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Quotes of the Day:
"I would hope that all educated citizens would fulfill this obligation—in politics, in Government, here in Nashville, here in this State, in the Peace Corps, in the Foreign Service, in the Government Service, in the Tennessee Valley, in the world. You will find the pressures greater than the pay. You may endure more public attacks than support. But you will have the unequaled satisfaction of knowing that your character and talent are contributing to the direction and success of this free society."
– John F. Kennedy
"If what matters in a person's existence is to accept the inevitable consciously, to taste the good and bad to the full and make for oneself more individual, accidental. and inward destiny alongside one's external fate. then my life has been neither empty nor worthless.
– Herman Hesse
"Thinking is difficult, that's why most people judge."
– Carl Jung
1. Conspiracy Theories and Their Dangerous Impact on America’s Military
2. Sinwar’s Bloody Gambit Changed the Middle East—but Not as He Imagined
3. Are the Amazon’s Trees Worth More Alive than Dead? A New Industry Thinks So
4. How College Students Beat Boeing in a Battle to Take Down Drones
5. Electric Motors Are About to Get a Major Upgrade Thanks to Benjamin Franklin
6. How to Fix the Secret Service
7. The axis of evil is a fantasy
8. A Candidate for U.S. Senate Says He Was Shot in War. Was He?
9. Industry looking for what's next after Army's cancelation of next-gen Patriot interceptor
10. Crew still missing as Special Forces and search teams reach Navy Growler crash site
11. How the Patriotic Investment Act Can Counter China’s Stimulus Package
12. Vietnam’s Grand Strategic Architecture Amid the Russia-Ukraine War
13. The India-South Korea-US Triad’s Emerging Roles in the Indo-Pacific
14. Russian hybrid warfare's origins in Moldova
15. Who might make up Trump’s Cabinet
16. Election 2024: Is the United States Ready to Confront the Axis of Autocracies?
17. HYBRID INTELLIGENCE: DECISION DOMINANCE AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
18. Marine Raiders Ordered to Stop Wearing Multicam Uniforms to Align Elite Unit with Broader Service
19. Trump, Harris, Zelenskiy: Nobody’s Plan Will End the Ukraine War
20. Alfred McCoy, The New Cold War Comes to Asia
21. "The Ugly American" needs to be re-read with a focus on Korea
1. Conspiracy Theories and Their Dangerous Impact on America’s Military
Important analysis that should be discussed at PME and in leadership training.
These are very logical recommendations. However, they are also susceptible to being exploited by partisans on both sides and may only motivate conspiracy theorists. When education and training programs provide concrete examples of conuspract theories that favor one side of the political spectrum or the other it will be the subject of criticism and derision in the press and from the. political class and will be used to confirm conspiracy theories. Every time some says there are good people on both sides or bad people on both sides it will be the subject of extreme criticisms by the other. And the recommendation that social media be monitored will be compared to the "Big Brother" theory (The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism in Orwell's 1984).
A question is can we present training classes in such a way that does not give "both sides" the ability to dispute and disregard the ideas presented in the training because of their baked-in partisan views? Or does that water down the training so much that there will be no critical thinking involved?
Excerpts:
One way to mitigate this risk is to implement educational programs to enhance critical thinking and media literacy among service members. Research shows that people often share misinformation because they aren’t paying attention to accuracy.¹⁵ By fostering a culture that values evidence-based analysis and critical thinking, the military can help reduce the spread of false information within its ranks.
Moreover, identifying individuals more susceptible to conspiracy theories should become part of the military’s broader strategy for safeguarding operational integrity. This may include monitoring social media activity and providing training that teaches personnel to recognize disinformation and think critically about the sources of their information.¹
I hate to keep harping on this from the 2017 NSS but it is still the best description of what we as citizens, including current and former military members, must do.
"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
Access NSS HERE
Conspiracy Theories and Their Dangerous Impact on America’s Military
Studies Reveal Certain U.S. Groups More Susceptible To Conspiracies
Strategy Central
By and For Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth, October 19, 2024
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/conspiracy-theories-and-their-dangerous-impact-on-america-s-military?utm
Introduction
Conspiracy theories have become a significant challenge for American society, shaping political discourse and health decisions and even threatening the fabric of democratic institutions. While belief in conspiracies is not exclusive to the U.S., certain demographic factors and political leanings have amplified this phenomenon. The widespread belief in conspiracies presents a unique threat to the military, potentially undermining national security and operational integrity. Understanding why individuals are drawn to conspiracy theories and how the military can address this issue is crucial for safeguarding the future of American defense.
The Psychological Appeal of Conspiracy Theories
Conspiracy theories are often rooted in emotional, psychological, and social factors, appealing to those who feel alienated, distrustful, or marginalized. According to research, conspiracy theories offer simplified explanations for complex events and fulfill psychological needs like the desire for control, certainty, and security.¹ They often frame events in a "good versus evil" narrative, attributing malevolent intent to unseen forces.²
One primary reason people fall for conspiracy theories is motivated reasoning, which tends to favor information that supports pre-existing beliefs while rejecting evidence that contradicts them.³ This cognitive bias allows individuals to maintain their worldview even when faced with disconfirming evidence.⁴
While conspiracy theories may seem like the delusions of a few fringe individuals, research shows that they can affect people from all walks of life. Over 50 percent of Americans believe in at least one conspiracy theory.⁵ However, specific demographics, such as younger individuals and those with lower education levels, tend to be more susceptible.⁶
Who Is Most Prone to Conspiracy Theories?
Demographic data show that certain groups are more likely to embrace conspiracy theories. Studies consistently find that Millennials rank highly among those most susceptible, the extreme left and right of the political spectrum.⁷ This is particularly concerning, given millennials and more right-wing demographic groups overlap significantly with those who enlist in the military. Millennials currently make up a significant portion of the U.S. armed forces.
Political polarization plays a crucial role in shaping conspiracy beliefs. Supporters of former President Donald Trump, for example, are more likely to endorse theories questioning the legitimacy of elections, that the 9/11 Twin Towers bombing was a U.S. government false flag operation, and that the government controls the weather. Left-leaning Americans are more apt to believe that the world can quickly stop using fossil fuels and easily convert all energy sources to electric power, the October 7 attack by Hamas was actual a false flag operation conducted by the Israeli government, or that the rich do not pay taxes. Even more concerning is that polling shows younger individuals, particularly Millennials, are more prone to believe in conspiracies related to scientific matters. Shockingly, as much as one-third of millennials believe the earth is flat, misunderstand the causes of climate change, and that vaccinations contain microchips to track them.⁸ The prevalence of conspiratorial thinking among these groups raises concerns about the military's susceptibility to misinformation.
Research also shows that those who align themselves with extreme ideologies—both left and right—are more likely to believe in and spread conspiracy theories.⁹ This dynamic creates an environment in which individuals are not only exposed to misinformation but are also inclined to believe it. In the age of social media, this phenomenon is exacerbated by platforms that allow misinformation to spread rapidly and unchallenged.¹⁰
How Misinformation Affects the Military
The military relies heavily on accurate, timely information to conduct operations and make strategic decisions. When service members are susceptible to misinformation, it creates vulnerabilities that foreign adversaries can exploit. Psychological operations (psyops), disinformation campaigns, and influence operations are time-tested tools state and non-state actors use. These operations aim to sow confusion, create divisions, and manipulate decision-making within targeted groups.
Misinformation creates confusion and can lead to unforced errors in military operations. For instance, spreading false or misleading information during high-stakes missions could result in strategic miscalculations or misinterpretations of the enemy’s intent. In the broader scope of military readiness, a workforce swayed by conspiracy theories is less likely to make decisions based on objective, evidence-based analysis.¹¹ Furthermore, disinformation campaigns targeting military personnel could undermine the chain of command, weaken cohesion, and erode trust in leadership.
In today's geopolitical landscape, where information warfare plays a central role, America’s military must remain vigilant against these emerging threats. Foreign powers like Russia and China have long recognized the potential of exploiting divisions within U.S. society, and conspiracy theories are a potent tool in their arsenal.¹²
Addressing the Problem: The Role of Military Leadership
In theory, the military’s hierarchical structure and commitment to discipline should create a buffer against conspiracy theories. However, the rise of social media has made it more challenging to contain the influence of misinformation. Platforms like Facebook and Twitter have become breeding grounds for conspiracy theories, and younger generations are particularly vulnerable.¹³ With nearly three-quarters of Americans using social media daily, the military must recognize that its personnel are not immune to these influences.¹⁴
One way to mitigate this risk is to implement educational programs to enhance critical thinking and media literacy among service members. Research shows that people often share misinformation because they aren’t paying attention to accuracy.¹⁵ By fostering a culture that values evidence-based analysis and critical thinking, the military can help reduce the spread of false information within its ranks.
Moreover, identifying individuals more susceptible to conspiracy theories should become part of the military’s broader strategy for safeguarding operational integrity. This may include monitoring social media activity and providing training that teaches personnel to recognize disinformation and think critically about the sources of their information.¹⁶
Another key recommendation is for military leadership to create clear lines of communication regarding disseminating official information. When official communication channels are transparent, timely, and authoritative, they help drown out the noise of misinformation. The military must also emphasize the importance of trust within the chain of command, ensuring that soldiers have faith in their leadership rather than relying on dubious online sources for information.¹⁷
The Role of the Secretary of Defense
The next Secretary of Defense must prioritize addressing the threat of misinformation and conspiracy theories within the ranks. This problem is not just about curbing the spread of false information but safeguarding national security. A military workforce that conspiracy theories can easily sway is a vulnerable workforce that foreign adversaries will undoubtedly target.¹⁸
The Department of Defense (DoD) should invest in comprehensive studies to understand the full extent of conspiracy theory penetration among military personnel. Additionally, military leadership must work closely with cybersecurity and information warfare experts to develop robust countermeasures against disinformation campaigns aimed at service members. As the U.S. prepares for future conflicts in an increasingly digital and information-centric age, the military must be equipped to combat physical threats and the cognitive ones that misinformation presents.¹⁹
The next administration must recognize that conspiracy theories significantly threaten military readiness and national security. By understanding the factors that make certain individuals more susceptible to these ideas, the military can develop strategies to counter them. A proactive approach to media literacy, critical thinking, and information security will be essential to protecting the U.S. military from the dangers of misinformation. It is a problem that the next Secretary of Defense cannot afford to ignore.
Notes:
1. Lawrence Hamilton, Conspiracy vs. Science: A Survey of U.S. Public Beliefs (Durham, NH: Carsey School of Public Policy, 2022).
2. Christina Georgacopoulos, Why We Fall for Conspiracy Theories (2020).
3. Ibid.
4. Shauna Bowes, “Why Some People Are Willing to Believe Conspiracy Theories,” Psychological Bulletin, June 26, 2023.
5. Ibid.
6. Adam Enders et al., "The Sociodemographic Correlates of Conspiracism," Scientific Reports, 2024.
7. Lawrence Hamilton, Conspiracy vs. Science.
8. Ibid.
9. James Devitt, “Online Misinformation Most Likely to be Believed by Ideological Extremists,” NYU Center for Social Media and Politics, 2024.
10. Denise-Marie Ordway, "Why Do Americans Share So Much Fake News? One Big Reason is They Aren’t Paying Attention," Nieman Foundation, 2021.
11. Aliza Vigderman, 2022 Misinformation and Disinformation Study, Security.org, 2024.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Denise-Marie Ordway, "Why Do Americans Share So Much Fake News?"
16. Adam Enders et al., "The Sociodemographic Correlates of Conspiracism."
17. Ibid.
18. James Devitt, “Online Misinformation Most Likely to be Believed by Ideological Extremists.”
19. Aliza Vigderman, 2022 Misinformation and Disinformation Study.
2. Sinwar’s Bloody Gambit Changed the Middle East—but Not as He Imagined
Excerpts:
“A necessary condition for any kind of positive changes in the Middle East is the elimination of terrorist masterminds like Sinwar and Nasrallah,” said Mark Dubowitz, chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank that supports Israel, Ukraine and Taiwan. “But it’s not sufficient. Unless there is a concerted effort to weaken, to undermine, and if history smiles on us, to bring down the Islamic Republic of Iran, then these terrorist organizations will regenerate because the Iranians will continue to finance, weaponize, train and coordinate these terror armies.”
The parameters of Israel’s expected strike on Iran are still unknown, as is the scope and nature of an eventual Iranian response. But what is certain is that the struggle between these two countries will continue for the foreseeable future, with Tehran trying to regain the initiative after recent setbacks.
Possible responses, in addition to renewed investments to rebuild Hezbollah, Hamas and other members of the axis of resistance, could include closer military cooperation with Russia, a dash to weaponize Iran’s nuclear program, or yet another strategic surprise that has become a hallmark of Middle East warfare.
“It’s clear that Israel has managed to weaken Iranian interests, but I don’t think this is the end not only of this escalation, but also of the tension that has been going on for years,” said Nicole Grajewski, an Iran specialist at the Carnegie Endowment. “Iran is going to have to recalibrate its strategy. Over the long term, Iran will find ways of adapting to the situation.”
Sinwar’s Bloody Gambit Changed the Middle East—but Not as He Imagined
Israel was wounded but didn’t fold, and Palestinian statehood is more remote than ever
By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow
Updated Oct. 19, 2024 12:19 am ET
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/sinwars-bloody-gambit-changed-the-middle-eastbut-not-as-he-imagined-95c69da4?mod=hp_lead_pos1
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar sought to remake the Middle East with last year’s attack on Israel, dragging Iran, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and much of the region into what he foresaw as a decisive battle ending in the Jewish state’s demise.
The region, and the world’s balance of power, have indeed been decisively altered in the aftermath of that carnage, which killed some 1,200 Israelis.
The Israeli response since then has caused tens of thousands of deaths in Gaza and Lebanon, including of Sinwar and Hezbollah’s chief, Hassan Nasrallah, along with countless Palestinian and Lebanese civilians. For the first time in its history, Israel now is involved in a direct military conflict with Iran.
But, like the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks—in which Osama bin Laden aimed to destroy American power in the Middle East and spearhead an Islamist takeover of the region—Sinwar’s bloody gambit didn’t quite go according to plan. In the short term, it has showcased Israel’s military strength, defanged the Iranian-led “axis of resistance” and made the aspirations of Palestinian self-determination more remote than ever.
In part, that is because, instead of facing a concerted attack from its foes, Israel has managed to go after them sequentially.
Israeli airstrikes leveled much of Gaza City after Hamas’s attack on Israel last year. Photo: Ali Jadallah/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
It first conquered Gaza, flattening much of the area to remove Hamas as the enclave’s de facto government. In a series of intelligence-driven strikes, Israel then decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership—removing the Lebanese militant group’s ability to serve as Iran’s strategic deterrent—and started a ground operation in border areas of southern Lebanon. And now, with U.S. support, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is planning a strike on targets in Iran, a response to an Iranian ballistic missile attack. All the while, Israel’s society and economy have continued operating with few major disruptions.
How it will play out over the longer term is still an open question, and will depend on whether Israel manages to translate its recent military successes into lasting political achievements.
“Iran is clearly on the back foot. Israel has neutralized some of the strategic threats that it faced, but in doing so may have also created new ones,” said Emile Hokayem, director of regional security and the Middle East at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. “Despite the defeat of the resistance movements, the resistance mindset has not been neutralized—also because now there is more to resist against.”
Sinwar’s Oct. 7, 2023, plan has resulted in catastrophic devastation for Gaza and horrendous suffering by ordinary Palestinians who never asked for or assented to a war against a much stronger foe. Yet the crisis Sinwar precipitated also punctured the illusion, long nurtured by Netanyahu, that Palestinian aspirations to statehood could be ignored forever as Israel pursued normalization with other Arab nations.
Palestinian civilians leaving Gaza City earlier this month as the Israeli military sought to root out Hamas militants. Photo: Abdalrahman T. A. Abusalama/Anadolu/Getty Images
“Sinwar certainly achieved his goal of bringing the Palestinian issue to the center of geopolitics,” said Nancy Okail, chief executive of the Center of International Policy, a progressive think tank. “But this came at a very high cost and in reality hasn’t moved the United States an inch in its support of Israel. And if the U.S. policy doesn’t change, the situation for Palestinians won’t change.”
For now, Israel’s diplomatic relations with Arab states have survived the trials of the past year. Several flights a day continue plying Saudi Arabian skies as they connect Tel Aviv to Dubai, and Riyadh is still interested in a normalization deal with Israel—provided it comes with U.S. security guarantees and progress toward a Palestinian state. Israel’s cold peace with Jordan and Egypt is shaken but still stands, as do the more recent diplomatic agreements with Morocco and Bahrain.
Still, images from Gaza and Lebanon—including the footage of Sinwar’s death in battle—have increased popular pressure on Arab governments to take a much tougher stand, particularly in Egypt, which is going through a major economic slowdown.
Elsewhere in the developing world, countries from Colombia to South Africa have cut or downgraded ties with Israel, as Russia and China claimed the high moral ground, lambasting American support for Netanyahu. More important over the long term, support for Israel has shrunk in the U.S. itself and in Europe, especially among the youth, as the horrors of Gaza’s destruction have unfolded on TV, computer and phone screens.
Pro-Palestinian demonstrators marched outside the Columbia University campus in New York this spring. Photo: Jeenah Moon for WSJ
“The Israeli brand has been compromised, and Israel is more isolated than ever before,” said Aaron David Miller, a former senior U.S. negotiator for Middle East peace and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank. At the same time, he added, neither the U.S. nor the rest of the international community has been able to affect Israel’s decision-making or fundamentally alter the trajectory of the conflict.
Yet, while the Palestinian cause is front and center of global attention once again, it is definitely not on Sinwar’s terms, said Firas Maksad, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington. Sinwar’s plan was a cataclysmic conflict that would engulf the entire region, inflict a decisive military defeat on Israel and trigger the exodus of many, if not most, of Israel’s Jews.
“Instead, we are back talking about a two-state solution, about reforming the Palestinian Authority, a vision that is the antithesis of Sinwar’s,” Maksad said. “Ultimately, his objective has backfired.”
The firestorm sparked by Sinwar, of course, continues to spread, with Israel and Iran so far firing what appear to be only the initial shots of their direct conflict. Israeli officials increasingly express aspirations to achieve regime change inside Iran, comparing it to the late-stage Soviet Union and planning to foment internal unrest there.
The Tehran funeral of Abbas Nilforoushan, a commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard who was killed last month during an Israeli airstrike on Beirut. Photo: Rouzbeh Fouladi/Zuma Press
“A necessary condition for any kind of positive changes in the Middle East is the elimination of terrorist masterminds like Sinwar and Nasrallah,” said Mark Dubowitz, chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank that supports Israel, Ukraine and Taiwan. “But it’s not sufficient. Unless there is a concerted effort to weaken, to undermine, and if history smiles on us, to bring down the Islamic Republic of Iran, then these terrorist organizations will regenerate because the Iranians will continue to finance, weaponize, train and coordinate these terror armies.”
The parameters of Israel’s expected strike on Iran are still unknown, as is the scope and nature of an eventual Iranian response. But what is certain is that the struggle between these two countries will continue for the foreseeable future, with Tehran trying to regain the initiative after recent setbacks.
Possible responses, in addition to renewed investments to rebuild Hezbollah, Hamas and other members of the axis of resistance, could include closer military cooperation with Russia, a dash to weaponize Iran’s nuclear program, or yet another strategic surprise that has become a hallmark of Middle East warfare.
“It’s clear that Israel has managed to weaken Iranian interests, but I don’t think this is the end not only of this escalation, but also of the tension that has been going on for years,” said Nicole Grajewski, an Iran specialist at the Carnegie Endowment. “Iran is going to have to recalibrate its strategy. Over the long term, Iran will find ways of adapting to the situation.”
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Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, a U.S.-designated terrorist, triggered a war with Israel in Gaza in October 2023. Photo: Mahmud Hams/AFP/Getty Images
Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com
3. Are the Amazon’s Trees Worth More Alive than Dead? A New Industry Thinks So
I think this is an example of one aspect of "climate economy." The Amazon rainforest is the "world's lungs". Are there investment opportunities that can create profit and protect the environment.
Are the Amazon’s Trees Worth More Alive than Dead? A New Industry Thinks So
Brazil is encouraging bioplastics, ecotourism and fishing businesses in the rainforest to replace illegal logging and mining
https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/brazil-amazon-rainforest-deforestation-solution-9369338a?mod=latest_headlines
By Samantha PearsonFollow | Photographs by Dado Galdieri for WSJ
Oct. 19, 2024 10:00 am ET
CARAJÁS, Brazil — Jefferson Sousa could have been eking out a living at the expense of the Amazon forest, working on a cattle ranch like his father.
“It was all I knew, it was what kept our family alive,” he said.
But now Sousa, who is in his mid-30s, spends his days cultivating jaborandi, a once-endangered shrub used in glaucoma medication and one of the Amazon’s most promising new sustainable industries.
In Brazil’s long-running battle between industries that exploit the rainforest’s riches and environmentalists trying to protect it, a middle way is emerging that fuses business interests to the Amazon’s survival and makes its 400 billion trees worth more money alive than dead.
The idea is to cultivate different sorts of industries—the so-called bioeconomy—to lure the Amazon’s 40 million inhabitants away from activities such as logging and mining. The forest becomes so valuable, the theory goes, that there is no economic sense in cutting it down.
The effort comes as the Amazon nears a tipping point when climate scientists say swaths of the forest will turn into savanna with catastrophic effects for global warming.
Some of Brazil’s biggest companies are involved, including the huge mining company, Vale, which runs Sousa’s nursery. As the owner of Carajás, the world’s largest iron-ore mine dug into the middle of the Amazon jungle, the company isn’t a natural beacon in the fight against the mass extraction of natural resources
As part of its pledge to regenerate mined areas and support local communities, however, the company has become one of Brazil’s biggest private-sector investors in the Amazon’s burgeoning green economy.
Jefferson Sousa works to cultivate jaborandi seedlings at a greenhouse near Parauapebas, Brazil.
Brazil wants to recruit people to work in rainforest ‘bioeconomies’ and steer them from extractive industries such as logging and mining.
Here in the Brazilian state of Pará, an expanse of jungle almost twice the size of Texas that has seen some of the Amazon’s highest rates of deforestation over the past decade, politicians are turning to the bioeconomy to ensure its protection.
The new agenda is a shift from cattle ranching, which in the Amazon was the primary use of 90% of deforested land between 1985 and 2023, according to a study this month by MapBiomas, a nonprofit land-use research group.
“If you improve people’s living conditions, they are more likely to help monitor the forest,” said Claudomiro Gomes, mayor of Altamira, the state’s largest municipality. “It’s the best way, the only way to preserve the forest,” said Gomes, who is on a mission to turn the gritty, crime-ridden city into the world’s biggest producer of high-end chocolate.
Pará is Brazil’s biggest grower of cacao, which grows in the shade of native trees, and has long exported much of what it produces. But in a bid to squeeze more value—and jobs—out of the crop, the state last month hosted Latin America’s biggest chocolate festival, drawing some 800 producers from across the region.
Accumulated deforestation since 2008
VENEZUELA
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
COLOMBIA
Atlantic Ocean
AMAZON BIOME
Peru
BRAZIL
CERRADO
BIOME
Brasilia
BOLIVIA
PACIFic Ocean
PARAGUAY
Deforestation area by year
Cerrado
Amazon
6,000 sq. miles
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
'15
'15
2010
'20
2010
'20
Source: National Institute for Space Research
Emma Brown/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Government organizations, private philanthropies and bilateral donors such as the U.S. Agency for International Development have poured money into sustainable agriculture and fishing, alongside activities such as the harvest of indigenous remedies and the use of seed oils for everything from lipstick to bioplastics. Other examples include nature-based tourism—from bird-watching to luxury cruises down the Amazon—to lure high-paying visitors to the forest with minimum impact.
In Belém, some 60 miles upriver from the Atlantic Ocean on the Pará River, dozens of scientists working in Vale’s research laboratory carry out genetic studies of the flora and fauna of the forest surrounding Carajás. They alternately get excited about the possibilities held by the Amazon and despair over the other potentially valuable and yet unknown species being lost with every new square mile of forest razed.
“It’s a battle against time,” said Cecílio Caldeira, an agronomist at the lab who has been researching the jaborandi shrub. “We’re losing species faster than we can discover them.”
Jaborandi seedlings are lined up at a native-plant greenhouse near Parauapebas. The plant's leaves are the only known natural source of pilocarpine, the main component used in eyedrops for glaucoma.
Used by indigenous tribes to treat fever and snake bites, jaborandi leaves are the only known natural source of pilocarpine, an important component used in eyedrops for glaucoma for decades. In addition, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved pilocarpine last year for use against presbyopia, or near-vision loss, opening up more of the global eyedrops market that, according to Zion Market Research, is forecast to be worth $23 billion by 2030.
After attempts to grow jaborandi outside the Amazon produced plants with low concentrations of pilocarpine, Caldeira and his team set about sequencing its genome to understand how it produces the compound. Vale also has bought up disused cattle ranches near Carajás for experimental plantations of the shrub.
Centroflora, a São Paulo-based company that extracts some two-thirds of the pilocarpine for pharmaceutical companies, said it now counts on some 30,000 people to collect the leaves in the forest but expects that to grow with the FDA’s approval for presbyopia.
To get more companies involved, the Inter-American Development Bank along with some 20 development banks from South America have agreed to lend up to $20 billion to bioeconomy businesses in the Amazon by 2030 as part of the so-called Green Coalition launched last year. By 2030, the global bioeconomy market is expected to reach $7.7 trillion, according to a report in June by the bank.
Brazil wants to see more people in the Amazon area employed in sustainable jobs, such as working as fishing guides.
Local guides lead a bird-watching excursion in Brazil’s Carajás National Forest.
Environmentalists warn, however, that developing new industries is no panacea. Their implementation relies on progress in other areas, namely laborious and politically fraught efforts by the government to determine who actually owns swaths of the Amazon.
The push for bioeconomies isn’t without its own risks, say its critics. Too small, and the alternative industries fail to compete with logging and mining. Too big, and the new activities can bring more people into the forest and inadvertently accelerate its destruction, said Ricardo Hausmann, a former minister of planning in Venezuela and professor at Harvard Kennedy School.
Creating new industries in the forest means building more roads, extending the power grid, building schools and health clinics, all of which makes the surrounding land more valuable and susceptible to illegal logging, said Hausmann. “Suddenly you’ve brought economic activity to an area of nature that you supposedly wanted to protect.”
Time is running out. Taking office in January last year, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva promised to end deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon by 2030, launching an all-out attack on illegal loggers and miners in a bid to slow global warming.
Under da Silva, Brazil’s environmental-protection agency, Ibama, carried out more than 600 combat operations in indigenous lands across the Amazon last year, handing out twice as many fines as it did under his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro.
A tourist boat motors past a waterside shopping mall in Belém, Brazil.
The riverside in Belém.
