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Quotes of the Day:
"To rush into explanations is always a sign of weakness."
– Agatha Christie
"Any attempt to replace a personal conscience by a collective conscience does violence to the individual and is the first step to totalitarianism"
– Herman Hesse
"The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool."
– Richard Feynman
1. America’s Approach to Its Allies Is Backward
2. Israel and Iran Seemed on the Brink of a Bigger War. What’s Holding Them Back?
3. Putin's new nuclear doctrine: It's my arsenal and I'll strike if I want to
4. Musk, Ramaswamy publish plan to slash workforce
5. US defense chief regrets China's decision not to meet during Southeast Asian security talks
6. Russia fires intercontinental ballistic missile in attack on Ukraine, Kyiv says
7. Army picks Red Cat’s small quadcopter for 2nd Short-Range Reconnaissance tranche
8. Why the military’s approach to its suicide epidemic is failing
9. Military draft registration is going down, so Congress wants to take action
10. Anduril to equip US Marines with new drone countermeasures
11. This Foreign Country Holds More US Debt Than Any Other - and It's Not China
12. Money Talks and Hunger Walks: Buying Down State-Actor Influence Risk
13. The True Aims of China’s Nuclear Buildup
14. Americans Love a Tough Guy
15. Joint Readout from Australia-Japan-Philippines-Republic of Korea-United States Defense Ministers' Meeting
16. More NATO in the Arctic Could Free the United States Up to Focus on China
17. Review of Conflict Realism
18. The Katanga Secession, the Five Factors Model, and Counterinsurgency (COIN) Theory
19. 'Russia only wins if the West quits' — Gen. Ben Hodges
20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20, 2024
21. The Myth of "No Military Solutions"
22. Xi Jinping lays out four red lines US must not challenge in meeting with Joe Biden
1. America’s Approach to Its Allies Is Backward
Conclusion:
This is a poor use of the best geopolitical asset we have: our allies. When the frontier is on fire, Washington should unleash our allies that want to defend themselves and thus restore a beneficial equilibrium in their regions.
America’s Approach to Its Allies Is Backward
We should restrain them in peace and support them in war, but we often do the opposite.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/americas-approach-to-its-allies-is-backward-foreign-policy-israel-ukraine-france-08d72888?mod=Searchresults_pos4&page=1
By Jakub Grygiel
Nov. 20, 2024 12:32 pm ET
Anti-Gadhafi fighters fire a multiple rocket launcher near Sirte, Libya, Sept. 24, 2011. Photo: goran tomasevic/Reuters
Allies are America’s comparative advantage: We have them, while our rivals don’t. Alliances are our most efficient tool for managing regional dynamics in Eurasia, a region that’s essential to American security and welfare but that’s also geographically far from the U.S.
But we should use allies properly. During periods of political stability in Europe or the Middle East, Washington should discourage allies from upsetting peaceful order for their own narrow gains. But when our enemies’ advances cause a massive disequilibrium, then it’s in America’s interest to back our allies and let them take the necessary risks to restore stability.
Restrain them in peace; unleash them in war.
We often do the opposite—we unleash them when at peace and we restrain them when they are attacked—with dire consequences.
Take the 2011 war in Libya. France, a U.S. ally, began a war there with little thought of how to conduct or finish it. The French knew the U.S. likely would step in, as it eventually did, to supply fuel, munitions and ultimately its own forces to defeat the perceived enemy. The result was Moammar Gadhafi’s fall, Libya’s descent into chaos, and continued regional instability, which opened the floodgates of illegal immigration to Italy and across Europe. Instead of praising an overly ambitious Paris (recall Hillary Clinton’s quip that “we came, we saw, he died” on the news of Gadhafi’s death), Washington should have restrained France early on, as the geopolitical status quo was preferable to the post-Gadhafi chaos.
But it is different when the situation is already in shambles. Today, Europe’s eastern frontier and the Middle East are on fire because of wars begun by Russia and by Iran and its proxies. China is watching, eager to reap benefits on the Pacific, but is also getting involved, if only with its own North Korean proxies on Ukraine’s front. Around 10,000 North Korean troops have already been deployed alongside Russian forces. In the Middle East, Iranian proxies have escalated dramatically, with Hamas’s attack on Israel last year, the Houthis targeting shipping vital to global trade, and Iran striking Israel with the largest single ballistic missile attack in history.
The Biden-Harris approach to this mayhem has been to constrain our allies’ defensive responses in the name of “escalation management.” Visiting Tel Aviv last month before Israel’s retaliatory attack on Iran, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said it was “very important that Israel respond in ways that do not create greater escalation and do not risk spreading the conflict.” Following the same logic, until a few days ago the Biden-Harris administration refused to allow Ukraine to strike targets on Russian territory using U.S.-provided weapons.
Restraining U.S. allies and partners when they’re responding to the aggression of our common enemies is ineffective and counterproductive. Equilibrium won’t be restored unless the aggressor is pushed back to the status quo ante. By telling our allies (Israel) and friends (Ukraine) under attack to limit their responses and not to strike too hard at the enemy, a new equilibrium may be achieved, but it will be more beneficial to the attacker, encouraging further aggression and war.
A policy of restraining allies in war is akin to a fiscal policy of money tightening during recession. The effect may be financial savings in the short term, but an economic and political disaster for a long while.
So far, Israel has been successful in destroying Hamas and decapitating Hezbollah because it has ignored the Biden-Harris calls not to strike too hard and to negotiate with the two groups. Ukraine is suffering unduly from Russian attacks on its infrastructure because the Biden-Harris administration for too long had imposed limits on where it can strike in response. Israel chose not to be constrained by Washington and is succeeding. Ukraine had no choice but to respect Western bans on using weapons provided to it. Now that some restrictions have been lifted, it may be too late to alter the conditions on the front line and certainly to undo the devastation wrought by Russia on Ukraine’s economy and energy infrastructure.
This is a poor use of the best geopolitical asset we have: our allies. When the frontier is on fire, Washington should unleash our allies that want to defend themselves and thus restore a beneficial equilibrium in their regions.
Mr. Grygiel is a professor of politics at the Catholic University of America and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution.
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Free Expression: By exaggerating our woes for partisan reasons, politicians on both sides of the aisle threaten to squander America's enduring global superiority. Photo: Shen Hong/Xinhua via ZUMA Press/AFP via Getty Images
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Appeared in the November 21, 2024, print edition as 'America’s Approach to Its Allies Is Backward'.
2. Israel and Iran Seemed on the Brink of a Bigger War. What’s Holding Them Back?
Someone did not tell the NY Times that the nature of war is enduring but the character may change.
Excerpts:
The Nature of War is Changing
The tit-for-tat strikes by Iran and Israel bear little resemblance to warfare known as shock and awe — the use of overwhelming firepower, superior technology and speed to destroy the enemy’s physical capabilities and its will to resist — that was first introduced as a concept in 1996 by two American military experts.
Perhaps its most memorable demonstration was the barrage of airstrikes that started the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which were followed by ground troops that sent Saddam Hussein into hiding. But its core tactics were deployed earlier, in the 1991 Gulf War, as well as in the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.Shock and awe warfare would be difficult to carry out in this current Middle East conflict, where launching ground troops would likely require more land, air and sea assets than either Israel or Iran would want to deploy across the hundreds of miles that separate them.
There is also an ongoing debate in military circles as to whether a shock and awe offensive is still viable. Autonomous weapons and artificial intelligence are transforming warfare, argued the retired Joint Chiefs chairman, Gen. Mark A. Milley, and Eric Schmidt, the former Google chief executive, in an August analysis for Foreign Affairs. “The era of ‘shock and awe’ campaigns — in which Washington could decimate its adversaries with overwhelming firepower — is finished,” they wrote.
Israel and Iran Seemed on the Brink of a Bigger War. What’s Holding Them Back?
So far, direct attacks between the two adversaries have been precise and calculated. Whether that lasts is another question.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/21/world/middleeast/israel-iran-brink-bigger-war.html
People stand near the remains of a missile near the Dead Sea, in Israel, in October.Credit...Erik Marmor/Getty Images
By Lara Jakes
Lara Jakes writes about global conflicts and diplomacy.
Nov. 21, 2024
Updated 3:15 a.m. ET
Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Iran and Israel? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.
It has been nearly a month since Israel sent more than 100 jets and drones to strike Iranian military bases, and the world is still waiting to see how Iran will respond.
It is a loaded pause in the high-risk conflict this year between the two Middle East powers. Israel’s counterattack came more than three weeks after Iran launched over 180 ballistic missiles — most of which were shot down — on Oct. 1 to avenge the killings of two top Hezbollah and Hamas leaders.
The first volley of strikes came in April, when Iran decided to avenge an attack on one of its diplomatic compounds by directly bombarding Israel with at least 300 missiles and drones. Even then, Israel waited days, not hours, to respond.
Not long ago, analysts might have predicted that any direct strike by Iran on Israel, or by Israel on Iran, would have prompted an immediate conflagration. But it has not played out that way.
Partly that is the result of frantic diplomacy behind the scenes by allies including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. But the calculated, limited strikes also reflect the fact that the alternative — a war of “shock and awe” between Israel and Iran — could lead to dire consequences not just for the region but also much of the world.
“The nature of the attacks seem to speak to a shared acknowledgment of the acute risk of an even deeper regional war that both sides still probably want to avoid,” said Julien Barnes-Dacey, the Middle East director at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
That does not mean there are not dangers to the current approach, he noted. “It’s an extremely precarious and likely unsustainable pathway that could quickly spin out of control,” he said. “There is also a possibility that Israel may be more deliberately working its way up the escalatory ladder with the intention of eventually doing something wider and more decisive.”
In a video message last week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel appeared to warn that he could ratchet up the intensity of the conflict if Tehran were to strike again. “Every day, Israel gets stronger,” Mr. Netanyahu said. “The world has seen but a fraction of our power.”
The Nature of War is Changing
The tit-for-tat strikes by Iran and Israel bear little resemblance to warfare known as shock and awe — the use of overwhelming firepower, superior technology and speed to destroy the enemy’s physical capabilities and its will to resist — that was first introduced as a concept in 1996 by two American military experts.
Perhaps its most memorable demonstration was the barrage of airstrikes that started the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which were followed by ground troops that sent Saddam Hussein into hiding. But its core tactics were deployed earlier, in the 1991 Gulf War, as well as in the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
Shock and awe warfare would be difficult to carry out in this current Middle East conflict, where launching ground troops would likely require more land, air and sea assets than either Israel or Iran would want to deploy across the hundreds of miles that separate them.
Image
Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system intercepted projectiles over Tel Aviv on Oct. 1 after Iran launched a barrage of missiles toward Israel.Credit...Abir Sultan/EPA, via Shutterstock
There is also an ongoing debate in military circles as to whether a shock and awe offensive is still viable. Autonomous weapons and artificial intelligence are transforming warfare, argued the retired Joint Chiefs chairman, Gen. Mark A. Milley, and Eric Schmidt, the former Google chief executive, in an August analysis for Foreign Affairs. “The era of ‘shock and awe’ campaigns — in which Washington could decimate its adversaries with overwhelming firepower — is finished,” they wrote.
Two analysts at Britain’s Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre countered last month that shock and awe warfare is evolving, not over, and pointed to Israel’s exploding pager and walkie-talkie attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Dozens of people were killed, and thousands wounded, but the fear that the attacks created struck a psychological blow to the militant group. Two weeks later, Israeli airstrikes killed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s longtime leader.
“Far from being a thing of the past, shock and awe must be an integral part of our approach to multi-domain warfare,” they wrote.
These Strikes Are About Domestic Politics as Much as Deterrence
For decades, Iran and Israel were locked in a shadow war, with Israel carrying out covert attacks and Iran relying on proxy militias in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen as its front line forces.
All that changed on April 1. While almost all the missiles and drones that Iran aimed at Israel were intercepted, the airstrikes marked the first time that Tehran had directly attacked Israel from Iranian soil.
That put officials around the globe on alert for a broader regional war. Hours after the strikes, Gen. Hossein Salami, the commander in chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Iran had decided to create “a new equation” in its yearslong conflict with Israel.
But so far, the conflict has been carried out solely with deep precision missile strikes, mainly targeting military bases in the other’s country. Farzan Sabet, an analyst on Iran and Middle East politics at the Geneva Graduate Institute in Switzerland, said the restrained volley of missile attacks appeared to signal a new kind of warfare.
“Deep precision strikes aren’t new, but their use on such scale as the centerpiece” of a conflict “is novel,” Mr. Sabet said.
Still, “we may not have seen the worst of it,” he said, noting that Tehran had recently signaled that it was prepared to strike Israel’s key energy sources — including gas fields, power plants and oil import terminals — if Iran’s civilian infrastructure was hit. “That would be a new element,” Mr. Sabet said.
He and other analysts said the airstrikes so far, combined with the public warnings that preceded them, were part of a deterrence campaign by both nations to try to keep the conflict from spiraling out of control.
“It’s ‘I slap, therefore you get slapped, so you understand, and so now you can decide whether you want to step down or you want to step up,’” said Assaf Orion, a retired Israeli brigadier general and defense strategist at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “The fact is that both parties are taking their time to calculate, to collaborate, to shape their own operations,” he added.
The Stakes Are High, and The Situation Could Still Explode.
While Israel has not used conventional shock and awe against Iran, it has been far less restrained in its attacks on Iran’s proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, as the pager attacks demonstrated. And Hamas’s attack on Israel, which incited the ongoing wars on Oct. 7, 2023, was brutal and unconstrained.
Israel has since pounded Gaza with airstrikes that have killed more than 43,000 people, many of whom were women and children. In Lebanon, the United Nations estimates that more than 3,300 people have been killed by Israeli attacks since Oct. 8, 2023, when Hezbollah joined the fight to show solidarity with Palestinians.
Image
The coffins of two Hezbollah fighters, killed in September by coordinated pager explosions, being carried during a procession in the Dahiya area of Beirut, Lebanon.Credit...Diego Ibarra Sanchez for The New York Times
But Iran has been spared the scale of death and humanitarian disaster that Israel has exacted on its proxies. It has even sought to portray its own missile attacks against Israel as a resounding success.
Mr. Sabet said Tehran appeared to care as much about showing its public the number of “spectacular” strikes it was launching against Israel as about how many of them hit their targets. “Iran is trying to have the last word, in a sense,” he said. “It wants to show a response, and show its domestic and regional audiences that’s done something, but it doesn’t want to escalate the conflict.”
But, he added, “I’m just not sure that’ll work.”
Israel’s debilitating attacks on Hezbollah and Hamas, on which Iran has long relied for what it calls forward defense, are a blow to Tehran. And the re-election of President Donald J. Trump, a staunch ally of Mr. Netanyahu, changes the equation again.
One of Mr. Trump’s close advisers, the tech billionaire Elon Musk, met last week with Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations in what was described as an opening attempt to diffuse tensions between Tehran and the incoming American president.
But Mr. Trump is widely expected to make U.S. foreign policy more favorable to Israel, and is stacking his cabinet with Iran hawks. That could very well bring the war between Iran and Israel into new terrain.
