from the fallout of U.S. and European related sanction spikes – or drops – in oil prices.

In the long term, China needs to continue its structural reduction of oil consumption, a resource it just does not produce enough of domestically. While it has already made great strides through electrification, efficiency, and demand-side transformation, China needs to wean itself off the cheap oil from unstable regimes it has come to rely on, allowing it to decouple domestic energy needs from broader geopolitical crises.

China, the world’s second largest oil consuming country, has masterfully taken advantage of discounted oil available from pariah states, such as Iran, Venezuela and Russia. Yet the toppling of Maduro is the first crack in the bargain that traded cheap oil against pariah regime exposure. By relying on discounted oil from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, Beijing internalized geopolitical risk from abroad into its own economy. Venezuela’s collapse could just be the first crack, and while Russia remains the silent variable, Iran’s unraveling may shatter the teapot.

Authors

Guest Author

Nik Foster

Nik Foster is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council's China Hub and the former deputy China adviser for USAID.

Consolidation Is Not Flattening: Why the “Department of War” Needs a JSOC Model

realcleardefense.com · Stephen D. Cook February 03, 2026

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/02/03/consolidation_is_not_flattening_why_the_department_of_war_needs_a_jsoc_model_1162480.html

Secretary Pete Hegseth’s directive to trim 20% of the four-star ranks is a necessary first step, but it risks becoming another exercise in "reorganizing the deck chairs" if the underlying architecture of the Generating Force isn’t fundamentally dismantled.

In the Operating Force, specifically within organizations like JSOC, we have already proven that flattening works. When an O-6 commander reports directly to an O-9 to achieve strategic effects, the "flash to bang" is instantaneous. Yet, in the Generating Force—the massive machine responsible for training, equipping, and sustaining the military—we’re doubling down on Consolidation instead of Flattening.

The Consolidation Trap: T2COM and PAEs

The recent standing up of T2COM (Transformation and Training Command) and the transition to Portfolio Acquisition Executives (PAEs) are touted as revolutionary. In reality, they are "Ghost Echelons." By merging disparate commands into "super-portfolios," we aren't removing layers; we’re merely hiding the same number of flag officer staffs under a single roof.

The logic of the current reform implies that rank equates to competence—a fallacy reinforced by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). For decades, the Generating Force has served as a sanctuary for those whose career paths hit a ceiling in the Operating Force. Under DOPMA’s "up-or-out" mandate, we’re forced to create high-ranking "oversight" positions to justify the careers of generalists, creating a friction-rich environment where an O-7 or O-8 must "concur" on technical decisions that a SOCOM O-5 would handle solo.

AI: The Staff-Killer for the Generating Force

The primary output of the Generating Force isn’t lethality, but paperwork intended to mitigate risk. In 2026, this is a role for Artificial Intelligence, not egos. Secretary Hegseth’s "Wartime AI Footing" must move past the concept of AI as a "tool" and recognize it as an eventual replacement for legacy echelons.

However, this transition requires a shift from Human-in-the-loop (manual processing) to Human-on-the-loop (validation and oversight).

The G-3/5/7 (Operations & Planning): For decades, these staffs have ballooned to manage the "Adaptive Staff Model"—parsing doctrine and drafting OPLANs. With the deployment of Enterprise Agents via GenAI.mil—a secure, LLM-based architecture that utilizes Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to ground outputs in verified military doctrine—we now have the capability to generate and "Red Team" thousands of Courses of Action (COAs) in seconds. When an AI can parse 25 years of tactical doctrine and current sensor data to draft a deployment order, the requirement for a battalion of O-5 "Action Officers" to sit in planning cells evaporates.
ATEC (Army Test & Evaluation Command)/ NOSSA (Naval Ordnance Safety & Security Activity): Organizations like ATEC and NOSSA have traditionally acted as the "bureaucratic brake" on materiel solutions. Their manual oversight can be replaced by Computational Wargaming and Continuous T&E. This process utilizes high-fidelity digital twins and Monte Carlo simulations to run millions of virtual stress tests against a new materiel solution, identifying safety and cost risks before a single piece of hardware is built. We no longer need a massive staff of "naysayers" to spend years producing a test report that the Operating Force needed yesterday.
The G8 (Budget & Programming): The manual labor of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) cycle is perhaps the greatest drain on military talent. AI-driven "Mission Alignment" reviews—which utilize predictive analytics to cross-reference contract performance against real-time operational requirements—can now automate this entire process, identifying "budget bloat" and non-performing programs in real-time. If an algorithm can perform a 99.9% accurate audit of a $20 million contract in minutes, the need for layers of "Budget Analysts" to manually justify every line item is gone.

Addressing the Risk: A Phased Transition

The pushback against AI adoption often centers on data integrity—the fear of "poisoned" data or incomplete sets. These are valid risks, but they are not justifications for maintaining a bloated bureaucracy. In a flattened model, the human’s role shifts from data-entry and initial analysis to final arbiter of high-stakes outputs.

Validation, Not Re-Work: The human "on-the-loop" serves as the fail-safe against data poisoning, reviewing AI-generated COAs for logical fallacies or adversarial influence without needing a 400-person staff to re-create the data from scratch.
The Competence Standard: By utilizing the JSOC model, we place this validation authority in the hands of an O-6 Portfolio Lead who possesses the domain expertise to spot anomalies—removing the "Ghost Echelons" of generalists whose primary function is checking boxes rather than verifying lethality.

By eliminating the "Ghost Echelons" of risk-averse middle management, we don't just save money; we remove the friction that has allowed our adversaries to out-pace us in the "Gray Zone". The 20% reduction Hegseth is seeking shouldn't just be the goal—it should be the starting point for a total automated gutting of the Generating Force.

The Choice: Lethality or Liability?

If the Department of War truly wants to return to a "Warrior Ethos," it must stop treating the Generating Force as a personnel management exercise. We do not need fewer PEOs; we need zero PEOs/PAEs. We need direct-reporting Portfolio Leads who answer to a Service Secretary—unfiltered, un-staffed, and empowered by AI-driven risk assessment focused on cost and safety.

As long as we allow DOPMA to dictate our organizational charts, we’re trading strategic relevance for procedural safety. True reform isn't about moving the flag officers to Austin; it’s about removing the need for the flags altogether.

Stephen D. Cook is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel with 25 years of service. A combat veteran decorated for both heroism and valor, he is the author of the field manuals "Plan Like a Green Beret," and "Finding Your Way in the Dark," and the techno-thriller "In the Shadows of the Sky." His work explores the intersection of elite military decision-making, intuition, and disruptive leadership. He is based in St Augustine, FL.

11. Russia Resumes Strikes on Ukrainian Energy Sites

Summary:

Russia launched its largest aerial assault of the year on Ukraine, striking energy systems across eight regions and hitting thermal power plants that provide heat to Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipro. The attacks left nearly 2,000 apartment buildings without heating during extreme cold, injured at least 12 people, and forced local officials to drain radiators to prevent wider damage. The strikes followed a short pause that POTUS said he requested and Moscow said it accepted until Feb. 1, but Ukraine says the pause began Friday and ended Tuesday, calling it a broken promise. Ukraine reported intercepting most drones and missiles.

Comment: If Moscow can pause and then surge strikes at the coldest moment, what does that reveal about its leverage strategy in ceasefire talks?

Russia Resumes Strikes on Ukrainian Energy Sites

WSJ

Attack hits thermal power plants across Ukraine after Trump had asked Moscow to halt its attacks amid freezing temperatures

By Anastasiia Malenko

Updated Feb. 3, 2026 5:56 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-resumes-strikes-on-ukrainian-energy-sites-ffdca8b0

A Ukrainian thermal power plant damaged in an earlier Russian attack prior to Tuesday’s strike. Reuters

Russia launched its biggest aerial assault of the year on Ukraine, ending a pause on strikes on Ukraine’s energy systems and dealing another blow to the country during some of the winter’s coldest days.

President Trump had said in recent days that he had asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold off on strikes for a week because of the frigid temperatures. Russia had continued its nightly barrages on Ukraine—including strikes on transportation infrastructure—but Moscow appeared to refrain for several days from direct assaults on energy.

That ended Tuesday. Russian forces attacked eight Ukrainian regions, striking thermal power plants providing heat for residents of the capital of Kyiv and other cities such as Kharkiv and Dnipro, according to the energy ministry.

The attack left nearly 2,000 apartment buildings without heating in Kyiv and Kharkiv, with the temperatures dropping to 13 degrees below zero Fahrenheit. The strikes, which injured at least 12 people, left authorities in several cities scrambling to drain water from radiators in some buildings to prevent damage to heating systems.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Kyiv would continue to support de-escalatory steps ahead of talks between the U.S., Russia and Ukraine, which were set to resume Wednesday in Abu Dhabi. But he said the strikes Tuesday were an indication of Moscow’s unwillingness to engage in the peace process.

“Each such Russian strike confirms that attitudes in Moscow have not changed: They continue to bet on war and the destruction of Ukraine, and they do not take diplomacy seriously,” Zelensky wrote on X, urging the timely delivery of air-defense missiles from allies.

A thermal power plant damaged by a Russian strike predating attacks on Tuesday. Reuters

Trump initially said Thursday that Putin had agreed to hold off on strikes for a week. Asked Tuesday during an Oval Office event about the latest attacks, Trump replied: “It was Sunday to Sunday…he kept his word on that. It’s a lot. One week is…we’ll take anything because it’s really, really cold over there.”

On Friday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that there had been a request and that Moscow had agreed to stop its strikes until Feb. 1. When asked Monday whether the energy cease-fire remained in place, he said he had no further details to share.

Zelensky said the energy cease-fire began in practice on Friday and ended on Tuesday, adding that Russia broke its promise in Kyiv’s view.

“That is, either Russia now believes that there are less than four days in a week instead of seven, or they are really betting on war, and only that, and simply waited for the coldest days of this winter,” Zelensky said Tuesday.

