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Quotes of the Day:
"Weak people seek revenge. Strong people forgive. Intelligent people ignore."
– Albert Einstein
“The easiest and quickest path into the esteem of traditional military authorities is by the appeal to the eye, rather than to the mind. The ‘polish and pipeclay’ school is not yet extinct, and it is easier for the mediocre intelligence to become an authority on buttons, then on tactics.”
– Captain Sir Basil Liddell-Hart,Thoughts on War, 1944
“A man on a 1000 mile walk has to forget his goal and say to himself every morning, today I'm going to cover 25 miles, and then rest up and sleep.”
– Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace.
1. South Korea Indicts Another Ex-President, Leaving No Leader This Century Free of Scandal
2. South Korea: Recognizing Yoon’s Achievements
3. U.S. Urges Japan and South Korea to Commit to $44 Billion Alaska Gas Project
4. North Korea: Revisionist Ambitions and the Changing International Order
5. North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Facilities: What We Learned from KCNA’s Images
6. North Korea nuclear program "completely off the charts": UN watchdog
7. South Korea says DeepSeek transferred user data to China and the U.S. without consent
8. Treasury secretary calls high-level trade talks with S. Korea 'very successful'
9. S. Korea, U.S. to hold regular KIDD defense talks at Pentagon next week: spokesperson
10. New video confirms North Korea provided M1991 240mm rocket launchers to Russia to fight against Ukraine
11. ‘Entire Platoon’ – Ukrainian Special Forces Eliminate 25 North Koreans in Close Combat in Russia’s Kursk
12. Korea gears up for June 3 election amid political polarization, presidential power frays
13. #ROK: NAIVE HOPE. DAVID MAXWELL. GORDON CHANG. Apr 23, 6:10 PM
14. A Stress Test For South Korea’s Democracy: Conservatism’s Authoritarian Relapse – OpEd
1. South Korea Indicts Another Ex-President, Leaving No Leader This Century Free of Scandal
Who would want to be the president of South Korea? It does not seem to be a career enhancing job. It never seems to end well for any candidate.
But I think in this June 3d election for the first time we know what a leading candidate, Lee Jae Myung, has already been indicted for so at least the Korean people in the South know what they are getting:
South Korean politician Lee Jae-myung, leader of the Democratic Party of Korea and a prominent opposition figure, is currently facing multiple legal challenges. Below is a summary of the crimes he has been accused of, along with their status and potential implications under U.S. laws:
Crimes and Allegations Against Lee Jae-myung
1. Misappropriation of Public Funds
Details: Lee is accused of misusing approximately 106.5 million won (around $72,399) in public funds during his tenure as governor of Gyeonggi Province (2018–2021). Allegations include using government-issued corporate credit cards for personal expenses such as laundry services, food, and family-related events.
Status: The trial began on April 8, 2025, in the Suwon District Court. His wife was also implicated but has not been formally charged due to limited involvement.
2. Bribery and Property Development Scandal
Details: Lee faces charges related to bribery and corruption during his time as mayor of Seongnam. This includes allegations tied to a controversial $1 billion property development project.
Status: These charges are part of ongoing trials at the Seoul Central District Court.
3. Election Law Violations
Details: Lee was previously convicted for providing false information during a parliamentary review in 2021 but was acquitted on appeal in March 2025.
Status: The appellate court overturned his conviction, allowing him to remain eligible for political office.
4. Illegal Remittances to North Korea
Details: Lee is accused of orchestrating an $8 million illegal remittance to North Korea between 2019 and 2020 through the Ssangbangwool Group while serving as governor of Gyeonggi Province. The funds allegedly supported a smart farming project in North Korea and facilitated a planned visit by Lee to Pyongyang.
Charges:
Third-party bribery
Violating South Korea's Foreign Exchange Transactions Act (FETA)
Violating the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act (IECA), which regulates economic activities with North Korea.
Status: Trials are ongoing, with proceedings set to resume on April 23, 2025. Lee denies the charges, claiming no connection between Gyeonggi Province and the remittance.
Do Any Crimes Violate U.S. Laws?
The illegal remittance to North Korea may potentially violate U.S. laws under certain conditions:
Violation of U.S. Sanctions on North Korea: The United States enforces strict sanctions on financial transactions with North Korea under its sanctions regime (e.g., the International Emergency Economic Powers Act). If any part of the $8 million transfer involved U.S.-regulated financial institutions or U.S. persons/entities, it could constitute a violation of U.S. sanctions.
There is no evidence from the provided information that U.S.-based entities were involved in these transactions.
Conclusion
Lee Jae-myung faces significant legal challenges in South Korea, including allegations of bribery, misuse of public funds, and unauthorized dealings with North Korea. While his alleged illegal remittance to North Korea could theoretically breach U.S. sanctions if linked to U.S.-regulated systems, no such connection has been reported so far.
And of course the remittances to north Korea will put the US and the alliance in a bind.
South Korea Indicts Another Ex-President, Leaving No Leader This Century Free of Scandal
Bribery charges against Moon Jae-in follow recent history of former leaders having faced impeachment, prison or suicide
https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/south-korea-indicts-another-ex-president-leaving-no-leader-this-century-free-of-scandal-40fa46e0?mod=hp_listb_pos1
By Soobin Kim and Timothy W. Martin
Follow
April 24, 2025 5:51 am ET
Moon Jae-in’s presidency ended in 2022. Photo: Ahn Jung-hwan/Associated Press
SEOUL—Former South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who left office in 2022, was indicted on bribery charges, a development that leaves all of the country’s leaders elected this century with post-presidencies ending in legal woes or suicide.
As he remained scandal-free, the 72-year-old Moon, a left-leaning politician who prioritized North Korean engagement, had been the exception among South Korea’s leaders in recent decades.
His immediate predecessor, the conservative Park Geun-hye, was impeached, then ousted over an influence-peddling scandal. The same happened with Moon’s successor, Yoon Suk Yeol, who was removed from office earlier this month over his short-lived declaration of martial law in December. Yoon currently stands trial on criminal charges of leading an insurrection.
The other two South Korean leaders elected since 2002 include one imprisoned for corruption, while the other killed himself while facing a bribery investigation.
The legal scrutiny highlights the vitriol and revenge common in South Korean politics. The country is revving up for a snap election on June 3 to choose Yoon’s replacement, as Seoul faces tariff talks with Washington, growing belligerence from Pyongyang and major political cleavages at home.
The frontrunner for the upcoming race is opposition party head Lee Jae-myung, who shares a party with Moon and survived a brutal knife assault last year perpetrated by someone who allegedly feared Lee would one day become president. After his release from the hospital, Lee called for an end to South Korea’s “warlike politics where we have to kill and eliminate opponents.”
Moon, whose remarks were relayed through a Democratic Party legislator, dismissed his indictment as “absurd and outrageous,” slamming the move as “retaliatory prosecution for former President Yoon’s impeachment.”
Prosecutors allege Moon received a bribe equating to around $150,000 between 2018 and 2020. The funds were paid as salary and housing assistance to Moon’s then-son-in-law, who was an executive at an airline owned by a former Moon presidential campaign official. That official had been appointed the head of South Korea’s government-funded agency for startups and small businesses around the same time. Prosecutors have said the airline-executive salary meant Moon benefited financially by not having to provide financial support to his daughter and her then-husband.
Prosecutors said the former son-in-law, who divorced Moon’s daughter in 2021, had no aviation-industry experience and lacked credentials. The airline, called Thai Eastar Jet, closed in 2022.
A trial date hasn’t been set. Prosecutors didn’t detain Moon, who has denied wrongdoing.
Write to Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com
2. South Korea: Recognizing Yoon’s Achievements
An objective assessment from Japan. I hope that has some effect in South Korea.
However, while the author noted Kim Jong Un's about face on unification (but he still seeks domination) he did not highlight the contribution of the 8.15 unification doctrine which has just been updated by the Ministry of Unification and is the most comprehensive unification vision and planning by any ROK administration. I hope the next president will not toss it out but will embrace it as Korea's vision.
Excerpt:
In this context, the roles that Japan and South Korea play in providing international public goods that contribute to the formation of a fair and peaceful international order are more important than ever before. That calls for Yoon’s legacy put to be to good use in the foreign policy realm.
South Korea: Recognizing Yoon’s Achievements
It is not hard to understand why some would be inclined to reverse Yoon’s policies in their entirety. Nonetheless, his administration’s foreign policy was effective.
https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/south-korea-recognizing-yoons-achievements/
By KIMIYA Tadashi
April 24, 2025
Credit: ID 285175257 © Gints Ivuskans | Dreamstime.com
On December 3 last year, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law. After a motion for his impeachment was passed by the National Assembly on December 14, the president was finally removed from office on April 4 this year, and an election campaign kicked off for the next presidential election to take place on June 3.
The Constitutional Court’s announcement of its verdict in the impeachment trial was slower than expected, and by April there was talk of the possibility of the impeachment being dismissed and the president returning to his post. Under the light of dispassionate and unanimous legal judgment, however, it should be clear that the president’s dismissal was a natural and appropriate response to his actions.
In the coming presidential election, Lee Jae-myung, who is expected to be the Democratic Party candidate from the progressive camp, is the frontrunner. The conservative camp is split over the issue of impeaching an incumbent president, and it remains a question whether it can repair this split and choose a candidate for the presidency. Conservatives face a difficult challenge achieving party unity in the general election less than a month after the party’s primary.
