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Quotes of the Day:
"They always say that time changes things, but you actually have to change them yourself."
– Andy Warhol
"Nothing is so firmly believed as what is least known."
– Michel de Montaigne
"Our power is our ability to decide."
– Buckminster Fuller
1. The Dream of Korean Unification Is Splitting Apart
2. South Korea’s Nuclear Latency Dilemma
3. Rampant adoption fraud separated generations of South Korean children from their families, AP finds
4. North Korea tests ‘explosive power’ of new ballistic missile
5. NK newspaper 'unusually' silent on new missile tests: Seoul
6. North Korea ‘governor-in-waiting’ vows to stop Russian weapons supplies
7. North Korea bookends Chuseok holiday with more trash balloon launches
8. Korean American Senate candidate looks to become 'strong' voice for security on Korean Peninsula
9. North Korean junior women’s soccer team defeats US to reach U-20 World Cup final
10. North Korea’s new missile can carry ‘super-large’ warhead: state media
11. Vietnam deputy defense minister on rare visit to North Korea
12. South Korean Military: “Difficult to judge by appearance” on North Korea’s ‘4.5-ton warhead’ claim
13. Joint Chiefs of Staff: “North Korea floated 160 garbage balloons on the 18th”
14. Yoon arrives in Czech Republic to begin trip focused on nuclear power cooperation
15. Top diplomats of N. Korea, Russia discuss bilateral ties in Moscow
16. 3.9 magnitude earthquake hits northwestern N. Korea: KMA
17. FM Cho to attend U.N. General Assembly in New York next week
1. The Dream of Korean Unification Is Splitting Apart
So much to parse with this essay.
Having studied and planned for the potential north Korea instability and regime collapse I know fullwell the dangers of collapse. It is not something that we should wish for. But the very real possibility exists and we must plan and prepare for it.
But a "two-state solution" is not the answer. This is not the Middle East (though it looks like a two state solution is pretty difficult there).
Dr. Kim interprets the 8.15 Unification Doctrine the way many pundits do. That is that it is really a plan for causing the collapse of the regime. But that is a mistake. The 8.15 Unification Doctrine is calling for helping to create the conditions for change inside north Korea and for the korean people in the north to seek self -determination of government which we all believe would include the establishment of a new Korea - a United Republic of Korea (UROK). That said, it is very possible that in trying to create the conditions for change inside north Korea, it could very well result in regime collapse. That is a contingency that we must plan and prepare for. But it is not the intention of the 8.15 Unification Doctrine to cause collapse. it is about empowering the Korean people in the north to seek change which results in new leadership who could be influenced to seek peaceful unification. It is the first plan that shows a possible path to unification while recognizing the difficulties and dangers. It finally jettisons the old incorrect assumptions that there could be a federation process of one country and two systems and that Kim Jong Un would agree to peaceful unification and integration of the north and South into an eventually unified Korea.
Here is my response to 5 critiques of unification from a forthcoming report I am contributing to.
There are critics within the U.S. national security structure who may offer four critiques to why the US shouldn’t support of unification.
First, some could claim that unification is only a Korean problem, dismissing discussions as well as policy and strategy recommendations about unification. However, any unification scenario is most likely to fundamentally change the security dynamics in East Asia and has wide-ranging implications for the ROK-U.S. alliance. As established before, North Korea’s human rights abuse is entwined with its nuclear program, and the solution to both involves compelling the regime to fundamentally change its relationship with its people. Thus, as a contingency to prepare a promising solution to protracted problems regarding North Korea, unification is also a U.S. problem entwined with U.S. national security interests. The dismissal of discussions and recommendations about unification exposes the U.S. and the alliance to a glaring strategic weakness.
Second, others could speculate that U.S. support of unification would prevent any future denuclearization agreement with North Korea, because unification implies absorption and the end of the Kim family regime. The past four decades of denuclearization talks were conducted without unification consideration and under negotiation premises that were favorable to North Korea. However, they failed repeatedly and have a slimmer chance of success in the future.[i] It’s notable that North Korea has been historically willing to return to diplomatic engagements with the U.S. during periods of relatively strong sanctions enforcement. As emphasized before, U.S. support of unification, implemented in conjunction with a comprehensive pressure campaign, has immense potential to change Kim Jong-un’s decision-making calculus and incentivize the North Korean people to seek long-term regime transformation. Thus, U.S. support of unification could arguably create better conditions for a potential denuclearization agreement with North Korea.
Third, some critics could argue that arms control is a better approach than U.S. support of unification to achieve denuclearization. The National Security Staff’s and the State Department Special Representative for North Korea’s recent statements that “interim steps” may be employed as first steps to have North Korea return to the negotiating table may be interpreted as shifts to an arms control approach.[ii] Although well intended, an arms control approach carries significant risks. It may likely harden Kim Jong-un’s resolve because he may believe that the U.S. has tacitly accepted his possession of nuclear weapons. He could likely assess his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies a success and double down. Such behavior is particularly worrying as Kim’s end goal remains the domination of the Korean peninsula. Hence, an arms control approach is arguably less favorable than U.S. support of unification.[iii]
Fourth, some observe that a growing number of South Koreans no longer desire unification because of the economic impact and potential disruption to their way of life. As emphasized repeatedly in the previous sections, the stakes have never been more dangerous for the U.S. and ROK. War and regime collapse are undesirable but increasingly possible contingencies that could deeply disrupt South Korea’s economy and their way of life. All planning for unification empowers the ROK-U.S. alliance to be in better long-term strategic positions if undesired contingencies arise.
Lastly, some argue that China will oppose unification. China’s well known “three no’s” are no war, no instability and regime collapse, and no nuclear weapons. China is seeking to maintain the status quo for as long as possible. Some analysts argue that China will prevent unification to sustain a buffer state and to keep U.S. forces from its border. However, unification offers China the best hope for what is its real objective: to get U.S. troops off the Korean peninsula and the Asian land mass. In addition, China does not desire to incur the burden and cost of absorbing north Korea to maintain a buffer state. It does not want to face the likely resistance of the Korean people in the north if it tries to occupy and stabilize it. Therefore, when the status quo can no longer be maintained China is likely to position itself to assume a dominant economic and diplomatic role in the region and work to have a United Republic of Korea end the presence of U.S. troops.
While these are valid critiques that policy makers and strategists must consider they can all be mitigated with proper planning.
In addition, the idea that the South entering north Korea would be a violation of the UN charter fails to account for existing UN Security Council resolutions that call the north the aggressor and calling on the international community to defend the South's freedom. UN General Assembly resolutions (notably 811 among many others) have called for the unification of Korea. The war has never ended and I would make the argument that the the collapse of the regime would bring the conclusion of the war and the ROK (and ROK/US alliance and the UNC) would have a responsibility for post conflict operations and the requirement to ensure security and a return of essential services to the Korean people in the north and finally securing a political outcome to the war and the Korea question as articulated in paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice. (e.g., unification).
Excerpts:
On a more practical level, many argue that if Seoul renounces the goal of unification and permanently recognizes North Korea as a separate country, South Korea will forfeit its legal claim over North Korean territory and lose any standing to lead the reunification and rebuilding process in the event of a North Korean regime collapse.
However, this reasoning may not hold up to scrutiny. Even if North Korea were to collapse, South Korea’s refusal to recognize North Korea as a separate country would have no bearing on international law. The two Koreas joined the United Nations in 1991 as distinct countries, and the international community recognizes them as such. A total of 157 countries maintain diplomatic relations with both Koreas, clearly indicating they do not have a “one Korea” policy. This contrasts sharply with countries’ “One China” policies, as no country maintains formal diplomatic relations with both China and Taiwan. If South Korea were to enter the North following a regime collapse, it could be viewed as an illegal foreign intervention in violation of the U.N. Charter. Legally speaking, South Korea has no greater authority over the fate of North Korea than any other state, regardless of whether it refuses to recognize North Korea as a separate country.
Pursuing unification by encouraging regime collapse offers no tangible benefits and only heightens tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Given the risks of escalation, an official two-state solution is worth considering. However unappealing this may seem, it could be the least bad option in the long run. As long as there is only “one Korea,” each side will claim to be the sole legitimate representative, making the other a target for elimination. In such a scenario, mutual coexistence is impossible. As distinct countries, the two Koreas could coexist—not necessarily amicably but coexist nonetheless.
The Dream of Korean Unification Is Splitting Apart
Seoul’s policy shift is riskier than it seems.
By Lami Kim, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
Foreign Policy · by Lami Kim
September 18, 2024, 11:02 AM
In a speech last month marking the 79th anniversary of Korea’s independence from Japanese colonial rule, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol called for the establishment of “a unified, free, and democratic nation, rightfully owned by the people … across the entire Korean Peninsula.” He argued that Korea’s liberation remains incomplete as long as North Koreans are deprived of freedom. This was a stark difference from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s recent statement about the issue in December 2023, when he renounced unification and said it was no longer viable.
In a speech last month marking the 79th anniversary of Korea’s independence from Japanese colonial rule, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol called for the establishment of “a unified, free, and democratic nation, rightfully owned by the people … across the entire Korean Peninsula.” He argued that Korea’s liberation remains incomplete as long as North Koreans are deprived of freedom. This was a stark difference from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s recent statement about the issue in December 2023, when he renounced unification and said it was no longer viable.
The two Koreas now find themselves at a somewhat awkward crossroad on the issue of unification. On the surface, Seoul’s position seems benign, while the specifics of Pyongyang’s rhetoric appear aggressive and provocative. Upon closer examination, however, Pyongyang’s stance could suggest an attempt to coexist with the South—a two-state solution—whereas Seoul’s call for a unified, democratic Korea might be perceived by the North as a denial of the Kim regime’s legitimacy and an incitement of popular uprising. This could intensify the concerns that led Kim to renounce unification in the first place.
Ever since the peninsula was divided in the late 1940s, reunification has been a shared objective for both Koreas. During the height of the Cold War, the two governments refused to recognize each other as legitimate and competed to be the government that would unify the country. South Korean President Syngman Rhee stated in 1953 that it was his duty to unify the nation by force if necessary. Similarly, in 1968, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung sought to incite a communist revolution in the South, declaring that “a revolution in the South is a struggle to achieve sovereignty, and the only way to achieve this sovereignty is through force.”
The end of the Cold War opened the door for the two Koreas to discuss peaceful unification, eventually resulting in the 2000 Joint Declaration. In this agreement, both sides committed to ending hostilities, building trust, and pursuing peaceful unification through a confederation, in which North and South Korea retain their respective autonomous governments within a single state—a one-state, two-systems model—as a transitional step toward eventual unification. Whether by force or through peaceful means, unification had, until now, never been abandoned as an official policy by either side.
Kim Jong Un’s December announcement renouncing unification was a significant shift. Shortly thereafter, North Korea demolished the Arch of Reunification, built in 2000 to commemorate the Joint Declaration. At the July plenum of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim directed the removal of goals related to “unification” and “grand national unity” from the constitution. In no uncertain terms, these moves signaled a decisive break from any aspirations of reunification, solidifying the regime’s commitment to a permanent division between the two Koreas as separate countries.
This shift has sparked both confusion and concern. Some have interpreted it as a transformation in Pyongyang’s perception of Seoul from “a dialogue partner or a separate entity to coexist with” to an adversary to be subjugated, as Cha Du-hyeogn, a former Blue House official, told NK News. However, if North Korea’s goal were truly to subjugate the South, it would make more sense to advocate for unification rather than renounce it. Subjugating the South is one way of unifying the peninsula, after all. Others suggest that this move may be an attempt to justify the use of nuclear weapons against South Koreans—something difficult to rationalize if they were still regarded as compatriots. But using nuclear weapons against the South would lead to a full-blown war, triggering major upheaval and likely the downfall of the Kim regime, at which point the justification for nuclear use would be the least of Pyongyang’s problems.
A more compelling interpretation is that this shift is driven by Pyongyang’s recognition that it has lost the “unification competition,” or the contest to be the legitimate government to unify Korea. North Korea lags far behind the South economically, diplomatically, culturally, and even militarily—except in the nuclear domain. More importantly, this disparity is now well known to North Koreans, largely due to the widespread influence of South Korean pop culture in the North. Exposure to South Korean lifestyles through movies, shows, and music may naturally prompt North Koreans to imagine how different their own lives could be, potentially breeding grievances and resentment toward their leadership.
For that reason, Kim sees South Korean pop culture as a significant threat to his regime and has cracked down on its growing influence in the North. In December 2020, North Korea enacted the Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Act, imposing harsh penalties—including the death penalty—for watching or distributing foreign media. In April 2021, Kim issued a directive urging the prevention of youth from adopting South Korean speech, fashion, and hairstyles. This January, BBC Korean reported that two teenage boys had been publicly sentenced to 12 years of hard labor for watching and sharing South Korean television shows. Despite the risks, North Koreans continue to consume South Korean content.
