Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners
 
 

Quotes of the Day:


Franklin D. Roosevelt: “We all know that books burn, yet we have the greater knowledge that books cannot be killed by fire. People die, but books never die. No man and no force can put thought in a concentration camp forever. No man and no force can take from the world the books that embody man’s eternal fight against tyranny of every kind. This became a famous poster, with a monumental book behind miniature storm troopers throwing books into the fire, and the tagline ‘Books are weapons in the war of ideas’. Roosevelt was an accomplished rhetorician, and like most great orators, he used words carefully. When he and other political leaders identified books and authors, poets and publishers as key resources in the business of war, we must take them seriously. This book shows how this came to be.”
– The Book at War: How Reading Shaped Conflict and Conflict Shaped Reading by Andrew Pettegree

“Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element.”
– Rosa Luxemburg

"Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak; courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen."
– Winston Churchill




1. West Sea collision: choices Korea can no longer avoid

2. N. Korea's Kim reelected as general secretary of ruling party for reinforcing nuclear power

3. Eruption of Iron Faith and Ardent Desire to Bring New Upturn in Juche Revolution under Leadership of Comrade Kim Jong Un Fourth-day Sitting of Ninth WPK Congress

4. China's Xi congratulates Kim on reelection to top party post, vows to advance ties

5. N. Korea's parliamentary chief, other seniors excluded from list of party central committee members

6.  North Korean Arms, Nuclear Technology Flowing to Iran and its Proxies Across the Middle East

​7. Xi Jinping expresses hope China can open ‘new chapter’ in relations with North Korea

8. China-U.S. aerial tensions over Yellow Sea place South Korea in tight spot

9. McMaster Warns Exercise Cuts May Provoke Kim Jong-un

10. Exclusive: Russian Embassy in Seoul Defies South Korea, Keeps Pro-War Banner

11. Viral phrase mocks N. Korea’s wealthy

12. Elite Pyongyang defense unit hit with secrets scandal

13. Finance chief says uncertainties surrounding U.S. tariff scheme 'very' high



1. West Sea collision: choices Korea can no longer avoid


Summary:


Chun In-bum argues a West Sea intercept episode became politically fraught in Seoul less because it was unusual and more because of coordination and sensitivity near China’s periphery. He says South Korea likely declined related exercises to avoid provoking Beijing, mindful of China’s economic retaliation after THAAD in 2017. He stresses the West Sea beyond territorial limits is international space and that accommodating China’s asserted sensitivities risks narrowing Seoul’s options. The old bargain, U.S. security and China-driven growth, is eroding as U.S.-China rivalry becomes structural. He says South Korea must make unavoidable choices on defense integration, economic security, and modernization beyond a north Korea-only focus.



Comment: Seoul’s stated concern about notification can mask a deeper political warfare effect: Beijing’s sensitivities become internalized as “normal” constraints, shifting what Seoul treats as legitimate allied activity in lawful space.

LTG Chun implies ambiguity is no longer a stable hedge. In structural rivalry, observable alignment behaviors like exercises, intelligence integration, and export controls become the real signal, and hesitation erodes deterrence credibility over time.


How can South Korea build a deliberate strategy that preserves alliance credibility in international waters while hardening its economy against coercive retaliation, so future West Sea incidents do not force ad hoc choices under pressure?



The ROK and the ROK/US alliance must sufficiently align their assumptions about both the PRC and north Korea as to their natures, objectives, and strategies. Without sufficiently aligned assumptions we will experience strategic incoherence. 

West Sea collision: choices Korea can no longer avoid

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By Chun In-bum

  • Published Feb 23, 2026 2:23 pm KST

Chun In-bum

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/opinion/20260223/west-sea-collision-choices-korea-can-no-longer-avoid

Recent reports of U.S. aircraft operating over the West Sea and Chinese fighters scrambling in response have generated political friction in Seoul. The incident itself is not unusual. Major powers routinely monitor one another in international airspace. Such intercepts are a standard feature of strategic competition. The controversy stems less from the flight itself and more from coordination. Seoul reportedly protested inadequate prior notification, highlighting the sensitivity of operations near China’s periphery.

It also appears South Korea was invited to participate in related exercises but declined, likely to avoid provoking Beijing. That caution is understandable. China remains Korea’s largest trading partner, and the economic retaliation following the 2017 deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system remains fresh in memory. Policymakers know that security signaling toward Beijing can carry tangible costs.

But caution must not distort principle. Beyond territorial limits, the West Sea is international space. No country owns it. China’s expanding claims of authority in its surrounding waters do not alter international law. What has changed is not sovereignty, but behavior. And what must change now is Korea’s strategic mindset.


For decades, South Korea benefited from a stable formula: The United States guaranteed security while China drove economic growth. That balance is eroding. The U.S.-China relationship is no longer a mix of cooperation and competition. It is structural rivalry. Military posture, advanced technology, supply chains and alliance networks are now instruments of geopolitical competition.

In this environment, neutrality becomes increasingly difficult. Middle powers are judged less by rhetoric than by alignment patterns — interoperability, intelligence sharing, basing access, export controls and military participation. Ambiguity no longer comes without cost.

The West Sea episode is symbolic. If Korea’s primary concern is procedural coordination rather than strategic legitimacy, it risks signaling discomfort with allied operations in lawful international space. Gradually internalizing Beijing’s sensitivities as operational constraints will only narrow Seoul’s options over time.

The reality is blunt: Geography denies Korea strategic distance. It sits between a continental power and a maritime alliance. It relies on the United States for extended deterrence against a nuclear-armed North Korea. It depends economically on China. Pressure is structural, not temporary.

Serious choices are therefore unavoidable.


First, defense integration. As the United States increases Indo-Pacific operational tempo, Korea will face decisions about participation in exercises, intelligence integration, missile defense and contingency planning. Each choice will carry diplomatic implications.

Second, economic security. Semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence and critical minerals are no longer purely commercial sectors. They are strategic assets. Korea cannot indefinitely separate trade policy from national security.

Third, military modernization. North Korea’s codified nuclear doctrine openly contemplates early use under certain conditions. At the same time, China is expanding naval and nuclear capabilities at scale. Defense planning focused solely on the North Korean threat will be insufficient for the decade ahead.

These adjustments will not be painless. Economic retaliation is possible. Domestic political divisions will intensify. Diplomatic friction is inevitable. But postponement does not reduce cost — it compounds it. Strategic ambiguity buys time only if that time is used to build resilience. Otherwise, ambiguity becomes vulnerability.

None of this requires hostility toward China or automatic alignment on every issue. What it does require is clarity about core interests. The U.S.-ROK alliance remains the foundation of deterrence and stability on the peninsula. If Seoul begins to constrain lawful allied operations due to external pressure, credibility is incrementally eroded.

The world has changed. Power struggles are structural. Countries that adapt early preserve agency, while those that hesitate watch their options shrink.

South Korea is a major technological and economic power. But influence requires resolve. The West Sea incident is not about notification procedures. It is a reminder that the equilibrium of the past three decades has ended.

Painful decisions are coming. The only question is whether Korea makes them deliberately — or has them made.

Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.


2. N. Korea's Kim reelected as general secretary of ruling party for reinforcing nuclear power


​Comment: Anyone surprised?


Stalin: "It is not the vote that counts. It is who counts the votes."

World News Feb. 23, 2026 / 5:39 AM

N. Korea's Kim reelected as general secretary of ruling party for reinforcing nuclear power

By Park Boram, Yonhap News Agency

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/02/23/Kim-Jong-Un-ruling-party-reelected-general-secretary-ninth-congress/4821771842670/

   


In this photo released Monday, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (C) and officials applaud during the fourth day of the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in Pyongyang. According to KCNA, Kim was re-elected Sunday as the general secretary of the ruling Workers' Party. Photo by KCNA/EPA


North Korea's ruling party reelected Kim Jong-un as its general secretary at the ongoing party congress, touting the rapid improvement of the country's nuclear-based war deterrence under his leadership, state media said Monday.

