Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Special Operations Forces were built to solve the hardest of hard problems. You are creative, you are entrepreneurial, you are committed to solving the most difficult things, and you never, ever, ever give up."

– Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine during SOF Week 2025 keynote, May 8.

"Somewhere in the world right now, at this very moment, a small SOF team is operating quietly, thousands of miles from home ... They are doing what SOF has always done: providing the asymmetric advantage America needs in a volatile world."

– Mr. Colby Jenkins,, PTDO ASD/SOLIC, SOF Week, May 8

"The name of the game is multi-domain. It's integration, it's interoperability, it's interchangeability. If we're going to make a return on investment and close kill chains to ensure SOF forces are capable, lethal, and resilient, we have to have interoperable mission systems."

– SOCOM AE Melissa Johnson, SOF Week, May 7th

1. Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea

2. South Korea’s Global Vision: Opportunities for UK–South Korea Partnership

3. Putin Parades China, North Korea Ties in Victory Day Show of Force

4. DP candidate says strong S. Korea-Japan relations vital to economy, security

5. PPP candidate, party's interim leader clash again on candidacy merger

6. Court dismisses injunction seeking to recognize Kim Moon-soo as PPP presidential candidate

7. Putin meets N. Korean military delegation during Victory Day parade in Moscow

8. What if a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan emboldens North Korea

9. ROK ruling party candidate Kim Moon-soo embraces nukes to counter North Korea

10. Putin, Xi demand end to sanctions and ‘military pressure’ against North Korea

11. North Korean missile test simulates nuclear attack on US-ROK forces: State media

12. North Korea claims 'nuclear trigger training', but... "Purpose is to export 600mm rocket launcher to Russia"

13. Korean Abductee Families Distribute Anti-North Korea Leaflets Along Gangwon Border

1. Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea

I of course fundamentally and strongly agree with the conclusion that the current trajectory of north Korean relations is unsustainable and that the US administration needs a new strategy.

Based on my assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime I do not think sustained peaceful coexistence is possible. It is the fundamental assumptions that drive the direction of policy and strategy and our fundamental assumptions are diametrically opposed.

I believe the administration's new strategy must focus on supporting the Korean people's pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

This paper is valuable in that it provides lot of well researched background but it provides descriptions of the regime and comes to conclusions that I do not agree with so let me offer my description of the regime and my recommended acceptable durable political arrangement (or end state) that will serve, protect, and advance US and ROK/US alliance interests (and solve the "Korea question").

The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.

The only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people living in the north by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a free and unified Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. A free and unified Korea or in short, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK).

While they recognize the horrendous human rights situation in the north I don't think they take a strong enough stance on the issue because human rights are not only a moral imperative they are a national security issue as well. Here is their recommendation about human rights.

Cooperation on humanitarian and human rights concerns. North Korea could agree to restart joint recovery operations for the remains of 5,200 U.S. service members still believed to be in North Korea from the Korean War and to support efforts to reunite thousands of Korean American families with their relatives in North Korea.54 North Korean willingness to engage constructively on human rights with the United States and other relevant partners such as the UN would help improve diplomatic ties and advance stable coexistence. Meeting human rights obligations to which North Korea has already committed in conventions and the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, such as the rights of children and persons with disabilities, would offer Pyongyang a more palatable starting point. The 1975 Helsinki Accords—under which Europe and the United States secured the Soviet Union’s agreement to various human rights provisions as part of a broader deal that allowed Moscow to receive territorial and economic trade benefits—may be a useful model for how the United States could advance North Korean human rights within a stable coexistence framework.

And these are excerpt of the recommendations they make:

After North Korea reengages and reciprocates with its own confidence-building measures, the United States could, after consulting and coordinating with allies, consider these additional steps within a negotiation process:

Offering time-limited, partial sanctions relief.
...
Proposing a strategic military-to-military dialogue between the Korean People’s Army and the U.S. Department of Defense.
...
Seeking engagement with North Korea on strategic stability.
...
Resuming discussions on risk and conventional arms reduction frameworks, including the currently suspended 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement
(CMA) between North and South Korea.
...
Loosening restrictions on North Korean travel to and in the United States.
...
Proposing U.S.–North Korea collaboration and exchanges on various economic, health, humanitarian, and other people-to-people areas.
...
Offering humanitarian assistance.

The conclusion and summary are below.

The full 38 page report can be downloaded in PDF here: https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Aum Panda_North Korea Policy-1.pdf

The full paper can be read online here: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/05/pursuing-stable-coexistence-a-reorientation-of-us-policy-toward-north-korea?lang=en

On a side note. Although I often disagree with my friend and colleague Frank Aum, I respect his work. I am saddened by the loss of his employer, the US Institute of Peace to our nation. You may not agree with all the conclusions its scholars reach but the work they have done (and hopefully will continue to do) advances our knowledge of conflict around the world in the hope of bringing peace in our time.

Conclusion

After nearly thirty-five years, the time has come for the United States to revise the first principles

guiding its policy toward North Korea. The status quo trajectory is unsustainable and

has allowed unacceptable risks to fester. Meanwhile, an emboldened North Korea is now

not only a source of instability in Northeast Asia, but also in Europe, where its troops fight

alongside Russia against Ukraine. Pyongyang’s increasingly survivable and diverse nuclear

arsenal, meanwhile, has rendered the risk of nuclear war—with catastrophic consequences

for Northeast Asia and the U.S. homeland alike—more credible. Against this backdrop, the

Trump administration has an opportunity to fundamentally redesign North Korea policy,

moving away from one that prioritizes the unattainable goal of denuclearization toward a

broader, stable coexistence with a nuclear-armed North Korea. The administration should

seize this opportunity to make the United States safer, stronger, and more prosperous and to

advance peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.

Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea

It is now clear that applying pressure does not lead to North Korean restraint; rather, it fuels North Korean provocations. The United States and its allies should instead seek stable coexistence with Pyongyang as an overarching goal.

by Frank Aum and Ankit Panda

Published on May 6, 2025

Frank Aum
Frank Aum was formerly the senior expert on Northeast Asia at the United States Institute of Peace. He focused on ways to strengthen diplomacy to reduce tensions and enhance peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. From 2011 to 2017, he worked at the U.S. Department of Defense as the senior adviser on Korea in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Ankit Panda
Stanton Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program

Summary

The status quo trajectory of U.S. policy toward North Korea is unsustainable. Rigid adherence to a narrow strategy of denuclearization and enhanced deterrence has led to a state of dangerous coexistence. The results are unbridled growth in North Korea’s nuclear force capabilities, its adoption of a nuclear doctrine that features preemptive use of nuclear weapons, and compounded risks of crisis escalation. The current state is also plagued by complete estrangement between Washington and Pyongyang that forecloses crisis management and tension reduction, increased demand for nuclear weapons in South Korea, and a strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia that is destabilizing multiple regions.