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.), one of Ukraine’s supporters in Congress, urged Trump to put more pressure on Russia after Tuesday’s attack. “After this massive attack last night, I would urge President Trump to start a process to provide Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles which would be a game changer militarily. In the coming days and weeks, we must apply more pressure to Putin,” Graham said in a post on X.

The Ukrainian air force said it downed 412 of 450 drones and 38 of 71 missiles launched by Russian forces in Tuesday’s attack. The Russian ministry of defense said it struck energy facilities that were supporting Ukraine’s military.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he was invited to join President Trump’s new Board of Peace but voiced reservations if Russia were also included. Photo: Gian Ehrenzeller/EPA/Shutterstock

Even though Russia appeared to pause strikes on energy sites in recent days, it continued the nightly barrages on Ukraine’s cities. The strikes hit Ukrainian railroads Friday, and killed 12 miners who were on a bus coming from a mine on Sunday, according to DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private energy company.

“They delayed the strike, increased the number of missiles and drones, and struck on the coldest days,” Zelensky said, adding that 43 missiles launched overnight could only be intercepted by the Patriot air defense system.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte arrived Tuesday morning in Ukraine as the Russian attack continued. He said that Russia sought to cripple the Ukrainian energy infrastructure with the latest strike and visited one of the damaged plants. He said that Ukraine needed more interceptors for its air-defense systems.

“Ukraine needs much more,” Rutte said. “And we are urgently working to ensure that more is delivered as quickly as possible. I continue to work with allies, urging them to dig deep in their stockpiles, knowing how pressing is the need.”

Watch: Why Russia Is Building a $25 Billion Nuclear Power Plant in a NATO Country (August 2025)

From August 2025: Russia is building and operating Turkey’s first nuclear power plant—a $25 billion project. WSJ explains what it means for Turkey and NATO. Photo Illustration: MacKenzie Coffman

Appeared in the February 4, 2026, print edition as 'Russia Resumes Strikes On Ukrainian Energy Sites'.

Anastasiia Malenko is a contributor to The Wall Street Journal covering the war in Ukraine, focusing on how it has reshaped Ukrainian society. She is based in Kyiv. She previously covered the war as a breaking news correspondent for Reuters and a reporter for the Kyiv Independent, the leading English-language newspaper in Ukraine.

Anastasiia graduated from Stanford University with degrees in political science and economics.

WSJ

12. Opinion | Vladimir Putin Isn’t Winning in Ukraine

Summary:

The editorial argues Vladimir Putin is not winning in Ukraine despite claiming he cannot be defeated. Citing a CSIS report by Seth Jones and Riley McCabe, it estimates Russia has suffered about 1.2 million casualties since 2022, with deaths possibly as high as 325,000. It says Russia’s territorial gains do not match those losses, pointing to slow advances near Pokrovsk. It also argues Moscow’s war spending is consuming roughly half the budget and that Russia lacks the economic dynamism to sustain the effort. The piece concludes POTUS has leverage to press harder with sanctions and weapons to secure a stronger peace.

Comment: Has this become a war of exhaustion for Russia? If Russia’s losses and economic strain weaken its bargaining position, why would POTUS accept a deal that lets Moscow regroup rather than using pressure to lock in durable security guarantees?

Opinion | Vladimir Putin Isn’t Winning in Ukraine

WSJ · Vladimir Putin Isn’t Winning in Ukraine

The Russian death toll may be as high as 325,000 in four years.

By The Editorial Board

Feb. 3, 2026 5:25 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/vladimir-putin-ukraine-russia-war-csis-report-84152ece

Russian President Vladimir Putin Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Sputnik/Pool/Associated Press

President Trump has his hands full in Venezuela while also pondering military action in Iran, but the Ukraine war is grinding on and Vladimir Putin wants the world to think he can’t be defeated. A new, detailed report on the war underscores that Mr. Putin isn’t winning, and Mr. Trump can still apply military and economic pressure to produce a peace that is honorable.

Russian forces have taken an astonishing 1.2 million casualties in Ukraine since 2022, according to estimates from Seth Jones and Riley McCabe of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Russian death toll may be as high as 325,000—more than five times than in all Soviet and Russian conflicts combined since World War II. Some 36,000 Americans died in the grinding three-year Korean War.

Opinion: Potomac Watch

Trump's ‘Armada’ Nears Iran / U.S. Life Expectancy Hits a Record

As a U.S. aircraft carrier arrives in the Middle East, President Trump goes back to negotiating with Iran. But what does the U.S. want in a deal, now that Iran's nuclear sites are rubble, and will Trump help the country's protesters? Plus, new figures show Americans are living longer, which is good news with political lessons.Read Transcript

The conventional wisdom is that Mr. Putin will eventually prevail because Russia is the larger power and Mr. Putin can keep throwing men into his human meat grinder. Yet Mr. Putin isn’t making territorial gains commensurate with his losses.

Consider Mr. Putin’s struggle to take the city of Pokrovsk. Russian forces have advanced in the area on average 70 meters a day from late February 2024 to January of this year. That’s like starting the day on 42nd street in Manhattan and ending up on 43rd street.

The Ukraine war draws comparisons to the trench warfare of World War I, but the Russian advance has been “slower than the most brutal offensive campaigns over the last century, including the notoriously bloody Battle of the Somme during World War I,” says the report. Ukraine has its own manpower shortages, but Russian casualties are two or 2.5 to one for Ukraine.

Meanwhile, half of Moscow’s budget is flowing to “the armed forces, the military-industrial complex, domestic security and debt service,” CSIS notes. Moscow doesn’t have the economic growth or dynamism to keep underwriting the misadventure for the long haul. One illustrative fact: Russia has “a grand total of zero companies in the top 100 list of technology companies as measured by market capitalization.”

All of this means Mr. Putin shouldn’t be able to wield a whip hand at the negotiating table. The Russian dictator is in a weakened position that Mr. Trump could exploit with tougher sanctions and more U.S. weapons, to at least force Mr. Putin to give up some stolen territory and tolerate real security guarantees.

The same Mr. Trump who arms his diplomacy with Iran to increase his leverage has been oddly unwilling to do the same with Mr. Putin. But a weak peace would let Mr. Putin “up off the mat,” as GOP Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker put it last year. The Russian would rearm with a renewed animus for NATO.

Mr. Putin isn’t the unstoppable man he wants Mr. Trump to think he is. The question of the past year has been whether President Trump will see this strategic opening to reduce the Russian threat to the U.S., and deter the world’s bad actors in Beijing and elsewhere, by driving a harder bargain in Ukraine.

Appeared in the February 4, 2026, print edition as 'Vladimir Putin Isn’t Winning in Ukraine'.

The Editorial Board speaks for free markets and free people, the principles, if you will, marked in the watershed year of 1776 by Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence and Adam Smith's “Wealth of Nations.” So over the past century and into the next, the Journal stands for free trade and sound money; against confiscatory taxation and the ukases of kings and other collectivists; and for individual autonomy against dictators, bullies and even the tempers of momentary majorities.

WSJ · Vladimir Putin Isn’t Winning in Ukraine

13. The Clash of Civilizations at 30: Huntington was right to highlight the West's civilizational achievement.

Summary:

Graham McAleer revisits Samuel Huntington 30 years on, arguing his civilizational lens still explains post Cold War disorder and the West’s predicament. He notes critiques from Edward Said and John Gray, then stresses Huntington’s core claim that civilization based order can reduce world war risk, even as modernization makes the world “more modern and less Western.” He frames Ukraine as a “cleft” case across West and Orthodox lines, argues Western choices helped cast the war as civilizational, and says Western credibility is eroding as hard power wanes and domestic trust fractures.

Comment: When I was in CGSC and SAMS in 1994-1996 Huntington's Clash and Kaplan's The Coming Anarchy were the basis for debates on the state of the world at that time.

If civilizational identity and “core states” shape order more than ideology, what should the West protect first: its internal civic trust, its military hard power, or its restraint that signals prudence rather than arrogance?

The Clash of Civilizations at 30

Huntington was right to highlight the West's civilizational achievement.

Published on

Feb 3, 2026

Contributors

Graham McAleer

https://www.civitasoutlook.com/research/huntingtons-the-clash-of-civilizations-at-30-c7193201-034e-4df7-a4b2-1a8072a85de3

‍

About Samuel Huntington’s “seminal book,” Zbigniew Brzezinski says, “the sheer size of [the] book’s global readership testifies that it satisfied the widespread craving for a comprehensive understanding of our currently turbulent historical reality.” Published after the ideological wars of the twentieth century, Huntington’s 1996 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order argued that moving forward, the central and most dangerous phenomenon in global affairs would be “conflict between groups from differing civilizations.” Despite the best-seller numbers, commentators from the left and the right reacted negatively. In The Nation, Edward Said rebuked “this belligerent kind of thought.” John Gray pointed out that history shows war happens more within civilizations than between them, citing the catastrophes of WW1, WW2, and the Cold War as examples.

Huntington is well able to blunt Said’s point, for his conflict claim had a corollary, that “an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war.” In fairness, Huntington, who died in 2008, was more interested in order than in war. Gray contends that the great twentieth century conflicts were resource wars, not disputes between value orders. Yet hierarchies of worth promoted by civilizations must shape how peoples value land. Huntington identified Sinic, Japanese, Orthodox, Christian West, Hindu, Islamic, Buddhist, African, and Latin civilizations. The list is obviously unstable, with all manner of overlaps, yet some such classification of order rings true, and this is why “big picture” philosophies of history work along these lines.

Western civilization is a special focus of the book, but not exceptionalism: “The development of the West to date has not deviated significantly from the evolutionary patterns common to civilizations throughout history.” Huntington saw clearly the rise of multipolarity and the fading of Western power, but he paid little heed to the signs of the West’s internal confusion. Reacting to on-going social failures that have dogged the West for decades, many are revisiting socialism and is surging . Huntington identified the West with constitutionalism and individualism, but our governments routinely invoke emergency powers to rule and the tribalism that Adam Smith said attends all poor economic thinking is now throughout the West . Rather than being marginalized, the West is eroding.