In Japan, a great deal of attention is focused on the direction that South Korean foreign policy will take. After all, the change from Moon Jae-in’s progressive administration to Yoon’s conservative administration produced a major shift in South Korean foreign policy, and there is concern that this shift will be reversed if a progressive government returns to power.
The relationship between Japan under its former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and South Korea under the Moon administration was very tense. While the direct cause of tensions was rooted in historical issues that have existed between Japan and Korea for many years, there was also a divergence in foreign policies, which amplified the distrust shared by the neighbors.
There are a number of points of contention, including whether the emphasis in South Korean policy toward North Korea will be on engagement or deterrence; whether South Korea will maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” leaning towards neither the U.S. nor China in the face of confrontation between those two countries; whether South Korea will cooperate with like-minded countries and persuade the U.S. to share the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” in order to maintain U.S. involvement; and whether South Korea will maintain a cautious stance with regard to trilateral security cooperation with Japan and the U.S. (given its particularly complex relationship with Japan), or whether it will actively promote this cooperation, including its institutionalization. The policy choices of the Yoon administration were much more compatible with Tokyo’s position, and as a consequence relations between Japan and South Korea improved dramatically.
South Korea’s early political history was dominated by its staunch opposition to communism, and there was relatively little domestic conflict over policy issues, especially when it came to foreign policy. Today, however, the conservative and progressive camps are in extreme opposition, as very clearly evidenced with the recent impeachment. This has encouraged the parties to put an excessive emphasis on the relatively few foreign policy differences that had existed previously. The question now is whether a new administration will be able to move beyond this polarization and choose a foreign policy that will satisfy both sides.
There is no doubt that the international situation surrounding South Korea and the Korean Peninsula has changed dramatically since 2018, when Moon was in power. North Korea, which had previously expressed its openness to denuclearization, has not only abandoned that idea, but has also changed course entirely toward a North Korean version of the “Two Koreas” policy, abandoning even the goal of unification that it had once shared with South Korea. In addition, the confrontation between the U.S. and China has now entered a different dimension, moving into areas such as the economy and technology. This vastly changed situation offers no grounds for pursuing a Moon-era foreign policy.
The next South Korean administration should view staying the course with Yoon’s foreign policy as a basic principle. In particular, with the second inauguration of Donald Trump, the United States itself – always a key factor in the equation – is clearly basing its tariff and other policies on an America First approach, disregarding alliances. Russia and North Korea are meanwhile stepping up their military cooperation in the former’s lawless invasion of Ukraine, while China shows no signs of making an active contribution to maintaining a just and peaceful order.
In this context, the roles that Japan and South Korea play in providing international public goods that contribute to the formation of a fair and peaceful international order are more important than ever before. That calls for Yoon’s legacy put to be to good use in the foreign policy realm.
There is no question that Yoon’s declaration of martial law was illegal and warranted his removal from office. It is not hard to understand why some would be inclined to reverse his policies in their entirety. Nonetheless, his administration’s foreign policy – and particularly its realistic recognition of the turbulent international situation and its appropriate response based on that recognition – was effective. While foreign policy is unlikely to play a major role in the election campaign, the choices before the South Korean people should at the very least be carefully considered.
Authors
Guest Author
KIMIYA Tadashi
KIMIYA Tadashi is a former professor at the University of Tokyo.
3. U.S. Urges Japan and South Korea to Commit to $44 Billion Alaska Gas Project
WIll it be credited to their cost sharing for military forces?
U.S. Urges Japan and South Korea to Commit to $44 Billion Alaska Gas Project
A group advising President Trump on energy policy is seeking meetings with Japan and South Korea’s trade ministries, with the hope of announcing progress in early June.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/24/business/alaska-lng-japan-south-korea.html
Listen to this article · 4:36 min Learn more
New pipeline could shorten L.N.G. trips
Proposed pipeline
Alaska
Nikiski
From new export facilities
in Alaska, liquefied natural
gas could reach Japan in
about a week.
JAPAN
U.S.
Tokyo
It takes about three weeks from states along the Gulf Coast, or about 30 days depending on Panama Canal congestion.
Houston
Pacific Ocean
Note: The shipping routes are approximate.Sources: Alaska LNG; SearoutesBy Weiyi Cai
By River Akira Davis
Reporting from Tokyo
April 24, 2025
Updated 2:43 p.m. ET
Want to stay updated on what’s happening in East Asia? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.
Officials in the United States are urging Japan and South Korea to make a formal commitment within the next few weeks to a $44 billion natural gas project in Alaska.
The effort, known as Alaska L.N.G., is a centerpiece of President Trump’s energy agenda, and aims to ship gas from northern Alaska in a liquefied form to nations in Asia. Its feasibility hinges on securing backing from the region, home to some of the world’s largest purchasers of liquefied natural gas.
A group created by Mr. Trump that is advising him on domestic energy production, the National Energy Dominance Council, is seeking to convene officials from the trade ministries of both Japan and South Korea for a summit in Alaska on June 2, according to three people with knowledge of the confidential outreach who requested anonymity.
The project’s proponents want to be able to announce at the summit that they have received signed letters of intent from Japan and South Korea to invest in Alaska L.N.G. or purchase its gas, the people said. Taiwan formally signed a similar letter of intent to purchase gas from Alaska L.N.G. last month.
The White House, as well as the Japanese and South Korean trade ministries, did not respond to requests for comment.
Alaska L.N.G., first proposed more than a decade ago, had been considered by many in the energy industry to be a long shot. But it occupies a prominent spot in Mr. Trump’s efforts to reshape the U.S. energy landscape and restore momentum for fossil fuels.
The plan is to construct an 800-mile pipeline from fields north of the Arctic Circle to southern Alaska. From there, the gas would be cooled into liquid form and shipped on tankers to Asia.
For Asian countries, shipping L.N.G. from Alaska would be cheaper and quicker than importing it from many of their traditional sources, including Australia, the Middle East and the Gulf Coast of the United States.
But major Asian buyers of the fuel, including Japan, have long been cautious about the Alaska L.N.G. project because of its substantial costs, and doubts that it would actually be able to get off the ground.
Editors’ Picks
On his first day in office, Mr. Trump signed an executive order aimed at “unleashing” Alaska’s energy potential, including the pipeline proposal.
Image
An oil well on the North Slope of Alaska. For Asian countries, shipping L.N.G. from Alaska would be cheaper and quicker than importing it from many of their traditional sources, including Australia, the Middle East and the Gulf Coast of the United States.Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan face the possibility of additional double-digit-percentage tariffs, which have been imposed by Mr. Trump on numerous U.S. trading partners. Economists have warned that the tariffs, which have been paused until early July, could severely slow economic growth if they take effect.
Japan, which initiated tariff talks with the United States last week, has indicated that pledges to purchase more American liquefied natural gas would be a significant component of its offer to the administration. South Korea has made similar promises and is set to begin negotiations in Washington on Thursday.
Last month, Taiwan’s state oil and gas company, CPC, signed a letter of intent to buy six million metric tons of gas from Alaska L.N.G. That would represent almost a third of the total amount of liquefied natural gas Taiwan imported last year.
Mr. Trump has said he believes that countries in Asia would sign on to support the Alaska project. During his address to Congress in March, he said Japan and South Korea wanted to invest “trillions of dollars each” in the project, a statement that took officials in Tokyo and Seoul by surprise. He did not clarify how the project, which isn’t expected to begin shipping liquefied gas until the early 2030s, would receive trillions in investment.
In Japan, and most likely elsewhere, the challenge will be securing private-sector buyers willing to align with government plans and enter into long-term agreements to purchase gas from Alaska L.N.G. In Japan, U.S. officials see three energy companies — Jera, Tokyo Gas and Inpex — as potential customers, two of the people familiar with the matter said.
Many remain wary of the economics of such a deal. Letters of intent to participate in the project are likely to include room to withdraw. Alaska L.N.G. says the price of its gas would be competitive when it begins operations.
Kiuko Notoya and Jin Yu Young contributed reporting
River Akira Davis covers Japan, including its economy and businesses, and is based in Tokyo.
4. North Korea: Revisionist Ambitions and the Changing International Order
A comprehensive review from Syd Seiler.
He has chosen "Axis of Upheaval."
included is a review of the National Intelligence Estimate and nuclear use scenarios.
Excerpts:
Colliding Interests and Diplomatic Windows
Beijing’s response to Putin’s actions against Ukraine serves as a useful example for Kim to consider as he decides how Beijing, Moscow, and other axis members might respond to North Korean aggression targeting South Korea. Xi may have been surprised at Putin’s actions and even concerned about reputational risks of the emerging axis, but it would prove to be overly hypocritical for China to do anything but support Russia’s efforts as it lays the groundwork for its own future actions toward Taiwan.
Kim Jong-un, meanwhile, likely hopes that the DPRK-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership will secure Russia’s support or at least acquiescence in DPRK military actions against South Korea. However, China’s support remains uncertain, as previously mentioned in Xi and Biden’s meeting in November 2024. Doubtlessly, both Xi and Putin remember the Cold War, a system in which Beijing and Moscow felt free to act but sought to keep their satellite states under control to prevent becoming entrapped or entangled. Putin may have acted with confidence that U.S. support to Ukraine would be limited by the absence of a formal mutual defense treaty between Kyiv and Washington. Xi may believe that there are Taiwan scenarios where a lack of U.S. intervention could be confidently guaranteed. Both Xi and Putin likely would be concerned that North Korean revisionist military actions against South Korea would bring an overwhelming—and potentially nuclear—U.S. response that neither wants. Here is where Kim Jong-un’s confidence in an expanded set of options may meet its limits.
