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AQAP’s New Emir Calls for Global Jihad
On 5 June 2025, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released a video titled “Incite the Believers” through its official media wing, Al-Malahem Media, marking the first public appearance of the group’s newly appointed Emir, Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki. This release is a pivotal moment in AQAP’s ideological evolution and strategic posture. More than a year after assuming leadership, al-Awlaki uses his inaugural speech not simply to reaffirm traditional jihadist tropes, the binary targeting of the “far enemy” (the United States) and the “near enemy” (Israel and allied Arab regimes), but to elevate AQAP’s global ambitions and operational doctrine. His rhetoric is more personalised, symbolic, and transnational, representing a calculated shift toward the mobilisation of global jihadist “lone wolves” in a new era of decentralised militancy.
A Break from Batarfi: Rethinking the Sectarian Lens
Al-Awlaki’s speech also marks a notable departure from the narrative strategy of his predecessor, Khaled Batarfi, who maintained a doctrinally purist stance. Batarfi frequently invoked AQAP’s opposition to the Iran-aligned Houthi movement, positioning AQAP as a staunch defender of Sunni orthodoxy and a bulwark against Shia expansionism in Yemen. In contrast, al-Awlaki conspicuously omits any reference to the Houthis or the Sunni–Shia divide. This rhetorical silence signals a possible strategic recalibration: a shift from sectarian confrontation to a broader, pan-Islamic anti-Western narrative.
Toward a Pan-Islamic Front?
By doing so, al-Awlaki appears to deprioritise internal Islamic fault lines in favour of presenting AQAP as an inclusive actor in the global jihadist front, one that can potentially coexist, or at least coordinate in parallel, with other anti-Western forces, even if they fall outside AQAP’s ideological orthodoxy. This reframing echoes current dynamics on other jihadist fronts, particularly in Somalia, where rival militant factions have increasingly aligned operationally, even if not formally, to oppose U.S. and Western-aligned forces. Al-Awlaki’s avoidance of sectarian rhetoric reflects a pragmatic leadership style, one that prioritises operational convergence over ideological rigidity.
From Local Struggles to Global Ambitions
This evolution is significant for AQAP, which remains rooted in Yemen’s volatile landscape but now seeks to reposition itself within the broader ecosystem of transnational jihadism. The video signals AQAP’s renewed commitment to global relevance and its intent to reassert itself as a vanguard force in the broader jihadist struggle.
Echoes of Bin Laden: Reinvoking the 1998 Manifesto
Perhaps most striking is al-Awlaki’s revival of classical global jihadist themes, drawing direct lineage from the foundational documents issued by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in the late 1990s, particularly the 1998 “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders”. Echoing this manifesto, al-Awlaki calls for a united front against Western powers and their regional allies, explicitly naming high-profile global figures such as Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as targets for assassination.
Renewing the Target List
The inclusion of el-Sisi is particularly symbolic, as he is portrayed not just as a collaborator with the West but as a modern embodiment of the secular Arab autocrats targeted by al-Zawahiri in the 1980s and 1990s. This framing resurrects al-Zawahiri’s thesis that “the road to Jerusalem passes through Cairo”—the idea that the liberation of Palestine is contingent upon the toppling of apostate Arab regimes.
Simultaneous Jihad on All Fronts
In essence, al-Awlaki’s speech restates and intensifies the strategic schema proposed by al-Qaeda’s founders: a simultaneous, global jihad against Jews, crusaders, and local Arab tyrants. Unlike earlier phases in which jihadist priorities were presented as sequential (defeating the near enemy before confronting the far enemy), al-Awlaki articulates a convergent model of jihad, where all perceived enemies are targeted concurrently, and the battlefield extends beyond the Middle East to encompass Western political, economic, and technological elites.
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