"The Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) decides to elect Kim Jong-un as general secretary of the WPK ... for the development of the WPK and the prosperity of the state," the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, citing the "unshakable" will of party members, the people and soldiers.


The KCNA reported the congress decision made the previous day, the fourth day of what is typically several days of meetings, at the end of which key policy goals for the next five years are announced, including on the economy, defense and diplomacy.

North Korea's party regulations require the ruling party to elect its general secretary at a party congress.

Related

The congress hailed Kim for building "the revolutionary armed forces capable of coping with any threat of aggression on their own initiative and fully prepared for any form of war."

"The war deterrence of the country with the nuclear forces as its pivot has been radically improved and our state has dynamically advanced in the orbit of prosperity ... despite the stern challenges of history," the KCNA said, quoting the congress decision.

Speaking to the congress, party secretary Ri Il-hwan said the leader "made it possible to design and create to the full the dream and ideal for prosperity, which had been desired for a long time, even in the middle of this confused planet shaking with wars and tyranny."

"Only Kim Jong-un can guide the trend of gigantic transformation of our cause put on an orbit of leap forward to a steady upturn without halt," Ri also said, adding that the country has successfully defied sanctions and become a "formidable" force recognized by the enemies.

The KCNA said the congress also adopted revised party rules during the Sunday meeting, but no particular details were released, including whether they had codified the North's policy regarding the two Koreas as "hostile countries," as some had speculated.

At the end of the congress, the party is expected to adopt a decision setting new policy directions for the next five years, including on the economy, defense and diplomacy. Whether it will issue any message in response to Washington's or Seoul's overtures to resume dialogue remains a key point of attention.

North Korea launched the ninth congress last Thursday, its first since the eighth in 2021. The congress is the highest decision-making body in North Korea.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.





3. Eruption of Iron Faith and Ardent Desire to Bring New Upturn in Juche Revolution under Leadership of Comrade Kim Jong Un Fourth-day Sitting of Ninth WPK Congress


​Summary:


KCNA reports the ninth WPK Congress held its fourth day sitting on Feb. 22, focused first on speeches supporting the Central Committee work review and drafting a decision to be refined in sectional meetings and the Politburo before final adoption. Delegates then unanimously adopted revisions to the WPK Rules. The Congress moved to elections for the ninth term Party leadership, electing 138 Central Committee members and 111 alternate members, with Kim Jong Un first elected as a Central Committee member. It then unanimously elected Kim Jong Un again as general secretary, framing this as essential to the revolution’s next stage and national prosperity.




Comment: The revolution. What does revolution mean in north Korea? Completing the revelation to dominate the entire peninsula under the rule fo the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. There will be no stability, national security, and national prosperity until the revolution is complete. Understanding this should help us figure out how we must deal with northKorea and the Kim family regime.


The rules revision and leadership elections signal pre coordinated succession continuity, not deliberative contestation. The emphasis on “1,800 odd days” and global “wars and tyranny” suggests a narrative of siege and endurance to justify tighter discipline and mobilization. The staged process for the work review decision implies performance management and quota driven plan alignment across sectors.




Eruption of Iron Faith and Ardent Desire to Bring New Upturn in Juche Revolution under Leadership of Comrade Kim Jong Un Fourth-day Sitting of Ninth WPK Congress

Date: 23/02/2026 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source

https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1771802214-140900470/eruption-of-iron-faith-and-ardent-desire-to-bring-new-upturn-in-juche-revolution-under-leadership-of-comrade-kim-jong-un-fourth-day-sitting-of-ninth-wpk-congress/

Pyongyang, February 23 (KCNA) -- The fourth-day sitting of the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea was held on Feb. 22.


The Congress continued its historic work amid high enthusiasm of the delegates who attentively listened to the report on the review of the work of the Party Central Committee that will powerfully encourage the cause of the DPRK and its struggle to a higher stage.


Speeches were made on the first agenda item "Review of the Work of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee" at the fourth-day sitting of the Congress.


Kim Jong Gwan and Yun Jong Ho, delegates of the Cabinet Party organizations, and Kim Jong Sik, first vice department director of the C.C., WPK who is a delegate of the headquarters Party organization, took the floor.


Written speeches were made by delegates of Party organizations at all levels including Ri Il Hwan, Pak Thae Song, No Kwang Chol, Jon Sung Guk, Mun Chol, Ri Chol Man, Pang Tu Sop, Kim Chol Sam, O Il Jong, Kim Myong Hun, Kim Hyong Sik, Kim Il Guk, Yun Jae Hyok and Ri Song Bom.


Expressing full support to the report on the review of the work of the Party Central Committee, the speakers said that the revolutionary nature of the Party serving the people was fully displayed in the period under review thanks to the outstanding ideology and theory and energetic leadership of Comrade Kim Jong Un and remarkable progress and changes were made in all domains, sectors and regions of the country which develop simultaneously in a balanced way.


They analyzed and reviewed the lessons drawn from the work of their sectors and units in the course of the struggle for implementing the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the WPK and expressed their solemn resolve to play the vanguard and core role in the all-people advance toward a new victory of the revolution.


The Congress decided to study a decision on the first agenda item at sectional study and consultative meetings and revise and supplement it in reflection of constructive opinions and then deliberate it at the Political Bureau before it is adopted at Congress.


The Congress discussed the second agenda item, "On the Revision of the Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea".


Jo Yong Won made a report on the revision of the WPK Rules.


A decision "On the Revision of the Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea" was adopted with unanimous approval.


The Congress discussed the third agenda item "Election of the Central Leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea".


The venue of the Congress with discussion of the agenda item of great political significance in glorifying most brilliantly the absolute prestige and leadership ability of the WPK just ahead was filled with high enthusiasm of the delegates to fulfill their historic responsibility before the times and the revolution, the country and its people.


The Congress declared that the eighth-term Party central leadership would successfully complete its term according to the WPK Rules, and held the election of the ninth-term Party central leadership.


The relevant provisions of the "Detailed Regulations for Election of the Central Leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea" were read out before the start of procedures for the election of members and alternate members of the Party Central Committee.


The method of nominating candidates for members and alternate members of the Party Central Committee was discussed and decided and, according to it, candidates were nominated and elected.


Upon authorization of the presidium of the Congress, Ri Hi Yong proposed candidates for members of the Ninth Central Committee of the WPK.


At the moment when Kim Jong Un was proposed as a candidate for a member of the Party Central Committee, all the delegates burst into cheers and gave enthusiastic applause.


All the proposed candidates were nominated as candidates for members of the Party Central Committee with unanimous approval of the delegates.


The delegates unanimously recognized that all the nominated candidates for members of the Party Central Committee are the core elements of the Party who are boundlessly loyal to the Party's revolutionary ideas and fighting programmes and fully ready to powerfully push ahead with the perfect implementation of the Party's policies by playing the vanguard role.


The Congress held elections to nominated candidates for the members of the Party Central Committee.


The person, who presided over the Congress, courteously proposed first to elect Comrade Kim Jong Un as a member of the Party Central Committee, representing the unanimous will and desire of all the Party members and the delegates to the Party Congress.


All the participants expressed full support and approval with stormy cheers of "Hurrah!" and enthusiastic applause.


138 candidates for the members were elected to the members of the Central Committee of the WPK under full approval of the delegates.


The Congress elected alternate members of the Party Central Committee.


111 candidates were elected as alternate members of the Party Central Committee through relevant nominating and election procedures.


The Congress greeted the most important and responsible moment of decisive significance in strengthening the Party and accomplishing the revolutionary cause.