This is where there is diplomatic opportunity for the United States to make Beijing and Moscow stakeholders of Pyongyang and its actions, depending on how Trump engages Putin and Xi, and what impact that might have on revisionist bloc dynamics. If Beijing and Moscow are convinced that there would be a price to pay in failing to contain North Korea—a greater U.S. military presence in the region, the possibility of horizontal escalation, etc.—there is a possibility that they may be more inclined to act to contain and discourage Kim before the fact, or be tolerant of U.S. actions in response. Greater pressure will be needed to remind Kim Jong-un that any perceived newly emerging global order does not give him carte blanche to engage in dangerous military actions, and that actions against South Korea will inevitably have global implications beyond the peninsula. At the very least, reminding Beijing and Moscow that there is no scenario for conflict on the Korean Peninsula from which they would be immune to the ramifications requires firm and consistent messaging.
North Korea: Revisionist Ambitions and the Changing International Order
Photo: Contributor/Getty Images
Commentary by Sydney Seiler
Published April 24, 2025
https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korea-revisionist-ambitions-and-changing-international-order
The emergence of an “Axis of Upheaval” consisting of revisionist states—which, to borrow language from former Secretary of State Antony Blinken, seek to “alter the foundational principles of the international system” while “entrenching autocratic rule” at home—has been embraced by Pyongyang, driven by tangible and intangible security needs, along with tactical and strategic shared interests. The structure, behaviors, and durability of this new geopolitical order continue to evolve as countries probe the risks and benefits of working within a structure designed to openly challenge the rules-based liberal order. Understanding North Korea’s needs and interests can help in assessing the future direction of its behavior and interaction with other revisionist states, and in considering possible diplomatic strategies to counter and deter potentially dangerous outcomes.
Discerning Between Defensive, Coercive, and Offensive Military Needs
The Korean Peninsula has been in a state of armistice for almost 72 years. It has been a period marked by long stretches of peace and stability that have allowed South Korea and other Northeast Asian countries to enjoy remarkable economic growth, stability, and prosperity. Occasional flare-ups resulting from North Korean provocations occur, but over the decades, Pyongyang’s confidence that it faces little military threat from South Korea or the United States has grown, particularly as its repeated lethal and kinetic provocations have gone relatively unpunished by South Korea or the United States in the name of de-escalation and maintenance of the armistice. This is why, in part, North Korea has exhibited no real interest in security guarantees, tension reduction, or confidence-building efforts during multiple rounds of denuclearization negotiations. That reality, coupled with North Korea’s incremental and gradual nuclear and missile development, confirms the National Intelligence Council’s assessment that North Korea’s security needs are not and have not been primarily defensive in nature.
Coercive and Offensive Needs
North Korea’s overarching security objective is to build well-rounded weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional capabilities to coerce and dominate South Korea and potentially, through larger-scale revisionist actions, redefine the balance of power on the peninsula in Pyongyang’s favor. Therefore, enhancing WMD and conventional capabilities is likely what North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seeks in his relations with Russia, highlighting the serious regional security implications in both the near and longer terms.
The 2023 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed that, through 2030, “Kim Jong-un will most likely continue to pursue a strategy of coercion, potentially including non-nuclear lethal attacks, aimed at advancing the North's goals of intimidating its neighbors, extracting concessions, and bolstering the regime’s military credentials domestically.” Additionally, it dismissed as “very unlikely” the possibility that Pyongyang was developing nuclear weapons for purely defensive use over the coming decade.
Intangibles Kim Jong-un Likely Seeks in a New Alternative World Order
Over its 30-year nuclear pursuit, North Korea’s strategic ambition has been acceptance as a nuclear power, leading to diplomatic and economic “normalization” for longer-term survival with diminished sanctions and pressure. This was Kim’s goal after claiming in 2017 to have a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could reach the United States. In 2018, Pyongyang pivoted to diplomacy to mitigate pressure and advance its “responsible nuclear power” status. At the 2018 Singapore Summit with President Trump, Kim aimed to project himself to both domestic and international audiences as the leader of a recognized nuclear power, treated as an equal by the United States. However, this effort ultimately fell short, as evidenced by the failed 2019 Hanoi Summit, where Kim was unable to secure de facto recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status or obtain sanctions relief in exchange for limited and reversible denuclearization measures. Kim told his people to abandon hopes for sanctions relief and improvement of relations with the outside world in his read-out of a major plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea at the end of 2019.
As North Korea began to reengage the outside world in 2023, one question emerged: With whom could a non-denuclearizing North Korea engage? Clearly not South Korea, the United States, or Japan, which all demand denuclearization progress for reconciliation and normalization. Even China, despite its inconsistent sanctions enforcement, insists denuclearization must remain the end goal for the Korean Peninsula, limiting its support for North Korea to avoid straining China-U.S. relations. Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, desperate for munitions to sustain his aggression against Ukraine, was willing to accommodate Kim’s conditions while ignoring the nuclear issue, increasing Kim’s confidence that the changing geopolitical environment would be conducive to his goal of enduring and prevailing through selective engagement without denuclearizing. This confidence has also been bolstered by the Trump administration’s early avoidance of references to denuclearization.
Tangibles Kim Likely Seeks
While there is no concrete evidence yet of the tangible benefits North Korea might ultimately obtain, the surge in cooperation between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has provided North Korea with its traditional survival needs and the networks to circumvent multiple UN Security Council sanctions, while becoming one of the most flagrant examples of revisionist countries within the axis.
Iran-DPRK Relations
Pyongyang and Tehran have a history of “significant and meaningful” missile cooperation, particularly North Korea’s support to Iran’s short- and medium-range missile programs. While quality and performance issues and Iran’s relationship with South Korea have, at times, militated against more robust cooperation with North Korea, Pyongyang might turn to Tehran for assistance in areas that could greatly enhance and complement its missile program, such as drone technology. If the new axis tolerates nuclear breakouts and Tehran pursues that path, North Korea could be one of several potential technology, material, and design providers.
China-DPRK Relations
Since the post-Mao era, Beijing has been cautious about empowering North Korea in ways that would bring “conflict and turmoil to the Korean Peninsula,” which Xi Jinping warned China would not allow during his November 2024 meeting with President Biden. Thus, China supports North Korea enough to “survive, but not thrive” as an emboldened Pyongyang strengthens both Seoul’s and Tokyo’s demands for a stronger U.S. military presence in the region, a concern heightened by Moscow’s reported WMD and conventional weapons support to Pyongyang.
Russia-DPRK Relations
Kim appears largely focused on securing WMD, missile, space, and conventional gains from Russia. Enhanced efficiency and quality control in North Korea’s munitions industry will benefit both countries’ munition needs. As Kim and Putin test each other’s reliability, the relationship could move significantly beyond mere transactional, one-off deals and agreements.
The United States has released details of specific benefits North Korea is receiving from Russia, but of greatest concern is that Russia would help North Korea increase the performance, reliability, and lethality of its nuclear warheads, including reentry vehicle technologies it may not yet have perfected. While Russia may avoid openly supporting North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, it is less likely to be concerned about supporting its space program, the enhancement of which is necessary for targeting and battle damage assessment. North Korea’s successful launch of a reconnaissance satellite on November 21, 2023, strongly hinted that recent Russian technical support enabled success in an area where North Korea had previously failed. Secretary Blinken’s January 6, 2025, revelation that there is “reason to believe that Moscow intends to share advanced space and satellite technology with Pyongyang” suggests continued Russian support of North Korea’s space program.
Since assuming power in 2011, Kim has focused on modernizing North Korea’s large yet undertrained and underequipped military. Poorly maintained Soviet-era ground, air and air defense, and naval systems had not been modernized for years. While long-range artillery has served as a powerful tool of coercion and deterrence, threatening Seoul and its 25+ million citizens, it alone cannot win wars without “boots on the ground,” meaning a well-equipped and trained conventional force.
It is believed that Kim has been seeking help with ground, air and air defense, and naval systems, to include possible S-400 surface-to-air missile, MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft, and even nuclear-powered submarine technology. In the ground domain, North Korea is reported to have provided both M-1978 Koksan 170 millimeter (mm) self-propelled howitzers and 240 mm multiple launch rocket systems to Russia, yielding lessons in tactics and weapons performance.
What might be concluded thus far is that when it comes to Russia’s potential support for North Korea’s WMD and conventional capabilities, Kim Jong-un will need to be practical, and Putin is likely to be conservative. While advanced aircraft are much needed by North Korea, options like MiG-29s and Su-27s—though upgrades—do not reflect an exponential leap beyond what North Korea already possesses, such as older MiG-29s and Su-25s. Perhaps Kim asked for more advanced aircraft and was rejected, settling for the lesser aircraft that is a more practical match for North Korea’s air force needs and life cycle infrastructure. Kim settling for the possible and affordable demonstrates that even the “Axis of Upheaval” is still hierarchical, with stronger powers like Russia and China limiting what they provide to “junior” partners such as North Korea and Iran.
What Kim Might Offer the Axis
Until now, it would have been a stretch to consider any grouping of nations’ interests to be advanced by North Korea’s inclusion. However, Putin perceives diplomatic and symbolic value in Kim Jong-un’s support for Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine. Furthermore, North Korea is serving as an early case study for countries intrigued by transformations in the global order, a perceived weakening of U.S. dominance, and the costs and benefits of aligning with leading revisionist states such as China and Russia. If Putin is serious about promoting this alternative order even beyond the Ukraine conflict, he is likely to see value in sustaining cooperation with North Korea and will not be easily convinced to sell out Kim Jong-un to please Trump.
