Dear Kenneth,

August has come too soon. I love August, but its one month closer to the end of summer and that I don’t like so much! Enjoy it while you can.

I worked remotely for the month of July which meant a very productive work month for me, replete with great cottage views-even when it poured with rain!

Sammi is maximizing her U.K. experience and is not coming home this summer, so I am back visiting her for some London fun. This time we had a Peter Pan Tea at the Shard-spectacular views and impressive spread with British style! We also enjoyed another show with Tay Tay…also quite the entertaining experience!

I finished the Sam read, FUNNY STORY, by Emily Henry, which was a summer immersive, but now she wants me to read another by the same author, Beach Read. Sammi is definitely not ascribing to my bio/autobiography preferences! Not that we ever need to find something to talk about, but this however makes certain we always can share a laugh.

We watched Zootopia, a Disney Animation from 2016 - I recommend it, both adults and kiddies can learn from this one!

Enjoy the Read,

Kim

STEP CANADA NEW TEP'S

WEL PARTNERS congratulates the following recipients of the TEP designation. WEL Done!!

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/step-canada_step-stepcanada-tep-activity-7230193575353806848-LbLL/

By Albert H. Oosterhoff

Introduction

Winter v Winter^[1] is a recent English case in which the testator, Albert Winter, left the residue of his estate to one of his sons, Philip while cutting out his other two sons, Richard and Adrian. The residue consisted of the testator’s interest in a business partnership and company and the property on which the business was operated. Richard and Adrian brought an action in which they claimed, first, that Albert and his late wife previously made mutual wills and that Albert’s Will was materially different from the mutual wills. Second, they claimed that their parents made numerous assurances to them over the years that they would leave everything to their three sons equally and that Richard and Adrian relied on these assurances to their detriment. Thus, they based their claim in second instance on proprietary estoppel.

Facts

The testator, Albert Winter, his wife, Brenda, and his three sons, Richard, Philip, and Adrian, operated a market garden business as a partnership, known as Team Green Growers (the ‘Partnership’), since 1988. Each of them held a one-fifth share. The business was conducted from its main parcel of land, Bower Farm (Bower Farm’). It was owned by Albert and Brenda, but they had declared a trust of it in favour of the Partnership and they transferred the beneficial interest in the farm to the Partnership in 2000. The Partnership purchased two other farms later which it built houses for Adrian and Philip. The Partnership also built a new house on Bower Farm for Richard.

Brenda died in 2001 and by her will, made in 2000, she transferred her share of the Partnership to her three sons in equal shares. She left the residue of her estate to Albert. Consequently, thereafter, Albert had a 20% share in the Partnership and the three sons each had a 26.66% share. However, in 2004 they transferred the business, but not the property, to a company. Team Green Growers Ltd (the ‘Company’) of which Albert and his sons were equal shareholders. Even though Albert and his sons were equal partners, until about 2014, Albert exercised effective control over the affairs of the Company.

Albert made a new will in 2015. In it he made a gift of £20,000 to his then partner, Diana Turner, and left the residue of his estate, including his interests in the Partnership and the Company, to Philip.

Richard and Adrian sued Philip, the executor of Albert’s estate. They presented two arguments. First, they argued that Brenda and Albert made mutual wills in the same terms as Brenda’s Will of 2000, with the result that, as they claimed, Albert’s estate was subject to a constructive trust to give effect to the alleged mutual will. Second, they argued that they were entitled to an equal share of the estate with Philip based on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. They presented evidence of numerous assurances allegedly made by Brenda and Albert that they would leave all their assets (at least the land and the farming business) equally to their three sons if they committed their lives to the family business. And they argued that they relied to their detriment on those assurances.

The sons worked part-time in the business while they were in school and full-time thereafter, except for two occasions. Richard wanted to join the military after school. But he was invalided out of the Parachute Regiment early on and then abandoned his plans to join the Royal Marines and decided to work on the farm full-time. He was by then in a committed relationship with his future wife and albert had made clear that if he chose the Marines, he would be cut off from the family business. Adrian had a falling out with Albert in 1996, when he went to work for the Royal Ordinance Factory for a few months, followed by some other jobs. But he returned to the family business when Albert had made it clear to him that if he left, he would lose any share he might otherwise receive in the family business. After Richard returned to the family business, the parents established the Partnership.

In 2013-2014 relations between Richard and Adrian on the one hand and Albert and Philip on the other, began to deteriorate. Philip had become closer to his father after Brenda died, while Richard and Adrian focused more on the business. In consequence, Albert sided with Philip in the business. Meanwhile, the business ran into financial difficulties because of excessive borrowing. An independent consultant developed a plan to resolve the difficulties. He recommended that parts of the farming business be discontinued, and some farm machines and excess acreage be sold. Albert and Philip did agree to the plan but were unhappy with it, and Philip took steps to obstruct its implementation. The accountant of the business noted that the lack of communication between the partners and the lack of teamwork would continue to cause problems. He recommended that one family member should be in control of the business, and in fact, Richard assumed effective control. When Albert gave instruction for his 2015 Will, he told his solicitor (who had also advised him and Brenda), that he was disappointed with Richard and Adrian and did not want to leave them anything. The breakdown of relations meant that Richard and Adrian did not meet with their father in the last years of his life and did not attend his funeral. Albert died in 2017. Thereafter the Partnership and Company ceased trading, and its assets were sold or were being sold. Bower Farm was sold for a large amount of money because it had development potential, and indeed, in 2018, planning permission was obtained to develop it into a residential estate.

Analysis and Judgment

Mr. Justice Zacaroli addressed the argument on proprietary estoppel first. By reference to the judgment of Lewison LJ in Davies v Davies,^[2] his Lordship noted that the ingredients necessary to raise an equity are: (a) an assurance of sufficient clarity; (b) reliance by the claimant of that assurance; and (c) detriment to the claimant in consequence of his reasonable reliance. The essential test is unconscionability and, if found, the court must do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result. But the court must also ensure that there is proportionality between the remedy and the detriment which it seeks to avoid. The question of proportionality was also a main focus of the speech of Lord Briggs in Guest v Guest.^[3] Thus, for example, while specific performance of the promise, or its monetary equivalent may be the ideal, if that ‘would be out of all proportion to the cost of the detriment to the promisee’ (para 41), the court may have to limit the remedy. In §80, Lord Briggs summarized his conclusions as follows:

In the end the court will have to consider its provisional remedy in the round, against all the relevant circumstances, and ask itself whether it would do justice between the parties, and whether it would cause injustice to third parties. The yardstick for that justice assessment will always be whether, if the promisor was to confer that proposed remedy upon the promisee, he would be acting unconscionably. “Minimum equity to do justice” means in that context, a remedy which will be sufficient to enable that unconscionability question to be answered in the negative.