Against this backdrop, Kim’s stance allows him to convey two distinct messages. The first is to a domestic audience: South Koreans are no longer considered compatriots, and emulating their way of life warrants severe punishment. The second is to the South: Let’s acknowledge our different political systems, ideologies, and ways of life and agree not to interfere in each other’s affairs.
In contrast, Yoon has put forth a markedly different vision for the future of the peninsula, which could be interpreted by Pyongyang as endorsing the eventual absorption of North Korea into the South. Contradictory to the 2000 Joint Declaration, Yoon’s vision for unification is not through consultation with Pyongyang but through encouraging the North Korean people to pursue liberal democracy—against the wishes of the Kim regime. North Korea’s democratization implicitly cannot occur without overthrowing the regime, since Kim is unlikely to give up power voluntarily. This vision can be more clearly understood alongside Unification Minister Kim Young-ho’s op-ed from April 2019, in which he argued, “Only when the Kim Jong Un regime is overthrown and North Korea is liberalized, bringing both Koreas under a unified political system, will the path to unification truly open.”
In order for North Korea’s liberalization to happen, Yoon pledged during his National Liberation Day speech to establish a government fund to support civic groups promoting freedom and human rights in North Korea, along with efforts to expand North Koreans’ access to external information via radio and television to “make them aware of the false propaganda and instigations” spread by Pyongyang. Yoon added: “If more North Koreans realize that unification through freedom is the only way to improve their lives and are convinced that the Republic of Korea will embrace them, they will become a strong, friendly contingent to support a freedom-based unification.”
Although its rhetoric may seem benign, this approach to unification is highly risky. Pyongyang is notoriously sensitive about the kinds of information tactics Yoon is promoting, and intensifying such campaigns will only exacerbate tensions and increase the risk of military confrontation.
Instead of encouraging revolt in North Korea, which could have catastrophic consequences for the peninsula, South Korea could consider a two-state solution of its own to ease North Korea’s fears of absorption and help reduce inter-Korean tensions. This would involve, in the immediate term, refraining from promoting unification by absorption and accepting the current reality of two separate states and, in the longer term, establishing diplomatic relations with the North and fostering cooperation, mutual understanding, and peaceful coexistence as neighboring states.
Admittedly, there are valid reasons that a two-state solution is not acceptable for many South Koreans. As some point out, the pursuit of unification is not only a policy preference but a constitutional obligation. Article 3 of the South Korean Constitution defines the territory of the Republic of Korea as encompassing the entire Korean Peninsula and its surrounding islands. Article 4 further stipulates that the “Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall establish and implement a peaceful unification policy based on the principles of freedom and democracy.” Article 66 says in no uncertain terms that the president has a constitutional duty to pursue peaceful unification. These clauses remained unchanged through nine constitutional amendments since their inclusion in South Korea’s first constitution in 1948.
The issue of unification is also deeply emotional. Support for unification has declined, especially among younger generations who prefer a status quo due to fears of economic burdens and social disruption, but it remains significant. According to a recent survey, only 46.5 percent of South Korean millennials believe that reunification with North Korea is necessary. The majority of other age groups, however, still support reunification, with more than 73 percent of those who lived through the Korean War expressing strong support. The belief in a “unitary nation” that is “ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive” is deeply ingrained in the national identity. Case in point, South Korean children grow up singing a song called “Our Wish Is Unification.” For many, abandoning the goal of reunification just doesn’t feel right.
On a more practical level, many argue that if Seoul renounces the goal of unification and permanently recognizes North Korea as a separate country, South Korea will forfeit its legal claim over North Korean territory and lose any standing to lead the reunification and rebuilding process in the event of a North Korean regime collapse.
However, this reasoning may not hold up to scrutiny. Even if North Korea were to collapse, South Korea’s refusal to recognize North Korea as a separate country would have no bearing on international law. The two Koreas joined the United Nations in 1991 as distinct countries, and the international community recognizes them as such. A total of 157 countries maintain diplomatic relations with both Koreas, clearly indicating they do not have a “one Korea” policy. This contrasts sharply with countries’ “One China” policies, as no country maintains formal diplomatic relations with both China and Taiwan. If South Korea were to enter the North following a regime collapse, it could be viewed as an illegal foreign intervention in violation of the U.N. Charter. Legally speaking, South Korea has no greater authority over the fate of North Korea than any other state, regardless of whether it refuses to recognize North Korea as a separate country.
Pursuing unification by encouraging regime collapse offers no tangible benefits and only heightens tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Given the risks of escalation, an official two-state solution is worth considering. However unappealing this may seem, it could be the least bad option in the long run. As long as there is only “one Korea,” each side will claim to be the sole legitimate representative, making the other a target for elimination. In such a scenario, mutual coexistence is impossible. As distinct countries, the two Koreas could coexist—not necessarily amicably but coexist nonetheless.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Defense Department or the U.S. government.
Foreign Policy · by Lami Kim
2. South Korea’s Nuclear Latency Dilemma
Dr. Kim is on a roll. She has two key articles on Korea yesterday and today.
We should always keep in mind that this discussion supports Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy because he believes that it will contribute to dividing the alliance. We need to keep that in mind while we have these discussions (and we should find the opportunities for counter messaging - recognize Kim's strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it, and attack the strategy with a superior political warfare strategy). He also likely has no fear of South Korea with nuclear weapons.
Conclusion:
It is not hard to understand South Korea’s security concerns, given the persistent nuclear threats from North Korea and the possibility of a leadership change in Washington that could weaken the U.S. security commitment. It is natural for national security experts to explore various options to safeguard the nation. Ultimately, it is up to policymakers in both South Korea and the United States to decide whether South Korea’s development of nuclear latency is a desirable or at least acceptable course of action.
However, for such a decision to be made, the two allies ought to be able to discuss the issue openly and frankly. Building trust is essential. It is not sound policy to advocate for nuclear latency as a pathway to rapid nuclearization in front of a domestic audience, while framing it as purely for nuclear energy and naval propulsion to the United States and the international community. Moreover, enshrining the peaceful use of nuclear energy in domestic legislation with the intent to violate it if necessary contradicts democratic principles. While a nuclear option may seem attractive to Seoul, other important values — such as maintaining trust with its ally and upholding democratic norms — should not be overlooked.
South Korea’s Nuclear Latency Dilemma - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Lami Kim · September 19, 2024
Despite Washington’s efforts to alleviate South Korea’s security concerns, culminating in the April 2023 Washington Declaration, calls for nuclear armament in South Korea have not subsided. Recent polls show public support for nuclear armament consistently hovering above 70 percent. However, unlike the general public, the majority of South Korean elites do not favor outright nuclear armament. While some prominent politicians have advocated for nuclear armament, including President Yoon Suk Yeol and Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun, opposition to nuclear armament prevails among South Korean elites, whose opinions carry more weight particularly in defense and national security issues. An April 2024 poll by Victor Cha found that only 34 percent of South Korean elites favored it, while 66 percent were against it.
However, this does not imply a strong commitment by elites to nuclear nonproliferation either. Instead, many of South Korean security experts are pursuing nuclear latency. This refers to the capability to rapidly develop nuclear weapons without actually acquiring them, thereby avoiding the substantial costs associated with outright nuclear armament. Acquiring nuclear latency by obtaining the ability to produce nuclear fissile materials would significantly reduce the costs associated with nuclear armament.
To galvanize support for nuclear latency, conservative politician You Yong-won has launched a National Assembly initiative known as the Mugunghwa Forum. The forum is dedicated to promoting nuclear latency and developing strategies to secure it. You has called upon experts, academics, reserve military associations, political circles, the media, and other civilian sectors to rally behind this cause. The forum’s inaugural ceremony was held on July 9, 2024, with over 20 prominent politicians pledging their “full support” to make nuclear latency a reality.
The real challenge will be acquiring America’s consent for South Korean development of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. While South Korea is believed to have the capacity to develop these technologies, it is currently restricted from doing so by its bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, commonly known as the 123 Agreement. Due to the proliferation risks associated with enrichment and reprocessing, the United States has consistently opposed South Korea’s pursuit of these capabilities.
In order to persuade Washington, advocates of nuclear latency provide justifications for the need for enrichment and reprocessing for purposes such as fuel production, spent-fuel treatment, and submarine propulsion, but their underlying motive is achieving nuclear latency. They have even gone so far as seeking to amend South Korea’s domestic law that restricts the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes, despite their overt support for potential nuclear armament, effectively advocating for a violation of the very law they are promoting.
This situation creates a dilemma: South Korean politicians must explain the need for nuclear latency to galvanize support, but doing so risks exposing their ambitions for nuclear armament, complicating efforts to obtain Washington’s approval. They should carefully navigate this dilemma, as their current approach risks undermining both Washington’s trust in South Korea and democratic principles.
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Why Nuclear Latency?
Nuclear armament could be highly costly — economic sanctions would likely follow, potentially disrupting South Korea’s nuclear energy production, and the country could face isolation on the international stage. Most critically, Washington might withdraw its security guarantee, leaving South Korea dangerously vulnerable to North Korea’s nuclear threats until it could develop a viable nuclear arsenal. Experts estimate that South Korea would need at least two to three years, if not more, to develop nuclear weapons, as it currently lacks the capability to produce fissile materials. This stands in stark contrast to Japan, which has accumulated over 45 tons of separated plutonium — enough to build up to thousands of nuclear weapons — and is believed to be able to go nuclear within a matter of months.
Once South Korea has enrichment or reprocessing technologies and infrastructure required for producing nuclear fissile materials, however, the time required for South Korea to develop nuclear weapons could shrink from a few years to a few months. If Seoul can present its nuclear armament as a fait accompli, the costs would become far more manageable. The shorter the process of developing nuclear weapons, the less challenging it will be for South Korea to withstand both the security vacuum and international opposition.
Hence, a growing number of experts advocate for nuclear latency as an “insurance policy” that would enable South Korea to develop nuclear weapons quickly and relatively inexpensively if necessary in the future. Notably, Han Dong-hoon, the leader of the ruling conservative People’s Power Party, posted on June 25, 2024:
The international situation is unpredictable, and relying solely on alliances has its limits. Therefore, like Japan, we need to develop the potential capability for nuclear armament when necessary, such as by securing enrichment and reprocessing technology… If we pursue direct nuclear armament immediately, the risk of international sanctions is high. I believe nuclear latency is a realistic and effective measure that doesn’t depend solely on alliances.
Similarly, Lee Baek-soon, a former ambassador to Australia, stated, “Even if we cannot rush to become a nuclear-armed state … it is time to take steps toward securing nuclear latency without further delay.” Hwang Woo-yea, chairman of the ruling party’s Emergency Response Committee, emphasized the urgency of securing nuclear latency, calling it “an immediate task that can no longer be postponed.”
Challenges and Rationales
South Korea is believed to have the capacity to develop enrichment and reprocessing, but has refrained from doing so because it would contradict the 123 Agreement with the United States. Under the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act, all significant nuclear cooperation with other countries requires a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. Section 123a of the law prohibits recipients from enriching or reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear materials without Washington’s consent. South Korea agreed to these terms in the 1970s in exchange for U.S. civil nuclear assistance. Although the agreement was revised in 2015 to allow for the possibility of enrichment and pyroprocessing (a type of reprocessing) for civilian purposes, such activities still require U.S. approval.
Advocates for nuclear latency present several rationales to persuade Washington to consent to South Korea’s development of enrichment and reprocessing or pyroprocessing technologies. One of the key arguments is the need for enrichment capability to ensure a stable fuel supply for South Korea’s 26 nuclear power plants, which generate roughly 30 percent of the country’s electricity. Given that Russia dominates global enrichment capacity, and South Korea imports 30 percent of its nuclear fuel from Russia, proponents argue that South Korea should develop its own enrichment capabilities to avoid reliance on and potential coercion by Moscow.
Additionally, advocates emphasize the importance of pyroprocessing or reprocessing technology to manage South Korea’s growing nuclear waste problem. The country’s nuclear waste storage facilities are nearing saturation, and reprocessing would reduce both the volume and radiotoxicity of nuclear waste, while allowing the recycling of nuclear material into fuel. This would offer a long-term solution to South Korea’s nuclear waste management challenges.
Another justification for developing nuclear fissile materials is the need for nuclear-powered submarines. These submarines can remain submerged longer than diesel-electric ones, the argument goes, making them less vulnerable to detection and better suited for stealth operations, such as tracking and destroying North Korea’s nuclear-armed submarines. Advocates emphasize the urgency for nuclear-powered submarines in light of North Korea’s growing underwater nuclear capabilities, which include not only its submarine-launched ballistic missile capabilities but also its Kim Geun-ok-class tactical nuclear attack submarine.