Order

The Clash of Civilizations appeared in the heady days of Fukuyama’s End of History thesis, which proposed that history shows the only right model of governance is Western. Huntington cites President Clinton in 1994 saying, “freedom’s boundaries now should be defined by new behavior, not by old history. I say to all… democracy everywhere, market economies everywhere, countries cooperating for mutual security everywhere. We must guard against lesser outcome.” He notes that the Clinton presidency gave up these lofty goals as the “old history” of geopolitics reasserted itself. What Fukuyama had missed, argued Huntington, was that “democracy is inherently a parochializing not a cosmopolitanizing process.” In a fine summation of where we are today, Huntington observes, “a Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be impossible for him to do that with a Russian Orthodox nationalist.” He bluntly disposed of Fukuyama’s thesis, observing that “in the five years after the Berlin wall came down, the word `genocide’ was heard far more often than in any five years of the Cold War.” Necessary, argued Huntington, is a theory of order that does not romanticize history.

Huntington served on the national security team of the Carter administration, held a named Chair at Harvard, and founded one of America’s preeminent foreign relations journals. Nonetheless, he cautioned that his book was not a work of social science but rather “an interpretation of the evolution of global politics after the Cold War.” The interpretation rests on Huntington’s belief that peoples first wonder, who are we? “We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.” In consequence, when “coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family.” Thus, “the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the world’s major civilizations.”

Now widely accepted is Huntington’s observation: “Modernization, instead, strengthens those cultures and reduces the relative power of the West. In fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less Western.” Sophisticated but significantly different civilizations span the globe. For an order of civilizations, he contended, there must be some strong nation-states particularly imbuing the civilization, the core states: “the most important countries in the world come overwhelmingly from different civilizations.” Said rebuked Huntington for his belligerent thinking, but the Harvard man’s contention is that core states add stability to a civilization. Said reacted to Huntington’s claim that Islamic civilization is especially fractious, yet this point was not malicious but formal. There is no core state in Islamic civilization: Iran cannot be that state because it is Shiite; Saudi Arabia is too small; and Indonesia, the most likely candidate for the anchor role on account of its population, is geographically on the outer fringe.

Disorder

Huntington also observed that in very many locales, nation-states do not cement order – rivals for that role include mafias, corporations, collectives, religious councils, city-states, and the like. Compounding the problem are cleft countries – countries abreast civilizational faultlines. At the time of the Second Iraq War, The Clash of Civilizations was slotted into the West v Islam book genre, yet an important test case for Huntington was the Western Christianity v Orthodoxy faultline, specifically Ukraine.

The Russo-Ukraine War has scrambled many international relations conceits, but Huntington’s thesis emerges well from that crucible. Ukraine is a cleft state split along a Christian West/Orthodox line running north to south. Presciently, Huntington argued, “NATO expansion limited to Western states would also underline Russia’s role as the core state of a separate, Orthodox civilization, and hence a country which should be responsible for order within and along the boundaries of Orthodoxy.” Smart policy, he thinks, is for NATO to concede that role to Russia. Assuming no meddling, he did not foresee war. Though a cleft country, the two Slavic peoples have muddled along for centuries, and intermarriage is widespread. “If civilization is what counts, however, violence between Ukrainians and Russians is unlikely.” This might now seem a howler, but it is critical to recall that the Biden administration made the war a clash of civilizations, pitting Orthodox Russia against the Christian West’s military alliance. We know that at the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul, it was the West that told the Ukrainians to keep fighting, and it was NATO that planned and supplied the disastrous 2023 Ukrainian counterattack. Huntington fares well because that war fully displays the resilience and agency of civilizations.

Western Crisis

The `20s have not been kind to the West, and the wounds are largely self-inflicted. Ignoring Huntington’s advice, European members of NATO have issued tremendous verbal support of Ukraine but haven’t backed those words with necessary means to prevail against Russia, exposing the continent’s powers as hollow. That perception has cratered Western credibility. The West is no longer perceived as admirable or prudent. Our world matches Huntington’s statement: “The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness.”

He observes that the US is alone in having the capacity to bomb any country in the world and he darkly noted that in the fading light it would start to do so. What he did not see – but no one could have seen – is the impact of drones and cheap missile technology. This development inhibited the US Navy from defeating the Houthis attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. At the time of writing, the Red Sea is still closed after two years on account of Houthi anger over Gaza. Drones have also made mechanized war practically impossible, and the West is ill-equipped to deploy large amounts of infantry. Much of the West’s military edge has been taken off the board. As Huntington observed, soft power follows hard power, and the West’s reaction to diminished hard power looks petulant and craven.

Equally acute is the loss of trust inside Western polities. Alternative and social media have caught Western politicians lying so frequently that “conspiracy” thinking is now a default. Tall tales and cover-ups are so pervasive that real social and economic costs are mounting. As Huntington pointed out: “Businessmen make deals with people they can understand and trust; states surrender sovereignty to international associations composed of like-minded states they understand and trust.” Adam Smith warned that without constitutionalism and individualism, societies revert to tribalism. It was a signature accomplishment of the West’s long tradition of humanism to make durable a civic framework of liberty that generated trust in leadership and moderation in technology. Huntington was right to highlight that civilizational achievement. He was also right to caution that when arrogance replaces virtue, then the world will be far more dangerous.

Graham McAleer is lay member of the Judicial Ethics Committee of the State of Maryland and author, most recently, of Tolkien, Philosopher of War (CUA Press, 2024).

14. America’s Critical-Minerals Strategy Looks Increasingly Chinese

Summary:

The U.S. is adopting a China-like approach to secure rare earths and other critical minerals by creating a $12 billion government-led stockpile called the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve, or “Project Vault.” The Export-Import Bank would provide up to $10 billion in loans, with about $2 billion expected from private capital. The government is also investing in miners, including a potential $1.6 billion for USA Rare Earth with shares going to the government, and it has taken stakes in other strategic firms. The reserve aims to cushion boom-bust cycles, protect manufacturers from supply shocks, and support domestic processing, but stockpiling minerals is complex and building resilience could take years.

Excerpt:

If the facilities are stocked with relatively unprocessed raw materials, they couldn’t be used immediately in factories during an emergency. But storing the finished version of the products, such as rare earth magnets, presents its own issues because product specifications evolve. “There is no one-fits-all,” said Thomas Kruemmer, a rare earths analyst based in Singapore.

“We’re focused on the critical raw materials,” said Jovanovic of the Export-Import Bank.

Assuming the vault doesn’t buy from China, it could take years to build a stockpile that would sufficiently shield the U.S. in an emergency. For materials such as scarce “heavy” rare earths, there is little processing capacity outside of China, and the plants now being built will likely meet only a portion of demand in the U.S. and allied nations over the next couple of years.

Comment: What about refining/processing? I thought refining/processing is the long pole in the tent? (or supply chain). If the U.S. is moving toward state-driven capitalism to counter China’s coercive minerals leverage, how will Washington prevent “Project Vault” from becoming a slow, politicized allocator while still delivering real surge capacity in processing and finished components like magnets?

America’s Critical-Minerals Strategy Looks Increasingly Chinese

WSJ

Trump’s Project Vault steps up government involvement to assure rare-earth supplies and protect U.S. industry

By Jon Emont

Feb. 3, 2026 10:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/business/americas-critical-minerals-strategy-looks-increasingly-chinese-75f9d7c1

President Trump announced the creation of the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve in the Oval Office on Monday. Alex Wong/Getty Images

The new U.S. strategy for rare-earth minerals looks a lot like China’s old one.

A U.S. government agency is providing most of the funding for a $12 billion government-led stockpile of minerals, some of which will likely be sourced from mining companies partly owned by the government.

The plan for the newly created U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve—which President Trump called Project Vault—borrows from Beijing’s longstanding playbook because that is the rival Washington is trying to combat. China last year brandished its control of rare-earth minerals and processing to extract trade concessions from Trump.

“That’s been a total paradigm shift in how the U.S. looks at these things,” said Morgan Bazilian, director of the Payne Institute at the Colorado School of Mines.

Beijing recognized years ago that supporting local mining companies would ensure a stable supply of materials for its manufacturers and give it a tool for international coercion. At the same time, state involvement doesn’t mean total state control: Many Chinese miners are in the private sector—including some listed on stock exchanges—and they compete for profits and market share.

Likewise, the U.S. government is investing in private-sector miners and bringing companies such as Boeing, General Motors and Alphabet’s Google into Project Vault.

In January, USA Rare Earth, a vertically integrated emerging producer of rare earths and magnets, said it was offered potential government funding of up to $1.6 billion, with some company shares to be given to the government.

Embracing a Chinese-style model of state-driven capitalism, the U.S. government has made similar investments in other domestic minerals producers since last year and intervened in strategic industries. It took a 10% stake in chip maker Intel and a “golden share” in U.S. Steel when the latter was acquired by Japan’s Nippon Steel.

For Project Vault, the Export-Import Bank, a U.S. agency, will provide loans of up to $10 billion, while private capital is expected to provide about $2 billion to the project.

Trump didn’t give details of how the vault would operate, but it could provide a steady buyer to tide American and allied producers through the boom-bust cycle, a traditional feature of the minerals business that has often deterred private investment. John Jovanovic, the chairman of the Export-Import Bank, said the stockpile would support domestic processing of critical raw materials as well as protect U.S. manufacturers from supply shocks.

Beijing has long amassed stockpiles of metals such as copper, aluminum and zinc, and it upgraded the system in 2024 to add more types of minerals.

When China slashed exports of rare-earth magnets last spring, American companies such as Ford were forced to temporarily shut down factories because of supply shortages.

The name Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve echoes the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a federally owned and managed oil stockpile stored in underground salt caverns at four sites in the U.S. Like the new minerals reserve, the petroleum stockpile dates to a foreign supply shock—the Arab oil embargo of the 1970s. With an authorized storage capacity of 714 million barrels, it is designed to deter threats by hostile nations to interrupt supplies.