All the participants were greatly exalted by the crucial event of electing the general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, the head representing and leading our great Party.


Ri Il Hwan made a proposal on the election of the general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea.


We are to adopt the most important and responsible decision in firmly guaranteeing the destiny and future of our great state and people and in attaining all the goals and ideals we want to achieve, the speaker said, adding that if our revolution is to successfully carry out the huge tasks for the new stage of development while steadfastly preserving its lifeline, it is necessary to further strengthen the leadership ability of the Party and this can be successfully realized only when a political activist, who is most loyal to the cause of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and who is possessed of outstanding and seasoned skills, undertakes this responsible duty.


At this moment, the immutable truth of history most strictly proved in the past struggle, the results of the revolution keenly realized by all the people on this land, and the faith deeply cherished during the unusual 1 800-odd days are making the desire and will of all the delegates unanimous ones, he said, stressing that it was the strength of the great ideology and politics, the strength of the great Comrade Kim Jong Un that made it possible to design and create to the full the dream and ideal for prosperity, which had been desired for a long time, even in the middle of this confused planet shaking with wars and tyranny.


The course of the struggle of the eighth-term Party Central Committee with amazing goal and more admirable fruition of success made our people and the world appreciate the personality of Kim Jong Un as the peerlessly great man who certainly brings about successful results while simultaneously designing huge projects and pushing ahead with them in a lightning way without halt in any case, he said.


Now when the historic advance towards greater victory is started true to the new line of struggle and action programme set forth by the Ninth Congress of the Party, only Kim Jong Un can guide the trend of gigantic transformation of our cause put on an orbit of leap forward to a steady upturn without halt, the speaker said, courteously proposing to the Congress to entrust the important post of general secretary, the supreme duty of the WPK, the organizer and guide of all victories for the DPRK people, to the great Comrade Kim Jong Un again for the development of the WPK, brilliant implementation of the gigantic action programme, prosperity of the country and the rosy future of socialism, in reflection of the unanimous desire of all the Party members and people.


All the delegates expressed full support and approval, raising enthusiastic cheers of "Hurrah!" in reflection of their ardent desire to dynamically advance towards the road of Juche, invariably holding in high esteem Kim Jong Un as the top leader of the WPK, and their loyalty.


The Ninth Congress of the WPK adopted with unanimous approval the decision on electing Kim Jong Un as general secretary of the WPK in reflection of the unanimous will and desire of all the delegates, Party members, people and service personnel of the People's Army.


The participants in the Congress extended the highest glory to the General Secretary, vowing to remain faithful to the his leadership of Kim Jong Un to the last for the eternal prosperity of the country.


With the boundless pride and excitement of invariably holding in high esteem Kim Jong Un as the great leader of the dignified WPK, the delegates will study and discuss the plans of each sector to be reflected in the decision of the Congress on the basis of the goals set forth in the report on the review of the work of the Party Central Committee according to the schedule of the Congress. -0-


www.kcna.kp (2026.02.23.)


4. China's Xi congratulates Kim on reelection to top party post, vows to advance ties


​Comment: Surprised? I think not.



China's Xi congratulates Kim on reelection to top party post, vows to advance ties | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 23, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260223006900315?section=nk/nk

SEOUL, Feb. 23 (Yonhap) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping on Monday sent a congratulatory letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on his reelection as the ruling party's general secretary, vowing to strengthen strategic cooperation with Pyongyang, a Chinese news report said.

Xi sent the celebratory telegram to Kim after the North Korean leader was reelected as general secretary of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea during the ongoing party congress, Xinhua News Agency reported.

Xi touted Kim for "achieving new results in building a Korean socialist country" and said his reelection reflects "the high trust and heartfelt support" of the party, the government and the people, according to the report.

Xi described China and North Korea as "friendly socialist neighbors," reaffirming his party and government's "unwavering policy" to maintain and solidly advance bilateral ties.

The Chinese leader also recalled his recent meetings with Kim, proposing that the two leaders implement major agreements reached during the meetings so as to "open a new chapter" in bilateral relations.

The North's official Korean Central News Agency reported earlier in the day that the ninth party congress reelected Kim to the top party post on its fourth day Sunday.


North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during their meeting in Beijing on Sept. 4, 2025, in this file photo released the next day by the Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 23, 2026


5. N. Korea's parliamentary chief, other seniors excluded from list of party central committee members


​Summary:


Yonhap reports that north Korea’s Ninth Workers’ Party Congress elected a new Central Committee list that excludes several senior figures, including parliamentary chairman Choe Ryong-hae, party secretary Pak Jong-chon, and defense adviser Ri Pyong-chol. KCNA’s congress coverage indicates 138 members and 111 alternate members were chosen, with roughly 70 names changed from the 2021 list, signaling a major reshuffle. Yonhap notes Central Committee membership is close to a prerequisite for top posts, so Choe’s omission could foreshadow removal from his state roles when a new parliament is formed. Separately, two well-known inter-Korean hands were also left off.



​Comment: To Korea watchers: Please read the tea leaves for us. 


This looks like controlled generational turnover that tightens Kim Jong Un’s personnel grip by rotating out legacy elites, especially those tied to the military and state apparatus. Dropping senior inter-Korean officials is consistent with institutionalizing a longer hardline posture toward Seoul rather than preparing a diplomatic pivot.


What comes next?


N. Korea's parliamentary chief, other seniors excluded from list of party central committee members | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 23, 2026

By Park Boram

SEOUL, Feb. 23 (Yonhap) -- Choe Ryong-hae, the 76-year-old chairman of the North Korean parliament who once served as the top military leader, has been excluded from members of the country's ruling party central committee, along with other senior officials, signaling a major generational shift in leadership.

Choe, party secretary Pak Jong-chon, party adviser for defense Ri Pyong-chol and other senior officials were not included in a new list of members of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

On the fourth day of the ninth party congress on Sunday, the party elected 138 members and 111 alternate members of its central committee.

Including Choe, Pak and Ri, nearly 70 members of the central committee were replaced compared with the list from the eighth congress in 2021, marking a significant reshuffle of the top leadership body.


This Korean Central News Agency image on Sept. 26, 2025, shows North Korea's parliamentary chief Choe Ryong-hae receiving a letter of credence from a new ambassador the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Membership in the party central committee is almost a prerequisite for assuming a major official post in North Korea.

Choe has served as director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army and then chairman of the standing committee of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly since 2019, while also serving as a member of the party's politburo.

Choe's omission from the party central committee suggests he may be relieved of his current positions when the North forms a new parliament following the party congress.

The departure of Choe, along with Pak and Ri, both of whom held marshal rank and top-level military posts, signals a major generational shift in North Korean leadership.

The list shows that those newly joining the central committee include Jo Chun-ryong, head of the party's defense manufacturing department, who won Kim's favor for his lead role in developing new weapons systems.

The list also omitted two high-profile senior officials in charge of inter-Korean relations -- Ri Son-gwon, director of North Korea's now-abolished United Front Department (UFD), and party adviser Kim Yong-chol, which indicates that the North may continue its hostile policy toward Seoul.

North Korea launched the ninth congress Thursday, its first since the eighth in 2021, to review policy results from the previous congress and put forth new goals for the next five years. The congress is the highest decision-making body in North Korea.


Former South Korean President Moon Jae-in (C) poses for a photo with top officials on inter-Korean relations Ri Son-gwon (1st from L) and Kim Yong-chol (2nd from L) at a lake atop Mount Paektu in North Korea in 2018. (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · February 23, 2026


6. North Korean Arms, Nuclear Technology Flowing to Iran and its Proxies Across the Middle East


​Summary:


Don Kirk reviews a new book, Rogue Allies, arguing that north Korea has long been a key enabler of Iran’s military build-up, starting with ties forged during the Iran–Iraq War. The authors, Bruce Bechtol and Anthony Celso, contend Pyongyang has supplied missiles, naval designs, and tunnel-building expertise that Iran then extends to proxies including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. The book claims this weapons-for-cash relationship helped north Korea survive the 1990s famine and helps Iran harden forces through underground networks and maritime capabilities, including a midget submarine design linked to north Korean engineering.