Though Pyongyang’s tangible contributions to Russia’s munitions needs may be limited, with reports of outdated and defective shells, its production capabilities and quality are steadily advancing. Foreign Policy has reported that North Korea has provided between 1.6 and 6 million shells to Russia. By being the “nuts and bolts munitions provider” to countries like Russia and Iran, North Korea could secure advanced technologies, materials, and machinery to enhance and modernize its munitions industry.
North Korea could also be a force provider. It has a long history of sending workers abroad for hard cash, but sending troops to fight alongside Russian counterparts takes this to a new level. Currently, it is believed that 11,000–12,000 North Korean troops have been dispatched to Russia, with some estimates reaching as high as 100,000 troops. As the Korean People’s Army’s warfare experience improves, Kim Jong-un is likely to pursue more opportunities for its people to go abroad to acquire hard cash. Prohibited by UN Security Council Resolution 2375 since 2017, expanding the number of North Koreans working abroad will also erode the current sanctions regime writ large, reflecting Kim’s hopes that this newly emerging illiberal order will render current standing UN Security Council resolutions meaningless.
Military Cooperation Going Forward
Based on the level of technologies involved, three broad areas of conventional military cooperation among these like-minded countries can be posited. Cutting-edge technologies are the least likely to be shared among the “Axis of Upheaval” countries, given the unique military advantages, investment, and future sales potential to the technology owner. Low-end exchanges such as basic munitions and spare parts for older legacy systems will continue to be important considering their fundamental role in ensuring success in any extended conflict, and because a distributed production architecture has proven indispensable for sustained military operations.
Between the high-end and low-end capabilities are less high-tech but still crucial capabilities such as drones, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), air defense systems, basic missile components, and other legacy ground, air, and naval systems that enhance conventional capabilities’ lethality. These are capabilities where countries such as Iran and North Korea can provide systems of sufficient reliability to help replenish arsenals depleted by current or recent conflict. Conversely, these are capabilities North Korea would burn through quite quickly in any protracted conflict on the peninsula, necessitating support from outside suppliers. When it comes to North Korea, conventional assistance obtained from Russia is as troublesome as WMD cooperation itself, since conventional weapons are more likely to be used in coercive or even revisionist actions than WMDs.
Worries Looking Forward: Enabled and Emboldened for Revisionist Actions?
The 2023 NIE judged that North Korea will likely limit its nuclear use to supporting conventional coercive actions, but sees them as less likely than revisionist actions to redefine and dominate the Korean Peninsula’s security status quo. Although most experts assess that a classic unification of the peninsula, similar to the 1950 attempt, is well beyond the Korean People’s Army capabilities, other significant strategic objectives achievable through force could be pursued as North Korea’s nuclear and conventional capabilities expand.
Figure 1: Going Forward: U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Nuclear Use Scenarios
Remote Visualization
Source: National Intelligence Council.
In both the most likely scenario of coercive use and the much less likely scenario of outright offensive use of nuclear weapons, Pyongyang’s perception of support or tolerance from outside actors, especially Beijing and Moscow (whether as an economic lifeline against sanctions or isolation or through direct military support, including munitions, weapons systems, or even troops, as Pyongyang has done for Moscow over the last two years), serves as an important “driver” of whether Kim Jong-un might go down that path. Enhanced conventional capabilities were also seen as a potential driver in the 2023 NIE, providing Kim more options and greater confidence in maintaining escalation dominance compared to high-risk nuclear weapons. As the use of force for revisionist objectives becomes an accepted norm within the “Axis of Upheaval,” and as Kim grows confident in mutual defense guarantees, such as the DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the possibility grows that Kim feels empowered by strengthened capabilities and emboldened to use them. As cooperation grows among axis members over time, even military support from Iran or from China might be perceived by Kim as a possibility during a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
This leads to the “why?” question. What is Kim Jong-un seeking in resorting to either lethal and kinetic coercive actions or more dangerous, larger-scale revisionist ones? Intended outcomes Kim may be pursuing fall along a continuum, as depicted in the chart below.
Figure 2: DPRK Strategic Objectives Through the Use of Force
Remote Visualization
Source: Author’s analysis.
Note: ROKG refers to the Republic of Korea government; USFK refers to the United States Forces Korea.
While not an exhaustive listing of all possible coercive or revisionist actions and intended outcomes, the above graphic is useful in considering what actions short of an all-out war to reunify the Korean Peninsula Kim Jong-un might consider risking to achieve revisionist outcomes of significant strategic value, and that by nature would include either threats or actual use of nuclear weapons to compel capitulation by South Korea.
Colliding Interests and Diplomatic Windows
Beijing’s response to Putin’s actions against Ukraine serves as a useful example for Kim to consider as he decides how Beijing, Moscow, and other axis members might respond to North Korean aggression targeting South Korea. Xi may have been surprised at Putin’s actions and even concerned about reputational risks of the emerging axis, but it would prove to be overly hypocritical for China to do anything but support Russia’s efforts as it lays the groundwork for its own future actions toward Taiwan.
Kim Jong-un, meanwhile, likely hopes that the DPRK-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership will secure Russia’s support or at least acquiescence in DPRK military actions against South Korea. However, China’s support remains uncertain, as previously mentioned in Xi and Biden’s meeting in November 2024. Doubtlessly, both Xi and Putin remember the Cold War, a system in which Beijing and Moscow felt free to act but sought to keep their satellite states under control to prevent becoming entrapped or entangled. Putin may have acted with confidence that U.S. support to Ukraine would be limited by the absence of a formal mutual defense treaty between Kyiv and Washington. Xi may believe that there are Taiwan scenarios where a lack of U.S. intervention could be confidently guaranteed. Both Xi and Putin likely would be concerned that North Korean revisionist military actions against South Korea would bring an overwhelming—and potentially nuclear—U.S. response that neither wants. Here is where Kim Jong-un’s confidence in an expanded set of options may meet its limits.
This is where there is diplomatic opportunity for the United States to make Beijing and Moscow stakeholders of Pyongyang and its actions, depending on how Trump engages Putin and Xi, and what impact that might have on revisionist bloc dynamics. If Beijing and Moscow are convinced that there would be a price to pay in failing to contain North Korea—a greater U.S. military presence in the region, the possibility of horizontal escalation, etc.—there is a possibility that they may be more inclined to act to contain and discourage Kim before the fact, or be tolerant of U.S. actions in response. Greater pressure will be needed to remind Kim Jong-un that any perceived newly emerging global order does not give him carte blanche to engage in dangerous military actions, and that actions against South Korea will inevitably have global implications beyond the peninsula. At the very least, reminding Beijing and Moscow that there is no scenario for conflict on the Korean Peninsula from which they would be immune to the ramifications requires firm and consistent messaging.
Sydney Seiler is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
The views expressed in this submission are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
5. North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Facilities: What We Learned from KCNA’s Images
Please download the 37 page report in PDF at this link: https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/North_Korea%E2%80%99s_Uranium_Enrichment_Facilities_What_We_Learned_from_KCNA%E2%80%99s_Images_April_24_Final.pdf
North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Facilities: What We Learned from KCNA’s Images
by David Albright and Spencer Faragasso with Sarah Burkhard
https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/north-koreas-uranium-enrichment-facilities-what-we-learned-from-kcnas-image?utm
April 24, 2025
Download PDF
For the first time ever, North Korea has released images of the inside of two of its gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants. The first set of images was released on September 13, 2024, by the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), including five images of the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un touring gas centrifuge cascade halls. 1 On January 29, 2025, Pyongyang Times released nine KCNA images of Kim touring another gas centrifuge plant. 2
The September images appear to show a major portion of the inside of the undeclared Kangsong, aka Kangson, enrichment plant, which the Institute first revealed publicly in May 2018, and which has since been expanded in size. 3 The second imagery set from January appears to show major portions of the Yongbyon enrichment plant, which North Korea admitted to having in 2010. It should be noted that while the images and official assessments are consistent with Kangsong being an enrichment plant, this conclusion remains unverified and there is no definitive proof that the images were taken at Kangsong, or Yongbyon, for that matter. Figures 1 and 2 show recent commercial satellite images of these two facilities.
Previously, North Korea has only allowed a brief view of an enrichment hall at Yongbyon to one select group of non-governmental U.S. experts in 2010. 4 None of the experts was a centrifuge expert, and their North Korean hosts rushed the group through the plant and were hesitant to answer questions. Further, the enrichment plant at Yongbyon has undergone notable changes and expansions since that visit in 2010. Thus, these images offer a unique opportunity to study North Korea’s enrichment facilities and centrifuges and estimate their current capabilities.
Based on the images and two accompanying official statements, North Korea appears to be expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities. It also claims that it is deploying or will deploy more advanced centrifuges, although this assertion cannot be ascertained in any quantitative manner from the images.
6. North Korea nuclear program "completely off the charts": UN watchdog
Hyperbole that will drive us to do something rash? Either make radical concessions or conduct arms control negotiations - both of which mean victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.
North Korea nuclear program "completely off the charts": UN watchdog
Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · April 23, 2025
ByEllie Cook is a Newsweek security and defense reporter based in London, U.K. Her work focuses largely on the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. military, weapons systems and emerging technology. She joined Newsweek in January 2023, having previously worked as a reporter at the Daily Express, and is a graduate of International Journalism at City, University of London. Languages: English, Spanish.You can reach Ellie via email at e.cook@newsweek.com.