The Ulterior Motive: Paving the Way for Nuclear Armament
While these arguments are not without merit, the push for nuclear latency appears to be primarily motivated by ambitions to lay the groundwork for future nuclear armament. A key point of suspicion is that this call is being driven largely by South Korea’s national security establishment, rather than its nuclear industry. As one South Korean researcher observed, “Outside of security experts, there is little demand from the scientific community, the nuclear industry, or the energy security sector” for pursuing nuclear latency. This discrepancy raises concerns about the true motivations behind the push for these capabilities.
In fact, advocates of nuclear latency do not conceal their ambitions. The very name of the forum — Mugunghwa or Rose of Sharon — symbolizes the aspiration for nuclear weapons due to the popular nationalistic novel Mugunghwa Kkoti Pieotseumnida (The Mugunghwa Flower Has Bloomed), which portrays a counterfactual scenario where the Park Chung Hee regime successfully developed nuclear weapons in the 1970s.
Participants at the July 2024 inaugural meeting of the forum made their ambitions for potential nuclear armament explicit. Han Yong-sup, professor emeritus at Korea National Defense University, lamented that while the novel has been a bestseller, its scenario remains fictional, and called for nuclear latency as an “interim option” to turn the novel’s vision into reality. Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy at the Sejong Institute, argued that South Korea should elevate the 123 Agreement to match the U.S.-Japanese 123 Agreement, warning of a “worst-case scenario” where Japan becomes nuclear-armed, leaving South Korea as the only non-nuclear state in Northeast Asia, unable to keep pace. Several other participants in the event echoed the need for nuclear latency as a means to develop nuclear weapons if necessary.
The Dilemma
A dilemma arises here. On one hand, advocates of nuclear latency must convince their domestic audience the value of nuclear latency as an insurance policy that allows for rapid nuclear armament in the future without incurring the immediate costs of full-scale nuclear development. On the other hand, openly advocating for nuclear latency as a stepping stone toward nuclear weapons undermines the chance to acquire Washington’s approval for nuclear latency. The more South Koreans raise their voice about their intention for nuclear armament, the less likely Washington will give its consent. Washington remains firmly opposed to South Korea’s nuclear armament, although some scholars and policy pundits have expressed support. It is unlikely that Washington would consent to South Korea having enrichment and reprocessing capabilities while knowing that South Korea’s real motive is potential nuclear armament.
Precedents highlight this point. Washington has granted Japan permission for enrichment and reprocessing, in part due to Japan’s deeply entrenched anti-nuclear sentiment, which reduces the risk of proliferation. Similarly, the decision to transfer nuclear-powered submarine technology to Australia under the AUKUS agreement was driven by the low proliferation risks associated with Australia’s non-nuclear posture in addition to its lack of nuclear technology and personnel. These precedents highlight why Washington would remain cautious in the case of South Korea, which has both means and motives to build nuclear weapons.
Even if the U.S. executive branch were to offer support for granting permission, Congress could oppose it, especially if it perceives South Korea’s pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing as a veiled effort to advance its nuclear weapons program. Revising the 123 Agreement to allow such activities would conflict with the nonproliferation criteria under Section 123a, which prohibits the enrichment and reprocessing of U.S.-origin materials. Additionally, permitting South Korea to develop nuclear-powered submarines would breach another criterion that forbids the use of U.S.-origin nuclear materials for military purposes.
While the U.S. president may exempt an agreement from these requirements if he determines that doing so would serve U.S. nonproliferation objectives or protect common defense and security, this is a challenging path. The open discussions among South Korean elites about the potential for nuclear armament make it difficult to allay concerns about nuclear proliferation. Discussions on nuclear latency as an interim step toward nuclear armament would only intensify skepticism, further complicating efforts to secure Washington’s approval.
Recognizing that openly advocating for nuclear latency as a pathway to nuclear armament would raise international suspicion, there have been efforts to mask these ambitions. Shortly after the launch of the forum, You also proposed an amendment to the Nuclear Promotion Act, adding clauses affirming that South Korea’s use of nuclear energy is solely for “peaceful purposes” and aimed at “contributing to human society.” This move is intended to bolster international confidence in South Korea’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. However, given You’s strong advocacy for nuclear latency as a means to quickly develop nuclear weapons in a crisis, this amendment appears to be a strategic maneuver designed to gain U.S. consent — an effort that is unlikely to fool Washington.
Conclusion
It is not hard to understand South Korea’s security concerns, given the persistent nuclear threats from North Korea and the possibility of a leadership change in Washington that could weaken the U.S. security commitment. It is natural for national security experts to explore various options to safeguard the nation. Ultimately, it is up to policymakers in both South Korea and the United States to decide whether South Korea’s development of nuclear latency is a desirable or at least acceptable course of action.
However, for such a decision to be made, the two allies ought to be able to discuss the issue openly and frankly. Building trust is essential. It is not sound policy to advocate for nuclear latency as a pathway to rapid nuclearization in front of a domestic audience, while framing it as purely for nuclear energy and naval propulsion to the United States and the international community. Moreover, enshrining the peaceful use of nuclear energy in domestic legislation with the intent to violate it if necessary contradicts democratic principles. While a nuclear option may seem attractive to Seoul, other important values — such as maintaining trust with its ally and upholding democratic norms — should not be overlooked.
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Lami Kim is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, a U.S. Department of Defense Institute based in Hawaii. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
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Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Lami Kim · September 19, 2024
3. Rampant adoption fraud separated generations of South Korean children from their families, AP finds
So tragic. This really saddens me. Now I worry about all the Korean adoptees I have known over the years. The years and years of pain experienced by Korean families, the adoptees themselves, and their adopted parents is unfathomable.
I recall US soldiers escorting babies to the US in the 1980s while going on leave in return for having their flights paid for by the adoption services. Everyone thought they were doing a good thing.
Excerpts:
Calabretta is among a growing and vocal community of victims of an adoption system they accuse of searching out children for would-be parents, rather than finding parents for vulnerable children — sometimes with devastating consequences only surfacing today.
South Korea’s government, Western countries and adoption agencies worked in tandem to supply some 200,000 Korean children to parents overseas, despite years of evidence they were being procured through questionable or downright unscrupulous means, an investigation led by The Associated Press found. Those children grew up and searched for their roots — and some realized they are not who they were told.
Their stories have sparked a reckoning that is rocking the international adoption industry, which was built in South Korea and spread around the world. European countries have launched investigations and halted international adoption. The South Korean government has accepted a fact-finding commission under pressure from adoptees, and hundreds have submitted their cases for review.
The AP investigation, done in collaboration with Frontline (PBS), was based on interviews with more than 80 adoptees in the U.S., Australia and six European countries, along with parents, agency employees, humanitarian workers and government officials. It also drew on more than 100 information requests and thousands of pages of documents — including many never publicly seen before and some the AP got declassified — from courts, archives, government files and adoption papers.
Rampant adoption fraud separated generations of South Korean children from their families, AP finds
By KIM TONG-HYUNG and CLAIRE GALOFARO
Updated 2:05 AM EDT, September 19, 2024
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · September 19, 2024
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — As the plane descended into Seoul, Robert Calabretta swaddled himself in a blanket, his knees tucked into his chest like a baby in the womb. A single tear ran down his cheek.
The 34-year-old felt like a newborn — he was about to meet his parents for the first time since he was 3 days old.
Most of his life, he thought they’d abandoned him for adoption to the United States. When he finally found them, he learned the truth: The origin story on his adoption paperwork was a lie. Instead, he said, his parents were told in 1986 that their infant was very sick and they thought he had died.
“I am so sorry,” his birth father had written when they found each other, his words interrupted by fits of weeping. “I miss you. How did you endure this cruel world?”
Calabretta is among a growing and vocal community of victims of an adoption system they accuse of searching out children for would-be parents, rather than finding parents for vulnerable children — sometimes with devastating consequences only surfacing today.
South Korea’s government, Western countries and adoption agencies worked in tandem to supply some 200,000 Korean children to parents overseas, despite years of evidence they were being procured through questionable or downright unscrupulous means, an investigation led by The Associated Press found. Those children grew up and searched for their roots — and some realized they are not who they were told.
Their stories have sparked a reckoning that is rocking the international adoption industry, which was built in South Korea and spread around the world. European countries have launched investigations and halted international adoption. The South Korean government has accepted a fact-finding commission under pressure from adoptees, and hundreds have submitted their cases for review.
The AP investigation, done in collaboration with Frontline (PBS), was based on interviews with more than 80 adoptees in the U.S., Australia and six European countries, along with parents, agency employees, humanitarian workers and government officials. It also drew on more than 100 information requests and thousands of pages of documents — including many never publicly seen before and some the AP got declassified — from courts, archives, government files and adoption papers.
In dozens of cases AP examined with Frontline, it found: Children were kidnapped off the streets and sent abroad. Parents claim they were told their newborns were dead or too sick to survive, only to have them shipped away. Documents were fabricated to give children identities that belonged to somebody else, leading adoptees to anguished reunions with supposed parents — to later discover they were not related at all.
The agencies and governments each played a part in keeping the baby pipeline pumping. Adoption agencies created a competitive market for children and paid hospitals to supply them, documents show. The South Korean government not only knew of fraudulent practices but designed laws to speed up the exportation of children it deemed undesirable. Western governments turned a blind eye, sometimes even pressuring South Korea for children, while promoting the narrative that they were saving orphans with no other options.
Calabretta doesn’t believe he was saved; he believes he was stolen. And many in his network of adult adoptees believe they were, too.
Advocates say the vast majority of adoptions are honest and end well. But it is impossible to know how many adoptions are fraudulent because unreliable documents prevent adoptees from finding their birth families and learning the truth. Government data obtained by AP shows less than a fifth of 15,000 adoptees like Calabretta, who have asked South Korea for help with family searches since 2012, have managed to reunite with relatives.
In 2019, a Korean government agency told Calabretta they had found his father. He pictured himself as a rock on a beach, with two waves crashing over it. The first was joy — he had been loved. The other was fury that something profound had been taken from him.
“You’re constantly in flux between two worlds,” he said, “the one you could have and should have been in, and the one where you are.”
“A baby factory”
Adoptions from South Korea peaked in the 1980s, fueled by the government, just as Calabretta’s parents arrived at the hospital with a blanket in which to carry their firstborn son home.
The adoption industry had grown out of the wreckage of the Korean War in the 1950s, when Americans took in the unwanted biracial children born of Korean women and Western soldiers. As it clawed its way out of post-war poverty, South Korea continued to rely on private adoption agencies as its social safety net, bringing millions of dollars into the economy and saving even more by never building its own child welfare program.
Meanwhile, in the West, the number of adoptable babies plummeted because of access to birth control and abortion. The desires of two cultures collided: couples in wealthy nations desperately wanted babies, and South Korea desperately wanted to rid itself of mouths to feed.
As the supply of biracial babies dwindled, South Korea turned to those it saw as unwelcome citizens: fully-Korean children of poor families and unwed mothers.
Korean officials fit their laws to match American ones to make children adoptable for what some deride as “baby diplomacy” to satisfy Western demand. The government endorsed “proxy adoptions,” for families to adopt children quickly without ever visiting Korea, meeting them by the planeloads at American airports.
In an internal memo from 1966 obtained by AP, International Social Service, a Geneva-based organization, wrote that it suspected the Korean government assessed agencies not by child welfare standards, but by the money they brought in.
“There is quite a bit of rivalry and competition among the different agencies, and it is not beyond agencies to bribe or pressure mothers for the release of these children, and not beyond agencies to try to compete with each other for the same child,” officials noted in the document, now at the agency’s archives at the University of Minnesota Libraries.
In 1976, Patricia Nye, east Asia director for ISS, concluded in a memo that the South Korean government was “entirely irresponsible.” What was happening, she wrote, was “close to being scandalous, the mass exportation of children, Korea has been called a baby factory.”
Nye, who has died, said publicly on a BBC program called “A Traffic in Babies,” that Korean adoptions had “gone out of control.”
“We are not talking about little pets or pieces of wood,” Nye said into the camera. “It’s almost like a trade in children … Asian children flowing from Asia to Europe and North America.”
The Korean government tried to downplay the concerns. Documents reveal an official insisted the show — which described the country’s adoption program as “baby wholesaling” — actually depicted it as “organized and well-managed.”
In December 1976, the government facilitated a new law that widened the legal definition of adoptable children, removed judicial oversight and granted vast powers to the heads of private agencies.
The government empowered four agencies to handle most adoptions: Holt Children’s Services, which had pioneered sending Korean children to the U.S., and three others, Eastern Social Welfare Society, Korea Welfare Services and Korea Social Service. A 1983 Health Ministry audit cited all four agencies and accused Holt of providing larger-than-allowed payments to impoverished birth mothers. The ministry’s response was to issue a “warning.”