Comment: This book grows in importance every day as we see the collaboration and collusion of the CRInK.


North Korean Arms, Nuclear Technology Flowing to Iran and its Proxies Across the Middle East

New book describes how Pyongyang is providing missiles, boats, tunnel-making expertise to Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis as American forces await orders to attack.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, center, meets soldiers on March 13, 2024. Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, file

https://www.nysun.com/article/north-korean-arms-nuclear-technology-flowing-to-iran-and-its-proxies-across-the-middle-east


DONALD KIRK

Published: Feb 22, 2026, 12:16 PM ET

Updated:Feb 22, 2026, 07:17 PM ET


Iran, confronting American aircraft carriers bristling with war planes, counts on one source of support that’s gone almost unnoted as the world waits anxiously to see if the region will explode in war. That’s North Korea, purveying the weapons, technology and even the nuclear secrets on which Iran has counted ever since the Islamic regime’s disastrous war with Iraq in the 1980s.

Almost forgotten after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the entry of American troops in the first Gulf War, the Iran-Iraq war “resulted in over a million deaths,” write a veteran analyst of North Korea’s military leadership, Bruce Bechtol, and a colleague at Angelo State University, Anthony Celso, in “Rogue Allies: the Strategic Partnership Between Iran and North Korea.”

It was then that Iran and North Korea, two different but equally cruel dictatorships, bonded in a relationship that provided Pyongyang with funds that it desperately needed during a famine of the 1990s that took two million North Korean lives. For Iran, the reward was not only missiles for its own defense but also weaponry for caching in vast tunnel networks, redoubts, and caves carved out for hiding proxies ranging from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen. 

“Rogue Allies” adds a fresh dimension of understanding of Iran’s success at not only building its elite forces after Soviet subsidies ended in 1990 but also at developing a nuclear program for terrorizing its enemies, notably Israel.

Beyond the destruction of Israel, Iran “aspires to promote its brand of Shia revolutionary doctrine challenging Sunni Gulf States Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,” says the book. “The funds that North Korea generates from its alliance with Iran serve to maintain the regime’s ability to support its large military and to provide rewards to the small number of members in the elite who keep the governmental infrastructure running.”

Iran is also getting plenty of support from Russia, which supplies anti-aircraft missiles, and China, the source of missiles and patrol boats, but the authors reckon “North Korea is the single most significant contributor to Tehran’s ambitious weapons acquisition policy.”

Thanks to North Korea, the waters off Iran are no safer for American and allied vessels than the seas off North Korea. “Iran’s midget submarine fleet, for example, is based on North Korean engineering Yono-class designs.”

On shore, the North Korean influence is just as pervasive. “Hezbollah’s military entrenchment in Lebanon has been furthered by Iran’s financial underwriting of North Korean rockets, missiles, and underground tunnel facilities,” say the authors. From Syria to Bahrain, militias “employ North Korean rockets, missiles, and conventional arms.” Beyond weaponry, the North Koreans have built tunnel complexes abroad just as they’ve done in their own country.

Israeli defense experts, we’re told, have described the tunnels built by Hamas as “the Gaza Metro” that formed a critical node in Hamas’s resistance strategy and “permitted its al-Qassam military wing to store, smuggle, and deploy weapons.” Divers picked up drops of arms from “fishing vessels” and deposited them via tunnels beneath the sea into the “Metro underground system.”

The authors may not be disclosing top secrets, but they provide descriptions of North Korean complicity that have gone largely unpublicized in the reporting on a struggle in which Iran counts on North Korean weapons. 

“The scale of Iran-North Korea weapons proliferation and sanctions evasions requires a recalibration of the international community’s efforts to combat their malign impact,” the authors say. “Past attempts in the nuclear containment area have failed, and neither Iran nor North Korea has been effectively contained.” Nor have “diplomacy, economic sanctions, and military threats” diminished “Pyongyang and Tehran’s weapons-for-financial-compensation.”

All that’s clear is that North Korea is playing a role on Iran’s behalf as seen in this comprehensive report on “rogue allies” at both ends of what George W. Bush, in his state-of-the-union address in 2002, called an “axis of evil.”

DONALD KIRK

Mr. Kirk, based in Seoul and Washington, has been covering Asia for decades for newspapers and magazines and is the author of books on Korea, the Vietnam War and the Philippines.



7. Xi Jinping expresses hope China can open ‘new chapter’ in relations with North Korea


​Summary:


Xi Jinping congratulated Kim Jong Un on being re-elected general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea at the Ninth Party Congress. Xi said Kim’s re-election showed the “high trust and wholehearted support” of the north Korean party, government, and people. He framed the congress as occurring at a “crucial stage” for the party and state, and expressed hope that north Korea would use it to “open up new prospects” for its socialist cause. Xi also reaffirmed Beijing’s “unswerving policy” to preserve and develop China–DPRK ties, and said he was ready to “write new chapters” of cooperation amid global turbulence.



Comment: Is the alliance still closer than lips and teeth? Imagine having north Korea as your only ally?


Xi Jinping expresses hope China can open ‘new chapter’ in relations with North Korea

Chinese leader sends message of ‘high trust and wholehearted support’ to Kim Jong-un after major party event

Yuanyue Dangin Beijing

Published: 5:57pm, 23 Feb 2026Updated: 7:08pm, 23 Feb 2026

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3344350/xi-jinping-expresses-hope-china-can-open-new-chapter-relations-north-korea



Chinese President Xi Jinping has congratulated North Korean leader Kim Jong-un after he cemented his leadership at the latest congress of the country’s ruling party.

Xi said Kim’s reselection as general secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea on Monday reflected the “high trust and wholehearted support” of the country’s “party, government and people”, according to Chinese state news agency Xinhua.

Xi said he was ready to work with Kim to “open a new chapter in China-DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] friendship, serve the cause of socialist development in both countries, and enhance the well-being and friendship of our peoples”.

Xi also said he hoped that North Korea’s “party and people” would take the opportunity to “drive the socialist cause in DPRK to constantly break new ground”.

The Chinese leader added that China and North Korea were “socialist [and] friendly neighbours” and said “safeguarding, consolidating and developing China-DPRK relations remains an unwavering policy” of Beijing.

Kim succeeded his father Kim Jong-il as the supreme leader upon his death in December 2011.

In 2016, he revived the custom of holding a party congress every five years – after a 36-year pause.

The congress concluding on Monday was the third held during Kim’s tenure and the ninth such conclave overall.

According to state-run Korean Central News Agency, Kim told the event: “Ahead of our party are heavy and urgent tasks of advancing economic development and improving people’s livelihoods, and transforming all aspects of social life in the country as quickly as possible.”

Beijing sent a congratulatory message to Pyongyang to mark the start of the party congress last Thursday, saying: “In recent years, under the strategic guidance of the top leaders of the two parties and countries, China-DPRK relations have entered a new historical period.”

Russia also sent a similar congratulatory letter on Thursday, saying the friendship between the two countries had helped them to defy “external pressure”.

Xi, Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin put on what was widely seen as a united front against the West last September, when they gathered at a parade in Beijing to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.

At the time, Xi said China and North Korea were “good neighbours, good friends and good comrades who have shared weal and woe and helped each other in time of need”.

Beijing attached great importance to the traditional friendship between the two countries, he said, adding that “no matter how the international landscape may evolve, this position will stay unchanged”.