Yet the United States continues its approach of denuclearization through pressure despite consensus among U.S. intelligence that North Korea will not disarm and despite empirical evidence that suggests U.S. diplomatic engagement can mitigate North Korea’s provocative behavior. It is now clear that applying pressure does not lead to North Korean restraint; rather, it fuels North Korean provocations. This clash between analysis and goals has promoted policy incoherence.

The United States and its allies should instead seek stable coexistence with Pyongyang as an overarching goal. This approach would emphasize risk reduction and improved relations with North Korea while maintaining deterrence. It would also entail, at least for the near term, tolerating North Korea’s continued possession of nuclear arms and recognizing that the status quo of attempting to manage threats exclusively through deterrence measures ultimately presents unacceptable risks to U.S. and allied interests.

Stable coexistence is consistent with U.S. President Donald Trump’s stated intention to “have relations with North Korea” and “get along with” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.¹ The current U.S. administration therefore seemingly has the political will to start pursuing stable coexistence and be the first to take proactive steps to reduce tensions and risks. These steps could include formally announcing the United States’ intention to improve relations with North Korea, which Trump has already begun to signal, and initiating confidence-building measures that are taken independently but designed to invite reciprocity from Pyongyang.

At the same time, the United States should instill the urgency of pursuing stable coexistence in its ally South Korea, explaining the goal as crucial for reducing the risk of conflict and nuclear war with North Korea. Regardless of which administration is in power in Seoul, Washington must stay the course on stable coexistence, stressing the reality of a nuclear North Korea, the paramount importance of risk reduction, and the relationship between engagement with North Korea and lower levels of provocative behaviors that could result in unwanted conflict.

This policy framework would also suit broader U.S. geopolitical objectives. Improved relations with Pyongyang could mitigate the worst possible consequences of ongoing Russia–North Korea cooperation. Similarly, given U.S. prioritization of strategic competition and deterrence vis-à-vis China, a more stable relationship with North Korea will help render deterrence and defense requirements for the Korean Peninsula more modest, allowing for a short-term adjustment to the U.S. military posture in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Trump administration has an opportunity to fundamentally redesign North Korea policy, moving away from the unattainable goal of denuclearization toward a broader, stable coexistence with a nuclear-armed North Korea. The administration should seize this opportunity to make the United States safer, stronger, and more prosperous and advance peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.

2. South Korea’s Global Vision: Opportunities for UK–South Korea Partnership

A view from the UK.

This provides some very good analysis about South Korea policy and again, although it is from a UK perspective, it is useful to all of us in helping to understand the Korea situation. For some sections you could substitute US for UK.

Read the entire long policy brief at this link: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/policy-briefs/south-koreas-global-vision-opportunities-uk-south-korea-partnership

The introduction and the section headings and conclusion are excerpted below.

South Korea’s Global Vision: Opportunities for UK–South Korea Partnership

Ha Chae Kyoun8 May 2025

17 Minute Read

This Policy Brief examines South Korea’s foreign policy trajectory and its relevance for the UK.

South Korea is a middle power in the Indo-Pacific region that has been seeking to articulate a global role through partnerships with like-minded countries, including the UK. In November 2023, South Korea and the UK signed the Downing Street Accord (DSA) that promised to raise their bilateral ties ‘to the highest level of strategic ambition, to endure for this century and beyond’. The relevance of the UK–South Korea bilateral partnership is clarified by common challenges to the rules-based international order as manifested by the growing influence of illiberal states and their undemocratic behaviours, such as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Such developments have further led to the strengthening of illicit ties between Moscow and Pyongyang.

Against such a backdrop, the political turmoil in Seoul that began in December 2024 with the short-lived martial law declaration by ousted president Yoon Suk Yeol creates uncertainties not only for its domestic politics, but also for its foreign policy projection. The purpose of this Policy Brief is to situate UK–South Korea ties in the context of Seoul’s larger strategy and outline the implications of South Korea’s global vision for its relationship with the UK. Despite South Korea’s political embroilment, enhancing the UK–South Korea partnership is important because the two countries complement each other – Seoul’s aspirations to increase its capacity as an important global stakeholder remains unwavering, while Westminster continues to expand its engagement with the rising Indo-Pacific region.

This Policy Brief examines South Korea’s foreign policy trajectory and its relevance for the UK. The research is based on a review of key official documents and speeches released by former South Korean administrations to understand Seoul’s global vision. It briefly outlines the historical development of South Korea’s ambitions as a growing middle power and how Seoul pursues its goals. It goes on to argue that the UK should extend its efforts to strengthen the bilateral ties that will also promote its own global status in the Indo-Pacific. The brief concludes with practical policy recommendations for enhancing UK–South Korea cooperation.

South Korea as a Global Middle Power

Seoul’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: More than a Regional Framework

A Value-Based Diplomacy and UK–South Korea Partnership

Internal and External Challenges

Policy Recommendations for the UK

Conclusion

South Korea has attempted for decades to define itself in various ways on the global stage. In recent years, its bilateral and multilateral relationships with like-minded countries, and with the developing world, have deepened – demonstrating Seoul’s capacity to live up to its global goals. During this process, its elevated partnership with the UK has been a key anchor.

For the UK, its ambiguous stance on engagement with the Indo-Pacific concerns regional stakeholders as to whether its actions will follow its words. While the challenges in Europe may take priority, its overtures in the Indo-Pacific should not be overlooked. Moreover, supporting South Korea’s global vision can be constructive for European security, as Seoul increases its defence ties with the UK and other European partners.

Despite its continuing political upheaval, South Korea is still an important global stakeholder. The UK should take advantage of this opportunity to step up its partnership with South Korea, even though there remain challenges from internal and external factors that hinder realising its full potential. The perennial challenge of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities development, as well as its deepening ties with Russia, is alarming not only for South Korea, but for the global liberal international order. As Seoul seeks to enhance its global profile, the limitations to its domestic and international capacity could be supplemented by support from like-minded states.