An oil storage facility in Texas. ADREES LATIF/REUTERS

The mineral reserve calls for crucial raw materials to be stashed in secure facilities across the country. The Export-Import Bank’s announcement said the stockpiles would be independently governed, but didn’t describe the entity that would control them.

Experts say minerals would be trickier to stockpile than petroleum. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve includes sweet and sour crude, while there are 17 rare earths as well as dozens of other critical minerals. The quantities needed change over time depending on how cars, planes and other industrial goods are manufactured.

If the facilities are stocked with relatively unprocessed raw materials, they couldn’t be used immediately in factories during an emergency. But storing the finished version of the products, such as rare earth magnets, presents its own issues because product specifications evolve. “There is no one-fits-all,” said Thomas Kruemmer, a rare earths analyst based in Singapore.

“We’re focused on the critical raw materials,” said Jovanovic of the Export-Import Bank.

Assuming the vault doesn’t buy from China, it could take years to build a stockpile that would sufficiently shield the U.S. in an emergency. For materials such as scarce “heavy” rare earths, there is little processing capacity outside of China, and the plants now being built will likely meet only a portion of demand in the U.S. and allied nations over the next couple of years.

A new processing plant for gallium, a key semiconductor material dominated by China, is expected to start up in Australia at the end of 2026, with backing from the Japanese, American and Australian governments.

“We don’t want to ever go through what we went through a year ago,” Trump said.

Jon Emont is a reporter based in Singapore, where he writes about the intersection of business and geopolitics. Frequent topics include mining and critical minerals, companies caught up in trade tensions, and global efforts to boost manufacturing and secure food supplies.

He was previously based in Hong Kong, where he wrote about Amazon's push to recruit sellers in Asia and the Hong Kong protest movements, among other issues. In 2020, he was part of a WSJ team whose series on Amazon was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in investigative reporting.

Prior to joining the Journal in 2017, Jon worked as a freelancer in Indonesia, where he wrote for the New York Times, Washington Post and Financial Times. He was a Fulbright scholar in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, and speaks Bahasa Indonesia.

In his spare time, Jon reads novels and plays with his dog and daughter.

WSJ

15. Hegemony and the Chinese Grand Strategy: Continuity in the CCP’s Political Lexicon

Summary:

Musa Fareed argues that the CCP’s anti hegemonism language has shown strong continuity from Deng Xiaoping’s 1974 U.N. debut to Xi Jinping’s 2025 SCO address. He contends the CCP defines hegemony less by how much power a state has and more by how it is used, with “hegemon” tied to dominative, coercive behavior rather than ideology. The essay frames China’s grand strategy as nationalist rejuvenation, restoring “wealth and power” after the Century of Humiliation, while preserving a moral high ground by emphasizing transformative power, coalitions, and “peaceful” slogans. It portrays policy as opportunistic and pragmatic, shifting partners as threats change, while warning that dependence on an external “boogeyman” raises questions about China’s behavior if it becomes unrivaled.

Comment; Graphics and images at the link.

Hegemony and the Chinese Grand Strategy: Continuity in the CCP’s Political Lexicon

by Musa Fareed

02.04.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/04/hegemony-and-chinese-grand-strategy/

On April 10th, 1974, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) addressed the U.N. General Assembly for the first time. After years of war and struggling for power, they were internationally recognized as the legitimate government of China. This speech would be the first delivered by the CCP to the entire globe and would mark a new era in Chinese foreign affairs. Deng Xiaoping, the selected spokesperson and eventual leader of the CCP, delivered a passionate rallying cry for “Third World” countries across the globe. He emphasized the need to unite and fight against great evils, including colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism.

Now, over 50 years later, an increasing number of people view China as the world’s top economy. On September 1st, 2025, leaders, dignitaries, and heads of state from around the world gathered in Tianjin to join Xi Jinping in his vision for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. He opened his address by emphasizing the need to combat the Cold War mentality, protectionism, and hegemonism.

Nearly everything about China has changed in the last 50 years, but the international call to combat hegemonism has not. Why? What is it about hegemonism that enshrines it in the CCP’s language? To answer that question, one must also analyze how the CCP’s usage of the word has evolved since 1974. Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that the CCP’s definition and application of hegemonism remain unchanged.

The CCP’s definition of hegemony is based not on how much power a state has, but on which type of power. The accusation is leveraged based on foreign policy and involvement, not ideological misalignment. The driving force behind CCP policy isn’t ideological alignment – it’s nationalism and a desire to restore Chinese “wealth and power.” Maintaining a moral high ground is central to achieving the ultimate goal of a “rejuvenated” China.

Given the ideologies of China’s two recent strategic adversaries – first the USSR and then the United States – one might assume that if the same word is used to define both, its meaning has changed. However, it has not.

To support this conclusion, I defined key terms, analyzed their usage, and tied in historical and current developments to highlight the drivers of Chinese policy. The terms discussed are grand strategy, power, and Western versus Chinese perceptions of hegemony. I then provide proof of what I argue is the CCP’s definition of hegemony. Finally, I analyze the CCP’s grand strategy, explain why the consistent cry against hegemony is important, and present evidence for these assertions.

What is Grand Strategy?

In the world of strategic studies, strategy can be defined as “the art of creating power”. So, what separates strategy from grand strategy?

Drawing the boundary between grand strategy and strategy is a fierce debate I do not plan on settling in this paper, but for this paper, a pointed version is “a state’s plan for maximizing gains during peacetime.” Each state pursues a goal (e.g., restoring national pride) that dictates all other strategies (e.g., foreign relations, propaganda efforts, military buildup, economic development), with that overarching goal called grand strategy.

Figure 1: A visual representation of how grand strategy dictates a state’s actions. The grand strategy is at the center of everything it does, influencing all branches of government.

What is Power?

A state wishing to maximize gains requires power. So, what does power mean? Most of us associate power with force. “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. While this is true, analyzing how A gets B to do something is very, very important.

Felicia Pratto, a social psychologist, put forth an interesting argument on relational power. Definitions of power focus almost exclusively on the powerful actor rather than the agency of all actors. Power can never be quantified in a vacuum because it is entirely perceptual. You can put a gun to my head and threaten to shoot me. In this scenario, most would say you are more powerful than I. But what if I am convinced that no matter what threat you make, you will not pull the trigger? Then, really, you possess no power.

Power, therefore, is relational and can only be measured as such. Pratto identifies four types of relational power:

Dominative: Power over; forcing another actor to do something against its interest
Affiliative: Power with; “influence through relationships with others who have compatible goals”, e.g., coalitions, alliances
Positional: Power in; “Influencing others through virtue of position, rank, or role”, e.g., professor and student, CEO vs laborer
Transformative: Empower others; “a party with greater capacity helps another party to expand the latter’s capacity”.

We can easily find examples of all four types in international relations. A nation that threatens or uses violence to achieve its goal demonstrates dominative power. The formation of coalitions and alliances, such as NATO, ASEAN, and the U.N., represents affiliative power. Positional power could be defined as the roles states play in those alliances (e.g., having a permanent seat on the Security Council). Finally, aid and development agreements build transformative power.

What is Hegemony, and do China and the West Agree?

Every state aims to build power, but how much power puts an actor in a tier above the rest? What differentiates the underdog from the Vegas favorite, the rogue state from the hegemon? The textbook definition of a hegemon is “a leader, country, or group that is very strong and powerful and therefore able to control others”.

Modern Western strategic analysts consider only a country’s power when classifying it as a hegemon. How much can it get other actors to act in its own interests? However, Chinese definitions, unlike Western ones, are not amoral. Badao, the Chinese word for hegemony, “has a decidedly normative overtone”. Chinese scholars claim that hegemons (currently the United States) “worship violence”, are “bloodthirsty”, and have a “warlike disposition”.

Let us tie hegemony to the four types of power. Most Western analysts only care about how much power a state has. The CCP cares greatly about which kind of power a state has. To the CCP, a state becomes a hegemon and an enemy when it exercises predominantly dominative power (power over). Therefore, no matter how much transformative power (empower others) China builds, it will not classify as hegemonic.

Figure 2: A graphic showcasing the difference between the contemporary Western definition of hegemony in strategic studies and the commonly-accepted Chinese word for hegemony, badao.

What is the Historical Proof?

In the CCP’s first address to the world in 1974, Deng Xiaoping assails the United States and USSR, the two superpowers and hegemons of the world:

“Each [the U.S. and the USSR] in its own way attempts to bring developing countries … under its control and, at the same time, to bully the developed countries that are not their match in strength.”

Notice the emphasis on the coercive (aka dominative) nature of the two bullies. They were evil not because they were powerful, but because they used their power to exploit and oppress others.

China was not equal in its criticism of the USSR and the U.S. At that time. the Americans were key allies against the aggressive Soviets. Mao and Deng had made clear that the Soviets were dangerous hypocrites. Violent conflicts such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan reflected the Soviets’ comfort with force and military domination. As a result, the CCP sided with the U.S., the (relatively) moderate, détente force.

Once the immediate, violent threat was dealt with, the U.S. and China were actually on good terms. However, to the CCP, America was becoming increasingly coercive. Both Bushs’ insistence on the Gulf Wars was a huge red flag. Now, Donald Trump now is using economic and military might to put nations in their place and remind them that they do not “want to f— around” with the U.S. With America not only fitting but embodying the CCP’s definition of hegemony, ties are continually worsening.

What is the CCP’s Grand Strategy, and Why is Combatting Hegemony so Important?

I argue that the CCP was founded on and is still centered around nationalism. Evidence is found in the CCP’s history. A central part of the CCP’s official history is the Century of Humiliation, a period from 1839 to 1949 during which the Chinese people were displaced, denigrated, and subject to foreign oppression.

After World War 1, the Japanese controlled some Chinese territories. Chinese diplomats were sent to the Paris Peace Accords to negotiate the return of Shandong, the Japanese-controlled land, but were unsuccessful. Citizens were furious and protested en masse in the May 4th Movement.