Records show that officials were aware of a laundry list of dubious practices in the industry: lost children were documented as abandoned; the origins of alleged orphans weren’t verified; some were “disguised” by agencies as being born from unwed mothers to make them adoptable, according to Health Ministry records seen by AP. In the early 1980s, the government itself likened the agencies’ child-hunting practices to “trafficking.” At a meeting in 1982, documents show, the ministry admitted to child “intake” problems and cautioned agencies to improve their practices to avoid the appearance of “trafficking, profiteering.” Yet the government still called for “as many adoptions as possible.”
Calabretta was taken from the Red Cross Hospital in Daegu in 1986. His father, Lee Sung-soo, said an administrator told him his son had serious lung and heart problems. The family didn’t have a lot of money. The only option, the administrator said, was a high-risk and very expensive surgery that could leave the baby dead or severely disabled.
She advised Lee to relinquish his son to Holt, which would pay for the surgery and find a home for a disabled child if he survived.
Lee said he signed the paper, believing it was the only way to save his son, and wept. The AP could not verify Lee’s account — the hospital closed and its records were destroyed. Information obtained through a records request show that 470 children born in that hospital were adopted during the 80s and 90s.
“It felt like the sky was falling,” Lee said. “I felt like my heart was being ripped apart.”
By then, agencies were procuring most of their children directly from hospitals and maternity homes, which often received illegal payments for babies, records show. Though the stated intention of adoption was to spare children from orphanages, they gathered more than 4,600 children from hospitals in 1988, 60% of their supply.
“In paying rewards for childbirth delivery costs to hospitals, maternity homes, local administrative offices and others when acquiring children for adoption,” the Health Ministry wrote in 1988, “the social welfare institutions (agencies) have lost their morality and have descended to become trafficking institutions.”
A government audit the following year shows that Holt made nearly 100 illegal payments to hospitals during six months in 1988, worth about $16,000 now. Eastern Social Welfare Society gave even more, now worth about $64,000, to hospitals over that period.
The South Korean government declined to answer questions about its responsibility for the past, saying it will let the fact-finding commission finish its work. In a statement, the Health Ministry acknowledged that skyrocketing adoptions in the 1970s-80s were possibly driven by an intent to reduce welfare spending to balance cuts in foreign aid.
Lee Moo-ja, a retired local official in Boryeong city, recalled a sense of helplessness during the 1980s. Abandoned children were supposed to be reported to city officials, who would assign them to an orphanage, she said. But instead, agencies were directly scooping them up, and the pleading letters she sent to hospitals went nowhere.
The national government wasn’t interested in enforcement, she said, leaving local officials like her powerless to stop it.
Calabretta’s parents felt powerless too; they got onto an elevator with other couples holding their newborn children. All they had was the empty blanket.
___
“Is this really all for children?”
With the government on their side, agencies raced against time for children.
Employees were told to process them as quickly as they could, said two former adoption workers who spoke anonymously because Korean law forbids them from publicizing confidential information.
“All I heard was work faster, faster,” said one, employed at an agency from 1979 to 1984. “Do it faster and faster.”
Even now, the woman clenches her hands and clutches a pillow as she said she convinced herself they were saving orphans. She couldn’t help but quietly wonder: “Is this really all for children?”
Agencies had intake workers scour every region of the country for children, she said. They invested “zero effort” in confirming a child was truly orphaned.
She questioned whether dubious practices were baked into the system, from beginning to end. A colleague once brought in a girl allegedly abandoned in Daegu, about 145 miles away from Seoul. She refused to process the girl for adoption because she thought it was too soon to conclude she was abandoned. Not long after, the Daegu worker sent the same girl again, with the same photo — but a new name and background story that claimed she’d been abandoned earlier.
The former worker said she never learned whether the girl was adopted.
Some lost children ended up overseas.
Laurie Bender was approached by a strange woman while playing in the front yard in South Korea in 1975. She remembers the woman saying that Bender’s family didn’t want her anymore because her mother had another baby. She went with the woman, and felt so sad she thought she might die.
Bender says she was 4, but Korea calculates birthdays differently and her records say she was 6.
Every day, her mother, Han Tae-soon, went to police stations, government offices, adoption agencies. Every night, she slept with a picture of her missing daughter.
That picture was displayed everywhere — in subway stations, on lamp posts, on bags of snacks that advertised missing children, the Korean version of American milk cartons. But Bender was on the other side of the globe — sent by Holt to an American family who believed she was an orphan.
The U.S. took in the highest number of orphans by far, and to be eligible for a visa, they had to have lost one or both parents to death, disappearance or abandonment. The agencies seized on the word abandonment, applying it to most of the children they acquired.
Records from 1980 to 1987 show that more than 90% of the Korean children sent to the West almost certainly had known relatives, said Philsik Shin, a scholar at Korea’s Anyang University. The number of children sent for adoption was often more than 10 times higher than the police count for abandoned children, he found — close to 9,000 in 1985.
Listing children as abandoned made adoptions easier because agencies didn’t have to verify child origins or obtain parental relinquishment. It was “almost customary” to document children as abandoned, said Helen Noh, who matched hundreds of children with U.S. parents at Holt Children’s Services from 1981 to 1982.
Now a scholar at Seoul’s Soongsil University, Noh said Holt workers understood the agency was charging adopters about $3,000 per child.
“My salary was 240,000 won, which is like less than $200 a month,” Noh said. “If you send one child … that amount could pay at least one worker for the whole year.”
Documents obtained by AP show that agencies were likely charging even more, around $4,000 to $6,000. But they pocketed some of that money through improper means, such as charging for travel expenses for adoption workers but arranging for commercial passengers to carry babies instead.
Workers tried to meet specific requests from adoptive families. Some asked for siblings, Noh said, so she and her colleagues would compete over the small number of twins in their networks.
Another former worker, employed at two agencies from the 1970s to early 1990s, said anybody facing challenges in raising their children would be strongly encouraged to give them away.
“Many of the children we gathered would have stayed with their biological parents with a little help,” the former worker said. “But what we heard (from management) was always the same – if we don’t take that child, another adoption agency will.”
Private counseling records in a 1988 Holt document obtained by AP show that some parents who relinquished their children soon pleaded for them back. The agency’s workers told them that their children would thrive under good Western parents and may return home someday rich or “with Ph.Ds.”
In one case, a mother returned and asked to see her son. The boy was still in Seoul, but a Holt worker told the mother he’d been flown to the U.S.
“After being told the lie,” the worker wrote, “the birth mother began to regain her peace of mind as expected.”
Susan Soonkeum Cox, who long worked for Holt International, the Oregon-based U.S. arm of the Holt adoption network, denied widespread problems. She said the goal was always to find good homes for children who would have otherwise grown up in orphanages.
“Has there been some activity that shouldn’t have happened? Probably. We’re human and everybody is different. There’s good social workers, there’s bad social workers, there’s good employees, bad employees,” she said. “But…the accusation of systemic, deliberate wrongdoing, that I reject.”
The Seoul-based Holt Children’s Services, which split from the American agency in the 1970s, and the three other Korean agencies declined to comment on specific cases.
Holt Korea has in recent years denied accusations of wrongdoing and attributed adoptee complaints to misunderstandings and Korea’s social welfare issues. Kim Jin Sook, president of Eastern, has said the agency carried out government policies to find homes for “discarded children.”
But some other agencies on the ground started closing their programs because of ethical concerns.
In the 1970s, Francis Carlin ran South Korea’s Catholic Relief Services, which facilitated about 30 adoptions a month, compared to hundreds by the larger agencies. The demand from the West was intense, and there weren’t enough legitimate orphans to feed it, he said, leading to “a lot of the compromises, a lot of the hanky panky.”
The larger agencies toured orphanages, grabbing up healthy babies and leaving older and disabled children, he said.
“These, I would call them brokers, were going out and trying to get more and more children,” Carlin said when reached by AP. “They would put the legitimate parent on a guilt trip and say, what are you doing? You can’t afford to take care of this child…. Why don’t you just step back and let them have a better life? You’re so selfish.”
One Korean social worker expressed disgust in words so crushing they stuck with Carlin all these years: “It’s sickening, just sickening.”
Catholic Relief Services ceased its adoption program in 1974. Carlin remembers standing up at a meeting of humanitarian organizations: “We are beginning to slide into the abyss,” he said.
Four decades later, Laurie Bender took a DNA test because her own daughter was curious about their heritage. In 2019, she got a call: “Your mother has been looking for you.”
Bender dropped the phone.
“It’s like a hole in your heart has been healed, you finally feel like a complete person,” Bender said. “It’s like you’ve been living a fake life and everything you know is not true.”
Bender and her daughter flew to South Korea just weeks later. Her mother, Han Tae-soon, wore her best outfit and lipstick for the first time in a long time. She recognized her daughter immediately in the airport and ran to her, screaming, moaning, running her fingers through her hair.
Han, who is in her 70s, has notebooks feverishly annotated with English translations, written during countless hours trying to learn her daughter’s language. Amid the photos of her children on her living room wall is a black-and-white one of Bender as a little girl, stuck in time.
Han plans to sue the South Korean government and Holt for robbing them of ever having a real relationship.
“I feel like I am dying. I really am dying,” she said. “There’s so little time for me.”
She jabbed her finger at paperwork that sent her daughter away.
“Isn’t this a government seal?” she demanded. “Why did you make this up and sell away other people’s children?”
___
This story is part of an ongoing investigation led by The Associated Press in collaboration with FRONTLINE (PBS). The investigation includes an interactive and the upcoming documentary South Korea’s Adoption Reckoning, premiering Sept. 20 on PBS & online.
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Switched identities
This system turned children into people with no history, no parents, no ties.
Many adoptees will never know the basic facts of their lives — their birthdays, their birth parents, if they were wanted or truly abandoned — because their documents are false.
Robyn Joy Park, adopted to the United States, cherished her documents so much that she tattooed her adoption number — 82C-1320 — on her back. It was her only tether to her motherland.
Those documents said she was a girl named Park Joo Young, born in Busan in August 1982, and her unmarried mother couldn’t afford to keep her. In 2007, Park traveled to Korea to meet the woman that her adoption agency, Eastern, listed as her mother.
Their bond deepened slowly over years. They visited relatives, held hands, shared hotel rooms — the mother spoonfed her rice. The woman’s son changed his name to Park Joon Young, to share the “Young” syllable in line with Korean naming traditions for siblings.
Five years passed. Park asked the woman to take a DNA test in the hope of finding her father.
They were not related. She was not Park Joo Young — she was another, unknown, girl.
“I really was so hurt and stunned and devastated and incredibly angry,” Park said. “I could only imagine what it was like for her.”
She lost touch with the woman, although she remains in contact with the man she considered her brother. Her agency offered her nothing but an apology, and declined to comment when reached by AP.
Her story is not uncommon. When children processed for adoption died, became too sick to travel or were found by their biological families, agencies often replaced them with other children instead of redoing the process from scratch, according to former adoption workers. At a meeting with an adoptee in 2021 where AP was present, a longtime worker said Western partner agencies were willing to take “any child of the same sex and similar age, because it would take too much time to start over again.”
The AP has spoken to 10 others who found that their identity was switched with someone else.
One of them, Mia Sang Jørnø, raised in Denmark, developed a close relationship with the family of the man listed as her father by her agency, Korea Social Service. She attended his funeral in 2000, even joining relatives as they received guests through the traditional three-day mourning procession.
He had given her the name of her mother, and she worked up the courage to contact her. They took a DNA test.
They weren’t related.
The agency told her that her paperwork was mistaken, and she wasn’t even the girl named on her documents, Park Sang Ok. She was Kim Eun-hye. She had mourned a father who wasn’t hers.
“I always have this kind of restlessness, she said, “of just not knowing that part of me, my identity.”
KSS did not respond to questions. In letters seen by AP and Frontline, the agency has admitted to adoptees that the stories on their paperwork were invented to get the adoptions through.
“I would like to apologize for the wrong information in your adoption paper,” a KSS worker wrote to a Danish adoptee in 2016. “It was made up just for adoption procedure.” The worker could not be reached by AP.
In 2022, the agency emailed another adoptee that their “real background is different” than listed, apologizing that the discrepancy might “confuse” them.
Neither Park nor Jørnø ever found their real parents. They both think often of the girls whose identities they were given, and wonder: What happened to her?
___
“We were supposed to be a happy family”
The Korean government cracked down on the adoption industry when the 1988 Olympics brought attention to the baby trade as a national shame.
The Health Ministry instructed agencies to “improve” their practices and stop “touring” hospitals and orphanages to gather children, according to a document obtained by AP. They were told they could be punished if they continued to “competitively engage in unlawful practices.”
Adoptions plummeted, from around 8,000 a year in the mid-1980s to around 2,000 a year in the 1990s. But tens of thousands of children were already overseas, including Calabretta.