The results were immediate. Brazil lost some 4,400 square miles of primary forest last year, a 36% reduction from 2022—the lowest level of deforestation since 2015. The decline represented the largest annual decrease for any country in the world, according to Global Forest Watch, a platform developed by researchers at the University of Maryland with Brazilian government data.
Vale’s scientists have also been studying ways to produce more, and better-tasting cacao, by improving pollination of the trees and fermentation of its seeds. They also have been genetically mapping the pirarucu, a valuable river fish, to make fishing more sustainable, advising fishermen on how much they can catch in certain areas without wiping out local populations.
Other bioeconomies have flourished across the Amazon, including sustainable timber, the production of biofuels from material such as palm husks, and the fast-growing market for açai, an Amazonian berry packed with antioxidants now widely popular in the U.S., Europe and Japan. Production of the berry reached 1.9 million tons in 2022, a near-50% increase since 2016, according to government figures.
State governments also have encouraged farmers to adopt agroforestry, the plantation of crops such as cacao and banana trees alongside native Amazonian trees in scorched wastelands that were once soybean plantations or cattle ranches. The native trees provide shade for the crops, but also help improve soil quality and retain water, encouraging the regeneration of deforested lands while providing a source of income, agronomists say.
Cattle graze on deforested land near Parauapebas.
Urban development spreads near the Carajás National Forest.
The efforts are already paying off. Pará shipped some 74,000 tons of cacao to the country’s processing plants last year, a near-30% increase from the previous year, according to the Brazilian association for cacao processors.
But for Joel Luis Guerra, a banana and cacao producer some 30 miles deep into the jungle south of Altamira, that is still a distant dream.
After a recent drought left part of his 20-hectare plot (roughly 50 acres) unfit for planting, Guerra said he was preparing to clear another 5 hectares of the forest to make way for his next banana crop. While given the right by the government to settle in the area in 2006, Guerra still doesn’t have a deed to the land, meaning he can’t get a loan to buy fertilizer to reuse the land he already cleared.
“I get it, if we cut down all of this, the world stops breathing,” he said, pointing to the pristine forest surrounding his farm, part of which he is soon to raze. “But what can we do?”
Morning mist and smoke from forest fires sift amid the slopes of Carajás National Forest near Parauapebas, Brazil.
Paulo Trevisani contributed to this article.
Write to Samantha Pearson at samantha.pearson@wsj.com
4. How College Students Beat Boeing in a Battle to Take Down Drones
Rather than social justice protesting on campus these college students are employing their intellectual and innovative firepower.
Also this is in Canada and not part of the Hacking For Defense project (as far as I can tell), this illustrates the intended outcome of Hacking For Defense on college campuses.
How College Students Beat Boeing in a Battle to Take Down Drones
Device that blasts sound waves shows how smaller players are competing against defense giants
By Alistair MacDonaldFollow | Photographs by Joel Rodriguez for WSJ
Oct. 19, 2024 5:30 am ET
https://www.wsj.com/tech/antidrone-tech-competition-college-students-4765a6ed?mod=latest_headlines
In an antidrone technology competition earlier this year, Boeing showcased a futuristic laser weapon that can punch a hole straight through a hostile aerial threat.
The multinational—and several other defense giants—lost to four college students who knocked drones out of the sky using sound waves. The rookies’ device was developed in the backyard of a student’s parents using an old car speaker.
The students’ success in the technology competition, hosted by the Canadian military, highlights a shifting dynamic in one part of the defense industry. While giant companies have long dominated the weapons business, the advent of drone warfare is giving minnows more of a chance to compete.
Drones used in Ukraine and the Middle East, for example, are often made cheaply with off-the-shelf components by smaller companies or even individuals. Huge demand is prompting governments to cast a wider net for new equipment.
In Ukraine, there are more than 200, mainly small, drone makers. The U.S. and its allies want to foster more companies that develop drones, and ways to defend against them.
The four University of Toronto engineering students spent around $17,000 of their own money to develop their antidrone technology. Their speakerlike device blasts ultrasound waves that destabilize a drone’s navigation systems, sending them off course or crashing to the ground.
Members of the team include Parth Mahendru, Anna Poletaeva and Michael Acquaviva.
Now comes the hard part. The newbies want to turn their prototype into battlefield-ready equipment. They need to raise funds, refine their technology and turn initial interest into orders.
“We are building from scratch, we had no reference whatsoever,” said Anna Poletaeva, one of the students.
The project began over a cup of tea. Poletaeva, who was studying material sciences, and Parth Mahendru, an aerospace-engineering student, were discussing the competition but knew they couldn’t afford to build a weapon that fired missiles or bullets. They decided instead to target the components inside drones.
All materials have a so-called resonant frequency—the point at which they vibrate most when hit by sound waves—and Poletaeva reasoned this could be used to destabilize drones midair. It is akin to the science class demonstration of shattering a wine glass with sound.
The pair enlisted Asad Ishaq, a robotics student, who unscrewed two “tweeter” speakers from his car. Tweeters produce higher-pitch sounds, which the team blasted at drone components in Mahendru’s living room. An electrical engineer, Michael Acquaviva, joined to build the device’s circuitry.
Early findings persuaded the group to buy more-expensive speakers capable of hitting frequencies beyond those picked up by the human ear, which they tested in Ishaq’s parents’ backyard.
The students spent around $17,000 of their own money to develop their antidrone technology.
The group named their startup Prandtl Dynamics, after Ludwig Prandtl, the German aerospace pioneer.
When Mahendru found out that Prandtl had been invited to compete at the competition, he saw the email addresses of the other competitors, including Boeing, the Italian defense giant Leonardo, and Teledyne, the U.S. industrial conglomerate.
“That kind of scared us,” said Mahendru, who now serves as Prandtl’s chief executive. “We realized that this was not just a student project anymore.”
From student project to company
At the competition, held at a military base in southern Alberta in June, the mismatch was clear. Rival teams drove large SUVs and turned up to breakfast wearing company-branded clothing.
Nevertheless, Prandtl’s system knocked one drone out of the sky and sent others veering off direction. The students placed second out of 15 entries alongside another four-person startup. The winner was a laser weapon from AIM Defence, a small Australian company.
Mahendru had arrived in Alberta with almost $9,000 in credit-card debt from funding the project. His company left with the equivalent of more than $270,000 in prize money.
Prandtl is now seeking new premises, investors and clients. The move from student project to fully fledged company remains an amateur endeavor. Acquaviva sought advice from a corporate lawyer who lived on his parents’ street, while Ishaq turned to a family friend for help with pitch books.
Small companies aren’t new to defense. Some 60,000 businesses work in the defense industry, according to the National Defense Industrial Association, a trade body. But most supply components to the big companies that typically win government contracts.
The group named their startup Prandtl Dynamics, after a German aerospace pioneer.
New equipment tends to be made by larger companies because development costs are prohibitively high. The U.S. defense giant Lockheed Martin spent $3.2 billion on research and development last year.
The emergence of low-cost drones in war is starting to bring smaller organizations into the high-profile field, according to companies and defense experts.
Billions of dollars have flowed into the defense-tech industry in recent years, and a host of venture-backed players are starting to make inroads. Those include Anduril, the startup founded by a former Facebook executive. Smaller drone companies, including Teal, from Utah, and Huntsville, Ala.-based PDW have recently won military contracts.
At a recent conference in Ukraine, more than a hundred investors descended on Kyiv to hear dozens of small drone and electronic-warfare companies pitch their products.
Funding for earlier-stage companies, though, is often hard to come by. Globally, only two seed-capital investments, worth a total of $14.2 million, were made in defense startups last year, according to the data provider PitchBook. The federal government has spent billions in recent years on technology from top national-security startups, but most U.S. defense spending continues to go to traditional military contractors.
‘A bit daunting’
Prandtl still has to work on the technology. Canadian Army officials have indicated that they could be interested, Acquaviva said, if the company can increase the range at which it stops drones to at least 100 meters, up from 50 meters.
That might not be easy. Using sound waves to destabilize a drone at greater distances is harder because they dissipate on hitting the air, said Gregory Falco, a professor at Cornell University and an expert in aerospace security.
“They will need a lot more sound,” or figure out how to better direct the waves to the target, Falco said.
Poletaeva said the company is confident in getting past 100 meters but that surpassing 150 meters will be tricky. There are various ways to amplify sound waves, including using magnets and lenses, she added.
Another challenge for Prandtl is that drone makers are constantly coming up with new ways to guard against countermeasures. For instance, foam could be added to drones to block sound waves, a measure against which the company is already testing its tech.
Overall, Prandtl’s technology could be ready to deploy within the next two years.
“It’s exciting for sure, sometimes a bit daunting,” said Poletaeva.
Michael Acquaviva and Parth Mahendru flying a drone in Mahendru’s Toronto apartment.
Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com
5. Electric Motors Are About to Get a Major Upgrade Thanks to Benjamin Franklin
As we see college students innovate for the future, one of our most revered founding fathers continues to contribute. Pretty amazing.
Electric Motors Are About to Get a Major Upgrade Thanks to Benjamin Franklin
Long a fascination of engineers, electrostatic motors are in testing and have massive potential
By Christopher Mims
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Updated Oct. 18, 2024 10:19 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/electric-motors-are-about-to-get-a-major-upgrade-thanks-to-benjamin-franklin-e96f339d?mod=latest_headlines
A technology pioneered by Benjamin Franklin is being revived to build more efficient electric motors, an effort in its nascent stage that has the potential to be massive.
A handful of scientists and engineers—armed with materials and techniques unimaginable in the 1700s—are creating modern versions of Franklin’s “electrostatic motor,” that are on the cusp of commercialization. It’s reminiscent of the early 1990s, when Sony began to produce and sell the first rechargeable lithium-ion batteries, a breakthrough that’s now ubiquitous.
Franklin’s “electrostatic motor” uses alternating positive and negative charges—the same kind that make your socks stick together after they come out of the dryer—to spin an axle, and doesn’t rely on a flow of current like conventional electric motors. Every few years, an eager Ph.D. student or engineer rediscovers this historical curiosity. But other than applications in tiny pumps and actuators etched on microchips, where this technology has been in use for decades, their work hasn’t made it out of the lab.
Electrostatic motors have several potentially huge advantages over regular motors. They are up to 80% more efficient than conventional motors after all the dependencies of regular electric motors are added in. They could also allow new kinds of control and precision in robots, where they could function more like our muscles.
And they don’t use rare-earth elements because they don’t have permanent magnets, and require as little as 5% as much copper as a conventional motor. Both materials have become increasingly scarce and expensive over the past decade, and supply chains for them are dominated by China.
These motors could lead to more efficient air-conditioning systems, factories, logistics hubs and data centers, and—since they can double as generators—better ways of generating renewable energy. They might even show up in tiny surveillance drones.
Out of the lab in Wisconsin
Leading the effort to resuscitate Franklin’s concept for motors big enough to use in industrial applications is C-Motive Technologies in Middleton, Wis. It is a 16-person startup founded by a pair of University of Wisconsin engineers named Justin Reed and Daniel Ludois who spent years tinkering with electrostatic motors to see if they could be improved.
An expanded rendering of the C-Motive motor and the rotor/stator plates inside. Photo: C-Motive Technologies, Inc.
They’re reaching out to companies, hoping to get their motors out into the real world. So far, FedEx and Rockwell Automation, the century-old supplier of automation to factories, are among those testing their motors.
“In motor technology, this is unique,” says Kyle Crum, director of advanced technology at Rockwell, which has made a small strategic investment in C-Motive, and is testing the company’s motors in one of its laboratories.
“Other motor technologies are kind of iterations on a theme, but they all work on the same physics,” he adds. “This is turning everything on its head. I don’t use the term ‘disruptive technology’ lightly, but this could be that. It could change the game.”
FedEx Supply Chain is testing the motors in conveyors at a distribution center near Fort Worth, Texas, says Mark Crowley, the automation technician at the site.
Electric motors 101
Conventional electric motors come in many types, but they all work by transforming a flow of electricity into motion. Picture the high school science experiment of wrapping copper wire around a nail. Current running through that coil can make the axle of a motor spin—or the process can run in reverse, yielding a generator. In a conventional electric motor, the movement of electrons induces a force that makes it go.
Electrostatic motors, for which the basic principle hasn’t changed since Franklin built the first practical example, are different. The force in these motors comes not from the movement of electrons but from the attraction and repulsion between negative and positive charges in components—the same type of static charge that gives you a shock when you touch a doorknob after shuffling across the carpet in winter.
Franklin’s original model—which he first demonstrated to the public in 1749 as a rotisserie to cook a turkey—is an illustrative example.
Reproduction of an electrostatic motor designed by Benjamin Franklin at the Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History. Photo: Richard W. Strauss, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution
Rather than being pushed by a continuous electromagnetic field, the axle of Franklin’s motor included brass sewing thimbles that had their charge reversed as they passed one of four glass jars that store electric charge, one at each corner of the device. This meant every thimble had either a positive or negative charge, and was therefore attracted to the next glass jar and repelled by the one it just passed.
This is an ingenious way to turn electricity into motion, but it has a major flaw: It relies on air as the insulator keeping the positive and negative charges separated. Air is only so-so at this, which means that a Franklin-style electrostatic motor big enough to do useful work in industry would be weak and inefficient.
C-Motive’s founders discovered that a number of technologies had matured enough that, when combined, could yield electrostatic motors competitive with conventional ones. These enabling technologies include super fast-switching power electronics—like those in modern electric vehicles—that can toggle elements of the motor between states of positive and negative charge very quickly.
But the secret sauce of C-Motive’s motors is, in a sense, an actual secret sauce. Dogged exploration of combinations of various readily available industrial organic fluids led to a proprietary mix that can both multiply the strength of the electric field and insulate the motor’s spinning parts from each other—all without adding too much friction—says C-Motive Chief Executive Matt Maroon.
The biggest challenge to this new technology is the same that faces many other radical new ones—there’s already a huge infrastructure devoted to the existing technology, making companies reluctant to switch to something new, and relatively untested and costly, says James Edmondson, research director at emerging-technology analysis firm IDTechEX.
Electrostatic motors also require much higher voltages than traditional motors, which means they require a different kind of power electronics to feed current to the motor, potentially adding to the cost of the total system, he adds.
Micro drones
Electrostatic motors are inherently efficient because they don’t lose energy to the process of moving current around like a conventional motor, says Mingjing Qi, a professor of electrical engineering at Beihang University in Beijing. But until recently engineers didn’t have a very good understanding of how to optimize their efficiency, he adds.
A team of scientists led by Dr. Qi worked for six years to design an electrostatic motor light and powerful enough for a small, solar-powered drone. Their eventual goal is drones the size of insects, that can fly as long as sunlight shines on them, while carrying a payload that includes a tiny camera.
A sunlight-powered micro aerial vehicle. VIDEO: Wei Shen, Jinzhe Peng, Rui Ma, Jingyi Li
Electrostatic tech isn’t suitable for fast-spinning motors like those in the powertrains of electric vehicles and conventional drones, says C-Motive’s Maroon. But if they prove compelling in industrial applications, it’s possible that some systems that are currently designed for conventional motors could be redesigned to use electrostatic ones, such as home heating and cooling systems.
“With any startup and any new technology, there’s a bunch of ifs,” says Crum, of Rockwell Automation. “But we’re talking about fans, pumps, servos for robots, conveyors—just drive down the road, and every industrial facility you see has these. Just the electrical efficiency you could gain from these alone is gigawatt after gigawatt, if widely adopted.”
For more WSJ Technology analysis, reviews, advice and headlines, sign up for our weekly newsletter.
Write to Christopher Mims at christopher.mims@wsj.com
Corrections & Amplifications
Electrostatic motors are up to 80% more efficient than conventional motors. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said the motors are up to 80% as efficient as conventional motors. (Corrected on Oct. 18)
Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the October 19, 2024, print edition as 'Benjamin Franklin Is Key For Future Electric Motors'.
6. How to Fix the Secret Service
This may be one of our most important national security issues. Our nation cannot afford such lapses and breakdowns.
How to Fix the Secret Service
A review of the Trump assassination attempt calls for big changes.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/donald-trump-butler-assassination-attempt-report-secret-service-4d6e68fa?mod=hp_opin_pos_5#cxrecs_s
By The Editorial Board
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Oct. 18, 2024 6:09 pm ET
United State Secret Service agent secures the area as President Joe Biden departs Albert Whitted Airport after visiting areas damaged by Hurricanes Milton and Helene on Sunday, Oct. 13 Photo: Luis Santana/Zuma Press
A report issued Thursday on the assassination attempt against Donald Trump this summer in Butler, Pa., comes to an alarming conclusion about the Secret Service’s shortcomings. In the absence of “fundamental reform,” it says, “another Butler can and will happen again.” Will that sobering assessment help to prompt real changes, and fast?
The 52-page report was written by a bipartisan panel appointed under the Department of Homeland Security. This inquiry into the Butler shooting included 58 interviews and 7,000 documents. It goes through, in detail, the failures on the ground. The roof from which the gunman fired had been deemed part of the “outer perimeter,” traditionally staffed by state and local police, not the Secret Service.
Communication between these agencies was a muddle. About 20 minutes before Mr. Trump took the stage, Secret Service personnel were made aware of a “suspicious person” who had been using a rangefinder, and police were trying to locate him for questioning. “The leadership of the Trump detail—those who were in closest proximity to him and tasked with managing his personal movements—were never informed,” the panel says.
The report also makes broader criticisms of the Secret Service’s culture, including “a pattern of undertraining”; an attitude of “doing more with less,” which is “inconsistent” with its no-fail mission; “an overreliance on assigning personnel based on categories (former, candidate, nominee)” instead of individual risk assessments; and a lack of auditing and “continuous improvement” mechanisms.
The panel says new money would help, “but an influx of funds, without more, will not address the problems.” It has recommendations for better communications and planning, while suggesting new leadership recruited from outside the agency. The report also argues that the Secret Service should shed responsibility for investigating financial crimes, so it can be “hyperfocused” on its most vital task.
“There is simply no excuse to need to ‘do more with less’ concerning protection of national leaders,” the panel says. “Unless and until those responsibilities are fulfilled, no resources (funds or time) should be allocated to other missions that are not centrally related to the protective function.” After Butler, that’s an idea that should be taken seriously.
WSJ Opinion: 'Mission Creep' Surrounds Trump’s Fraud Verdict
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Appeared in the October 19, 2024, print edition as 'How to Fix the Secret Service'.
7. The axis of evil is a fantasy
An axis of convenience, sure. A transaction relationship, sure. But it is not just Putin's weakness.
But we should keep in mind these relationships among the "Dark Quad" are due to fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.
The axis of evil is a fantasy
North Korean help exposes Putin's weakness
unherd.com · by Ian Garner · October 18, 2024
An axis of convenience (Photo by ED JONES/AFP via Getty Images)
Ian Garner
October 19, 2024 4 mins
A terror is stalking Europe. That, at least, is the impression you get from Kyiv. As Andriy Yermak, head of the country’s office of the president proclaimed, a new “axis of evil” is forming right across the planet, developing into a thoroughgoing military alliance that “challenges democracies and the world order”. And certainly, you can understand his fears to a point. North Korea, after all, is apparently planning to deploy some 10,000 troops to bolster Russia’s war effort, even as Pyongyang may now be supplying half of Moscow’s artillery shells.
Yet if a June 2024 agreement between the countries is certainly worrying, especially when dovetailed by Chinese sabre-rattling in the Pacific, the West is facing less an axis of evil than of convenience. The truth is that Vladmir Putin is deeply reliant on Kim Jong Un — and the help he’s getting from the hermit kingdom is basically a sign of weakness, not strength.
The sudden appearance of North Koreans in their country was unsurprisingly greeted by alarm in Kyiv. And considering how the conflict is going, Yermak’s dramatic language surely makes sense. Over the last few months, after all, the Russians have made grinding gains right across Ukraine, sometimes advancing as much as a kilometre a day and threatening strategically significant cities like Pokrovsk. To an extent, meanwhile, the recent alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang reflects a long-standing amity. The countries have enjoyed generally warm relations since Putin’s ascension to the presidency 25 years ago. Among other things, Pyongyang played host to one of the president’s first state visits abroad, when he hailed the Soviet army’s special role in “liberating” North Korea from Japanese occupation in 1945.
Nonetheless, Moscow issued firm condemnations of North Korea’s erratic and dangerous behaviour on the international stage in the mid-2000s, when Putin hoped to burnish his international reputation by playing mediator on the Korean Peninsula. No less important, the sweep of Russian history demonstrates the real balance of power between the two countries. During the early years of the Cold War, the North Korean regime relied on Soviet help to carve out territory. From there, it spent decades oppressing its population while dodging Soviet retaliation. While the Kim dynasty never Russian pariahs, in other words, they were always treated as junior partners, to be praised or scolded as it suited Moscow.
Since his 2022 invasion, however, Putin has been desperate for partners wherever he can find them. Now, the president makes naked attempts to rewrite history and paint Russia and Korea as old and equal partners. The security partnership signed this year, and North Korea’s increasing provision of soldiers and shells, seem to suggest that equality is being embraced by both sides. Yet despite the pageantry of the official dinners, and the finesse of the PR statements, Putin is clearly desperate for Kim Jong Un’s support.
Notwithstanding recent Russia’s victories around places like Pokrovsk, that’s fundamentally down to its broad geopolitical frailty. Russia is today struggling with a deep crisis in military recruitment, fuelled mainly by the huge losses it’s suffered at the front. Each month, 30,000 men enter the military — and the same number are invalided home or killed on the battlefield. Despite the vast bonuses offered to contract soldiers who choose to enlist, which by some measures now account for 1.5% of the Russian spending, the state is still forced to scour the globe for mercenaries to support its war. A division of raw North Korean conscripts, ignorant of Russian and unfamiliar with their officers, would vanish if thrown into the Ukrainian meat grinder.
“A division of raw North Korean conscripts would vanish if thrown into the Ukrainian meat grinder.”
And if its reliance on North Korea speaks to a military problem, meanwhile, Russia also leans on the DPRK economically. Though the Kim regime can certainly manufacture shells in vast numbers, reportedly shipping some five million to its Russian allies, many appear to be badly made. The fact that Putin is accepting them anyway suggests that he has nowhere else to turn. That’s clear elsewhere: though Russia is now spending some 40% of its budget on defence, and refurbishing factories to pump out munitions, it remains totally reliant on external partners like North Korea. Despite boasting an economy some 10 times larger than North Korea’s, in short, Russia, seems incapable of waging an independent war on Ukraine — let alone launching an attack on Nato as part of some nefarious plot to explode the global order. Pyongyang, for its part, can only offer marginal support to their desperate Russian partner, assistance they’re anyway giving mainly to extract cash, scientific research, and other goodies.
Despite the ominous signs, then, the purported axis of evil probably shouldn’t worry Western leaders. On the contrary, the June alliance points to Moscow’s ever weaker position on the world stage. Putin, frantic to pick up whatever scraps of men and materiel he can, has been reduced to begging. And as soon as the North Koreans spot a better deal, particularly from China, they’ll have little incentive to remain loyal to Moscow. Should China demand or buy Pyongyang’s support for an invasion of Taiwan, Putin’s war will be forgotten in an instant.
Russia may win some small gains from its North Korean ally. But 10,000 troops — as unwelcome as their presence in Ukraine undoubtedly is — ultimately won’t change the course of the war. Yet if the world at large has little to fear from Putin and Kim’s fair-weather friendship, might the West have an opportunity here? If, after all, Kim Jong Un can be tempted to stop providing shells and soldiers to Moscow, either by China or a Western coalition, might an exhausted Russia be forced to retreat from Ukraine? Such a move won’t, of course, win the war alone. Re-supplying Ukraine’s own exhausted military is vital too. Yet squeezing Russia’s supply of weapons would surely hamper Putin’s ability to hold the line, or indeed prepare for another attack against Ukraine. Divided by ideological differences, and opposing medium-term goals, the new “axis of evil” is hardly an axis at all.
Dr. Ian Garner is assistant professor of totalitarian studies at the Pilecki Institute in Warsaw. His latest book is Z Generation: Russia’s Fascist Youth (Hurst).
irgarner
unherd.com · by Ian Garner · October 18, 2024
8. A Candidate for U.S. Senate Says He Was Shot in War. Was He?
Hmmmm..... Curiouser and curiouser.
A Candidate for U.S. Senate Says He Was Shot in War. Was He?
Tim Sheehy, a Republican running for U.S. Senate in Montana, says he has a bullet in his arm from Afghanistan. But new questions have been raised about his account.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/18/us/tim-sheehy-gunshot-wound-montana-senate.html?unlocked_article_code=1.TE4.Fvvj.ZH-cVk61iQ2o
By Mike Baker and Kellen Browning
In a book and in his campaign for the U.S. Senate in Montana, Tim Sheehy has talked about a bullet lodged in his forearm — an injury he says he suffered as a Navy SEAL during a firefight in Afghanistan.
The bullet wound stands at the center of a story of bravery and honor that has boosted his credibility among voters in Montana, where Mr. Sheehy appears to be on the verge of ousting a longtime incumbent, Senator Jon Tester, and perhaps flipping the Senate chamber to Republican control. But the tale grew murky this year when it emerged that Mr. Sheehy had reported to the police that he had accidentally shot himself in the arm at Glacier National Park in Montana, three years after his military deployment.
In a campaign that is one of the most closely watched in the country this year, Mr. Sheehy has stuck by his war story.
Now, in interviews, two people who had close interactions with Mr. Sheehy during key moments in the story have come forward, raising new questions about whether the bullet wound had come during his military service.
A former SEAL colleague, Dave Madden, who had what he described as a close relationship with Mr. Sheehy before they deployed to Afghanistan, said that Mr. Sheehy never mentioned a gunshot wound to him, and almost certainly would have done so in a conversation they had during their deployment if he had indeed been wounded.
On the issue of the later injury in Montana, Kim Peach, a park ranger who spoke with Mr. Sheehy that day at the hospital, said Mr. Sheehy personally told him that he had accidentally shot himself in the arm, and handed over a revolver with a spent round.
“I am 100 percent sure he shot himself that day,” Mr. Peach said in an interview.
The accounts provide additional evidence on an issue of truthfulness that has dogged the Sheehy campaign, after The Washington Post first reported about the injury in Montana and the various accounts that Mr. Sheehy has provided, one of which he has admitted was a lie.
Mr. Sheehy and his lawyers have insisted that he was indeed shot in Afghanistan and that suggesting otherwise was “tantamount to falsely accusing him of stolen valor.” They disputed the accounts of Mr. Madden and Mr. Peach, and said that Mr. Sheehy did not initially report his war wound because he suspected that it may have occurred as a result of friendly fire, which might have caused problems for his platoonmates.
That initial effort to protect his peers, the lawyers said, continued for years, after Mr. Sheehy left active duty. They said that when Mr. Sheehy suffered what they said was an injury on a hike in the national park and sought help at a hospital emergency room, the medical staff told him they needed to report the bullet in his arm to law enforcement. He decided to lie about it, the lawyers said, by telling both the medical staff and Mr. Peach that the bullet had come from an accidental shooting that day.