Yuanyue Dang


Yuanyue reports on Chinese politics, defence and foreign affairs from Beijing. Prior to joining the Post in 2022, he was a feature writer in Chinese. He studied journalism in Hong Kong and anthropology in London.


8. China-U.S. aerial tensions over Yellow Sea place South Korea in tight spot


​Summary:


The article argues that recent U.S. flights from bases in South Korea into the Yellow Sea, followed by Chinese scrambles, are widening U.S.-China military friction into a space Beijing treats as especially sensitive. It says Seoul was also invited to join U.S.-Japan air drills but declined, then later protested that it had not been fully briefed on the U.S. mission’s scope. The piece frames this as “strategic flexibility” in practice, with USFK increasingly oriented toward deterring China while South Korea still depends on the alliance for deterrence against a nuclear-armed north Korea. It warns Seoul’s room for ambiguity is shrinking.



Comment: We appear to be testing how far we can normalize high-tempo “freedom of overflight” operations near China’s core maritime approaches while using Korea-based forces as a theater-wide instrument, not a peninsula-only deterrent.  Seoul’s procedural protest may be less about airspace law than about alliance friction, since a visible lack of coordination feeds Beijing’s narrative leverage and intensifies South Korea’s domestic political strain and economic exposure.


Is this a ROK/US alliance inflection point? How will history look back and assess this time period?



China-U.S. aerial tensions over Yellow Sea place South Korea in tight spot

washingtontimes.com · Andrew Salmon

By - The Washington Times - Sunday, February 22, 2026

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/feb/22/china-us-aerial-tensions-yellow-sea-place-seoul-tight-spot/

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

SEOUL, South Korea — A series of recent high-stakes aerial incidents involving Chinese, Japanese and U.S. — but not South Korean — warplanes has become a flashpoint in the increasingly complicated alliance between Seoul and Washington.

The incidents may also signal that the U.S. is opening a new “front” in the region’s tense strategic geography, marked by naval and aerial challenges and counter-challenges.

Beijing habitually makes clear its displeasure when other nations’ warships transit the Taiwan Strait. It also bristles at “freedom of navigation” naval patrols near the bases it has built in the South China Sea, and at “freedom of overflight” patrols in that area.


U.S. sorties last week from Korean bases into the skies over the Yellow Sea — a body of water China jealously guards — appear to be part of a new American-led test of the People’s Liberation Army and its air force.

Aerial chicken games in recent years have largely taken place over the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan and the Taiwan Strait. For the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, the Yellow Sea lies uncomfortably close to home.

The situation presents a diplomatic conundrum for Seoul, which shares Yellow Sea coastlines with China and North Korea.

As tensions with China have ratcheted up, ties between Japan and the U.S. have tightened.


But South Korea is walking a fraying diplomatic tightrope between Washington and Beijing as it seeks to maintain optimal relations with the Trump administration while soothing its giant neighbor and trade partner China.

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The Seoul-Washington divide

Since November, when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said Japanese forces would activate in the event of a Taiwan contingency, Beijing-Tokyo relations have plunged.

Beijing, which claims the democratic island, retaliated with diplomatic insults and restrictions of exports to, and imports from, Japan. That may have backfired.

The landslide general election victory won by Ms. Takaichi in February greatly strengthened her hand to resist China, upgrade Japanese forces and tighten security links with Washington. Those links were on display last week.

Eleven Japanese jet fighters and four U.S. B-52 strategic bombers conducted bilateral aerial drills over the East China Sea and Sea of Japan — proximate to the southern entrance to the Yellow Sea on Feb. 16 and again, two days later, on Wednesday.

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Domestic Korean media reported that Seoul was invited to join, but did not. Korea’s biggest national holiday, the Lunar New Year, spanned Feb. 16-Feb 18. Korea’s top newspaper reported Sunday that Seoul had asked for a schedule adjustment, but was denied.

Separately, on Wednesday, an undisclosed number of U.S. F-16 fighters launched from South Korea approached China’s Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ, over the Yellow Sea.

An ADIZ lacks basis in international law, but is a widely followed protocol — and also widely ignored. China’s ADIZ overlaps with South Korea’s.

Though the U.S. jets were reportedly in international air space, PLAAF fighters scrambled. No clashes were reported.

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The U.S. fighters sortied from Osan Air Base, on Korea’s Yellow Sea coast, south of Seoul.

The Yonhap News Agency reported Saturday that the U.S. flights compelled South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Jin Young-sun to call U.S. Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander in chief of U.S. Forces Korea, to protest that Seoul had not been fully apprised of the scope of the mission.

Poking China

The Yellow Sea is hugely strategic for China.

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The closest sea to capital Beijing, its seaboard is hosts aircraft carrier shipyards in Dalian in the northeast; China’s only nuclear submarine yard in Huludao in the north; and the Northern Fleet Command in Qingdao in the west.

In 2018, the U.S. completed a pivot of the bulk of its forces in Korea from Seoul and the inter-Korean DMZ to a series of bases lining Korea’s western Yellow Sea coastline.

Those bases are ideal for deterring China, and are the only U.S. bootprints inside the First Island Chain, the critical line for the defense of Taiwan.

For Seoul, the bases are sensitive, given its need to manage relations with Beijing.

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Related stresses are coming into focus as the Trump administration makes deterring China the primary strategic objective of the 28,000-strong U.S. Forces Korea. And as the American mission has shifted, Mr. Trump has placed a bigger share of the burden of deterring North Korea onto South Korea.

The use of USFK as a region-wide force is dubbed “strategic flexibility.”

In January, U.S. Under Secretary of War Elbridge Colby, speaking in Seoul, focused heavily on China, not North Korea. USFK Commander Brunson has written and spoken widely on the geographic import of Korea for regional force projection.

These matters present a ticklish challenge for South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, who took office last year. He has established good relations with Mr. Trump — praising him and presenting gifts during their one meeting — but has also held two amicable summits with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

A new U.S. front

Regional analysts were taken aback by the apparent new U.S. focus on the Yellow Sea.

“I don’t know exactly over the West Sea where this happened, but I have a feeling it happened in the south,” said Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean general, of the flights.

“West Sea” is Korean nomenclature for the Yellow Sea.

“For the last 50 years we have not done [aerial drills there] out of respect for China, though we had every right to, as it is in international air space,” Mr. Chun continued. “Perhaps the Americans and Japanese realized that the good will has not been returned, as the Chinese have dominance in the West Sea.”

China, for its part, also seemed to be caught off-guard. Chinese military expert Song Zhongping told the Global Times newspaper that USFK “has rarely held military activities in this area before.”

“The U.S. has long regarded South Korea’s ADIZ as its own territory … its military operations in the area are aimed at simulating interception of aircraft from other countries entering the zone,” he continued. “But if the U.S. military shifts from defense to offense … the nature will be completely different.”

The Trump administration has been pressuring allies economically with tariffs on their exports. It has also been demanding European capitals upgrade defense spending while its comments over Greenland caused a near-panic in NATO.

The approach irks some U.S. commentators.

“It’s like a gangster protection racket!” said Daniel Pinkston, an international relations expert based in Seoul.

Mr. Chun suggested which capital Seoul should pivot toward.

“I am disappointed that Korea is still clinging to the idea of being as neutral as it can be,” between China and America, he said.

The recent developments show “that the window is closing, and we are going to have to make a choice, which is uncomfortable, but is the way things are on the Korean peninsula,” the former general added.

While Mr. Lee ponders options, two precedents exist. In both cases, Seoul sided with Washington against China — and suffered economic fallout.

In 2017, USFK established a terminal high altitude defense battery — the American anti-missle system more commonly known as THAAD — in South Korea, infuriating Beijing, which claimed its radars could monitor China’s atmosphere.