Lara Jakes, based in Rome, reports on diplomatic and military efforts by the West to support Ukraine in its war with Russia. She has been a journalist for nearly 30 years. More about Lara Jakes
3. Putin's new nuclear doctrine: It's my arsenal and I'll strike if I want to
Excerpts:
In all, the new doctrine says that Russia will use nuclear weapons whenever the president decides to do so. It also contains a laundry list of things it doesn’t like, in an effort to try to shape Western behavior. But by expanding the role of nuclear weapons beyond “exclusively” deterrence, and by expanding the dangers that could become threats — to include military infrastructure or exercises near its borders — it risks sending ambiguous or non-credible deterrent signals that could, in turn, require Putin to act out further in order to credibly deter the West.
It remains to be seen if President-elect Donald Trump will seek to stabilize the relationship with Russia, seek new arms control arrangements with Russia and China, acquiesce to Russian demands over things like Ukraine or NATO, or move in other unexpected directions.
Regardless, in the interim, we can expect more threats from Moscow on the basis of a doctrinal document that is interesting but remains firmly in the world of propaganda rather than military doctrine.
Putin's new nuclear doctrine: It's my arsenal and I'll strike if I want to - Breaking Defense
In a new analysis, expert William Alberque says Putin's new nuclear doctrine says "that any nation aligned with a nuclear state, or any state receiving assistance from any nuclear state or state aligned with a nuclear state — i.e., all of NATO — can be the target of nuclear weapons if Russia feels threatened."
breakingdefense.com · by William Alberque · November 20, 2024
In this pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin meets with Yevgeny Balitsky (not pictured), the Moscow-installed head of the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine, at the Kremlin in Moscow on November 18, 2024. (Photo by VYACHESLAV PROKOFYEV/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia’s new nuclear doctrine on Nov. 19, just days after US President Joe Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to strike Russian territory with US-made weapons. The timing of its publication surely is intended to send a message of displeasure to the West about this decision — as well as a larger anger around Western support for Ukraine in general. It also comes in the context of talks among the P5 — the nuclear weapon states defined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: the US, UK, France, Russia, and China — that were scheduled earlier to discuss nuclear doctrine, but delayed by Russia and now back on the calendar.
However, the contents of the document should not shock those paying attention. In truth, the changes contained in the doctrine are consistent with longer-term shifts in Russian public messaging about its nuclear deterrent, practical changes in Russia’s threat environment, as well as its own capabilities and confidence in those capabilities. In fact, the 2024 doctrine is likely closer to Russia’s actual nuclear doctrine, which is that Russia will use nuclear weapons whenever Putin thinks it necessary to do so.
Public-facing, unclassified nuclear doctrine documents are a product of the post-Cold War thaw in relations, with the US publishing its first Nuclear Posture Review in 1994. Russia’s military was in a state of collapse at the time, with concern in Moscow that the United States might intervene in Russia’s bloody Chechen wars or in Iraq (twice) and Yugoslavia, or worse, overthrow the regime in Moscow.
While Russia did not release an unclassified version of its nuclear doctrine during the 1990s, its leadership engaged in very public nuclear messaging, culminating with simulated nuclear strikes against NATO at the end of its ZAPAD 1999 exercise and a public discussion on a very-low Russian nuclear threshold. However, Russia’s nuclear threats were increasingly at odds with its position in the United Nations — particularly in the dialogue around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — which has led to confusion about what, exactly, their doctrine allowed or precluded in terms of actual nuclear use.
Finally, in 2020, Russia released its first public nuclear doctrine document, which appeared to have a very high threshold for nuclear use — with nuclear weapons used “exclusively as a means of deterrence, their use being an extreme and compelled measure.” There are mentions of nuclear weapons in other official documents — such as Russia’s official Military Doctrine (current version: 2014), but they have a similarly high threshold. Such a high perceived threshold for nuclear use is not consistent with Russia’s nuclear posture — which includes nuclear weapons designed for warfighting — and became a direct impediment in President Vladimir Putin’s threats against the US and NATO for their support of Ukraine.
Thus, something had to change. Russia’s new Nuclear Doctrine was published on the Kremlin website as Decree 991, “On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” replacing the previous version — Decree 355 of 2 June 2020. As with all things, the devil is in the details. And, because bureaucrats are bureaucrats (that is, naturally lazy), a side-by-side comparison of the 2020 and 2024 documents is the best way to highlight and analyze the changes.
So, what’s different? Structurally, it’s almost identical, with a few minor deletions alongside some highly-significant new language intended to make Russian threats more credible against its adversaries — particularly NATO and the United States. It is still about six pages, with 26 paragraphs (versus 25 in the old one) and a number of sub paragraphs, organized around four sections:
- General Provisions (one very important change)
- The Essence of Nuclear Deterrence (some significant changes)
- Conditions for the Transition of the Russian Federation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons (very significant changes) and
- Tasks and Functions of Federal State Authorities, Other State Bodies and Organizations in the Implementation of State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence (no significant changes)
Informed from 1,000 days of conflict in Ukraine and the world’s response, Russia’s new doctrine first and foremost seeks to lower the threshold for nuclear weapons use. The new doctrine accomplishes this by removing the word “exclusively” for the use of nuclear weapons (new doctrine paragraph 6: “The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, the use of which is an extreme and necessary measure”). It also replaces the threshold for use against actions that threaten the existence or viability of the state to include actions that pose a critical threat to Russian or Belarusian sovereignty or territorial integrity (new doctrine paragraphs 18 and 19.d, 2020 doctrine paragraph 17) including conventional attacks — a far more subjective judgement, leaving open nuclear use in far more abstract threat scenarios.
Then, in Sections 2 and 3, Russia’s new doctrine expands who it is seeking to deter with nuclear weapons, under what conditions it would use nuclear weapons, and who it is defending under its nuclear umbrella.
Section 2 expands the “who it is seeking to deter” by adding not just nuclear weapon states (e.g., the US) or states in military blocs (new paragraph 10 in the 2024 doctrine) allied with nuclear weapon states (i.e., NATO) to include states that enable attacks on Russian territory from their borders and states that have significant conventional capabilities allied with nuclear weapon states (paragraph 11) or not allied with a nuclear weapon state (paragraph 9).
In plainer terms, this now gives Russia the doctrine that any nation aligned with a nuclear state, or any state receiving assistance from any nuclear state or state aligned with a nuclear state — i.e., all of NATO — can be the target of nuclear weapons if Russia feels threatened.
Section 3 expands the part about “what conditions it would use nuclear weapons” significantly, to include not only launch on warning of ballistic missile attack (old doctrine paragraph 19 a), but a new formulation aimed towards a more comprehensive program of Launch on Warning: “receipt of reliable information on the massive launch (take-off) of aerospace attack weapons (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aircraft) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation” (new paragraph 19 e).
Further on conditions for nuclear use, Russia’s nuclear doctrine lists dangers that might become threats that would require nuclear use. The old and the new doctrine both list the possession of WMD by adversaries, expansion of and deployment of missile defenses, buildups of conventional forces, nuclear weapons in outer space, nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of non-nuclear weapon states, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (the old doctrine highlighted the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons only, the new doctrine expands this to all WMD).
But the new doctrine adds new or expanded blocs of countries allied against Russia with military infrastructure nearby (15.f), the threat of blockades of Russia (15.g), the threat of damaging facilities that could cause widespread environmental damage (15.h) and the planning or conduct of exercises near Russia’s borders (15.i).
I guess Russia will try to deter what it does best?
Finally, Section 3 expands “who it is defending” with nuclear deterrence to include not just Russia and its allies (as in the 2020 doctrine), but specifically Belarus, and Belarus as part of the Union State (additions to paragraphs 18 and 19d), and to use nuclear deterrence Russian military forces outside its territory (new paragraph 19.b).
The remaining changes are consistent with recent developments, including central control by Russia of its nuclear forces based abroad (read: Belarus), and it eliminates any reference to compliance with arms control — a bad sign for the future of New START, scheduled to end Feb. 4, 2026.
In all, the new doctrine says that Russia will use nuclear weapons whenever the president decides to do so. It also contains a laundry list of things it doesn’t like, in an effort to try to shape Western behavior. But by expanding the role of nuclear weapons beyond “exclusively” deterrence, and by expanding the dangers that could become threats — to include military infrastructure or exercises near its borders — it risks sending ambiguous or non-credible deterrent signals that could, in turn, require Putin to act out further in order to credibly deter the West.
It remains to be seen if President-elect Donald Trump will seek to stabilize the relationship with Russia, seek new arms control arrangements with Russia and China, acquiesce to Russian demands over things like Ukraine or NATO, or move in other unexpected directions.
Regardless, in the interim, we can expect more threats from Moscow on the basis of a doctrinal document that is interesting but remains firmly in the world of propaganda rather than military doctrine.
William Alberque is the former Director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Center, with a 30-year career spanning the US Department of Defense, State Department, and Department of Energy. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center focusing on nuclear weapons and the future of deterrence, risk reduction, conflict management, and arms control.
4. Musk, Ramaswamy publish plan to slash workforce
Buckle up. This will be a rough ride.
Musk, Ramaswamy publish plan to slash workforce
The leaders of President-elect Donald Trump’s rule-cutting team outlined their plans Wednesday in an op-ed.
Robin Bravender
11/20/2024, 4:37pm ET
Civil service protections can’t stop large-scale firings of federal workers, the leaders of President-elect Donald Trump’s effort to downsize the government wrote Wednesday in an op-ed.
Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, the co-leaders of Trump’s planned effort to cut federal rules and workers, authored a Wall Street Journal op-ed offering the most comprehensive plan sketched out so far for the new Trump endeavor.
They plan to serve as “outside volunteers” and will work with the Trump transition team to “identify and hire a lean team of small-government crusaders,” they wrote. The new team will work “in the new administration” closely with the White House Office of Management and Budget, the authors wrote.
Musk and Ramaswamy said they’ll advise the effort, which they’ve dubbed the “Department of Government Efficiency,” to pursue three major types of reforms: regulatory cuts, administrative reductions and cost-savings.
The team will work with legal experts inside government agencies and “aided by advanced technology” to identify rules that exceed the authority Congress granted agencies. Their team will then present their list of rules to Trump, “who can, by executive action, immediately pause the enforcement of those regulations and initiate the process for review and rescission,” they wrote.
A big reduction in regulations “provides sound industrial logic for mass head-count reductions across the federal bureaucracy,” Musk and Ramaswamy wrote. Their operation intends to identify “the minimum number of employees required at an agency” for it to perform its legal and constitutional duties.
“The number of federal employees to cut should be at least proportionate to the number of federal regulations that are nullified: Not only are fewer employees required to enforce fewer regulations, but the agency would produce fewer regulations once its scope of authority is properly limited,” they wrote.
Employees whose jobs are cut “deserve to be treated with respect,” Musk and Ramaswamy wrote, and their goal would be to help support their “transition into the private sector.”
Trump can use existing laws “to give them incentives for early retirement and to make voluntary severance payments to facilitate a graceful exit,” they said.
The Trump advisers said that despite conventional wisdom, civil service protections can’t stop Trump or his appointees from firing federal workers, as long as the firings are “reductions in force” that don’t target specific workers.
Ramaswamy suggested recently that it would be possible to randomly fire workers based on their Social Security numbers. On Trump’s first day in office, he could fire workers whose numbers end in an even digit, Ramaswamy said, adding that the idea was a “thought experiment,” but would avoid lawsuits alleging discrimination.
As president, Trump would have the authority to implement rules “that would curtail administrative overgrowth, from large-scale firings to relocation of federal agencies out of the Washington area,” Musk and Ramaswamy wrote.
They said they would welcome “a wave of voluntary terminations” of federal employees who don’t want to work from the office five days a week. “If federal employees don’t want to show up, American taxpayers shouldn’t pay them for the Covid-era privilege of staying home,” they wrote.
Critics are assailing Trump’s plan to shred the federal government and target federal workers. But Musk and Ramaswamy say they welcome the fight.
“We are prepared for the onslaught from entrenched interests in Washington. We expect to prevail,” they wrote.
5. US defense chief regrets China's decision not to meet during Southeast Asian security talks
I have heard China hands describe how China and the US have different views of talking. We certainly place a lot greater emphasis on talking than the Chinese.
US defense chief regrets China's decision not to meet during Southeast Asian security talks
AP · November 20, 2024
US defense chief regrets China’s decision not to meet during Southeast Asian security talks
VIENTIANE, Laos (AP) — U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin expressed regret Wednesday that his Chinese counterpart chose not to hold talks with him during meetings of Southeast Asian defense chiefs in Laos, calling it a setback for the entire region.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is holding security talks in Vientiane at a time of increasing maritime disputes with China and as the transition to a new U.S. president approaches.
The decision by Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun “is a setback for the whole region,” Austin said after the first day of meetings.
“It’s unfortunate. It affects the region because the region really wants to see us, two significant players in the region, two significant powers, talk to each other, and that reassures the entire region,” he said.
There was no immediate comment from China on its decision not to meet with Austin.
Austin just wrapped up meetings in Australia with officials there and with Japan’s defense minister. They pledged to support ASEAN and expressed their “serious concern about destabilizing actions in the East and South China Seas, including dangerous conduct by the People’s Republic of China against Philippines and other coastal state vessels.”
In addition to the United States and China, other nations attending the two-day ASEAN meetings from outside Southeast Asia include Japan, South Korea, India and Australia.
Along with the Philippines, ASEAN members Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei have competing claims with China in the South China Sea, which Beijing claims almost entirely as its own territory.
Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos are the other ASEAN members.
Opening the talks, Laotian Defense Minister Chansamone Chanyalath said he hoped for productive meetings that would “become a standard for us to continue ASEAN’s cooperation in defense, including how to handle, thwart, and manage security challenges in the present and in the future.”
As China has grown more assertive in pushing its territorial claims in recent years, ASEAN members and Beijing have been negotiating a code of conduct to govern behavior in the sea, but progress has been slow.
Officials have agreed to try to complete the code by 2026, but talks have been hampered by thorny issues, including disagreements over whether the pact should be binding.
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who has called for more urgency in the code of conduct negotiations, complained at a meeting of ASEAN leaders last month that his country “continues to be subject to harassment and intimidation” by China’s actions, which he said violated international law.
Chinese and Philippine vessels have clashed repeatedly this year, and Vietnam in October charged that Chinese forces assaulted its fishermen in disputed areas in the South China Sea. China has also sent patrol vessels to areas that Indonesia and Malaysia claim as their exclusive economic zones.
At the meeting of ASEAN leaders last month, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Washington was “very concerned about China’s increasingly dangerous and unlawful activities in the South China Sea which have injured people, harm vessels from ASEAN nations and contradict commitments to peaceful resolutions of disputes.”
He pledged that the U.S. would “continue to support freedom of navigation, and freedom of overflight in the Indo Pacific.”
In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said U.S. and other non-regional militaries present in the sea were the main source of instability.
“The increasing military deployment and activities in the South China Sea by the U.S. and a few other non-regional countries, stoking confrontation and creating tensions, are the greatest source of instability for peace and stability in the South China Sea,” Mao said.
It is not clear how the incoming administration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump will address the South China Sea situation.
After Austin’s meetings in Australia, the Defense Department said the U.S., Australia and Japan had agreed to expand joint drills and announced a defense consultation body among the three countries’ forces to strengthen their cooperation.
When asked Tuesday while in the Philippines about whether the strong U.S. defense support would continue for the country under Trump, Austin said he would not speculate.
Although Austin failed to hold talks with Chinese Defense Minister Dong, Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani was expected to meet with Dong and express concerns about Beijing’s military activities, Japan’s NHK public television reported.
Japan has protested that a Chinese military aircraft violated its airspace briefly in August, and in September expressed “serious concerns” after a Chinese aircraft carrier and two destroyers sailed between two Japanese islands.