Mr. Justice Zacaroli went on to point out that to establish a proprietary estoppel, the assurance relied on by the claimant must be clear. He quoted a statement by Lord Walker in Thorner v Major,^[4] where he pointed out that what amounts to sufficient clarity is ‘hugely dependent on context’, and on that point, Lord Walker quoted the following statement of Lord Hoffman in the unreported case, Walton v Walton:^[5]

The promise must be unambiguous and must appear to have been intended to be taken seriously. Taken in its context, it must have been a promise which one might reasonably expect to be relied upon by the person to whom it was made.

Mr. Justice Zacaroli then considered the evidence. Richard and Adrian testified to the constant assurances by their parents that the three sons would inherit the business if they worked hard on the farm. He found both witnesses to be straightforward and truthful. Philip agreed that the three sons would eventually be treated equally if they worked on the farm in the meantime but denied that his parents had promised that ‘one day all this will be yours’. Philip was aware that Albert was changing his will in 2015 to leave everything to him, but Richard and Adrian were not.

Other witnesses, family members, friends, and professionals, mainly confirmed that Brenda and Albert always intended that their three sons would inherit the business. His Lordship found that the evidence provided by witnesses called by Philip was not helpful, since they had no knowledge about the assurances. The solicitor who drafted the 2015 will did testify that nothing in what Albert said or did during his course of dealings with him suggested that he made promises to his sons that could have created an estoppel. However, his Lordship noted that the assurances were made informally over a long period of time, it would be surprising if Albert was aware of the concept of proprietary estoppel, and therefore it was not surprising that Albert did not tell the solicitor about the assurances.

His Lordship found that the evidence described a family that worked together in their business, that profits were ploughed back in the business and that the sons were expected to work for low wages because they were working for their future. Further, the parents intended to treat their sons equally and intended to leave the business to them if they continued working in it. He concluded that whether or not Albert or Brenda actually told them, ‘All of this will be yours someday’, it was reasonable for the sons to understand that this would be so from the assurances their parents did make to them. This was confirmed by the fact that Brenda left her interest equally to her sons. He noted that what parents tell their children is often said informally, and then it is difficult to distinguish a mere statement of intention from an assurance. But when, as in this case the statements were made to encourage the sons to continue to work in the family business, it is easier to characterize the statements as assurances. He also noted that an assumption by the sons that they would inherit everything would not by itself suffice to raise an equity. But an assumption induced in the sons by things the parents have told them over a long period of time is a sufficient basis for an estoppel.

There was also a subsidiary question, namely, whether the assurances the parents made extended to all their property. His Lordship concluded that the evidence did not allow such a conclusion but that the assurances extended only to the farming business and assets.

Next, his Lordship considered the discrete aspects of proprietary estoppel, namely, reliance, detriment, and unconscionability, separately. He concluded that reliance was clearly established in this case. On the aspect of detriment, he concluded that, while Richard and Adrian did gain and retain a share in the Partnership and the Company, those countervailing benefits could not be held to avoid the conclusion that they suffered a detriment. However, the court may consider such countervailing benefits in structuring the remedy. On these points his Lordship relied, inter alia, on Gillett Holt,^[6] and Davies v Davies.^[7] His Lordship also concluded that it would be unconscionable for Albert’s estate to renege on the assurances made to Richard and Adrian. The fact that the circumstances have changed since those assurances were made, in that the business had become dysfunctional, the sons were no longer able to work together, the business has been wound up, and that Adrian had physically assaulted his father at one point.

His Lordship then considered the appropriate remedy. By reference to Lord Briggs’ speech in Guest,^[8] he considered that, when assurances have been made and acted on over a long period of time, the starting point for determining the appropriate remedy is to give full effect to the assurances. Those assurances would result, in this case, in the sons each receiving a one-third share of the parent’s interest. The fact that the sons have already received value from the realization of their own shares in the Partnership and the Company is irrelevant. So is the fact that the sons have received a windfall from the increase in the value of the Bower Farm, something that the family members did not contemplate when they began the business. Nor was Richard and Adrian’s claim barred by contractual estoppel because they entered into Partnership agreement which contained an option that allowed continuing partners to buy out an outgoing or deceased partner. It was true that Richard and Adrian served a notice on Philip’s lawyer purporting to exercise the option to purchase Albert’s share. However, by its terms, the option was exercisable only by all the other partners together. Since that did not happen, the purported exercise of the option by Richard and Adrian was ineffective.

Finally, his Lordship dismissed the mutual wills argument. The mutual wills doctrine can be made if the testators have entered into a binding agreement that the survivor cannot change his will. There was no evidence of such an agreement and an agreement could not, in the circumstances be inferred from the assurances the parents made to their sons.

Accordingly, his Lordship held that the assurances Albert and Brenda gave throughout their lives were sufficient to give rise to proprietary estoppel in favour of Richard and Adrian. The estoppel extended only to Albert’s and Brenda’s interest in the assets of the Partnership and, from 2004, Albert’s shares in the Company. It did not extend to Albert and Brenda’s personal estates. Thus, Albert’s share of the Partnership business and assets and his shares in the Company were divisible equally between the three sons.

---

[1] [2023] EWHC 2393 (Ch).

[2] [2016] EWCA Civ 463, §38.

[3] [2022] UKSC, at §§74-80. See also my blog, https://welpartners.com/blog/2022/12/proprietary-estoppel-guest-v-guest/  

[4] [2009] UKHL 18, §56.

[5] [1994] CA, §16.

[6] [2001] Ch 210 (CA).

[7] Footnote 2, supra.

[8] Footnote 3, supra.

By Albert H. Oosterhoff 

Introduction

The title to this blog raises an odd question, doesn’t it? The well-known traditional view is that people who might benefit under a charitable trust are not beneficiaries, and therefore they have no right to enforce the trust in proceedings against the trustees. Only the Attorney General (or the Public Guardian and Trustee in Alberta and Ontario) has the jurisdiction to enforce a charitable trust and the people who might benefit under the trust must look to the Attorney General or the Public Guardian and Trustee to enforce the trust.