Hospital officials told Calabretta’s mother to assume he had died. She went to a temple three times to offer a Buddhist ceremony to bless the soul of the dead.
The documents that went with him to the U.S. in 1986 described him as a “normal healthy baby, adoptable,” born to an unwed mother, and made no mention of a surgery.
Calabretta returned to South Korea in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. His father, Lee Sung-soo, could not wait out the two-week quarantine and showed up outside the apartment the next day.
Calabretta threw open the window. “Dad!” he shouted.
“My son!” Lee shouted back.
“We were supposed to be a happy family, not separated. He was my precious firstborn son,” Lee said. “For over 30 years, he lived in a foreign land against his will. That makes my heart break.”
Calabretta visits South Korea often, and they talk on the phone every few days. He has the same odd divot in his ear as his mother, the same laugh as his father, the same taste in shoes and jackets and music, the same allergies.
All those years, Calabretta’s mother kept the blanket she’d carried empty out of the hospital, a symbol of the absence where her son should be.
He asked her to rename him, to reclaim him, as her son and a son of Korea. In Korea, there is a sentiment that something isn’t truly yours until you name it, and once you do, you must take care of it.
So he prefers his new name now: Hanil Lee.
___
AP reporter Lori Hinnant and researcher Rhonda Shafner and Frontline’s Lora Moftah and Emily Sternlicht contributed to this report.
___
COMING TOMORROW: The role of the West
Robert Calabretta blames not just South Korea but also the United States for taking him away from his parents and adopting him out to an American family.
“What higher trophy is it of domination than taking one’s children and carting them off?” he asked. “The audacity of that. And it’s all tied in a bow of, ‘you must feel so lucky that you’re adopted.’”
Western governments turned a blind eye to rampant fraud and pressured the South Korean government to keep the kids coming, an Associated Press investigation has found.
CLAIRE GALOFARO
KIM TONG-HYUNG
Kim has been covering the Koreas for the AP since 2014. He has published widely read stories on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, the dark side of South Korea’s economic rise and international adoptions of Korean children.
twittermailto
AP · by KIM TONG-HYUNG · September 19, 2024
4. North Korea tests ‘explosive power’ of new ballistic missile
These missiles are "dual use:" They support the regime's political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies while also providing advanced warfighting capabilities should Kim divide to use force to dominate the peninsula.
North Korea tests ‘explosive power’ of new ballistic missile
Kim Jong Un again blames ‘outside forces’ pushing development of Hwasong variant along with an upgraded cruise missile
https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/north-korea-tests-explosive-power-of-new-ballistic-missile/
Shreyas Reddy September 19, 2024
Kim Jong Un and senior DPRK officials observe the launch of the Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5 missile | Image: KCNA (Sept. 19, 2024)
Kim Jong Un oversaw a new ballistic missile and upgraded strategic cruise missile tests on Wednesday, framing Pyongyang’s continuing missile build-up as a direct response to “the grave threat of outside forces.”
The state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Thursday that the DPRK’s Missile Administration test-fired the “new-type tactical ballistic missile Hwasongpho-11-Ta-4.5” (Hwasong-11C-4.5) to verify its “explosive power” and accuracy at a medium range of approximately 200 miles (320 km).
The missile was reportedly tipped with a 4.5-ton conventional warhead, and state media images showed it striking a ground-based target with a large explosion.
North Korean media showed the Hwasong-11C-4.5 missile striking a ground-based target with ‘explosive power’ | Image: KCNA (Sept. 19, 2024)
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Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, highlighted the similarity between the bullseye target shown in KCNA photos and South Korea’s official photos and videos of its Hyunmoo ballistic missile tests.
“North Korea has developed this missile to convey a degree of parity with South Korea and I think that shows here,” he told NK News.
The Missile Administration previously tested the Hwasong-11C missile with the 4.5-ton warhead on July 1 at a maximum range of 310 miles (500 km) and a minimum of 56 miles (90 km).
State media reported at the time that North Korea would test the missile’s “flight characteristics, hit accuracy and explosion power” at an intermediate range of 155 miles (250 km) later in July, but did not report any further launches until now.
In addition to the goal of sending a message to Seoul, Panda said the missile’s tests at different ranges primarily help ensure operational readiness.
Yang Uk, a military analyst at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, agreed that Wednesday’s launch was aimed more at testing the ability to support the super-large warhead over a given range.
“When North Korea does something, it’s not always about sending a political message,” Yang explained, calling Wednesday’s test a “practical operation.”
He also told NK News that North Korea’s decision to publish photos of the test when it declined to do so after the July test-fire shows the regime’s confidence in the success of simulating a large warhead blast.
The Hwasong-11C-4.5 missile shortly before hitting a ground-based target | Image: KCNA (Sept. 19, 2024)
Unusually, North Korea has only advertised the launch through outward-facing outlets like KCNA, with the party newspaper Rodong Sinmun and state television yet to report it to domestic audiences as of Thursday at 4 p.m. KST.
Yang said the newest Hwasong SRBM “might be intended for foreign export.”
“They want to show the world that they have great accuracy.”
Ukrainian authorities have previously cast doubt on the quality of Hwasong-11A (KN-23) missiles reportedly used by Russian forces, and Yang said this test serves to advertise that Pyongyang has “a much more accurate missile with a much more powerful warhead.”
However, he added that North Korea’s new weapon may not be as effective as comparable missiles like South Korea’s Hyunmoo-4, as it focuses on explosive power without incorporating elements to break through buildings.
Kim also oversaw the test of a strategic cruise missile, which the KCNA report said has been “highly upgraded for its combat use,” without providing further details about the claimed improvements.
North Korea tests an ‘improved’ strategic cruise missile. | Image: KCNA (Sept. 19, 2024)
On Wednesday, South Korea and Japan detected the two missile launches early in the morning. The former announced that North Korea fired the missiles from around Kaechon, South Pyongan Province. NK News analysis of the KCNA photos indicates the launch took place from Kaechon Airbase.
The military estimated that the missiles flew approximately 250 miles (400 km), but did not provide further details about the projectiles’ flight or performance.
The North Korean leader highlighted the importance of weapons development to deter enemies amid growing regional tensions, and emphasized the need to continue to “bolster up the nuclear force” and strengthen the country’s military.
“Only when we have strong power, can we contain and frustrate the enemies’ strategic misjudgment and will to use armed forces, he said, adding this is a true deterrent for defending peace and stability,” KCNA reported.
Kim also tested various small arms developed by the Academy of Defence Sciences, including a 7.62 mm sniper rifle and a 5.56 mm automatic rifle.
He was previously photographed holding the same rifles and other guns at military drills last Wednesday. North Korean weapons expert Joost Oliemans identified the 5.56 mm automatic rifle as a new “NATO standard” caliber assault weapon, based on photos from state media.
Kim Jong Un tests a 7.62 mm sniper rifle. | Image: KCNA (Sept. 19, 2024)
Colin Zwirko contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Arius Derr
Last updated at 3.50 p.m. KST on Sept. 19 with additional context and expert comments.
5. NK newspaper 'unusually' silent on new missile tests: Seoul
Perhaps they think it is not necessary since most of our comments feed into the regime's desired narrative. Not once have the press or pundits or government officials noted the regime's failed policies and that it is prioritizing these tests over the welfare of the people. Instead we talk about the threats which reinforce the regime's desired narrative. We need to include the human rights aspects of these tests in our responses.
NK newspaper 'unusually' silent on new missile tests: Seoul
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · September 19, 2024
By Ji Da-gyum
Published : Sept. 19, 2024 - 15:18
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (center) inspects the test-fire of the Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5, a new tactical ballistic missile, equipped with a 4.5-ton warhead on Wednesday, in this photo provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency on Thursday. (Yonhap)
While North Korea's state-run Korean Central News Agency, primarily targeting international audiences, reported on Thursday's missile test launches under Kim Jong-un's supervision, the country's primary domestic newspaper unusually omitted the coverage.
Kim supervised the tests of tactical ballistic missiles fitted with "super-large" warheads and modified cruise missiles on Wednesday, according to the KCNA.
But the Rodong Sinmun, North Korea’s most widely circulated newspaper, remained silent on the event, a move the Unification Ministry in Seoul called "unusual," given the regime's typical coordination of domestic and international reports on its leader's public activities.
The Unification Ministry highlighted two rare instances, with the possibility of more, where the Rodong Sinmun departed from its tradition of featuring Kim Jong-un's public activities on its front page, despite coverage by KCNA.
The first instance occurred in February 2012, when Kim Jong-un attended a concert celebrating Kim Jong-il's 70th birth anniversary, just months after his death in December 2011. The second took place in January 2019, when Kim met with the North Korean delegation returning from Washington ahead of the second Kim-Trump summit, which ultimately collapsed in a sudden breakdown.
Such omissions are exceedingly rare, as the newspaper publishes seven days a week without pause.
The Unification Ministry is currently examining several potential reasons for the absence of Kim’s military activities from the Rodong Sinmun and whether similar precedents exist.
Jung Dae-jin, a professor at Halla University in Wonju, Gangwon Province, suggested that "North Korea may have deemed last week's reports on (Kim's) military activities, aimed at bolstering internal solidarity, sufficient."
Last week, the Rodong Sinmun and other state media outlets extensively covered six military-related activities by Kim Jong-un from Sept. 8-13, including supervising the test-firing of a new 600mm multiple rocket launcher and inspection of a uranium enrichment facility producing weapons-grade nuclear material.
"Kim Jong-un's emphasis on self-defense military capabilities, demonstrated during his supervision of the missile test with a 4.5-ton super-large warhead and his other field inspections, also appeared to be primarily targeted at related government officials and external audiences, which makes the selective media coverage understandable," Jung told The Korea Herald.
Kim said Wednesday that the missile "tests and steady improvement of performance of weapons and equipment through them are directly related to the grave threat of outside forces to the state security environment" of North Korea, according to KCNA.
However, Jung also noted, "If necessary, the missile test could still appear in Rodong Sinmun tomorrow. Such decisions are made at its discretion."
North Korea's Missile Administration successfully conducts the test-fire of the Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5, a new tactical ballistic missile, equipped with a 4.5-ton warhead on Wednesday in this photo provided by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the following day. (Yonhap)
According to the KCNA report, North Korea's Missile Administration had "successfully" conducted test-fires of the Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5 as well as a "strategic cruise missile whose performance has been highly upgraded for its combat use."
The ballistic missile was armed with a "4.5-ton super-large conventional warhead," the KCNA said, with the test designed to verify the missile's "accuracy of hit at medium range of 320 km and explosive power of the super-large warhead with a missile loaded with such a warhead."
The report by the KCNA, meanwhile, was the first time North Korea has explicitly declared that it deliberately launched a missile toward an inland target, rather than over water -- an action widely interpreted as a show of confidence.
Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the government-funded Korea Institute for National Unification, noted that while the first test launch of the Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5 on July 1 "focused on verifying flight stability and hit accuracy, the latest test aimed to confirm both target hit precision and the explosive power of the super-large warhead."
Hong said that North Korea "deliberately showcased the missile's precision by releasing multiple images of the missile striking the exact center of a crosshair target from a vertical angle."
"The released images also subtly highlighted the warhead’s explosive power, showcasing its ability to penetrate deep into the ground," he added.
Hong further pointed out that the distance from Kaechon, in South Pyongan Province, to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, along South Korea’s western coast, falls precisely within the 320 km range tested.
"While framed as an experimental launch, the selection of Kaechon as the launch site appears deliberate, likely aimed at demonstrating North Korea’s ability to target US military bases at medium range," Hong said.
Hong assessed that the simultaneous testing of ballistic and cruise missiles was intended to "demonstrate North Korea’s capability to target US military bases and strike naval forces approaching by sea," aligning with the country's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy.
"With the US presidential election approaching, the unveiling of these new weapons systems appears to be a calculated move to emphasize North Korea’s minimum deterrence capability against the US," Hong explained.
While overseeing the tests, Kim stated, "only when we have strong power, can we contain and frustrate the enemies' strategic misjudgment and will to use armed forces," adding that "this is a true deterrent for defending peace and stability," according to KCNA.
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · September 19, 2024
6. North Korea ‘governor-in-waiting’ vows to stop Russian weapons supplies
Not sure how. But Ji Seong Ho is an amazing human being.
North Korea ‘governor-in-waiting’ vows to stop Russian weapons supplies
Ji Seong-ho, who lost a hand and foot while searching for coal in the North as a child, is now a senior member of the South’s government
Nicola Smith
Asia Correspondent
Related Topics
19 September 2024 5:00am
The Telegraph · by Nicola Smith
Ji Seong-ho, who lost a hand and foot while searching for coal in the North as a child, is now a senior member of the South’s government
Asia Correspondent
19 September 2024 5:00am
19 September 2024 5:00am
Ji Seong-ho, the governor of the South Korean province North Hamgyong, wants to transform its port into a hub for trade with the UK WOOHAE CHO
Nicola Smith Asia Correspondent
19 September 2024 5:00am
Since his dramatic escape from North Korea, using crutches to propel himself 3,700 miles across rivers, mountains and dense jungle to safe refuge in Seoul, Ji Seong-ho has vowed to fight for his former compatriots who still live under Kim Jong-un’s cruel, authoritarian regime.