North Korea's nuclear program has ballooned "exponentially," the head of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog has said, as Pyongyang forges ahead with its extensive military buildup.
Why It Matters
North Korea has declared itself a nuclear weapons state, although it does not have this official recognition from the international community.
Pyongyang withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, and conducted its first nuclear test three years later. Trump's Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, warned last month that Pyongyang could be gearing up for its first nuclear test since 2017.
In this April 15, 2017, file photo, an unidentified missile that analysts believe could be the North Korean Hwasong 12 is paraded in Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea. In this April 15, 2017, file photo, an unidentified missile that analysts believe could be the North Korean Hwasong 12 is paraded in Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea. AP Photo/Wong Maye-E, File
What To Know
Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said on Tuesday that North Korea's nuclear weapons program had grown "exponentially," but the international community had very little look-in at Pyongyang's activities.
North Korea has an estimated 50 nuclear warheads.
"You cannot have a country like this, which is completely off the charts with this nuclear arsenal…with such a big program—nuclear program—with all these facilities, without us having any clue of any safety or security measures which are being applied to it," Grossi said during an appearance at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington D.C.
The U.N. has long leveled sanctions at North Korea designed to curb its weapons development, but the measures have been largely ineffective in heading off Pyongyang's programs. Russia vetoed a U.N. resolution that would have maintained expert monitoring of the enforcement of sanctions on North Korea in March 2024.
The IAEA's inspectors were kicked out of North Korea in April 2009, when Pyongyang told the agency it was "immediately ceasing all cooperation" with the U.N. body, the IAEA said at the time.
The IAEA still has "a pretty good idea of what is going on," Grossi said. Pyongyang has built new nuclear site across the country since the agency left North Korea, including a possible third enrichment facility, he said.
Experts and officials suspect Pyongyang is receiving help with its ballistic missile and nuclear development from the Kremlin in exchange for support with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. North Korea has emerged as a major supplier of artillery shells and other munitions to Russia, and is the only nation outside of Moscow and Kyiv to have formally committed military forces to the war in Eastern Europe.
Earlier this year, Pyongyang unveiled what state media called "a nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine" under construction.
North Korea successfully launched a spy satellite in November 2023, quickly saying it had captured "detailed" images of sensitive U.S. sites like the Pentagon, the White House, and facilities housing U.S. nuclear aircraft carriers.
Grossi has previously called for "proactive" engagement with the secretive nation, adding in an interview with The Associated Press in 2024: "We must open doors for dialogue."
Speculation had swirled around whether the Trump administration would seek to reopen channels of communication with North Korea, although experts warned that Pyongyang could be reluctant to accept U.S. overtures. President Donald Trump has so far not homed in on North Korea talks, prioritizing a ceasefire in the Middle East, a deal to bring fighting in Ukraine to a halt, and a nuclear agreement with Iran.
"I think he misses me," Trump said of Kim in July last year. He has since dubbed the North Korean dictator a "smart guy" and "not a religious zealot."
But Trump left a summit with North Korea focused on nuclear weapons in the Vietnamese capital, Hanoi, in 2019 without an agreement, souring relations with Pyongyang during the Republican president's first term in office.
"The way that unraveled stung the North Koreans," Samuel Ramani, an associate fellow at the London-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank, previously told Newsweek.
"Presidential diplomacy is important," Grossi said on Tuesday. "Engaging is indispensable."
The U.S. has also sought to bring Iran back into a binding agreement on its own nuclear development. Iran says its nuclear program is peaceful, while analysts warn Tehran is very close to the levels of uranium enrichment needed to make a nuclear weapon.
What People Are Saying
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi said on Tuesday: "I know that for some—and I understand, I have great respect for them—it's only, 'They disarm or we don't talk.' Well, unfortunately, things are a bit more complicated in international life, and you're not going to get everything you want, especially when a country has acquired such a big nuclear arsenal."
What Happens Next
As yet, there have been no formal announcements concerning future talks between Washington and Pyongyang.
Newsweek · by Ellie Cook · April 23, 2025
7. South Korea says DeepSeek transferred user data to China and the U.S. without consent
South Korea says DeepSeek transferred user data to China and the U.S. without consent
Key Points
- The agency said that before DeepSeek's chatbot was removed from app stores in South Korea, the company was transferring user data to firms in China and the U.S. without consent.
- The findings were released in relation to an ongoing investigation into DeepSeek, and the company has been sent corrective recommendations.
CNBC · by Dylan Butts · April 24, 2025
Jaap Arriens | Nurphoto | Getty Images
South Korea's data protection authority has concluded that Chinese artificial intelligence startup DeepSeek collected personal information from local users and transferred it overseas without their permission.
The authority, the Personal Information Protection Commission, released its written findings on Thursday in connection with a privacy and security review of DeepSeek.
It follows DeepSeek's removal of its chatbot application from South Korean app stores in February at the recommendation of PICP. The agency said DeepSeek had committed to cooperate on its concerns.
During DeepSeek's presence in South Korea, it transferred user data to several firms in China and the U.S. without obtaining the necessary consent from users or disclosing the practice, the PIPC said.
The agency highlighted a particular case in which DeepSeek transferred information from user-written AI prompts, as well as device, network, and app information, to a Chinese cloud service platform named Beijing Volcano Engine Technology Co.
While the PIPC identified Beijing Volcano Engine Technology Co. as "an affiliate" of TikTok-owner ByteDance, the information privacy watchdog noted in a statement that the cloud platform "is a separate legal entity and has no relation to ByteDance," according to a Google translation.
According to PIPC, DeepSeek said it used Beijing Volcano Engine Technology's services to improve the security and user experience of its app, but later blocked the transfer of AI prompt information from April 10.
watch now
VIDEO3:0103:01
OpenAI calls for U.S. DeepSeek ban
TechCheck
DeepSeek and ByteDance did not immediately respond to inquiries from CNBC.
The Hangzhou-based AI startup took the world by storm in January when it unveiled its R1 reasoning model, rivaling the performance of Western competitors despite the company's claims that it was trained for relatively low costs and with less advanced hardware.
However, the app's rising popularity quickly triggered national security and data concerns outside China due to Beijing's requirement for domestic firms to share data with the PRC. Cybersecurity experts have also flagged data vulnerabilities in the app and voiced concerns about the company's privacy policy.
PIPC on Thursday said it had issued a corrective recommendation to DeepSeek, which includes requests to immediately destroy AI prompt information transferred to the Chinese company in question and to set up legal protocols for transferring personal information overseas.
When the data protection authority announced the removal of DeepSeek from local app stores, it signaled that the app would become available again once the company implemented the necessary updates to comply with local data protection policy.
That investigation followed reports that some South Korean government agencies had banned employees from using DeepSeek on work devices. Other global government departments, including in Taiwan, Australia, and the U.S., have reportedly instituted similar bans.
CNBC · by Dylan Butts · April 24, 2025
8. Treasury secretary calls high-level trade talks with S. Korea 'very successful'
Hopefully both sides are seeing success.
(3rd LD) Treasury secretary calls high-level trade talks with S. Korea 'very successful' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 25, 2025
(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES with Bessent's remarks in paras 1-5; TRIMS)
By Song Sang-ho, Kim Han-joo and Kim Dong-hyun
WASHINGTON/SEOUL, April 24 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described high-level trade talks with South Korea in Washington on Thursday as "very successful," noting that Seoul came with its "A-game" and anticipating that the allies will discuss "technical terms" as early as next week.
Bessent made the remarks after he and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer met with Seoul's Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok and Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun for their "two-plus-two" trade consultations at the Department of the Treasury.
"We had a very successful bilateral meeting with the Republic of Korea today. We may be moving faster than I thought," Bessent said during a press availability at the White House, referring to South Korea by its official name.
"We will be talking (about) technical terms as early as next week as we reach that agreement on understanding as soon as next week. So the South Koreans came early. They came with their A game, and we will see if they follow through on that," he added.
He did not elaborate on what proposals South Korea has put forward, as the Asian ally is angling to remove the Trump administration's sweeping "reciprocal" tariffs on it and shield its industries from other new U.S. duties.
The Trump administration started imposing country-specific "reciprocal" tariffs, including 25 percent duties, on April 9, only to place a 90-day pause on them shortly afterward to allow for negotiations. Its 25 percent levy on automobiles went into effect on April 3, with the same-rate duties on some auto parts set to come no later than May 3.
South Korea's Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok (2nd from L), Trade Minister Ahn Duk-geun (L), U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent (2nd from R) and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer pose for a photo prior to their trade talks in Washington on April 24, 2025 in this photo provided by Seoul's industry ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The outcome of Thursday's talks is expected to be announced later in the day.
Upon arrival in Washington on Wednesday, Ahn said Seoul aims to seek the removal of the Trump administration's reciprocal tariffs and swiftly address Washington's auto tariff measures.
The new U.S. levy on imported cars has been a major source of concern for Asia's fourth-largest economy, as the U.S. is a top auto export market for South Korea.
Of South Korea's total car exports last year, exports to the U.S. were tallied at US$34.7 billion, or 49.1 percent. Hyundai Motor Group and GM Korea exported around 970,000 and 410,000 units to the U.S., respectively, last year.
Last month, South Korean conglomerate Hyundai Motor Group unveiled a plan to invest $21 billion in the U.S. through 2028, as U.S. President Donald Trump has been using tariffs to bolster domestic manufacturing and reduce America's trade deficits.