The meetings are also likely to touch on tensions in the Korean Peninsula, the Russia-Ukraine war, and wars in the Middle East. They are also expected to discuss other issues, including natural disasters, cybersecurity and terrorism.
Another thorny regional issue is the civil war and humanitarian crisis in ASEAN member Myanmar. The group’s credibility has been severely tested by the war in Myanmar, where the army ousted an elected government in 2021, and fighting has continued with pro-democracy guerillas and ethnic rebels.
More than a year into an offensive initiated by three militias and joined by other resistance groups, observers estimate the military controls less than half the country.
Myanmar military rulers have been barred from ASEAN meetings since late 2021, but this year the country has been represented by high-level bureaucrats, including at the summit in October.
___
Associated Press writer David Rising in Bangkok contributed to this report.
AP · November 20, 2024
6. Russia fires intercontinental ballistic missile in attack on Ukraine, Kyiv says
A message? Are they saying this could have been a nuclear weapon?
Russia fires intercontinental ballistic missile in attack on Ukraine, Kyiv says
By Anastasiia Malenko, Tom Balmforth and Max Hunder
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-attack-ukraine-kyiv-says-2024-11-21/?utm
November 21, 20249:29 PM GMT+9Updated 11 min ago
Item 1 of 4 Firefighters work at the site of a Russian missile strike in Dnipro, Ukraine, November 21, 2024. REUTERS/Handout
[1/4]Firefighters work at the site of a Russian missile strike in Dnipro, Ukraine, November 21, 2024. REUTERS/Handout Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab
Summary
- Ukraine's air force says Russia fired ICBMExperts says ICBM never previously used in warUkraine fired Western weapons into Russia this weekTensions rising in 33-month-old war
KYIV, Nov 21 (Reuters) - Russia fired an intercontinental ballistic missile during an attack on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro on Thursday, Kyiv's air force said, in what would be the first use in war of a weapon designed to deliver long-distance nuclear strikes.
The launch, if confirmed, highlights rapidly rising tensions in the 33-month-old war after Ukraine fired U.S. and British missiles at targets inside Russia this week despite warnings by Moscow that it would see such action as a major escalation.
Security experts said it would be the first military use of an intercontinental ballistic missile. ICBMs are strategic weapons designed to deliver nuclear warheads and are an important part of Russia's nuclear deterrent.
"Today there was a new Russian missile. All the characteristics – speed, altitude – are (of an) intercontinental ballistic (missile). An expert (investigation) is currently underway," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in a video statement.
The Ukrainian air force said the missile was fried from the Russian region of Astrakhan, more than 700 km (435 miles) from Dnipro in central-eastern Ukraine. It did not specify what kind of warhead the missile had or what type of missile it was. There was no suggestion it was nuclear-armed.
Asked about the Ukrainian air force statement, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters to contact the Russian military for comment.
Ukrainska Pravda, a Kyiv-based media outlet, cited anonymous sources saying the missile was an RS-26 Rubezh, a solid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 5,800 km, according to the Arms Control Association.
The RS-26 was first successfully tested in 2012, and is estimated to be 12 metres (40 ft) long and weigh 36 tons, according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). It said the RS-26 can carry an 800-kg (1,765-pound)nuclear warhead.
The RS-26 is classified as an ICBM under a nuclear arms reduction treaty between the United States and Russia, but it can be seen as an intermediate-range ballistic missile when used with heavier payloads at ranges below 5,500 km, CSIS said.
The Russian missile attack targeted enterprises and critical infrastructure in the central-eastern city of Dnipro, the air force said.
Ukraine's air force did not say what the ICBM targeted or whether it had caused any damage, but regional governor Serhiy Lysak said the missile attack damaged an industrial enterprise and set off fires in Dnipro. Two people were hurt.
Russia also fired a Kinzhal hypersonic missile and seven Kh-101 cruise missiles, six of which were shot down, the Ukrainian air force said.
'TOTALLY UNPRECEDENTED'
The NATO military alliance did not immediately respond to a request for comment. The U.S. European Command said it had nothing on the reported use of an ICBM and referred questions to the U.S. Department of Defense.
"If true this will be totally unprecedented and the first actual military use of ICBM. Not that it makes a lot of sense given their price and precision," Andrey Baklitskiy of the U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research posted on X.
German security expert Ulrich Kuehn posted: "It looks as if Russia has today used an intercontinental ballistic missile in a war for the first time in history, against the civilian target Dnipro."
Some military experts said the ICBM launch, if confirmed, could be seen as an act of deterrence by Moscow following Kyiv's strikes into Russia with Western weapons this week.
"An ICBM launch can certainly be seen as a threatening gesture, potentially in response to the lifting of restrictions on ATACMS and Storm Shadow. It’s a means of deterrence," said a European military source.
Russian war correspondents on Telegram and an official speaking on condition of anonymity said Kyiv fired British Storm Shadow cruise missiles into Russia's Kursk region bordering Ukraine on Wednesday.
Russia's defence ministry, in its daily report of events over the previous 24 hours on Thursday, said air defences had shot down two British Storm Shadow cruise missiles but did not say where.
Ukraine also fired U.S. ATACMS missiles into Russia on Tuesday after U.S. President Joe Biden gave the all-clear to use such missiles, two months before he leaves office and Donald Trump returns to the White House. Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday lowered the threshold for a nuclear strike in response to a broader range of conventional attacks.
Trump has said he will end the war, without saying how, and criticised billions of dollars in aid for Ukraine under Biden. The warring sides believe Trump is likely to push for peace talks - not known to have been held since the war's earliest months - and are trying to attain strong positions before negotiations.
Moscow has said the use of Western weapons to strike Russian territory far from the border would be a major escalation in the conflict. Kyiv says it needs the capability to defend itself by hitting Russian rear bases used to support Moscow's February 2022 invasion.
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Additional reporting by Sabine Siebold in Brussels, Mark Trevelyan and Pavel Polityuk; Writing by Tom Balmforth; Editing by Bernadette Baum and Timothy Heritage
7. Army picks Red Cat’s small quadcopter for 2nd Short-Range Reconnaissance tranche
Army picks Red Cat’s small quadcopter for 2nd Short-Range Reconnaissance tranche - Breaking Defense
The service and company are expected to ink a deal by the end of the year.
breakingdefense.com · by Ashley Roque · November 20, 2024
A soldier flies a Red Cat quadcopter in this image from the company. (Red Cat)
WASHINGTON — The US Army announced it has picked systems made by Red Cat subsidiary Teal Drones for the service’s Short-Range Reconnaissance (SRR) program of record.
After the company preempted the service announcement on Tuesday, the Army confirmed today that it had selected Red Cat’s quadcopter for SRR but noted that “exact funding, quantities, and other details” will be hammered out throughout the rest of the year as the duo work though the contract details.
“The selection was made based on a combination of criteria that included soldier feedback, performance, and reliability during the SRR tranche 2 prototyping effort,” an Army spokesman said in a brief statement.
The Army spokesman did not disclose if Red Cat’s small Teal drone would be the only drone selected for this second tranche but noted that the program office is focused on fostering competition among companies and will be continually assessing new technologies for future tranches.
“The long-awaited production selection marks a new era for our company and the future of American drones,” George Matus, Red Cat’s chief technology officer, said in an announcement on Wednesday.
“Our top priority now is to start ramping production of the next generation system, recently announced as the Black Widow and WEB, and give warfighters the tools they need to be successful on the modern battlefield,” he later added.
Skydio’s RQ-28A quadcopter was picked as the first tranche of the SRR program and was first delivered to soldiers in 2022, one of which noted at the time that the man-portable drones were so new that the service didn’t have tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for using them in operations.
The service is moving out on plans to acquire and field a host of new aerial drones to provide soldiers at every echelon with a system. That plan includes:
- The Soldier Borne Sensor like Teledyne Flir’s Black Hornet 3 to squads
- The SRR assets to platoons level;
-
A medium-range reconnaissance drone like Ghost X from Anduril Industries and the C-100 from Performance Drone Works for company formations;
- A Future Tactical Uncrewed Aircraft System (FTUAS) aligned with brigades; and
-
The conceptual long-range reconnaissance drone as a follow on or replacement for General Atomic’s MQ-1C Gray Eagle for battalions.
8. Why the military’s approach to its suicide epidemic is failing
Excerpts:
Effective suicide prevention requires a broader, more holistic approach that incorporates diverse perspectives, including those from individuals with lived experience, community leaders and those affected by systemic issues like poverty, discrimination and isolation.
Individuals who understand the complexities of suicide prevention beyond clinical frameworks can create more effective, empathetic and comprehensive solutions that resonate with at-risk populations.
We must stop comparing the public to the military regarding suicide because the experiences, pressures and environments of military personnel are fundamentally different than those of their civilian counterparts.
Military service members face unique stressors, such as combat exposure, deployments and a highly structured, high-risk environment, which can have profound psychological effects.
The stigma surrounding mental health in the military, combined with intense demands, often leads to delayed help-seeking behaviors and increased suicide risk.
Why the military’s approach to its suicide epidemic is failing
militarytimes.com · by Ken Falke · November 21, 2024
Editor’s note: This report contains discussion of suicide. Troops, veterans and family members experiencing suicidal thoughts can call the 24-hour Suicide and Crisis Lifeline at 988 and dial 1, text 838255 or visit VeteransCrisisLine.net.
This week, the Department of Defense released their 2023 suicide data, showing that active-duty suicides rose from 331 in 2022 to 363 in 2023. In a Military Times article about the increase, a Pentagon spokesperson sought to downplay the report and stated that the increase is not “statistically significant.”
It is difficult to find words to describe how outrageous, disgusting and inappropriate such a response is — particularly in the face of a suicide epidemic that has grown across the U.S. military over the past decade.
This epidemic continues despite the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars on prevention programs, awareness initiatives and various other efforts. And it’s happening within an institution that prides itself on leadership, discipline, strength and resolve.
The simple truth is this: What the Defense Department is doing to prevent suicide is not working. If we want to truly address the problem of military suicide, a comprehensive rethinking is required.
RELATED
Military suicides rose in 2023, continuing a troubling trend
Officials said that the suicide rate among troops has increased steadily over the last decade.
Implementing emotional intelligence training in the military can significantly support suicide prevention by fostering a culture of awareness and empathy. The first step is to integrate emotional intelligence into the existing training and leadership continuum, beginning in basic training.
Recruits should be taught to recognize and manage their emotions, which can help reduce impulsive behavior and stress during crises. Additionally, leaders at all levels must be trained to identify emotional distress in their subordinates, engage in active listening and offer support and resources.
Cultivating an environment where emotional intelligence is valued can foster trust and teach soldiers to seek help before reaching a crisis point. This means creating training modules that teach service members how to recognize their own emotional struggles, how to identify signs of burnout and how to access mental health resources before issues escalate.
Rather than solely focusing on “toughening up,” military training should incorporate emotional intelligence and strategies for managing stress, anger, depression, anxiety and grief.
While mental health and public health experts bring valuable knowledge to suicide prevention, it’s essential to reconsider their dominant role in leadership positions. These experts focus on clinical or policy-driven approaches, which overlook the lived experiences and social contexts that contribute to suicidal ideation.
Effective suicide prevention requires a broader, more holistic approach that incorporates diverse perspectives, including those from individuals with lived experience, community leaders and those affected by systemic issues like poverty, discrimination and isolation.
Individuals who understand the complexities of suicide prevention beyond clinical frameworks can create more effective, empathetic and comprehensive solutions that resonate with at-risk populations.
We must stop comparing the public to the military regarding suicide because the experiences, pressures and environments of military personnel are fundamentally different than those of their civilian counterparts.
Military service members face unique stressors, such as combat exposure, deployments and a highly structured, high-risk environment, which can have profound psychological effects.
The stigma surrounding mental health in the military, combined with intense demands, often leads to delayed help-seeking behaviors and increased suicide risk.
In contrast, while civilians face their own challenges, their daily lives generally lack the extreme pressures, trauma and consequences of military service.
Comparing the two groups oversimplifies the issue and ignores the specific needs and circumstances of military personnel. Suicide prevention efforts must be tailored to the distinct realities of military life.
I am also convinced that our language around suicide prevention is a key factor in our inability to reach our military recruiting goals.
The term “resilience” has, unfortunately, become a four-letter word in the military lexicon, with the focus on resiliency more of a buzzword than an actionable strategy.
Most people don’t even know what the word means. At its core, resilience means “to bounce back.” Unfortunately, the military has expanded this definition to mean resistance to trauma. This is just not true.
Replacing resiliency with something akin to “mental toughness” or “navigating adversity” should be a priority. After all, service members are expected to operate under extreme conditions. They are asked to endure physical and emotional hardships in service to their country, and the military prides itself on producing men and women who can navigate adversity.
But when the concept of resilience becomes a blanket expectation rather than a practical support system, it risks doing more harm than good.
Ultimately, fixing the military suicide epidemic requires a new approach — one that redefines leadership, revamps training and fosters an environment of openness and mutual support.
Only then will we begin to reverse the devastating trend of military suicides and create a system that truly supports the men and women who serve our country.
The military is known for its leadership, discipline and strength. I hope our next defense secretary will realize that our current approach is not working. The time to act is now, before more lives are lost.
Ken Falke is founder and chairman of Boulder Crest Foundation, and is the author of “Struggle Well, Thriving in the Aftermath of Trauma.”
9. Military draft registration is going down, so Congress wants to take action
I was speaking with a couple of active duty military personnel today. One suggested it is time to have women register for the draft as the ultimate statement of equality. The other said we should consider making draft registration optional for women for a time before we make it mandatory to see how many would volunteer for selective service.
Military draft registration is going down, so Congress wants to take action
sandboxx.us · November 19, 2024
Shortly after the United States entered World War I in 1917, military enlistment encountered a major crisis: the Army failed to meet a target of one million new volunteers. Even with the nation’s entry into an existential conflict that would be known as “The War to End All Wars,” only about 73,000 new recruits had signed up in the first month of fighting.
Congress and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson took decisive action, creating the U.S. Selective Service System (SSS) on May 18, 1917. All of a sudden, military-aged men could be conscripted and required to fight for their nation, facing up to a year in prison if they refused. More than 2.8 million conscripts were shipped off to fight in World War I, and notable draft registrants (though they weren’t conscripted) included baseball legend Babe Ruth and escape artist Harry Houdini.
While the military draft was shut down in 1920 following the end of the war, conscription would return in future conflicts. World War II saw more than 10 million draftees; Korea saw 1.5 million, and Vietnam more than 1.8 million.
The last draft order in U.S. history was issued in 1972, and the American all-volunteer force was formally established the following year. But after a pause of several years, President Jimmy Carter issued Proclamation 4771, establishing an ongoing draft registration requirement for male citizens aged 18 to 25. This meant the nation, on short notice, could resume conscription from ready rolls of registrants.
The existence of the SSS, which now operates out of an ordinary-looking office building in Arlington, Virginia, has continued to provoke controversy over the years. As recently as 2016, bills were introduced in the House and Senate to abolish the military draft for good. The same year, a “Draft Our Daughters” amendment that would add women to draft registration made progress toward passage, despite its author only having introduced it for shock value.