Last month, Mr Ji, 42, was offered a fresh chance to do so when South Korea appointed him the new governor of North Hamgyong province, his former home, where he was forced to beg for scraps as a child and was maimed in a horrific train accident while scrounging for coal.
For the next three years, Mr Ji will lead a government-in-waiting for the hoped-for reunification of the peninsula that was ripped apart by the 1950-53 Korean War.
As governor, he wants to create a world where residents of his destitute former province “can eat meat soup with rice”, said Mr Ji at his inauguration ceremony.
Mr Ji was forced to beg for scraps as a child under Kim Jong-un’s authoritarian regime JEAN CHUNG/THE WASHINGTON POST
In an interview last week in his grand office at the foot of Bukhansan, a mountain on the northern tip of Seoul, he told The Telegraph he had another goal – to transform Hamgyong’s port of Rason from a suspected waypoint for North Korean munitions to Russia into a hub for trade with the UK.
The city was now being used to transport arms to prop up Moscow’s war in Ukraine, he said, “but the route itself has a greater potential value for travel and the trade of resources” that could stretch from east Asia to British shores.
In Mr Ji’s own words, his survival and astonishing political rise is nothing short of a “miracle”.
After an accident when he collapsed from hunger and fell between the carriages of a train, his limbs were so mangled that surgeons considered whether he was worth saving. They then proceeded to amputate his left hand and leg, sawing through bones without anaesthesia as he screamed in agony.
He later witnessed his grandmother starve to death in the brutal famine that swept the country in the 1990s. Realising he had no future in the dystopian dictatorship, he decided to attempt a dangerous escape to South Korea.
In Seoul he founded a human rights group to help other defectors escape and resettle JEAN CHUNG/THE WASHINGTON POST
In previous interviews, he has described how he was unprepared for the extreme hardship along the route after he crossed the Tumen River into China and travelled often by foot to Laos and then on to Thailand.
As he scrambled through dense jungle and up steep mountainsides with the help of his crutches, he often broke down exhausted in tears and despair, praying to God for help and promising to live a good life if he made it to South Korea.
He beat the odds, arriving in Seoul with barely $50 to his name, and then learnt how to use a computer and synthetic limbs before he founded a human rights group to help other defectors escape and resettle.
His brother also escaped, but Mr Ji is still burdened by the grief of losing his father, who was caught trying to defect and tortured to death.
‘I’ve found peace by surviving’
Rather than break him, Mr Ji said it motivated him to work harder to improve lives in North Korea.
“This pain that my family went through gave me the courage to become the proud son that I am when I visit the graves of my father or my grandmother,” he said.
“I’ve already found peace by surviving, but the people in Hamgyong still live on without freedom,” Mr Ji said. “And if you know what freedom is and experienced it, you have the responsibility to act on it.”
In 2018, he raised his crutches in the air as he received a standing ovation from US Congress after Donald Trump, then president, used Mr Ji’s harrowing tale to denounce the lack of freedoms under Kim Jong-un’s iron-fisted rule.
Mr Ji received a standing ovation from the US Congress in 2018 AARON P BERNSTEIN/BLOOMBERG
But Mr Ji’s ambitions to highlight the plight of North Koreans go far beyond symbolism.
In 2020, he was elected to the South’s parliament, where he advocated for greater measures to help defectors better integrate and overcome their trauma – a job he will continue in his current post as some 60 per cent of defectors come from North Hamgyong.
He now has the additional task to prepare a shadow administration and all its economic, trade, educational, social and humanitarian policies, to be ready in the event of the South and North reunifying.
South Korea’s “Committee for the Five Northern Korean Provinces” reflects Seoul’s claim to be the sole legitimate government of the entire Korean peninsula, which has been divided by a heavily militarised border for more than seven decades.
An administrative chart hangs on Mr Ji’s office wall revealing the faces of dozens of officials already preparing the building blocks for a new modern society in Hamgyong.
People were now even worse off than when he lived there, said Mr Ji.
‘Regressing to the past’
“There is no growth in the Hamgyong area as it is regressing to the past,” he said. “This Kim Jong-un administration has cut off governmental resources along with trade from China, so the people living in Hamgyong are even more poor.”
In January, Kim took the unprecedented step to reverse the dynasty’s previous long-standing policy of unification with the South, designating his neighbour instead as the “principal enemy”.
Seoul maintains its firm goal of unifying with the North, but younger generations of South Koreans, who have no living memory of the war and who are struggling with the cost of living, are hesitant to accept the inevitable high economic price of doing so.
But Mr Ji remains optimistic that “reunification will happen”, even if not during his tenure as governor.
In the meantime, the success story of the young beggar who conquered adversity to become a senior-ranking member of the South’s government is now being broadcast into the North through giant loudspeakers lining the border.
“I was a victim of the North Korean regime and had a difficult life. My appointment as governor will give people hope,” he said.
“North Koreans still want reunification because they think it is the only way that their lives can get better,” he added. “The international community needs to give them courage.”
More stories
The Telegraph · by Nicola Smith
7. North Korea bookends Chuseok holiday with more trash balloon launches
North Korea bookends Chuseok holiday with more trash balloon launches
Launches Wednesday follow consecutive days of barrages at beginning of holiday but no accidents, major damage reported
https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/north-korea-bookends-chuseok-holiday-with-more-trash-balloon-launches/
Jeongmin Kim September 19, 2024
The contents of North Korean trash balloons reportedly found in South Korea on July 21, 2024 | Image: Seoul's Joint Chiefs of Staff (July 21, 2024)
North Korea launched another round of trash-filled balloons on the last day of the Chuseok fall harvest holiday, according to the South Korean military.
The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced at around 8:30 p.m. on Wednesday that the DPRK had carried out more balloon barrages, the 21st launch since late May.
The ROK military spotted around 160 balloons, with around 30 falling in South Korea, local media reported, citing the JCS. It also stated that the contents of Wednesday’s balloons were mostly paper and plastic waste again, with no hazardous materials found.
The Chuseok holiday fell from Monday to Wednesday, over which period the government expected around 37 million people to travel, raising concerns about potential damage caused by falling balloons.
Wednesday night’s balloon launch follows two consecutive days of launches on Saturday and Sunday, all occurring when the ROK government announced it would see the largest number of people on the country’s roads.
There have been no reported road accidents caused by the balloons during the holiday period, but there was one minor fire caused by a balloon that reportedly fell on a street in Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, at around 9:40 p.m. Wednesday. The fire was extinguished almost immediately, with no casualties.
“One of the reasons for North Korea continuing to launch the trash balloons is … to stoke conflict within our society,” Col. Lee Sung-jun, the head spokesperson of the JCS, said at a briefing on Thursday.
“These North Korean trash balloons or their by-products may cause damage, and I would like to thank the citizens who are calmly dealing with these issues,” Lee added. “Our military is always prepared for North Korean provocations and will respond immediately, strongly and until the end if any damage occurs due to such actions.”
The South Korean National Intelligence Service in July noted that North Korea has included “white powder” disguised as hazardous material in some of the balloons to stoke fear. Asked about the issue on Thursday, Lee said Pyongyang’s potential use of actual biochemical weapons “seems unlikely,” speculating that North Korea could be including “flour” in the balloon packages.
“Nevertheless, keeping that possibility in mind, we are conducting chemical, biological and radiological tests to check for harmful substances and taking appropriate measures.”
The North Korean trash balloons launched from May to early September have caused at least $140,000 in property damage in the Seoul metropolitan area, including damage to the roof of a car on a road in Gyeonggi Province and multiple fires on rooftops, forests and a storage building in Paju.
In response to a question about whether North Korea might be using timers to intentionally cause fires, Lee said it is unlikely.
Edited by Alannah Hill
8. Korean American Senate candidate looks to become 'strong' voice for security on Korean Peninsula
I hope he will hire some advisors who will inform him about the dangers of a premature end of war declaration (which he has supported inthe past) and other concessionary measures that support Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy though it appease he has the experience to understand this. He also comes from a very inspirational family.
Excerpts:
In a speech to his backers at the Chuseok reception, Kim highlighted the value of public service that he has held dear to his heart, something he learned from his South Korean immigrant parents.
His father, who was born with polio and was homeless for a good chunk of his childhood, ended up getting a doctor's degree in genetics in the U.S., while his mother got a nursing degree and served at a hospital in New Jersey -- a story he shared to underline his gratitude for America and his family's history of service.
"(My parents) said service isn't just a job. It's a way of life. That is something that they held very close to their heart," he said.
...
Kim boasts a prominent foreign policy career, having served at the NSC, the Pentagon, the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and as a civilian adviser to Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. John Allen in Afghanistan.
Kim earned a political science degree from the University of Chicago. He was awarded a prestigious Rhodes Scholarship and a Harry S. Truman Scholarship, which led him to earn a master's degree and a doctorate in international relations from the University of Oxford.
Korean American Senate candidate looks to become 'strong' voice for security on Korean Peninsula
Song Sang-ho
Diplomacy 13:37 September 19, 2024
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By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Sept. 19 (Yonhap) -- A Korean American Senate candidate has vowed to become a "strong" voice to help tackle security challenges on the Korean Peninsula if elected in November, as Pyongyang has been ratcheting up tensions with its recent disclosure of a uranium enrichment facility and continued weapons tests.
Rep. Andy Kim (D-NJ), the Democratic nominee for the Senate, made the remarks, as scores of his supporters gathered in Washington on Wednesday to celebrate Chuseok, the Korean autumn harvest celebration, with Election Day less than seven weeks away.
"I do plan to be a strong national security voice for the United States and the challenges we face on the Korean Peninsula, especially when it comes to North Korea," Kim told Yonhap News Agency, noting his extensive foreign policy portfolio, including a stint at the White House National Security Council (NSC).
Rep. Andy Kim (D-NJ) poses for a photo after an event to celebrate Chuseok, the Korean autumn harvest celebration, in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 18, 2024. (Yonhap)
Kim has been leading a formidable campaign for a New Jersey Senate seat -- up for grabs as Robert Menendez resigned from it following corruption convictions. The Garden State has not elected a Republican as its senator since 1972. If elected, he would become the first Korean American member of the Senate.
As a Korean American, Kim underlined one of his election priorities -- playing a role as a "bridge" to further enhance the South Korea-U.S. alliance.
"I hope I can be someone that can be a bridge between the U.S. and South Korea, someone that can try to show how beneficial that relationship is to both countries," he said. "It's really a win-win."
In a speech to his backers at the Chuseok reception, Kim highlighted the value of public service that he has held dear to his heart, something he learned from his South Korean immigrant parents.
His father, who was born with polio and was homeless for a good chunk of his childhood, ended up getting a doctor's degree in genetics in the U.S., while his mother got a nursing degree and served at a hospital in New Jersey -- a story he shared to underline his gratitude for America and his family's history of service.
"(My parents) said service isn't just a job. It's a way of life. That is something that they held very close to their heart," he said.
"They very much believe service isn't just a job that you have nine to five. It's about your fundamental relationship and responsibility to the people around you ... not just people you know, but everybody."
Also present at the celebration was Sen. Cory Booker of New Jersey. He pinned hopes on Kim's role to add diversity to the Senate.
"The U.S. Senate is one of the least diverse bodies that we have representing us. It is a body that I was the fourth black person ever popularly elected in the U.S. history," he said.
He added American politics needs "more character" and "more kindness" -- attributes he cast as "what Kim is about at his core."
"Americans from every background have shown in wars past, in struggle and strife that we can continue to bend that arc of the moral universe more towards justice," he said. "So I am overwhelmingly joyous about this candidacy."
Kim boasts a prominent foreign policy career, having served at the NSC, the Pentagon, the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and as a civilian adviser to Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. John Allen in Afghanistan.
Kim earned a political science degree from the University of Chicago. He was awarded a prestigious Rhodes Scholarship and a Harry S. Truman Scholarship, which led him to earn a master's degree and a doctorate in international relations from the University of Oxford.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
9. North Korean junior women’s soccer team defeats US to reach U-20 World Cup final
I will look for the Propaganda and Agitation Department's celebration of this.