Participants included future leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In Deng’s words, he participated in “the Nationalist effort to rid China of the humiliation it had suffered” and “to make it rich and strong”. When Mao announced the establishment of the PRC in 1949, he declared, “Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up”.

The accumulation of “wealth and power” and the “rejuvenation” of China are specific phrases found littered through CCP texts. The phrase “wealth and power” is over 2,000 years old, but its use gained widespread traction during the Century of Humiliation. It replaced Confucian teaching of the “rule of the virtuous” and remains “something of a north star for Chinese intellectual and political leaders”.

Xi Jinping made clear his grand strategy is China’s rejuvenation; it is the center of his “China Dream”. During an address in 2017, he invoked the horrors of the Century of Humiliation and declared rejuvenation as “the original aspiration and mission of the Chinese Communists”.

Both Mao and Xi often made clear that only the CCP can achieve those goals. Their centralization of authority and control of national society is in the name of stability. But to participate in the international arena, they need power. China wants to become a regional power and a hegemon in the Western definition of the word, but seeks the most efficient way to do that. China is a realist state, meaning it realizes the necessity of amassing power to pursue any type of grand strategy. Within realism, there are two approaches: offensive and defensive realism.

Offensive realism states that each nation should actively seek hegemony and achieve hegemonic status through any means possible. According to defensive realism, although each state should wish to be a hegemony, pursuing hegemony is not desirable. Constantly battling actors for control over a region will build harbored hatred and eventually lead to a cycle of uprising and suppression.

Figure 3: A table to display the difference between offensive and defensive realism.

The CCP’s international relations strategy combines both approaches. It amasses regional power by uniting countries disadvantaged in the current status quo and empowering them. Building transformative power instead of dominative power reduces the likelihood of being associated with hegemonic aspirations while achieving the goal of a stronger and wealthier China.

Where is the Evidence for the Grand Strategy Put Forth?

Evidence can be found in CCP texts and foreign policy. To reduce the likelihood of being associated with hegemonic aspirations, party officials often screen publications for words that are deemed sensitive to observers wary of Chinese power. For example, texts for foreign audiences are less likely to explicitly mention China’s efforts of displacing U.S. hegemony. In another example, the usage of “peaceful rise” was dropped in favor of “peaceful development” to “avoid appearing militarily threatening”.

In 1974, Deng specified five principles all countries should uphold, including peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit. When Xi opened his remarks at the SCO, he emphasized the need to “uphold our original commitment to peaceful coexistence” and “strengthen our confidence in win-win cooperation”. These examples highlight the CCP’s commitment to portraying itself not as a dominative regional power but as a leader with the interest of all in mind.

To maintain that image in the international arena and fulfill its nationalistic policies, the CCP is opportunistic. It doesn’t give support based purely on ideological alignment – rather, the proposed grand strategy of nationalism drives policy.

In the 1974 address, Deng uses Mao’s Three Worlds theory, where Third World countries are characterized by low economic development, and revolution entails financial prosperity. As part of supporting revolutionary forces, the CCP backed causes of all kinds, regardless of if they aligned with socialist ideals. Some supported causes were controversial, with one even being partly funded by apartheid South Africa. The following examples highlight the CCP’s opportunism in pursuing the grand strategy of nationalism, not establishing communism.

“Revolution could quickly give way to pragmatic policy needs, as later economic developments illustrate”. As mentioned before, the U.S. used to be a close ally of the CCP. China faced a greater threat from a strong USSR, so the USSR became public enemy number one. Deng even distanced himself from the 1974 speech because of its harsh criticism of American policy. In the 1970s, Chinese relations with Taiwan actually improved – Taiwan was given more freedoms with the pretext that there was an implicit parallel interest in protecting shipping lanes from adversaries. A series of Sino-Japanese trade agreements were also signed in the 70s despite their extremely violent, imperialist past. Now, U.S. relations have deteriorated largely due to the continued use of dominative power, which meets the CCP’s definition of hegemony and threatens its proposed equalitarian world order.

What’s Next?

For the CCP, Chinese power is an end, not a means. Its grand strategy is to reverse the damages of the past two centuries and restore “wealth and power”. Party leaders like Mao, Deng, and Xi believe that building transformative power is the most efficient way to do so. By calling on nations to combat hegemonies (states that rule others through dominative power), they ensure prosperity for their people. Maintaining that image of benevolent leader is crucial and is a very conscious, strategic choice. Even though the U.S. and the USSR are ideological opposites, to the CCP, their exploitive and violent nature classify both as hegemonic and evil.

In Xi’s words, “Time and momentum on our side.” China is experiencing a “period of historical opportunity”. Countries have long been oppressed and are joining China’s rallying cry for change. But with power as an end and not a mean, how much power is too much power, and what is China’s strategy for when there are no more dominative hegemonies?

This is something I could not find an answer to. All evidence analyzed points to the Chinese understanding of relational power – there is a strong hegemony (the USSR, then the U.S.) that must be displaced through cooperation. There’s a boogeyman to combat, but what happens when there is no boogeyman? China has been punching up in the world order, but if it stands alone at the top, will it continue to build transformative power, or will it exert dominative power to maintain the China-centric status quo? Answering these questions is key to understanding the CCP’s policy and future.

Afterword

“Thank you to Dr. Amos C. Fox, Dr. Max Rayneard, and Dr. Lee Jeong-Ho for guiding me and making this possible.”

Tags: Chinese communist party, Hegemony, Power

About The Author

Musa Fareed

16. Engineering Options to Intercept “A House of Dynamite” Attack

Summary:

Tariq Khan proposes engineering concepts to intercept a single rogue nuclear missile attack like the scenario in the film A House of Dynamite. He argues the core problem is time, since detection, decision, and engagement must work inside roughly a 30-minute window, and failure to intercept does not automatically require “launch on warning” given U.S. retaliatory capability. He emphasizes AI-enabled swarm coordination and miniaturized satellites or drones to shorten response time. The main concept is layered satellite swarms that maneuver to form a “mesh” of directed-energy lasers across a warhead’s path, with multiple orbital layers for redundancy. He also discusses suborbital threats, mirrored satellites, kinetic swarming, and debris risks.

Comment: Graphics at the link.

Essay| The Latest

Engineering Options to Intercept “A House of Dynamite” Attack

by Tariq Khan

02.04.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/04/engineering-options/

ABSTRACT

An informal essay proposing engineering designs or options that could help the United States intercept a single missile rogue nuclear attack like that presented in the 2025 Netflix motion picture film A House of Dynamite. Theoretical modern technology designs are presented that the United States Department of Defense (War) and advanced military armament and space organizations can consider for possible near-term and future platforms, including Golden Dome proposals.

Introduction

In the 2025 Netflix motion picture film A House of Dynamite, the public is made aware of the challenges with intercepting even a single ICBM armed with a nuclear warhead. The film does a great job in stressing a key challenge and obstacle – the limited amount of time to intercept and react to a high-velocity missile threat. In a world of random events, and with the daily chaos of human life, the odds of all government systems, communication, monitoring, and escalation processes working seamlessly, in any given approximately 30-minute-long window, is very small. Thus, beyond a vast investment in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems, we have a real-world problem and a clear and present danger. Note, however, that the existence of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) guarantees the threat of retaliation by the United States as a key aspect of our nuclear triad defense strategy, so even the “failure to intercept,” of a single nuclear warhead does not require, per se, an immediate response i.e. a “launch on warning” as somewhat insinuated in the film.

Swarm Coordination

A key challenge with any space-based system, including any anti-ballistic missile defense system, is the cost. This includes the high cost of initial proposals for an American Golden Dome defense system based on the deployment of massive quantities of ground-based interceptor missiles. But there are designs and strategies, even with current technologies, that can reduce the massive spending requirement of an ABM system. Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) that reduces compute resources and allows for complex and extremely fast and precise decision making, targeting, and coordination of fleets of devices, is a modern technology that has reached a level of maturity where it can be deployed to alter the battlespace dynamic.

A.I. is a critical component of all theoretical space-based ABM designs, but a larger benefit is likely from the miniaturization of satellites and drones, with both technologies, using A.I. for swarm coordination that enables an extremely fast response time to any incoming threat (see fig. 1). Examples of such small microsatellites, nanosatellites, picosatellites, and femtosatellites include: Agile MicroSat (AMS), Millennium Space Systems, CubeSat, Demeter, Essaim, Parasol, Picard, Microscope, Taranis, Elisa, SSOT, SMART-1, Spirale-A/-B, and Starlink satellites.

Response time is of particular importance given the additional threats that now exist with even less identification and reaction time available from an attack using cruise missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles that never travel above earth’s atmosphere, not to mention new technologies like aeroballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) land attack cruise missiles, fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), and possible nuclear powered cruise missiles.

Theoretical designs are presented that may help that United States, or any technologically advanced nation, optimize modern aerospace systems to address the threat of a rogue ICBM attack. As a black widow spider spins a web to capture and immobilize its agile victim, we can imagine a system that resembles such a web or an umbrella-style approach to warhead interception i.e., when it begins to rain, we don’t attempt to stop each rain drop, we use an umbrella.

With new extremely fast and lightweight microprocessors, SpaceX has advanced the development of small rocket thrusters for satellite maneuvering much as they advanced rocket technology to the level of landing large rocket boosters on floating platforms in the ocean and returning them to earth after a launch to be “caught” by mechanical arms of the rocket’s launch tower. This level of miniaturization and engineering precision is needed to overcome the challenge, as literally noted in the film’s dialog, of using a missile traveling at hypersonic velocity to strike an incoming re-entry vehicle warhead that is also traveling at hypersonic velocity i.e., of “hitting a bullet with a bullet.”