Against such a backdrop, it would be in the interest of partners such as the UK to endorse and support Seoul’s quest to play a greater role on the global stage. In turn, South Korea’s enhanced global status and the increased responsibilities it will assume can complement the UK’s efforts to sustain the liberal international order.

3. Putin Parades China, North Korea Ties in Victory Day Show of Force

Remember that these relationships are based on fear, weakness, desperation, and envy.

Video at the lnk.

Putin Parades China, North Korea Ties in Victory Day Show of Force

Moscow used a World War II commemoration to signal to Washington that Russia can be a helpful ally—or a fearsome foe

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-putin-victory-day-world-leader-gathering-7c4e1954?mod=hp_lead_pos9

By Thomas Grove

May 9, 2025 8:13 am ET

DP candidate says strong S. Korea-Japan relations vital to economy, security | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 9, 2025

By Kim Seung-yeon

SEOUL, May 9 (Yonhap) -- Democratic Party (DP) presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung underscored Friday the need to maintain strong ties between South Korea and Japan, saying bilateral cooperation is vital to both the economy and security.

Lee made the remark in a written congratulatory message sent to a forum hosted by a DP lawmaker, as he has been bolstering his campaign for the June 3 election, buoyed by his growing lead in the polls.

"South Korea and Japan are important partners that have long maintained a close cooperative partnership," Lee said in the message at the event held to discuss Seoul's relations with Tokyo.

"Continuing bilateral cooperation is vital from both the economic and security perspectives," he said.

With Japan being the fourth-largest trading partner for South Korea, security cooperation between the two neighbors has served as the "foundation for the trilateral security partnership with the United States, which has contributed to ensuring peace in Northeast Asia and the prosperity of South Korea," Lee said.

Democratic Party presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung (R) holds up a card he received from a shop owner with a message of support, while on a "Listening Tour in Every Alley" campaign in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, on May 9, 2025. (Yonhap)

Lee called for enhancing bilateral relations with Japan through "meticulous and sophisticated diplomacy to advance national interest," particularly at a time when South Korea is at a "pivotal moment of geopolitical transformation."

That said, Lee also took note of pending bilateral issues stemming from Japan's 1910-45 colonization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as Japan's release of contaminated water from its crippled Fukushima nuclear power plants.

"In particular, addressing historical issues is essential for building a future-oriented relationship," Lee said. "The South Korea-Japan relations can mature further when dialogue and cooperation are based on mutual respect and a sense of responsibility."

Lee, who's been leading recent opinion polls, has been stepping up his campaign to present his policy approach in economy and diplomacy.

On Friday, Lee traveled to the southeastern city of Gyeongju, the host city for the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, as part of a nationwide canvassing to engage voters in public spaces.

Speaking to voters at a local market, Lee called for a successful APEC hosting, highlighting the city's rich cultural heritage.

Gyeongju lies in the Gyeongsang region, a stronghold for the DP's conservative rivals.

elly@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Seung-yeon · May 9, 2025

5. PPP candidate, party's interim leader clash again on candidacy merger

The longer this continues the less likely the PPP will be able to win.

(LEAD) PPP candidate, party's interim leader clash again on candidacy merger | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · May 9, 2025

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout; CHANGES headline, photo)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, May 9 (Yonhap) -- People Power Party (PPP) presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo and the party's interim leader clashed again Friday on a move to merge campaigns with former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, marking the latest showdown within the conservative party ahead of the June 3 vote.

The clash between Kim and the PPP's interim leader, Kwon Young-se, came shortly before the conservative party was set to unveil its result of two-day opinion polls about favorable ratings between Kim and Han.

"The forced merger pushed by the party leadership is nothing more than an attempt to remove me and make an independent candidate the party's presidential nominee," Kim told a meeting with PPP lawmakers. "I cannot accept this."

It was the first time that Kim attended such a meeting since he won the party's nomination earlier this month.

In response, Kwon expressed disappointment over Kim's remarks, saying a "true leader, especially one aspiring to become a great leader, must be willing to sacrifice his personal interests."

Kim Moon-soo (R), presidential candidate of the conservative People Power Party (PPP), walks out of a general meeting of PPP lawmakers at the National Assembly on May 9, 2025, after the PPP leadership pressures him to merge his candidacy with former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo. (Yonhap)

The polls came as Kim, former labor minister, has demanded the PPP's leadership stop forcing him to unify his candidacy with Han, an independent preliminary presidential candidate, demonstrating a growing rift within the conservative party with the presidential election just 25 days away.

Kim and Han held their second round of talks Thursday to try to unify their candidacies, but the talks ended without an agreement.

The June 3 presidential election is being held to pick a successor to ousted President Yoon Suk Yeol over his failed martial law bid, with the PPP still divided over its stance about Yoon's ouster.

The opinion polls will be based on a combination of 50 percent party member votes and 50 percent public opinion polling.

Amid ongoing tensions, Kim canceled his campaign stops in the southeastern cities of Daegu and Busan, and is likely to focus on response measures to the PPP leadership and Han's push for the merger.

Kim Moon-soo (C), presidential candidate of the People Power Party, walks to a restaurant in Seoul on May 7, 2025, to discuss with former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, an independent preliminary presidential candidate, a possible unification of their candidacies ahead of the June 3 presidential election. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

Since being selected as the presidential candidate, Kim has been at odds with the party leadership, which has been pushing him to unify his campaign with Han.

Han has insisted that the merger be finalized by May 11 to ensure that one of them can run as the PPP candidate without dividing the conservative votes to better counter Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung, who is leading opinion polls.

Han said he will not register for the presidential race if there is no agreement with the PPP on unifying candidacies.

Kim, however, proposed that he and Han each campaign for a week, before holding a televised debate and public opinion polls to decide on the candidacy next week.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · May 9, 2025

6. Court dismisses injunction seeking to recognize Kim Moon-soo as PPP presidential candidate

(LEAD) Court dismisses injunction seeking to recognize Kim Moon-soo as PPP presidential candidate | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · May 9, 2025

(ATTN: ADDS more details in paras 3-4)

SEOUL, May 9 (Yonhap) -- A Seoul court on Friday dismissed an injunction request filed by Kim Moon-soo, presidential candidate of the conservative People Power Party (PPP), seeking recognition of his candidacy status.

The Seoul Southern District Court dismissed Kim's petition, which was aimed at compelling the party to recognize him as its official presidential candidate, amid internal party strife over whether to merge Kim's campaign with that of former Acting President Han Duck-soo.

The court said it found no "practical benefit in seeking a ruling on the injunction" as the PPP "is not completely refuting Kim's eligibility as a candidate."