Beijing retaliated, sanctioning Korean companies, slashing tourism and halting imports of K-pop and K-dramas

Also in the first Trump administration, South Korea, the world’s leading maker of advanced memory chips, was forbidden by Washington, which owns key patents in the machinery used for fabrication, from deploying advanced machines to its fabs in China.

That restricted firms’ ability to manufacture advanced chipsets.

“The discomfort is great for Korea: It is not just for the politicians, but also for the business elite, for the firms,” added Mr. Pinkston. “U.S. allies have to figure out what the limits are.”

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2026 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.


washingtontimes.com · Andrew Salmon

9. McMaster Warns Exercise Cuts May Provoke Kim Jong-un


​Summary:


H. R. McMaster warns that reducing, postponing, or halting South Korea U.S. combined exercises could signal wavering resolve, make Kim Jong Un feel stronger, and invite provocation. He argues readiness is built through repetition, and deterrence rests on visible alliance competence, including trilateral resilience with Japan. On OPCON transfer, he supports progress only if it preserves integrated command, joint capabilities, and seamless coordination across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. He judges risks around north Korea rising after the 9th Party Congress and urges stronger public communication in America about why the alliance still matters to U.S. security.




Comment: It depends on the definition of provoke. Kim Jong Un will simply assess his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy is successful and therefore he will double down and that may include some form of provocation to keep extracting concessions..



McMaster Warns Exercise Cuts May Provoke Kim Jong-un

Former Trump Advisor Emphasizes Alliance Strength, Warns Against Undermining Joint Capabilities in OPCON Transfer

By Kim Eun-joong

Published 2026.02.24. 00:51

Updated 2026.02.24. 01:55https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2026/02/24/PAEH2NG2FZFD7GSRLLIUVFMI54/





Herbert. R. McMaster, former White House National Security Advisor, conducts a video interview with our newspaper on the 20th. /Courtesy of Kim Eun-jung

Herbert McMaster, 64, former White House National Security Advisor who served as the top security official in the first Donald Trump administration, commented on domestic moves to scale back, postpone, or halt South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, stating, “This could make Kim Jong-un feel stronger and provoke him instead.” In a recent video interview with this newspaper, he said, “If I were advising President Trump, I would not recommend such a reduction in exercises,” explaining his stance.

McMaster, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, addressed the Lee Jae Myung government’s push to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) within its term, stating, “Now is a time of increasing risks related to Kim Jong-un,” and emphasized, “The transfer must occur in a way that does not undermine command and joint capabilities.”

- **Can scaling back South Korea-U.S. exercises bring North Korea to the negotiating table?**

“If I could advise President Trump, I would say not to do it. Actions like halting exercises, perceived as a lack of resolve between South Korea and the U.S., could make Kim Jong-un feel stronger and provoke aggressive actions. We must continue to convey the strength of the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the resilience of the three countries—South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. In that sense, despite historical grievances, President Lee Jae Myung is playing a commendable role in South Korea-Japan relations.”

- **South Korea did not participate in the U.S.-Japan exercises in the West Sea aimed at countering China.**

“How to respond to the threat from China and the People’s Liberation Army is a decision for the South Korean government. However, China has shown aggression across the Indo-Pacific, including the South China Sea, and I do not believe the Communist Party will abandon its ambitions in the region. They aim to establish subordinate relationships with neighboring countries like South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan and secure exclusive dominance in the Indo-Pacific. This would be a terrible outcome for the South Korean people. Didn’t they already experience the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army during the Korean War?”


President Lee Jae Myung, left, and U.S. President Donald Trump meet and hold a summit at the White House in August last year. /Newsis

- **The Lee Jae Myung government is pushing to transfer OPCON within its term.**

“Judging from the recent 9th Party Congress, Kim Jong-un is less isolated and thus may become more aggressive. We must thoroughly assess the risks of North Korea’s aggressive actions and the readiness of the command responsible for OPCON. Nothing should change regarding the efficiency of South Korea-U.S. joint operations. The ability to cover land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace is crucial, but the coordination and integration functions of the command are most important.”

- **If OPCON is transferred, won’t the U.S. be less involved in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula?**

“I do not think so, but we must communicate more with the American public, who are critical of foreign intervention, about the importance of alliances. A late 1940s CIA report stated, ‘Within months of the last U.S. troop withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula, North Korea will start a large-scale war.’ There are still generations in the U.S. who remember the horrific war of 1950–1953, so this point must be emphasized to the American people.”

- **Could Trump, who is visiting China in April, engage in dialogue with Kim Jong-un?**

“Trump is someone who can talk to anyone. He strongly believes he can achieve negotiations that no one else can. However, as seen in Hanoi in 2019, where he walked out after Kim Jong-un made absurd demands, he will not sign a bad deal.”

- **How do you view the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS)?**

“The NSS is closer to an idealistic document than one that confronts reality. The most critical issue today is that the ‘axis of invasion’—comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—is unprecedentedly uniting and cooperating to dismantle the existing order and international rules and replace them with new ones favorable to their authoritarian rule. I had hoped the document would address China, but Trump, wanting to secure a major deal, likely excluded it to lay the groundwork for negotiations.”

☞ Herbert R. McMaster

Born in 1962. Served as White House National Security Advisor from 2017 to 2018 during the first Donald Trump administration. A retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, he was described by *Time* magazine as “the scholarly warrior of the 21st-century U.S. Army.” Graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and earned a Ph.D. in military history from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, focusing on the Vietnam War. His book *Dereliction of Duty*, based on his dissertation, is a seminal analysis of the Vietnam War’s failures and a required read for U.S. military personnel. Participated in the Gulf War, Iraq War, and Afghanistan War. Resigned after conflicts with Trump over North Korea and Russia policies.

· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.





10. Exclusive: Russian Embassy in Seoul Defies South Korea, Keeps Pro-War Banner


​Summary:


Days before the Feb. 24 anniversary of Russia’s Ukraine invasion, Russia’s embassy in Seoul hung a 15-meter banner reading “Victory will be ours.” South Korea’s foreign ministry asked for removal, but Moscow refused, and Seoul cannot compel action under diplomatic inviolability rules. European diplomats reportedly raised concerns. Russia’s ambassador also publicly thanked north Korean troops for helping in Kursk and praised the 2024 Russia–north Korea strategic partnership, sharpening security anxieties in Seoul. The embassy is said to be planning another pro-war rally, escalating a pattern that critics say tests South Korea’s restraint.



Comment: Seoul is in the middle of everything - Russia, China, and north Korea problems.


Russia is running a deliberate signaling campaign in Seoul: normalize the war narrative, probe Seoul’s political limits, and advertise the Moscow–Pyongyang axis as a fact on the ground. Seoul’s constrained toolkit risks creating a perception of passivity, which can invite further “salami-slice” provocations that raise alliance and domestic political costs over time.


north Korea is not only receiving money and weapons technology from Russia, it is also receiving Russian political warfare support.



Exclusive: Russian Embassy in Seoul Defies South Korea, Keeps Pro-War Banner

Ambassador thanks North Korea for war support; Russia plans rally, escalating tensions

By Lee Ha-won

Published 2026.02.22. 05:30

Updated 2026.02.23. 14:05https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/02/22/CKQ3SFM5E5HYBNH6AZUX6DAN7U/





On the 21st, ahead of the 4th anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a large banner reading 'Победа будет за нами' (Victory will be ours) in Russian hangs on the wall of the Russian Embassy building in Jeong-dong, Jung-gu, Seoul. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests removal, but the Russian Embassy refuses. /Courtesy of Lee Ha-won

Ahead of the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the 24th, a large banner reading “Победа будет за нами” (Victory will be ours) in Russian was hung on the building of the Russian Embassy in Seoul’s Jung-gu district. The South Korean government requested its removal, but Russian authorities have refused, as confirmed.