A Full Mesh of Defensive Lasers

An example space-based ABM design involves a swarm of three or more small satellites, akin to Starlink-sized satellite devices, in a fleet that always has at least three satellites over a given region above the continental United States, preferably in a geostationary orbit. Even with large fleets of small satellites, orbital distances are vast and, while satellite rocket thruster technology is improving as noted, many commercial satellites take a long time to change location. Thus improving rocket thruster power, for satellite maneuverability and to allow them to quickly move large distances, will be a key design requirement for a military defensive system. Progress in this area is already underway even on the commercial side. In 2021 Starlink acquired Swarm Technologies and have begun to deploy their argon-powered Hall thrusters that TechCrunch reported in 2023 will “generate 2.4 times the thrust and 1.5 times the specific impulse than previous Starlink thrusters.” Each satellite in this design would be armed with a defensive laser technology formally described as a directed energy weapon (DEW) or high-energy laser (HEL) system.

This design uses fleets of small satellites separated or stacked in various orbits resembling a “layer cake,” around the planet. The full spectrum of orbital capabilities are covered with dozens or more fleets, from low earth orbit (LEO) at 160-2000 km (with fast orbits of approximately 90 minutes) to fixed positions at high geostationary orbit (GEO) at 36,000 km, akin to a metaphorical “deep shield” (see fig. 2). If an ICBM or MIRV re-entry warhead approaches any United States territory, or even the territory of its allies or forward deployed forces anywhere on the globe, we can imagine high-powered lasers creating a full mesh “web” between each satellite – at least three satellites as a minimum, but scalable to a much larger number of satellites given the amount of time another satellite in the swarm has to reach its maximum distance to join the web full mesh network. This occurs separately, at each orbital altitude in this full mesh “layer cake” approach, via A.I. swarm coordination, (see fig. 3). Note that each satellite is designed with the ability to coordinate the entire swarm as a controller satellite driving inherent resiliency of command, control, and communication for the swarm coordination response.

Layers of Redundancy

The lasers in this vision need to be powerful, but not beyond current technology, as the satellites can maneuver using the aforementioned modern rocket thrusters to reach a location just close enough to create the laser mesh to “catch” the warhead in that mesh “web,” akin to a baseball outfielder catching a pop fly baseball in their glove. The warhead is destroyed as the laser overheats, explodes, or cuts the projectile as it passes through the laser beam mesh. If the first attempt fails, another satellite swarm is already beneath it at a lower orbital altitude creating a stack of more and more “webs” in a vertical cylindrical shaped “tunnel” along the re-entry path of the warhead. Similar to calculations used for single shot kill probability (SSKP) of interception, independent layers for redundancy are necessary to ensure a 100% chance of success.

Failures can occur on any given satellite or layer regarding target detection, target tracking, and target classification probability. All of these factors must be considered at each phase of a missile attack including booster phase, mid-course phase, and terminal phase. Layers of independent space-based satellite swarms are required to ensure warhead interception via redundancy. Only layers of redundancy can ensure a 100% kill probability contrasted against the various causes of ground-based interceptor failures (see fig. 4).

Suborbital Attacks

A separate and increasingly prevalent threat is that of long-range missiles that do not require an orbital trajectory. To address these sub-orbital attack vectors, we can imagine a new design style – akin to the legacy Strategic Air Command Operation Looking Glass – with a fleet of aircraft in flight 24x7x365, naval ships, or even an assortment of tall towers, containing swarms of small drone aircraft ready to deploy in a similar manner, but within our atmosphere. As seen in the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia, these drones can be armed with small explosives and, even with a reasonably sized swarm, can create a very high-percentage kill success rate. Early detection, as always, is essential in any of these scenarios.

Golden Dome Proposals

Another design option is a single satellite or drone that deploys lasers akin to a spinning fan or dandelion for a similar destructive effect. Also, a satellite, with a nuclear device in it, may be able to spread a flat stream of high-powered X-rays in a horizontal blanket or pancake shape to destroy, damage, or divert any incoming projectile.

Note how all of these designs do not require the creation of new ultra-high powered lasers like a Star Wars “Death Star” aiming at the single incoming warhead.3 Also note that the total cost of these platforms would likely be much less than a vast fleet of ground-based interceptor (GBI) missiles and much faster and also with a higher success rate of interception (see table 1). All of these designs are proposed for the new Golden Dome anti-ballistic missile program established by the Trump Administration and Lockheed Martin including our proposal to “catch” a MIRV missile warhead in a mesh or web of laser beams from small satellite swarms or even using the satellites themselves to directly crash into the warhead.

These ABM designs resemble the classic calculus optimization problem of a drowning swimmer in the ocean and a lifeguard (or dog) attempting to travel down the beach and then swim in the water, in as short an amount of total time as possible, to save the drowning swimmer. The problem is solved via an optimal combination of running time and swimming time e.g., satellite maneuvering or travel time and laser interception time, to achieve the fastest overall interception response.

An assortment of factors come into play in terms of engineering the ability to quickly intercept a high-velocity threat and to ensure the success of the effort. Obviously at a certain point the number or quantity of ground-based interceptors (GBI) or even orbiting satellites (regardless of size) becomes cost prohibitive i.e., to build, launch, track, and maintain so many of them.

The total spherical surface area of any given earth orbit is a vast amount of space to cover, thus even the use of nanosatellites or femtosatellites would still be an enormous challenge to engineer and operate at scale, even with A.I. coordination and miniaturized satellites with powerful and maneuverable thrusters. But, like our calculus ocean analogy, where the optimal solution becomes a “dual path solution” (using X amount of time running down the beach and Y amount of time swimming in the ocean to save the drowning swimmer for a total minimum amount of time of Z = X + Y), we can envision a fleet of small satellites in orbit (with a certain minimum fleet count), with a certain standard distance between each of them, and with an optimal number of orbital levels (each orbital altitude with its own independent satellite swarm fleet). Factors including time-to-identify, the time of a given satellite or swarm to coalesce (get to the warhead or to the point at their orbital level where the warhead will cross) based on the maximum speed of the satellite, the maximum distance of laser efficacy, the maximum distance of swarm communication and coordination by our A.I. system, and the expected lifespan, replenishment rate, and cost of each satellite model, are all engineering constraints that play into any final design (see table 1).

Mirrored Satellites to Create a Laser Mesh

The swarm formation can have a variety of architectures including: a high-powered laser creating a meshed web by reflecting off of a swarm of mirrored nanosatellites, a swarm of small satellites each with various lasers being transmitted around it like a fan or dandelion shape, a swarm of these satellites arranged in a patchwork or quilt formation, or the noted swarm of A.I. coordinated satellites each emitting a small number of laser beams with all of the beams overlapping into an optimal mesh with the power of A.I. adjusting the swarm’s laser-based web shape at extremely high-speed and adjusting to all relevant variables of each satellite – and the warhead telemetry – to ensure interception.

During any interception event, satellites using thrusters, continue to coalesce into a larger and larger swarm formation that the high-speed calculating A.I. engine is able to process and coordinate, including the coordination of fleets at each orbital level, so if the high-altitude initial intercept swarm misses, the next lower altitude levels (with more and more coalescing satellites) has a higher and higher percentage of kill success. Classic kill success calculating approaches like single shot kill probability (SSKP) and circular error of probability (CEP) would be rapidly adjusted and updated in these designs via A.I. processing.

Swarming Kinetic Kill Vehicles

The ability of a satellite or a swarm of satellites to all coalesce using their physical mass as an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) is another design option. However the only kill advantage in this approach is via the added redundancy gained from the increased quantity of attempts to intercept the path of the warhead analogous to a game of darts with a player given dozens of throws to hit the bullseye center target of the board. This is a possible strategy, but it depends on the quantity of satellites and their ability to maneuver fast enough to directly reach the warhead or the warhead’s path in time. In this approach the satellites are also not reusable as some, or many, will have been lost with the kinetic collision with the incoming warhead. This option also involves a larger program and replenishment cost as any damaged or lost satellites would need to be replaced. This design also impacts the functionality of the larger initiative as the collision debris creates additional hazards to the remaining orbital swarm fleet as even small debris can damage or destroy satellites as described by the Kessler Syndrome.

Conclusion

Thus, it is likely the case that a satellite swarm’s web or mesh of lasers will have an ability to cross the path of the warhead faster than any single satellite or small swarm group of satellites. A laser is faster than any rocket powered device but, given current technology, it will need to already be in orbit. Thus the need for an A.I. coordinated swarm of satellite-based lasers. Akin to the lifeguard optimization problem, the proposal uses both 1) the quantity of a swarm of satellites, and 2) the faster speed, flexibility, and destructive power of laser beam weapons, for an optimal design. We can compare this approach to the evolutionary optimization seen in the ant kingdom.4 In the ant kingdom a sweet spot is found between the strategies of using a large quantity of soldier ants and of using groups of ants with specialization or specific focused abilities, to overcome a threat, regardless of its speed or size.

While many of these design concepts are likely already being considered, all possible methodologies should be researched to solve a problem of such national and existential importance as intercepting a rogue single missile nuclear warhead attack like that presented in the 2025 Netflix motion picture film A House of Dynamite. Design strategies including small satellite swarms, artificial intelligence satellite swarm coordination, satellites with space-based lasers that combine into a mesh network, layers of redundant satellite swarms at various orbital altitudes, defensive laser mesh swarms using satellites with mirrors, and using satellite swarms as directed kinetic kill vehicles, are all concepts that should be researched and tested for Golden Dome and future anti-ballistic missile defense programs.

Figures

Figure 1. The miniaturization and mass production of small and highly maneuverable satellites and airborne drones, with both technologies using A.I. for “swarm coordination,” enables an extremely fast response time to small and high-velocity targets.

Figure 2. A “before and after” style diagram is presented of a fleet of small satellites at a single orbital level. Each small satellite in this design is equipped with a powerful laser beam and each maintains an equidistant position from its peer satellites at this orbit around the globe in its “normal operational state.” Upon identification of an ICBM attack, the artificial intelligence coordinated fleet swarms into action using laser beams to create a mesh at a location in the warheads path that will destroy the warhead re-entry vehicle upon contact.