“Mr. Sheehy’s account is the only plausible one,” the lawyers said.
The questions over the bullet wound have become an issue in the campaign. Democrats have seized on Mr. Sheehy’s conflicting stories about his injury and run an ad that questioned his truthfulness.
Since the initial news reports on the issue appeared in April, Mr. Sheehy has largely stopped talking about his wound in his stump speeches. The controversy appears to have done little to dampen his chances of winning the race; a recent poll showed him leading Mr. Tester by seven percentage points.
Mr. Madden, who served as a Navy SEAL for nearly a decade, now works as a software engineer in the Pacific Northwest, and recalled in an interview how much he admired Mr. Sheehy during their preparations for war. A registered Democrat who has frequently criticized Mr. Sheehy’s politics and character online in recent months, Mr. Madden said he agreed to speak publicly about his recollections because he had grown increasingly concerned about Mr. Sheehy’s truthfulness.
Image
Mr. Sheehy’s story about sustaining a gunshot wound in combat in Afghanistan improved his standing with Montana voters.Credit...Will Warasila for The New York Times
He said he and Mr. Sheehy had grown close during the 18 months of shoulder-to-shoulder training they underwent before their unit was deployed to Afghanistan in early 2012. In Afghanistan, the two men were assigned to separate platoons, working to stabilize different villages. Mr. Madden showed a series of emails indicating that they had remained in contact during the spring of 2012, and he said they got together again that July.
Mr. Sheehy told The Post that he was shot in the forearm during a firefight in late April or early May of that year. But Mr. Madden said that Mr. Sheehy never spoke about it to him, either in emails or when they reconnected in July 2012.
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During that in-person meeting, Mr. Madden said, the two men swapped war stories about the various close conflicts with enemy fighters that they had endured. But through the entire conversation that day, he said, Mr. Sheehy never mentioned any sort of bullet wound. He said he remembers that Mr. Sheehy had his sleeves rolled up during the conversation, and there was no visible evidence of any injury to his arm.
Mr. Madden said he was surprised when Mr. Sheehy began talking more recently about having been shot that spring in Afghanistan, and that he became convinced that Mr. Sheehy had invented the story.
“It seems obvious to me and every other operator I’ve talked to about this,” Mr. Madden said, referring to other military veterans.
Mr. Sheehy’s lawyers said the conversation Mr. Madden described having with Mr. Sheehy in July 2012 never happened, and that Mr. Madden was coming forward now for political reasons. “Mr. Madden’s social media and donation history makes clear that he supports Democratic candidates and wants Mr. Sheehy to lose his Senate race,” they said.
The incident at Glacier National Park occurred in October 2015. Mr. Peach, the park ranger, wrote in his incident report that when he interviewed Mr. Sheehy at a hospital outside the park, Mr. Sheehy told him that he had mishandled his revolver, which discharged a round that ended up in his arm.
Mr. Peach had spoken to The Post anonymously for its initial report in April. In an on-the-record interview with The New York Times, Mr. Peach affirmed key details of his incident report, and said that he was certain that Mr. Sheehy had received a gunshot wound to his arm at the park.
Updated Oct. 19, 2024, 7:53 a.m. ET5 hours ago
He said a visitor had called in a report of a gunshot fired in a parking lot at the park, and that he had started driving toward the lot to check it out. While he was on the way, though, dispatchers heard from a hospital that Mr. Sheehy had arrived there wounded, Mr. Peach said. Health care professionals in the state are required to report gunshot wounds to law enforcement.
Mr. Peach said that when he got to the hospital, he found Mr. Sheehy with a bandage on his arm, preparing to be discharged. With a medical staff member present, Mr. Sheehy reported that he had accidentally shot himself and that a bullet was now lodged in his arm, Mr. Peach said.
Because it is illegal to discharge a firearm in a national park, Mr. Peach said, he and Mr. Sheehy went out to Mr. Sheehy’s vehicle, where Mr. Peach temporarily confiscated the gun and unloaded it, finding five live rounds and the casing of one that had been fired. Mr. Peach, who described himself as someone who generally votes for Democrats, said Mr. Sheehy was embarrassed at what had transpired. He was charged and agreed to pay a $525 fine.
Mr. Sheehy went on to write a statement in which he said that he had just finished a hike and was loading his gear into his vehicle when a firearm he had brought along for bear protection “fell out and discharged into my right forearm.” He requested leniency, expressing “my deepest apologies for any inconvenience this incident caused.”
Image
Tim Sheehy, left, has been leading Senator Jon Tester, right, in the polls. The two men took part in a debate in Missoula, Mont., on Sept. 30.Credit...Ben Allan Smith/The Missoulian, via Associated Press
Lawyers for Mr. Sheehy said in a letter to The Times this week that the bullet had actually come from an apparent ricochet during a firefight in Afghanistan, and that Mr. Sheehy had not wanted to spark an official investigation that could create problems for his fellow SEALs.
Three years later in Montana, they said, he slipped on a patch of ice and fell to the ground, re-aggravating the bullet injury. When he got to the hospital, they said, he informed medical workers of his past gunshot wound. He explained that the gunshot was not fresh, the lawyers said, but when hospital officials said they would still have to contact law enforcement, Mr. Sheehy changed his story to say that he accidentally shot himself in the national park, still fearing that revealing the ricochet bullet could result in problems for his former SEAL teammates.
The lawyers said that Mr. Sheehy did not have gunshot residue on his body when he went to the hospital for treatment, but they did not produce any medical records of the examination.
The lawyers also said that Mr. Sheehy could not have accidentally shot himself by dropping the weapon out of his car, because the firing mechanism on the Colt .45 revolver requires that someone pull the trigger. Manuals for some versions of the gun, however, include a warning that the weapon can fire when dropped.
Mr. Madden said the claim that Mr. Sheehy was trying to protect his platoon mates by first concealing and later lying about the bullet in his arm did not make sense to him. From his experience, he said, there would be no reason to cover up a wound in the name of protecting platoon mates because nobody would be investigating the origin of a bullet from a firefight. And in any case, he said, a ricochet during a firefight would be considered a hazard of battle, not a scandal.
As Mr. Madden heard more about Mr. Sheehy’s Senate campaign, he said, he was also surprised at Mr. Sheehy’s reference to parachuting into Glacier National Park as part of his SEAL training before the deployment to Afghanistan. “We’d parachute into Glacier National Park,” Mr. Sheehy said at a campaign speech in July. “We’d climb the mountains. We’d do horseback training right through the Continental Divide here.”
Mr. Madden said he was with Mr. Sheehy during the training in Montana, writing the contracts for the different activities, and none of it included parachuting, let alone jumping into Glacier National Park. The Daily Montanan reported that officials with the National Park Service and the Navy have also questioned the account, saying that parachuting is not permitted in the park, even for the military.
Mr. Sheehy declined requests to provide The Times with military medical records that might show when he received any injuries in Afghanistan, or hospital records that would reflect that the injury in Montana was a result of a fall and not a fresh gunshot wound. He has not given the hospital in Montana permission to discuss his treatment.
Mr. Sheehy’s campaign helped The Times connect with some of his other SEAL peers, including Justin Sheehan and Paul Zohorsky. Neither man was present at the firefight where Mr. Sheehy says he was shot. But both of them recalled hearing about Mr. Sheehy suffering injuries. They did not recall discussion of a gunshot, and Mr. Sheehan said that his conversation with Mr. Sheehy focused on injuries from an improvised explosive device.
Both men said they considered Mr. Sheehy trustworthy. “He is 100 percent a credible, do-the-right-thing guy,” Mr. Sheehan said.
Another of Mr. Sheehy’s former SEAL peers spoke on condition of anonymity because he is working in a sensitive capacity for the government. He said he recalled Mr. Sheehy speaking about an I.E.D. blast and mentioning having been struck in a friendly fire incident. But the SEAL said he did not know any further details about the incident, like whether a bullet had lodged in Mr. Sheehy’s arm, and said he considered the matter “insignificant” in the larger scheme of the war.
Another service member, who was attached to Mr. Sheehy’s platoon in Afghanistan and spoke anonymously because he is still in the military, said he recalled a brief conversation after a firefight in which Mr. Sheehy said he thought he had “caught a ricochet.” Mr. Sheehy did not show a wound or discuss whether a bullet had entered his body, he said, as the conversation was a brief check-in to make sure everyone was OK, and Mr. Sheehy seemed to still be fully functional.
Mr. Sheehy earned some of the military’s highest accolades for his service in Afghanistan, including a Bronze Star for his efforts to rescue one wounded man in a firefight.
In 2015, he was awarded the Purple Heart, a military decoration for service members who have been injured or killed in the line of duty. The public record does not specify the nature of the injury or injuries for which the medal was awarded, and Mr. Sheehy did not respond to requests for further information. A local news account from the 2015 award ceremony said Mr. Sheehy received it for injuries from an improvised explosive device.
Mr. Madden said he suspected that Mr. Sheehy was injured in the same way many troops were at that time, by I.E.D. explosions that can sometimes cause concussive or impact injuries without a direct hit.
“Tim was a good SEAL,” Mr. Madden said. “Tim was a better SEAL than I was. There is no doubt in my mind about that.” But even so, he said, he does not believe Mr. Sheehy’s claim to have been shot in Afghanistan.
Mr. Madden, who has donated over the years to Democratic candidates, has had plenty of issues with Mr. Sheehy’s politics. In online postings referring to Mr. Sheehy’s business career, Mr. Madden has called him “Private Equity’s golden son, ascendant,” and has predicted that if Montanans elected him to the U.S. Senate, Mr. Sheehy would “make ungodly amounts of money selling their public lands and taking bribes.”
Mr. Madden has also referred to a personal falling-out the two men had in Afghanistan, when Mr. Madden said he was going through a personal “breakdown” and asked Mr. Sheehy for help, but Mr. Sheehy “walked away.” That happened during the same 2012 conversation they had about war injuries, Mr. Madden said, and it was one of the reasons that, even years later, he remembered the conversation so well.
Still, Mr. Madden said, he has been reluctant this year to fully tell his story. He said he dislikes both political parties, and felt motivated to come forward not by politics but by a sense of responsibility.
Mr. Sheehy left active duty in 2014. On the campaign trail, he has told voters that his medical troubles, including a heart issue discovered after underwater training, meant that he “couldn’t serve any more as a SEAL, which was something I wanted to do for the rest of my life.” However, in his book, Mr. Sheehy said the Navy offered him a “period of recovery and evaluation” before he could return to active duty, and that he chose to leave the SEALs instead.
“I was no longer interested in following that path if I didn’t know I could return to operational status,” he wrote. Mr. Sheehy eventually transitioned to the Navy Reserve. Then, records show, he was discharged with an “involuntary separation” after failing to earn promotion to the next rank.
Kitty Bennett contributed research.
Mike Baker is a national reporter for The Times, based in Seattle. More about Mike Baker
Kellen Browning is a Times reporter covering the 2024 election, with a focus on the swing states of Nevada and Arizona. More about Kellen Browning
9. Industry looking for what's next after Army's cancelation of next-gen Patriot interceptor
Industry looking for what's next after Army's cancelation of next-gen Patriot interceptor - Breaking Defense
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon had been closing watching the Army's Lower-Tier Future Interceptor program, but the cancelation of that effort comes as little surprise, company officials said.
By Valerie Insinna
breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · October 18, 2024
A Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI) missile is launched during a successful Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) flight test at White Sands Missile Range in 2021. (Darrell Ames/Army)
AUSA 2024 — The US Army this week announced it was cancelling plans to develop a next-generation interceptor for the Patriot air defense system, but executives from key air defense competitors largely shrugged off the news to Breaking Defense.
Maj. Gen. Frank Lozano, the Army’s program executive officer for missiles and space, on Monday announced the service’s intent to walk away from the effort, called the Lower-Tier Future Interceptor (LTFI). Instead of buying a new interceptor, which Lozano called “very expensive,” the Army will upgrade the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement currently made by Lockheed Martin, he told Defense News.
Lockheed had been preparing to compete for LTFI, and as of Tuesday afternoon, the Army had not yet informed the company of its specific path forward for future PAC-3 upgrades, said Tim Cahill, executive vice president of the company’s missiles and fire control business.
However, the decision didn’t catch Lockheed “flat footed,” as it typically invests in future capability enhancements on PAC-3 and has technology “waiting in the wings,” he added.
“There’s budget challenges, and so future programs are always going to face some level of uncertainty relative to whether they’re going to go forward or exactly how they’re going to go forward,” Cahill told Breaking Defense.
While the Army has not laid out which technology upgrades it could seek to transfer from LTFI to future PAC-3 production, Cahill said the company typically pursues improvements to solid rocket motors, seeker technology and lightweight materials — all of which can extend the range of the missile or improve its ability to detect targets.
Raytheon, the prime contractor for the overall Patriot system, had also been developing concepts for LTFI, but will lose little sleep over its cancellation, said Tom Laliberty, Raytheon’s president of Land & Air Defense Systems.
“To be honest it doesn’t really surprise me, only because funding has been — over the last several years — what I would call sort of conservative,” he said.
Laliberty said Raytheon and other vendors likely had plans to test upgrades to existing weapon systems that could provide a cheaper way to do the mission LTFI was designed for. For example, in a recent demonstration in partnership with Northrop Grumman, the companies integrated Raytheon’s Standard Missile 6 and Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor with Northrop’s Integrated Battle Command System.
“We basically showed how effective SM-6 could be for a large portion of that threat set, that mission that potentially LTFI was also going to be addressing. So I don’t know if that played into the decision, but my point is that there’s other things out there,” he said.
The Army’s senior leadership and program office made the decision to cancel LTFI after conducting a business case analysis of the effort, Lozano said in his interview with Defense News. He said the service would “continue to advance” PAC-3 “so that it can remain relevant against the evolving threats,” but did not provide further information on the Army’s path forward.
breakingdefense.com · by Valerie Insinna · October 18, 2024
10. Crew still missing as Special Forces and search teams reach Navy Growler crash site
The 1st SFG mountain teams as well as many current and former Special Forces soldiers have a lot of time on Mt Rainier.
Crew still missing as Special Forces and search teams reach Navy Growler crash site
Search teams reached the remote crash site on Mount Rainier, Washington Friday, but could not immediately account for the 2-man crew.
Matt White
Updated on Oct 19, 2024 9:20 AM EDT
taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White
The 2-man crew of a Navy EA-18G Growler was still missing Friday night after search teams that included Army Green Berets reached the plane’s wreckage at a remote crash site on Mount Rainier in Washington. The plane went down Tuesday on a training flight, the Navy said, but was only spotted from the air early Thursday amid bad weather and mountainous terrain.
“Finding the aircrew continues to be our primary focus,” said Cmdr. Beth Teach, a Naval Air Forces spokesperson. “Personnel on site are methodically searching an expansive area, evaluating debris and searching for information in the snow-covered, wilderness environment.”
The Whidbey Island-based EA-18G crashed on Oct. 15 during a flight the Navy called a “routine training mission.” Search and rescue flights — which included a Navy spy plane and a submarine hunter — spotted the wreckage in terrain at approximately 6,000 feet in what the Navy said is “a remote, steep and heavily wooded area east of Mount Rainier.”
To reach the site, officials called in soldiers from 1st Special Forces Group at Joint Base Lewis-McChord near Seattle. Those soldiers, the Navy said, have expertise in “high-angle rescue, medical, and technical communication skills necessary to navigate the difficult terrain associated with the Cascade Mountain Range that is inaccessible by other means.”
In a statement, Navy officials did not say whether they believed the crew was still alive or at the crash site.
“Our priority is to locate our two aviators as quickly and as safely as possible,” said Capt. David Ganci, commander, Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet. “We cannot identify or confirm the names of aircrew involved in a mishap until 24 hours after their next of kin have been notified of their status.”
Since the first hours after the plane went down Tuesday, search crews flying Navy, Army, and civilian planes and helicopters combed the rugged, heavily forested landscape around Mount Rainier.
“Aerial operations continued through [Tuesday] night, launching from NAS Whidbey Island and searching in the area 30 miles west of Yakima,” a Navy spokesperson said in a release Wednesday.
The two-seat EA-18G flies with a pilot an Electronic Warfare Officer.
The search included EP-3E Aries II aircraft from Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1) and P-8A Poseidon from Patrol Squadron 46 (VP-46). The EP-3E is a signal intelligence plane built to eavesdrop on enemy communications and other electronic spying, while the airliner-sized P-8A conducts anti-submarine missions. Teams from NAS Whidbey Island Search and Rescue and Army helicopters from 4-6 Air Cavalry Squadron from Joint Base Lewis-McChord were also searching.
The fighter jet crashed, the Navy said, “east of Mount Rainier,” which sits about halfway between Seattle and Yakima.
The plane was based at Whidbey Island as part of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 130. Whidbey Island is home to nearly all of the Navy’s EA-18Gs and its initial schoolhouse for pilots and flight officers assigned to the plane. VAQ-130 is part of Carrier Air Wing 3, which is attached to the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier.
The EA-18G Growler is a variant of the FA-18 fighter with weapons and electronic systems dedicated to electronic warfare tasks, like finding and attacking enemy radar locations.
This is a developing story and will be updated as new information becomes available.
The latest on Task & Purpose
taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White
11. How the Patriotic Investment Act Can Counter China’s Stimulus Package
Conclusion:
While the United States is able but unwilling to respond to these affronts with military action, starving China of the capital needed to fuel its economic growth – and military modernization – is a very appropriate way to send a message to Beijing. More importantly, it’s a great way to send a message to Wall Street: stop giving money to the United States’ adversaries.
How the Patriotic Investment Act Can Counter China’s Stimulus Package
thediplomat.com
A little-noticed bill introduced in the U.S. Congress has the potential to chill American investors’ appetite for Chinese assets.
By David Rader and Adam Chan
October 17, 2024
Credit: Depositphotos
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China just announced a tranche of monetary moves to breathe air into its floundering economy, sending Chinese stocks soaring, But amid last week’s euphoria, a little-noticed bill was introduced in the U.S. Congress that has the potential to chill American investors’ appetite for Chinese assets.
The Patriotic Investment Act (PIA) – jointly introduced by House China Committee Chairman John Moolenaar and Senator Marco Rubio – proposes to add a new tool to the United States’ growing economic statecraft arsenal: using the tax code to explicitly incentivize U.S. money away from China. Specifically, the bill is the fulfillment of a recommendation from the China Committee’s bipartisan economic competition report to “[e]nact legislation to ensure capital gains and dividends made from investing in the PRC are not taxed at a lower rate than American workers’ salaries.”
Americans in the highest tax bracket pay 20 percent (with a 3.8 percent surtax) in taxes on most long-term capital gains, but 37 percent on their salaries. Because investment drives productivity and economic growth, the United States incentivizes investment through the tax code. But as Rubio put it, “The capital gains tax rate was meant to encourage investment in American innovation, not fund an oppressive communist regime.” To quote Moolenaar, “Our nation’s tax code should be incentivizing investment in the United States, not collaboration with the CCP.”
Thus, the PIA encourages “divestment from Chinese securities by removing the beneficial capital gains tax rate,” according to a bill summary – requiring all U.S. investors to pay the 37 percent rate for ordinary income on all future financial gains from investments in Chinese financial assets. The bill would allow investors six months to divest from China to avoid the higher taxes. The PIA would also increase the tax rate on future gains, deterring U.S. capital from returning to China and would deny foreign tax credits paid to China.
If U.S. investors want to use their capital to strengthen an adversary’s economic, technological, and military development, Washington should at least not subsidize this investment through the tax code.
Investors interested in the China market (despite the PRC’s economic woes and adversarial relationship with the U.S.) would do well to take note. Whereas the Biden administration’s Executive Order restricting investment into China focused only on active investment and was limited to a few sectors, the PIA is much broader. It would encompass passive purchases of Alibaba stock on the NASDAQ, as well as venture capital into Chinese semiconductor stocks. It would reach the approximated $1 trillion of U.S. capital invested in China.
U.S. investors in China should be especially alert because the PIA faces a decent chance of passage. First, it is a bill to increase taxes being led by two prominent Republicans; Democratic support should be easy to pick up. Second, with a massive tax cliff coming next year, one of the few post-election certainties is that Congress will pass a large tax package, and they’ll be looking for politically palatable ways to raise revenue. The PIA is just such a bill. What member of Congress would not support taxing those investing in the United States’ foremost adversary at least the same tax rate applied to American workers’ salaries?
The PIA’s introduction comes at a crucial time. China’s economy is the most fragile it has been in decades, with bankruptcies across the manufacturing sector, structural cracks in its real estate market, and declining consumer spending. China is desperate for foreign capital, as their latest moves to juice its stock market emphasize. China needs to retain as much capital as it can while appealing to future investors to sustain growth. The PIA would thus significantly exacerbate China’s worries about its declining appeal as a home for foreign direct investment in the years ahead.
Free trade, free flow of capital, and trillions in foreign investment have not fulfilled the dreams of many to transform the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into a peace-loving, capitalist, or democratic ruling class. Under Xi Jinping, China’s economy is becoming increasingly statist, its politics totalitarian, and its foreign policy militarist. In just the last few months, the CCP has given military support to Russia to aid its war in Ukraine, attacked ships and seized islands from a U.S. treaty ally in the South China Sea, sailed warships into Japanese waters, fired an ICBM into the Pacific for the first time in decades, and flown bombers off the Alaskan coast.
While the United States is able but unwilling to respond to these affronts with military action, starving China of the capital needed to fuel its economic growth – and military modernization – is a very appropriate way to send a message to Beijing. More importantly, it’s a great way to send a message to Wall Street: stop giving money to the United States’ adversaries.
Authors
Guest Author
David Rader
David Rader is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the former deputy director for Global Investment & Economic Security at the U.S. Department of Defense.
Guest Author
Adam Chan
Adam Chan is the former National Security Legal Fellow for the Select Committee on Competition with the Chinese Communist Party at the U.S. House of Representatives.
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12. Vietnam’s Grand Strategic Architecture Amid the Russia-Ukraine War
Excerpts:
In line with Vietnam’s grand strategy, the deepening of Vietnam’s U.S. partnership necessitated some actions to reassure both China and Russia. Thus, in anticipation of future advancement in U.S.-Vietnam relations, CPV chief Trong traveled to China in late 2022, breaking a decades-long rule that saw Laos as the first destination abroad of Vietnam’s top leader after his election. The double upgrade of U.S.-Vietnam relations also prompted Hanoi to join Beijing’s “community with a shared future” in December 2023, ending Vietnam’s years-long resistance to the Chinese scheme.
Most recently, Vietnam’s new leader To Lam also went to China on his inaugural trip abroad after becoming CPV general secretary. In June 2024, Hanoi lavishly hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin on his first visit to Vietnam since attending the APEC Summit in Da Nang in 2017.
Adding to the complexity and subtlety of Vietnam’s balancing act, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and President To Lam have always met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy whenever they have attended the same multilateral gathering, whether that was the G-7 meeting in Japan in May 2023, the World Economic Forum in January 2024, or the United Nations General Assembly in September 2024.
The fixing and strengthening of Vietnam’s complex web of partnerships can be considered a great feat in today’s divided world. However, Hanoi’s efforts so far have not qualitatively improved the country’s grand strategic architecture. Its current form – a combination of the strengthened web of partnerships, Vietnam’s “all people’s defense,” ASEAN membership, and the “four no’s” – does not deter aggression, nor does it maximize the country’s defense.
As I have suggested before, Vietnam’s strategic architecture must be augmented and re-arranged “in ways that can deter aggressors and when deterrence is not possible, maximize its defensive response.”
Vietnam’s Grand Strategic Architecture Amid the Russia-Ukraine War
thediplomat.com
The Russia-Ukraine war has rearranged the configuration of Vietnam’s web of partnerships but has not drastically changed its foreign policy approach.
By Alexander L. Vuving
October 17, 2024
Vietnam’s President To Lam (right) hosts Russian President Vladimir Putin for a reception during Putin’s state visit to Vietnam, June 20, 2024.
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When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the world was ushered into a new era of heightened great power rivalry and weakened international order. In Europe, countries such as Finland and Sweden responded to this by discarding neutrality and joining a military alliance in the form of NATO. But not so Vietnam, whose situation is in many ways similar to that of Ukraine. Like Kyiv, Hanoi lives next door to a far bigger and more powerful neighbor that harbors territorial and hegemonic ambitions against it.
Hanoi’s response to the war in Ukraine has been to strengthen its existing foreign policy paradigm entailing a delicate and dynamic omnidirectional balancing act, especially between the great powers.
Vietnam’s foreign policy paradigm resulted from its own historical experiences dealing with a Ukraine-like situation. As with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, China in 1979 attacked Vietnam without provocation. The Chinese invasion occurred after Vietnam had secured a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union, a nuclear-armed great power. As Beijing explained it, the war was to “teach Vietnam a lesson.” But Hanoi did not learn the lesson once and for all. The lesson it learned has evolved over time, reinforced or modified by subsequent experiences.
This lesson had crystallized by the late 1990s into a defense doctrine known as the “three no’s” policy, which would evolve by the late 2010s into “four no’s.” The policy stipulates that Vietnam must not join any military alliance, not side with one country against another, not allow any foreign military bases on its soil, and not use force or threaten to use force in international relations. More than a year into the Russia-Ukraine war, these “four no’s” were elevated to become “guiding rules” within the “Strategy for Safeguarding the Fatherland in the New Situation,” adopted by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in October 2023. The document serves as a kind of national security strategy.
The self-imposed restrictions of the “four no’s” do not work alone but are predicated on Vietnam’s “all people’s defense,” its membership of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and a thick web of partnerships with global and regional powerhouses. These principles and relationships constitute the core architecture of how Vietnam provides security for itself in the world today.
With its multiple directions and interlocking ties, the web of partnerships serves as Vietnam’s “safety net” in the international arena. However, the Russia-Ukraine war has rearranged its configuration and caused a tear in this safety net. The conflict has deepened and intensified the strategic competition between the United States and the West on one side and Russia and China on the other.
Rather than building a new safety net, Hanoi has tried to fix and strengthen the existing one. The biggest task in this endeavor was to deepen relations with the United States without losing Russia’s trust amid growing hostility between the two countries. Another major task was to keep Moscow closer to Hanoi or at least neutral in the South China Sea disputes with Beijing despite the China-Russia strategic rapprochement. Vietnam has successfully resolved these tasks by taking one step backward and then two steps forward in its relations with the United States, while also accommodating Russia.
Russia-U.S. hostility following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 initially prompted Vietnam to postpone elevating its ties with the United States. Hanoi did not drop the goal of upgrading its existing “comprehensive partnership” with Washington to a “strategic” one, but as journalists in Hanoi were told in April 2022, this goal needed to be frozen to demonstrate Vietnam’s “independence, balance, and autonomy” in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. In May and again in July 2022, Vietnam canceled the planned visit of a U.S. aircraft carrier. In August and September 2022, Hanoi told high-ranking U.S. officials visiting Vietnam that it intended to upgrade the bilateral relationship “when the conditions are conducive.”