Observers said that this week's talks might cover a wide array of bilateral trade issues, including U.S. tariffs and non-tariff barriers, such as South Korea's ban on American beef from cattle older than 30 months.
Before the talks, Seoul officials said that defense-cost sharing matters would not be part of the agenda for the trade talks, although Trump has cast his negotiation approach as "one-stop shopping" -- a term that raised the prospects of the tariff meeting going beyond just trade issues.
khj@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 25, 2025
9. S. Korea, U.S. to hold regular KIDD defense talks at Pentagon next week: spokesperson
As I have said many times, it is important to note that the South Korean government continues to function effectively despite the presidential turmoil. it has in no way been paralyzed by the politics.
(2nd LD) S. Korea, U.S. to hold regular KIDD defense talks at Pentagon next week: spokesperson | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 25, 2025
(ATTN: RECASTS lead; ADDS more info in paras 6-7)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States plan to hold their key regular defense talks in Washington next week, a Pentagon spokesperson said Thursday, in a sign that the allies are maintaining close security cooperation under the Trump administration to counter evolving North Korean threats.
The spokesperson said that the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) is set to take place at the Pentagon on Thursday and Friday. The upcoming meeting will mark the first KIDD gathering since U.S. President Donald Trump took office in January.
"The Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue will occur next week and there will be a joint press statement release after the meeting," the spokesperson told Yonhap New Agency via email.
Launched in 2011, KIDD is a comprehensive senior-level defense meeting between the allies.
When held, the KIDD meeting is expected to touch on a range of bilateral security policy cooperation issues, including reinforcing deterrence against evolving North Korean nuclear and missile threats and the allies' combined defense posture.
Under a working-group session, the two sides could also take stock of progress in the allies' joint efforts for the conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control from the U.S. to South Korea.
The forthcoming KIDD meeting is expected to help ease lingering concerns that a political transition period in Seoul following the ouster of President Yoon Suk Yeol could have a negative effect on the allies' security policy coordination.
Stoking worries over defense collaboration, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth skipped South Korea in his recent trip to the Indo-Pacific that included stops in Japan and the Philippines. His predecessor, Lloyd Austin, also canceled the Korea portion of his Asia swing in December.
Asked to comment on the future operation of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), the allies' key nuclear deterrence body, the spokesperson said that "NCG deliberations are ongoing."
Earlier this week, an official in Seoul said that Seoul and Washington will keep the NCG running under the Trump administration with its next meeting set to take place as early as June.
The NCG was launched by former President Yoon and former U.S. President Joe Biden following their April 2023 summit to strengthen the U.S. "extended deterrence" commitment to defending its ally South Korea with all of its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons.
This undated file photo shows troops saluting, with the U.S. and South Korean national flags in the background. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 25, 2025
10. New video confirms North Korea provided M1991 240mm rocket launchers to Russia to fight against Ukraine
One of the many moneymakers Kim is shaking.
New video confirms North Korea provided M1991 240mm rocket launchers to Russia to fight against Ukraine
armyrecognition.com · by Jérôme Brahy
A video shared by ButusovPlus on April 20, 2025, has confirmed for the first time the presence of North Korea’s M1991 multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in Russian service. Published on April 20, 2025, by Ukrainian military journalist Yurii Butusov, the footage shows Russian servicemen installing improvised anti-drone protection on an M1991 system inside what appears to be a hangar. Although intelligence reports have long stated that these systems were transferred from North Korea to Russia, this video serves as the first visual verification of their operational use.
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The Pyonghwa Motors General Factory in Nampo City has been identified as a production site for North Korea’s 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), including updated variants of the M1991. (Picture source: Telegram/ButusovPlus and KCNA)
According to statements by Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, Russia had received 120 M1991 units from North Korea by January 2025 and was expected to receive another batch of a similar size in the near future. Ukrainian officials, including Lt. Andriy Kovalenko from the Center for Countering Disinformation, reported that the first transfer occurred on November 29, 2024, as part of a broader delivery that also included over 100 units of North Korean military equipment. These reportedly included M1989 Koksan self-propelled howitzers, KN-23 ballistic missiles, and over five million artillery shells. The delivery was described as a measure to compensate for Russia’s extensive artillery losses in Ukraine since February 2022.
Since 2022, the presence of North Korean arms in Ukraine has expanded. In addition to the artillery and rocket systems, reports from 2024 indicated that over 10,000 North Korean nationals were deployed to Russia, some near the front lines. Their roles ranged from logistical support to technical maintenance. In June 2024, a strategic partnership treaty was signed between North Korea and Russia, which was later ratified by Pyongyang in November 2024. Following this agreement, additional shipments were confirmed, including 50 M1989 howitzers and 20 upgraded 240mm MLRS units deployed in Russia’s Kursk region.
The M1991’s utility in Ukraine is tied to its area suppression role. Russia’s losses of MLRS units and high demand for replacement systems have made the M1991 a viable option despite its lack of precision. Russian MLRS such as the BM-21 Grad, BM-27 Uragan, and BM-30 Smerch also rely on unguided rockets, and the M1991 performs a similar function. Its integration into Russian operations is part of a larger pattern of acquiring artillery from external partners to sustain prolonged conflict.
The Pyonghwa Motors General Factory in Nampo City has been identified as a production site for North Korea’s 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), including updated variants of the M1991. This includes models intended for domestic deployment between 2024 and 2026, as well as potential export. In May 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited the facility, where he personally drove one of the newly manufactured launcher vehicles on site and observed the test-firing of guided rockets described as a technically updated version of the 240mm system. North Korean state media reported that the rockets hit their targets during the tests, and that these systems would be delivered to combined units of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), specifically assigned to operations in the western region. The test-firing followed a prior inspection of multiple arms production sites, including factories producing sniper rifles and artillery vehicles.
In May 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited the facility, where he personally drove one of the newly manufactured launcher vehicles on site and observed the test-firing of guided rockets described as a technically updated version of the M240mm system. (Picture source: KCNA)
The factory was originally completed on April 6, 2002, and was initially established as a civilian automotive plant under the name Pyonghwa Motors. It was located in Nampo’s port district, adjacent to the Pyongyang-Nampo highway and near Sinnampo Station. The project began as part of inter-Korean cooperation, involving both North Korean and South Korean partners. At the time of its inauguration, attended by over 3,000 people despite rainy weather, South Korean representatives included figures from the Korean Cultural Foundation and the Mount Kumgang International Group. North Korean officials from the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee also participated. During the opening ceremony, the South Korean side introduced a plan to produce passenger cars, including the Fiat Siena (1.6L engine), along with vehicles such as buses, ambulances, fire trucks, and refuse collection vehicles. The facility was also expected to manufacture and export vehicle components.
The plant was visited again in 2007 by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun during the inter-Korean summit with Kim Jong-il. At that time, the factory was still viewed as a cooperative initiative. However, subsequent developments indicated a transition in its function. By the 2010s, the site was reportedly restructured for military purposes. Production infrastructure at the plant includes an automated assembly line and conveyor-based processing systems. The layout and configuration have been compared to other North Korean arms production sites, such as the Pyongyang tracked vehicle plant. According to various analyses, the facility appears to have undergone a gradual conversion into a munitions production base.
This shift was confirmed in 2024 when North Korean state media published photographs showing Kim Jong-un inspecting the upgraded 240mm launcher system. External analysts, including Jeffrey Lewis, conducted image verification using satellite imagery and reference photos, confirming that the location shown in the state media corresponded to the Pyonghwa Motors General Factory. Specific features such as red containers visible on site were used as reference points, and it was noted that those containers had been in place for several years. Additional imagery taken from different perspectives further confirmed the identification.
The M1991 system, which North Korea previously showcased during tests in May 2023, is designed to fire unguided 240mm spin-stabilized rockets. Each rocket weighs approximately 497 kilograms, including a 90-kilogram warhead, and the launcher can fire a full salvo of 22 rockets in approximately 45 seconds. The rockets have a firing range between 40 and 60 kilometers, with unconfirmed claims of newer variants reaching up to 120 kilometers. The M1991 uses a road-mobile 6x6 truck chassis, including Romanian Roman models and licensed Chinese variants such as the Shacman Steyr 6x6 and Hongyang 6x6, among others. These platforms allow for rapid deployment, with a stated readiness time of two minutes, a firing cycle of under one minute, and a withdrawal time of six minutes.
The M1991 rocket launcher system, which exists in several variants, is designed to fire unguided 240mm spin-stabilized rockets at a range between 40 and 60 kilometers (Picture source: KCNA)
Technical adaptations by North Korea include reinforcing imported civilian truck chassis, adding hydraulic stabilizers, and installing launcher rails. Models such as the CQ15250, CQ19210, CQ25290, and CQ30290 have been repurposed for this use. These adaptations reflect North Korea’s strategy of acquiring ostensibly civilian vehicles to bypass arms embargoes. According to South Korean sources, Chinese manufacturers have produced licensed Roman vehicles, enabling the procurement of such platforms through indirect supply chains. The Roman company, a Romanian truck and bus manufacturer, has sold vehicles to various countries, and China’s Hongyang Truck Manufacturing Company is known to produce them under license.