It also dismissed a separate petition filed by Kim's supporters to ban the holding of the National Committee and the National Convention, set for this weekend, which Kim had criticized as a ploy to replace him.

With the court's decision, the PPP now has the legal leeway to grant the party's presidential candidacy status to Han.

Kim won the PPP primary last week but has since come under intense pressure from the party leadership to merge campaigns with Han, an independent candidate, who has polled better in hypothetical matchups with front-runner Lee Jae-myung of the liberal Democratic Party.

Kim has vowed to take all necessary legal measures to maintain his status and register his candidacy by Sunday's deadline.

Kim Moon-soo, the presidential candidate of the People Power Party, addresses a general meeting of party lawmakers at the National Assembly in Seoul on May 9, 2025. (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Woo Jae-yeon · May 9, 2025

7. Putin meets N. Korean military delegation during Victory Day parade in Moscow

Putin meets N. Korean military delegation during Victory Day parade in Moscow | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · May 9, 2025

SEOUL, May 9 (Yonhap) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin on Friday met with a North Korean military delegation during a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory in World War II held in Moscow.

Following his speech and the conclusion of the military parade in Moscow's Red Square, Putin greeted top Russian military commanders and dignitaries at the ceremony.

At the end of the line, he shook hands with members of the North Korean delegation, including Kim Yong-bok, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, and Sin Hong-chol, North Korea's ambassador to Russia.

Kim saluted Putin upon seeing him, while Putin offered a handshake while expressing warm remarks.

The Russian president also greeted other North Korean officials, including Ri Chang-ho, director of the North's Reconnaissance General Bureau, and Sin Kum-chol, director at the operations bureau of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army.

Kim, Ri and Sin are all sanctioned by South Korea, the United States and the European Union for their alleged involvement in dispatching North Korean troops to support Russia's war efforts.

North Korean forces, deployed to Russia last year, are reportedly engaged in combat against Ukrainian troops in front-line regions such as Kursk.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin (R) greets North Korean officers during the Victory Day military parade, marking the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory in World War II, on Red Square in Moscow, on May 9, 2025, in this photo provided by RIA Novosti. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · May 9, 2025

8. What if a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan emboldens North Korea

This is why we must take a holistic view of all the strategic challenges in the Asia-Pacific.

What if a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan emboldens North Korea

US inaction or defeat would leave allies feeling vulnerable, and push Seoul to take desperate measures for its defense

https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/what-if-a-successful-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan-emboldens-north-korea/

James Fretwell May 9, 2025

China's People's Liberation Army, Pexels and KCNA, edited by NK News

Editor’s note: What If? is an NK News series that provides readers with thoughtful, informed speculation about North Korea’s future. Articles in this series draw on verified facts and rigorous analysis to explore hypothetical scenarios in the years and decades ahead.

The People’s Liberation Army has taken Taiwan. Xi Jinping stands triumphant, having stood up to the mighty American military and cemented his place in history as the leader who realized China’s long-standing goal of national reunification.

The U.S. sent huge amounts of aid to help the Taiwanese, part of Washington’s expanded efforts to deter Beijing, but its assistance only went so far. In the end, Donald Trump, champion of “America First,” wasn’t willing to send soldiers to fight a war thousands of miles from U.S. shores against the world’s next rising superpower.

Across the East China Sea, South Korea looks on with concern.

It stayed well away from the war in Taiwan, partly out of concern about Chinese strikes on its own territory but also because it needed to stay alert to the threat from North Korea.

However, it was counting on the U.S. to show that it still had what it takes to guarantee the regional status quo. And Washington disappointed.

Seoul now finds itself asking the question: If the U.S. couldn’t save Taiwan from China, would it be able to save South Korea from the North?

Over the past few years, the DPRK has pursued tactical nuclear weapons designed to incinerate key enemy ROK military targets.

Pyongyang has also developed long-range missiles capable of reaching the American mainland. While the U.S. could defeat North Korea if it wanted, Washington might not think it’s worth getting involved if there’s the risk of a retaliatory nuclear strike on a major American city.

Trump already signaled this is the case when he made good on his threat to partially withdraw American troops from the peninsula, aiming to both cut costs and pressure Seoul to increase its own military spending.

Although South Korea has been asking itself this question for years now, China’s recent victory empowers voices calling for Seoul to take security matters into its own hands with the only step that can guarantee its survival: developing its own nuclear weapons.

This might mean international economic sanctions. It might also mean the end of its alliance with the U.S.

But that doesn’t mean anything if South Korea can’t guarantee its own survival. Left vulnerable by Trump’s actions, and with North Korea increasing its saber rattling after China’s victory, ROK leaders conclude that they have no choice but to go nuclear, come what may.

U.S. and South Korean forces pose in front of the U.S. Air Force’s B-52H “Stratofortress” strategic bomber. | Image: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (Oct. 19, 2023)

ANALYSIS

Unless the U.S. intervenes — and, most importantly, wins — in Taiwan, a Chinese victory would have drastic implications for the Korean Peninsula, potentially prompting South Korea to develop nuclear weapons.

Thus far, South Korea hasn’t made its own nuclear weapons out of belief in the U.S. commitment to come to its defense in case of an invasion.

A successful American intervention in Taiwan would put any doubts to bed about the U.S. commitment to Northeast Asian security, even in the face of war with a nuclear great power like China.

If the U.S. didn’t come to Taiwan’s aid, some would argue that America blinked at the crucial moment, despite having supposedly decided that the “denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan” is its “sole pacing scenario.”

Others would argue that sitting the conflict out wouldn’t actually say anything about its commitment to South Korea’s security. After all, while the U.S. signed an alliance treaty with South Korea in 1953, it maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” on intervention in Taiwan.

However, Seoul’s clandestine nuclear program in the 1970s suggests that what Washington promises on paper isn’t always enough. More now than ever, as North Korea develops ever-more powerful long-range missiles, many in South Korea question whether the U.S. would actually “trade Seoul for Los Angeles” if threatened with a retaliatory nuclear strike on the American mainland.

From South Korea’s perspective, the worst-case scenario might be that the U.S. did intervene in Taiwan, but lost.

On the one hand, it would prove to North Korea that the U.S. won’t shy away from confrontation, even with the likes of mighty China, to defend countries that aren’t even official allies.

On the other hand, proponents of South Korean nuclear weapons would be able to claim that China’s victory in Taiwan showed the limits of American power in Northeast Asia.