In the following months, Vietnam lobbied for a visit to Hanoi by U.S. President Joe Biden. After this was turned down, Vietnam lobbied instead for a phone call between Biden and its top leader, CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. The Biden-Trong phone call took place in late March 2023, and was followed by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to Hanoi in April. A key result of Blinken’s visit was that Hanoi and Washington penciled July 2023 as a tentative date for Trong’s trip to Washington.
Meanwhile, Vietnam was negotiating with Russia a large arms deal worth $8 billion over 20 years, which would use the book of a joint Russian-Vietnamese oil venture to bypass Western sanctions.
In July 2023, a few days after the eventual port call of a U.S. aircraft carrier to Vietnam, the CPV’s foreign relations chief Le Hoai Trung was in Washington to discuss plans for the Biden-Trong summit meeting and an upgrade of the bilateral relationship. U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan suggested that Biden would go to Vietnam in September 2023 after cutting short his participation at the G-20 meeting in India. Later, Sullivan also proposed a two-step upgrade to ties that would put the United States on par with Vietnam’s other “comprehensive strategic partners”: China, Russia, India, and South Korea.
Vietnam’s pragmatic leadership grasped the opportunity and agreed to the bold initiative. As I said in an interview with The Diplomat in September 2023, what really convinced the Vietnamese to “leapfrog” was the U.S. offer to turn Vietnam into a major high-tech and semiconductor hub embedded within U.S.-friendly supply chains. When the two countries formally raised their ties to the level of a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in September 2023, semiconductors were “the centerpiece of an action plan” adopted during Biden’s visit.
To further strengthen its web of partnerships, Vietnam elevated Japan, Australia, and France to its sixth, seventh, and eighth comprehensive strategic partners, respectively, in November 2023, March 2024, and October 2024. Vietnam is also weighing upgrading its ties with Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines to this highest level.
In line with Vietnam’s grand strategy, the deepening of Vietnam’s U.S. partnership necessitated some actions to reassure both China and Russia. Thus, in anticipation of future advancement in U.S.-Vietnam relations, CPV chief Trong traveled to China in late 2022, breaking a decades-long rule that saw Laos as the first destination abroad of Vietnam’s top leader after his election. The double upgrade of U.S.-Vietnam relations also prompted Hanoi to join Beijing’s “community with a shared future” in December 2023, ending Vietnam’s years-long resistance to the Chinese scheme.
Most recently, Vietnam’s new leader To Lam also went to China on his inaugural trip abroad after becoming CPV general secretary. In June 2024, Hanoi lavishly hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin on his first visit to Vietnam since attending the APEC Summit in Da Nang in 2017.
Adding to the complexity and subtlety of Vietnam’s balancing act, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and President To Lam have always met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy whenever they have attended the same multilateral gathering, whether that was the G-7 meeting in Japan in May 2023, the World Economic Forum in January 2024, or the United Nations General Assembly in September 2024.
The fixing and strengthening of Vietnam’s complex web of partnerships can be considered a great feat in today’s divided world. However, Hanoi’s efforts so far have not qualitatively improved the country’s grand strategic architecture. Its current form – a combination of the strengthened web of partnerships, Vietnam’s “all people’s defense,” ASEAN membership, and the “four no’s” – does not deter aggression, nor does it maximize the country’s defense.
As I have suggested before, Vietnam’s strategic architecture must be augmented and re-arranged “in ways that can deter aggressors and when deterrence is not possible, maximize its defensive response.”
This article expands on the findings of a research paper published in The Pacific Review, an international relations journal covering the interactions of the countries of the Asia-Pacific.
Authors
Guest Author
Alexander L. Vuving
Alexander L. Vuving is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. His major areas of research include the evolution of great power politics, soft power, Asia-Pacific geopolitics, the rise of China, Vietnamese politics and foreign policy, and the South China Sea disputes. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect those of his employers.
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13. The India-South Korea-US Triad’s Emerging Roles in the Indo-Pacific
Conclusion:
But these difficulties are outweighed by the opportunities. The trilateral partnership can promote innovation, strengthen supply chain resilience, and uphold an Indo-Pacific rules-based order by formalizing regular dialogues, establishing formal mechanisms for cooperation, and highlighting common objectives like economic security, technological leadership, and maritime stability. By working together to handle transnational issues like illicit fishing, piracy, clean energy, and technological advancement, India, South Korea, and the United States can create a strong framework for regional peace and prosperity and pave the way for future collaboration.
The India-South Korea-US Triad’s Emerging Roles in the Indo-Pacific
thediplomat.com
The India-South Korea-U.S. trilateral partnership holds great potential for military cooperation, green energy, maritime security, and strategic cooperation on vital technologies.
By SeungHwan (Shane) Kim and Shubhankar Agarwal
October 17, 2024
Credit: Depositphotos
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The United States and India inaugurated the U.S.-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) in January 2023. That was followed by the U.S.-South Korea Next Generation Critical and Emerging Technology Dialogue in December 2023. As a follow-up initiative, all three nations held their first inaugural trilateral technology dialogue in Seoul in March 2024. India, South Korea, and the United States were able to solidify their trilateral cooperation in various areas, including economic security, supply chain resiliency, and emerging technologies in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
There are various opportunities for this triangular dynamic that can foster innovation, enhance strategic alliances and partnerships, and benefit each of the three nations, even as certain challenges exist.
Military Cooperation
Trilateral defense cooperation between India, South Korea, and the U.S. aligns with strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific to enhance collaboration among like-minded regional actors. In February 2022, the United States released its Indo-Pacific Strategy, highlighting the importance of strengthening security and upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific region. To achieve this, the U.S. supports a “strong India” and South Korea as key partners and allies in realizing this regional vision. Similarly, India advocates for a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific through its vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), and South Korea reiterates a free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific through its Indo-Pacific Strategy.
At the same time, India’s rise as a significant importer of military equipment (accounting for 9.8 percent of total global arms imports) allows major exporters like South Korea and the United States to reap economic benefits and further develop their defense industries, fostering a sense of growth and prosperity. This increases interoperability among their armed forces and diversifies India’s arms supply away from Russia, which continues to play a dominant role.
Recent developments already exemplify the accelerated collaboration in defense industrial and technological development. After the United States and India launched their U.S.-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) in 2012, Washington recognized India as a Major Defense Partner (MDP) in 2016. This was followed by initiating the India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X) and signing the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) in 2024. With South Korea also having signed a SOSA agreement with the U.S. in 2023, there are more trilateral opportunities to come in terms of military cooperation.
The United States has become a significant defense supplier to India, providing advanced weapon systems such as Apache attack helicopters, C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft, P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, and MH-60R Seahawk helicopters. Similarly, South Korea has emerged as a primary defense partner for India, as seen in India’s acquisition of 100 K9 Vajra-T self-propelled howitzers, a variant of South Korea’s K9 Thunder. This successful export led to a Roadmap for Defense Industries Cooperation in 2019 for the joint development of land and naval defense systems, creating a foundation for more robust military cooperation and reaping economic benefits for all parties involved.
With the India-South Korea-U.S. trilateral, military and security cooperation is not just significant, it’s strategically crucial. However, the triad’s synergy extends into other areas as well.
Green Energy Partnerships
The inaugural trilateral technology dialogue between the United States, India, and South Korea, held in Seoul, represents a significant milestone in strengthening cooperation on critical and emerging technologies for green transition. The dialogue emphasized areas of cooperation that are integral to economic growth and security, with clean energy and critical minerals at the forefront. This partnership is aligned with the global push toward green energy solutions, particularly focusing on building resilient technology supply chains.
In the clean energy sector, the United States, India, and South Korea identified several key areas for collaboration, including the development of advanced materials for renewable energy technologies and the exploration of critical mineral supply chains, essential for manufacturing batteries, solar panels, and wind turbines.
South Korea has been ramping up its investments in green technologies through its Green New Deal, which focuses on transitioning to renewable energy, building eco-friendly infrastructure, and developing electric vehicles (EVs). In collaboration with the U.S. and India, Seoul has sought to expand joint investments in clean hydrogen production and decarbonization technologies.
As part of the broader Indo-Pacific strategy, the Quad nations – India, the United States, Japan, and Australia – have engaged in discussions to boost clean energy partnerships. This group has facilitated cross-national investments in solar energy projects and supply chains for critical minerals essential for renewable energy. South Korea and India have also partnered on solar energy initiatives, with Korean firms investing in solar power plants across India. This cooperation is expected to expand, particularly with the trilateral dialogue placing green energy at the center of its discussions.
This collaboration also aligns with the growing global focus on decarbonization and climate action, as all three nations aim to capitalize on clean energy technologies and critical minerals to advance their renewable energy capacities. By fostering partnerships in areas like solar energy, hydrogen production, and critical mineral supply chains, the trilateral dialogue addresses both environmental challenges and the need for secure technology ecosystems. It further highlights the increasing importance of multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, especially as these countries seek to counterbalance dependencies on dominant supply chains, such as those tied to China. This initiative not only supports innovation but also positions these nations as key players in driving the global green energy transition.
Emerging Tech and Innovation
The trilateral cooperation can shed light not only on military cooperation and the green transition but also on emerging technologies and innovation. The semiconductor industry is one of the critical areas for collaboration among the United States, South Korea, and India, aiming to enhance supply chain resiliency and strengthen research and development for advanced chips. This potential is phenomenal because of the fragmentation of expertise in the whole value chain of the semiconductor industry.
The United States is known for its expertise in chip design and advanced semiconductor research. Companies like Intel, AMD, and Qualcomm are all at the forefront of developing new chip architectures and AI processors, leading in semiconductor intellectual property. On the other hand, South Korea is a semiconductor fab hub with two integrated device manufacturers, Samsung and SK Hynix, dominating the production of cutting-edge chips.
With its vast pool of highly skilled and educated engineers, India can play a vital role in this value chain. While the U.S. and South Korea lack chip talents due to workforce shortages, India can become a hub of the semiconductor industry’s R&D. Numerous multinational companies, including Texas Instruments and Qualcomm, have established design and R&D centers in India. Thus, the three countries’ synergy will allow them to collaborate across the semiconductor value chain – from R&D and design (the U.S. and India) to manufacturing (South Korea), with India’s role being particularly significant and promising.
Private South Korean and U.S. chipmakers’ efforts to collaborate with India as part of a broader trilateral effort are already underway. The Indian government, through its “Semicon India” program and numerous incentives, is attracting investments from both South Korea’s Samsung and SK Hynix, as well as U.S. firms like Intel and Micron. Meanwhile, South Korean firms are investing heavily in U.S. states like Texas and Indiana after the United States passed the CHIPS and Science Act. This trilateral dynamic has the potential to expand simply from chipmaking to other sophisticated emerging technologies, including space, artificial intelligence, 6G, biotech, and quantum computing.
Challenges Ahead
However, trilateral cooperation still has its limitations. The differing approaches to China among the three nations present a challenge to trilateral cooperation.
Considering the United States’ emphasis on strategic competition and its view of China as a primary challenger to the international order, it might consider the India-South Korea-U.S. triad as another minilateral within Washington’s latticework strategy. Its views on China can be exemplified in the Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the recent notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) prohibiting selling and importing connected cars that utilized technologies from China and Russia.
However, South Korea is reluctant to join blocs that appear to target China, given its substantial economic ties and the precedent of China’s economic retaliation following the 2016 THAAD deployment. Meanwhile, India is “hedging,” avoiding full alignment with any one power bloc. While India does face border disputes and strategic rivalry, it tries to continue its economic ties with China, as exemplified by their trade volume surpassing that between the United States and India.
That said, Washington may act as a catalyst in pulling India and South Korea together for its own economic statecraft in the Indo-Pacific by taking advantage of both Seoul’s and New Delhi’s strained ties with Beijing.
Another major challenge that will also affect this trilateral is the possibility of Donald Trump winning the U.S. presidential election in November 2024. Formerly, Trump referred to India as a “very big abuser” of trade connections with the United States, suggesting that he could slap heavy tariffs on Indian products. If Trump wins the election, the trilateral relationship will experience significant changes due to the uncertainty created by the messaging, let alone if the Trump administration ultimately implements some of the more concerning pledges, recommendations, and possible actions that the former president has hinted at.
Policy Recommendations
For more effective trilateral cooperation, institutionalization is essential. Consistency is key in diplomacy, as regular interactions ensure that cooperative efforts are sustained over time beyond the changes in political landscapes. Thus, creating formal mechanisms by initiating ministerial-level trilateral dialogues, consultative groups, and communication hotlines can provide a more structured platform for collaboration and coordination of policies.
It is also crucial to communicate actively with China, stating that these efforts are not aimed at creating a new bloc or containing China. By emphasizing that the India-South Korea-U.S. partnership is focused on common goals such as economic security, transnational threats, and emerging technology standards, the three nations can reduce misunderstandings and convey their actions as contributory to regional stability.
Though currently underexplored, the India-South Korea-U.S. trilateral presents a unique opportunity to enhance maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, a region critical to global trade and strategic stability. As the geopolitical and economic significance of the Indo-Pacific grows, securing vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and addressing threats such as piracy, illegal fishing, and other illicit activities has become a priority for these three nations. India, positioned at the heart of the Indian Ocean, plays a pivotal role in ensuring maritime safety and stability, while the United States and South Korea bring advanced naval capabilities and strategic expertise to the table. By working together, these countries can strengthen coordinated patrols, share intelligence, and improve capacity-building efforts for maritime domain awareness (MDA), ensuring that the Indian Ocean remains a free, open, and secure space for international commerce.
Conclusion
The India-South Korea-U.S. trilateral partnership holds the potential to influence the Indo-Pacific region’s future via military cooperation, green energy transitions, maritime security, and strategic cooperation on vital technologies. Even if the early efforts, such as the iCET and technology discussions, represent important turning points, this trilateral agreement has complex issues. These include differing perspectives on China, with the United States’ strategic competition posture contrasted with South Korea’s economic reliance on China and India’s non-alignment strategy. The course of trilateral cooperation may also be further complicated by prospective changes in U.S. policy in sectors like defense and trade cooperation, especially if the Trump administration returns.
But these difficulties are outweighed by the opportunities. The trilateral partnership can promote innovation, strengthen supply chain resilience, and uphold an Indo-Pacific rules-based order by formalizing regular dialogues, establishing formal mechanisms for cooperation, and highlighting common objectives like economic security, technological leadership, and maritime stability. By working together to handle transnational issues like illicit fishing, piracy, clean energy, and technological advancement, India, South Korea, and the United States can create a strong framework for regional peace and prosperity and pave the way for future collaboration.
Authors
Guest Author
SeungHwan (Shane) Kim
SeungHwan (Shane) Kim is currently an East Asia-focused researcher based in Washington, D.C., at the Korea Foundation and a research fellow at the Vanguard Think Tank. His works have been published in numerous publications, including the Diplomat, the National Interest, the East Asia Forum, the Asia Times, and the Pacific Forum.
Guest Author
Shubhankar Agarwal
Shubhankar Agarwal is currently an Indo-Pacific-focused researcher based in Washington, D.C.. He is a U.S.-Korea fellow researching economic policy and supply chain management at the Wilson Center. His works have been published in various publications and journals like AsiaMattersforAmerica, the International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research Review and Studies, the Journal of International Service, and the International Journal of Research, to name a few.
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14. Russian hybrid warfare's origins in Moldova
Russian hybrid warfare's origins in Moldova
https://www.counteroffensive.news/p/russian-hybrid-warfares-origins-in?r=7i07&utm
Tomorrow, Moldova holds a EU membership referendum. Russian hybrid warfare, now used in Ukraine, was first used there: over the fight for Transnistria. Now it's working overtime to oppose the EU.
Mariana Lastovyria
Oct 19, 2024
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In the Moldovan village of Corjova, disappearances began even before the Soviet Union's collapse.
Some victims were discovered at the bottom of a well, while others vanished on their way to work, never to return.
But everything changed on the night of March 2, 1992, when the village police station was brazenly attacked by separatists, who carved out their own state from Moldovan territory with the name of Transnistria.
“They said it was the Transnistrian Guard,” recalled war veteran Iurie Cotofan to The Counteroffensive. “But there were also Russian officers, paratroopers from the Russian army. The KGB was active there, along with military intelligence and counterintelligence units.”
A man crossing the border checkpoint from Transnistria to Moldova on March 10, 2015 in Corcieri, near Chisinau, Moldova. (Photo by Carsten Koall/Getty Images)
Iurie Cotofan, a proud Moldovan activist, reacted without hesitation. He went to the military enlistment office the very next day, where he received only equipment that would defend him from a chemical weapons attack. Throughout the war, he fought fiercely to defend his right to live in a free Moldova, battling both Transnistrian separatists and Russian forces within his own home country. Yet, three decades later, the separatist regime still persecutes him.
Tomorrow – on October 20 – Moldovans will vote in a referendum on whether to enshrine Moldova's path to EU membership in their constitution. If the majority votes for the EU, Moldova’s path toward European integration will become nearly irreversible. Even if a pro-Russian government takes power in the future, the constitutional mandate could make any renewed rapprochement with Russia significantly more difficult.
Moldova’s sharp turn toward Europe has alarmed Russia, which continues to lose influence in its former Soviet sphere. As a result, Moldova is now viewed by some as a potential next target for Putin's aggression, following the invasion of Ukraine.
In some ways, however, Moldova was the first country where Russia tested its hybrid warfare tactics after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 — strategies later deployed in its war against Ukraine.
Russian aggression in Moldova has not ceased, with some 1,500 Russian troops still occupying its territory, where they helped create the breakaway pseudo-state of Transnistria.
Moldovan veteran Iurie Cotofan. Screenshot from Zona de Securitate.
Iurie Cotofan knows all too well what Russian imperialism brought to his homeland — it still robs him of a peaceful life. His village, which belongs to Moldova, was effectively cut off from the capital Chisinau due to its location on the left bank of the Dniester River, where the pseudo-state of Transnistria was formed.
Screenshot of Corjova’s location.
“[The Russians] created a state for themselves, just like the “DPR” and “LPR” (Donetsk and Luhansk Public Republics — ed.) in Ukraine. We had the rehearsal. They tried it here, and it worked. Then came Georgia, and after the Maidan, to Ukraine,” Iurie Cotofan explained to The Counteroffensive.
For Transnistria's regime, Cotofan represents a threat. Over the last three decades, he has been kidnapped seven times and imprisoned in Transnistrian jails. He has been deported and barred from returning to his village for years.
One such imprisonment occurred in 2011 after Kotsofan and fellow veterans marched with a Moldovan tricolor.
“We were gassed,” he recalled. “I tasted bitterness — it was sarin, a chemical weapon. After we were released and taken to Chisinau, we were diagnosed with hepatitis.”
Moldovan veteran Iurie Cotofan. Screenshot from Zona de Securitate.
The path to European integration, in Cotofan’s opinion, is a way to finally separate from Russia. He is not alone in this view. The reforms of Moldova's pro-European leader, Maia Sandu, who has been in power since 2020, have greatly boosted support for the European path – in a country that, like Ukraine, had previously vacillated in its focus on Russia and the European Union.
Eugen Muravschi, an expert at an WatchDog.MD, an organization that analyzes Moldovan government policies, thinks that attitudes in the country have also been changed by visiting other countries abroad.
“People travel to Europe. They see that life is better there, that there is peace in Europe, there is prosperity in it. Europe is financing the repair of hospitals or kindergartens in Moldova. Russia has never done anything like this,” he said.
An advertisement for obtaining a visa to work in the European Union and Schengen zone on a wall near the central market on July 12, 2021 in Chisinau, Moldova. (Photo by Pierre Crom/Getty Images)
Consequently, Russia is gradually losing its grip on Moldova, a country it once considered a fraternal nation, and the Kremlin isn’t pleased.
Today, Russia has nearly exhausted its avenues for direct pressure on Moldova. Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moldova has blocked pro-Kremlin media channels, disconnected from the shared energy grid, and ceased buying Russian gas — long a tool of Moscow’s manipulation in the region.
However, Russia still wields a potent weapon: hybrid warfare. In recent years, Moscow has ramped up its use of propaganda and disinformation. According to Eugen Muravschi, one of the key narratives Moscow is now pushing is that joining the EU will lead Moldova to abandon its traditional and Christian values. They claim that ‘LGBT propaganda’ will infiltrate kindergartens and schools.
Orthodox Christian priest in a church in the Russia-backed and unrecognised Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic also known as Transnistria on August 16, 2017. (Photo by Pierre Crom/Getty Images)
Moscow is currently betting heavily on Moldovan-Israeli businessman Ilan Shor to help influence Moldovan politics. Sentenced to 15 years in prison for embezzling nearly 1 billion euros from a Moldovan bank, Shor fled to Russia in 2019. Now, he has orchestrated a corruption network in Moldova, funded by Russian money. Through this network, Russia is allegedly buying votes against the EU. The money is sent from a bank linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense or in cash smuggled into Moldova.
According to Moldovan police, using Shor, Russia has transferred over $15 million to the accounts of some 130,000 people. Members of this network are also involved in organizing paid protests and spreading pro-Russian propaganda against EU integration.
“They even have trained ‘sportsmen,’ tough guys, who in case of protest, can make some provocations,” Eugen Muravschi said to The Counteroffensive.
A protester holds a placard reading “Maia Sandu and EU- Poverty and cold in every home” in Chisinau October 12, 2024. (Photo by Daniel MIHAILESCU / AFP) (Photo by DANIEL MIHAILESCU/AFP via Getty Images)
On October 16, the Moldovan Foreign Ministry warned of possible attempts to organize illegal transportation of voters to polling stations set up in Russia. These efforts are seen as a way to undermine the legitimacy of the upcoming vote.
In total, Russia has reportedly spent about $108 million on disinformation campaigns and possible provocations to undermine the voting.
Iurie Cotofan does not believe that Russia will launch an open war against Moldova. After all, unlike in 1992, Russia cannot send additional military to Transnistria as it would require crossing Ukrainian territory. It is no longer an option amid the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine.
Two Russian soldiers block the street on a border checkpoint in on March 10, 2015 in Dubasari near Chisinau, Moldova. (Photo by Carsten Koall/Getty Images)
It's true that Russian vessels still have access to Moldova's Giurgiulesti ports, situated at the border between Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania. This could raise concerns about a repeat of the Crimean occupation on Moldovan soil. However, a full-fledged operation to seize territory would require much more than a single naval landing.
Cotofan remains undaunted by either the Russians or the Transnistrian regime. For him, there is no fear of those who are trying to take away the land where his ancestors are buried.
He is convinced that Moldova's future lies in Europe.
“We belong to the Romance group, alongside other European nations. We are located in Europe, just like Ukraine. So why not integrate into the EU?” Cotofan remarked.
Today, as Moldova mirrors Ukraine's path toward European integration — with both nations gaining EU candidate status in June 2022 — the risk of re-escalation, or at least provocation, from Russia looms large.
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NEWS OF THE DAY:
Good morning to readers; Kyiv remains in Ukrainian hands.
UKRAINE RETURNS 95 POWs: Overnight, Ukraine had 95 servicemen released from captivity, including Azov soldiers and human rights activist Maksym Butkevych, Zelenskyy said. Conscripts from the Kursk region were reportedly among those returned to Russia. This is the first time that Ukrainian POWs sentenced in Russia have been exchanged. According to the POW Coordination Headquarters, 28 of them were sentenced to long-term imprisonment and 20 to life imprisonment.
U.S. OFFERS $10 MLN FOR INFO ON RUSSIA MEDIA: The United States is offering a reward for information that can lead to the identification and location of employees of the Russian war blog Rybar. The outlet, with over 1.3 million subscribers, is accused of attempting to interfere in the U.S. election. Previously backed by now-deceased Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, Rybar also runs the social networks #HOLDTHELINE and #STANDWTHTEXAS, which are used to promote Russian political interests in the U.S.
Rybar is now sponsored by Rostec, a Russian state-owned defense corporation under U.S. sanctions since 2022. In response to Russian interference, the U.S. has announced new sanctions against the Kremlin's RT TV channel.
RUSSIA TO DISGUISE N. KOREAN TROOPS AS OWN: South Korea's president convened an emergency meeting due to North Korea's troop movements toward Russia. With the help of Russian transport ships, North Korea has already transferred 1,500 troops to its country.
According to South Korean intelligence, North Korea is expected to send a total of 12,000 troops, including members of elite units. The soldiers have reportedly used fake IDs to pose as locals. After completing their training, the North Korean troops are expected to be deployed to the front lines.
UKRAINE ATTACKS RUSSIAN ELECTRONIC PLANT: Kyiv has reportedly launched an attack on one of the largest microelectronics plants in Bryansk, Russia, according to The Kyiv Independent. The plant's products are used in the military industry, including in the development of air defense and ballistic missile systems. This marks the fourth time Ukraine has successfully targeted the facility.
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DOG OF WAR:
Today’s dog of war is Borys from the Kharkiv region. Oleksandr’s friends from the military often feed him since the dog lives near the frontline.
Stay safe out there.
Best,
Mariana
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JoelKS
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This is a remarkable, very helpful article that helps date the start of efforts to reconstitute the Russian empire back to 1992. Understanding this puts an entirely new light on subsequent events.
Also important is the revelation about Ilan Shor. As the West has started to recognize the connections between the bad actors of this world, especially Russia, Iran, and North Korea, Israel's position seems ambiguous. On the one hand, it is fighting and killing Russian allies in Hamas and Hezbollah. On the other hand, a) until 10/7/23 it was funding the Hamas government, b) its aggression outside of Israel consumes American weapons and attention that would be better devoted to Ukraine and Taiwan, and c) it has been remarkably parsimonious in assisting Ukraine. According to this article [1], as of January 2024, there was no Israeli assistance to Ukraine despite the terrible missile and drone attacks Ukrainian civilians have endured. The reasons given seem ... inadequate. As of this summer, they were *still* not sending Patriot missile batteries that they aren't using [2].
We need to understand whether Israel is fully an ally, is playing both sides of the fence, or is quietly assisting Russian objectives. At this point, their actions are ambiguous.
15. Who might make up Trump’s Cabinet
Go to the link for the proper formatting of this article: https://www.politico.com/interactives/2024/potential-cabinets/trump-second-term-cabinet/?utm
Who might make up Trump’s Cabinet
10/19/2024 05:00 AM EDT
Politico · by Natalie Allison
Former President Donald Trump, who is in the throes of a tight campaign, has not engaged in formal conversations about a potential Cabinet. But that hasn’t stopped him from spitballing potential contenders during his frequent plane rides to campaign events, or when he is impressed by one of his allies on television.
“He would be great at this,” or “She would be great at that,” Trump has said on recent occasions while watching surrogates on television, according to a person with knowledge of his comments who was granted anonymity to speak freely. And like with his monthslong search for a running mate, the TV circuit has become an important venue for the aggressive jockeying underway by allies eager to secure a Cabinet job. Some candidates for the Cabinet have even hired their own public relations teams.