North Korean sources report that the M1991 belongs to an artillery brigade known as "Jangsa Jeongpo," which is positioned along the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This unit is tasked with maintaining readiness to engage targets across the border. The M1991 is one of several long-range artillery systems used by North Korea for area bombardment. It is deployed alongside the 170mm M1989 Koksan self-propelled howitzer and the 300mm KN-09 MLRS. These systems are typically located in hardened or semi-hardened positions and are capable of launching coordinated strikes. According to South Korean Army manuals, the M1991 has a 19-minute operational exposure window, which includes five minutes to open the cave gate, two minutes to prepare, one minute to fire, and six minutes to move. This makes the M1991 more mobile and harder to target than the 170mm Koksan system, which has a 34-minute exposure window.
The system’s range capabilities allow it to reach key areas in South Korea, including the entire Seoul metropolitan region, parts of Incheon, Incheon Airport, Bucheon, Anyang, and Siheung. With extended-range munitions, it may also be capable of reaching deeper into South Korean territory. The M1991 is considered an evolution of the M1985 and M1989 systems, themselves derived from the Soviet BM-24. Although older M1985 and M1989 systems are mostly held in reserve or relegated to secondary roles, the M1991 remains in frontline use, with an estimated 430 units reportedly operational. It is used for area suppression and has been assessed to carry not only high-explosive payloads but also smoke, incendiary, and potentially chemical warheads.
In May 2023, North Korea displayed a renewed version of the 240mm launcher mounted on a Czech Tatra truck chassis. The system was tested with improved munitions and was reportedly driven by Kim Jong-un himself during a demonstration along a highway. North Korea announced plans to replace older systems with this updated version between 2024 and the end of 2026. North Korean state media referred to the system as a “renewed 240mm MLRS” without confirming an official designation. The new version is believed to incorporate upgrades in payload and launcher electronics, although exact specifications remain unverified.
The M1991 has also been exported. Iran is known to operate modified variants of the earlier M1985 system under the name Fajr-3. Uganda and Angola have been reported to operate the M1991 and M1989 respectively. Reports suggest Myanmar may also possess some units. The use of these systems by multiple foreign operators indicates that North Korea has actively pursued export opportunities despite international sanctions, often disguising military sales through civilian intermediaries. The presence of the M1991 in Ukraine and its confirmed use by Russian forces illustrates the growing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. It reflects the broader strategic alignment that has developed since North Korea recognized the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics in July 2022. Subsequent arms transfers, personnel deployments, and treaty agreements have further entrenched this partnership, resulting in expanded support for Russian operations in Ukraine.
armyrecognition.com · by Jérôme Brahy
11. ‘Entire Platoon’ – Ukrainian Special Forces Eliminate 25 North Koreans in Close Combat in Russia’s Kursk
As someone wrote on social media, Russia and north Korea are locked in a fight to see who has the second best Army in Ukraine.
‘Entire Platoon’ – Ukrainian Special Forces Eliminate 25 North Koreans in Close Combat in Russia’s Kursk
kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · April 24, 2025
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- ‘Entire Platoon’ – Ukrainian Special Forces Eliminate 25 North Koreans in Close Combat in Russia’s Kursk
North Koreans in Ukraine SSO Top News
Footage shows intense combat, first aid for a wounded Ukrainian, and the team’s withdrawal after completing the mission.
The screenshot from the video.
Flip
Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that a platoon of North Korean (DPRK) soldiers was eliminated in close combat during an operation in Russia’s Kursk Oblast.
The SSO shared video footage of the assault on Telegram Thursday, writing:
“Soldiers of the 6th Ranger Regiment of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine conducted special operations against regular North Korean troops in the Kursk region of Russia.”
Content Warning: Graphic Material
According to the report, during a rapid engagement, Ukrainian forces eliminated 25 DPRK troops.
Kyiv Post could not independently verify the time or location of the footage. However, the video shows what appear to be body camera and drone-recorded moments from the assault, including an intense firefight and first aid being administered to a wounded Ukrainian soldier.
“These events took place last month, but due to operational security, we are only now able to release details and footage from SSO drone and body cameras,” the statement says.
The SSO reported eight rangers, riding in an armored Humvee and supported by reconnaissance drones, advanced deep behind Russian lines.
Once in range, they took up positions in trenches and initiated a firefight with a DPRK unit three times their size.
“Despite the numerical superiority of the enemy and heavy artillery fire, the SSO soldiers proved that quality beats quantity,” the report reads. “They didn’t leave the entire DPRK platoon a chance during the engagement.”
Ukraine has been working on restructuring of the GDP warrants since 2024 Eurobond restructuring, but so far it has achieved no result despite communication between the government and hedge funds.
After completing their mission, the rangers withdrew from the area.
Russia announced on April 19 that its forces had retaken Oleshnya, the second-to-last village in Kursk Oblast still held by Ukrainian troops, following Kyiv’s surprise offensive in August last year.
The Ukrainian operation caught Russian forces off guard and allowed Ukraine to reclaim over 1,000 square kilometers (around 400 square miles) of territory.
According to Moscow, only one village – Gornal – currently remains under Ukrainian control in the area.
In March, Russian troops reportedly regained significant ground in the region, including retaking the town of Sudzha, previously used by Ukrainian forces as a key base.
The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had confirmed that Ukrainian troops have withdrawn from the city of Sudzha.
kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · April 24, 2025
12. Korea gears up for June 3 election amid political polarization, presidential power frays
Korea gears up for June 3 election amid political polarization, presidential power frays
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
By - The Washington Times - Tuesday, April 22, 2025
A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.
SEOUL, South Korea — South Korea’s June 3 presidential election is Lee Jae-myung’s to lose.
The former head of the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea, Mr. Lee has resigned his position to make his third run at the presidency. This time the 61-year-old has an approval rating above 50%.
A presidential race in South Korea had not expected before 2027, but the political calendar was flung into disorder after President Yoon Suk Yeol’s removal from office on April 3.
Mr. Yoon was impeached after his shock declaration of martial law in December. He now faces insurrection charges.
In a poll published Monday by Realmeter, Mr. Lee had an approval rating of 50.2%, well ahead of the candidate in second place, Kim Moon-soo of the ruling conservative People Power Party, at 12.2%.
Though there are DPK challengers to Mr. Lee, his victory in the party primary is widely seen as a given.
The PPP held its first-round primary on Tuesday, cutting its first-round field of eight contenders down to four.
Following a second-round primary, a single PPP presidential candidate will be chosen on May 3. Per Monday’s poll, Mr. Kim is the likeliest choice.
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Despite Mr. Lee’s obvious political chops, his game has been off in two high-profile plebiscites.
Following the impeachment of conservative President Park Geun-hye in 2017, Mr. Lee lost the DPK’s primary to Moon Jae-in, who went on to win the single-term presidency.
Mr. Lee won the next DPK primary, then lost the 2022 presidential election narrowly to Mr. Yoon.
But nobody can accuse Mr. Lee of being milquetoast.
On the night of martial law, he livestreamed to the nation while rushing to the National Assembly. There, he breached a police and special forces cordon. Inside, he led a quorum, which voted down martial law just three hours after its issuance.
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Monday’s poll data suggests that Mr. Lee is successfully softening his formerly uncompromising leftist image.
A tough-talking, working-class man, he entered national politics the hard way: Fighting uphill through mayorships and provincial governorships.
Though he remains popular in his first constituency, Seongnam, he has been dogged by endless allegations of corruption and abuse of power, and been impacted by multiple suicides among his entourage.
Politically, he has promoted universal basic income, spoken angrily at demonstrations against Mr. Yoon’s outreach to Japan, and sought better relations with China and North Korea.
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With the presidency so close, he is walking back some of his earlier positions.
Mr. Lee faced flak from conservatives for holding a chummy meeting with the Chinese ambassador in 2023. This January, he met the acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea.
Seen by some as anti-business, he met Samsung Electronics Chairman Lee Jae-yong in March.
In certain policy areas — engaging with North Korea’s leadership, possibly reducing U.S. troop numbers in South Korea — he may sync well with President Trump. He shares Mr. Trump’s disdain for multilateral security partnerships, and has blamed NATO for the war in Ukraine.
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But whether Mr. Lee and Mr. Trump would agree on improving relations with Beijing, or of potentially using U.S. forces in South Korea for off-peninsula operations, is questionable.
In 2025, South Korea mastered its third impeachment crisis without major strife, but whoever wins the presidential race will inherit a troubled and polarized domestic polity.
The peninsula’s frozen, eight-decade division illustrates the contentious nature of inter-Korean politics. With three of its last five presidents suffering impeachment, South Korea’s domestic politics are equally divisive.
The two main parties battle over a political terrain that fortifies bipartisanship. The executive and the legislature are frequently at odds, and as the National Assembly lacks an upper house, there are only two power nodes.
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A political thinker told foreign reporters that the last two presidents, Mr. Moon and Mr. Yoon, widened political chasms by deprioritizing consensual leadership.
“Retaliatory policies and the Moon administration’s strategy raised anger among conservatives,” said Kang Won-taek, a politics professor at the elite Seoul National University.
Under Mr. Moon, who led South Korea from 2017-2022, two former conservative presidents, as well as most of the cabinet of the prior administration, were jailed.
That “had a severe impact” on the 2022 presidential election, Mr. Kang continued: “The parties tried to see who was a good fighter among presidential candidates, rather than who would be a more competent, better president.”
As Mr. Moon’s term ended, Mr. Lee and Mr. Yoon emerged as their respective parties’ champions.
Mr. Lee’s DPK, wielding its legislative majority, impeached more cabinet appointees than any prior parliament, and crushed Mr. Yoon’s proposed budget.
Mr. Yoon escalated with martial law — and was unseated.
Some in the National Assembly are researching possible constitutional change.