Figure 3. A Golden Dome ABM design proposal using a full mesh of lasers based on A.I. coordinated swarms of small satellites at various orbital altitudes, akin to a layer cake or “deep shield” to ensure successful interception and destruction of any rogue ICBM attack. The “web” of high powered laser beams (green), between highly maneuverable satellites, ensures a successful warhead target interception via the ability to respond exponentially faster than ground-based interceptor rockets – that must reach orbit before attempting a single attempt kill – and via layers of redundancy with small satellite fleets at various orbital levels.

Figure 4. Historical failure root cause examples from ground-based interceptor tests of the Ground-based Mid-course Defense system (GMD).

Table 1. Design success factors are assessed and compared between the current ground-based interceptor fleet (GMD) and three options of the proposed Golden Dome space-based small satellite fleets with artificial intelligence swarm coordination.

Tags: anti-ballistic missile system, drone, Golden Dome, satellite swarm, Swarm

About The Author

Tariq Khan
Tariq Khan is an author and independent researcher. He works in information technology management, has a master’s degree in economics and an MBA, and currently resides in Omaha Nebraska. He has worked at the Defense Innovation Unit, ServiceNow, and in telecommunication and power utility organizations. His research interests center around the topics of philosophy of physics, theoretical computer science, and aerospace.

17. War Injuries: Seeing Beyond Weapons and Doctrines

Summary:

War injuries, the authors argue, are not just collateral damage but evidence of how wars are fought, linking weapons, doctrine, protection, and vulnerability across eras. They trace shifts from Napoleonic amputations and infection, through Crimean hygiene reforms, to World War I industrial shrapnel, gas, and shell shock, and World War II burns and crush injuries. Modern wars add blast polytrauma, TBIs, and PTSD. Ukraine, as a near-peer artillery and drone war, shows extreme explosive injuries and the collapse of air-enabled evacuation, forcing prolonged field care, distributed micro-hospitals, and civil-military integration. Body armor redistributes wounds to limbs, while antibiotic resistance and constant surveillance deepen long-term physical and psychological harm.

War Injuries: Seeing Beyond Weapons and Doctrines

by Daniel Ekwall, by Anders Jonsson, by Jan-Olof Svärd

02.04.2026 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/02/04/war-injuries-seeing-beyond-weapons-and-doctrines/

Abstract

War injuries are more than collateral damage; they are historical markers that reveal how wars are fought, the weapons used, and the doctrines that shape them. From Napoleonic amputations to traumatic brain injuries in modern conflicts, and the collapse of the “Golden Hour” in Ukraine, these wounds testify to the evolving interplay between weapons, protection, and human vulnerability. They underscore that the true story of war is written not in triumph but in the visible and invisible scars that demand care long after the guns fall silent.

“The medics generally see the worst of the worst. They see everything. They’re working on their friends, and they’re working on their enemy.” – Brendan Fehr

Every battlefield tells a story written in flesh and bone instead of in thunderous speeches and compelling narrative of righteousness. War injuries are more than collateral damage; they are the silent memory of conflict. They tell the story of how the war was fought and with which weapons. All changes in warfare will be found in changes in war injuries. From shattered limbs on Napoleonic fields to traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) in asymmetric wars, wounds reveal the evolution of warfare itself. Each scar is both a marker of progress and a reminder of its human cost.

War injuries have always mirrored the weapons that inflict them, each era inscribing its own signature on the human body. In the Napoleonic age, the battlefield was a theatre of close-range brutality. Musket balls shattered limbs with blunt force, while cannon fire tore through ranks. Bayonets and sabers completed the spectacle, carving deep wounds in hand-to-hand combat. Blast injuries from artillery shells began to appear in greater numbers, but they were still relatively rare, foreshadowing a future where explosive forces would dominate warfare. For the wounded, survival was a race against time and infection. Amputation became the surgeon’s refrain, performed without anesthesia. The true enemy was not always the weapon; it was the invisible contagion that followed. Gangrene and septicemia claimed more lives than musket fire, thriving in the filth of improvised hospitals where sanitation was an afterthought.

The Crimean War marked a pivotal shift, not in the scale of wounds, but in their management. The injuries themselves were familiar: shattered limbs from musket balls, deep cuts from bayonets, bodies mangled by artillery. Yet mortality soared because of insufficient healthcare and a full lack of knowledge of the need for good hygiene. Surgeons were skilled, but knowledge of antisepsis was absent. Florence Nightingale’s insistence on cleanliness, ventilation, and statistical rigor transformed hospitals from charnel houses into sites of recovery. The Crimean War reframed the problem: Heroism in surgery was not enough; systemic prevention was the new frontier. In this sense, it laid the foundation for modern military medicine, proving that organization could be as decisive as innovation.

World War I did not merely escalate violence – it industrialized it. The battlefield, primarily on the Western Front, became a factory of wounds. Artillery fire dominated the horizon, raining down in relentless barrages that turned landscapes into lunar wastelands. Each shell carried not only explosive force but a payload of jagged fragments, shredding bodies. Shrapnel wounds were no longer incidental; they became the signature injury of a war fought in trenches, where soldiers crouched in mud, waiting for the next storm. The Western Front changed not only warfare but also the cultural understanding of war itself. Tolkien´s Mordor is, for example, a fantasy replication of the landscape after the Battle of the Somme. A mental understanding of reality in warfare and attached horrors for all to see and remember, when reading The Lord of the Rings.

The war wound types expanded in gloomy harmony with their arsenal: trench foot, gas gangrene, and chemical burns from chlorine and mustard gas. These injuries blurred the line between physical and psychological trauma, as the terror of gas attacks lingered long after the fumes dissipated. Shell shock – Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) – emerged as the war’s invisible wound, a term for shattered minds in an era that mistook neurological collapse for weakness. World War I revealed an obvious truth: The human nervous system was as vulnerable to industrial warfare as flesh and bone.

If World War I industrialized injury, World War II mechanized its brutality. High-velocity rounds from semi-automatic rifles and machine guns tore through tissue with devastating efficiency, leaving wounds that were deeper, more complex, and harder to treat than those inflicted by slower projectiles. The pure scale of WWII makes it possible to find very different types of warfare in the same war. For instance, during the battle for Stalingrad, knife and sharpened shovels became useful weapons in close-quarter combat. Flamethrowers and firebombs introduced a new dimension of harm. Burns became a defining injury of the era, forcing medical science to confront challenges of skin grafting and infection control on an unprecedented scale. The sea theatre of WWII offered a new understanding of naval warfare, where ships never see each other but still sailors are burned or drowned, as in old times, but with new weapons. Beyond the frontlines, strategic bombing campaigns turned civilian neighborhoods into killing fields. The collapse of buildings under aerial bombardment produced mass crush injuries, fractures, and suffocation on a scale that overwhelmed emergency response systems. WWII blurred every boundary between front and home, combatants and civilians, survival and obliteration.

Vietnam brought fragmentation to its zenith. Landmines and booby traps dismembered soldiers´ bodies. Napalm seared landscapes and bodies alike. By the Gulf Wars and Afghanistan, the signature wound had changed again: blast injuries from improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These were not mere wounds but polytrauma, limbs torn away, organs ruptured, brains concussed by shockwaves. Alongside these came the invisible epidemic: traumatic brain injury, often paired with PTSD, a dual assault on body and mind.

If weapons evolve, so does medicine. From saws and scalpels wielded in Napoleonic tents to telemedicine and advanced prosthetics in modern conflicts, each era forced innovation. Blood transfusion and plastic surgery emerged in World War I; penicillin and mass evacuation defined World War II. Korea and Vietnam introduced the “golden hour,” compressing the time between injury and care. The key to understanding the concept of golden hour in war medicine is that the logistics capabilities determine success, and this includes air supremacy, which enables quick and reliable transport from the warzone back into the healthcare chain. Today, combat medics carry portable imaging devices and clotting agents that stop hemorrhage in seconds.

The war in Ukraine marks the first large-scale near-peer conflict since World War II, and its wounds tell a story of technological escalation and doctrinal upheaval. This is not a war of insurgency but of industrial lethality, fought with artillery, drones, cluster munitions, and thermobaric weapons. The result is staggering casualty rates are estimated to be 10 to 15 times higher than those seen in Iraq or Afghanistan, with injuries dominated by explosive mechanisms causing polytrauma, burns, and TBIs. It is important to remember that air supremacy in Iraq and Afghanistan enabled not only rapid airlift but also the development of prehospital blood, which increased survival to 99.8% for those alive when they arrived at ROLE2 Camp Bastion.

The collapse of predictable evacuation chains has shattered the “Golden Hour” paradigm. Air superiority, once the guarantor of rapid medical evacuation, is absent. Ukrainian medics now sustain patients for hours or even days under fire, performing advanced interventions such as blood transfusion, airway management, and analgesia at or near the point of injury. Prolonged Field Care (PFC) and Damage Control Resuscitation (DCR) have become new standards, supported by innovations like walking blood banks and drone-based delivery of lifesaving supplies. The logistical capabilities play a big part here. Weapons and treatment are bound together with short lead times in the healthcare chain. The use of tourniquets illustrates this well: the longer they remain in place, the higher the risk of irreversible tissue damage and amputation. In Ukraine, evacuation delays often exceed six hours, far beyond the two-hour safe limit, leading to severe complications. Recent studies and expert estimates suggest that up to 75% of amputations could have been avoided, highlighting how prolonged tourniquet use, combined with unnecessary application, has become a major driver of limb loss.

Medical facilities are no longer a sanctuary. Systematic targeting of hospitals and evacuation routes has forced a radical rethinking of infrastructure. Ukrainians have adopted distributed “micro-hospitals,” mobile surgical teams, and underground treatment sites to evade detection. Civil-military integration has become essential as civilian hospitals absorb combat casualties, blurring the boundaries between military and civilian care.