Selective service information available in a local post office in Boston, Massachusetts, July 2020. (Photo by Whoisjohngalt/Wikimedia Commons)
Throughout all of this, the requirement and means of Selective Service registration have remained the same: young men, ideally within 30 days of turning 18, need to register with SSS online or by mail. Often, they’re prompted to do so when completing other processes like obtaining a driver’s license. If they don’t, they’re ineligible for federal loans and grants and may, in theory, face up to five years in prison or a fine of up to $250,000.
Yet, nobody has been prosecuted for non-registration since 1986, and the link between federal student aid and registration compliance was recently dissolved.
But the system is now facing a new crisis: how to respond to declining registration rates. According to the SSS’s 2023 annual report, registration declined from 15.6 million in 2022 to 15.2 million last year, for a national registration rate of 84 percent.
“This was largely driven by the loss of the requirement for men to register with SSS to receive Federal student aid and the removal of the option to register on the Free Application for FAFSA form,” the report stated. “These were both outcomes of the passage of the FAFSA Simplification Act in 2020. This method of registration historically accounted for approximately 20 percent of all annual registrations nationwide.”
Faced with dropping registration rates and an increasingly toothless enforcement policy, Congress is now trying to take action. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2025, the annual defense policy and budget bill that will likely see passage before the end of the year, includes two different proposals that would make draft registration automatic, rather than optional.
The House version of the NDAA would automatically register with SSS every male citizen and legal U.S. resident who otherwise meets requirements. The Senate version would go a step further, automatically registering “every citizen” and every legal resident within SSS parameters. This version, for the first time, would add young women to the SSS.
For this version of the bill, the change would not be immediate, but would take effect within two years of the NDAA’s passage. After that, young people would get notices in their mailbox informing them they had been registered – no action necessary.
Apart from cultural discomfort over the possibility of women being required to serve, there could be downsides to the automatic registration policy.
“Automatic registration could potentially reduce costs for the SSS that would normally be used for advertising and outreach to encourage registration,” the Congressional Research Service stated in a report on the new legislation. “On the other hand, continuing to require proactive registration could serve as a reminder to individuals of their civic obligation and may even encourage individuals to consider volunteer military service.”
In any case, an automatic registration requirement would be a historic update to a system that has been in place in some form or another for 107 years.
But will the SSS ever be used once again as a mechanism for military conscription? That’s an entirely different question. As the Center for a New American Security think tank outlined earlier this year in its report on bringing back the draft, it wouldn’t be easy – and likely wouldn’t happen as quickly as Congress and the president might want. Fewer Americans who meet military fitness and education standards might pose a problem to mass mobilization, the report noted, and social media might become weaponized for resistance against the government.
On one thing the report was completely clear: the U.S. shouldn’t return to military conscription unless it finds itself in a war that leaves no other choice.
Feature Image: On 20 July 1917, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, blindfolded, drew the first draft number in the lottery to be called up: Number 258. Those drafted were to serve in the American forces during World War I. (Wikimedia Commons)
10. Anduril to equip US Marines with new drone countermeasures
Anduril to equip US Marines with new drone countermeasures
defence-blog.com · November 20, 2024
U.S. defense technology firm Anduril Industries has secured a $200 million, five-year Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract from the U.S. Marine Corps to develop a Counter Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS) Engagement System (CES).
The contract forms part of the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) aimed at protecting Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) units from rapidly evolving aerial threats.
The MADIS CES contract is a major part of a block upgrade program for the Marine Corps’ primary expeditionary counter-drone system. The enhancements aim to bolster the Marines’ air defense capability with a focus on keeping pace with emerging threats.
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Anduril’s CES includes Anvil, an autonomous kinetic interceptor designed specifically to neutralize Group 1 and Group 2 drone threats. The Anvil interceptor uses advanced onboard computing and sensors to maintain lock on targets, providing precision-guided engagements in dynamic combat environments. The CES will also incorporate Anduril’s Lattice command-and-control operating system—a platform built on advanced sensor fusion, computer vision, and artificial intelligence—to streamline rapid decision-making in high-tempo scenarios.
“This contract represents a significant milestone in Anduril’s partnership with the U.S. Marine Corps,” said Chris Brose, Chief Strategy Officer at Anduril Industries. “By leveraging advanced AI and autonomy, Anduril’s CES will provide the Marines with a robust and scalable solution to counter evolving drone threats, ensuring greater protection and operational effectiveness on the battlefield.”
The MADIS CES system is designed to provide increased lethality to counter a range of aerial threats, from small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to rotary and fixed-wing aircraft. The system’s modular, open-architecture design ensures the Marines can incorporate future capabilities through continuous Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs). This “software-first” approach allows for rapid upgrades, enhancing operational resilience against new and emerging threats.
Anduril has previously demonstrated its effectiveness with similar CUAS deployments at Marine Corps bases across the United States. The fixed-site Sentry Towers, used to autonomously detect, track, and neutralize Group 1 and Group 2 UAS, have informed the development of the MADIS CES. The new CES will soon be deployed to Marine units operating on the frontlines.
Pat Morris, Vice President of Air Defense at Anduril, emphasized the importance of the project for U.S. defense capabilities. “Anduril is committed to delivering innovative, mission-critical solutions to protect our service members from the most pressing threats. We are proud to support the Marine Corps in this vital mission and look forward to continued collaboration in delivering critical capabilities to the warfighter.”
The CES aims to enhance situational awareness and air defense effectiveness for the Marines, ultimately contributing to a more integrated defense network capable of addressing both current and future threats. The partnership between Anduril and the Marine Corps aims to create a versatile, fully integrated air defense ecosystem to ensure protection for MAGTF units in an increasingly complex threat environment.
defence-blog.com · November 20, 2024
11. This Foreign Country Holds More US Debt Than Any Other - and It's Not China
Spoiler alert: China is number 2. This lists the top 20 countries that hold most of US debt.
Not mentioned in the article and I cannot confirm this but I recall being told the majority of US debt is actually held by the American people and American companies.
This Foreign Country Holds More US Debt Than Any Other - and It's Not China
DenisProduction.com / Shutterstock.comDrew Wood
Published: November 20, 2024 9:35 pm
https://247wallst.com/economy/2024/11/20/this-foreign-country-holds-more-u-s-debt-than-any-other-and-its-not-china/?utm
At the moment, the United States just recently ticked over $36 trillion in debt … and in the time it took you to read those words the interest on the debt went up another $100,000. How did we get to this point? Who do we owe all this money to? Should we be worried?
24/7 Wall St. Insights
- Defense spending, social programs, and debt interests are three of the largest drivers of American budget deficits.
- The United States covers its budget deficit by selling U.S. Treasury securities, which are repaid with interest.
- A handful of foreign countries, mostly U.S. friends and allies, are the main foreign holders of our debt.
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Also: Discover “The Next NVIDIA”
How Did the National Debt Grow So Large?
Steve Heap / Shutterstock.com
Just like a family budget, the national budget goes into debt when spending is higher than revenues. Crises like wars and the Great Depression caused the United States to incur heavy debt in the past, but in more recent years the debt has increased because of military spending and social programs that are inadequately covered by tax revenues. On average, the U.S. government takes in about $4.4 trillion in revenues every year but spends $6.1 trillion.
Debt Interest: Money Down the Drain
irin-k / Shutterstock.com
Every day, the U.S. government spends $2.4 billion just on interest on the national debt. Projections indicate that within a decade, interest payments on the debt will surpass what the country spends on Medicare, Medicaid, or discretionary defense items. That’s money that could fund other underfunded programs or do new beneficial things like provide expanded mental health services for veterans, small business loans, improve school funding, build infrastructure, or protect the environment.
How Do Demographics Affect the National Debt?
Dusan Petkovic / Shutterstock.com
About 10,000 more Baby Boomers reach retirement age every day. This is straining the resources of programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Moreover, the elderly population also puts extra strain on the health care system. Healthcare in the U.S. costs twice as much on average as other developed countries like the U.K., Canada, Sweden, France, and Australia without producing significantly better results.
How Does the Government Fund the Debt?
christianthiel.net / Shutterstock.com
The United States government issues Treasury securities that are considered around the world to be stable investments for individuals, corporations, banks, and national treasuries. These are paid back with interest according to their maturity dates. The United States has maintained a high credit rating by paying its debts on time, making creditors willing to keep lending even as the country’s debt increases.
Following are the countries that hold the most U.S. Treasury securities. This data is from the U.S. Department of the Treasury and was current as of August 2024.
20. Mexico
diegograndi / iStock via Getty Images
Historically, relations have not always been good between the United States and Mexico, but in recent decades the countries have integrated their economies with each other and with Canada in a free trade agreement that has benefited all three countries. Mexico has loaned the United States $95.7 billion.
19. Germany
benedek / E+ via Getty Images
Germany has loaned the U.S. $96.1 billion. Th0ugh they were enemies in the world wars, the two countries are close allies today, joined in a mutual defense agreement through NATO.
18. South Korea
SeanPavonePhoto / iStock via Getty Images
South Korea holds $122.9 billion in U.S. debt. The United States and other allies saved South Korea from an invasion by North Korea from 1950-53. Today, tens of thousands of U.S. troops are permanently stationed there to deter another attack by the heavily-armed and eccentric North.
17. Saudi Arabia
Kashif Hameed / Shutterstock.com
Saudi Arabia is a partner with the United States in the Middle East based on shared interests in the oil industry and in deterring aggression from Iran. When the U.S. went to war to expel invading Iraqis from Kuwait, it was not only to save Kuwait, but to protect the nearby oil fields of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have loaned the United States a total of $142.8 billion.
16. Norway
william87 / iStock via Getty Images
Norway, a NATO ally, has loaned the U.S. $164.4 billion. Norway is in a strategic location to monitor Russian activities in the Arctic and North Atlantic Oceans. It is also a major petroleum producer from wells in the North Sea.
15. Brazil
Ranimiro Lotufo Neto / iStock via Getty Images
Brazil, the largest country in South America, is considered along with India, South Africa, and a select few others, to be a future great power in the world economically and militarily. Brazil has loaned the U.S. $233.3 billion.
14. Hong Kong
EarnestTse / iStock via Getty Images
Hong Kong is a city-state that was previously a British colony but was returned to China when its lease expired. Today it is partially self-governing, though ultimately under the thumb of the PRC. The U.S. currently owes Hong Kong $235.8 billion.
13. Singapore
orpheus26 / iStock via Getty Images
Singapore is a prosperous city-state at the tip of the Malay Peninsula. Its location is next to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, with traffic flowing between Japan, China and other parts of East Asia to and from Europe, the Middle East, and India. The portion of the National debt we owe to Singapore is $239 billion.
12. India
amlanmathur / Getty Images
India is the world’s most heavily populated country, with 1.45 billion people. Since we owe India $245.9 billion, it’s the equivalent of owing each Indian citizen about $169.
11. Taiwan
Sean3810 / iStock via Getty Images
Taiwan is officially a part of China, but it functions like an independent country. When the communists took over the mainland, the Chinese government moved to the large offshore island of Taiwan but never formally declared independence. The United States helps arm and defend Taiwan, as mainland China continues to build up for a possible invasion of the island. The U.S. owes Taiwan $284.4 billion.
10. Switzerland
AleksandarGeorgiev / E+ via Getty Images
Switzerland is a small country in the Alps of southwestern Europe, but it plays an outsized role in world affairs. Famed for its strict neutrality, Switzerland has become a prosperous, secure safe haven for wealthy individuals, companies, and countries. Switzerland has invested $296.3 billion in U.S. Treasury securities.
9. France
Catarina Belova / Shutterstock.com
France helped the United States win independence from Britain, doubled the size of the country by selling the Louisiana Territory, and gave us the Statue of Liberty as a love-gift. In turn, the U.S. defended and liberated France in both world wars and has been allied with it throughout the Cold War. Our good friends the French have loaned the United States $312.2 billion.
8. Ireland
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31.5 million Americans, about 9% of the U.S. population, have Irish ancestors. Ireland has loaned the United States $321.8 billion.
7. Belgium
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Belgium, a NATO ally and the headquarters of the European Union, holds $325 billion of the American debt.
6. Canada
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Canada is one of the U.S.’ closest allies, literally and metaphorically. The two share thousands of miles of peaceful, undefended border and thoroughly integrated economies and a combined defense infrastructure as part of NATO. Canada has loaned the United States $365.4 billion to date.
5. Luxembourg
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A small country between France, Belgium, and Germany, Luxembourg is one of America’s NATO allies and holds $402 billion in U.S. Treasury notes.
4. Cayman Islands
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The Cayman Islands are not an entirely independent country but are a self-governing Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom located in the Caribbean. The islands are a popular location for offshore bank accounts for wealthy people and corporations seeking a tax shelter. The Islands invest a good chunk of their profits in the U.S. national debt: $419.5 billion to date.
3. United Kingdom
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The U.K. is arguably the closest ally of the U.S. It holds $743.9 billion of the U.S. national debt. The two countries are linked in the NATO alliance, but their so-called “Special Relationship” makes them even closer allies than they are with other NATO countries.
2. China
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With $774.6 billion in U.S. Treasury securities, the People’s Republic of China is the second largest foreign holder of U.S. debt. Relations between the two countries are strained over issues of trade, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and China’s support for Russia in the war in Ukraine.
1. Japan
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Japan holds the most U.S. Treasury securities of any country: $1.13 trillion. The two economies are deeply intertwined and have a mutual defense pact.
Take-Away Thoughts
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While the unprecedented size and continuing growth of the U.S. debt are concerning, here are a few thoughts that might help keep it in perspective:
1. Big debt, but also big economy
The U.S. economy is growing faster than the debt. The U.S. has a GDP of $29 trillion. The size of our debt compared to the size of our economy is more favorable than many other countries.
2. Friendly creditors
The vast majority of the overseas holders of the U.S. debt are friendly and closely-allied countries, many of whom depend on America for their defense. They are not trying to hurt the U.S., but just see a good business opportunity to loan money to a country they trust will pay it back.
3. What’chu gonna do about it?
No country can come and take our assets to collect the debt. The U.S. has the strongest military in the world. In the end, we could just simply refuse to repay the debt and no one could do anything about it except stop loaning us money in the future. And if the U.S. defaulted on its debt, it would disrupt the entire world financial system, which wouldn’t be good for anyone.
4. Above our pay scale
The debt problem is not going to be solved in our lifetime. Period. We can vote and lobby for candidates with spending priorities we agree with, but beyond that there is little any of us as individuals can do about this macro-scale problem.
So no matter how serious a problem is, if you have limited or no power to affect it, then there isn’t much point in worrying about it. It makes sense to be a good citizen, pay your taxes, vote according to your conscience, and find things to do that make your life and the lives of people around you better. And if 346 million Americans did that, well then we might see this whole thing start to move incrementally in a better direction.
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12. Money Talks and Hunger Walks: Buying Down State-Actor Influence Risk
A lot to unpack in this essay. I had no idea of "parametric insurance" even though the author informs us that it is not new.
Excerpts:
Parametric Insurance 101
Think about an insurance policy that pays out strictly on the magnitude of an event, like a Category 5 hurricane or a 7.0Mw earthquake. If that magnitude is reached, the insurer pays. That’s parametric insurance. Parametric insurance has become particularly effective in developing markets, with regular use in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. It’s also used in more mature economies to fill holes in the traditional insurance market.
To understand how parametric insurance works, consider earthquake risk insurance in Istanbul and the nearby Marmara Sea (a common region for parametric insurance). The area covered would be defined by coordinates, creating a “box” in which the earthquake’s epicenter would have to occur for the policy to trigger. The policy would also specify the magnitude of the quake necessary—for Istanbul earthquakes, common levels range from 6.5-7.5Mw, as measured by the US Geological Survey. What results is effectively a checklist, and when the conditions on that checklist are satisfied, the policy pays out.