15-meter-long large banner

On the morning of the 21st, a banner hung by the Russian Embassy was clearly visible from the plaza in front of Chungdong First Methodist Church. The banner, approximately 15 meters long, was produced against a backdrop of the Russian tricolor. The phrase was widely used in the Soviet Union during World War II and has recently been employed as a symbolic expression to justify the invasion war within Russia. It is unusual for a diplomatic mission in downtown Seoul to display a slogan evoking victory in an invasion war.

To verify whether similar banners exist at Russian embassies in other countries with comparable status to South Korea, a contact in Japan was asked to check the Russian Embassy in Tokyo on the same day. As of the 21st, no banners related to the Russia-Ukraine war were found at the Russian Embassy in Tokyo. Similar banners were also not observed at the Russian embassies in France, communist-state countries like China, or Vietnam.


On the 21st, unlike the Russian Embassy in Seoul, no banners related to the Russia-Ukraine war were displayed at the Russian Embassy near Azabudai Hills in Tokyo, Japan.

In Seoul’s diplomatic circles, criticism has mounted that “displaying a slogan declaring victory in an invasion war in the heart of another country is a significant breach of diplomatic conventions.” It was reported that diplomatic envoys from European countries, among others, conveyed concerns to South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the banner.

“Grateful to North Korean troops” in front of South Korean journalists

The issue is not limited to the banner. Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev stated at a press briefing with South Korean journalists at the embassy on the 11th, “Russia is not unaware of how much North Korean troops contributed to liberating the southern regions of Kursk from Ukrainian forces and Western mercenaries,” adding, “We will not forget the greatness of the North Korean troops.”

It was unprecedented for the Russian ambassador in Seoul to publicly express gratitude for North Korea’s participation in the war in front of South Korean journalists. North Korean troops who fought in the Russia-Ukraine war are likely to have gained combat experience and learned advanced drone technology, which could be used to threaten South Korea upon their return, primarily by being deployed along the DMZ. Concerns are rising that this could pose a direct or indirect threat to South Korea’s security. Yet, publicly thanking North Korean troops in front of South Korean journalists is nothing short of a reckless remark. Ambassador Zinoviev also emphasized that the “comprehensive strategic partnership treaty” signed between North Korea and Russia in June 2024 has elevated bilateral relations to a higher stage. This is interpreted as a direct message to South Korean society about strengthening military cooperation with North Korea.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ warning and the limitations of the Vienna Convention

The South Korean government warned that the banner and the ambassador’s remarks were “clearly over the line.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently conveyed its position that “Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, cannot be tolerated for publicly expressing its stance on an illegal war on the walls of its embassy.” Displaying such a slogan on an embassy building could provoke the South Korean public and harm South Korea-Russia relations. Given that the Ukrainian Embassy is also stationed in Seoul, unnecessary diplomatic tensions could arise. The ministry requested the banner’s removal based on this reasoning, but the Russian Embassy refused. The South Korean government cannot forcibly remove it due to the Vienna Convention, which stipulates the inviolability of diplomatic missions.

Russia to hold pro-war rally this year as well

Seoul’s diplomatic circles analyze that Russia is testing the South Korean government’s response level by continuously provoking controversy. On the third anniversary of the invasion on February 24 last year, Russia held a pro-war rally in the plaza in front of Chungdong First Methodist Church, with participants marching while holding large Russian flags. Ambassador Zinoviev took the podium, criticizing the West while referring to the invasion of Ukraine as a “special military operation.” He stated, “Three years ago, the day we invaded Ukraine symbolized the end of the unipolar era and the transition to a fair and democratic multipolar international order.”


On February 24 last year, the 3rd anniversary of the Ukraine invasion, Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgy Zinoviev (front) exits the embassy after holding a pro-war rally, then marches with a large Russian flag toward the embassy. /Russian Embassy in South Korea Facebook

The Russian Embassy in South Korea is reportedly planning a rally similar to last year’s for the fourth anniversary on the 24th. According to coverage by this newspaper’s social affairs mobile team, the embassy has notified the Namdaemun Police Station of its intention to hold the rally. While Russia did not hold public rallies during the first and second anniversaries of the invasion, analysis suggests it has gradually escalated its actions in recent years.

South Korea’s passive response emboldens Russia

An expert familiar with Russian affairs stated, “The Lee Jae Myung government seeks to avoid confrontation with Russia as much as possible, aiming for long-term projects like railways and gas pipelines connecting the two Koreas and Russia, and Russia seems to have noticed this.” In Seoul’s diplomatic circles, there are criticisms asking, “How disrespectful must Russia be toward South Korea to act this way?”

Some criticize the South Korean government’s defensive and passive response for emboldening Russia. Even after Russia restored its blood alliance with North Korea and repeatedly ignored South Korea, the government’s low-key approach under the “Russia special theory” is problematic. When foreign media reported in December 2024 that Russia had designated South Korea’s major industrial and infrastructure facilities as attack targets in the event of a conflict, the government merely stated, “We are monitoring it seriously,” without taking significant action. The government has also summoned the Russian ambassador for protests privately, in contrast to Japan, which publicly discloses such actions and allows photos to be taken, even for minor issues.

“How disrespectful must Russia be toward South Korea?”

Since the inauguration of the Lee Jae Myung government, frequent visits by lawmakers, high-ranking corporate officials, and scholars to the Russian Embassy in South Korea have been pointed out as problematic. While exchanges with Russia can continue even during its invasion war, given the South Korea-Russia relationship, there is a need to consider how smiling toasts with the Russian ambassador by ruling-party lawmakers might be perceived internationally. A former ambassador to Russia, L, stated, “I received multiple invitations from the Russian Embassy in South Korea but did not attend because even shaking hands at an event hosted by the embassy of a country that started a war could lead to misunderstandings.”

Stably managing South Korea-Russia relations is an important diplomatic task. However, the premise is mutual respect. Displaying a banner declaring victory in an invasion war on an embassy building, holding pro-war rallies, and making grateful remarks about North Korea’s participation in the war cannot be described as respect for South Korea. How the Lee Jae Myung government will respond to the Russian Embassy’s overstepping actions remains to be seen.

· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.




11. Viral phrase mocks N. Korea’s wealthy


​Summary:


Daily NK reports a satirical phrase is spreading again in Ryanggang Province markets, especially around Hyesan, to mock the regime-adjacent wealthy. The line, translated as “Though the years go by, take a look at me,” splices lyrics from a 2014 pro-regime song (“Though the Years Go By”) with a hook from the folk song “Milyang Arirang.” In daily use it becomes a sarcastic jab at people with money and power who flaunt comfort while most residents struggle. The phrase first surged in 2020, faded during COVID disruptions, and has resurfaced as inequality becomes more visible.



Comment. Resistance potential in the Socialist Workers Paradise.


Viral phrase mocks N. Korea’s wealthy

dailynk.com · February 23, 2026

The saying faded during COVID-19 but has come back as inequality deepens

By Lee Chae Eun - February 23, 2026

https://www.dailynk.com/english/viral-phrase-mocks-north-koreas-untouchable-wealthy-class/

FILE PHOTO: In this August 2018 photo, apartments can be seen in Hyesan, Yanggang Province. (Daily NK)

A satirical phrase mocking North Korea’s wealthy class has been making the rounds in Ryanggang province marketplaces, blending lyrics from two well-known songs into a sharp jibe at the affluent as frustration over inequality deepens.

“The phrase ‘Though the years go by, take a look at me’ is often heard at marketplaces and other social gatherings in Hyesan nowadays. It refers to people with a comfortable lifestyle, and in particular those with money and power,” a source in Ryanggang province who requested anonymity for security reasons told Daily NK recently.