Trump’s potential second-term picks will likely have to get through tight Senate margins, even if Republicans take back the majority. His first Cabinet was confirmed at a slow pace, due to Democrats slow-walking the process, only to see high turnover in those top jobs during his four years in office.
Despite all the chatter, the Trump campaign said Trump isn’t touching the issue yet.
“There have been no discussions about who will serve in a second Trump administration,” said his press secretary, Karoline Leavitt. “President Trump is focused on winning the election and when he does, he will then choose the best people to help him make America great again.”
This is POLITICO’s snapshot of the leading contenders for Trump’s top jobs.
Secretary of State
Trump’s first term demonstrated how secretaries of State can crumble — or thrive — as the nation’s top foreign policy official.
Trump had a frosty relationship with his first secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, slowly shutting him out of U.S. policymaking before firing him in front of the world on social media. But Tillerson’s replacement, Mike Pompeo, became one of Trump’s most trusted advisers and one who could find another job in a second administration.
Trump’s pick for secretary of State will be closely watched across Europe after years of his taunts about distancing the U.S. from NATO and his eagerness to wind down military support for Ukraine. It will also serve as a measure of how much power the Russia hawks in the GOP still have.
Ric Grenell
Grenell, a blunt and outspoken MAGA advocate, emerged from the Trump administration as one of the former president’s top diplomatic prizefighters. He served as U.S. ambassador to Germany, where he roiled the German diplomatic establishment, and then served as acting director of national intelligence — becoming the first openly gay Cabinet secretary in U.S. history. He has cemented himself as one of the most influential advisers on foreign policy issues in Trump’s orbit — Trump refers to him as “my envoy” — and many GOP experts consider him to be a top contender for either secretary of State or national security adviser if Trump wins the White House. Right now, he’s a senior adviser to the Protecting America Initiative, a nonprofit focused on combating the influence of the Chinese government.
Bill Hagerty
The Tennessee senator is one of the establishment Republicans who turned to the MAGA movement after Trump won in 2016. A George W. Bush administration veteran and early supporter of Jeb Bush, Hagerty went on to serve as Trump’s ambassador to Japan before running for Senate in 2020. In the Senate, Hagerty has used his position on the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee to stake out a reputation as a staunch China hawk. He was also among a small number of senators who voted against the national security aid package passed earlier this year with increased funding for Ukraine. He said at the time it was because the package failed to address border security.
Robert O’Brien
O’Brien stands out as the only one of Trump’s four national security advisers who hasn’t had a high-profile falling out with the former president. O’Brien served as Trump’s special envoy for hostage affairs from 2018 to 2019, where he entered the MAGA spotlight in a bizarre chapter of Trump-era diplomacy: He helped free U.S. rapper A$AP Rocky from Swedish custody after an alleged brawl in Stockholm. (Trump intervened in the case, reportedly threatening a trade war with Sweden over the matter.) O’Brien would be welcomed in Brussels and Kyiv and is seen as a big supporter of NATO and Ukraine in the Republican Party.
Marco Rubio
Rubio is a former Trump opponent-turned-supporter with hardline views on many foreign policy issues, especially Cuba and Iran. Still, the Florida senator worked with Democrats on legislation that makes it harder for Trump to quit NATO. He has also tried to seem supportive of Ukraine without breaking entirely with Trump’s position that Kyiv must negotiate with Moscow to end the war. Rubio would likely earn enough Democratic votes to get Senate confirmation. The big question is whether Trump would see him as too weak to be America’s chief diplomat. When Rubio ran against Trump for president in 2016, Trump derided him as “Little Marco.”
Mike Waltz
Waltz, a U.S. Army veteran and former Green Beret, is one of the most strident China hawks in Congress and has supported U.S. aid to Ukraine while seeking to boost oversight of taxpayer funding for Kyiv’s war efforts. He was also at the vanguard of the Republican backlash over President Joe Biden’s botched Afghanistan withdrawal. Waltz, a Florida representative, has emerged in GOP circles as a potential contender for a top national security post in a second Trump term, including secretary of State, secretary of Defense or a senior intelligence agency posting.
Treasury Secretary
Voters care about few things more than the economy, and Trump’s pick for Treasury secretary would be advancing an agenda that shapes an issue central to his legacy.
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin proved to be among Trump’s most durable Cabinet secretaries in an administration marred by frequent turnover in the top jobs.
But regardless of who wins, the next secretary will steer the administration through key fiscal battles set to dominate Washington in the coming year: a potentially bruising debt ceiling fight and negotiations over the expiring 2017 Republican tax law.
Trump’s next picks for Treasury secretary and other key economic posts will be closely watched for whether he might advance any of the populist ideas he espoused during the campaign — such as a new suite of tariffs of 20 percent on most imports — or govern as a more traditional, business-friendly Republican.
Business leaders, Wall Street executives and congressional Republicans have embraced Trump’s calls to slash regulations and taxes on companies, even as they disagree with his protectionist trade policies.
Howard Lutnick
Lutnick leads the investment firm Cantor Fitzgerald and was personally tapped by Trump to lead his transition alongside Linda McMahon. Trump is close with Lutnick, who once appeared on “The Apprentice,” has given more than $10 million to the former president’s campaign and has raised more than $75 million for the campaign overall.
Robert Lighthizer
As Trump’s top trade official during his first term, Lighthizer helped upend global trade and Republican orthodoxy on the issue. Lighthizer has remained close with Trump and is widely seen as a leading contender for a top economic post, especially as Trump vows to go even bigger on tariffs in a second term.
Jay Clayton
Clayton, a veteran Wall Street and corporate lawyer, was Trump’s chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission during his term. He was confirmed by the Senate on a 61-37 vote in 2017.
Larry Kudlow
The longtime TV financial analyst was director of Trump’s National Economic Council and a major face of the White House’s economic response to Covid. Kudlow has since served as vice chair of America First Policy Institute, an outside group set up to promote Trump’s policies and prepare for a second administration.
John Paulson
The prominent billionaire financier is a Trump ally and has backed him since 2016. Bloomberg reported earlier this year that Trump had floated Paulson in private conversations as a potential Treasury secretary in a second-term Cabinet.
Scott Bessent
The hedge fund manager and Trump fundraiser who has been an unofficial adviser to the campaign is widely seen as in the mix for a Cabinet position. Trump has publicly praised Bessent’s Wall Street prognostications, and he’s also an ally of JD Vance.
Bill Hagerty
Like Lighthizer, the Tennessee senator is one of the rare Trump administration figures to still be close to his old boss and enjoys respect from both parties on Capitol Hill. The Tennessean was held in high regard for his work as ambassador to Japan under Trump, where he helped negotiate an updated trade deal with Tokyo and smoothed over Trump’s foreign policy declarations for one of the U.S.’s closest allies. He is a frontrunner for a number of Cabinet posts, from USTR to Commerce, State or even Treasury, and would be likely to win confirmation to any of them.
If
Harris
wins?
Here's how her Cabinet might look
Defense Secretary
The secretary of Defense under Trump will need to spend time defending his mostly isolationist worldview against the national security establishment and the department’s 2 million-plus employees.
It’s also a role where loyalty will be important since the person in the job must be persuasive with the public and members of both parties.
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, once a darling within Trump’s Cabinet, quietly broke with the president on a range of strategic decisions, ranging from Trump’s desire for a Space Force, a ban on transgender servicemembers and deploying thousands of troops to the U.S.-Mexico border. When he ultimately announced his resignation in 2018, he did so by publicly disagreeing with Trump’s decision to withdraw troops from Syria.
Mattis later criticized Trump’s decision to deploy the U.S. military to police American streets after George Floyd’s murder in 2020, saying the administration was making a “mockery of the Constitution.”
Trump has subsequently expressed anger at Mattis and his replacement, Mark Esper, who he says didn’t follow his policy directives. As a result, he’ll likely look for someone who he knows beforehand will be committed to rolling back things like Biden-era personnel policies centered on promoting racial and gender diversity in the armed forces.
Mike Waltz
The retired National Guard Special Forces colonel, with experience in the Pentagon and the White House, has been a Trump adviser on national security issues and said he is open to becoming Defense secretary. Elected to the House representing Florida in 2018, Waltz is the first Green Beret to serve in Congress. He embodies two qualities Trump values: media presence and loyalty. The frequent Fox News guest has defended Trump on key issues, including his stance on Ukraine, allegations of political activities at Arlington National Cemetery and charges related to hush money paid to a porn actor.
Tom Cotton
The Arkansas senator was under consideration to be Trump’s first Defense secretary before retired Gen. Jim Mattis was ultimately picked. A former Army infantry officer and veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, Cotton was an early Trump supporter and advised him during his presidency. As a sharp-tongued member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Cotton recently hinted how he’d lead when he called for a more robust and innovative Pentagon at a think tank event in September.
Mike Pompeo
Pompeo, a former House member and West Point graduate, was a fixture in national security policy during Trump's presidency as head of the CIA and later as secretary of State. Though he weighed a presidential bid of his own in 2024, Pompeo has been a reliable defender of Trump and advocate of his foreign policy.
Strong support for Israel and a harder line on Iran were hallmarks of Pompeo's tenure at the State Department and would likely be key to a Pompeo-led Pentagon. Many Democrats would oppose the conservative if he's tapped for the job, but he would likely be confirmed by a GOP-led Senate.
Attorney General
Picking the nation’s next attorney general will likely be one of Trump’s biggest prizes in winning back the White House. The attorney general will have the power to help Trump accomplish two of his top legal objectives: getting rid of the federal criminal cases against him and prosecuting his enemies.
If Trump retakes the presidency, he will be facing one active federal criminal prosecution and a separate dismissed federal criminal case that special counsel Jack Smith is seeking to reinstate. One of Trump’s first acts of business is sure to be ordering his Justice Department to make sure both of these cases come to an end.
Trump is also charged in a state-level criminal case in Georgia and is due to be sentenced for his hush-money conviction in Manhattan. While the attorney general won’t oversee those matters, it’s almost certain the cases would be put on hold until after Trump leaves office.
Trump has spoken frequently about his other objective: using the Justice Department to exact revenge on his perceived enemies.
Jeff Clark
Clark is perhaps best known for carrying out a pressure campaign to try to prompt Justice Department officials to prevent the transfer of power after Trump lost the 2020 election. For that, a disciplinary panel has recommended Clark’s law license be suspended for two years, and he has been indicted alongside Trump in Georgia for trying to overturn the election results. Nevertheless, Clark’s loyalty and deference make him widely considered to be a candidate for a top Justice Department job in a second Trump administration. He briefly served as acting assistant attorney general for the Justice Department’s civil division. He’s now a senior fellow and litigation director at the Center for Renewing America, a conservative Washington-based think tank.
Mike Lee
Initially a Trump skeptic, the Utah lawmaker has become one of Trump’s most prominent allies in the Senate. The former president has considered elevating Lee before. In 2018, Trump interviewed Lee about joining Samuel Alito, whom Lee once clerked for on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, on the Supreme Court. Lee also worked to advance schemes to help keep Trump in power following the 2020 election and has been a vocal critic of the criminal cases against Trump. Those close to Trump believe Lee would be a highly desirable choice for attorney general — and Lee is someone who could plausibly win Senate confirmation.
John Ratcliffe
One of Trump’s staunchest allies, Ratcliffe earned the former president’s admiration during the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election, when the then-Texas representative became one of the sharpest critics of Robert Mueller’s probe. Questions about whether he had embellished his resume scuttled his bid to become the country’s top intelligence official the first time Trump nominated him in 2019, but Ratcliffe ultimately won Senate confirmation for the job the following year. Ratcliffe was believed to have used the post to carry out Trump’s political agenda — precisely the type of performance that could help him win a Cabinet job during a second Trump administration. He is the co-chair of the Center for American Security at the America First Policy Institute, a Trump-aligned think tank.
Interior Secretary
The Interior Department manages nearly every acre of public land in the country — and when he was president, Trump steered it toward fossil fuel production almost to the exclusion of everything else.
Two of the agency’s responsibilities fall in line with Trump’s promise to “drill, baby, drill”: It sets safety standards for offshore oil rigs and leases out land for oil, natural gas and coal development.
Under Trump, Interior sought to roll back rules on rig safety, climate change and Endangered Species Act protections in attempts to make things as easy as possible for oil companies to drill on public land. With Trump’s most recent talk of oil being “liquid gold” and that crude production would be four or five times higher under him than Biden, expect the former president to look for new ways to remove regulatory speedbumps the current administration has put in place.
Trump’s love of energy has not extended to renewables. Whoever he selects to run the agency is likely to scale back or end many of the Biden efforts to set up vast wind farms off the East Coast and other renewables on public lands.
Given how vast public land is in the West, one common thread through most Interior secretaries — including Trump’s — is that they hail from states that side of the Mississippi.
Doug Burgum
The North Dakota governor was floated as a potential Trump pick for vice president or Interior secretary earlier in the year, and his job as an energy-state governor puts him in a good position for the job. North Dakota is the third-largest oil-producing state in the country and also has more than 4 million acres under federal oversight. Burgum himself has heaped praise on Harold Hamm, the executive chair of oil company Continental Resources who has been an informal energy adviser to Trump. But Burgum seems to be hoping for a post with a bigger profile, such as secretary of State.
Katharine MacGregor
MacGregor, who once worked for then-Reps. Thelma Drake (R-Va.) and Eric Cantor (R-Va.) and as a staffer on the House Natural Resources Committee, served as the Interior Department’s No. 2 under Trump. She has also been praised as an “adult in the room” who could go back in for a second Trump administration. She is NextEra Energy’s vice president of environmental services.
Cynthia Lummis
Lummis interviewed — and was passed over — twice for the top Interior job during the Trump administration. The Wyoming senator is no longer eyeing the position, she told E&E News in June, although her work on public lands might make her a good fit. She has moved from the House to the Senate since she last vied for the secretary job and currently sits on the Environment and Public Works Committee and chairs the Senate Western Caucus. Recently, though, she has drawn attention on the Hill for her leadership on cryptocurrency, potentially signaling a shift away from Interior-aligned ambitions.
David Bernhardt
Bernhardt, Trump’s second Interior secretary, has been said to be interested in joining a second Trump administration, but where he lands is unclear. While he could slot back into his old job as secretary, people familiar with his thinking say Bernhardt would prefer to run the Office of Management and Budget. He is the co-chair of the Center for American Freedom at the America First Policy Institute, a Trump-aligned think tank.
Agriculture Secretary
The Agriculture Department is the Cabinet agency with the strongest connection to Trump-dominated rural America and the farm communities that are often struggling to compete with global conglomerates.
This post shapes everything from farm subsidies at home and food deliveries abroad to school lunches and hunger programs for more than 50 million low-income Americans.
Candidates for the job tend to come from the Midwest (a box Indiana’s Kip Tom or Ted McKinney would check) or the South. The agency also directs millions of dollars every year into rural areas for economic development.
But in recent years, Republicans on Capitol Hill have grown more intent on trimming back food programs like SNAP that is a political lightning rod in particular for urban-centered Democrats.
Sid Miller
Trump has discussed Miller as someone he’s considering for USDA chief. The MAGA loyalist is a former rodeo cowboy turned bomb-throwing Texas agriculture commissioner (who notes he still does participate in rodeos at the age of 69). Miller has also battled with agriculture interests and threatened to “hunt” moderate “RINO” Republicans.
It’s unclear if Miller could gain Senate approval for such a role. He has also openly clashed with Republicans and his GOP Gov. Greg Abbott. When Miller tweeted and then quickly deleted an obscene post in 2016 about Hillary Clinton, Abbott condemned Miller, saying his language was “reprehensible” and “an embarrassment.”
Kip Tom
Tom is the current co-chair of the Farmers and Ranchers for Trump group and potentially in the mix as a possible USDA chief or senior official. In an interview with POLITICO earlier this year, he suggested Trump officials could seek to claw back some of the billions of dollars in funding congressional Democrats and Biden’s USDA have budgeted for “climate-smart” agriculture programs.
Ted McKinney
McKinney has privately made clear he wants the top USDA job, but he’s not actively campaigning for it like some other Republicans. He served as Trump’s Agriculture undersecretary for trade and foreign agricultural affairs and currently leads the nonpartisan group of all 50 state agriculture chiefs.
Some blue-state agriculture chiefs allege that McKinney is allowing politics to seep into NASDA’s work as he angles for a top spot in a Trump USDA. McKinney would be a more mainstream pick than Miller. He may seek to temper Trump’s push to slap new, broad tariffs on Beijing, given the backlash that would draw from U.S. farmers.
Commerce Secretary
The Commerce Department is the hodgepodge of agencies ranging from business development to economic sanctions, tariffs and the census. While typically a low-profile, workhorse agency, Trump elevated it to help implement his new-look trade policy.
Under its Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce played a central role in setting economic sanctions and trade restrictions against foreign nations. The secretary of Commerce has been tasked with advancing U.S. trade interests abroad, a core part of Trump’s “America First” economic message. Under Trump, the agency was also key to enacting tariffs on steel and aluminum that hit allies and adversaries alike, and an ill-fated attempt to alter the U.S. Census.
Under the Biden administration, Secretary Gina Raimondo has pivoted the agency back toward allies, playing a key role in negotiating three of the four sections of its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, setting new investment networks and voluntary labor and environmental standards for U.S. trading partners in South Asia. But she has continued weaponizing the agency against China, Russia and other adversaries through sanctions and trade restrictions at BIS — efforts likely to escalate no matter who wins the White House.
Robert Lighthizer
Lighthizer is one of the few Cabinet officials from Trump’s first term who has managed to stay in the former president’s good graces while also enjoying a warm reception from both parties on Capitol Hill. The former trade chief led some of Trump’s most durable achievements, like tariffs on China and a renegotiated NAFTA deal, and would be all but assured to be confirmed by the Senate. After serving as Trump’s top trade official, those close to him say Lightizer would prefer a higher profile role, preferably Treasury secretary.
Linda McMahon
McMahon served as Trump’s head of the Small Business Administration. When she stepped down in 2019, she moved to lead America First Action, a pro-Trump super PAC. McMahon and her husband, Vince McMahon, were the forces behind transforming World Wrestling Entertainment from a small business into a multibillion-dollar enterprise. McMahon is a personal friend and donor to Trump and Republicans, who ran unsuccessfully for Senate in Connecticut more than a decade ago. After leaving the Trump administration, McMahon played a key role in creating the conservative America First Policy Institute, a think tank composed of top figures from the Trump administration, and is now helping build out Trump’s transition. McMahon is co-chair of Trump’s transition.
Bill Hagerty
Like Lighthizer, Hagerty is one of the rare Trump administration figures to still be close to his old boss and enjoy respect from both parties on Capitol Hill. The Tennessean, known for his directness, was held in high regard for his work as ambassador to Japan under Trump, where he helped negotiate an updated trade deal with Tokyo and smoothed over Trump’s chaotic foreign policy declarations for one of the U.S.’s closest allies. He is a frontrunner for a number of Cabinet posts, from USTR to Commerce, State or even Treasury, and would be likely to win confirmation to any of them.
Labor Secretary
The Labor Department is rife with targets for a Republican administration, so the mission for any Trump pick is straightforward: undo Biden’s myriad new labor regulations — particularly those that shifted power to labor unions.
It’s an agenda that would undercut organized labor’s gains under Biden, but one that hasn’t deterred the Trump supporters among rank-and-file union members.
Yet, it was also a political minefield for Trump the first time around.
His first choice for the top job at the agency — fast food executive Andrew Puzder — withdrew from consideration less than a month into Trump’s term after POLITICO reported on past allegations of domestic abuse (which he denied).
Trump then turned to Alexander Acosta, who was ultimately forced out in 2019 after losing the president’s trust amid renewed scrutiny of how the former prosecutor handled well-connected sex offender Jeffrey Epstein’s case during his time as a U.S. attorney in Florida. Trump’s third Labor secretary was Eugene Scalia, a management-side labor attorney and son of the late Supreme Court justice, who was comparatively drama-free and executed on the administration’s business-friendly regulatory agenda after Acosta’s resignation.
The role is not typically a coveted Cabinet spot in Republican administrations, though it could appeal to a business-minded candidate who misses out on agencies like Treasury or the SEC.
Patrick Pizzella
An affable figure who is well-known to business groups and conservatives — and disliked by unions — Pizzella served as deputy Labor Secretary through the end of the Trump administration in January 2021 and led DOL in an acting capacity in between Acosta’s resignation and Scalia’s confirmation. Since then he was elected mayor of Pinehurst, North Carolina, a golf haven that could appeal to the famously links-loving Trump.
Bryan Slater
George “Bryan” Slater is a known quantity in Republican circles in both Washington and beyond. Prior to serving as Virginia Gov. Glenn Youngkin’s Labor secretary, he was a Trump hand at the Transportation Department before working as assistant secretary at the Labor Department later in the administration. He also served as a labor liaison in the George W. Bush White House. However, picking an unflashy bureaucrat could be a tough sell to Trump, who may instead be drawn to a more TV-ready pick like Youngkin himself or another businessperson-turned-governor like North Dakota Gov. Doug Bergum.
Health and Human Services Secretary
What Trump seeks in an HHS secretary varies — and is at times contradictory — according to officials from his first administration.
Trump might want an HHS leader who has significant leadership experience, executive presence and a strong will to bring one of the largest federal agencies to heel. But he might also opt for a secretary with deep institutional knowledge of the agency itself and the ability to effectively move policy and fly under the radar for the Senate confirmation process.
Finding someone with a blend of those qualities — and who is both deeply loyal without being a pushover — could prove difficult. And a Trump-appointed HHS secretary could be key to using federal leverage to reduce abortion access or change how the Affordable Care Act is implemented.
Deciding how to balance those skills could depend on the kinds of policies Trump ultimately settles on, and which policy battles will consume most of a potential administration’s energy.
Bobby Jindal
Jindal, a former Louisiana governor and representative, is now chair of the Center for a Healthy America, a wing of the Trump-aligned America First Policy Institute, where he has argued for Affordable Care Act reforms and new price transparency measures. Jindal’s new focus on health policy — as well as having held leadership roles — could boost a nomination to lead HHS. And his record running a state government could help him argue that he is equipped to lead one of the federal government’s largest agencies.
Jindal, who was previously considered a top contender to lead HHS, has health sector and regulatory experience as well. He was assistant secretary of HHS under former President George W. Bush and he was executive director of the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare.
Brian Blase
Blase was special assistant to Trump for economic policy and now leads the Paragon Health Institute, a Virginia-based think tank that has churned out research and policy recommendations and that has become a leading voice in conservative health policy, especially emphasizing the need to reduce overpayments and stop what he sees as unnecessary government subsidies in the system.
Eric Hargan
Hargan served as deputy secretary of HHS for most of the Trump administration and acted in the same role under President George W. Bush. He’s a name often brought up among insiders in conversations about health care in a potential second Trump administration. He can point to successes in Operation Warp Speed — bringing Covid-19 vaccines to market in less than a year — and has launched a health care consulting group, the Hargan Group. He also has been a major proponent of telehealth and other health tech issues, including data sharing.
Paul Mango
Mango served as deputy chief of staff at HHS during the Trump administration and was key in leading Operation Warp Speed in the early days of the pandemic. He is a public adviser at the Paragon Health Institute, a conservative think tank.
Mango also worked in HHS on transparency and interoperability. Previously, he was chief principal deputy administrator and chief of staff at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in the Trump administration. Before that, he ran for governor in Pennsylvania. His deep understanding of the agency could bode well for his chances of nomination, particularly for a Trump administration looking to move more quickly on policy than it did in its first term.
Joe Grogan
Grogan served as assistant to the president and director of the Domestic Policy Council in the Trump administration. He also served on the White House Covid-19 task force in the early days of the pandemic. He was previously associate director for health policy at OMB and, before that, special assistant to the FDA commissioner in the George W. Bush administration.
Housing and Urban Development Secretary
Trump’s campaign-trail concern about rising housing costs isn’t likely to temper the kind of hostility the Department of Housing and Urban Development faced during his first administration.
The agency has a $70 billion budget and roughly 8,000 employees — two things Trump and Ben Carson, his HUD secretary, sought to wear down.
Carson faced criticism from Democrats about his family’s involvement in the agency’s operations, his relative lack of knowledge about its mission and his eagerness to cut its budget. But the biggest policy whiplash among Barack Obama, Trump and Biden has been over the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing rule, the agency’s most public fight.
The rule would require states and localities to track and address patterns of residential segregation to receive federal funding as part of a broader agenda to narrow the racial wealth gap and improve racial equity. It eventually became something Trump latched onto during the 2020 campaign as evidence that Democrats wanted to “abolish the suburbs,” before scrapping the rule entirely that year.
Biden officials proposed an updated version of the Obama-era regulation early last year, but it’s unlikely to be finalized unless Democratic nominee Kamala Harris wins in November.
Ben Carson
Believe it or not, the former neurosurgeon-turned-HUD-secretary could be back in the mix, according to housing lobbyists, who note that Carson has always spoken quite highly of Trump. Carson pursued an agenda to ease local barriers to housing before reversing his views in the summer of 2020, when Trump warned that Democrats were going to “war on the suburbs.” He now heads the American Cornerstone Institute, a Washington-based nonprofit he founded to promote conservative principles.
Tim Scott
The South Carolina senator, and top Republican on the Senate Banking Committee, says he’s “probably better off” remaining in Congress than going to work on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. But never say never. Scott has been a reliable campaign surrogate for Trump this year, worked with the Trump administration to establish Opportunity Zones to encourage investment in distressed areas, and he recently released a sweeping housing plan.
Brian Montgomery
Montgomery served as the deputy secretary of HUD and as the Federal Housing Administration commissioner during the Trump administration.
Transportation Secretary
In many ways, the Transportation secretary is a great post for a politician: It’s filled with ribbon-cuttings and doling out millions of dollars for roads, bridges and transit.
Trump’s first DOT secretary, Elaine Chao, previously served as George W. Bush’s Labor secretary and brought gravitas and ties to Washington’s established political machine into the Cabinet when much about how Trump might govern was uncertain.
A Trump pick this time around is likely to have a mandate to cut spending and claw back some of the $1.2 trillion handed out by Biden under the 2021 infrastructure law — especially for climate-focused initiatives like EV charging and equity initiatives like tearing down highways that have divided poor, often minority, communities. Trump’s next potential Transportation chief will be expected to focus taxpayer money on “hard” infrastructure like roads and highways instead of equity programs or transit.
Garret Graves
Graves, a senior lawmaker on the House Transportation Committee, will end his tenure in Congress by year’s end after being edged out by an unfavorable redistricting draw. It may come just in time for a turn atop DOT, especially since Graves has already been having informal talks with Trump’s transition team about transportation issues. As chair of the subcommittee in charge of aviation, the Louisiana lawmaker is intimately familiar with air safety, one of the department’s most important mandates. And he’s also regularly taken aim at the big spending laws that form the backbone of Biden’s climate agenda.