Objects under a discretionary trust, that is, persons who might become entitled to benefits if the trustees exercise a power of appointment in their favour, were at one time also thought not to have any interest in the trust property and therefore did not have any right to enforce the trust in proceedings against the trustees. However, in McPhail v Doulton,^[1] Lord Wilberforce (who wrote the major decision) held that trustees of a power or a trust power are fiduciaries and can be controlled by the court in proceedings brought by objects of the power or trust power if the trustees exercised the power capriciously or beyond the terms permitted by the trust. The Privy Council came to a similar conclusion in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd.^[2] It concerned trusts that contained wide powers of appointment. The trusts had been created by a wealthy Russian expat. He died unexpectedly and intestate, and his son was his administrator and a potential appointee under the trusts. The son tried to trace his father’s assets brought proceedings against the trustee to make full disclosure of them. The Privy Council held that although objects such as the son, do not have a proprietary interest in the trust property, in appropriate cases the court, in its inherent jurisdiction to supervise and intervene in the administration of trust, can order disclosure of trust documents. The Board expressed the view that the son had an exceptionally strong claim.

More recently, there have been indications in charitable trust cases that people who might benefit under a charitable trust may also be able to bring proceedings against the trustees who act contrary to the terms of the charitable trust. One such case is Bisrat v Kebede.^[3] It concerned a trust established for the promotion of the interests of the Community of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The Management Committee sought to exclude certain members. Those members brought proceedings against the trustees. His Honour Judge Purle QC stated at paragraph 22:

I think one has to be careful of the use of the word “beneficiary” in this context. A charitable trust, as such, does not have beneficiaries in the same sense as beneficiaries under a private trust. No individual has any proprietary interest in the charity’s assets and funds as such, but a person may become a beneficiary in a loose sense as an object of the charitable trust. The advancing of the Ethiopian Orthodox faith would, in one sense, embrace all those of that faith. That would not make all members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, anywhere in the world, who are very considerable in number, persons interested in this charity, but I do think that regular worshippers, who have contributed as such to the acquisition of the assets of the charity, as well as worshipping at the church in its various forms over many years, are undoubtedly interested persons for this purpose.

A similar issue came before the Court of Appeal in Bhamani v Sattar,^[4] and it is significant enough to consider here. Although English charity law differs from the law in the Canadian common law jurisdictions in that in England jurisdiction over charities has been assigned to the Charity Commission and the Attorney General, the law is sufficiently similar to Canadian law.

Facts

The case concerns an unincorporated charity, registered with the Charity Commission, known as Wembley Central Masjid. It operates religious activities for Muslims in one of the London boroughs, where it has established a place of worship and a community centre. Its constitution describes a number of typical charitable objects. It also states that the Masjid provides facilities for daily prayers and prayers on other occasions, and for the advancement of and to promote the social welfare of the Community. Any Muslim was entitled to be a member of the Masjid if he agrees to subscribe to its aims and objects. The property was registered in the names of five persons. The Claimants are either members of the Management Committee or trustees of the Masjid. The Defendants are worshippers at the Masjid, many of them of long standing. The Claimants brought an action against the Defendants in which they claim an injunction to restrain the Defendants from entering the premises. They applied for summary judgment on the ground that they are entitled on behalf of the Masjid to possession of the premises and therefore entitled to refuse access to the Defendants. The Defendants argued that the Claimants were not exercising their powers as charity trustees for the purposes they were given, namely, to further the purposes of the Masjid. Rather, they were trying to silence opposition by the Defendants to their actions and thereby they breached their fiduciary duty. The judge at first instance dismissed the application because it raised issues of fact that could not be resolved on the application for summary judgment.^[5] Not all members of the Management Committee joined as Claimants, but all supported it, and therefore the judge held that the Claimants were charity trustees and had standing to bring the proceedings on behalf of the Masjid. The Claimants appealed.

Analysis and Judgment

The court reviewed the lengthy background to the proceedings, which showed that the affairs of the Masjid had not run smoothly for some years and that the Charity Commission had occasion to write to the trustees on several occasions. Some members, including the Defendants, were in favour of a more inclusive approach, whereas others promoted a stricter or “anti-inclusive” approach. The Management Committee dismissed Mr. Sattar from his position as Imam, a position he had held for many years. He favoured a more inclusive approach. After certain altercations in 2019, the Management Committee closed the Masjid for a few days and resolved to deny entry to the premises to members of the congregation involved in the incident. The Defendants later submitted revised undertakings to abide by the Masjid’s Code of Conduct. The court also reviewed other aspects of the judgment at first instance, in which the Judge held that the Management Committee does not have an absolute or unfettered right to exclude members of the Community without regard to their duties as charitable trustees.

The claimants raised a number of grounds for the appeal. I shall address only the two most relevant ones, namely:

(2) that the Judge was wrong to find that the Defendants could in principle defend a claim in trespass on the grounds that the Claimants were in breach of their duties as charity trustees; and

(3) that the Judge failed to find that the Defendants’ proposed defence amounted to charity proceedings within the meaning of s 115(8) of the Charities Act,^[6] for which the Defendants neither had authorization from the Charity Commission nor permission from the Court.

Lord Justice Nugee, who wrote the judgment for the court, noted with respect to the second ground of appeal that in their amended defence the Defendants alleged that the Claimants’ actions were not to further the purposes of the Masjid but to silence opposition and to promote a particular, restrictive, sectarian and fundamentalist place of worship instead of continuing its inclusive practices. In his Lordship’s view, in principle this should be considered a good defence to the claim in trespass by persons who are objects of the charity as against charity trustees who are not acting to further the purposes of the charity but for some collateral purpose. He held that the Management Committee’s power to control access to the premises must be exercised for the purpose for which it was conferred, namely, the furtherance of the purposes of the Masjid. The Constitution made it clear that those purposes were the provision of facilities for prayers for the benefit of Muslims residing in the Borough and that membership was open to all Muslims regardless of race, colour or gender and country of origin. In the circumstances, he held that the allegations put forward by the Defendants in their amended defence, were capable, if established at trial, to prove that the Management Committee failed to exercise the powers given to it for the purposes of the Masjid. His Lordship noted in paragraph 43:

If the Management Committee are using their power for a collateral or ulterior purpose, that is a misuse of their powers. I do not see that the Court has any business granting an injunction barring the Defendants from the premises from the Premises if that is shown to be something that is being sought as a result of the Management Committee misusing their powers in this way.