“Korean democratization was all about taming the ‘imperial presidency,’” said Michael Breen, Seoul-based author of “The Koreans,” who, as a journalist, covered the anti-authoritarian struggle of the 1980s. “What they should think about now is legislative tyranny.”
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
washingtontimes.com · by Andrew Salmon
13. #ROK: NAIVE HOPE. DAVID MAXWELL. GORDON CHANG. Apr 23, 6:10 PM
My interview with John Batchelor and Gordon Chang. We started our conversation with a discussion of our campus tour for a free and unified Korea and then discussed South Korea’s satellite launch and the South Korean political situation.
https://audioboom.com/posts/8709910-rok-naive-hope-david-maxwell-gordon-chang
14. A Stress Test For South Korea’s Democracy: Conservatism’s Authoritarian Relapse – OpEd
I know it is counterintuitive to many but I think president Yoon would argue his action was to prevent the authoritarian leanings of the opposition party. He was (is) concern with the external influence (control?) of China and north Korea of the opposition party. President Yoon believed he was trying to uphold liberal democracy because the opposition party was blocking democratic action.
A Stress Test For South Korea’s Democracy: Conservatism’s Authoritarian Relapse – OpEd
https://www.eurasiareview.com/23042025-a-stress-test-for-south-koreas-democracy-conservatisms-authoritarian-relapse-oped/?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=topic/northkorea
April 23, 2025 0 Comments
By Bee Yun
The South Korean Constitutional Court has unanimously confirmed the removal of the 12th president, Yoon Suk-yeol. This marks the end of the nearly four-month-long stress test for South Korean democracy. But has the democratic crisis been overcome as well?
South Korean democracy’s ongoing stress test began on December 3, 2024. In a nighttime speech, President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law, issued a decree banning political gatherings and suspended freedom of the press. Troops were sent to surround the parliament building and prevent political activities. In the decree, Yoon accused the opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) of “anti-state activities”. The opposition wanted to paralyze the government by boycotting political measures and dismissing ministers one after the next. The state of emergency, it said, was necessary to protect the country’s free and democratic order from “pro-North Korean anti-state forces.”
This unconstitutional move failed after just six hours due to solid political resistance. Despite the lockdown of the parliament building, 190 MPs gathered within two hours of martial law being imposed and voted unanimously to lift it. Thousands of citizens also gathered in front of parliament and, as a protest, formed a protective wall for the members of parliament. This was a further demonstration of the vitality and strength of South Korea’s democratic civil society, which has developed over decades of struggling against dictatorship.
Soon after martial law was lifted, a wealth of evidence and testimonies emerged suggesting that Yoon intended to create a constitutional crisis through the extensive use of military force. Shortly before this, Yoon, who has long been criticized for his authoritarian governing style as well as various accusations against his wife, was cornered by the opposition over alleged ties to a shady political broker who is said to have influenced the nomination process of Yoon’s People Power Party (PPP) and manipulated polls in the run-up to the last parliamentary elections.
In desperation, Yoon resorted to a conspiracy theory, which was spread by far-right media and YouTube channels. He claimed that the last parliamentary election, which his opponents won overwhelmingly, had been systematically manipulated by a conspiracy between the opposition party, officials close to it and the Chinese government.
A focus on the judicial system
On January 26, 2025, the president was officially charged with attempting to overthrow the government. The Constitutional Court justified the decision to remove the president by stating that there was no national crisis and that the president had violated South Korea’s democratic constitution by imposing martial law, thereby unsettling Korean society.
As the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) points out, the Constitutional Court has established itself as an effective guardian of the constitution since it was founded in 1989. In addition, institutions such as the anti-corruption authority CIO, which played a decisive role in Yoon’s arrest, support the trustworthiness of the political system. South Korea achieved a score of 8 out of 10 in the BTI “Prosecution of office abuse” indicator.
A large part of Korean society is currently in a celebratory mood. People are celebrating the resilience of Korean democracy, which has once again been demonstrated. The new presidential election is scheduled for June 3. Nevertheless, it is too early to declare the democratic crisis over.
Unlike the impeachment of Yoon’s predecessor Park Geun-hye in 2017, when Korean society voted almost unanimously against the president accused of corruption and abuse of office, Korean society now finds itself starkly divided.
The PPP boycotted the first vote on the impeachment and remained reluctant or opposed to the subsequent votes. Meanwhile, Yoon’s supporters mobilized mass protests in Seoul and other major cities, with tens of thousands defending the imposition of martial law and calling on the Constitutional Court to reject the impeachment. On January 19, the day Yoon’s arrest warrant was issued, hundreds of supporters even stormed the courthouse. His supporters also continued their personal attacks on the constitutional judges. Numerous influential PPP members of parliament have expressed their sympathy for the demonstrators. Every Saturday, downtown Seoul saw demonstrations both for and against the impeachment. On the day of the Constitutional Court’s decision, the police issued an emergency warning to prevent a clash between opponents and supporters of the impeachment process.
A quick resolution of the polarization in Korean society, which became evident through the court process, seems unlikely. There are many reasons to believe that the societal divide will continue to burden South Korea’s politics even after the Constitutional Court’s decision. After all, there is more behind the radicalized demonstrations of Yoon’s supporters than extreme right-wing agitation. In some polls, the imprisoned president’s popularity grew and the ruling party was ahead of the opposition, even if the conservative voices may have been over-represented. Yoon’s supporters are even demanding his return to the presidency – similar to Trump – although this is not legally possible.
Stark divisions with historic roots
Korean society’s emerging split has deep roots. For four decades, from the end of the Korean War until democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, authoritarian regimes relied primarily on militant anti-communism based on a clear distinction between friend and foe to legitimize themselves. This was combined with rapid, state-directed economic growth that focused on the large family conglomerates. This ideology is still strongly held by the older generation (those over seventy), whose mentality was strongly influenced by the threat of poverty and North Korea after the Korean War. They are irreconcilably opposed to currents in society that demand more welfare and redistribution.
The hostility will further complicate the already difficult task of social integration in South Korea. In just six decades or so, the country has developed from one of the poorest countries in the world into a highly developed industrial and economic nation. The accompanying rapid social transformation has presented South Korea, like other highly developed countries, with new challenges, such as balancing the interests of the various social classes and groups. The far-reaching ideological radicalization, which threatened to escalate into an armed declaration of war with the imposition of martial law on the evening of 3 December, hampers productive discussion and the necessary social reform.
Regressive conservatism and polarization
The intransigence of conservative politicians is a significant aggravating factor. Even after the country’s transition to democracy following the 1987 uprising, a number of conservative forces in South Korea have been unable to break free from their authoritarian ties. They have repeatedly stoked the desire for a strong hand and launched McCarthy-like smear campaigns when necessary. After Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, conservatives were expected to reorient themselves. Instead, however, they have shown a regressive tendency by clinging to the so-called tarmac base, the far-right wing, to consolidate their support base. The behavior of conservative politicians defending Yoon’s martial law is particularly troubling because it will exacerbate the ideological weakness of conservative politics in the medium to long term.
This regression of the conservative party will pose a huge obstacle to reforming the political landscape. The two-party system, which dates back to the authoritarian era, is increasingly met with dissatisfaction and criticism from citizens: they want an alternative to the current dual system and its constant confrontation. Polarization means that elections are no longer decided between parties but between ideologies. Forces that actually hold differentiated positions come under pressure to “rally around the democratic party” in order to protect democracy from authoritarianism. In such a polarized political environment, there is little room for dialogue or mutual understanding.
Bleak prospects for a necessary overhaul of conservatism
The decisive factor for the development of Korean democracy and its stability will be whether the conservatives in South Korea halt their backward slide and turn to a political vision that leaves room for the interests of all social classes within the democratic system. All those who long for a change in Korean politics must therefore primarily hope for a reorientation of the conservatives.
Unfortunately, there are currently no signs that the conservatives will pull off such a shift. At the last impeachment hearing on February 26, the deposed president again justified the imposition of martial law as an act to save the country from the “communists” – by which he means the opposition as well as North Korea and China. He failed to make a serious apology for his breach of the constitution and the law. Outside the Constitutional Court, meanwhile, his supporters gathered en masse and demanded that the proceedings be dropped. On the streets, the PPP put up polarizing posters reading “No to Lee Jae-myung” (the chairman of the DPK).
The clear decision of the South Korean Constitutional Court regarding Yoon’s impeachment seems to have had little impact on the authoritarian mainstream of the PPP so far. Yoon’s internal party supporters are calling those lawmakers who voted for the impeachment procedure traitors and are even demanding their expulsion from the party. Instead of seeking a new direction for conservative politics, they are urging the formation of a united front against Lee Jae-myung. The goal is to maintain control over the government.
Recent polls have shown that the supporters of the PPP are most strongly aligned with those right-wing politicians who have consistently defended Yoon’s imposition of martial law. Yoon’s supporters are already planning a new campaign under the slogan “Reset Korea, Yoon Again” to position a successor who will continue his political line. Given the current dynamics, many observers doubt that the struggling party will fully detach itself from these extreme forces. Yoon Suk-yeol himself, who bears the greatest responsibility for the current crisis, shows no signs of remorse. A sincere apology to the public is still absent. Instead, he sends encouraging messages to his most radical supporters and announces his intention to continue fighting alongside them. South Korean democracy thus remains under pressure – the political storm is far from over.
Bee Yun
Bee Yun is a professor of political science at Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul, where he teaches political theory. From September 2023 to July 2024, Yun was a Fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Institute for Advanced Study in Berlin).
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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