Sam Graves
Graves, who has been the top Republican on the Transportation Committee for almost a decade, is steeped in transportation policy experience and even holds a special class of pilot’s license that would allow him to fly a commercial airplane. The Missouri lawmaker is respected on Capitol Hill and has worked across the aisle to push major bills through to enactment and would lend immediate credibility to any Trump initiative. Graves, who has spent much of his career in Congress deeply involved in transportation issues, will have to give up his gavel at the end of the year, though, unless his long-shot quest for a waiver of his party’s committee rules is successful.
Energy Secretary
The Energy secretary under Trump would serve as a measure of his commitment to the fossil fuel industry.
The agency’s core responsibilities include maintaining the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, regulating everyday appliances, managing the 17 national labs and cleaning up Cold War-era radioactive waste. Over the past 15 years, however, it’s also become a massive engine for doling out billions of dollars in grants and loans to quicken the transition to low-carbon power — making it a regular target for Republicans.
Trump, who has called climate change a “hoax,” is promising to claw back any unspent money Biden secured in the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act and could potentially slow down the pace of loans and grant-making.
If he really wants to pull a large amount of the money, Trump’s Energy secretary will need the political or technical savvy to navigate around members of his own party who are seeing the funds land in their districts.
Doug Burgum
The North Dakota governor’s name has already emerged for a role in a next Trump administration — even by the former president himself — since he ran an energy-focused presidential campaign in the GOP primary. Burgum “probably knows more about energy than anybody I know,” Trump said at a rally earlier this year.
As governor, Burgum embraced carbon capture technology without restricting oil and natural gas drilling, and as a Trump campaign surrogate, echoes criticism of Biden’s climate policies. Burgum, who is not seeking a third term, opened remarks at the RNC this year by focusing on American energy dominance. Allies have also floated him as “energy czar” within the Trump administration, but Burgum seems to be hoping for a post with a bigger profile, such as secretary of State.
Mark Menezes
Menezes served in DOE’s leadership during Trump’s first term, and his current job as president and CEO of the U.S. Energy Association has him representing companies across the sector. He is the founder of Global Sustainable Energy Advisors LLC, a strategic advisory firm to energy, technology and defense organizations, and teaches courses on energy law, policy and climate change at Georgetown Law School as an adjunct professor.
He held executive positions at Berkshire Hathaway Energy and American Electric Power, and he worked as chief counsel of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. He was also a partner at Hunton & Williams.
Paul Dabbar
After his role in the previous Trump administration, where he managed the majority of the national labs and the commercialization of technologies, Dabbar has taken his skills to the private sector.
His current company, Quantum Technologies, is focused on the emerging quantum internet, and he’s been outspoken about artificial intelligence’s role in the energy sector — an increasingly significant area of focus for the department. Dabbar is also a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
Education Secretary
Trump has pledged to disband the Education Department if he becomes president again — no different than most Republicans since Ronald Reagan.
Despite how the GOP often treats the agency as a backwater, billionaire philanthropist Betsy DeVos made use of it as Trump’s Education secretary. She wielded it to relax rules that targeted for-profit colleges and to boost defenses for those accused of sexual misconduct on school grounds. But the position is likely far more appealing than it was at the outset of Trump’s first term now that conservatives — especially Virginia Gov. Glenn Youngkin — have seen political success in attacking diversity, equity and inclusion programs.
It’s a role Trump could use to agitate teachers unions, some of the nation’s largest labor organizations and among the most loyal to Democrats. A Trump-led Education Department is also certain to abandon Biden’s student debt relief agenda and reverse Democratic efforts to rewrite DeVos’ sexual misconduct and expand discrimination protections for transgender students.
Betsy DeVos
DeVos, who served in the role during Trump’s first term, drew attention for being a Cabinet member calling to abolish her own agency. She also codified new sexual misconduct guidelines under the federal Title IX law, rallied support for school choice and remains active on education policy.
Once a key surrogate for Trump, their relationship frayed when DeVos resigned from her post after the Jan. 6, 2021, riots at the Capitol. But the billionaire philanthropist now has support from some GOP lawmakers who say they want Trump to pick her or someone like her, largely for her proposal on school choice tax credits. DeVos has said she isn’t expecting a call from Trump, but she’s open to returning.
Ryan Walters
Trump has said some encouraging words about Oklahoma’s state schools superintendent, a young elected official with a talent for self-promotion and an attraction to controversy. Walters has described teacher unions as Marxist terrorist organizations. He appointed a far-right social media star to a state library committee months after her criticism of a Tulsa school librarian's video sparked bomb threats. Local superintendents are defying his demands to incorporate the Bible and Ten Commandments into school curriculum.
Glenn Youngkin
The Virginia governor built his campaign around education issues, tapping into a burgeoning parental rights movement led by suburban moms. He helped popularize calls by Republicans to end diversity, equity and inclusion topics in schools. As governor he signed executive orders to ban what he labeled “divisive concepts” in classrooms.
Youngkin will be out of a job in 2026 due to state term limits. Some Trump allies suggest he may find his way into a second Trump administration. He appears to be leaning into the possibility as a Trump surrogate for Virginia’s suburban swing voters.
Tiffany Justice
Justice served on a Florida school board for four years before she co-founded Moms For Liberty, a fast-growing conservative education group. She helped start the organization in 2021 amid frustration about Covid-19 school closures and mask mandates. The group is known for its efforts to restrict certain books in schools, especially those with LGBTQ+ themes. It also has applauded Trump for expressing a desire to abolish the Education Department.
Justice told POLITICO in August that she would be interested in the post.
Veterans Affairs Secretary
Whoever gets tapped to run the VA — the country’s largest integrated health system — needs a strong sense of purpose and a thick political skin.
David Shulkin, Trump's first VA secretary, was fired by tweet in 2018 after controversy over a taxpayer-funded trip to Europe stemming from a watchdog report Shulkin called inaccurate.
Trump then nominated White House physician Ronny Jackson, who withdrew his nomination after allegations he created a toxic work environment and drunkenly wrecked a car while serving in the federal government. Jackson, now a Republican representative from Texas, denied the allegations. Robert Wilkie replaced him, got confirmed and served in the role for the rest of the administration, putting him in contention to take the job again.
It often doesn’t take long before addressing the health care needs of millions of military veterans puts a spotlight on many of the VA’s failings over the years, creating ready fodder for lawmakers in both parties.
The latest high-profile concern is the financial strain stemming from a bipartisan 2022 law expanding benefits for veterans exposed to Agent Orange and other toxins. That’s made the agency responsible for the care of more veterans than ever, and billions of dollars in shortfalls.
A Trump VA would also be expected to reverse a Biden policy that allows the agency to provide abortion counseling and, in some cases, the procedure itself, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Dobbs decision.
Robert Wilkie
Wilkie served in the U.S. Navy Reserve and began his career on Capitol Hill as an aide to then-Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Rep. David Funderburk (R-N.C.). He served in top national security roles in the George W. Bush administration and was a senior adviser to then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.
As secretary, Wilkie helped implement legislation expanding access to care outside of the VA. He ultimately signed the deal with Cerner to lead the electronic health records project as acting VA secretary. He’s a distinguished fellow at the Center for American Security at the America First Policy Institute, a Trump-aligned think tank.
Matt Rosendale
Rosendale, a staunch conservative representing Montana in the House since 2021, is not seeking reelection and has been floated as a potential pick to lead the VA in a second Trump administration. He briefly entered a Senate race, abandoned it and then withdrew from the House race amid allegations that he left the Senate race because he impregnated a staffer. His office strongly contested those claims and vowed legal action.
The Freedom Caucus member serves on the House Veterans Affairs Committee and chairs its subcommittee on technology modernization, where he’s been a critic of the Biden administration.
Homeland Security Secretary
Immigration has been a driving force of all three Trump campaigns for the White House, and no part of the government intersects with it more than the Department of Homeland Security.
As president, Trump regularly pressed his DHS officials for statistics on deportations and illegal border crossings. His emphasis on security at the southwest border sometimes irritated senior department officials, as their remit is much broader. But since Trump’s time in office, immigration has become a politically promising issue for him: A recent poll showed that swing-state voters, by 12 percentage points, believe he’s more likely to improve the immigration system.
That means Trump’s DHS head would have significant power and face-time with the president –– as well as his intense scrutiny. The former president has called for dramatically increasing deportations and immigrant detention, as well as a hiring spree for the border patrol.
Another challenge will be advancing Trump’s immigration agenda without losing sight of the rest of DHS’s sprawling mission, which includes cybersecurity, counterterrorism, domestic extremism and disaster response.
Mark Morgan
The acting head of Customs and Border Protection at the end of the Trump administration, Morgan won Trump’s trust for leaning hard into his focus on the southwest border. His experience handling immigration and law enforcement is extensive, including many years in the FBI. Obama appointed him as head of Border Patrol in 2016, and he was removed when Trump became president. But Trump later installed him at Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and then Customs and Border Protection. Morgan won Trump’s favor in part for pugilistic media appearances. He’s a visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation.
Thomas Homan
Homan spent his career in immigration enforcement, holding senior positions in Immigration and Customs Enforcement during both the Obama and Trump administrations. Under Trump, he supported the family separation policy, arguing it would deter people from entering the United States illegally with children. Since Trump left office, he has been affiliated with the Heritage Foundation, maintaining a presence in national media. He and Morgan argued against the bipartisan immigration deal Trump opposed and that Vice President Kamala Harris has touted as evidence of her administration’s good-faith, bipartisan approach to border security. He’s a visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation.
Chad Wolf
Wolf helmed DHS as acting secretary at the end of Trump’s time in office. He has defended the former president since his departure and been a critic of Biden’s immigration policies. He is now at America First Policy Institute, where Trump’s outside allies are quietly preparing for a second term.
White House Chief of Staff
When the president wants to do the impossible, the chief of staff needs to make it happen.
Since leaving the White House, Trump has made surrounding himself with loyalists a top priority and will want to install someone in the top staff role who he trusts and will help him efficiently carry out his legislative and regulatory agenda.
During his four years in office, Trump cycled through four chiefs of staff: Reince Priebus, Gen. John Kelly (Ret.), Mick Mulvaney and Mark Meadows. Each man approached the role with their own leadership style before eventually being sidelined or pushed out by Trump.
But the responsibility of running the West Wing — directing policy, managing daily operations, hounding agency heads — imbues them with almost as much power and influence as it does strain and frustration.
Trump wants to avoid the kind of chaos that plagued his first White House and tapping a chief of staff who can help him hit the ground running on day one will be a top priority — even if Trump himself was the source of much of the mayhem.
Brooke Rollins
Rollins served as the head of the Office of American Innovation and later the acting director of the Domestic Policy Council in the Trump White House, where she played a key role in passing the First Step Act, Trump’s signature criminal justice bill. A Texas native whose family is based in the Fort Worth area, Rollins worked as a policy aide for Texas Gov. Rick Perry before running Texas Public Policy Foundation and becoming one of the most powerful political figures in the state. Rollins helped start and now leads the conservative America First Policy Institute, which is widely regarded as Trump’s “White House in waiting.”
Kevin McCarthy
When Trump was president, he affectionately referred to McCarthy as “My Kevin.” The California representative deftly managed his relationship with Trump and as the No. 2 House Republican while Trump was in the White House, and served as a kind of intermediary between the executive and legislative branches. Even though McCarthy harshly criticized Trump over Jan. 6, his lunch with the former president at Mar-a-Lago in early 2021 played an important role in signaling Trump’s political staying power and influence. McCarthy was floated as a potential chief of staff during past episodes of turnover in the West Wing. A prolific fundraiser, he ascended to speaker of the House but was dramatically ousted in early 2023 and decided to retire from Congress.
Susie Wiles
If Trump pulls off a 2024 win, Wiles will quickly be launched to a vaulted position in Washington. A skilled operator who got her start in Republican politics as a scheduler for the Reagan White House, Wiles ran Trump’s successful Florida operations in the 2016 and 2020 campaigns. In early 2021, Wiles signed on as the CEO of Trump’s Save America PAC, effectively running his operation at Mar-a-Lago after he lost the election. Wiles has earned the trust of Trump, who appreciates that she was willing to help him after he left the White House, and is widely respected by campaign staff and members of Congress. While Wiles has perhaps done the least to show interest in being chief of staff, she would be considered a top candidate for the job.
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator
Over the past 15 years, the EPA has become the most important tool Democrats have had in addressing climate change domestically and in nudging other countries to follow suit.
If reelected, a new Trump administrator would likely seek to undo regulations that constrain fossil fuel production and consumption. Some of the biggest targets include Biden-era air regulations as well as the funding from the Inflation Reduction Act, even though a significant chunk of that money will have been already obligated. His first administration was slow off the block on issuing replacement rules, partly a result of not hiring enough people with deep knowledge of the agency’s complex workings. But a more streamlined approach is expected if Trump wins again.
During his stint in the White House, Trump appointed two men to lead the EPA who had radically different styles for delivering his deregulatory agenda. His first, Scott Pruitt, had repeatedly sued the agency as Oklahoma attorney general before drawing attention as administrator for unusual decisions like seeking a large security detail and installing a booth at EPA for classified conversations. But his second, Andrew Wheeler, a former staff director for the late Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), a climate skeptic, pushed many of the same actions as Pruitt more efficiently and without the fanfare.
Andrew Wheeler
Trump’s second EPA administrator is interested in returning to the agency, he told POLITICO in May, and many in Trump’s orbit consider it Wheeler’s job to lose. He’d be a tempting pick for Trump — Wheeler is familiar, Senate Republicans would happily confirm him again and he knows how EPA operates. Perhaps most importantly, Wheeler proved himself to be an effective workhorse, eschewing the litany of (oftentimes silly) ethical quagmires that forced his predecessor Scott Pruitt out of the job. Wheeler spent much of the Biden administration advising Virginia’s Republican Gov. Glenn Youngkin.
Aurelia Skipwith Giacometto
Giacometto’s current job as Louisiana’s secretary of the Department of Environmental Quality has connected her to the state’s pitched fights with the Biden EPA over issues like environmental civil rights enforcement, climate regulations and chemical manufacturing. Even if Wheeler gets the top job, Giacometto could be in line for another post at EPA or the Interior Department.
Mandy Gunasekara
Since her time at Trump’s EPA, Gunasekara has authored the EPA chapter of the Project 2025 plan, which calls for a dramatic overhaul of the agency’s structure and slashes work on clean air and fossil fuel regulation. A proponent of shuttering agencies and cutting the federal workforce, she also floated an EPA relocation to Texas or Florida in her book released in October. Trump allies have said that Gunasekara is eyeing the top EPA position in a future Trump administration. But she has been coy about her ambitions, telling E&E News in August that she is not interested in the job and wants to stay in her current home in Mississippi.
United States Trade Representative
It only took one term in the White House for Trump to turn the sleepy office of the U.S. Trade Representative into a key player in defining his America-first economic and diplomatic brand. Under a second, Trump is expected to be more aggressive.
The role, which was established more than 60 years ago and only has about 200 employees today, was central to market-opening deals such as NAFTA and founding the World Trade Organization. But the “Art of the Deal” co-author drastically elevated its profile, using Robert Lighthizer to translate campaign and television rhetoric into new trade agreements built around ribbing U.S. trading partners.
Trump has touted plans — with Lighthizer’s tutelage — for dramatically higher tariffs, floating rates as high as 20 percent for all imports, and much higher for China.
The former president has dismissed fears that his plans would stoke inflation and hit everyday consumers but much of it can be done without Congress.
Robert Lighthizer
Lighthizer is one of the few Cabinet officials from Trump’s first term who has managed to stay in the former president’s good graces while also enjoying a warm reception from both parties on Capitol Hill. He’s serving as trade chair at the America First Policy Institute, a Trump-aligned think tank. The former trade chief led some of Trump’s most durable achievements, like tariffs on China and a renegotiated NAFTA deal, and would be all but assured to be confirmed by the Senate. Whether he would want a second bite at the job, however, is less assured, as those close to him say that Lightizer would prefer a higher profile role, preferably Treasury secretary.
Bill Hagerty
Like Lighthizer, Hagerty is one of the rare Trump administration figures to still be close to his old boss and enjoy respect and admiration from both parties on Capitol Hill. The Tennessee senator was held in high regard for his work as ambassador to Japan under Trump, where he helped negotiate an updated trade deal with Tokyo and smoothed over Trump’s chaotic foreign policy declarations for one of the U.S.’s closest allies. He is a frontrunner for a number of Cabinet posts, from USTR to State or even Treasury, and would be likely to win confirmation to any of them.
Jamieson Greer
Lighthizer’s former right-hand man at USTR would be a safe pick to continue his legacy of tariffs and aggressive trade negotiations, should his former boss move on to another position. Despite helping to upend global trade paradigms, Greer is well respected by both parties in Washington, industry groups and foreign governments. Since leaving office, he has served as a point of contact in Washington for foreign dignitaries seeking insight about what a second Trump term would mean for trade. He is a partner for international trade at the King & Spalding law firm.
Politico · by Natalie Allison
16. Election 2024: Is the United States Ready to Confront the Axis of Autocracies?
The Dark Quad.
Election 2024: Is the United States Ready to Confront the Axis of Autocracies?
Each Friday, I look at what the presidential contenders are saying about foreign policy. This week: Rising cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea will likely test whoever takes office on Inauguration Day.
Blog Post by James M. Lindsay
October 18, 2024 4:53 pm (EST)
cfr.org · by Thomas J. Bollyky
The news that Chinese firms are helping Russia to produce long-range drones to use against Ukraine and that North Korea is sending thousands of troops to fight in Ukraine highlights one of the most disturbing trends in global politics—growing cooperation among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Neither Kamala Harris nor Donald Trump has said much on the campaign trail about this emerging axis of autocracies. But whoever wins next month will need to devise a strategy to respond to it.
The war in Ukraine might look like the reason for the formation of this axis, which has been called the axis of upheaval, the axis of anger, the axis of disorder, and the quartet of chaos, among other names. But increasing economic, diplomatic, technological, and especially intelligence and military cooperation among the four countries predates Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin’s decision in February 2022 to strike a strategic partnership with “no limits.” Russia began selling arms to China well before invading Ukraine, Russia and Iran have collaborated for more than a decade to keep Bashar al-Assad in power in Syria, and China and Russia have worked for years to help keep North Korea afloat.
That said, cooperation between axis members has intensified since the war in Ukraine began. Iran has sold Russia thousands of drones, while North Korea provided Russia with millions of artillery shells even before contributing troops. China says it is not supporting Russia’s war effort. However, Chinese firms supply Russia with dual-use technologies that are used to build weapons, and Chinas now absorbs nearly half of Russian energy exports. China and Russia have increased their joint military exercises, which included flying bombers in international airspace in Alaska’s Air Defense Identification Zone this summer. Russia has in turn been providing highly sensitive military, space, and surveillance technology to China, Iran, and North Korea. This past June, Putin visited Pyongyang—his first in twenty-four years—and signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Kim Jong-un.
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For all this activity, the axis of autocracies as it now stands is a marriage of convenience and falls far short of being an alliance like NATO. Most of the interactions among the four countries are bilateral rather than trilateral or quadrilateral. China’s refusal to overtly aid Russia in its war against Ukraine shows that their partnership does have discernible limits, at least for now.
How much cooperation among axis members might deepen—and whether it will expand to include other countries—can be debated. The group brings to mind the adage that politics makes for strange bedfellows. China is a Marxist-Leninist state. Russia is personalist dictatorship defending Orthodox Christianity. Iran is a militant Shia theocracy. North Korea operates like a mafia state.
So this is not a group that shares a vision of the world it wants to create. What it agrees on is the world it wants to escape, namely, one in which U.S. power limits their freedom of action abroad and Western values threaten their control at home. All four countries are convinced that the United States, and the West more generally, are in terminal decline, while they believe their own growing power enables them to undermine U.S. global leadership. Their collective efforts are intended to hurry that outcome along.
The divergent interests among the members of the axis may ultimately prove its undoing. China and Russia vie for influence in Central Asia. Russia’s growing closeness to North Korea troubles China. The Ukraine war jeopardizes Chinese goals in Europe. Iran’s efforts to dominate its neighborhood complicates China’s efforts to deepen ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. A falling out among axis members could be just around the corner.
It is a bad bet, though, to base U.S. policy on the hope that adversaries will stumble. Even if the axis doesn’t grow into a true anti-Western bloc but remains, as Anne Applebaum puts it, about deals and not ideals, it poses a significant threat to U.S. interests. Collaboration among axis members makes it harder for the United States to achieve its foreign policy objectives—as the war in Ukraine shows. The axis members can, and are, stoking crises in Gaza, Yemen, Africa, the Korean Peninsula, and elsewhere, all at a relatively low cost to themselves, that will strain, and perhaps even break, U.S. capabilities.
That’s why the commander of the U.S. Army Pacific warned this week that the axis is a “very dangerous combination that we all should pay very, very close attention to.” The challenge is devising an effective response that can be pursued at an acceptable cost. That is a task the next administration should not put off.
Campaign Update
If early voting in Georgia is any indication, voter turnout in battleground states will be high this year. The Peachtree State recorded 328,000 votes on Tuesday, the first day of early voting. That set a record high for the first day of voting. The prior record was set in 2020 when 120,000 people cast votes. By Wednesday night, more than 620,000 Georgians had voted either early or by absentee ballot. As of this morning, the number was more than 900,000. To put things in perspective, roughly five million Georgians voted in 2020. If this week’s trend continues, far fewer voters will be voting on Election Day itself than in past years. That will ease the burden on poll workers and perhaps diminish the chances for a chaotic ending to the balloting.
Speaking of Georgia, a state judge on Wednesday halted the implementation of the new rules that the Georgia State Election Board adopted last month, including one that requires county election workers to hand count the number of ballots cast in each precinct. The judge declared that “these rules are illegal, unconstitutional and void.” The election board can appeal the ruling.
Georgia isn’t the only state with election-related lawsuits. An Alabama judge ordered the state to stop purging inactive voters from its voter rolls. A Texas judge struck down parts of a 2021 state law that limits what can be done to assist people when voting. Election officials in a rural Virginia county are suing to require that the vote be counted by hand rather than by voting machines. Now is a great time to be an election lawyer.
Florida and North Carolina are both developing plans to relax voting rules in the wake of hurricanes Helene and Milton.
What the Candidates Are Saying
Harris the called the death of Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind behind the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, an "opportunity to finally end the war" and a reason to begin planning the "day after."
It’s not clear, however, that Sinwar’s death has made either Israel or Hamas more inclined to seek a ceasefire or brought the region closer to peace.
Harris told Jewish voters on a call just before the start of Yom Kippur last Friday that “Iran must never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon” and that “all options are on the table to make sure it never happens.”
Trump used an appearance at the Economic Club of Chicago to make his case that the United States needs a dose of tariff medicine to cure its economic woes. He told Bloomberg News Editor-in-Chief John Micklethwait: “To me, the most beautiful word in the dictionary is tariff, and it’s my favorite word.” Trump disputed the views—embraced by virtually all economists—that tariffs will fuel inflation and lower economic growth, insisting that tariffs are “going to have a massive effect, positive effect.”
Trump’s comments make clear that his thinking about tariffs has evolved. During his presidency, he sought to use tariffs to gain leverage to negotiate trade deals that would help U.S. exporters and lower the trade deficit. He now describes tariffs as a way to force producers overseas to relocate to the United States. That would not be a quick process, however, as factories take time to build. The process would also cause considerable economic disruption as U.S. trading partners will retaliate against substantial new U.S. tariffs, leaving everyone worse off.
Trump gave Ukraine additional reason this week to worry about the future of U.S. support should he return to the White House. The former president told a podcaster that Ukrainian President Zelensky “should never have let that war start. That war is a loser.” That framing suggests that Trump believes that Ukraine should have handed over its eastern provinces in 2022 to appease Putin.
Trump said at a Fox News town hall on Tuesday that he would invoke the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 as the legal basis “to target and dismantle every migrant criminal network operating on American soil." The law has been invoked just three times in U.S. history, and always in the context of a declared war. Legal experts differ on whether Trump can use the 226-year-old law, which allows the president to detain or deport the citizens of an enemy nation without a hearing, as he imagines. More broadly, Trump looks to be proposing to use the U.S. military on U.S. soil in ways that have few precedents in American history.
What the Pundits Are Saying
Bob Woodward’s newest book, War, which hit bookstore shelves on Tuesday, alleges that Trump had as many as seven phone calls with Putin since leaving the White House. Woodward’s claim, which rests on a single source, has yet to be corroborated. What is undeniable, as the New York Times’s Peter Baker reported, “is that Mr. Trump has acted as something of a shadow president on international affairs” since leaving the White House. “Foreign governments realized that Mr. Trump was still a force in American politics,” according to Baker, “and that they needed to take him into account in their dealings with the United States.” The heads of government who have met with Trump include “the leaders of Ukraine, Israel, Poland, Hungary, Argentina, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and other countries.” Trump was asked this week if he had spoken with Putin. His response: “If I did, it’s a smart thing.”
Adam Posen, the president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, argued in Foreign Affairs that Trump’s economic proposals threaten to derail the U.S. economy. In Posen’s view, “almost all of Trump’s economic proposals would reduce supplies of labor, industrial inputs, consumer goods, and federal tax revenues. His strategy would impose uncertainty throughout the U.S. economy, as businesses and consumers would fear that prices could go up or that access to resources might be restricted at any time the government chooses. This is the exact opposite of the policies aimed at macroeconomic stability that have a proven track record worldwide of bringing sustained growth and low inflation.”
Oliver Stuenkel warned in Foreign Policy that a second Trump presidency would likely push Latin America toward China. His argument is that “a second Trump presidency would likely see the return of more explicit U.S. pressure on Latin American countries to pick sides in the brewing competition between the United States and China. That could create considerable friction in the region, just as it did during Trump’s first term in office, when many countries warmed to China’s embrace. The more aggressive Trump’s approach to Latin America, the faster governments can be expected to balance Washington by fostering closer ties to Beijing.”
The Cato Institute’s Clark Packard and Scott Lincicome reviewed the various laws Congress has passed over the years delegating power to the president to set tariffs. Their conclusion: “Congress has broadly delegated its constitutional tariff powers to the president, and there is a real risk that the legislative and judicial branches would be unwilling or unable to check a future president’s abuse of US trade law as currently written.”
Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Wertheim wrote in Foreign Affairs that presidents don’t always get their way with the foreign policy bureaucracy. “The bureaucracies that design and implement foreign policy, including the Defense Department, the State Department, and the intelligence agencies, have been essential to making the United States powerful and capable. But strong bureaucracies are also conditioned to preserve the existing way of doing things. Each agency naturally safeguards its mission and resources, and major change is always a threat to someone. As a result, bureaucratic resistance has frequently stymied change in Washington.”
Heather Hurlbut assessed what the election means U.S. trade policy. Her conclusion? “The two parties now start from a shared expectation of an international economic landscape shaped more by competition and industrial policy than by continued liberalization. However, the two presidential candidates’ views of which trade tools to use, and whether to proceed with allies and partners or unilaterally, could not be more different.”