Patterns of injury reflect the changing nature of warfare. Extremity wounds dominate, accounting for up to 90% of cases and often requiring amputation. Body armor mitigates torso injuries but leaves limbs, neck, and lateral trajectories exposed. Thermobaric weapons bypass conventional protection, inflicting burns and pulmonary trauma. Urban combat magnifies complexity: Missile strikes collapse buildings onto those seeking shelter, producing crush injuries that combine fractures, internal bleeding, and suffocation. Rescue delays turn survivable wounds into fatal ones as compartment syndrome and infection tighten their grip. Beyond the physical toll lies the psychological dimension. The constant hum of drones, the sudden roar of artillery, and the knowledge that death can descend from the sky at any moment carve scars into the mind as deep as any shrapnel. PTSD, anxiety, and moral injury stalk trenches and ruins, entwined with physical trauma in a cycle that defies easy repair.

The evolution of body armor tells a parallel story to the evolution of wounds, a dialogue between offense and defense. At the end of World War I, steel helmets became standard issue, reducing head injuries from shrapnel, yet the torso remained exposed. Full-body protection was impractical in an era dominated by mass infantry maneuvers. Soldiers relied on speed and cover, not plating, to survive. World War II introduced incremental improvements rather than a revolution. Helmets evolved in shape and metallurgy, offering better deflection against fragments, but heavy armor remained a liability. The real transformation began in the mid-20th century, driven by two forces: the rise of high-velocity small arms and the advent of new materials. Korea and Vietnam saw the introduction of flak jackets, layers of ballistic nylon designed to stop low-velocity fragments rather than bullets. These vests were lifesavers against shrapnel but offered little defense against rifle fire.

By the late Cold War, innovation accelerated. Kevlar redefined personal armor, combining strength with flexibility. Kevlar vests became standard for troops capable of stopping handgun rounds and reducing fragmentation injuries. Yet as assault rifles proliferated, even Kevlar reached its limits. Ceramic and composite plates emerged, integrated into modular systems that balanced mobility with survivability. But protection is never absolute. Body armor saves torsos but shifts the burden to extremities and heads, leaving soldiers with shattered limbs and complex cranial injuries. Modern conflicts, from Iraq to Afghanistan, cemented the role of body armor as a tactical necessity, yet its limitations persist. As protection improves, injuries migrate to unprotected zones. In this sense, body armor does not end vulnerability; it redistributes it. The dialogue between weapons and protection continues, a conversation written about war injuries.

The basic surgical principles for the care of war injuries have been essentially the same since the Napoleonic Wars. However, to achieve better quality, healing, and survival, effective antibiotics are needed. The frightening development of antibiotic resistance in Ukraine will most likely affect the outcome of injuries and long-term survival. Recent studies show that up to 84.6% of wound isolates are multidrug-resistant, reflecting an alarming escalation that threatens effective treatment and survival.

Hospitals in Lviv, including pediatric oncology units, report that two-thirds of transferred patients already carry multidrug-resistant infections, which often spread to other wards and facilities. Post-traumatic and postoperative infections remain common, and even with broad-spectrum antibiotics, hospital-acquired infections often pose significant treatment challenges. This is also part of the war’s damage panorama: Emergency surgery volumes have surged dramatically as hospitals prioritize trauma care, while routine and elective services collapse. A World Health Organization (WHO) report and hospital surveys confirm that patients now seek care later and with more severe conditions. In Ukraine, emergency services increased across most hospitals during the war, while elective care virtually disappeared, reflecting the strain on a system overwhelmed by conflict.

Not all scars are visible. From the trenches of World War I to the war in Ukraine, the mind has remained as vulnerable as flesh. Shell shock was the first name for this invisible wound. Modern warfare amplifies the burden. The hum of drones and the knowledge that death can strike at any moment carve injuries into the psyche as deep as any shrapnel. Anxiety, hypervigilance, and moral injury stalk soldiers long after the battle ends, echoing through families and societies in silence. The Ukrainian war adds new dimensions. Persistent surveillance and the erosion of safe spaces create a cognitive battlefield where stress is constant and escape elusive. The fear is not only of dying, but of losing autonomy amid chaos. Healing flesh is easier than mending memory. Suicide rates among veterans underscore this cruel reality.

The next battlefield will not merely wound; it will redefine harm. As autonomous systems and direct-energy weapons move from prototype to deployment, the lexicon of injury will be rewritten. Traditional trauma will persist, but alongside neuro-electrical disruptions from electromagnetic pulses, thermal burns from invisible beams, and cranial devastation from precision drone strikes. Strategically, NATO doctrine faces a reckoning. Assumptions of air dominance and secure medical infrastructure are obsolete. The golden hour for evacuation of military medicine is going away, and with that, the hope of a short lead time through the logistical chain linked to healthcare. On the other hand, the Golden Hour of hemorrhage physiology is here to stay. This means that more advanced healthcare needs to be handled in the front zone with less dependence on evacuation and more on the local medicine, personnel like a platoon medic.

Future planning must prioritize mine- and drone-resistant Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) platforms, decentralized logistics, and hardened medical facilities, possibly underground. Integration of AI-driven diagnostics, telemedicine, and robotic surgery will be critical as warfare migrates into multi-domain environments. Medical units will need to operate under constant threat, delivering advanced care in contested spaces while maintaining mobility and concealment.

The lessons from Ukraine are clear: Survival in future conflicts will depend not only on firepower but on adaptability in medical and logistical terms, but maybe more important than ever, psychological. The battlefield in Ukraine shows that, historically speaking, the traditional narrow line of clashing swords has evolved into a multidimensional zone, up to 40 km in depth, in the future probable even more. This leads to the fact that distance offers no sanctuary and that the first part of the logistical chain of healthcare needs to work under constant threat of attacks. We see the results of this in the return of war injury-related issues from WWI, where the first part of the logistical chain of healthcare was slow and inefficient.

War injuries do more than mark survival; they are a silent memory of conflict, writing history in flesh and bone. Each scar speaks of the weapons that shaped it, the doctrines that demanded it, and the societies that bore its cost. Progress in warfare is inseparable from its human toll; every advance in precision or protection creates new vulnerabilities, redistributing harm rather than erasing it. To read these wounds is to understand the evolution of war and to glimpse the battles yet to come. War injuries will remain as enduring witnesses long after the guns fall silent. They remind us that the true narrative of war is not written in grand tales of righteousness or triumph, but in the visible scars and invisible wounds that demand care and healing. In the end, war is as much about these injuries and the struggle to treat them as it is about technological progress or victory parades.

Tags: Medicine, Military History, military medicine, modern warfare, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), Russia-Ukraine War, Trauma, Ukraine, war casualties

About The Authors

Daniel Ekwall
Daniel Ekwall, PhD, is a Professor at the University of Borås and a visiting professor at Swedish Defense University, Sweden.
View all posts
Anders Jonsson
Anders Jonsson, MD, is a Professor at the University of Borås and a Senior Scientific Adviser (CF5), Swedish Armed Forces, Sweden.
View all posts
Jan-Olof Svärd
Jan-Olof Svärd, MD, is a Senior Consultant Surgeon at the Region of Jönköping and a Major in the reserves Swedish Armed Forces, Sweden.
View all posts

18.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

China aggression renews question of whether Trump would defend Taiwan with US military

Things Trump has said

Previous Presidents

Formalities of U.S.-Taiwan relations

Arms Sales and foreign assistance

What Trump advisers say

Other Clues in Public Statements and Documents

Skepticism and Confidence in Trump amid recent international conflicts

About The Author

The US Is Not Built For War Or Peace

America’s Industrial Resilience Gap

The Defense-Industrial Disconnect

How Efficiency Ate Resilience

The Missing Middle: Ecosystems, Not Stockpiles

A Strategy That Produces: Forging Industrial Resilience

The devil you know is better than the one you don’t: Proponents still fail to detail benefits of Beijing-led order

What the West Got Wrong About Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Understanding Russian Unconventional Activities Will Determine Future Strategies and the Resilience of Europe - PRIF BLOG

The Conceptual Rediscovery of Unconventional Warfare

As the Rapprochement Ended, Covert Actions Resumed

Intensification in the Context of the War against Ukraine

Russian Understanding of ‘Gibridnaya Vonya’

Differences and Convergence with Western Thinking

Limited Effectiveness, but Likely Continued Use

Autor*in(nen)

Analysis: As a parade of US allies rattled by Trump visit China, Beijing claims a win for its new world order | CNN

The end of ‘collective confrontation’?

A new world order

U.S. Army Quietly Stands Up Rotational Force in the Philippines - USNI News

Ruptures in China’s Leadership Could Be Due to Paranoia and Power Plays

NATO’s Asia-Pacific Engagement Does Not Impress China

China’s Cheap Oil Strategy Is Becoming a Geopolitical Liability

Consolidation Is Not Flattening: Why the “Department of War” Needs a JSOC Model

The Consolidation Trap: T2COM and PAEs

AI: The Staff-Killer for the Generating Force

Addressing the Risk: A Phased Transition

The Choice: Lethality or Liability?

Russia Resumes Strikes on Ukrainian Energy Sites

Attack hits thermal power plants across Ukraine after Trump had asked Moscow to halt its attacks amid freezing temperatures

Watch: Why Russia Is Building a $25 Billion Nuclear Power Plant in a NATO Country (August 2025)

Opinion | Vladimir Putin Isn’t Winning in Ukraine

The Russian death toll may be as high as 325,000 in four years.

The Clash of Civilizations at 30

Order

Disorder

Western Crisis

America’s Critical-Minerals Strategy Looks Increasingly Chinese

Trump’s Project Vault steps up government involvement to assure rare-earth supplies and protect U.S. industry

Hegemony and the Chinese Grand Strategy: Continuity in the CCP’s Political Lexicon

What is Grand Strategy?

What is Power?

What is Hegemony, and do China and the West Agree?

What is the Historical Proof?

What is the CCP’s Grand Strategy, and Why is Combatting Hegemony so Important?

Where is the Evidence for the Grand Strategy Put Forth?

What’s Next?

About The Author

Engineering Options to Intercept “A House of Dynamite” Attack

Introduction

Swarm Coordination

Golden Dome Proposals

Conclusion

Figures

About The Author

War Injuries: Seeing Beyond Weapons and Doctrines

Abstract

About The Authors