To dissuade it from going nuclear now, the U.S. would presumably need to seriously strengthen its commitment to South Korea. Seoul could demand measures that Washington has balked at in the past, such as permanently deploying strategic assets to the peninsula, redeploying tactical nuclear weapons or even a nuclear-sharing deal.

Or if those demands are too much and South Korean nuclearization is a foregone conclusion, the U.S. might need to follow through on threats to end the alliance and withdraw forces from the peninsula.

But if South Korea goes nuclear, Japan could follow suit. And trying to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons will become an even more impossible task than it already is.

Alternatively, opposition leader Lee Jae-myung — who could become South Korea’s next leader in an upcoming snap election following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment and removal from office — could instead decide to align his country more closely with China in recognition of its stronger presence in the region.

“We should just say ‘xie xie’ [to China] and ‘xie xie’ to Taiwan as well,” Lee argued last year.

“Why do we interfere in cross-strait relations? Why do we care what happens to the Taiwan Strait?”

The U.S. currently enjoys a chain of “ironclad” alliances and other security arrangements throughout Asia, designed to deter countries like China and North Korea from taking military action to achieve their objectives.

But if one link breaks, it could cause the rest of that chain to fall apart, with potentially profound consequences for the Korean Peninsula.

Edited by Bryan Betts

9. ROK ruling party candidate Kim Moon-soo embraces nukes to counter North Korea

ROK nuclear submarine and US tactical nuclear weapons.

ROK ruling party candidate Kim Moon-soo embraces nukes to counter North Korea

Presidential nominee vows to pursue nuclear sub and potential redeployment of US tactical nukes, endorsing Yoon policies

https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/rok-ruling-party-candidate-kim-moon-soo-embraces-nukes-to-counter-north-korea/

Joon Ha Park May 9, 2025

Kim Moon-soo, the People Power Party’s presidential candidate, accepts his party’s nomination on May 3 | Image: Kim Moon-soo via Facebook

Conservative South Korean presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo vowed to use nuclear weapons to counter North Korean weapons of mass destruction on Friday, including through the development of indigenous nuclear submarines and potentially the redeployment of American tactical nukes to the peninsula.

Speaking at a press conference in Seoul, the ruling People Power Party’s candidate offered a full-throated endorsement of the deterrence policies of impeached President Yoon Suk-yeol, pledging to bolster the U.S.-ROK alliance and South Korea’s three-axis defense system

Key elements of his proposal include the quasi-permanent deployment of U.S. strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula, enhancing joint Conventional-Nuclear Integration drills with U.S. forces and adding a “nuclear attack protection clause” to the 1953 mutual defense treaty between Seoul and Washington.

“If North Korea escalates its nuclear threats, we will consider additional steps such as redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, establishing a NATO-style nuclear sharing arrangement or positioning U.S. tactical nuclear arms in Guam specifically for South Korea’s defense,” Kim said.

“Peace without strong deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is fake peace. We must pursue fundamental and effective solutions to the existing North Korean nuclear threat through an active nuclear deterrence policy.”

Kim also pledged to revise the U.S.-South Korea nuclear energy agreement to secure rights to uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing at levels comparable to Japan, while staying within peaceful use limits under international law.

He further stated that, if necessary, his administration would work with Washington to acquire nuclear weapon “design capabilities” as part of an effort to enhance South Korea’s nuclear deterrent.

Citing North Korea’s development of submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles, Kim emphasized the need for South Korea to develop its own nuclear-powered submarines to maintain strategic balance.

When asked about possible conflicts with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Kim said all measures would be pursued “within the bounds of the treaty” through close consultation with the U.S.

A staunch anti-communist, the 73-year-old Kim has consistently argued for a defense-first approach to inter-Korean relations and criticized engagement with Pyongyang.

Jeongmin Kim

Kim’s pledge about tactical nuclear redeployment, ‘NATO-style nuclear sharing,’ and ROK protection-purpose tactical nuclear deployment for Guam rehashes now-impeached President Yoon’s 2022 campaign rhetoric. The near-constant deployment of strategic assets and conventional-nuclear integration also aren't new initiatives but ongoing pursuits under the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group. The U.S. is unlikely to agree to these options unless South Korea repurposes USFK for wider-theater defense — something Kim did not touch on. Reading between the lines, his emphasis on nuclear deterrence is straight out of Yoon’s playbook, targeting those who vote based on security pledges.

DPRK leader Kim Jong Un and top military officials walk away from a 600mm MLRS launch vehicle with four empty rocket canisters on May 8 | Image: KCNA (May 9, 2025)

FURTHER DETERRENCE PLANS

In his remarks on Friday, Kim also outlined plans for the comprehensive reinforcement of South Korea’s existing three-axis defense system.

For the “Kill Chain” preemptive strikes, Kim proposed enhancing cyber and electronic warfare technologies similar to the U.S. “Left of Launch” operations to complement missile capabilities.

He also proposed expanding South Korea’s Iron Dome-style low-altitude missile defense project into a broader “Sky Dome” system and developing laser interception weapons. For the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation, Kim emphasized his initiative to secure sufficient ballistic missiles and enhance counterstrike capabilities.

“My goal is a strong Korea that citizens trust and the international community respects, built on the foundation of a solid U.S.-Korea alliance,” he said.

Kim’s presidential campaign has been rocked by infighting within South Korea’s conservative bloc in recent days, casting doubt on the PPP’s ability to mount a unified challenge against Democratic Party frontrunner Lee Jae-myung.

A proposed merger between Kim, who secured the PPP nomination on May 3, and independent Han Duck-soo have collapsed after two failed rounds of negotiations. Just two days remaining until the May 11 registration deadline for presidential candidates.

After his proposal on Friday, Kim accused the PPP leadership of using “illegal methods” to push him aside in favor of Han and rejected growing pressure to unify the ticket at a party meeting.

“This forced unification is nothing more than an attempt to remove me and install an independent as the final candidate. I cannot accept it,” he said.

Kim also criticized the party for failing to back his campaign following his nomination victory.

“If the party had mobilized behind me after the convention, we wouldn’t be seeing these low poll numbers. I will win this election.”

Edited by Alannah Hill

10. Putin, Xi demand end to sanctions and ‘military pressure’ against North Korea

Of course they do. Thay have long been complicit in north Korean sanctions evasion.