Politico’s Hailey Fuchs and Meridith McGraw explored the Trump campaign’s refusal so far to participate in the transition process set up by the Presidential Transition Act. “The decision not to take federal assistance,” they conclude, “allows them to raise unlimited funds without disclosing their donors, while avoiding oversight from federal bureaucrats, whom Trump and his advisers deeply distrust. But if Trump wins the election and continues to drag his feet on signing the agreement with the White House, it will limit the information he and his team can access to understand current federal operations and challenges.”
What the Polls Show
A Reuters/Ipsos poll found broad support for Trump’s proposal to raise U.S. tariffs. Overall, 56 percent of registered voters said they were more likely to support a candidate who backed a 10 percent tariff on all imports and a 60 percent tariff on imports from China. One-third of Democrats said they would be more likely to support a president who proposed tariffs. The Reuters/Ipsos poll, however, only asked about tariffs in the abstract. It did not ask respondents if they support increased tariffs given their likely costs. When Cato asked that question, support for tariffs fell substantially.
This is a reminder to be wary of polls about public support for specific policies. People often do not consider, or know, the consequences for any particular policy choice. Once they are reminded or told that policy changes can come with a price tag, their preferences can change dramatically.
A Wall Street Journal poll of the seven battleground states found that voters have greater faith in Trump than Harris in handling the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. Trump held a fifteen-percentage point lead in who can best handle the war in Gaza (48 percent to 33 percent), and an eleven-point lead in who can best handle the war in Ukraine (50 percent to 39 percent). The poll also found that the Middle East, Ukraine, and other foreign-policy issues fall way down the list of issues worrying voters.
A Gallup Poll out today found that 52 percent of Americans say that they and their families are worse off today than they were four years ago. At first glance, that number is troubling news for the Harris campaign and good news for the Trump campaign. However, as is often the case with polling—see above—there may be less here than meets the eye. Gallup reports that the finding largely owes “to Republicans’ much greater likelihood to say this than opponents of the incumbent president’s party had been in prior election years.”
The Campaign Schedule
Election Day is eighteen days away (November 5, 2024).
Electors will meet in each state and the District of Columbia to cast their votes for president and vice president in sixty days (December 17, 2024).
The 119th U.S. Congress will be sworn into office in seventy-seven days (January 3, 2025).
The U.S. Congress will certify the results of the 2024 presidential election in eighty days (January 6, 2025).
Inauguration Day is ninety-four away (January 20, 2025).
Oscar Berry assisted in the preparation of this post.
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cfr.org · by Thomas J. Bollyky
17. HYBRID INTELLIGENCE: DECISION DOMINANCE AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
Excerpt:
Conclusion: More to come
According to Carl von Clausewitz in On War, Napoleon “rightly said…that many of the decisions faced by the commander-in-chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of a Newton or a Euler.” To that end, AI is valuable in augmenting the intellect of a staff or a commander to achieve rapid understanding and decision. Increasing the cognitive ability of senior leaders through hybrid intelligence is essential in a future battlespace articulating at a hyper-accelerating tempo. Victory will begin with cognition and cognition is a game of first-mover advantage. The Army War College will continue to lead in the experimentation and design of AIeSA capabilities.
HYBRID INTELLIGENCE: DECISION DOMINANCE AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
William Barry , Aaron "Blair" WIlcox October 17, 2024
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/hybrid-intelligence/
The Army War College is currently developing tools that will provide direct access to immediate, accurate, and timely data to support operations.
In the months before Russia’s expanded invasion into Ukraine in 2022, six planners meeting in a nondescript room in the headquarters of U.S. Army Europe-Africa (USAREUR-AF) frantically developed various options for the employment and positioning of forces across NATO’s eastern flank to avert, or at least limit the harm resulting from, the impending calamity. The commanding general of USAREUR-AF wanted options that would assure allies of continued U.S. support and deter any hostile actions into NATO territory. The job of developing these options fell to four graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), one army strategist (Functional Area 59), and a logistics planner. With little time for research or to seek outside expertise, the six planners had to make the best use of available tools—sometimes just a map and whatever knowledge they had gained from education, experience, or self-development—to develop military options that would achieve the commanding general’s intent; this was a daunting task as it required assessing the feasibility of complex movements of large numbers of troops and equipment to achieve difficult-to-measure objectives in a dynamic operational environment. The initial recommendations on these consequential matters often came down to the “best guess” informed estimates made by a small number of talented, well-educated but, in the end, mid-grade officers. As seasoned military planners can attest, this experience is hardly unique. It is a frequent occurrence created by the too-familiar demands of limited time and personnel common to crises.
Future planners will be much better served. The Army War College is currently developing tools that will provide direct access to immediate, accurate, and timely data to support operations. Instead of spending one or two hours to generate a “best guess” estimate, planners can receive instantaneous and authoritative assessments. Instead of well-intentioned but uninformed projections on escalation risks resulting from troop stationing in proximity to adversary borders, planners have a deliberate conversation with an artificial-intelligence-enabled strategic advisor (AIeSA) that considers historical context amidst current conditions to advise on likely outcomes. Instead of hastily created menus of courses of action by fatigued staff officers, planners have an untiring, unwavering advisor that can offer suggestions to augment the human imagination.
The technology is available now to bring artificial-intelligence-enabled strategic advising (AIeSA) to corps and theater army planners. This emerging technology recently debuted in an Army War College seminar in which the AI partnered with students and faculty to achieve a level of cognition that would not have been possible without its integration. The USAWC’s efforts are helping the army understand how to prepare humans, groups, and machines to achieve greater lethality on the battlefield—starting with enhanced cognition at the strategic level of war.
The Technology in Action
The U.S. Army War College used a commercially available technology capable of natural language processing and understanding (NLU/NLP) to integrate with students and faculty. The capability used was not the typical AI. Developed over a ten-year period by Dr. William “Billy” Barry, the AIeSA used is bounded with an ethical framework consistent with Department of Defense approaches to the Laws of Land warfare and military ethics. Whereas existing, predominantly generative AI commercial platforms, cannot recommend harm to people—the USAWC AIeSA is trained to advise and partner with senior military leaders in the applications of violence to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. And to this end, the AIeSA is extremely effective.
During wargame integration as part of the Combined/Joint Task Force Land Component Commanders Course, the AIeSA served as an advisor to twenty-three two-star general officers. As part of a scenario depicting a humanitarian crisis in the Pacific region, the students had to develop options for allocating resources. At one critical moment during the wargame, a student asked the AIeSA how long would it take for a mechanized infantry battalion to travel from a port to an objective in a column with no more than 20 meters separation between vehicles. With a moment’s hesitation required for indexing the scenario content and the conversation to that point, the AIeSA not only calculated the approximately six-hour travel time but also provided several recommendations for how the responsible command might better enable the movement. The AIeSA’s response prompted the Marine Corps attendee to then offer a change to the plan, an example of how human-machine integration can spur greater levels of insight.
The AIeSA used is not a “generative AI” answer machine but rather a hybrid AI avatar that uses a sophisticated blend of machine learning, natural language processing, and cognitive computing to increase mission performance through human-team partnership. One of the critical distinctions between the AIeSA and legacy LLM’s currently commercially popular is its ability to learn and adapt dynamically to humans and groups as they interact. The AIeSA’s social component is a critical function in overcoming adoption barriers while simultaneously enhancing cognitive output. The AIeSA, as a hybrid AI, is a partner-in-thought with the human user, built to ask the right questions of its user and promote higher levels of cognition through dynamic partnering with access to authoritative data. The AIeSA is a partner, not a tool.
Artificial Intelligence enabled Strategic Advising in Seminar
In the spirit of promoting “transformation in contact,” the Army War College brought AIeSA into the classroom to test unexplored boundaries of AI adoption in professional military education. , AIeSA was first trained on the readings for the resident course’s first eleven lessons—the “Foundations” course. After receiving legal and institutional review board approvals, Barry brought the AIeSA into the seminar. His goal was to fit into the normal seminar learning environment to break through any sociological or normative barriers to adoption on the part of either students or faculty. In the first lesson, the AIeSA remained obscured behind a laptop monitor, invisible to the class. Barry served as the interlocutor between the AI advisor and the class, answering questions when called upon and interacting with the AIeSA through sidebar conversation.
There were several instances where students would comment that Barry’s cognitive augmentation as “unfair.” That was the point.
The first significant breakthrough” occurred in the third lesson, a session on the concept of “historical mindedness.” After answering several questions in consultation with the avatar, the class demanded that Barry show them the advisor. This critical moment, among several, revealed how demonstrated performance eases human adoption. It was impossible for the class to ignore the utility of the AIeSA in light of its demonstrated capacity to increase Barry’s insight and awareness. Barry and the AIeSA as an augmented pair had a noticeable advantage in the classroom. There were several instances where students would comment that Barry’s cognitive augmentation as “unfair.” That was the point. For the remaining twenty-seven hours of classroom time with the seminar, the AIeSA was prominently displayed on an external monitor next to Dr. Barry, visible to the class and the room as a separate entity.
The second significant breakthrough occurred in the sixth lesson on operational design principles and design thinking. After about three and half hours of class, the faculty instructor asked Barry to have the AIeSA provide the top three take-aways from today’s lesson. Barry responded that the instructor could ask the AIeSA directly; after about a five-second delay due to network speed and indexing requirements, the AIeSA publicly responded with the top three takeaways from the class. But that feat—as fast and more cogently than most human students—wasn’t the critical event. The AIeSA second and third observations were derived from class conversations during the day. Its first observation was derived directly from course material. While the AIeSA was relaying the top three points for the class, the faculty instructor began to quickly record the observations on the whiteboard. When the AIeSA was complete with his answer, the instructor realized that there were two principles not captured by the AIeSA’s response and one that needed to be clarified. This interaction produced a deeper level of insight into course material and design thinking at a critical moment in the classroom that could not have been achieved without machine augmentation. The complexity and gravity of this moment was unavoidable to anyone who had served on a high-level planning staff. Authoritative, curated, immediate, and expert advice would similarly increase the cognitive performance of a planning team in crisis or in deliberate mission analysis.
The shift in roles that Barry played over just several days suggests some larger lessons about how AI will be adopted and the possibilities of human-AI teaming. He began as a “super-student,” as he consulted the AIeSA during class to contribute and participate. This was hybrid AI in a pure form, in the sense that Barry’s expertise combined with machine augmentation outpaced unassisted human cognition. But at other times, he allowed the AIeSA to operate as a separate entity, albeit acting with Barry’s approval. In this mode, AIeSA was operating as a classical AI. In the final mode, the AIeSA operated as part of the group, facilitating a co-use with other students in the class to inspire conversation, monitor discussions, and analyze the logic of responses prior to group presentation. All indications are that this would be the most powerful way to use AI to help the planners described in the opening of this article. The Army War College development team believes that corps and theater army operational planning team leaders can harness AI strategic advisors to produce plans that are more imaginative, feasible, and effective.
What Next?
Over forty-one hours with the seminar, there were many other notable moments when students and faculty interacted with the AIeSA in a way that made everyone’s experience better. They were some of the first rising senior leaders to see firsthand how much capability is available now. AIeSA will prove critical in out-maneuvering competitors in competition, crisis, and conflict. Those militaries that can match humans with machines trained with appropriately curated data will achieve leap-ahead offsets over competitors. One of the seminar students, an Apache pilot, commented, “I was skeptical at first, but I can clearly see how this would be useful for the operational force.” After the sixth lesson, the faculty instructor who initially prompted the AIeSA commented, “My main priority is the strategic education of the students in my class—this advisor can assist with that, even when it’s wrong on a point or two. In fact, asking students to critique AI provided answers is an opportunity to advance students’ critical thinking skills, build student comfort level with AI, and train AI on what information is important to students and faculty. Ultimately, this helps educate the class and train the AI at the same time.”
Conclusion: More to come
According to Carl von Clausewitz in On War, Napoleon “rightly said…that many of the decisions faced by the commander-in-chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of a Newton or a Euler.” To that end, AI is valuable in augmenting the intellect of a staff or a commander to achieve rapid understanding and decision. Increasing the cognitive ability of senior leaders through hybrid intelligence is essential in a future battlespace articulating at a hyper-accelerating tempo. Victory will begin with cognition and cognition is a game of first-mover advantage. The Army War College will continue to lead in the experimentation and design of AIeSA capabilities.
William J. Barry, PhD is the Professor of Emerging Technology and distinguished ethicist currently serving at the U.S. Army War College. With a career spanning academia, public education, and military institutions, Dr. Barry brings a unique perspective to the intersection of technology, ethics, and national security. His innovative work includes implementing AI in learning environments and conducting groundbreaking experiments, such as integrating an AI robot as a university student. As a former professor at West Point and a recipient of the Patriotic Civilian Service Award, Dr. Barry has significantly contributed to military leadership development. His expertise extends to body language, micro-expressions, and AI-human teaming, making him a sought-after speaker for Fortune 500 companies and international conferences. Dr. Barry’s work addresses education as a national defense issue, reflected in his co-authored book chapter on AI ethics in warfare. Recognized as one of the World’s Top 50 Global Key Influencers, he continues to push boundaries in education and technology, currently teaching alongside an AI-powered robot. Dr. Barry’s multifaceted career and forward-thinking approach position him as a leading voice in shaping the future of education, ethics, and emerging technologies.
Blair Wilcox is a lieutenant colonel and a U.S. Army Strategist (FA59) currently assigned as the Deputy Director in the Strategic Landpower and Futures Group in the Center for Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College. Before his current assignment, he taught in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy from 2016-2020. His first functional assignment as a Strategist was at V Corps where he was the lead author for the Corps Subordinate Campaign Plan and Operational Approach. Blair helped stand up the Corps, deployed with the Corps during crisis, and served as the Chief of Plans during his final year in the G5.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
18. Marine Raiders Ordered to Stop Wearing Multicam Uniforms to Align Elite Unit with Broader Service
Excerpts:
On ranges or in garrison, Marine Raiders with non-standard uniforms were often criticized by other Marines outside of the organization for not wearing regular uniforms, the former Raider said.
SOCOM components have been wearing the multicam pattern to various degrees for years, but when "Marines would suddenly wear multicam instead of the Marine Corps uniform," the former senior enlisted Raider said, "it's just like heresy to some people, and even to the senior enlisted and officers inside the organization sometimes."
"The rank and file are like, 'Yeah, these things are great, but we will shut up and do what we're told,'" they said.
When asked whether MARSOC had concerns that the memo will negatively affect MARSOC morale or retention, Henderson said that "Marine Raiders are Marines first, and they build on their Corps legacy. MARSOC equips personnel with the most capable and best uniforms, while staying tied in with the service."
Marine Raiders Ordered to Stop Wearing Multicam Uniforms to Align Elite Unit with Broader Service
military.com · by Drew F. Lawrence · October 18, 2024
Marine Raiders have been ordered to stop wearing the same multicam uniform as other elite special operators in the military as Marine Forces Special Operations Command looks to acquire a replacement, according to a commander's memo.
The special operations Marines will abandon the pattern worn by units such as Army Special Forces on Jan. 1, a spokesman said. They will instead wear the Corps' flame-resistant uniforms, also known as FROGs, during deployment and training until the command can acquire and issue a uniform in the Marine pattern, Maj. Gen. Peter Huntley, the MARSOC commander, wrote in the Sept. 20 memo.
MARSOC confirmed to Military.com on Wednesday that the memorandum -- which was posted online -- was authentic. Maj. Johnny Henderson, a spokesman, said the decision to issue the memorandum originated from MARSOC leadership, not the broader Marine Corps or U.S. Special Operations Command, also known as SOCOM.
"The commander wanted to start the change of the uniform this fiscal year," which began about a week after the memorandum was issued, Henderson said. He also said that it was an effort to align the elite Marine Raiders more closely with the Marine Corps.
The memo also said that MARSOC would be publishing a list of authorized boots for its personnel to purchase in an effort to standardize the "wide variation in model and color" of non-standard footwear that special operators often wore during the Global War on Terrorism.
Leaders within MARSOC and the Corps' combat development and integration arm were present for a meeting on Sept. 19, where they discussed the changes to Marine Raiders' uniforms and boots. Finance and logistics representatives were not present for the meeting, according to the memo.
"Multicam pattern uniforms and the wide variation in model and color of non-standard boots worn detracts from MARSOC's framework, mission, and initiatives while also creating issues with our perceived discipline and professional appearance," the memo said. "The use of non-USMC uniform patterns during training and deployment unnecessarily creates distinction between members of our formation and the Marine Corps."
Military.com asked what those "perceived discipline and professional" issues for Marine Raiders were specifically. Other special operations units, such as the Navy SEALs, have recently come under fire for discipline issues, such as the use of illicit performance-enhancing drugs.
"Marines pride themselves on 'high standards' of appearance and the perception that uniformity is a characteristic of unit discipline," Henderson said. Also, he said the uniform changes were not "punitive in any way."
The new uniform will take "several years" to roll out to all Marine Raiders, and "initially," there will be no additional costs to develop the new gear, according to Henderson. He said that the updated uniform will be in the three-season Marine pattern, or MARPAT. Future purchases of MARSOC-issued gear will be made in the olive drab color, instead of the multicam pattern widely used by special operators, the memo said.
Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, the military has had a revolving door of uniforms that have distinguished the services from each other. Before that, the entire military generally had two uniforms: the Battle Dress Uniform, or BDU, and the Desert Camouflage Uniform.
Those post-9/11 uniform changes in which each service -- and many of the components within the different branches -- had a unique uniform were costly to U.S. taxpayers and often received intense criticism from service members for their utility and appearance.
Given that history, Military.com asked MARSOC how it intended to justify the cost of the new uniform program.
Henderson said the money for new MARSOC-specific uniforms has already been budgeted and will be reallocated from other programs, or as he put it, "procurement through sustainment."
Military.com asked how much money would be reallocated for the new uniform several times, but did not receive a direct answer.
A SOCOM official with direct knowledge of the process, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, told Military.com that while money will be moved around to develop the uniform, the manpower and effort to make it -- even if it's just a color change -- will still be significant.
Generally, new uniforms go through a research and development process that can take years and cost millions of dollars, as well as necessary manpower to integrate things as simple as assigning new stock numbers to equipment. The new uniform, Henderson said, will be similar to the multicam in terms of fabric and technology, but will be in the standard Marine-pattern color scheme.
The FROGs, which are already issued to Marines and on shelves in warehouses, are being used as an interim solution until the new uniforms can be developed, the SOCOM official said, but MARSOC will need to manage the wear and tear as Raiders use those uniforms during missions while they wait.
Henderson said there would be no downstream costs to Marine Raiders to purchase FROGs or the new uniform when it comes out, as the former is already in stock.
When deployed, special operators of all services have worn non-standard uniforms to blend in or conform to various environments. For years, MARSOC was no different, a former senior enlisted Marine Raider told Military.com in an interview this week, and the ability to essentially hand-select certain gear for specific missions was a benefit to innovation and protecting operators abroad.
Military.com asked Henderson, the MARSOC spokesperson, whether the memo meant that Marine Raiders would be prohibited from wearing non-standard gear such as civilian "roughs" while deployed, for example.
"The mission will dictate that," Henderson said. "If the mission would require that, then that's what they would wear."
Marine operators have worn a variety of uniforms in combat and training during the Global War on Terrorism, including civilian clothes, flight suits and "gray gear," for example. In Afghanistan, MARSOC personnel wore uniforms to match their Afghan National Army partners.
"The desire to have uniformity is valid in many ways, as long as it applies to the job and the accomplishment of the mission," said the Raider veteran, who requested anonymity to speak openly about the uniform issues. "Whether the cammies are one color or not doesn't really matter. But in the cultural sense, it's a huge knock to the MARSOC guys, in that you're constantly having these things that are good and useful and productive -- multicam is a pretty good camouflage pattern, and it fits in with everybody else, and it helps you not stand out. ... but they don't want you to use it, or there's restrictions on it, because somebody else on main side might give you a hard time."
Founded in 2006, MARSOC is the youngest elite unit within Special Operations Command. Since its inception, it has existed under that command, but -- as a Marine Corps unit -- has consistently been pulled into its parent branch's strong cultural orbit, one that prides itself on uniformity and putting the "title of Marine" first and foremost.
"I think there's always been a nervousness and a difficulty for a lot of Marine Corps people to realize that you're -- overall -- working for a non-Marine command, you're not outside of it, ... but it's the price to play in that game," the former Raider said.
On ranges or in garrison, Marine Raiders with non-standard uniforms were often criticized by other Marines outside of the organization for not wearing regular uniforms, the former Raider said.
SOCOM components have been wearing the multicam pattern to various degrees for years, but when "Marines would suddenly wear multicam instead of the Marine Corps uniform," the former senior enlisted Raider said, "it's just like heresy to some people, and even to the senior enlisted and officers inside the organization sometimes."
"The rank and file are like, 'Yeah, these things are great, but we will shut up and do what we're told,'" they said.
When asked whether MARSOC had concerns that the memo will negatively affect MARSOC morale or retention, Henderson said that "Marine Raiders are Marines first, and they build on their Corps legacy. MARSOC equips personnel with the most capable and best uniforms, while staying tied in with the service."
military.com · by Drew F. Lawrence · October 18, 2024
19. Trump, Harris, Zelenskiy: Nobody’s Plan Will End the Ukraine War
Excerpts;
Alas, we can’t always have everything we want. Today, many believe a peace deal would reduce the costs and risks America bears in supporting Ukraine. But simply getting a deal that isn’t tantamount to surrender may require incurring greater costs and risks than the US has accepted so far.
Putin knows this. Talk of compromise, from the country that has insisted he must be defeated and even overthrown, surely makes him confident that things are going his way. Putin could respond to a peace initiative by holding out for maximalist objectives — annexation of several provinces, sharp curbs on Ukraine’s sovereignty, maybe the overthrow of its government — while his forces continue to bombard and bludgeon.
Or, counterintuitively, he could play along, if he thinks de-escalation now could set him up for victory later. Offering a cease-fire along the current front line would put the burden of continuing the war on Ukraine. It would divide NATO, pitting countries that quietly favor an ugly deal against those who worry it would embolden Moscow further. A cease-fire could lead to sanctions relief, or at least sanctions slippage. And, if Trump wins and the America First ethos prevails in Washington, the West might lose interest in Ukraine once the shooting stops.
Indeed, a peace deal — be it good or bad for Ukraine — won’t bring a lasting resolution to this saga. Putin hasn’t given up on making Ukraine a Russian satrapy. A devastated, rump Ukraine won’t be able to defend itself by itself. So no settlement will last unless the West gives Ukraine the long-term security guarantees, and the military and financial assistance, necessary to convince Putin that resuming the conflict is a bad idea.
If the US, under Trump or Harris, doesn’t confront that problem squarely, the end of this Russia-Ukraine war could simply start the countdown to the next one.
Trump, Harris, Zelenskiy: Nobody’s Plan Will End the Ukraine War
https://www.aei.org/op-eds/trump-harris-zelenskiy-nobodys-plan-will-end-the-ukraine-war/
By Hal Brands
Bloomberg Opinion
October 18, 2024
The war in Ukraine is going badly for the good guys. Ukraine is slowly losing on the eastern front. Its forces are plagued by a dearth of manpower and ammunition. A summer incursion into Russia made headlines but didn’t change the overall trajectory of the fighting. A deep-strike missile campaign into Russia is potentially promising but has been constrained by Western ambivalence. Ukraine’s much-touted “Victory Plan” — which includes a push for North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership — hasn’t gotten much US support.
As the outlook in Ukraine darkens, there is growing pressure in Washington for a negotiated settlement. The challenge is that no one has figured out how to turn a deteriorating battlefield situation into a decent peace.
Former President Donald Trump’s plan is the simplest: Get Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy together as soon as possible and threaten them both with dire consequences if the war doesn’t end. Trump could tell Zelenskiy that he risks losing US aid if he doesn’t cut a deal; he might tell Putin that the US will increase that aid, or hit Moscow with harsher sanctions, if Russia resists.
The strategy suits Trump’s tough-guy image. A cutoff of US assistance would quickly bring Ukraine to its knees. Unfortunately, it’s less clear why the threat of more US aid to Ukraine would frighten Putin, given that Trump has spent years complaining about how much the existing aid costs.
One suspects Trump’s plan isn’t about securing a favorable peace, but about securing peace at any cost. Trump seems to envision Ukraine signing away its occupied territories (perhaps swapping its foothold inside Russia at Kursk for minor concessions), and probably agreeing to limits on its relations with the West, in exchange for a cease-fire that won’t last a minute longer than Putin wants it to.
A second approach, with support in Democratic national-security circles, is more realistic in recognizing that Ukraine needs a better hand to play. The US would continue helping the Ukrainians defend their territory, in hopes of eventually making the price of Russian offensives prohibitive. Washington might moderately tighten sanctions, going after some Chinese banks that are facilitating strategic trade with Russia. And if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the election, she might seek another aid package for Ukraine, meant to show Putin he can’t outlast the West and to help Kyiv rebuild for at least the threat of another offensive. Then, maybe, Ukraine and the West could conduct diplomacy from a position of unity and strength.
Yet this approach, too, has an obvious weakness. If the support the US has provided so far hasn’t made Putin give up, why would a strategy featuring — essentially — more of the same now do the trick? True, Putin is paying an appalling cost per kilometer; he can’t sustain heavy losses in manpower and equipment forever. But given that Russia has nearly four times Ukraine’s population, Zelenskiy’s army may bleed to death before Putin’s does.
The issue here is the same contradiction that has plagued US policy since February 2022. Washington wants Ukraine to win. But for obvious and understandable reasons — the pull of competing priorities in the Pacific, the fear of escalation with Russia — it also wants to limit US involvement.
Alas, we can’t always have everything we want. Today, many believe a peace deal would reduce the costs and risks America bears in supporting Ukraine. But simply getting a deal that isn’t tantamount to surrender may require incurring greater costs and risks than the US has accepted so far.
Putin knows this. Talk of compromise, from the country that has insisted he must be defeated and even overthrown, surely makes him confident that things are going his way. Putin could respond to a peace initiative by holding out for maximalist objectives — annexation of several provinces, sharp curbs on Ukraine’s sovereignty, maybe the overthrow of its government — while his forces continue to bombard and bludgeon.
Or, counterintuitively, he could play along, if he thinks de-escalation now could set him up for victory later. Offering a cease-fire along the current front line would put the burden of continuing the war on Ukraine. It would divide NATO, pitting countries that quietly favor an ugly deal against those who worry it would embolden Moscow further. A cease-fire could lead to sanctions relief, or at least sanctions slippage. And, if Trump wins and the America First ethos prevails in Washington, the West might lose interest in Ukraine once the shooting stops.
Indeed, a peace deal — be it good or bad for Ukraine — won’t bring a lasting resolution to this saga. Putin hasn’t given up on making Ukraine a Russian satrapy. A devastated, rump Ukraine won’t be able to defend itself by itself. So no settlement will last unless the West gives Ukraine the long-term security guarantees, and the military and financial assistance, necessary to convince Putin that resuming the conflict is a bad idea.