Moreover, the Defendants were entitled to use this point as a defence to the claim which barred them from the premises. In other words, the Defendants had standing to raise this point. The Claimants argued that the Defendants did not have a private law right to insist on access to the premises; instead, they were seeking to rely on the right of the public to see that a charity was properly administered. His Lordship disagreed. He stated:

45. I do not accept this submission. I accept of course that the Defendants are not beneficiaries of the charitable trusts in same way that beneficiaries of a private trust are: a charitable trust does not have beneficiaries in the strict sense at all, or as it is sometimes said, the beneficiary of a charitable trust is charity itself. And I accept that charitable trusts are trusts of a public nature: it has always been a requirement of a valid charitable trust that it is for the public benefit … and they are regulated by the Charity Commission and enforced by the Commission and by the Attorney-General, in the public interest. But although charities do not have individual beneficiaries in the private trust sense, that does not mean that they do not benefit individuals. Educational charities educate individuals. charities for the relief of poverty relieve the poverty of individuals, and religious charities such as the Masjid provide facilities for worship for individuals. In the present case the Masjid was established for the benefit of the Community as defined in Article 3, that is Muslims in the relevant area, and among other things to provide services for those in the Community who wish to attend prayers in the Masjid. All such persons (whether members of the Masjid or not) are objects of the charity in this looser sense …^[7]

46. In those circumstances, the Defendants have a direct and personal interest in seeing that the charity, which was established for, among others, their benefit is being properly administered. They are not strangers to the charity with no more interest in it than any member of the public. Indeed Mr. Roseman accepted that they are persons “interested in the charity” (within the meaning of s. 115(1)(c) of the Charities Act 2011). Mr. Qamar’s evidence is that they are regular worshipper at the Masjid where they have attended for decades, and that he himself has attended since he moved to Wembley nearly 20 years ago and has previously served on two Management Committees. Where it is sought to bar them from attending prayers at the Masjid and thereby deprive them of the benefits the Masjid was intended to provide, I see no reason why they should not be able to raise as a defence to the claim the allegation that in issuing the Prohibition and bringing the action the Management Committee is misusing its power for an ulterior purpose …

His Lordship made two additional points:

47. First, this conclusion does not mean that the defendants, or any other objects of the Masjid, could initiate proceedings complaining of breaches of duty by the Management Committee. This trespasses onto Ground 3, but I do not mean to go any further than to say that, when sued, the Defendants as objects of the charity can raise this point as a defence to defend themselves.

48. Second, in his written submissions Mr. Roseman said that such a conclusion would have startling consequences as it would mean, for example, that trespassers on National Trust land could seek to defend a claim to remove them on the basis of alleged breaches of trust. That to my mind does not follow. Trespassers with no interest in the charity at all would be in a very different position to the Defendants here, who are members of the very class the charity was established to benefit. All that I mean to decide is that since the Masjid was established, among other things, to enable members of the Community to attend prayers, those Defendants who are members of the Community and wish to attend prayers are able to defend a claim for an injunction barring them from doing so by raising the defence that the Management Committee is not using its powers for the purposes of the Masjid but for some collateral and ulterior purpose of their own.

Lord Justice Nugee then turned to the third ground of appeal, namely that the defence sought to be raised by the Defendants would in effect convert the proceedings into charity proceedings and that the authorization of the Charity Commission or leave of the Court is required for such proceedings in accordance with s 115 of the Charities Act 2011. Section 15(2) prohibits charity proceedings unless the taking of them is authorized by order of the Commission, and s 115(8) defines “charity proceedings” as proceedings in any court in England or Wales brought under (the court’s jurisdiction with respect to charities, or (b) the court’s jurisdiction with respect to trusts in relation to the administration of a trust for charitable purposes.

His Lordship disagreed with this ground. It was agreed that when Claimants issued their claim the proceedings were not charity proceedings, because they were brought to enforce common law rights, namely, redress for the alleged tort of trespass in this case. The Claimants argued that if the Defendants are allowed to raise their proposed defence, that would raise questions relating to the administration of the trust for charitable purposes, for which the Commission’s authorization is required under s 115. To this argument his Lordship responded:

53. I do not doubt that if the Defendants had sought to issue a claim against the Claimants alleging that they were mismanaging the affairs of the Masjid and seeking relief on that basis, such proceedings would indeed be charity proceedings and require the authorization of the Charity Commission or the leave of a High Court Judge. But pleading a defence to a claim is not in my judgement “bringing” of proceedings, nor it is the “taking” of proceedings. It follows that if the proposed defence is pleaded, there will be no “proceedings … brought under … the court’s jurisdiction with respect to trusts” and hence no charity proceedings within s 115(8((b); nor could it be said that the authorization of the Charity Commission would be required for “the taking of the proceedings” within s 115(2). The proceedings would remain proceedings brought by the Claimants to enforce their common law rights; and the pleadings by the Defendants of the defence would not change the nature of the Claimants’ claim, nor would it itself be the bringing of proceedings by the Defendants.

His Lordship recognized that proceedings could change from not being charity proceedings to being charitable proceeding, but that had not occurred in this case.

Relevance in the Canadian Context

The obvious question is what relevance this case has in the Canadian context, since we do not have the same regulatory regime that England has. In particular. we do not have Charity Commissions. All true. But in Canadian common law jurisdictions it is accepted that private individuals, whether objects of a charity or not, cannot launch proceedings against charitable trustees to enforce the terms of the charitable trust. Instead, they must refer the matter to the provincial Attorney General to whom the Crown has delegated is parens patriae jurisdiction over charities.^[8] In other words, private individuals cannot commence “charity proceedings” against a charity.

On the other hand, as the Bhamani case makes clear, individuals who have a close connection to a particular charity in the sense that they receive benefits from it or are otherwise entitled to receive or take advantage of its services, can defend against claims by the charity purporting to deprive them of such benefits or services. But as the case also makes clear, persons who do not have such a connection to the charity lack such a right. This is clear, for example, from paragraph 48 of the judgment reproduced above.

Does that make persons with a close connection to a charity, beneficiaries? The case makes it clear that they can be considered beneficiaries only in a loose sense, and in my view, it is best to avoid that moniker for objects of a charity. The fact that certain objects, because of their close connection to a charity are entitled to defend their entitlement to benefits or services does not make them beneficiaries.

Finally, it is clear from the case that the public in general do not have the right to enforce a charitable trust. Thus, for example, a non-Muslim or a Muslim not resident in the area of the Masjid in the Bhamani case could not bring proceedings to enforce the trust. Similarly, when a trust that seeks to relieve poverty in a particular area of a city, a person who lives outside that area, or a wealthy person who does live in the area would have not standing to enforce the trust.

Finally, although the case does not address this point directly, the judgment implies that a charity which provides services or benefits to members or others closely associated with it, can exclude persons who are disruptive of its operations or are acting contrary to the charity’s purposes, if the charity can establish this fact.