North Korean junior women’s soccer team defeats US to reach U-20 World Cup final
DPRK women will now face off against Japanese team on Sunday after already beating them in final of Asian Cup in March
https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/north-korean-junior-womens-soccer-team-defeats-us-to-reach-u-20-world-cup-final/
Shreyas Reddy September 19, 2024
North Korean players celebrate a goal against the U.S. in the under-20 Women's World Cup | Image: FIFA via YouTube (Sept. 19, 2024)
North Korea’s under-20 women’s soccer team reached the final of the FIFA World Cup with a hard-fought win over the U.S. on Wednesday, showcasing the country’s ability to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the strongest teams in the world at the youth level.
The DPRK women edged the encounter in Colombia by a score of 1-0, continuing their dominance in a tournament that has seen the team outscore every other participating nation.
After an end-to-end start that saw both teams come close to scoring, forward Choe Il Son notched her fifth goal of the tournament in the 22nd minute to set up a rematch of the under-20 Women’s Asian Cup final in March, in which the DPRK defeated Japan.
If North Korea prevails over Japan this Sunday, it will join the U.S. and Germany as the most successful nations in the under-20 Women’s World Cup’s history with three tournament wins.
Wednesday’s face-off between the two women’s soccer powerhouses took place amid increasing tensions between Pyongyang and Washington, but the players appeared far more focused on the game than their countries’ politics.
Yong Ja Hong, a doctoral candidate at the University of North Korean Studies, said the game reflected North Korean athletes’ training to focus on the task at hand, but added that state propaganda would undoubtedly affect their perception of their opponent.
“Any match against the USA, Japan, or the ROK would definitely have special meaning for a loyal DPRK athlete,” she told NK News. “These three nations are invariably depicted as enemies on one level or another, whether it be due to historical scars or modern political pressures.”
Although state media will inevitably highlight the semifinal victory, as it has other positive results from this tournament, Hong said it is more likely to focus on the athletes than the political undertones.
State media have previously referred to South Korean sports teams as “puppets,” but such cases are the exception rather than the norm.
Hong explained that state media seldom talks about opponents, except to occasionally describe them as tough or skillful, as Pyongyang’s propaganda approach restricts political disputes to foreign governments rather than their people.
“DPRK athletics propaganda is more about exalting the greatness of their nation and glorifying their own athletes than it is about putting existing frames of political propaganda onto their opponents,” she said.
While the political context may not be a major factor in the athletes’ approach, Hong noted that sporting pressures can still have an effect, citing the DPRK women’s soccer documentary “Hana, Dul, Sed.”
In the film, a North Korean player said she felt intimidated to play against the far bigger players of the American women’s national team during the senior World Cup in the U.S. in 2003. However, after losing the game, she felt driven to face the same opponents again and win.
While the senior team has yet to defeat the U.S., which has won more World Cups and Olympic gold medals than any other country, the head-to-head record is far closer at junior levels.
Wednesday’s result marks a repeat of the DPRK’s victory in its last under-20 encounter against the U.S. in the 2016 edition’s semifinal en route to a second World Cup win. Eight years earlier, it was the U.S. that came out on top in the final of the 2008 tournament.
Hong said the continued excellence at the youth level, despite a four-year absence from international sports due to the COVID-19 pandemic, reflects the government’s focus on handpicking promising athletes from all over the country and placing them in dedicated academies.
She said the DPRK’s youth sporting development system tests the athletic prowess of every single child in the nation, sends them to disciplines in which the government thinks they will excel, and prioritizes selflessness, unity and loyalty over individualism.
Furthermore, female athletes in North Korea are given the same incentives as male athletes, unlike some other countries where women’s sport receives little support, Hong added.
However, at the senior level, this focus on basic training from a young age falls short due to North Korean athletes’ lack of exposure to strong international opponents.
“By the time athletes get to that level … they need an understanding of the most cutting edge techniques and strategy, as well as regular experience playing against the highest level of competition,” Hong said.
Edited by Alannah Hill
10. North Korea’s new missile can carry ‘super-large’ warhead: state media
Not large but super large. The north appears to be doing what it said it would do. We should take them at their word about many things.
North Korea’s new missile can carry ‘super-large’ warhead: state media
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-korea-super-large-warhead-09192024015700.html
The warhead is among the high-tech weapons that the North had vowed to develop in 2021.
By Taejun Kang for RFA
2024.09.19
Taipei, Taiwan
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un looks on during the test of what KCNA described as a new tactical ballistic missile, in this picture obtained by Reuters on Sept. 19, 2024, in North Korea.
KCNA/Reuters
North Korea said on Thursday it had successfully test-fired a new tactical ballistic missile capable of carrying a “super-large” warhead, a day after South Korea’s military said the North launched multiple short-range ballistic missiles.
The new missile, named the Hwasongpo-11-Da-4.5, was tipped with a 4.5-ton super-large conventional warhead in the test-firing conducted on Wednesday by the North's Missile Administration, said North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA.
A super-large warhead is on a list of high-tech weapons that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had vowed to develop at a party congress in 2021, including a military spy satellite and solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Smoke rises from an explosion as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un leads tests of new tactical ballistic missiles using super-large warheads and modified cruise missiles at an undisclosed location in North Korea, Sept. 18, 2024. (KCNA via Reuters)
“Its test-fire was aimed at verifying the accuracy of hit at medium range of 320 km and explosive power of the super-large warhead with a missile loaded with such a warhead,” KCNA said, adding that Kim guided the test-fires and expressed great satisfaction.
“The military and political situation in the region threatening the present state security environment indicates that the work for bolstering up the military capability for self-defense should be the most important affair of the country,” said Kim, cited by KCNA.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS, said the launches had been detected at about 6:50 a.m. on Wednesday from the North’s Kaechon area in South Pyongan Province, north of the capital Pyongyang. The missiles traveled about 400 kilometers (250 miles), the South Korean military said without providing further details.
RELATED STORIES
North Korea launches multiple short-range ballistic missiles: Seoul
North Korea unveils uranium enrichment facility for the first time
Kim Jong Un says North Korea to increase its arsenal of nuclear weapons
In response to the North’s missile launch, South Korea’s presidential office said it “sternly warned” against North Korean provocations, adding it was closely monitoring its behavior and was prepared for a range of possible provocations with a high level of readiness to protect the lives and safety of its citizens.
The missiles fired by North Korea are believed to be a similar variant to the modified version of the SRBM KN-23 series that it launched on July 1, according to a military source.
At the time, North Korea said the two launches were tests of the “new tactical ballistic missile Hwasongpo-11Da-4.5.”
The July test was conducted from the North’s North Hwanghae Province, and it was thought to have been a failure by the South Korean military, with one of the two rockets fired in a northeasterly direction traveling more than 600 kilometers (373 miles), but the other only 120 kilometers (75 miles) – meaning that one of the missiles flew off the coast of Chongjin, while the other crashed near Pyongyang.
North Korea said at that time the test was successful and promised to conduct another test, with a range of about 250 kilometers (155 miles).
Edited by Mike Firn.
11. Vietnam deputy defense minister on rare visit to North Korea
The north is competing on the Go/Baduk board trying to put a black stone on Vietnam to capture some influence from South Korea.
Vietnam deputy defense minister on rare visit to North Korea
Analysts warn that closer ties with North Korea may harm Vietnam’s improving relations with the US and South Korea.
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/vietnam-north-korea-defense-cooperation-09192024052609.html
By RFA Staff
2024.09.19
Bilateral talks between Vietnam’s deputy defense minister Hoang Xuan Chien and North Korea’s deputy defense minister Kim Min Sop in Pyongyang, Sept. 18, 2024.
Vietnam Ministry of National Defense
A Vietnam defense ministry delegation is in North Korea on a rare visit to boost cooperation, the ministry has announced on its website.
The visit has raised eyebrows as it takes place just days after North Korea revealed the first images of centrifuges used for enriching uranium at a production base for weapons-grade nuclear material.
North Korea is also under U.N. Security Council sanctions for its nuclear weapons and missile programs.
On Thursday, Vietnam's deputy defense minister, Senior Lt. Gen. Hoang Xuan Chien, held a bilateral meeting with his North Korean counterpart, Lt. Gen. Kim Min Sop.
The two sides “exchanged views on the current situation in the world and the region, as well as in both countries,” the Vietnamese ministry said, adding that they shared information about their countries’ defense policies.
“Defense cooperation is one of the important aspects of the bilateral relations,” the ministry said.
The officials agreed that Vietnam and North Korea would continue exchanges on multiple levels and strengthen cooperation in military medicine, border defense, defense industry, military technology and information sharing.
‘Misleading signals’
Chien invited Kim to visit Vietnam in December for the 80th anniversary celebrations of the Vietnam People’s Army and its second International Defense Expo from Dec. 19-22.
International weapons suppliers showcase their products at the expo, which is seen as an attempt by Hanoi to diversify its sources of imported arms.
North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency, or KCNA, had not reported on Chien’s visit at time of publication.
Vietnam’s deputy defense minister Hoang Xuan Chien visits a facility of the North Korean special forces, Sept. 18, 2024. (Vietnam Ministry of National Defense)
Analysts said the visit carried risks for Vietnam.
“To be honest, I am quite puzzled by the move,” said a Vietnamese analyst who wished to remain anonymous as he is not authorized to speak to foreign media.
“This trip can send very misleading signals about Vietnam’s intention, especially as defense minister Phan Van Giang has just visited the United States,” he said.
The new general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, To Lam, is expected to address the U.N. General Assembly in New York later this week.
“Vietnam wants to be friends with everyone but as a responsible member of the international community, it shouldn’t be seen as contradicting U.N. sanctions in any way,” the analyst warned.
Nguyen The Phuong, a defense analyst at the University of New South Wales in Australia, said Vietnam was unlikely to procure weapons from North Korea.
“Beside the quality problem, violating U.N.'s sanctions regarding North Korea would be disastrous,” he said.
RELATED STORIES
Vietnam defense minister Phan Van Giang visits US to boost ties
North Korea unveils uranium enrichment facility for the first time
Xi’s latest message to North Korea’s Kim hints at cooling ties
For years China has been North Korea’s sole main ally but it has been boosting its foreign friendships in recent months.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin on a visit in June when they announced a partnership treaty, agreeing to offer each other military assistance “without delay.”
The U.S. says North Korea has provided Russia with large amounts of weapons for the war in Ukraine, which both North Korea and Russia deny.
Long history
Vietnam and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK – as North Korea is officially known – have a long history of friendship and cooperation. In 2025, they will celebrate the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties.
North Korea was an ally of the then North Vietnam during the Vietnam War and provided substantial economic and military assistance, including weapons and ammunition.
North Korea reportedly transferred to Vietnam a number of midget submarines and missiles during the 1990s.
Vietnam-North Korea ties, however, have weakened in recent years as Hanoi and Seoul strengthened their cooperation, especially in investment and business.
South Korea has become one of Vietnam’s most important partners and in 2022 they elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, the highest tier of bilateral cooperation.
“Vietnam should bear in mind the risk of jeopardizing the relations with Seoul,” the Hanoi-based analyst said.
Some Korean analysts, such as Kim Young-sun, a former secretary general of the ASEAN-Korea Center, said that defense cooperation requires the highest levels of trust between countries and South Korea should consider carefully any plan to transfer arms to Vietnam.
Edited by Mike Firn.
12. South Korean Military: “Difficult to judge by appearance” on North Korea’s ‘4.5-ton warhead’ claim
It may only be large and not super large. Or it could be only a mock-up as all warfare (to include political warfare) is based on decpetion.
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
South Korean Military: “Difficult to judge by appearance” on North Korea’s ‘4.5-ton warhead’ claim
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/091924hw-09192024050815.html
Seoul - Hong Seung-wook hongs@rfa.org
2024.09.19
North Korea's Missile General Bureau successfully conducted a test launch of a new tactical ballistic missile, the Hwasongpo-11Da-4.5, and an improved strategic cruise missile the previous day, the Korean Central News Agency reported on the 19th.
Yonhap News
00:00 / 03:49
Anchor : South Korea's military authorities have stated that a comprehensive additional analysis is needed regarding North Korea's claim that it launched a missile carrying a warhead weighing up to 4.5 tons the previous day . There is also analysis that North Korea employed deceptive tactics, such as firing a mixture of ballistic and cruise missiles . Hong Seung-wook reports from Seoul .
North Korea's state-run media reported that the Missile General Bureau successfully conducted a test launch of a new tactical ballistic missile and an improved strategic cruise missile on the 18th .
According to a report on the 19th, the new tactical ballistic missile, the ' Hwasongpo -11 Da -4.5' , flew while carrying a warhead weighing 4.5 tons , and the missile, which was launched inland, sank nearly vertically toward the ground surface .
This is the second test launch of this missile following the one on July 1 , and unlike the previous test launch , it was equipped with a real warhead to verify the explosive power .
In this regard, South Korean military authorities stated that additional verification is necessary to determine the truth of North Korea's claims . This is what Lee Seong-jun, director of public relations for the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, said .