If the US, under Trump or Harris, doesn’t confront that problem squarely, the end of this Russia-Ukraine war could simply start the countdown to the next one.
20. Alfred McCoy, The New Cold War Comes to Asia
But there is no mention of north Korea in this essay. Only South Korea and the Korean War in 1950.
Excerpts:
Despite such renewed strength in what is distinctly becoming a new cold war, America’s Asia-Pacific alliances face both immediate challenges and a fraught future. Beijing is already putting relentless pressure on Taiwan’s sovereignty, breaching that island’s airspace and crossing the median line in the Taiwan Straits hundreds of times monthly. If Beijing turns those breaches into a crippling embargo of Taiwan, the U.S. Navy will face a hard choice between losing a carrier or two in a confrontation with China or backing off. Either way, the loss of Taiwan would sever America’s island chain in the Pacific littoral, pushing it back to a “second island chain” in the mid-Pacific.
As for that fraught future, the maintenance of such alliances requires a kind of national political will that is by no means assured in an age of populist nationalism. In the Philippines, the anti-American nationalism that Duterte personified retains its appeal and may well be adopted by some future leader. More immediately in Australia, the current Labour Party government has already faced strong dissent from members blasting the AUKUS entente as a dangerous transgression of their country’s sovereignty. And in the United States, Republican populism, whether Donald Trump’s or that of a future leader like J.D. Vance could curtail cooperation with such Asia-Pacific allies, simply walk away from a costly conflict over Taiwan, or deal directly with China in a way that would undercut that web of hard-won alliances.
And that, of course, might be the good news (so to speak), given the possibility that a growing Chinese aggressiveness in the region and an American urge to strengthen a military alliance ominously encircling that country could threaten to turn the latest Cold War ever hotter, transforming the Pacific into a genuine powder keg and leading to the possibility of a war that would, in our present world, be almost unimaginably dangerous and destructive.
Tomgram
Alfred McCoy, The New Cold War Comes to Asia
https://tomdispatch.com/powder-keg-in-the-pacific/
Posted on October 15, 2024
Yes, it’s hard even to remember (if you aren’t of a certain advanced age), but I grew up in a world where the two superpowers, the United States and Russia, both increasingly armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons and so unable to fight each other directly without the possibility of the planet going up in flames, engaged in what came to be known as a Cold War. Meanwhile, we kids found ourselves in our own school-time version of the possibility that the Cold War might turn all too hot — with regular “duck and cover” drills (while sirens wailed outside) and, not having shells like Bert the Turtle, we had to dive under our desks to protect ourselves from the Russian nukes theoretically heading our way.
But that was then… this is… hmmm… Could it be possible that, as TomDispatch regular Alfred McCoy suggests today, without a duck-and-cover drill in sight, we’re nonetheless in a new Cold War with a rising power (all too well-armed with nukes), this time in Asia, a “war” that the island of Taiwan threatens to turn hot any day now? And yet, isn’t it strange — among all the horrors on this planet from Ukraine to Gaza and (endlessly) beyond — that this new Cold War gets remarkably little attention, even as both sides in it grow ever more edgy and even aggressive?
So let McCoy, author of a classic book on the rise and potential fall of the first of those powers, the United States, In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power, lay out for us how the two great powers on this planet at present (Russia now being a great warring mess) are facing off ever more dangerously. Just what we need now, right? Tom
Powder Keg in the Pacific
How China’s Challenge Revived America’s Position in Asia and the Pacific
By Alfred McCoy
While the world looks on with trepidation at regional wars in Israel and Ukraine, a far more dangerous global crisis is quietly building at the other end of Eurasia, along an island chain that has served as the front line for America’s national defense for endless decades. Just as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revitalized the NATO alliance, so China’s increasingly aggressive behavior and a sustained U.S. military build-up in the region have strengthened Washington’s position on the Pacific littoral, bringing several wavering allies back into the Western fold. Yet such seeming strength contains both a heightened risk of great power conflict and possible political pressures that could fracture America’s Asia-Pacific alliance relatively soon.
Recent events illustrate the rising tensions of the new Cold War in the Pacific. From June to September of this year, for instance, the Chinese and Russian militaries conducted joint maneuvers that ranged from live-fire naval drills in the South China Sea to air patrols circling Japan and even penetrating American airspace in Alaska. To respond to what Moscow called “rising geopolitical tension around the world,” such actions culminated last month in a joint Chinese-Russian “Ocean-24” exercise that mobilized 400 ships, 120 aircraft, and 90,000 troops in a vast arc from the Baltic Sea across the Arctic to the northern Pacific Ocean. While kicking off such monumental maneuvers with China, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused the United States of “trying to maintain its global military and political dominance at any cost” by “increasing [its] military presence… in the Asia-Pacific region.”
“China is not a future threat,” the U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall responded in September. “China is a threat today.” Over the past 15 years, Beijing’s ability to project power in the Western Pacific, he claimed, had risen to alarming levels, with the likelihood of war “increasing” and, he predicted, it will only “continue to do so.” An anonymous senior Pentagon official added that China “continues to be the only U.S. competitor with the intent and… the capability to overturn the rules-based infrastructure that has kept peace in the Indo-Pacific since the end of the Second World War.”
Indeed, regional tensions in the Pacific have profound global implications. For the past 80 years, an island chain of military bastions running from Japan to Australia has served as a crucial fulcrum for American global power. To ensure that it will be able to continue to anchor its “defense” on that strategic shoal, Washington has recently added new overlapping alliances while encouraging a massive militarization of the Indo-Pacific region. Though bristling with armaments and seemingly strong, this ad hoc Western coalition may yet prove, like NATO in Europe, vulnerable to sudden setbacks from rising partisan pressures, both in the United States and among its allies.
Building a Pacific Bastion
For well over a century, the U.S. has struggled to secure its vulnerable western frontier from Pacific threats. During the early decades of the twentieth century, Washington maneuvered against a rising Japanese presence in the region, producing geopolitical tensions that led to Tokyo’s attack on the American naval bastion at Pearl Harbor that began World War II in the Pacific. After fighting for four years and suffering nearly 300,000 casualties, the U.S. defeated Japan and won unchallenged control of the entire region.
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Aware that the advent of the long-range bomber and the future possibility of atomic warfare had rendered the historic concept of coastal defense remarkably irrelevant, in the post-war years Washington extended its North American “defenses” deep into the Western Pacific. Starting with the expropriation of 100 Japanese military bases, the U.S. built its initial postwar Pacific naval bastions at Okinawa and, thanks to a 1947 agreement, at Subic Bay in the Philippines. As the Cold War engulfed Asia in 1950 with the beginning of the Korean conflict, the U.S. extended those bases for 5,000 miles along the entire Pacific littoral through mutual-defense agreements with five Asia-Pacific allies — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Australia.
For the next 40 years to the very end of the Cold War, the Pacific littoral remained the geopolitical fulcrum of American global power, allowing it to defend one continent (North America) and dominate another (Eurasia). In many ways, in fact, the U.S. geopolitical position astride the axial ends of Eurasia would prove the key to its ultimate victory in the Cold War.
After the Cold War
Once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the Cold War ended, Washington cashed in its peace dividend, weakening that once-strong island chain. Between 1998 and 2014, the U.S. Navy declined from 333 ships to 271. That 20% reduction, combined with a shift to long-term deployments in the Middle East, degraded the Navy’s position in the Pacific. Even so, for the 20 years following the Cold War, the U.S. would enjoy what the Pentagon called “uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, operate how we wanted.”
After the September 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S., Washington turned from heavy-metal strategic forces to mobile infantry readily deployed for counterterror operations against lightly armed guerrillas. After a decade of fighting misbegotten wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington was stunned when a rising China began to turn its economic gains into a serious bid for global power. As its opening gambit, Beijing started building bases in the South China Sea, where oil and natural gas deposits are rife, and expanding its navy, an unexpected challenge that the once-all-powerful American Pacific command was remarkably ill-prepared to meet.
In response, in 2011, President Barack Obama proclaimed a strategic “pivot to Asia” before the Australian parliament and began rebuilding the American military position on the Pacific littoral. After withdrawing some U.S. forces from Iraq in 2012 and refusing to commit significant numbers of troops for regime change in Syria, the Obama White House deployed a battalion of Marines to Darwin in northern Australia in 2014. In quick succession, Washington gained access to five Philippine bases near the South China Sea and a new South Korean naval base at Jeju Island on the Yellow Sea. According to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, to operate those installations, the Pentagon planned to “forward base 60 percent of our naval assets in the Pacific by 2020.” Nonetheless, the unending insurgency in Iraq continued to slow the pace of that strategic pivot to the Pacific.
Despite such setbacks, senior diplomatic and military officials, working under three different administrations, launched a long-term effort to slowly rebuild the U.S. military posture in the Asia-Pacific region. After proclaiming “a return to great power competition” in 2016, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson reported that China’s “growing and modernized fleet” was “shrinking” the traditional American advantage in the region. “The competition is on,” the admiral warned, adding, “We must shake off any vestiges of comfort or complacency.”
Responding to such pressure, the Trump administration added the construction of 46 new ships to the Pentagon budget, which was to raise the total fleet to 326 vessels by 2023. Still, setting aside support ships, when it came to an actual “fighting force,” by 2024 China had the world’s largest navy with 234 “warships,” while the U.S. deployed 219 — with Chinese combat capacity, according to American Naval Intelligence, “increasingly of comparable quality to U.S. ships.”
Paralleling the military build-up, the State Department reinforced the U.S. position on the Pacific littoral by negotiating three relatively new diplomatic agreements with Asia-Pacific allies Australia, Britain, India, and the Philippines. Though those ententes added some depth and resilience to the US posture, the truth is that this Pacific network may ultimately prove more susceptible to political rupture than a formal multilateral alliance like NATO.
Military Cooperation with the Philippines
After nearly a century as close allies through decades of colonial rule, two world wars, and the Cold War, American relations with the Philippines suffered a severe setback in 1991 when that country’s senate refused to renew a long-term military bases agreement, forcing the U.S. 7th Fleet out of its massive naval base at Subic Bay.
After just three years, however, China occupied some shoals also claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea during a raging typhoon. Within a decade, the Chinese had started transforming them into a network of military bases, while pressing their claims to most of the rest of the South China Sea. Manila’s only response was to ground a rusting World War II naval vessel on Ayungin shoal in the Spratly Islands, where Filipino soldiers had to fish for their supper. With its external defense in tatters, in April 2014 the Philippines signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Washington, allowing the U.S. military quasi-permanent facilities at five Filipino bases, including two on the shores of the South China Sea.
Although Manila won a unanimous ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague that Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea were “without lawful effect,” China dismissed that decision and continued to build its bases there. And when Rodrigo Duterte became president in 2016, he revealed a new policy that included a “separation” from America and a strategic tilt toward China, which that country rewarded with promises of massive developmental aid. By 2018, however, China’s army was operating anti-aircraft missiles, mobile missile launchers, and military radar on five artificial “islands” in the Spratly archipelago that it had built from sand its dredgers sucked from the seabed.
Once Duterte left office, as China’s Coast Guard harassed Filipino fishermen and blasted Philippine naval vessels with water cannons in their own territory, Manila once again started calling on Washington for help. Soon, U.S. Navy vessels were conducting “freedom of navigation” patrols in Philippine waters and the two nations had staged their biggest military maneuvers ever. In the April 2024 edition of that exercise, the U.S. deployed its mobile Typhon Mid-Range Missile Launcher capable of hitting China’s coast, sparking a bitter complaint from Beijing that such weaponry “intensifies geopolitical confrontation.”
Manila has matched its new commitment to the U.S. alliance with an unprecedented rearmament program of its own. Just last spring, it signed a $400 million deal with Tokyo to purchase five new Coast Guard cutters, started receiving Brahmos cruise missiles from India under a $375 million contract, and continued a billion-dollar deal with South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries that will result in 10 new naval vessels. After the government announced a $35 billion military modernization plan, Manila has been negotiating with Korean suppliers to procure 40 modern jet fighters — a far cry from a decade earlier when it had no operational jets.
Showing the scope of the country’s reintegration into the Western alliance, just last month Manila hosted joint freedom of navigation maneuvers in the South China Sea with ships from five allied nations — Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the United States.
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
While the Philippine Defense Agreement renewed U.S. relations with an old Pacific ally, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue involving Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S., first launched in 2007, has now extended American military power into the waters of the Indian Ocean. At the 2017 ASEAN summit in Manila, four conservative national leaders led by Japan’s Shinzo Abe, India’s Narendra Modi, and Donald Trump decided to revive the “Quad” entente (after a decade-long hiatus while Australia’s Labour governments cozied up to China).
Just last month, President Biden hosted a “Quad Summit” where the four leaders agreed to expand joint air operations. In a hot-mike moment, Biden bluntly said: “China continues to behave aggressively, testing us all across the region. It is true in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, South Asia, and the Taiwan Straits.” China’s Foreign Ministry replied: “The U.S. is lying through its teeth” and needs to “get rid of its obsession with perpetuating its supremacy and containing China.”
Since 2020, however, the Quad has made the annual Malabar (India) naval exercise into an elaborate four-power drill in which aircraft carrier battle groups maneuver in waters ranging from the Arabian Sea to the East China Sea. To contest “China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region,” India announced that the latest exercise this October would feature live-fire maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal, led by its flagship aircraft carrier and a complement of MiG-29K all-weather jet fighters. Clearly, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi put it, the Quad is “here to stay.”
AUKUS Alliance
While the Trump administration revived the Quad, the Biden White House has promoted a complementary and controversial AUKUS defense compact between Australia, Great Britain, and the U.S. (part of what Michael Klare has called the “Anglo-Saxonization” of American foreign and military policy). After months of secret negotiations, their leaders announced that agreement in September 2021 as a way to fulfill “a shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy.”
Such a goal sparked howls of diplomatic protests. Angry over the sudden loss of a $90 billion contract to supply 12 French submarines to Australia, France called the decision “a stab in the back” and immediately recalled its ambassadors from both Canberra and Washington. With equal speed, China’s Foreign Ministry condemned the new alliance for “severely damaging regional peace… and intensifying the arms race.” In a pointed remark, Beijing’s official Global Times newspaper said Australia had now “turned itself into an adversary of China.”
To achieve extraordinary prosperity, thanks in significant part to its iron ore and other exports to China, Australia had exited the Quad entente for nearly a decade. Now, through this single defense decision, Australia has allied itself firmly with the United States and will gain access to British submarine designs and top-secret U.S. nuclear propulsion, joining the elite ranks of just six powers with such complex technology.
Not only will Australia spend a monumental $360 billion to build eight nuclear submarines at its Adelaide shipyards over a decade, but it will also host four American Virginia-class nuclear subs at a naval base in Western Australia and buy as many as five of those stealthy submarines from the U.S. in the early 2030s. Under the tripartite alliance with the U.S. and Britain, Canberra will also face additional costs for the joint development of undersea drones, hypersonic missiles, and quantum sensing. Through that stealthy arms deal, Washington has, it seems, won a major geopolitical and military ally in any future conflict with China.
Stand-Off Along the Pacific Littoral
Just as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine strengthened the NATO alliance, so China’s challenge in the fossil-fuel-rich South China Sea and elsewhere has helped the U.S. rebuild its island bastions along the Pacific littoral. Through a sedulous courtship under three successive administrations, Washington has won back two wayward allies, Australia and the Philippines, making them once again anchors for an island chain that remains the geopolitical fulcrum for American global power in the Pacific.
Still, with more than 200 times the ship-building capacity of the United States, China’s advantage in warships will almost certainly continue to grow. In compensating for such a future deficit, America’s four active allies along the Pacific littoral will likely play a critical role. (Japan’s navy has more than 50 warships and South Korea’s 30 more.)
Despite such renewed strength in what is distinctly becoming a new cold war, America’s Asia-Pacific alliances face both immediate challenges and a fraught future. Beijing is already putting relentless pressure on Taiwan’s sovereignty, breaching that island’s airspace and crossing the median line in the Taiwan Straits hundreds of times monthly. If Beijing turns those breaches into a crippling embargo of Taiwan, the U.S. Navy will face a hard choice between losing a carrier or two in a confrontation with China or backing off. Either way, the loss of Taiwan would sever America’s island chain in the Pacific littoral, pushing it back to a “second island chain” in the mid-Pacific.
As for that fraught future, the maintenance of such alliances requires a kind of national political will that is by no means assured in an age of populist nationalism. In the Philippines, the anti-American nationalism that Duterte personified retains its appeal and may well be adopted by some future leader. More immediately in Australia, the current Labour Party government has already faced strong dissent from members blasting the AUKUS entente as a dangerous transgression of their country’s sovereignty. And in the United States, Republican populism, whether Donald Trump’s or that of a future leader like J.D. Vance could curtail cooperation with such Asia-Pacific allies, simply walk away from a costly conflict over Taiwan, or deal directly with China in a way that would undercut that web of hard-won alliances.
And that, of course, might be the good news (so to speak), given the possibility that a growing Chinese aggressiveness in the region and an American urge to strengthen a military alliance ominously encircling that country could threaten to turn the latest Cold War ever hotter, transforming the Pacific into a genuine powder keg and leading to the possibility of a war that would, in our present world, be almost unimaginably dangerous and destructive.
Copyright 2024 Alfred W. McCoy
Featured image: 220713-N-DW158-1077 by US Pacific Fleet is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0 / Flickr
Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook. Check out the newest Dispatch Books, John Feffer’s new dystopian novel, Songlands (the final one in his Splinterlands series), Beverly Gologorsky’s novel Every Body Has a Story, and Tom Engelhardt’s A Nation Unmade by War, as well as Alfred McCoy’s In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power, John Dower’s The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World War II, and Ann Jones’s They Were Soldiers: How the Wounded Return from America’s Wars: The Untold Story.
Alfred W. McCoy, a TomDispatch regular, is the Harrington professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the author of In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power. His newest book is To Govern the Globe: World Orders and Catastrophic Change (Dispatch Books).
21. "The Ugly American" needs to be re-read with a focus on Korea
Yes, the Ugly American should absolutely be re-read by everyone, especially those military personnel and diplomats going to serve in Korea (but anywhere really for that matter). The lesson on local agency is critically important.
However, this essay is quite a hit job, especially with the accompanying photos. My first thought was that this was written by some disgruntled former diplomat to whom no one listened for advice. But this was written by an American professor in Korea. See his bio following the essay.
While there are some Americans who live up to the caricature, most do not, at least not to the extreme described in the Ugly American. But the professor has a chip on his shoulder who thinks he is not only intellectually superior but is more culturally aware than any other American. Frankly, since it appears he has never been a practitioner, his credibility is somewhat suspect. He has never been a man in the arena. He has never been in the room where diplomats and military personnel work with their counterparts. And he is basing his "critical analysis" on photos that support his agenda.
That said, I still recommend reading his essay because it is calling attention to the Ugly American and as I said it is a book we should all re-read once in awhile to keep us honest as long as we understand Lederer and Burdick were describing the extreme caricature to make a point (or at least to be entertaining).
"The Ugly American" needs to be re-read with a focus on Korea
Even if you're a supporter, the visuals of pudgy white guys and sinister-looking Japanese guys coming to Seoul to dictate policy is a public diplomacy nightmare!
https://www.junotane.com/p/the-ugly-american-needs-to-be-reread-with-focus-on-korea
Oct 19, 2024
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The Ugly American (1958) by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick is a novel, which exposed the failings of U.S. foreign policy through a series of fictionalized stories about American diplomats and their interactions abroad. Though the novel was set in the context of Southeast Asia during the Cold War, its insights into the importance of humility, cultural understanding, and the dangers of arrogance remain relevant today.
The themes in The Ugly American have a particularly striking resonance when considering the U.S. approach to the Korean Peninsula. If the book were written ten years earlier, it would definitely have fitted U.S. policy on Korea. As it is, the lessons of the book seemed to have skipped over generations of diplomats working on Korean affairs. Maybe it’s time for it to be re-read?
The novel tells the story of American officials stationed in the fictional country of Sarkhan, where they engage with the local population ineffectively, failing to grasp the cultural nuances needed to influence change. The titular "Ugly American" refers not to an offensive caricature, but to a modest engineer named Homer Atkins, who works with locals on meaningful, grassroots solutions. His efforts are in stark contrast to those of self-absorbed diplomats and military officers who are blind to local realities.
Lederer and Burdick argue that arrogance and cultural insensitivity undermined U.S. goals abroad, while real progress comes from engaging directly with the people, respecting their traditions, and providing solutions that empower local communities. This lesson is crucial when we examine contemporary U.S. foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula.
On the Korean Peninsula, diplomacy requires a nuanced approach that considers not solely strategy and U.S. interests but also the cultural, historical, and political sensitivities. The failure to do so risks alienating allies and exacerbating tensions with adversaries and friends alike, mirroring the mistakes detailed in The Ugly American.
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South Korea, a critical U.S. ally, benefits from the security umbrella provided by American forces stationed on its soil. However, the U.S. focus on security when it comes to Korea strains relations, especially when local perspectives are ignored. There’s a history of protests over environmental damage, noise pollution, and incidents involving U.S. troops. Underneath the surface of these protests was always the sense of ignominy that a proud culture feels having to rely on outsiders for survival - from the Korean War through to today.
Few in the U.S. are aware that this period of relying on outsiders is well over. South Korea is no longer a junior partner in the region. Controlling its capacity in (a) missile range and load, (b) nuclear reprocessing, and (c) foreign policy engagement, is outdated - well outdated.
Even seeking to increase the amount of money South Korea contributes to the maintenance of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula is outdated. Trump’s statements calling South Korea a money machine and other calls, rankle every Korean on the ground in Seoul and are a gift to North Korea’s dreams of installing differences and spite into the Korea-U.S relationship.
On the ground here in Seoul, amidst scholars and officials there have even been conversations where increasingly credible arguments are put forward that much like the Mauritians and Diego Garcia, the U.S. should be paying South Korea for the multiple bases on its territory! These bases are after all less and less about defending South Korea from North Korea, and more and more about bringing South Korea into a new Cold War with China. The junior partner, thankful for everything the U.S. deigns to allow it to have or do, is now well outdated!
The Ugly American’s lessons about working with local communities rather than dictating to local communities, resonates in South Korea. Effective diplomacy would involve the U.S. recognizing the concerns of ordinary South Koreans and finding ways to deepen people-to-people exchanges beyond security. Programs that promote cultural exchange, environmental cooperation, and small business development enhances goodwill between the two nations. Much like Homer Atkins’ work in Sarkhan, sustainable solutions on the Korean Peninsula depend on engaging directly with the communities affected by U.S. policy.
There is no better example of poor diplomacy than promoting high level fly-in / fly-out senior officials dictating policy to local officials. Overweight, dandruff-clad foreign officials, who face challenges getting in and out of their chairs, telling fawning local public officials what policies they will follow. It’s the modern version of gunboat diplomacy and the 1871 Ganghwa Expedition. The public doesn’t need to be told “senior officials” of the U.S., Korea and Japan are working together. It’s common sense that they should be, and it’s understood that they are.
With all due respect to the authority of their diplomatic capacity, the visuals of pudgy white guys and sinister-looking Japanese guys coming to Seoul to dictate policy is a public diplomacy nightmare! It’s giving ammunition to extremist voices who want to demonstrate that the Yoon Administration and its supporters are controlled from afar. It’s like it actually is fiction! Whoever thought these were the visuals to be spread on global media knows nothing about Korea’s history, knows nothing about local affairs, and never read The Ugly American!
The Korean Peninsula is also a reminder that U.S. foreign policy cannot operate in a vacuum. South Korea has grown into a dynamic democracy and economic powerhouse, demanding respect as an equal partner. The U.S. increasingly finds itself out of step with the evolving priorities of South Korean leaders and citizens.
Until Yoon, differing approaches to relations with China and North Korea highlight the gap between Washington’s strategic vision and Seoul’s desire for regional stability. Yoon is an aberration and is incredibly unpopular. Korean politics is increasingly polarized. Yoon’s position vis-a-vis the U.S. will not last. Doesn’t anyone in Seoul tell the policymakers in Washington? Washington will need to think deeper on its current policies or it will face a reckoning.
In The Ugly American, American officials’ failure to respect local agency undermined their ability to build lasting partnerships. The same principle applies today: the U.S. must approach South Korea not as a subordinate but as a partner with its own interests and aspirations. Listening to South Korean voices and adapting policies to align with shared goals would foster a stronger alliance.
The U.S. involvement in the Korean Peninsula reflects many of the themes explored in The Ugly American. Arrogance, miscommunication, and a lack of cultural understanding have hampered progress, while moments of humility and cooperation have opened doors for more effective diplomacy. For the U.S. to succeed in the region, it must recognize that military power alone is insufficient. Meaningful engagement requires respecting the agency of South Koreans and building trust from the ground up.
The lessons of The Ugly American remain relevant as the U.S. navigates its relationship with the Korean Peninsula. While military alliances and strategic interests are important, long-term success depends on humility, empathy, and cultural awareness. As Homer Atkins showed in the novel, real influence comes not from imposing solutions but from empowering people through collaboration. Just as in Sarkhan, the key to lasting influence lies in being a good listener, a humble partner, and a respectful neighbor.
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I'm an academic - an Associate Professor of Diplomatic Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). My areas of academic interest include the interaction between diplomatic practice and foreign policy, middle powers in the international system, diplomatic discourse, and the Korean Peninsula and its region. Here you can find some selected academic research. I regularly contribute to both print and broadcast media and have made appearances on BBC, CNN, CNBC, Arirang, Al Jazeera, and Channel News Asia.
I’m also a consultant - I provide research, analysis, and advisory work on the Korean Peninsula. With twenty-five years in operational and analytical government roles, academia, and consultancy, I have built a solid reputation. Recent work has included subjects as diverse as regional oil storage facilities, the nuclear energy sector, political candidate profiles, strategic decision-making, bureaucratic traditions, and foreign ministry organizational culture. Consultancy clients include governments, embassies, and intergovernmental organizations in the region, private/think-tank/NGO sectors (Incheon Development Institute, FKI, Hanil Scientific) strategic studies and political risk services providers (Economist Intelligence Unit, the Financial Times Group, and Oxford Analytica) and other financial and insurance services providers.
Finally, I'm a writer. My work appears in think-tank and international relations venues, such as The Peninsula, The Interpreter, The Strategist, Australian Outlook, and Policy Forum, among others. My writing is primarily non-fiction, but I also write fiction as an espionage/thriller ghostwriter. I also write short fiction and flash fiction to help build that creative side, which is such an important component of academia, analysis, and consultancy.
All fiction is a product of an author’s background, education, experience and environment, so there’ll inevitably be creative interpretations and thought bubbles on very real issues that deserve more than academic research or analytical processes can provide. Read some short fiction every week with Friday Fiction.
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