Although parametric insurance is standard in the private market, governments have also become frequent users. Jamaica, Mexico, and Chile are among the states that have purchased parametric insurance, along with a range of government catastrophe programs across Africa. They seek parametric protection because it is straightforward (as above), relies on a third-party data source for triggering that makes it resistant to manipulation and dispute, and pays quickly.
Unlike foreign aid, parametric insurance allows donor states to scale their capital commitments. In addition to being cost-effective, because it’s negotiated ahead of need, parametric programs require that the donor state (or the benefitting state, if it pays for its protection) only pay the policy premium rather than the complete aid package. Imagine having $100 million in effect for only $5-10 million in outlay. If $100 million were necessary due to a triggering event, it would come from a private sector that is sufficiently resourced to pay that amount. After all, insurers paid nearly $100 billion in 2023 for natural disaster events.
Parametric insurance isn’t new, but using it to counter foreign influence would be. Recent droughts in Moldova show how this could work.
Money Talks and Hunger Walks: Buying Down State-Actor Influence Risk - Irregular Warfare Initiative
irregularwarfare.org · by Tom Johansmeyer · November 21, 2024
Risk is easily measured in meals. Vladimir Lenin claimed, “[e]very society is three meals away from chaos.” Britain’s MI5 believes society is “four meals away from anarchy.” If you can’t feed people, societal discord could follow, and where there are preexisting grievances, the problem is even more acute.
For foreign influence operations, food insecurity offers a ready lever for targeting communities at their most vulnerable. It’s easy to manipulate hungry people. And when that insecurity comes from a natural disaster, the influence operational environment becomes quite fertile. Victims look for hope, which leaves an open door for foreign influence. The problem has already taken hold and is poised to grow. But the solution already exists—right under our noses—money.
It’s tough to target hungry people when victims are fed. To put food back on the table, vulnerable states could turn to parametric insurance, a risk-transfer format already used by some developing market nations for hurricane and earthquake protection.
Money Talks and Hunger Walks: Buying Down State-Actor Influence Risk – Insider: Short of War
Parametric insurance not only provides pre-negotiated relief capital but also requires a much smaller up-front capital commitment, allowing donor states to achieve considerable leverage when providing support, particularly by engaging the private insurance market.
By developing a mechanism for providing cover to vulnerable states or quasi-state entities capable of dispensing claim payments, the United States could use a purely humanitarian approach to economic and food security to deny access to state influence peddlers. This solution is easy to implement, has precedent in the global south, is inexpensive, and can scale.
Influence Operations in Context
An oft-cited 2009 RAND report defines influence operations as “the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attitudes, behaviors, or decisions by foreign target audiences.” The report further qualifies operations as in “furtherance of US interests and objectives.” Still, the model is portable across borders and has been around at least since a “smear campaign” was run against Marc Antony in 445 B.C.E. However, with more than 17 billion devices and more than 5 billion people connecting to the internet, it’s hard to ignore the scale that influence operations can achieve today.
The effects of state-actor influence operations are notoriously difficult to quantify. Operations may seek to make some portions of the population feel marginalized or neglected. Only a few campaign attempts need to be successful, which means that a state willing to kiss a lot of toads, so to speak, can work its way to occasionally powerful results at a relatively low cost. Meanwhile, the potential cadence of the threat makes “responding to malicious influence campaigns solely in a reactive manner [is] insufficient to stem the tide,” according to Malzac.
This is particularly true of influence operations following natural disasters. Natural disasters are clearly on the rise, and this increase in frequency only means that disaster disinformation and influence will become more common—and presumably more effective. One of the underlying drivers, climate change, has itself become a rich foreign influence topic.
The rise of influence efforts was immediately evident following the February 2023 Kahramanmaras, Türkiye, earthquake, with accusations of US “tectonic” and “seismic” weapons use. For the wildfires in Hawaii that same year, allegations focused on the use of a “directed energy weapon.” Post-disaster foreign influence operations are most effective when targeting vulnerable populations with preexisting grievances. Most recently, disinformation circulated after Hurricanes Helene and Milton devastated portions of the Southeast, with rumors that the US government used weather technology to create the hurricanes, deliberately targeting Republican voters. A population at odds with its government may readily accept disinformation and other forms of influence simply because they’re being told what they want to hear.
While the problem looks thorny, the solution may be straightforward and have a track record spanning three decades.
Parametric Insurance 101
Think about an insurance policy that pays out strictly on the magnitude of an event, like a Category 5 hurricane or a 7.0Mw earthquake. If that magnitude is reached, the insurer pays. That’s parametric insurance. Parametric insurance has become particularly effective in developing markets, with regular use in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. It’s also used in more mature economies to fill holes in the traditional insurance market.
To understand how parametric insurance works, consider earthquake risk insurance in Istanbul and the nearby Marmara Sea (a common region for parametric insurance). The area covered would be defined by coordinates, creating a “box” in which the earthquake’s epicenter would have to occur for the policy to trigger. The policy would also specify the magnitude of the quake necessary—for Istanbul earthquakes, common levels range from 6.5-7.5Mw, as measured by the US Geological Survey. What results is effectively a checklist, and when the conditions on that checklist are satisfied, the policy pays out.
Although parametric insurance is standard in the private market, governments have also become frequent users. Jamaica, Mexico, and Chile are among the states that have purchased parametric insurance, along with a range of government catastrophe programs across Africa. They seek parametric protection because it is straightforward (as above), relies on a third-party data source for triggering that makes it resistant to manipulation and dispute, and pays quickly.
Unlike foreign aid, parametric insurance allows donor states to scale their capital commitments. In addition to being cost-effective, because it’s negotiated ahead of need, parametric programs require that the donor state (or the benefitting state, if it pays for its protection) only pay the policy premium rather than the complete aid package. Imagine having $100 million in effect for only $5-10 million in outlay. If $100 million were necessary due to a triggering event, it would come from a private sector that is sufficiently resourced to pay that amount. After all, insurers paid nearly $100 billion in 2023 for natural disaster events.
Parametric insurance isn’t new, but using it to counter foreign influence would be. Recent droughts in Moldova show how this could work.
Finding a Laboratory
Moldova struggles with disinformation and influence operations, drought, and economic security, making it a compelling test case for parametric insurance as a counter-influence tool. Agriculture is responsible for 12% of Moldova’s gross domestic product (GDP), 27% of the labor force, and 75% of its physical territory. In Gagauzia, a semi-autonomous region that has strained relations with Moldova’s official government, agriculture’s contribution of $125 million (2.2 billion Moldovan leu) represents 72% of the region’s GDP. If its agriculture business is threatened, Gagauzia suffers profoundly, as is the case for the rest of Moldova.
Unfortunately, this economic and food security problem comes within a society with competing loyalties. While Moldova seeks to align with the European Union, its two semi-autonomous regions, Gagauzia and Transnistria, look east to Moscow due to a combination of animosity toward the Moldovan-Romanian majority and a healthy dose of Russo-nostalgia. This has led to a fertile ground for influence operations, where the Gagauz are more than happy to receive sympathetic messaging as a show of support rather than a disruptive force.
The tenuous (at best) balance among competing interests in Moldova was challenged in 2022 by a severe drought—a risk the country has historically faced and can expect to intensify in the future. The drought caused the country’s agricultural sector to shrink by 18% in a year when energy security and the war in Ukraine had already imperiled the economy of one of Europe’s poorest countries. That year, the drought in Gagauzia was paired with foreign influence operations. Tapping into the drought’s effect on the local economy and the preexisting grievances that help disaster disinformation find purchase, Moldova was bombarded with foreign influence, largely welcomed by the Gagauz. Messaging on the drought was intensified with further influence on energy and economic woes, not to mention encouragement to protest.
The role of Russian influence in Moldova is part of a much broader and more intricate relationship dating back to the Soviet Union. However, there are clear cases of influence operations related directly to prevailing economic concerns, and the drought’s impact on the agriculture sector is among them. Again, there is no single solution to fending off foreign influence, but it seems as though the drought problem is calling for an economic security solution—a simple one.
Parametric insurance could do some heavy lifting in Gagauzia and across Moldova.
Implement and Scale
Drought struck Moldova again in 2024, providing insight into how to structure a parametric solution for the Moldovan agriculture sector, including Gagauzia. The goal would be to provide predictable, high-velocity capital to farmers in need to meet their immediate economic security concerns and thus erode the effectiveness of foreign influence operations. So far, the Moldovan government has approved 100 million Moldovan lei ($5.74 million) to farmers for “whom the drought hit at least 60 percent of the harvest of maize and at least 70- [sic] percent of the harvest of wheat,” with a benefit per farmer of up to 500,000 lei ($28,700).
Immediately, this reads like a parametric insurance structure. There’s a maximum amount of protection available ($5.7 million) and a maximum benefit per farmer ($28,700). The 60% maize and 70% thresholds for qualifying for relief closely resemble crop-yield parametric triggers. This language suggests that structuring and implementing a parametric insurance program would not be difficult. Think back to the Istanbul example earlier in this article—the Moldovan government has already provided parameters and thresholds! The only work to remain would be to broaden the scope of what has been reported and secure donor premiums to finance a private insurance market purchase (which is the easy part).
Given that the structure would be insurance rather than aid, the $5.7 million allocated this year could be a lot more powerful as an insurance premium on a parametric policy, as it could lead to an overall amount of protection, potentially 5-10 times greater (or even more, depending on the structure). Further, given the relatively small amount of capital needed for premium, engaging donor states would become much easier, particularly given the leverage those donor states would enjoy relative to potential impact.
The cost of eroding the effectiveness of foreign influence in Moldova could be as low as $5.7 million. It’s an easy place to start.
More than Moldova
A policy recommendation to support Moldova does contemplate bringing some stability to a small state in a strategically important part of the world during intense upheaval. However, piloting a parametric insurance structure for Moldova’s agriculture sector should be seen as a first step toward a worldwide solution for stemming the tide of post-disaster foreign influence operations. The same thinking and approach applied to Moldova above is portable, as evidenced by the use of parametric insurance by governments in Latin America, the Caribbean, and parts of Africa. After testing in Moldova, success should lead swiftly to a much broader rollout. The economics of parametric insurance as a counter-influence tool are too compelling to ignore, and the ancillary benefits—feeding the victims of a natural disaster—only amplify the scale of the opportunity.
Using parametric insurance to counter foreign influence works best when several conditions are met. First, a state has to be exposed to natural disaster risk. It helps when that risk is easily measurable, but today, most are. Parametric solutions exist for wildfire, extreme heat, soil moisture, hail, and rainfall, alongside the more traditional tropical cyclone and earthquake perils. Next, priority should be given to communities most vulnerable to an influence campaign that can materially reshape the target population’s sentiment. While the United States may be large enough to absorb such efforts (although Hawaii is an alarming counterpoint), smaller countries with more delicate economies are not.
The scope of a parametric counter-influence program could easily begin with what Russian president Vladimir Putin has started to call the “World Majority,” which includes “Asian, Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American countries … [as] an unconditional priority of Russia’s foreign policy in the foreseeable future.” Unsurprisingly, this comes as anti-US and broader anti-western sentiment are on the rise in the region. That could change if the World Majority becomes a roadmap. If parametric insurance can provide a meal or two, maybe it will help keep the world out of chaos.
Tom Johansmeyer is a PhD candidate in international conflict analysis at the University of Kent, Canterbury. He is researching the cyber insurance protection gap as an economic security problem and is also a reinsurance broker in Bermuda, focusing on alternative forms of risk transfer in developing markets for emerging risks.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.
Main Image: US service members stack boxes of aid while off-loading a US Army CH-47 Chinook during an aid relief mission on October 14, 2016 in Anse d’Hainault, Haiti. (US Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Paul Labbe)
13. The True Aims of China’s Nuclear Buildup
This Is an excellent and important contribution.
As I have continually written, we must recognize our adversary/enemy's strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it (as the authors are doing here), and then attack it with a superior political warfare campaign and information and influence activities. (Recognize, Understand, Expose, and Attack the strategy)
Excerpt:
The final prong of the United States’ strategy should center on politics. Beijing has been waging a largely one-sided philosophical struggle against the United States by flooding online outlets with disinformation in an attempt to exploit existing rifts within American society. Washington has hesitated to meet this ideological challenge. But in doing so, it has forfeited the chance to exploit China’s greatest vulnerability: its political system. Beijing devotes enormous resources to controlling its 1.4 billion citizens. The United States can use this fixation to impose steep costs on China, such as by finding ways to circumvent online censorship and disseminate writing by Chinese dissidents about the government’s corruption and economic failings. Beijing has gone to great lengths to silence individual dissidents and stamp out minor protests, suggesting it would spare no expense in countering a broader campaign. The best way to establish guardrails with China is to steer Xi’s attention away from his regional and global designs. The more he is focused at home, the less effort and fewer resources Beijing will devote to power projection.
Without a countervailing strategy that harnesses its competitive advantages, the United States risks its forward position in the western Pacific, which will be further eroded by a narrow military view of China’s nuclear breakout. Washington should exploit its asymmetric strengths and focus on revitalizing its credibility among its allies, exacerbating Beijing’s distinct vulnerabilities, and ultimately tipping the cost-benefit balance for China’s nuclear-backed coercion campaign. Once it appreciates the subtle role that China’s nuclear buildup plays in advancing Beijing’s geopolitical agenda, the United States can shift its own policies to maintain the status quo.
The True Aims of China’s Nuclear Buildup
Beijing’s Growing Arsenal Is Meant to Dissolve America’s Alliance System in Asia
November 21, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State · November 21, 2024
Since 2018, American defense analysts have repeatedly identified China as the greatest threat to U.S. national security. They have variously described Beijing as a “systemic challenge,” a “pacing threat,” and even a “peer adversary,” owing to China’s massive military buildup, belligerent behavior in the Asia-Pacific, and global campaign of economic coercion. These vague, buzzy phrases point to a growing consensus: that China’s ambitions greatly imperil American national interests. There is no consensus, however, on the intention behind China’s strategic moves, chief among them its rapid buildup of nuclear weapons.
The U.S. defense community has largely viewed this buildup in a narrow military framework concerned with weapons capabilities and arms-race balance. A recent essay in Foreign Affairs by the researcher Tong Zhao has broadened the analysis by describing China’s nuclear arsenal not as a coercive tool to achieve well-defined military objectives but as a symbol of national strength by which Beijing can earn Washington’s respect as a major player in world affairs. But any understanding of this nuclear expansion must also account for Beijing’s revisionist intentions.
China holds grand ambitions to remake the world in its image. It intends to do so by first dominating the western Pacific and then pulling much of Eurasia—a region that stretches from China’s immediate neighborhood through Central Asia and southeastern Europe—as well as Africa into its orbit. But Beijing has a geographic predicament of which it’s acutely aware: a number of states off its coastline that have signed on to U.S.-led coalitions devoted to the regional status quo, and which are galvanized by China’s own actions. If China escalates by launching a large-scale attack along its maritime periphery, it risks a devastating and coordinated response that jeopardizes its global designs.