Putin, Xi demand end to sanctions and ‘military pressure’ against North Korea

Leaders of Russia and China denounce US policy in Asia ahead of Victory Day parade set to showcase their alignment

https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/putin-xi-demand-end-to-sanctions-and-military-pressure-against-north-korea/

Anton Sokolin May 9, 2025

Russian and Chinese leaders Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping shaking hands during a summit in Moscow on May 8, 2025 | Image: Kremlin

The leaders of Russia and China urged an end to sanctions on North Korea following a meeting in Moscow on Thursday, ahead of Victory Day celebrations set to showcase their alignment against the U.S.-led global order.

In a joint statement, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping called on “the relevant states to abandon the policy of unilateral coercive measures and military pressure” against the DPRK and “to refrain from further militarization of the Northeast Asian region and actions that provoke confrontation.”

The two leaders stressed the need for “practical steps aimed at easing tensions and eliminating the threat of armed incidents and large-scale military conflicts on the Korean Peninsula,” underlining that the regional issues can only be solved through “political and diplomatic means.”

“Mutual respect for sovereignty and a balanced consideration of the national interests of the countries involved” is a “prerequisite” for resolving Korean Peninsula issues, according to the statement.

Russian and Chinese leaders Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding a summit in Moscow on May 8, 2025 | Image: Kremlin

Similarly, the two leaders accused the U.S. and its allies of “negatively impacting” peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region by seeking to expand NATO’s presence and building coalitions.

“Russia and China consider it unacceptable to build military blocs with an anti-Russian and anti-Chinese orientation that include a nuclear component, to deploy nuclear weapons in the region under the guise of ‘extended deterrence,’ and to station elements of the global missile defense system and ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles that threaten strategic stability,” the statement reads.

The leaders’ declaration aligns with Moscow and Beijing’s frequent criticism of U.S. policy in the region, which has seen Washington regularly deploy strategic assets to the peninsula in response to North Korea’s continued weapons development. The Trump administration has also made containing China its biggest foreign policy priority.

The joint statement came after the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. lambasted Moscow for obstructing sanctions enforcement during a U.N. Security Council meeting on Wednesday, one year after Russia vetoed the mandate of the Panel of Experts tasked with overseeing DPRK sanctions.

Ambassador Dorothy Shea also accused China of abetting Pyongyang’s sanctions evasion schemes by importing DPRK coal and iron ore, stating that the proceeds directly contribute to North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.

Xi is visiting Moscow on a three-day trip to attend a large-scale parade through the Red Square on May 9, celebrating the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany.

Nearly 30 foreign leaders are expected to attend, with 13 countries dispatching military contingents to march through Moscow. China has sent the largest number of honor guards, which are expected to take center stage at the festivities.

But the DPRK military won’t join the parade despite directly supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine and receiving an invitation from Moscow months ago, with the ambassador representing the country instead of leader Kim Jong Un or another high-ranking official.

The parade kicked off early Friday, with local media that high-level North Korean military officers attended with the ambassador.

Putin previously announced a three-day truce around the Victory Day festivities, up until May 11, but Ukraine rejected it as a ruse and claimed Russia has continuously violated its own ceasefire.

The Kremlin is currently taking maximum security measures to shield spectators and high-level dignitaries from potential Ukrainian aerial strikes.

OTHER CELEBRATIONS

The Russian Embassy in Pyongyang held a banquet to mark the upcoming Victory Day holiday on Thursday, inviting over 150 foreign diplomats, members of a recent Belarusian delegation and DPRK officials to the event at the Yanggakdo Hotel.

Key North Korean functionaries attended the banquet, including vice chair of the party’s Central Military Commission Pak Jong Chon, foreign minister Choe Son Hui and defense chief No Kwang Chol.

A Victory Day banquet held at the Russian embassy in Pyongyang on May 8, 2025 | Image: Russian Embassy in DPRK via Telegram

The highlight of the soiree was a photo exhibition, touting both the heroism of Soviet people during World War II and joint efforts of North Korean and Russian soldiers to repel Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region.

In a speech, Russian Ambassador Alexander Matsegora lauded the success of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in Kursk, expressing confidence that “beautiful monuments to Korean heroes will be erected in the liberated towns and villages, and the restored streets and squares will be named after them.”

“Those whose heroic deeds will forever remain in the grateful memory and hearts of the Russian people,” he added, noting that this combat experience has greatly improved the KPA’s battle readiness.

The two states recently acknowledged for the first time that DPRK troops are fighting on Russia’s side against Ukraine, and since then, Moscow has highlighted their shared combat history with Pyongyang as part of Victory Day celebrations.

For instance, a DPRK children’s delegation that is visiting Vladivostok for the holiday attended a kids’ military parade with the grandchildren of war heroes last Sunday. Bigger celebrations involving military units and vehicles took place early Friday.

The delegation from the Mangyongdae Children’s palace also performed in a concert for Vladivostok residents this week.

Meanwhile, Russia launched the first ever direct train from Vladivostok to the North Korean city of Rason overnight, with nearly 100 passengers on board. The tourists will visit several east coast cities and memorial sites to honor the memory of Soviet soldiers who fought against Japanese forces on the Korean Peninsula.

Updated at 4:15 p.m. KST on May 9, 2025 with additional details on the parade and remarks by the Russian ambassador

Edited by Bryan Betts

11. North Korean missile test simulates nuclear attack on US-ROK forces: State media

No surprise. Kim must be trying to emulate the US when it deploys strategic assets.

North Korean missile test simulates nuclear attack on US-ROK forces: State media

Kim Jong Un oversaw Thursday test of short-range missiles and command and control systems, state media reports

https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/north-korea-simulates-nuclear-attack-on-us-rok-with-missile-test/

Colin Zwirko May 9, 2025

600mm MLRS launches from a beach on the east coast | Image: KCNA (May 9, 2025)

North Korea tested two short-range missile systems on Thursday to simulate nuclear attacks on U.S. and South Korean forces and counter the allies’ joint military drills, according to state media on Friday.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said leader Kim Jong Un oversaw test firings of the 600mm multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) and Hwasong-11A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) from the east coast, a day after the South Korean military detected and reported the launches in real time.

The test targeted various “enemy” positions and aimed to familiarize nuclear missile units with the “national nuclear weapons integrated management system,” state media reported.

It included training on the “operational reliability of the ‘nuclear trigger’ system,” referring to the country’s nuclear command and control mechanism that was first mentioned in a March 2023 report on new tactical warheads designed to fit the 600mm MLRS and Hwasong-11A.