--

[1] [1971] AC 424 (HL).

[2] [2003] UKPC 26, [2003] 2 AC 709 (PC).

[3] [2015 EWHC 840 (Ch).

[4] [2021] EWCA Civ 243.

[5] [2020] EWHC 2488 (Ch) (Deputy Judge, Mr. Tom Leech, QC).

[6] 2011, c 25. Section 115(1) provides that Charity proceedings may be taken with reference to a charity, inter alia, by any person interested in the charity. Subsection (8) provides:

(8)       In this section “charity proceedings” means proceedings in any court in England or Wales brought under—

(a)       the court's jurisdiction with respect to charities, or

(b)       the court's jurisdiction with respect to trusts in relation to the administration of a trust for charitable purposes.

[7] Here his Lordship referred to the passage from Bisrat v Kebede reproduced in the text at footnote 3, supra.

[8] Or to the Public Guardian and Trustee in Alberta and Ontario to whom the Attorney General has sub-delegated that jurisdiction.

By Evan Pernica

In the recent decision of Kulyk v. Kulyk, an Estate Trustee with a Will was empowered to, amongst other things, deal with estate assets, including real property, despite a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee (“CAET”) never having been obtained.^[1]

Background

A deceased died testate, dividing the residue of his estate equally amongst his two sons, Roman and Andrew, with Roman holding Andrew’s share of residue in trust.

Roman, the Applicant, was named as Estate Trustee. He did not obtain a CAET (the “Applicant” or “Estate Trustee”).

Andrew and his children were the respondents (the “Respondents”).

The estate assets included real property (the “Properties”). The Deceased’s will did not contain language providing beneficiaries with a right to reside in the Properties.

At the time the Deceased’s death, Andrew and his children had been making use of and residing in the Properties. Following the Deceased’s death, Roman allowed Andrew and his then minor children to continue making use of the Properties.

Position of the Parties

Roman sought to have the Properties sold. He claimed that estate funds had been used to cover expenses related to the Respondents’ use of the Properties, with Roman subsequently using his own funds for expenses once a shortfall arose; that the Respondents were causing nuisance and contributing to deterioration of the Properties; and, that the Respondents were independently renting out portions of the Properties without accounting for rental income.

Being that a CAET had not been obtained, Roman sought an Order from the court that, amongst other things:

• vested the Properties in him as Estate Trustee with a Will;
• provided him authority to obtain vacant possession of and sell the Properties; and
• required the respondents to account for any rental revenue received in respect of the Properties.

The Respondents did not respond to the application.

Analysis

On the issue of whether Roman’s failure to obtain a CAET was fatal to the relief being sought, the Honourable Justice Faieta cited our colleague, Albert Oosterhoof for the position that Estate Trustees derive their authority from the terms of a will itself, while the CAET primarily serves to authenticate, rather than vest, those powers in the estate trustee:

The question is often asked: Is it necessary to obtain probate [certificate of appointment of estate trustee] in every case? The answer is, no. This is because executors derive their authority from the will rather than from the probate process. As a result, executors have the lawful authority to deal with estate property even if they do not obtain probate. Likewise, courts have jurisdiction over wills (and the executors appointed thereunder) regardless of whether they are submitted for probate. … The primary function served by probate [certificate of appointment of estate trustee] is therefore not to vest named executors with authority to deal with estate property but to authenticate to third parties that the persons presenting themselves as the executors are indeed the persons (more specifically, the only persons) with that authority.  See Albert R. Oosterhoff et al. Oosterhoff on Wills, 9th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2021) at page 33.^[2]

Accordingly, there was no need for an Order vesting, providing possession of, or permitting sale of the Properties as Roman already held legal title in trust for the Estate and derived the authority to sell the Properties from the terms of the will itself, despite a CAET not having been obtained.

Concluding Comments

The within decision affirms that the issuance of a CAET is not a necessary precondition to an Estate Truste with a Will exercising their authority. Instead, such authority is derived from the terms of a will itself, while the CAET serves to authenticate those powers already vested in the Estate Trustee.

---

[1] Kulyk v. Kulyk, 2024 ONSC 4213.

[2] Ibid at para 10; Albert R. Oosterhoff et al. Oosterhoff on Wills, 9th ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2021) at page 33

By Gabriella Banhara



In Drennan v. Drennan,^[1] the Court ordered against the Respondent, payment of substantial indemnity costs for his failure to participate in the litigation process, despite making allegations against the Applicant. The conduct of this litigation was described by the Court as scorched earth litigation, resulting in the Court ordering the Respondent to pay for the interest accumulated on the litigation loans of the Applicant.^[2]

The Deceased had two children, a daughter (the “Applicant”) and a son (the “Respondent”). Under the Deceased’s will, the Applicant was entitled to 50% of the residuary estate, while the Respondent was entitled to 25%, and his two children, were entitled to the final 25%.^[3] The Respondent was of the position that the estate should be divided equally in 1/3 shares. Due to the increasing tension amongst the parties, the Applicant sought the removal of the Respondent as the Estate Trustee of the Deceased and requested an Estate Trustee During Litigation (“ETDL”). During the hearing of the motion seeking the removal of the Estate trustee on November 21, 2023, the Respondents were self-represented and failed to file their materials. Additionally, the Respondent had pleaded that he had "prepared a lengthy narrative document answering the Applicant’s claims”.^[4]

Following the hearing, the Court’s endorsement outlined the procedural steps required for the Respondents’ continued participation in the proceedings. This included the Respondent’s required filing of a notice of appearance and sworn evidence, as well as a case conference to combine the procedural steps. The Court ordered costs against the Respondent for the motion that took place on November 21, 2023, due to his failure to abide the timeline previously set, and his failure to disclose important facts.^[5]

Following this motion, the Respondent continued to ignore the orders made by the Court. The Respondents failed to finalize the order and deliver a notice of appearance, despite the Court's warning of the risk of increased costs.^[6] Moreover, the Respondents did not commence a will challenge as they had previously threatened and had essentially remained “mute” for months following the hearing that took place in November of 2023.^[7] Lastly, the appointment of the ETDL was delayed due to the Respondent’s silence as an Estate trustee. This resulted in the mortgage of the Deceased’s home falling into arrears, and the mortgagee enforcing its rights.^[8]

The Court addressed the final and only remaining issue involving the application, costs. The court awarded the Applicant costs on a substantial indemnity basis. The Court outlined the reasons previously stated for such a cost award, including the Respondents delay of the application and, their failure to “oppose the relief sought by the applicant”. ^[9]

The Court also notably, stated the following:

[17] It seems that the respondents just wanted to make scurrilous allegations and then to delay so as to hurt the applicant even if it prejudiced them. This is an abuse of the litigation process and deserving of enhanced costs. See: Mars Canada Inc. v. Bemco Cash & Carry Inc., 2018 ONCA 239 (CanLII) at para. 43.^[10]

Lastly, the Applicant sought to recover the interest taken on her litigation loan as a disbursement. The Court allowed such disbursement on the basis that there was evidence to prove that the loans were taken due to the Respondent’s failure to administer the estate.^[11] The court went on to find:

[20] In this case, the loan amount is modest. The evidence is simple and straightforward. The loan was needed and used for the applicant’s legal fees to prosecute this application. Coupled with the [Respondent’s] abuse of the process of the court, this a prime case for recovery of the applicant’s interest costs as a disbursement reasonably incurred to carry the litigation.