Lee Sung-joon, Public Relations Officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Korea : It is difficult to measure its weight based on radar and the missile’s appearance alone . We need to comprehensively analyze the amount of the explosion and its flight trajectory , and I would like to tell you that the South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities are currently analyzing that .
The South Korean military said that further analysis is needed as it is still unclear whether the purpose of this ballistic missile test launch was to make up for the previous failure .
The missile that North Korea unveiled this time is a KN-23 short-range ballistic missile, also known as the “ North Korean Iskander ,” with a larger warhead and heavier weight .
The first test launch on July 1 was presumed to have been a failure as one of the two missiles flew only 120 km , but North Korean authorities claimed it was a success and announced further tests .
This time, unlike the first test launch, a photo was released showing the missile landing on land inland , the first time it was revealed that the missile was fired inland on purpose .
It appears that they have shown great confidence in the accuracy of the missile by forcing an inland launch that could cause significant damage in case of a test failure , said Lee Seong-jun, the director of public relations .
Lee Sung-joon, Public Relations Officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff : It is difficult to view North Korea as a normal country . Fortunately, on July 1 , it fell in a mountainous area and there was no damage , but I think there is a big difference with South Korea, which is preparing for all such things .
North Korea's Missile General Bureau successfully conducted a test launch of a new tactical ballistic missile, the Hwasongpo-11Da-4.5, and an improved strategic cruise missile the previous day, the Korean Central News Agency reported on the 19th. / Yonhap News
It is believed that there was an intention to deceive as North Korea released a photo of only one missile , even though it so-called ' mixed launch ' of several missiles, including ballistic missiles and cruise missiles , and announced that the flight distance was 320 km , which is different from the 400 km measured by the South Korean military .
However, the South Korean military has already announced that it has captured and is analyzing all missiles launched by North Korea .
The international community including the United States “condemns North Korea’s ballistic missile launch”
South Korean Military: North Korea's 'Minimum Range Test' Claim: 'High Possibility of Deception'
If North Korea's claim that it launched a missile carrying a 4.5- ton warhead is true, there is analysis that it may have been intended to strike key military facilities, such as underground command posts operated by the South Korean and US militaries , and that it may have been intended to respond to the South Korean military's announcement of its capabilities against the North . These are the words of Kim Dae-young, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Strategy .
Kim Dae-young, Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Strategy : While there is a goal of striking underground facilities , I believe it also has the character of responding to the Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) plan announced by the South Korean military .
Previously, it was reported that the South Korean military had prepared a plan called the ' Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation ' (KMPR), which involves firing dozens of missiles at Pyongyang in the event of an invasion by North Korea, as part of the so - called ' Korean 3-axis system . '
The South Korean military also possesses ' high-yield missiles ' with warheads weighing more than 8 tons , intended for destroying underground bunkers scattered throughout North Korea .
This is Hong Seung-wook of RFA's Radio Free Asia in Seoul .
Editor Yang Seong-won
13. Joint Chiefs of Staff: “North Korea floated 160 garbage balloons on the 18th”
Again, is the north trying to solve its environmental/ landfill problems by transferring their garbage to the South (note attempt at humor).
Joint Chiefs of Staff: “North Korea floated 160 garbage balloons on the 18th”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/trash_balloon-09192024092720.html
Seoul-Hando hando@rfa.org
2024.09.19
North Korea scattering trash balloons
/Yonhap News
00:00 / 03:53
Anchor : North Korea continued to scatter trash balloons toward South Korea on the 18th , the last day of the Chuseok holiday in South Korea, launching about 160 trash balloons . This is the 21st time North Korea has scattered trash balloons since May . Reporter Han Do-hyung reports from Seoul .
The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff announced on the 19th, “The military has identified that North Korea launched approximately 160 trash balloons from yesterday afternoon until night . ”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff added , “ So far, about 30 fallen objects have been confirmed in the northern Gyeonggi Province and Seoul area ,” and “ Currently, none have been identified in the air . ”
This is the 21st time North Korea has released trash balloons since May 28 .
North Korea also dispersed trash balloons on the 14th and 15th during the Chuseok holiday in South Korea .
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the contents of the trash balloons sent by North Korea this time were also household waste such as paper, vinyl , and plastic bottles, and did not contain any substances harmful to the body .
Lee Sung-joon, the Public Relations Officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a regular press briefing on the 19th, “ It seems difficult for North Korea to put biochemical weapons that harm the South Korean people in balloons ,” but added, “ We are taking measures with that possibility in mind . ”
The chief added that the military is always prepared for North Korean provocations and will respond according to the so-called "immediate, strong, and final" principle of responding " immediately , strongly , and to the end " if any damage occurs on the South Korean side .
Regarding the background of North Korea sending trash balloons every day, a South Korean Unification Ministry official said in a meeting with reporters on the 19th, “ We believe it is not because of the anti-North Korea leaflets they claimed as their justification . ”
“ Considering the recent trend and the fact that the number of groups sending anti-North Korea leaflets is not large, the continued scattering of trash balloons by North Korea does not appear to be a response at the level of ‘ tit -for-tat,’ where an eye for an eye is returned , ” the explanation is .
Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the Workers' Party of Korea, stated in a statement on May 29 that " from now on, we will respond to each case with dozens of times the amount of waste that South Korea spreads . "
North Korea Floats Trash Balloons Even During Chuseok Holidays … North Korean Defectors Anger
Kim Yo-jong mentions ' new response ' ... Expert: " Drone attack and loudspeaker broadcasts against South Korea are possible "
Unification Minister: “ Expanding North Korean Residents ’ ‘ Right to Access Information ’ by Applying Cutting-edge Technology ”
Moon Sung-mook, director of the Unification Strategy Center at the Institute for National Strategy, analyzed in a phone call with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 19th that North Korea's biggest intention in sending trash balloons every day is " to make the South Korean people tired and anxious, so that the arrows of criticism will be directed at the South Korean government . "
Unification Minister Kim Young-ho also stated at a press conference for foreign media on the 22nd of last month that North Korea's intention is to create anxiety among the South Korean people .
Director Moon predicted that North Korea will continue to scatter trash balloons in the future, saying, “ North Korea will not stop unless the South Korean military completely stops broadcasting through loudspeakers toward the North . ”
In addition, Director Moon stated that the reason why Rodong Sinmun, North Korea's official media outlet for domestic consumption, has not reported on the distribution of trash balloons since May is because " if this situation were made public, it would also result in propaganda about the fact that South Korean civic groups are sending leaflets to the North . "
Moon Sung-mook, Director of the Unification Strategy Center at the Institute for National Strategy : North Korea’s justification was that they were defining the leaflets from South Korean civic groups as trash and filth, and that we would respond by treating them as filth as well . From the perspective of North Korean residents, those ( contents sent by South Korean civic groups ) are treasures , but what North Korea is sending us is really trash . That’s why we can’t let the North Korean residents know that .
In a phone call with Radio Free Asia on the 19th, Professor Jeong Dae-jin of Wonju Halla University interpreted North Korea's repeated scattering of trash balloons as " North Korea's hostile actions based on the ' two hostile states ' theory of the South and the North , " and predicted that North Korea will continue scattering trash balloons in the future .
However, Professor Jeong analyzed that this is not North Korea's main purpose, saying, " North Korea probably knows that the effect of causing conflict between the South and the North by scattering trash balloons is not that great ," regarding the view that North Korea's purpose is to incite conflict within South Korean society .
Professor Jeong Dae-jin of Wonju Halla University : They are simply carrying out hostile acts against hostile countries . They are routine hostile acts and I think they will continue to do so in the future . If they want to link it with loudspeakers to North Korea, they can do so, but I think they are no longer at the stage where they consider leaflets sent by Korean civic groups as an important variable .
This is Han Do-hyung from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul .
Editor Yang Seong-won, Web Editor Han Deok-in
14. Yoon arrives in Czech Republic to begin trip focused on nuclear power cooperation
South Korea: The global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power.
Yoon arrives in Czech Republic to begin trip focused on nuclear power cooperation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · September 19, 2024
By Kim Eun-jung
PRAGUE, Sept. 19 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol arrived in the Czech Republic on Thursday to begin his four-day trip aimed at boosting South Korea's bid to win a major nuclear project and boosting economic ties with the European country.
On the first day, Yoon is scheduled to have summit talks with Czech President Petr Pavel to discuss ways to expand cooperation in nuclear energy, trade, investment, technology and other areas, in light of the European country's selection of the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) as a preferred bidder to build two nuclear power plants.
Yoon aims to reaffirm Seoul's commitment to the successful implementation of the Czech nuclear project and lay the groundwork for forging a "nuclear energy alliance" between the two nations, according to his office.
The trip comes at a time when the project faces a legal challenge as U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric filed an appeal with Czech authorities last month, arguing that KHNP's reactor designs are based on its technology.
The deal, estimated at around 24 trillion won (US$17.3 billion), will mark South Korea's second nuclear power plant export, following its 2009 project in the United Arab Emirates. It is expected to be finalized by the first quarter of next year.
President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) and first lady Kim Keon Hee arrive at Vaclav Havel Airport Prague in the Czech Republic on Sept. 19, 2024. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · September 19, 2024
15. Top diplomats of N. Korea, Russia discuss bilateral ties in Moscow
Half of the Dark Quad.
Top diplomats of N. Korea, Russia discuss bilateral ties in Moscow | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · September 19, 2024
SEOUL, Sept. 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui has met her Russian counterpart in Moscow to discuss ways to bolster bilateral ties and beef up cooperation, state media reported Thursday.
Choe held talks with Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, on Tuesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
They had "useful" exchanges of opinions in a bid to bolster bilateral relations in various fields in accordance with a new partnership treaty between the two nations, and further strengthen mutual cooperation on the international stage, the KCNA said.
Choe left Pyongyang on Monday to attend the fourth Eurasian Women's Forum and the first BRICS Women's Forum that kicked off Wednesday to run until Friday in St. Petersburg.
After summit talks in Pyongyang in June, Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed a new comprehensive partnership treaty that includes a mutual defense clause.
Sergei Shoigu, the head of Russia's Security Council and former Russian defense minister, visited Pyongyang last week to meet with the North Korean leader to mark the first anniversary of the summit talks between Kim and Putin at the Vostochny space center in Russia's Far East.
This image, captured from the website of Russia's foreign ministry on Sept. 17, 2024, shows Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (L) and his North Korean counterpart, Choe Son-hui, in Moscow. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sooyeon@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · September 19, 2024
16. 3.9 magnitude earthquake hits northwestern N. Korea: KMA
Is the region more prone to earthquakes due to nuclear testing?
3.9 magnitude earthquake hits northwestern N. Korea: KMA | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · September 19, 2024
SEOUL, Sept. 19 (Yonhap) -- A 3.9 magnitude earthquake struck North Korea's northwestern province bordering China on Thursday, which is believed to be a natural one, the South Korean weather agency said.
The quake struck an area 7 kilometers northeast-east of Ryongrim in Jagang Province, at 7:41 p.m., according to the Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA).
The epicenter was at a latitude of 40.54 degrees north and a longitude of 126.75 degrees east, the KMA said.
The quake is believed to have occurred naturally, it added.
This image, captured from the website of the Korea Meteorological Administration, shows North Korea's Jagang Province (red mark). (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
graceoh@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · September 19, 2024
17. FM Cho to attend U.N. General Assembly in New York next week
FM Cho to attend U.N. General Assembly in New York next week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · September 19, 2024
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Sept. 19 (Yonhap) -- Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul will fly to New York next week to attend the annual U.N. General Assembly, where he is expected to discuss key international issues and highlight South Korea's efforts toward sustainable peace, his office said Thursday.
During the six-day visit starting Monday, Cho will deliver a keynote speech at the general debate of the high-level gathering to reaffirm South Korea's commitment to ensuring global peace and prosperity, foreign ministry spokesperson Lee Jae-woong said in a press briefing.
Cho will also attend the general debate session of the U.N. Security Council and the ministerial conference of the U.N. peacebuilding committee.
Cho will also attend a foreign ministerial meeting of the Group of 20 member states and a separate gathering of MIKTA members, consisting of Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey and Australia, to discuss cooperation among middle-power nations.
Cho will be present at the Minerals Security Partnership meeting to give a speech highlighting the need for stronger cooperation in the supply of critical minerals, such as lithium and nickel.
Cho also plans to use the U.N. sessions to seek the international community's support for the new unification vision unveiled by President Yoon Suk Yeol last month, Lee said.
The new doctrine calls for expanding North Koreans' access to outside information and proposes opening an official dialogue channel between the two Koreas to discuss any issues.
Arrangements are being made for Cho's bilateral talks with his counterparts of other countries on the sidelines of the U.N. sessions, Lee added, without giving further details.
In this file photo, Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul speaks during a press conference after attending the ASEAN Regional Forum in Laos, on July 27, 2024. (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · September 19, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