Hwasong-11A SRBM launch from a beach on the east coast | Image: Rodong Sinmun (May 9, 2025)

At least two 600mm MLRS transporter erector launcher vehicles (TELs) fired missiles simultaneously | Image: Rodong Sinmun (May 9, 2025)

Missile unit commanders also took part in “a separate special lecture on counterattack system operation” on Thursday.

A spokesperson for the DPRK defense ministry said the test was meant to train units to “deal with changes in the military situation in sensitive areas that the enemies are escalating.”

“The U.S. and its followers have accepted a nuclear war against the DPRK as a fait accompli … and are conducting consecutive nuclear operation exercises on the Korean Peninsula and surrounding areas, requiring our forces to have a rapid response capability and thorough combat readiness,” the report added.

Kim Jong Un signaled plans for more missile unit training, saying he will “further enhance the combat reliability of tactical nuclear weapon systems and continuously expand their operational space.”

KCNA did not clarify the number of missiles fired, while the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) only said “multiple” missiles of “various” types were launched from Wonsan over the course of around an hour on Thursday morning.

NK News analysis of KCNA photos suggest five to eight 600mm MLRS rockets were fired. Two four-canister launch vehicles appeared to fire rockets simultaneously, and one photo showed one of the vehicles after the test with four empty canisters.

Kim and top military officials walk away from a 600mm MLRS launch vehicle with four empty rocket canisters. From left to right, the officials include Kim Jong Sik, Jang Chang Ha, an unidentified man commonly seen at missile tests, Pak Jong Chon, Jo Chun Ryong and Kim Yong Hwan | Image: KCNA (May 9, 2025)

The 600mm MLRS tests appeared to take place at 8:10 a.m., when JCS reported the first launch of the morning. The Hwasong-11A SRBM test likely took place later at 9:20 a.m., when the Japanese defense ministry reported detecting a launch.

The ministry said one missile, likely the Hwasong-11A, traveled 497 miles (800 km) — matching JCS’s assessment — at a maximum altitude of 62 miles (100km), adding that it “may have flown on an irregular trajectory” before splashing down off North Korea’s east coast prior to 9:42 a.m.

It’s unclear from the initial batch of 10 KCNA photos if the launch involved more than one Hwasong-11A SRBM, though both panels covering the launch vehicle’s two missiles appeared open after the test. State TV may provide more images later on Friday.

The test appeared to be conducted from the same beach in Anbyon south of Wonsan that was used for a Hwasong-11D missile test nearly one year ago.

It was the first test confirmed to have involved the Hwasong-11A SRBM in over two years, while a 600mm MLRS launch last appeared in state media in Sept. 2024.

Since the last publicly reported Hwasong-11A test, however, North Korea has exported the missile system to Russia for use against Ukraine, and likely received valuable data on its combat capabilities.

The test comes just two days after state media reported on Kim visiting a factory in Kanggye which produces the 600mm MLRS. The Hwasong-11A is produced up the east coast in Hamhung.

Edited by Kristen Talman

Last updated on May 9 at 8:43 a.m. KST with additional background details

12. North Korea claims 'nuclear trigger training', but... "Purpose is to export 600mm rocket launcher to Russia"

Two things can be true at once.

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

North Korea claims 'nuclear trigger training', but... "Purpose is to export 600mm rocket launcher to Russia"

Seoul-Handohyeong hando@rfa.org

2025.05.09

North Korea's state-run media outlet, Korean Central News Agency, reported on the 9th that General Secretary of the Workers' Party Kim Jong-un guided a joint strike drill of long-range artillery and missile systems the previous day. (Yonhap)

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/05/09/kn25-north-russia-weapon-600mm/

Anchor: North Korea claimed yesterday that the training was aimed at mastering the nuclear weapons management system and inspecting the 'nuclear trigger'. However, there is analysis suggesting that North Korea's main purpose is to export additional 600mm multiple rocket launchers, or KN-25s, to Russia rather than inspecting the 'nuclear trigger'. Reporter Han Do-hyung reports from Seoul.

North Korea's state-run media, Korean Central News Agency, reported on the 9th that General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim Jong-un guided a joint strike drill of long-range artillery and missile systems the previous day.

The media reported that 600mm multiple rocket launchers, namely the KN-25, and tactical ballistic missiles such as the Hwasongpo-11ga and the KN-23 were mobilized for the training, and claimed that it was a measure to demonstrate a rapid military response system capable of dealing with changes in the military situation in sensitive areas.

The outlet specifically said that “the credibility of the nuclear trigger system’s operation was censored layer by layer.”

North Korea first used the term "nuclear trigger" in March 2023, when it fired a KN-23 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) that exploded a mock nuclear warhead in midair and verified the "nuclear trigger." The "nuclear trigger" is North Korea's comprehensive nuclear weapons management system that commands and controls the entire process from when General Secretary Kim Jong-un presses the "nuclear weapon use button" until actual use.

People Power Party lawmaker Yoo Yong-won, a former military journalist, said in analysis materials distributed to reporters on the 9th that “North Korea has launched a propaganda campaign threatening South Korea with nuclear weapons by revealing the live-fire of the KN-23, a 600mm multiple rocket launcher capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons.” North Korea had previously hinted that it could be equipped with the KN-23, 600mm multiple rocket launcher, when it revealed the tactical nuclear warhead “Hwasan-31” in March 2023.

Rep. Yoo also analyzed that North Korea appears to be trying to show off its ability to strike the front and rear of the South simultaneously through the firing of the KN-23, a 600mm multiple rocket launcher.

However, he added, “North Korea claimed to have conducted nuclear attack drills, but they only disclosed that they conducted mixed launches, and the related details have not been made public.”

An official from Rep. Yoo's office explained in a phone call with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 9th that the actual force mobilized in this training, including launchers, was quite small for North Korea to have verified a nuclear trigger, and that there is a possibility that North Korea's intentions lie elsewhere.

Rep. Yoo raised the possibility that North Korea's main intention is to export 600mm multiple rocket launchers to Russia.

Rep. Yoo said that General Secretary Kim's recent visit to a 600mm multiple rocket launcher production plant and his on-site guidance of the 600mm multiple rocket launcher firing on the 8th were likely preliminary inspections for additional military support from Russia.

Lee Sung-joon, director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Relations Office, also said at a press briefing on the 8th that North Korea's latest launch "could be an experiment to check performance for export or to evaluate flight stability."

Military authorities are said to have determined that there is a possibility that North Korea may have already provided Russia with 600mm multiple rocket launchers.