The Applicant’s costs amounted to $65,000, and the Respondent was required by the Court to pay $60,000 of such amount. Drennan v. Drennan demonstrates the court's disapproval of scorched earth litigation and bad faith conduct through cost awards.

---

[1] Drennan v. Drennan, 2024 ONSC 3905 (CanLII)

[2] Ibid at para 19.

[3] Ibid at para 2.

[4] ibid at para 4.

[5] Ibid at para 3.

[6] Ibid at para 4

[7] Ibid at para 5

[8] Ibid at para 6

[9] ibid at para 12

[10] ibid at para 17.

[11] Ibid at para 19.

By Irit Gertzbein, LLB, of Gertzbein Law, in Association with WEL PARTNERS

With increased globalization, family wealth may now span across multiple countries, and even continents. Upon death, a conflict of laws arises when the legal regimes of several jurisdictions apply – each with different and sometimes contradictory laws – and each bringing about different legal outcomes.

Cross-border Succession

At law, every country possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory. The laws of every country, therefore, affect and bind directly all property, whether real or personal property, within its territory.

For example, the passing away of a Canadian, resident in Ontario, who owned real estate in Spain, would create a situation where the succession laws of one jurisdiction are in opposition to the laws of the other jurisdiction. The deceased Canadian’s property located in Spain would be subject to Spanish succession laws, which differ from succession laws of Ontario, most notably with respect to “forced heirship” in favour of spouses and children. If the Canadian individual had intended to gift the property located in Spain to a friend or to charity, Spanish forced heirship rules may impact the Canadian’s wishes with respect to that property.

The New European Union Succession Regulation

In the past there has been no uniform succession law applicable in Europe to give guidance to those who live or own property there, with respect to the succession of their assets located in Europe, upon death. The need for legal certainty and simpler court proceedings pertaining to the succession of estate assets has gone unmet among the European countries – until last year.

On August 17, 2015, the European Union Succession Regulation (“EU Succession Regulation”) came into effect to alleviate the difficulties and unintended results faced by individuals who own property in Europe, and to eliminate the need for the conflict of laws principle from applying and being addressed in multiple courts, as well as bringing about less cumbersome and less expensive international succession.

All countries who are part of the European Union, with the exception of Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom, are signatories (“Participating Nations”) to the new EU Succession Regulation. Where a citizen or resident of one of the Participating Nations directs, in writing, which country’s succession laws are to apply at his or her death, then, regardless of whether the succession ultimately occurs as per the deceased’s Last Will and Testament or as per the Rules of Intestacy, the chosen country’s succession laws will apply instead of the local laws.

Good News for Canadians

In essence, the EU Succession Regulation allows individuals who own property located within Participating Nations to opt out of that jurisdiction’s succession laws in favour of another jurisdiction’s laws, even if that other jurisdiction is not in Europe. The EU Succession Regulation enables individuals to choose either their nationality or their residency (where they differ) to determine the laws that will govern the succession of their estate, across all European borders (with the exception of Denmark, Ireland and the UK).

The benefits of adopting the new EU Succession Regulation by the Participating Nations include:

(i)       The application of a single law by a single court, enforceable in all other participating nations’ jurisdictions;

(ii)      Creation of a European Certificate of Succession, akin to a Certificate of Estate Trustee or Letters Probate in Canada which, once issued, authorizes the executors or administrators of an estate (referred to as a liquidator in Quebec) to act upon the estate, and provides the beneficiaries with the ability to exercise their entitlement across borders of participating nations without further proceeding;

(iii)     Citizens and/or residents of participating nations with multiple nationalities are able to choose whether the law applicable to their succession will be that of their residence or that of (one of) their nationality; and,

(iv)     Elimination of parallel court proceedings and conflicting judicial decisions and, therefore, a significant reduction in the cost and time spent administrating and distributing estates.

Seek Counsel

As a rule of thumb, the evolution of law follows Policy decisions, at some level. Sometimes new laws are meant to impose tighter restrictions, and other times legal reform is meant to expand citizens’ rights and advantages. In the case of the EU Succession Regulation, it is intended to be the latter. For Canadians who have ties to Europe in terms of property located there, this new law will provide advantageous estate planning opportunities.

As always, there is a caveat: estate planning is never simple. The introduction of new law creates, in addition to the new opportunities and advantages, further complications. It’s important for anyone who owns property within the European Union to review his or her estate plan with the appropriate professionals. The new succession rules are complex, and while revising Wills to take advantage of the opportunities available as a result of the new rules is recommended, conflicts of laws may still arise in the future in certain circumstances due to the opting out of some of the European Union nations from signing on to the EU Succession Regulation. Obtaining a specialist’s professional advice is recommended.

The Regulation will apply to the estate of any individual who died on or after August 17, 2015, whose last habitual residence was a European Union Member State, who had assets located in a European Union Member State, or, who chose in his or her Will the law of another Member State of which he or she was a citizen.

See the following link for more information regarding Gertzbein Law in association with WEL PARTNERS. https://welpartners.com/gertzbeinlaw

By Fabiana Araujo Monteiro da Silva Kennedy

Introduction

In a recent decision from the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Dewberry Estate (Re)^[1], an application was brought by an estate administrator, Angela Dewberry (“Ms. Dewberry”) for directions regarding the process to be followed in the sale of an estate property.^[2] The application is directed at obtaining an order that would authorize Ms. Dewberry to purchase the property in her personal capacity during, or immediately following the expiry of, the sale offer period.^[3]

Two previous applications were heard in this matter by Honourable Justice Thompson (“Justice Thompson”).