The phrase was coined by combining lyrics from two songs familiar to North Koreans. “Though the Years Go By,” released in 2014, praises the North Korean regime: its lyrics describe how, thanks to the favor of the Workers’ Party, people feel young in their twilight years and their hearts will never grow old. The phrase “take a look at me” comes from “Milyang Arirang,” an upbeat folk song well known on both sides of the Korean Peninsula. Together, the two fragments take on a new meaning — a sarcastic dig at wealthy North Koreans who love to flaunt their financial abundance.

“The rich and powerful are free of want and worry no matter what happens in the world around them. But while they’re flaunting their newfound wealth, most North Koreans are floundering in the swamp of poverty,” the source said. “Bitterness about that reality is what that phrase conveys.”

A resurgence rooted in deepening inequality

The phrase is not a new coinage. It enjoyed a burst of popularity in 2020 before fading, likely because the COVID-19 pandemic hit the wealthy hard enough to blunt its message. Its recent resurgence suggests that the class divide has widened again and is plainly visible to ordinary people.

“Everybody struggled during the pandemic, but over the past few years, an unbridgeable gap has opened up between the haves and the have nots. For those reasons, many people are impressed by the phrase and really relate to it,” the source said.

People living in Hyesan describe stark contrasts in daily life. Some families do not have enough food to eat while others dine lavishly and dress in the latest fashions. Some households have cars; others lack even a bicycle or an oxcart.

“People wouldn’t relate to this phrase so much if not for the huge lifestyle gap between the rich and poor,” the source said. “What the government needs to do right now is ensure that the worst off still have something to eat.”

Read in Korean

A Note to Readers

Daily NK operates networks of sources inside North Korea who document events in real-time and transmit information through secure channels. Unlike reporting based on state media, satellite imagery, or defector accounts from years past, our journalism comes directly from people currently living under the regime.


We verify reports through multiple independent sources and cross-reference details before publication. Our sources remain anonymous because contact with foreign media is treated as a capital offense in North Korea—discovery means imprisonment or execution.


This network-based approach allows Daily NK to report on developments other outlets cannot access: market trends, policy implementation, public sentiment, and daily realities that never appear in official narratives. Maintaining these secure communication channels and protecting source identities requires specialized protocols and constant vigilance.


Daily NK serves as a bridge between North Koreans and the outside world, documenting what’s happening inside one of the world’s most closed societies.

dailynk.com · February 23, 2026



12. Elite Pyongyang defense unit hit with secrets scandal


​Summary:


Daily NK reports that north Korea’s 91st Capital Defense Corps, known as Training Camp 91, is under intensified scrutiny after a defense ministry inspection found repeated mishandling of secrets. Inspectors reportedly saw level 2 and level 3 classified documents left on desks instead of secured in double-lock safes. They also found access codes for communications equipment left in the open, including stuck to monitors or left on desks, and senior-provided lecture and study materials stored carelessly despite rules requiring secure control. The ministry framed the pattern as a systemic lapse, warned punishment could reach senior ranks, and ordered follow-on inspections until compliance is judged “perfect.”



Comment: This looks like a loyalty-and-discipline correction wrapped in “secrecy” language, designed to reassert political control after earlier allegations of fund misuse. If such sloppiness is credible inside a capital defense unit, it suggests uneven readiness culture and basic operational security weaknesses that could be exploited by penetrations, defections, or technical collection.


Elite Pyongyang defense unit hit with secrets scandal

Inspectors found classified files left in the open and access codes stuck to monitors

By Jeong Seo-yeong - February 23, 2026


https://www.dailynk.com/english/elite-pyongyang-defense-unit-hit-with-secrets-scandal/

dailynk.com · February 23, 2026

https://www.dailynk.com/english/elite-pyongyang-defense-unit-hit-with-secrets-scandal/

North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un touches tank armour as he tours a military equipment facility at an unspecified location in North Korea, in this image released May 4, 2025 by the Korean Central News Agency.

North Korea’s 91st Capital Defense Corps, known as Training Camp 91, is facing fresh scrutiny after a defense ministry inspection found widespread failures to secure classified documents and communication equipment, compounding earlier findings that the unit’s commanders had misused funds.

“Training Camp 91 got in trouble when it was caught up in a storm-like inspection, which revealed that it had been lazy with managing and protecting military secrets,” a source in South Pyongan province who requested anonymity for security reasons told Daily NK recently. “The defense ministry slammed the unit when it found holes in their security, with the unit failing to systematically manage military secrets and even the commanders displaying a lax security consciousness.”

Inspectors found numerous instances in which Training Camp 91 left level 2 and level 3 classified documents on desks in plain view rather than locked in safes with double locks. They also found that some commanders had left access codes for communication equipment on their monitors or desks when they left work, in direct violation of standing security orders.

Inspectors further discovered that commanders had begun storing lecture and study materials from superiors carelessly, despite long-standing regulations requiring secure storage of such materials.

“Having received reports of the issues found in the inspection, the defense ministry could not hide its disappointment that things were still this bad, despite repeated warnings about security at every meeting,” the source said. The authorities had previously taken immediate action whenever problems emerged, elevating violations into political and ideological matters and punishing those responsible.

Defense ministry warns of punishment up the chain of command

What angered the defense ministry most was that nobody at Training Camp 91 appeared to recognize a problem existed, despite the continuous, everyday nature of the failures.

“The latest incident directly demonstrates how lax the military has become,” the source said. “The defense ministry noted that stronger measures are needed.”

The ministry strongly emphasized that strict adherence to military secrecy and security protocols was a basic military necessity, warning that forces lacking this discipline suffer complete defeat on the battlefield. It warned that not even high-ranking generals would escape punishment if found responsible, and ordered that inspections of Training Camp 91 would continue until secrecy and security adherence were deemed perfect.

Training Camp 91 is a key unit in the defense of Pyongyang, responsible for guarding the capital and protecting the nation’s leadership. Given the strategic nature of its role, authorities regard the lax discipline uncovered during the inspection as more than simple workplace negligence — viewing it instead as a serious security gap. The fallout from the inspection is unlikely to dissipate soon.

Read in Korean

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We verify reports through multiple independent sources and cross-reference details before publication. Our sources remain anonymous because contact with foreign media is treated as a capital offense in North Korea—discovery means imprisonment or execution.


This network-based approach allows Daily NK to report on developments other outlets cannot access: market trends, policy implementation, public sentiment, and daily realities that never appear in official narratives. Maintaining these secure communication channels and protecting source identities requires specialized protocols and constant vigilance.


Daily NK serves as a bridge between North Koreans and the outside world, documenting what’s happening inside one of the world’s most closed societies.

dailynk.com · February 23, 2026



13. Finance chief says uncertainties surrounding U.S. tariff scheme 'very' high


Finance chief says uncertainties surrounding U.S. tariff scheme 'very' high | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · February 23, 2026

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260223007800320?section=economy-finance/economy

By Kim Han-joo

SEOUL, Feb. 23 (Yonhap) -- Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol said Monday that uncertainties surrounding U.S. tariff measures remain "very" high following the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling.

Koo made the remarks during a parliamentary briefing after the top court decided to strike down U.S. President Donald Trump's global "reciprocal" tariffs.

"The level of uncertainty in the situation is very high," Koo said when asked about the court's decision. "In some respects, it could be a positive development, but it could also have negative effects."

Uncertainty surrounding the measures further increased after Trump announced a new global levy of 15 percent from 10 percent on trading partners despite the court ruling.

Koo said the latest measure is unlikely to change significantly from the previous policy but cautioned that nothing has been finalized.

"It is difficult to say anything definitively at this stage," he said.

The finance minister added that the government will respond proactively to changes in the situation while maintaining composure.


This Yonhap file photo shows Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol. (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · February 23, 2026





De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

https://apstrategy.org/

Executive Director, Korea Regional Review

https://www.upi.com/Korea-Regional-Review/

Editor-at-large, Small Wars Journal

https://smallwarsjournal.com/

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


 
 
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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