The United States should view China’s nuclear buildup as a tool that can help Beijing resolve its continental isolation. China has initiated a short-of-war coercion campaign to dissolve the U.S. alliance system in the Pacific, and its increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenal gives it more leverage to achieve this objective without igniting a catastrophic great-power war. If Washington fails to address this dimension of China’s nuclear breakout, it could risk its forward position in the western Pacific, through which it defends a free, open, and prosperous environment favorable to American interests.
Washington should be alive to the danger. It must recognize the geopolitical designs China has for its expanding nuclear arsenal and act to preserve the regional balance. As Beijing’s coercion campaign threatens U.S. allies, Washington must implement a countervailing strategy that arrays the United States’ competitive advantages against China’s distinct vulnerabilities. China may have already started wielding its nuclear power as an initial foray in its larger worldmaking project, but the United States still has an opportunity to nip these global ambitions in the bud.
MAKING WAVES
Chinese President Xi Jinping believes he is leading his country into a new era of Chinese-dominated geopolitics. He believes a struggle between Chinese socialism and Western democratic capitalism is already underway and cites his country’s growing prosperity and influence as evidence that it is ready to supplant the United States and remold the world. Such an international order would more closely reflect China’s internal system than the liberal values that have shaped much of the world for decades. Xi is particularly confident that structural trends—as evidenced by the 2008 financial crisis and the rise of populist movements in the West—favor China’s ascendancy.
But China’s geography complicates Xi’s vision. Like Napoleonic France in the nineteenth century and Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, Beijing considers itself hemmed in by hostile coastal states that are backed by a global naval power. Also like its antecedents, China’s continental position—straddling a type of land-sea boundary that the twentieth-century Dutch American strategist Nicholas Spykman dubbed the Eurasian “rimland”—raises the possibility that a poorly executed Chinese strategy could ignite a cataclysmic war with the United States and its Asian allies.
For Chinese strategists, these past examples are instructive. The modern revisionists all failed to resolve threats on their seaward flanks and suffered for it. Neither France nor Germany was naturally inclined to the sea and were ruined at the hands of rimland coalitions led by global naval powers. Imperial Japan provoked a two-front war, fighting Chinese armies on the Asian mainland and American expeditionary forces at sea, which proved too much to bear. And the Soviet Union ultimately could not overcome its rimland Cold War opponent, composed of coastal states and spearheaded by U.S. air and sea forces. Beijing has thus determined that before it can pull a vast swath of Eurasia into its orbit, it must first achieve primacy on its exposed maritime periphery.
Beijing protests that its maritime flank is surrounded by two concentric, crescent-shaped island chains littered with U.S. allies and military bases. The first, closer to China, runs southward from Alaska’s Aleutian archipelago through Japan and Taiwan and down past the Philippines. The second, farther east, runs from Japan through the U.S. military hub on Guam and to the northern reaches of Australia. The United States is bound by defense treaties to Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, as well as to South Korea, which sits inside this rimland perimeter.
This U.S.-backed barrier has frustrated China since the early days of the Cold War, when a “hub and spokes” network of bilateral alliances between the United States and a number of western Pacific states thwarted Beijing’s regional ambitions. In the 1950s, the United States, in defense of its allies, even threatened China with nuclear attack. In 1996, during the third Taiwan Strait crisis, Washington humiliated Beijing when it dispatched two carrier strike groups to support Taipei. Today, the United States is promoting trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea to strengthen regional defenses against ballistic missiles. As Xi watches this, the searing experiences of the past are never far from his mind. And China now has in spades something it once lacked: striking power, both nuclear and conventional, of the kind that can split Washington from its Asia-Pacific allies.
BREAKING GROUND
The debate in the United States over the meaning of China’s nuclear buildup has long played out in narrow military terms, divorced from geopolitics. American analysts have fixated primarily on whether Beijing is engaging in an arms race, whether it’s countering what it perceives as an increased U.S. nuclear threat, or whether its stated policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons is genuine. But China’s breakout can only be fully appreciated in the context of its geopolitical ambitions. Focusing on how this expansion represents a means to its broader political ends underscores why China has little interest in the American understanding of “strategic stability,” or the idea that rivals will not try to exploit military developments to their advantage. Put simply, China’s nuclear geopolitics is about destabilizing the maritime barrier now set up against it.
China’s nuclear expansion will affect how U.S. allies perceive the regional military balance. As they make their assessments, they are taking into account the stunning nature, in both quantity and quality, of China’s nuclear breakout. The United States has an active arsenal of some 3,700 nuclear warheads, though less than half of these are deployed. Beijing is quickly closing the gap, having increased its warhead inventory from about 200 to 500 between 2020 and 2023. The Pentagon has forecast that China will boast more than 1,000 warheads by 2030 and upward of 1,500 by 2035. And China already has a formidable capacity to employ such weapons in highly accurate strikes: it has more land-based intercontinental and intermediate-range missile launchers than the United States does. What’s more, Washington retired its only regional nuclear option—a submarine-launched cruise missile—in 2013, meaning in a potential crisis it would have no regionally based nuclear capability to reassure its allies of its security guarantee.
The United States’ partners in the Asia-Pacific are understandably alarmed. According to a recent study by the National Bureau of Asian Research, China’s quantitative advantages have raised anxiety on the first island chain, particularly in Japan. Tokyo worries that Washington will grow risk averse along the rimland as China’s capacity to conduct precision strikes against the continental United States continues to increase, allowing Beijing to dial up the pressure without drawing an American response.
China’s nuclear geopolitics is about destabilizing the maritime barrier now set up against it.
China’s defense establishment is also exhibiting an increasing interest in coercive nuclear strategies. Chinese military theorists now routinely refer to the country’s modernized nuclear weapons as a “trump card” that can impede external intervention in regional affairs. And many Chinese defense analysts have concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear coercion in the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine has prevented NATO from deeper intervention in that conflict, suggesting that Beijing could use its arsenal to achieve similar ends.
The Chinese conception of deterrence comprises the Western notion of dissuading adversaries from taking a particular course of action, but it also includes a more expansive goal: compelling adversaries to change their behavior. Training manuals for the branch of the Chinese army that controls the country’s land-based missiles have long advised that simply setting nuclear weapons at higher levels of readiness will “create a great shock in the enemy psyche” and shape the enemy’s actions. And now that China has a robust missile force to conduct coercive nuclear attacks, such tactics will have more credibility in the eyes of America’s regional partners. Beijing’s improved strike capabilities could thus encourage it to publicly abandon its no-first-use nuclear policy to drive a wedge between Washington and its allies.
As the United States’ Pacific partners increasingly see or experience Chinese efforts to use nuclear-backed coercion, their view of the regional balance could shift. And seeing inaction or insufficient action from Washington in the face of this intimidation would give them justifiable cause for further alarm. Crafting an effective response to China’s overall coercive power and the nuclear buildup itself will be key to maintaining U.S. credibility in the region.
SIMMERING POINT
China aims to use its nuclear breakout to pierce the rimland barrier without igniting a great-power war. Xi’s ability to dominate the conflict spectrum—from low-intensity political pressure to potential nuclear warfare—has likely emboldened him to sharpen the pressure in this region in recent months.
But China has been honing its capacity to pursue this coercive campaign for well over a decade. In 2012, Beijing seized from the Philippines control of the Scarborough Shoal, an important fishery in the South China Sea, using both low-intensity military force and economic pressure, including boycotts of some Philippine exports. The United States had protested China’s de facto annexation of the shoal, but Beijing’s escalation against the Philippines forced Washington to back off. Last summer, Beijing again initiated clashes in the South China Sea when Chinese maritime vessels rammed into Philippine ships within Manila’s exclusive economic zone. China faced no serious consequences.
Japan, too, has been subject to Chinese coercion since the dawn of the twenty-first century—and the pressure is rising with China’s nuclear buildup. Today, China is engaged in a persistent effort to unilaterally change the status quo of the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands) just north of Taiwan; almost daily, the Chinese navy operates in their vicinity to enforce China’s “domestic maritime law.” Chinese military forces also routinely enter or surround Japanese territory. In August, for example, the Chinese navy and air force violated Japan’s territorial waters and airspace—an escalation that was eclipsed, just weeks later, when China sailed an aircraft carrier through Japanese waters for the first time. This persistent pressure is designed to wear Tokyo down, weaken the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and normalize China’s behavior to create a new bar by which to measure future aggression.
Taiwan remains the main target of China’s short-of-war coercion campaign. In addition to its military and political intimidation of the island, Beijing attempts to marginalize Taiwan’s standing on the world stage and erode its coverage within international legal structures. But the threat of escalation is key to subjugating Taiwan without large-scale warfare. Beijing can, for example, exploit the possibility of an amphibious invasion to compel certain segments of the Taiwanese political class and population to give in to Chinese control of the island. Should Beijing decide to take this more extreme course of action, it would likely use the threat of limited nuclear escalation to deter U.S. and Japanese intervention.
Since Beijing initiated its sprawling coercive campaign, few of the countries it has targeted have grown their military capabilities. The Chinese army, on the other hand, has transformed into Asia’s largest military force, in both conventional and nuclear capability. For Xi, however, success is not about winning a head-to-head military clash that provokes U.S. intervention. Instead, success is defined as decoupling the United States from the region entirely by undermining Washington’s credibility there and compelling U.S. allies to shy away from confrontation. As China’s recent behavior suggests, China’s nuclear buildup has emboldened Xi to accept greater risks to achieve these objectives.
LIFTING THE COUNTERVAIL
Beijing’s short-of-war coercion campaign has thrown Washington into a reactive, defensive stance that has unnerved its regional partners. U.S. officials have yet to address the regional strategic implications of China’s nuclear breakout. If these trends continue, China could find itself well positioned to dissolve the bonds that tie the United States to its Asia-Pacific allies.
To blunt China’s momentum and regain the initiative, the United States needs a countervailing strategy that can demonstrate credibility to its regional partners and change Beijing’s calculus. China is simultaneously focused on its internal security, its regional ambitions, and the larger global designs that its regional actions support. Any U.S. strategy should force Xi to make punishing tradeoffs between his goals so that he cannot harbor the illusion of advancing on one front without jeopardizing the others.
China has distinct vulnerabilities. Like all nations, it has finite resources and cannot simply spend its way out of the burden of choice. This is especially true for an emerging, relatively isolated continental power with grand ambitions, a slowing economy, and the insecurity of a Marxist-Leninist regime—namely, a deep, near-obsessive distrust of its own citizens. By contrast, the United States is an established global power with a democratic system that lends itself to far-flung alliances and the creative energies of free societies. Washington’s task, then, is to exploit its favorable military, economic, and political asymmetries to exacerbate Beijing’s continental isolation.
The military prong of a countervailing strategy should emphasize existing U.S. advantages in alliance partnerships, missile defense, and undersea warfare. By embedding Japan and South Korea in a regional missile defense system and linking it to improved U.S. homeland missile defenses, for example, Washington can alleviate its allies’ fears and raise the stakes for Beijing dialing up pressure on any of them. Washington’s redeployment of a submarine-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile, which would give it a prompt, regionally based response option, would further boost allies’ confidence and divert more Chinese resources to missile defense and undersea warfare.
Any U.S. strategy should force Xi to make punishing tradeoffs between his goals.
The economic dimension should make use of allies’ interest in American markets. By deepening trade relations in the western Pacific, Washington would convey to its partners and to Beijing that U.S. economic security is indivisible from the regional status quo. Updated bilateral trade pacts focused on sectors that China dominates—such as critical minerals and pharmaceutical supply chains—would also wean Washington and its partners off the Chinese market and harden them against Beijing’s coercion. Although American domestic politics has made the establishment of trade pacts difficult, there is an appetite in Washington for agreements that counter China’s strategy of creating economic dependencies.
The final prong of the United States’ strategy should center on politics. Beijing has been waging a largely one-sided philosophical struggle against the United States by flooding online outlets with disinformation in an attempt to exploit existing rifts within American society. Washington has hesitated to meet this ideological challenge. But in doing so, it has forfeited the chance to exploit China’s greatest vulnerability: its political system. Beijing devotes enormous resources to controlling its 1.4 billion citizens. The United States can use this fixation to impose steep costs on China, such as by finding ways to circumvent online censorship and disseminate writing by Chinese dissidents about the government’s corruption and economic failings. Beijing has gone to great lengths to silence individual dissidents and stamp out minor protests, suggesting it would spare no expense in countering a broader campaign. The best way to establish guardrails with China is to steer Xi’s attention away from his regional and global designs. The more he is focused at home, the less effort and fewer resources Beijing will devote to power projection.
Without a countervailing strategy that harnesses its competitive advantages, the United States risks its forward position in the western Pacific, which will be further eroded by a narrow military view of China’s nuclear breakout. Washington should exploit its asymmetric strengths and focus on revitalizing its credibility among its allies, exacerbating Beijing’s distinct vulnerabilities, and ultimately tipping the cost-benefit balance for China’s nuclear-backed coercion campaign. Once it appreciates the subtle role that China’s nuclear buildup plays in advancing Beijing’s geopolitical agenda, the United States can shift its own policies to maintain the status quo.
Foreign Affairs · by The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State · November 21, 2024
14. Americans Love a Tough Guy
Conclusion:
Both parties face substantial political challenges in handling foreign policy issues over the next four years. Democrats need to build a better foreign policy brand while Republicans have created expectations that will be hard to satisfy. But each will have to find ways forward. Although it is hard to imagine that foreign policy will jump to the top of voters’ priority list any time soon, there is every reason to think that the next presidential election will be another close contest in which the candidates scrape and claw for every available vote. International relations moved votes in a close 2024 election, and it will likely do so again.
Americans Love a Tough Guy
Why Trump Won on Foreign Policy—and What the Democrats Can Learn From Him
November 21, 2024
Foreign Affairs · November 21, 2024
During the 2024 presidential campaign, the U.S. foreign policy establishment was virtually united in declaring Donald Trump unfit to serve as commander in chief. More than 100 Republican national security leaders joined with Democrats to endorse Kamala Harris, condemning Trump as an aspiring autocrat who would upend the U.S.-built global order. Even several of Trump’s own top officials—including two secretaries of defense, two national security advisers, and a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—warned that Trump posed a clear and present danger to the United States’ interests abroad and its democracy at home.
Yet Trump is now returning to the White House, and foreign policy appears to have helped him get there. Although international relations are not as important to voters as the economy, polling data indicates that global issues did play a role in the election’s outcome and that this factor worked to Trump’s advantage. This was partly because of Trump’s stance on immigration, which was the top international issue on voters’ minds by a wide margin. But it was also because Trump convinced voters that he is a strong leader—which is the attribute that the electorate values most in a commander in chief. Harris, meanwhile, struggled to explain how she would inject new life into U.S. foreign policy at a time when most Americans say they are dissatisfied with their country’s standing in the world.
The question now is whether Trump can deliver the kind of foreign policy leadership that he promised on the campaign trail. Some of his promises, such as quickly ending the war in Ukraine, seem unlikely to materialize. Others, such as imposing double-digit tariffs, could spark backlash from voters. If history is any guide, Trump will give his opponents plenty to criticize in his second presidential term. But for Democrats to compete effectively on foreign policy in 2028, they will need to develop a more convincing message about why their party offers a better vision for the United States’ global role.
THE MARGINS THAT MATTERED
Foreign policy was not the main issue for Americans on November 5. But there are good reasons to think that foreign policy mattered at the margins on Election Day. And in a contest where several swing states were decided by just a few percentage points, those margins helped push Trump over the finish line.