Background

William Scott Dewberry (“Mr. Dewberry”) died on August 10, 2016, without a Will.^[4]

He was survived by his three daughters namely, Ms. Dewberry, Tracey Friman and Elaine Eaton. The sisters are entitled to equal shares in Mr. Dewberry’s estate in accordance with s. 23(2) of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13.^[5]

Ms. Dewberry obtained a grant of administration in respect of Mr. Dewberry’s estate (“Estate”) on October 19, 2016.^[6] The Estate’s significant assets comprise a truck (which has already been sold), and a two-acre Port McNeill property with a manufactured home on it (“Property”). The Property is the focus of this application.^[7]

When Mr. Dewberry died, the Property was encumbered by two mortgages that totaled about $70,000. The BC Assessment value of the Property was $155,200 at the time of Mr. Dewberry’s death, and $179,600 in 2021. As is hardly surprising in BC, the value of the Property increased since Mr. Dewberry’s death. In 2024, the BC Assessment value for property tax purposes was $301,800.^[8]

Ms. Dewberry has been residing on the Property since about August 2017.^[9]

A. The July Decision^[10]

Ms. Dewberry’s April 17, 2023, application was heard on July 24, 2023, and the July 2023 Decision was issued as a result. Ms. Friman opposed the application and Ms. Eaton took no position.^[11]

The Justice Thompson rejected Ms. Dewberry’s application to purchase the Property for the sale price of $179,000.^[12] Nevertheless, Justice Thompson gave Ms. Dewberry the opportunity to confirm whether she would purchase the Property for $284,000, the appraised value at the time.

Ms. Dewberry made an offer worth $265,000, which was rejected by her sisters.

On August 23, 2023, Ms. Dewberry appeared before Justice Thompson again. She sought short leave for an application seeking an order allowing her to buy the Property without beneficiary consent. Justice Thompson declined to grant short leave. In doing so, he observed that the proposed application appeared to have little or no merit.^[13]

B. The October 2023 Decision^[14]

On October 5, 2023, Ms. Dewberry filed a notice of application seeking an order permitting her to purchase the Property without consent for $284,000. The application was dismissed in the October 2023 Decision.^[15]

Justice Thompson further stated that Ms. Dewberry had failed to abide by the timelines set in the July 2023 Decision and had failed to secure the necessary consent from her sisters.

The Application and Response

On March 7, 2024, Ms. Dewberry filed the notice of application seeking directions on the process for her to follow when selling the Property.

Justice Thompson kindly reminded the parties that an administrator owes a duty of good faith to the estate: Haynes Estate (Re), 2021 BCSC 669 at para. 22.,^[16] and on the facts, Ms. Dewberry did not meet that standard in attempting to sell the Property following the October 2023 Decision.^[17]

Ms. Dewberry did not make a diligent or reasonable effort to sell the Property following the October 2023 Decision.^[18]

Concluding Comments

Ms. Dewberry’s sale efforts following the October 2023 Decision did not comport with her fiduciary duties as administrator. It follows that the orders she seeks under the application cannot be made. As a result, the application was dismissed.^[19]

In this case, the Estate Administrator was looking to buy the property from the estate. A problem arose due to the rule against self-dealing. Justice Tucker remarkably explained that an application to self-deal, is only permissible under the law if all beneficiaries consent to the proposed transaction or by Court approval.

As this decision highlights, the rule of self-dealing triggers an important consideration to the drafting solicitor which is the selection of the Estate Administrator to finalize the Deceased’s affairs and the wording of the Will. The drafting solicitor will assist in choosing the best person suited to the task and explain their duties and responsibilities.



In answering the question whether self-dealing is allowed, the answer will be determined based on the facts of the matter reviewing if there is a will on the precise wording in the Will to exclude the self-dealing rule or if there is no will in an application for a Court approval.

--

[1] Dewberry Estate (Re), 2024 BCSC 1374 (CanLII) (“2024 Dewberry Estate (Re)”)

[2] Ibid at para 1

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid at para 3

[5] Ibid at para 4

[6] Ibid at para 5

[7] Ibid at para 6

[8] Ibid at para 7

[9] Ibid at para 8

[10] Dewberry Estate (Re), 2023 BCSC 1325 (CanLII)

[11] 2024 Dewberry Estate (Re) para 15

[12] Ibid at para 16

[13] Ibid at para 19

[14] Dewberry Estate (Re), 2023 BCSC 2508 (CanLII)

[15] 2024 Dewberry Estate (Re) para 15

[16] Ibid at para 31

[17] Ibid at para 34

[18] Ibid at para 47

[19] Ibid at para 48

By Oliver O’Brien

The law imposes a duty on all trustees, including estate trustees, to keep accurate and fulsome accounts. A trustee must keep a complete record of their activities and be always able to prove that they administered the estate prudently and honestly. The ability to properly account may impact the amount of compensation an estate trustee is entitled to.

Passing of Accounts

An application by a fiduciary to pass accounts is not strictly, in legal terms, a mandatory requirement. Rather, the fiduciary may choose to pass its accounts, or alternatively, may be compelled to do so by those legally entitled to request a passing. The legal duty is in the maintenance of the accounts as fiduciaries. The right to compel an accounting is not an absolute right, regardless of the circumstances, rather it remains within the discretion of the court to either grant or refuse such an order.

In Zimmerman v. McMichael Estate (“Zimmerman”), Justice Strathy (as he then was) stated that:

[31] A trustee has an obligation to keep proper accounts. A trustee must keep a complete record of his/her activities and be in a position at all times to prove that he/she administered the trust prudently and honestly. He/she must have the accounts ready and give full information whenever required: Carmen S. Thériault, Widdifield on Executors and Trustees, 6th ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 2002) at p. 13-1; Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada, above, at p. 1063; Sandford v. Porter, [1889] O.J. No. 43, 16 O.A.R. 565 (C.A.).[1] [emphasis added]

The jurisdiction of an estate trustee to pass accounts arises from section 48 of the Estates Act,[2] as follows:

Accounting by executor trustee

48. Every executor who is also a trustee under the will may be required to account for their trusteeship in the same manner as they may be required to account in respect of their executorship.[3]

Beneficiaries under a Last Will and Testament are entitled to accurate information and accounting from estate trustees. In Estate of Arthur O. Sawdon. v. Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Canada, Justice Ricchetti stated that the beneficiary of an Estate is entitled to all the documentation that an estate trustee has.^[4]

The procedure and form for estate trustee accounts is set out in the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure,^[5] specifically Rule 74.16 to Rule 74.18. Rule 74.14(1) states that estate trustees must keep accurate records of the assets and transactions in the estate. Pursuant to this Rule, estate trustee accounts filed with the court must contain the following:

i)          A statement of the original assets at the start of the accounting period;

ii)         An account of all money received by the estate;

iii)        An account of all money disbursed by the estate;

iv)       Where the estate trustee has made investments, an account detailing said investments;

v)         An account of unrealized assets at the end of the accounting period;

vi)       A list of investments at the end of the accounting period;

vii)      A statement of all liabilities of the estate at the end of the accounting period; and

viii)      A statement of compensation claimed by the estate trustee.