Korea, US, Japan 'strongly condemn' North Korea's ballistic missile launch

Expert: “North Korea’s Nuclear Operational Capability Improved Through Super-Large Launcher Training”

North Korea's state-run media outlet, Korean Central News Agency, reported on the 9th that General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim Jong-un guided a joint strike drill of long-range artillery and missile systems the previous day.

“North Korea’s training may have been a final inspection before exporting 600mm rocket launchers”

Kim Yeol-soo, director of the Security Strategy Office at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs, also said in a phone call with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 9th, “North Korea has already exported various conventional weapons to Russia, including 170mm self-propelled howitzers, 240mm multiple rocket launchers, and KN-23s,” and stated that additional exports of 600mm multiple rocket launchers are possible.

Director Kim said, “If North Korea’s recent launch was intended to export 600mm multiple rocket launchers to Russia, it can be seen as North Korea conducting a final check of accuracy, etc.”

[Kim Yeol-soo, Director of the Security Strategy Office, Korea Institute for Military Affairs] In fact, you can see that almost everything that can be done with conventional weapons has been done. There is also the possibility of exporting 600mm multiple rocket launchers to Russia, so there is a possibility that they will appear on the Russia-Ukraine front. If they were conscious of Russia, then it can be seen that they have finally checked whether they are firing properly and with accuracy.

In addition, Director Kim revealed that there is a possibility that North Korea may have fired the missile the day before as a "congratulatory artillery salute" to coincide with Russia's Victory Day.

Meanwhile, Kim Gun, a member of the People Power Party and former diplomat, pointed out on the 8th through his social media that while General Secretary Kim Jong-un has recently been working to modernize conventional weapons, the problem with North Korea is that it is already spending astronomical amounts of money on the advancement of nuclear weapons.

Rep. Kim said that Secretary General Kim's policy focus is not on fundamental reform of the North Korean regime, but on excessive spending on security to maintain the regime, and that South Korea should not miss the moment when the North Korean regime becomes difficult in the future.

This is Han Do-hyung, RFA Free Asia Reporter, Seoul.

Editor Yang Seong-won

13. Korean Abductee Families Distribute Anti-North Korea Leaflets Along Gangwon Border

As they should be able to demonstrate their freedom of expression. Let freedom ring.

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

Korean Abductee Families Distribute Anti-North Korea Leaflets Along Gangwon Border

Seoul-Hong Seung-wook hongs@rfa.org

2025.05.09

The Korean Abductees' Families Association is preparing to release balloons containing anti-North Korean leaflets in the border area between the South and the North in Gangwon Province on the night of the 8th. (Provided by the Korean Abductees' Families Association)

https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/05/09/victims-kidnapping-north-leaflets-family/

Anchor: A group of families of South Korean abductees has once again flown anti-North Korean leaflets north from the border area. This is the first time in 11 days that they have scattered leaflets since late last month. Hong Seung-wook reports from Seoul.

The Korean Abductees' Families Association announced on the 9th that on the night of the 8th, three large balloons carrying bundles of anti-North Korean leaflets were flown north from the border area between the South and the North in Gangwon Province.

According to this, one helium-filled latex balloon contained about 900 newsletters related to the kidnapped families, and a total of about 2,700 to 8,000 were distributed.

The newsletter printed the faces of seven abductees, including high school students abducted in the 1970s, the father of Choi Seong-yong, head of the Abductees' Families Association, and Japanese national Megumi Yokota, along with the circumstances surrounding their abduction and a request for confirmation of their life or death and their repatriation.

The Abductees' Families Association claimed that the balloon was set to fly for an hour before falling, and that according to the GPS signal transmitter attached to it, it appeared to have landed south of Geumgang County, Kangwon Province, North Korea.

They also released a map showing the route the GPS transmitter took from Yanggu County, Gangwon Province, to the south of Geumgang County.

Korean Abductee Family Group: “We Will Fly Leaflets Until North Korea Confirms Life or Death”

“The North Korea Leaflet Ban Act is in conflict with the US ‘North Korea Human Rights Act’”

This group launched a surprise leaflet scattering operation in Paju, Gyeonggi Province on the morning of the 27th of last month to avoid groups opposing the distribution of leaflets to North Korea, and then moved to Gangwon Province 11 days later and began scattering leaflets again.

Representative Choi stated that they will continue to scatter leaflets against North Korea in the future.

[Choi Seong-yong, head of the Abductees' Families Association] Shouldn't I also know about my father? And aren't the students in the newsletter? Didn't they plan to take the children on a school trip to North Korea by putting them on a spy ship? Two of the mothers of the students in the leaflet are alive.

An image of the GPS signal of a balloon carrying anti-North Korean leaflets flown by the Korean Abductees' Families Association in the border area of Gangwon Province on the night of the 8th.

Image of the GPS signal of a balloon carrying anti-North Korean leaflets that was released by the Korean Abductees' Families Association in the border area of Gangwon Province on the night of the 8th. (Provided by the Korean Abductees' Families Association)

Number of people traveling between the North and South is 'none' for 4 consecutive years... No trade volume

Meanwhile, the '2025 Unification White Paper' containing statistics reflecting the worsening inter-Korean relations was released on this day.

According to a white paper published by South Korea's Ministry of Unification, the number of people traveling between the South and the North has remained at zero for the fourth consecutive year, while the amount of trade between the two Koreas has remained at zero for the second year in a row. In addition, humanitarian aid to the North, which began in 1995, has completely stopped after 19 years.

Communication channels between the South and the North have not been restored since North Korea unilaterally severed them on April 7, 2023, and the statistics reflect one case of a separated family reunion in which an overseas Korean met his family in North Korea at the invitation of North Korea.

In this white paper, the word ‘dialogue’ is mentioned more often than last year.

Unlike last year's white paper, which did not separately address the government's efforts to resume inter-Korean dialogue, this year's white paper was titled 'Efforts to resume inter-Korean dialogue.'

The white paper cited former South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol's proposal to establish an inter-Korean dialogue consultative body in his Liberation Day speech, North Korea's efforts to normalize inter-Korean communication channels that it had cut off, and strengthening the dialogue capacity of organizations related to inter-Korean dialogue as efforts to resume dialogue.

It also pointed out that although the government has made various efforts to resume humanitarian cooperation, such as offering to provide material support for North Korea's flood damage, North Korea has not responded and has consistently maintained a hostile attitude.

This is Hong Seung-wook of RFA's Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.

Editor Yang Seong-won

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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