The international issue that mattered most in the 2024 election was immigration, which Republicans have framed in recent years as a national security threat. During the campaign, Trump referred to the United States as an “occupied country” confronting an “invasion” of illegal immigrants. He promised to use the U.S. military to carry out mass deportations. This tough talk appealed to a substantial chunk of the electorate. According to AP VoteCast, a survey of the U.S. electorate, roughly one in five Americans thought immigration was the most important issue facing the country, and 89 percent of those voters cast their ballots for Trump.
Voters also said that they trusted Trump to handle foreign policy in broader terms. National polls conducted in the month before Election Day showed Trump holding a ten-point lead on the question of which candidate would do a better job of handling national defense and a nine-point lead on which candidate would do a better job of handling war and terrorism. On generic survey questions that asked respondents which candidate would better handle foreign policy writ large, Trump regularly prevailed by a margin of at least five percentage points. Exit polls revealed that although only four percent of voters identified foreign policy as their main concern, Trump carried this group by a margin of 57 percent to 37 percent.
Trump’s emphasis on being a strong leader who would stand up to the United States’ adversaries resembled Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign, in which Republicans promised to deliver “peace through strength.” Trump boasted that he had rebuilt the U.S. military after eight years of decline during the Obama administration, claimed that Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan had set off a “collapse of American credibility” around the world, and argued that Moscow would not have dared to attack Kyiv in 2022 if the United States “had a real president” that Russian President Vladimir Putin respected.
Voters trusted Trump to handle foreign policy in broad terms.
These messages seemed to resonate with the electorate. In August, for example, when pollsters with the Institute for Global Affairs asked voters in battleground states which candidate was most likely to be “a strong leader who advances America’s interests internationally,” 54 percent chose Trump and 46 percent chose Harris. And leadership strength is, ultimately, what Americans value most when they consider how well presidential candidates will handle foreign policy. Research by one of us (Friedman) shows that when voters perceive candidates as tougher, they routinely rate them as being more fit to serve as commander in chief–even when voters disagree with candidates’ stances on specific foreign policy issues.
Projecting strength with hawkish rhetoric often comes at the cost of making presidential candidates seem reckless. For instance, 1964 Republican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater scared many Americans with careless statements about nuclear weapons—claiming, for example, that he wanted to “lob one into the men’s room of the Kremlin” and saying that he would delegate nuclear launch authority to commanders in the field. His opponent, President Lyndon Johnson, seized on that rhetoric, releasing one of the most famous television ads in the history of presidential campaigns, which suggested that electing Goldwater would bring about nuclear war. Johnson went on to win the 1964 election in a landslide. Both of Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaigns were dogged by similar criticisms; though Reagan won the White House twice, polling showed that voters worried about him being a “warmonger.”
Trump avoided this pitfall in 2024 by projecting strength without seeming overly prone to the use of force. Trump’s campaign touted that he had been the first president since Jimmy Carter who did not get the United States involved in a new armed conflict—another message that found a receptive audience. When the Institute for Global Affairs asked swing-state voters which candidate would be more likely to send troops to fight in an unnecessary war, respondents selected Harris by six percentage points.
Approval for Trump’s foreign policy was not just the product of broader support for him.
Trump’s remarkable success at appearing both tough and skeptical of foreign wars is evident in survey data. For example, surveys consistently showed that Americans generally thought Trump would do a better job than Harris of handling the ongoing war in Gaza, where he has pushed for offering extensive support to Israel for its military operations. But pollsters also found that voters trusted Trump to do a better job of handling the ongoing war in Ukraine, where he has questioned the value of U.S. military aid and called for negotiations. In short, voters did not align with Trump just because they wanted to elect a leader with hawkish views. Instead—and despite the warnings of national security experts to the contrary—voters generally trusted that Trump would do a better job of managing crises across the board.
It is always important to take survey data with a grain of salt. Voters tend to say nice things about their favorite candidates. This makes it hard to distinguish people who found Trump’s foreign policy message appealing from those who endorsed Trump’s foreign policies simply because they liked him on other topics.
Yet evidence suggests that approval for Trump’s foreign policy was not just the product of broader support for him. The percentage of Americans who told pollsters that they believed Trump would be a better commander in chief consistently outpaced his margin in the election’s popular vote. And voters criticized Trump on some foreign policy issues while disagreeing with him on others—or preferring Harris. Americans, for example, said that they trusted Trump to handle the war in Ukraine even though a majority of them say that they support sending military aid to Kyiv. Survey respondents might have reported viewing Trump as a stronger leader than Harris, but they also said that Harris had a better temperament. Voters thought that Trump would do a better job of handling immigration while also claiming that Harris would do a better job of handling climate change. This mix of survey responses does not simply reflect partisan cheerleading. Instead, polling data indicates that Trump performed particularly well on foreign policy issues in a way that helped him on Election Day.
TOUGH LUCK
For Harris, losing out to Trump on foreign policy may be especially jarring. The outgoing vice president spent the last days of her campaign highlighting dire warnings from Trump’s past foreign policy advisers. But her struggles, just like Trump’s successes, make sense. Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East created a perception that the world had fallen into crisis on Democrats’ watch. According to polling by Gallup, just one-third of Americans say that they are satisfied with the United States’ global position. Under these conditions, it is unsurprising that Americans did not see the outgoing vice president as an appealing commander in chief.
Harris is partially responsible for this perception. She received substantial blowback, for example, for declining to distance herself from Biden, particularly after an infamous television appearance where she could not think of any realm in which she would have made different decisions than Biden did.
But it is not obvious that Harris could have gotten much mileage from drawing contrasts with Biden on foreign policy issues. Toughening her position toward Israel, for example, might have helped Harris shore up support among Arab American voters in Michigan and with young progressive voters nationally. Yet Michigan’s electoral votes were not decisive to the election’s outcome, and only two percent of young Americans rated the war in Gaza as their main concern in preelection surveys. Exit polls showed that the percentage of voters who thought the Biden administration’s support for Israel had been too weak was roughly the same as the share of the electorate who thought Biden’s support for Israel had been too strong. A study that asked voters to rank reasons for voting against Harris found that “Harris is too pro-Israel” was one of the least common responses and that it ranked lower than the notion that “Harris is too pro-Palestine.” The political upside for Harris in tacking left on Gaza was therefore limited, and not obviously greater than the costs.
Harris was dealt a bad hand and given little time to play it.
Ukraine might seem like another area in which Harris could have broken from Biden’s policies. Hawks have repeatedly criticized the current president for placing too many restrictions on U.S. aid to Kyiv, arguing that Biden has needlessly handicapped Ukraine in a manner that makes Washington look weak. (Biden has ultimately yielded to those criticisms: shortly after Election Day, he granted Kyiv permission to strike Russia with U.S.-provided weapons.) Harris could have proposed loosening these restrictions during the campaign, thereby showcasing her willingness to stand up to the United States’ adversaries. But this move would have had risks of its own. Even though most voters support continuing military aid to Ukraine, they also say that the goals of weakening Russia or restoring Ukraine’s prewar borders are less important than preventing the conflict from escalating. Hewing to Biden’s policies may once again have been Harris’s best political play.
Climate change was the foreign policy issue on which Harris held her largest advantage. According to AP VoteCast, Harris held a double-digit edge on the question of which candidate would do a better job of tackling this problem. Yet just seven percent of voters said that climate change was the most important issue facing the country. Pre-election polls suggested that swing-state voters attached a particularly low priority to combating climate change while also expressing skepticism about constraining the use of fossil fuels. That helps to explain why the most prominent position that Harris took on climate change during the 2024 campaign was actually a defensive one, walking back her prior pledge to ban fracking.
There may have still been ways for Harris to reap electoral rewards from her foreign policy stances. But with relatively little foreign policy experience under her belt—and a timeline of just three months to introduce herself to voters—Harris was not well positioned to identify them. She was dealt a bad hand and given little time to play it.
BUILD BACK BETTER
Foreign policy was a winning issue for Trump’s 2024 campaign. But when Trump enters office, he will face the same complex set of foreign policy problems that bedeviled Biden and Harris. Both the war in Europe and the one in the Middle East will make it hard for him to maintain the image of competence he constructed on the campaign trail.
Ukraine will be an early test. Trump promised to end the conflict quickly, but it is hard to imagine him negotiating a settlement that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will endorse. This places Trump in a bind. He can reveal that he does not, in fact, possess a magic touch for resolving wars. Or he can ram through a deal that Ukraine does not support. At best, this would mean that Zelensky—and many of his allies in the United States—will denounce Trump for surrendering to Putin. At worst, Kyiv could reject any deal Trump proposes and continue fighting.
In the Middle East, Trump could score an early foreign policy win if Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secures a cease-fire in Lebanon for which the president-elect could take credit. But the region’s geopolitical landscape has changed dramatically since Trump was last in office. Building on the Arab-Israeli normalization agreements that Trump helped to strike during his first term will require resolving an impasse between Israel and Saudi Arabia on the issue of giving Palestinians a path to statehood, something that will be exceedingly difficult to do. In the meantime, Netanyahu might believe Trump’s victory gives him carte blanche to expand his military campaign against Iran and its proxies, tarnishing the president-elect’s self-professed reputation as a peacemaker in the region.
Democrats have to anticipate the foreign policy issues that will be most salient in 2028.
In other areas, Trump might succeed in implementing his foreign policy agenda only to find that it produces political backlash. For example, using the U.S. military to deport immigrants will not only be difficult and controversial but it will also likely harm the economy. At a time when unemployment figures are near record lows, removing millions of low-wage workers from the labor market will drive up inflation. Trump’s promise to slap double-digit tariffs on all imports is unlikely to play well for similar reasons. Voters who supported Trump because they were upset with the cost of groceries are unlikely to appreciate it when tariffs further raise the price of consumer goods.
Democrats thus have many reasons to think that their party will be in a better position to debate foreign policy four years from now. But to capitalize in this area, Democrats need to develop a clearer message about why voters should trust them to manage Washington’s place in the world. They can do so, in part, by cultivating leaders who possess national security experience, who project strength, or who can speak assertively about foreign policy issues. Former President John F. Kennedy provides a good case of how the party can elevate candidates who have comparatively light foreign policy backgrounds. Kennedy emerged from relative obscurity in 1960 by depicting himself as a vigorous leader who would “get America moving again” on the international stage.
Democrats will also have to anticipate the foreign policy issues that will be most salient in 2028. Continuing to pivot to the center on immigration might help neutralize Republicans’ advantage on the border, but there is no guarantee that immigration will play as much of a role in the next presidential election as it did this time around. By contrast, U.S. relations with China were barely discussed in the 2024 campaign, but this issue will likely take center stage in Trump’s second-term agenda. The Democrats’ next presidential nominee will need to put forth a confident critique of how Trump handles that challenge, and what they will do instead.
Both parties face substantial political challenges in handling foreign policy issues over the next four years. Democrats need to build a better foreign policy brand while Republicans have created expectations that will be hard to satisfy. But each will have to find ways forward. Although it is hard to imagine that foreign policy will jump to the top of voters’ priority list any time soon, there is every reason to think that the next presidential election will be another close contest in which the candidates scrape and claw for every available vote. International relations moved votes in a close 2024 election, and it will likely do so again.
Foreign Affairs · November 21, 2024
15. Joint Readout from Australia-Japan-Philippines-Republic of Korea-United States Defense Ministers' Meeting
The silk web of4 of our treaty allies in the Asia Pacific.
Remember that our adversaries/competitors fear and envy these relationships. (and they are internally weak and also desperate for support).
Joint Readout from Australia-Japan-Philippines-Republic of Korea-United States Defense Ministers' Meeting
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3973807/joint-readout-from-australia-japan-philippines-republic-of-korea-united-states/
Nov. 21, 2024 |
Australian Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy, Japanese Minister of Defense Nakatani Gen, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro, Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III met together for the first time on November 21 in Vientiane, Lao PDR. The defense leaders underscored their shared commitment to advance a vision for a free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, where international law and sovereignty are respected.
The Ministers and Secretaries emphasized the importance of close multilateral cooperation in support of regional security and stability, and underscored the importance of ASEAN centrality and unity and ASEAN-led regional architecture. The leaders highlighted the progress made in strengthening their defense cooperation and reaffirmed their commitment to working together moving forward.
16. More NATO in the Arctic Could Free the United States Up to Focus on China
We have to decide if we are going to be a global power with global responsibilities or a one trick China pony?
The paradox is if we are to prioritize competition with China we need to be able to compete globally because China is acting globally.
I fear that some (a general comment and not a criticism of these specific authors) who want to prioritize China really mean they want to prioritize preparation for a war over Taiwan. And I would not be surprised if China wants us to focus solely on Taiwan so that it can enjoy freedom of action around the world in all the places the US chooses to neglect.
That said, this proposal seems a wise use of our silk web of alliances to share the responsibilities and take effective action to protect our collective interests.
Excerpt:
Forming a Nordic-led Combined Joint Expeditionary Force for the Arctic would reduce the strain on U.S. forces. NATO lacks an Arctic strategy other than an October 2024 statement about defending “Allied interests in the Arctic.” NATO needs a comprehensive Arctic strategy that leads to investments in infrastructure, training, and equipment to match Russian power in the Arctic. Without proper resourcing, Russia will keep dominating the Arctic, making it less safe for international trade, freedom of navigation, and rule of law. Sino-Russian dominance of the Arctic has severe implications for global security and economic stability. Through collective action and improved Arctic-specific readiness, NATO can deter Sino-Russian aggression in the Arctic while supporting a U.S. shift to the Indo-Pacific.
More NATO in the Arctic Could Free the United States Up to Focus on China - War on the Rocks
Ryan R. Duffy, Jahara Matisek, Jeremy M. McKenzie, and Chad Pillai
warontherocks.com · by Ryan R. Duffy · November 21, 2024
Growing Russian-Chinese collaboration in the Arctic was showcased in July 2024 through a major naval exercise and maneuvers including nine Russian and Chinese naval vessels on a joint patrol in the Northwest Pacific. In another historic first that month, two Russian bombers and two Chinese bombers flew into Alaska’s Air Defense Identification Zone, leading to their intercept by U.S. and Canadian fighters. Some scholars argue that such Russian-Chinese cooperation “is still limited” in the Arctic, driven primarily by opportunism and economic interests. However, these Arctic exceptionalism views miss the growing geopolitical competition, driven largely by Russia’s dominance over the Arctic relative to NATO.
The Arctic becoming a strategic battleground was explicitly acknowledged in June 2024 through the U.S. Department of Defense’s Arctic Strategy, noting growing Russian-Chinese collaboration. Despite major combat losses in Ukraine, Russia continues to expand its Arctic military presence and activities. The Arctic’s unique environment requires specialized training and equipment, posing challenges for the United States in projecting and sustaining military forces in the region. This task is further complicated by the American strategic focus on countering China in the Indo-Pacific. NATO represents an ideal form of Arctic burden-sharing, allowing the United States to concentrate elsewhere.
As the Trump administration pivots back to Asia, maintaining strong NATO ties is crucial, despite rhetoric to the contrary. NATO has been tying its strategic survival to an Indo-Pacific pivot since 2019, and the Trump administration will need to rely more on Arctic-minded NATO allies to deter Russian and Chinese ambitions. The U.S. military has minimal forces capable of operating in the Arctic but also needs to defend its space-based infrastructure around the region. By leveraging NATO, particularly the Arctic expertise of British, Canadian, and Nordic allies, the United States can ensure a stable Arctic presence, enabling a robust military posture in the Indo-Pacific.