Estate Trustee Compensation

An estate trustee’s compensation will also reflect his or her administration and accounting of the assets. In Ontario, an estate trustee is generally entitled to claim compensation of 2.5% of capital receipts and disbursements, and 2.5% of all revenue receipts and disbursements above those expenses required to administer the estate (subject to adjustment by a court). This is referred to as roughly 5% of the estate’s value.[6] However, the court has the discretion to assess the quantum of compensation and will do so with consideration of the following factors:

1.   the size of the trust;

2.   the care and responsibility involved;

3.   the time occupied in performing the duties;

4.   the skill and ability shown by the estate trustee; and

5.   the degree of success resulting from the administration.[7]

In Zimmerman, the estate trustee did not comply with their duty to provide a sufficient accounting to the beneficiaries of the estate and accordingly breached their fiduciary duties. The estate trustee’s compensation was reduced to zero and ordered to repay the pre-taken compensation. Justice Strathy (as he then was) held that:

A trustee must make a proper accounting as a condition precedent to being awarded compensation. Without a proper accounting, the court is unable to assess the conduct of the fiduciary and to determine the compensation to which he or she is entitled.[8]

In Clark v. Kane et al, Justice Abrams reduced the estate trustees’ entitlement for compensation to zero and awarded costs given the accounts were “dilatory in the preparation and presentation of her accounts”.[9]

For further information on this topic including passing of accounts and trustee compensation, please see Whaley Estate Litigation Partners on Fiduciary Accounting (2024): https://welpartners.com/resources/WEL-on-fiduciary-accounting.pdf

---

[1] Zimmerman v. McMichael Estate, 2010 ONSC 2947 at para 31.

[2] Estates Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.21.

[3] Ibid. at section 48.

[4] Estate of Arthur O. Sawdon. v. Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Canada, 2010 ONSC 4066 at para 23.

[5] Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194

[6] See section 61 of the Trustee Act; RSO 1990, c T.23; Laing Estate v. Hines, 1998 CanLII 6867 (ONCA). And Farmers’ Loan and Savings Company, (1904), 3 O.W.R. 837.

[7] Toronto General Trusts Corp. v. Central Ontario Railway (1905), 6 O.W.R. 350 (H.C.). 

[8] Zimmerman at para 34.

[9] Clark v. Kane et al, 2022 ONSC 5525 at para 31 and para 34.

ACFI Conference – Association of Certified Forensic Investigators of Canada 

September 9-10, 2024, ACFI Fraud Conference

Fraud & Scams in Wills, Estates and POA’s 

Speakers: Kimberly Whaley and Bryan Gilmartin 

https://www.acficonference.ca/spring 

2024 STEP Chicago Conference

October 6 – 9, 2024

Incapacity Planning

Speakers: Kimberly Whaley

https://web.cvent.com/event/f9837a29-18bb-4e46-a911-2f5b3a15f2d5/summary?RefId=NAT%20HP

2024 STEP Bermuda Conference

October 15 – 16, 2024

Predatory Marriages

Speakers: Kimberly Whaley

https://preview.shorthand.com/GaL8B5bYtn4gvG1Q

Colloquium Legal Education Conference, Sudbury, ON

October 16 – 18, 2024

Estates Section

Speaker/Chair: Bryan Gilmartin

https://www.colloquiumsudbury.com/

Osgoode Estate Litigation Certificate Program

October 21, 2024

Non-Contentious and Contentious Proceedings – Locating Missing Beneficiaries

Speaker: Kimberly Whaley & Bryan Gilmartin

https://osgoodepd.ca/professional-development/certificates/estate-litigation/

Law Society of Ontario Trusts and Estates Summit, Day 1

October 22, 2024

Conflicts of Law in Guardianship Proceedings

Speaker: Bryan Gilmartin

https://store.lso.ca/27th-estates-and-trusts-summit-day-one

Law Society of Ontario Trusts and Estates Summit, Day 2

October 23, 2024

Complex capacity issues regarding granting and acting on powers of attorney

Speaker: Nima Hojjati

https://store.lso.ca/27th-estates-and-trusts-summit-day-two

STEP Italy Mental Capacity SIG Seminar

October 23, 2024

Predatory Marriages

Speaker: Kim Whaley

Canadian Lawyer Webinar

November 6, 2024

Case Law Update

Speakers: Kim Whaley and Ian Hull

LESA

April 10 - 12, 2025

Jointly Held Assets

Speaker: Kim Whaley

https://www.lesaonline.org/program/lesas-refresher-2025-wills-and-estates-victoria/

Check out our recent Feature Series which are posted on our Blog:

1 WEL PARTNERS - SENIORS’ SERIES

2 WEL PARTNERS ON POWERS OF ATTORNEY: POA Weekly

3 WEL PARTNERS ON GUARDIANSHIP: Guardianship Weekly

4 WEL PARTNERS – DIGITIZING THE BUSINESS OF WILLS

5 WEL PARTNERS – ELDER LAW SERIES

6 WEL PARTNERS ON SOLICITOR'S NEGLIGENCE

7 WEL ON THE STREET by Daniel Paperny

8 WHAT REMAINS by Bryan Gilmartin

9 USING ENGLISH PROPERLY by Albert H. Oosterhoff

10 WEL ON CHARITIES SERIES by Oliver O'Brien

The Determination of Costs in Capacity Litigation

The Power of Estate Trustees to Deal with Estate Assets Following the Expiry of an Initial Life Interest

A Case Demonstrating When a Settlement is an Enforceable Settlement?

Enforcing Minutes of Settlement

Litigation Tips – In-Person Civil Court Attendance Guide

Removal Or Passing Over of Executor?

Does an Executor Have a Duty to Notify Beneficiaries in an Earlier Will?

The Administration of an Estate Gone Wrong and an Estate Trustee’s Resignation

What Factors will a Court Consider in an Application for a Dependant’s Support Claim under the Ontario, Succession Law Reform Act

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