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The Strategic Importance of the Arctic
The Arctic has become a unique arena of global competition. It is the sole area of the world where both Russia and China operate in close proximity to North America across various domains. Melting sea ice and technological advances have increased accessibility, transforming the Arctic from a “strategic buffer” to a hotspot for valuable resources like oil, gas, rare earth minerals, and new fisheries, as well as opening shorter sea routes between Europe and Asia. This increased accessibility unlocks immense economic potential, including an estimated 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil, 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered natural gas, and $1 trillion in rare earth minerals. However, these opportunities bring heightened competition, where the growing Chinese and Russian presence directly challenges U.S. and NATO interests.
The Arctic has long been central to Russia’s identity and security, controlling 53 percent of Arctic coastline, and its Arctic policy identifies its economic and security needs. As the ice melts, the region becomes a real security concern for both Russia and the United States. The Arctic is crucial to Russia’s economy, accounting for 10 percent of Russian GDP and 20 percent of exports. Russia has expanded its military footprint, reopening Soviet-era bases, deploying advanced missile systems, and investing in nuclear-powered icebreakers. The Kola Peninsula, home to most of Russia’s ballistic missile submarines, underscores the Arctic’s role in Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy. Moreover, Russia attempts to control the Northern Sea Route, challenging international norms of freedom of navigation, posing a direct threat to NATO’s Northern Flank and member states’ economic interests.
China’s Arctic activities further complicate the security landscape. Despite not being an Arctic nation, China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and seeks influence through its Polar Silk Road initiative. These efforts, often dual-use, support military objectives. Sino-Russian joint Arctic exercises, including coast guard and naval patrols as well as joint bomber patrols, demonstrate increased military alignment against the United States. They pose a strategic challenge to NATO and the defense of the American homeland, by combining Russia’s military presence with China’s economic and technological capabilities.
NATO’s Valuable Arctic Expertise
Converging Russian and Chinese interests both in and beyond the Arctic requires the United States to work by, with, and through allies to counter threats in the region. Traditionally, the United States has enjoyed unrivaled military dominance, but in the Arctic, it now faces an emerging alliance between two formidable competitors. This situation underscores the need for a collaborative approach with NATO allies to ensure preparedness for a crisis in the Arctic. American dominance cannot be taken for granted. In the Arctic, U.S. capabilities are not enough to counter Russia, let alone a Sino-Russian alliance.
Per our recently published research, successful military operations in the Arctic require not only specialized equipment but also dedicated training and doctrine for polar warfare. Arctic operations are uniquely challenging, with complex logistics, extreme weather, and seasonal shifts like polar days and nights. Accordingly, building Arctic-ready forces requires “the deliberate education and development of Arctic-minded leaders alongside collaboration with allies and partners to foster enhanced cold weather war-fighting capabilities across the spectrum.” Arctic warfighting requires more than just specialized equipment — rather, it demands the dedicated attention of those troops who will be assigned to conduct it. Lessons learned from previous Arctic conflicts include the need for cold weather warfare training and equipment, dedicated polar war-fighting doctrine, joint operations, interoperability, mobility in Arctic conditions, planning for increased supplies and unique logistics, Arctic domain awareness and intelligence, space weather disrupting command and control, inimitable polar weather issues associated with polar days and nights, controlling Arctic sea lines of communication, and ensuring unity of command.
Fortunately, NATO already has much of the necessary infrastructure in place with the Nordics. For instance, the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force was established in 2014 and emphasized Arctic warfare capabilities with Nordic military forces in the High North. More recent developments include the establishment of a NATO Multi-Corps Land Component Command in Finland, the formation of a Nordic Air Force, and the creation of a NATO Commander Task Force Baltic in the German port city of Rostock. All reflect a boost in NATO’s cohesion, capability, and communication, helping establish the “3 Cs of Deterrence” around the Arctic Circle.
NATO’s role in defending the Arctic has grown increasingly vital, and the alliance can capitalize on the polar expertise of its Arctic countries. Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Sweden, and Finland are highly trained in cold-weather warfare, have a deep understanding of Arctic operations, and are geographically positioned to respond quickly to threats in the region. Moreover, the Nordic countries are jointly negotiating the procurement of an infantry fighting vehicle specifically for the subarctic climate.
Finland’s expertise in Arctic warfare can be traced to the Winter War (1939–1940), when it held off a numerically superior Soviet invasion force longer and better than expected due to superior tactics adapted to its unique Arctic environment, before ultimately losing. Finland’s contributions to NATO include substantial ground forces and long-range fires. Likewise, Norway hosts the NATO Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations. Sweden’s recent ascension to NATO bolsters the air capabilities and industrial base of the alliance while Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command provides critical presence, experience, and capability. Canada has long been a key U.S. partner in the Arctic as a part of the bi-national North American Air Defense Command.
Filling Gaps in the Ice
While Canada and the Nordics specialize more in Arctic warfighting, NATO still faces significant military capability gaps in the Arctic. To effectively counter potential aggression from Russia and China in the Arctic, NATO needs to strengthen its ability to conduct a range of specialized military operations in the Arctic including long-range fires, multi-domain awareness, air and missile defense, attack aviation, amphibious operations, and the logistical sustainment of resilient forces capable of enduring prolonged engagements in harsh polar conditions.
NATO faces specific challenges in Arctic naval readiness, particularly in ice-capable vessels and icebreakers, which are an “important element of Arctic sovereignty.” Russia holds a clear advantage with 46 icebreakers, Project 22100 Ocean Patrol Vessels, and its new ice-capable Project 23550 ships. These vessels offer Russia a massive Arctic advantage enabling superior presence and mobility. NATO should focus on building additional vessels like Canada’s Harry DeWolf Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships and an updated version of Denmark’s Thetis-class frigates. The recently penned collaborative ICE Pact between the United States, Canada, and Finland is a step in the right direction for bolstering their respective industrial bases to build more icebreakers. Additionally, partnerships with non-NATO allies that have icebreakers, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, could support NATO operations in the Arctic if needed in a crisis. For current gaps in Arctic coverage, NATO needs more anti-access and area denial capabilities to pose a credible threat to Russian operations. NATO needs to embark on a sustained investment campaign to bolster its Arctic deterrence capabilities both on land and at sea in the Arctic.
Minimal Arctic Capabilities
The United States needs NATO for Arctic stability, due to struggles in committing tangible resources to the Arctic besides more hollow strategies. Increasing Arctic-specific training, expanding icebreaking capabilities, and enhancing interoperability with Canada, the Nordics, and Arctic-minded countries (such as the United Kingdom) are essential steps for projecting force in the Arctic. Training exercises like Arctic Edge and the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center Rotation 24-02 demonstrate progress but should be scaled up to counter the threat posed by the growing Sino-Russian alliance. The United States also maintains critical Arctic installations — including Pituffik Space Base in Greenland, which serves as a critical hub for missile defense and satellite communications — but more Arctic bases are needed to effectively compete in the region. Similarly, the U.S. Army established the 11th Airborne Division “Arctic Angels” in 2022 at Anchorage, Alaska, with 11,000 soldiers focused on extreme cold weather operations. However, it is problematic that this unit maintains “readiness for global deployments … [and] for large-scale combat operations” when it should be wholly focused on polar warfare. Worse, the unit struggles with numerous internal morale issues.
The United States ought to go further in building its Arctic capabilities, by ramping up its Arctic-specific training programs and investing in research and development aimed at enhancing cold-weather operational capabilities. This includes expanding its fleet of icebreakers, which is currently insufficient to conduct the necessary peacetime missions, let alone support a potential conflict in the region. However, these initiatives are unlikely due to the Arctic being a low priority under current global force management postures. Ruthless defense prioritization means the Arctic will likely continue to be neglected, despite growing risks. Thus, the United States should foster greater cooperation with its NATO Arctic allies, particularly Canada and the Nordics, to ensure a coordinated and effective response to any potential crisis in the region. Undergirding that should be civil society engagement with indigenous populations around the Arctic Circle in a mutually beneficial way to ensure their security and to partner with them to increase Arctic domain awareness.
A Combined Joint Expeditionary Force for the Arctic
Canada, the Nordics, and other Arctic-minded allies should lead NATO in Arctic defense as the United States pivots to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. The combined Sino-Russian threat is global, and the United States needs allies to share the burden of defense. The United States and NATO should leverage the expertise of Arctic allies to establish a Nordic-led Arctic-focused Combined Joint Expeditionary Force within NATO, allowing the alliance to establish a dedicated force as a credible deterrent in the Arctic.
Forming a Nordic-led Combined Joint Expeditionary Force for the Arctic would reduce the strain on U.S. forces. NATO lacks an Arctic strategy other than an October 2024 statement about defending “Allied interests in the Arctic.” NATO needs a comprehensive Arctic strategy that leads to investments in infrastructure, training, and equipment to match Russian power in the Arctic. Without proper resourcing, Russia will keep dominating the Arctic, making it less safe for international trade, freedom of navigation, and rule of law. Sino-Russian dominance of the Arctic has severe implications for global security and economic stability. Through collective action and improved Arctic-specific readiness, NATO can deter Sino-Russian aggression in the Arctic while supporting a U.S. shift to the Indo-Pacific.
Become a Member
Ryan R. Duffy is a retired U.S. Army infantry officer who served primarily in Europe. He served in light, Stryker, and armored formations. His most recent assignment was at U.S. Army Europe and Africa where he has worked on campaign and contingency planning.
Jahara ‘FRANKY’ Matisek, Ph.D., is an active-duty U.S. Air Force command pilot serving as a military professor at the U.S. Naval War College and is a fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy and the European Resilience Initiative Center. He has over 3,700 hours of flight time and was previously an associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies department at the U.S. Air Force Academy.
Jeremy M. McKenzie is a retired U.S. Coast Guard officer and aviator. His last military assignment was as a researcher at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy’s Center for Arctic Study and Policy. He previously served as an Army aviator and has a Masters in public policy from Brown University as well as a Masters in social science from Syracuse University.
Chad M. Pillai is a senior U.S. Army strategist who has served in a variety of assignments in the U.S., Europe, Middle East, and Asia. He is an editor for the Emergent Defense Magazine and a member of the Military Writers Guild. He earned his Masters in international public policy from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. This article was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-20-1-0277.
Image: Corporal Ben Beale via Wikimedia Commons
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Ryan R. Duffy · November 21, 2024
17. Review of Conflict Realism (Book review)
Book Reviews| The Latest
Review of Conflict Realism
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/21/review-of-conflict-realism/?mc_cid=a6ab117d4f
by Bill Murray
|
11.21.2024 at 12:01am
Conflict Realism: Understanding the Causal Logic of Modern War and Warfare
By Amos C Fox, Ph.D. Howgate Publishing Limited, 2024. ISBN 978-1912440535. Bibliography. Pp. 1, 230. $29.95.
In Conflict Realism, Dr. Amos Fox presents a thought-provoking and incisive analysis of contemporary military theory, challenging established paradigms and advocating for a return to a grounded, realistic approach to understanding warfare. Through eight meticulously argued chapters, Fox dissects prevailing military doctrines and offers a fresh perspective that is both critical and pragmatic. His analysis strips away the fantasies of futuristic warfare often touted by techno-optimists and reaffirms that war remains an inherently human endeavor—fraught with uncertainty, risk, and consequences.
At a time when the conversation around military strategy is increasingly dominated by technological innovation and the prospect of an almost bloodless, surgical form of warfare, Fox’s Conflict Realism offers a vital corrective. If you’re looking for a book that will tell you some emerging technology is poised to replace sound strategy, or that conventional wars and battles are becoming obsolete, Conflict Realism is not for you. Instead, Fox urges readers to return to the fundamentals of military theory and to recognize the enduring nature of war and warfare—where state and non-state actors alike operate in a coherent, self-interested, and value-seeking manner. As he aptly puts it, “Thinking about the future of war must see beyond situational fads, fake novelty, and military myths.” In this review, we will explore the depth and nuance of Dr. Fox’s arguments, discuss the themes that run through each chapter, and reflect on why this book is an essential read for military professionals and scholars alike.
In Chapter 1, he identifies four schools of thought that dominate modern military discussions: the institutionalist, the futurist, the traditionalist, and the realist. By categorizing these perspectives, Fox gives readers a useful framework for understanding how different schools shape military strategy and decision-making. The institutionalists often rely on rigid structures and established norms, while futurists focus on emerging technologies and the idea that future warfare will look radically different from past conflicts. Traditionalists, on the other hand, are more grounded in history but sometimes fail to account for present and future developments. Fox is quick to advocate for the superiority of the practical realist approach. Realism, he argues, recognizes the messy, unpredictable nature of conflict and the need for military strategies that are flexible and adaptable. Rather than being swayed by the allure of technology or institutional dogma, the realist emphasizes practical solutions and hard truths—something often missing in the more idealistic or overly optimistic perspectives of other schools.
Fox is quick to advocate for the superiority of the practical realist approach. Realism, he argues, recognizes the messy, unpredictable nature of conflict and the need for military strategies that are flexible and adaptable.
The Hard Power versus Soft Power Debate
In Chapter 2, Fox pivots to a critique of the current over-reliance on soft power in military thinking. He argues that while diplomacy, economics, and influence are critical components of a state’s power, they often falter when faced with the realities of violent conflict. Fox is not dismissive of soft power’s potential, but he cautions that it should not be mistaken for a substitute for hard military power. Conflict realism, he explains, is a theory that recognizes that war, at its core, is violent and requires brute force. Fox challenges the assumption that conflicts can be won through minimal force or by avoiding combat altogether, pointing to recent historical examples where soft power strategies failed to achieve decisive outcomes. He underscores the dangers of underestimating adversaries who rely on force and violence as their primary means of advancing their objectives. For Fox, successful military strategy must integrate hard power in a way that acknowledges the grim reality of warfare.
Paradoxes of Modern Military Thought
Perhaps the most intellectually stimulating section of the book comes in Chapter 3, where Fox outlines five paradoxes that plague modern Western militaries. These paradoxes, which reflect deep-seated tensions between theory and practice, are essential to understanding why many military strategies fail. Fox questions long-standing assumptions about the primacy of command and control, the utility of small and dispersed forces, and the possibility of achieving battlefield transparency. He also critiques the notion that militaries can dictate the terms of how conflicts are fought, as well as the belief in the effectiveness of defeat mechanisms that aim to demoralize and destabilize the enemy. Fox’s analysis of these paradoxes is sharp and unflinching. He calls out the disconnect between the neat, academic models of warfare and the chaotic, unpredictable nature of real-world conflicts. In doing so, Fox pushes readers to question the very foundations of contemporary military theory and to reconsider how Western militaries should approach future conflicts.
The Overlooked Realities of Warfare
In Chapters 4 through 7, Fox turns his attention to several overlooked or misunderstood aspects of warfare. He begins by examining the dual nature of wars: they are not only fought between opposing forces but are also deeply influenced by the internal dynamics of the actors involved. Fox explains how the friction within a military organization, the political pressures on leadership, and the ever-present reality of resource constraints can shape the course of a conflict. One of Fox’s most striking contributions is his discussion of urban warfare, siege tactics, and attrition warfare—forms of conflict often dismissed in modern military thought. He stresses that these methods remain relevant and can be decisive in prolonged engagements. In particular, Fox challenges the over-emphasis on maneuver warfare, pointing out that while it is valuable, it is not the silver bullet many strategists believe it to be. His analysis of attrition warfare is especially relevant in light of recent conflicts, such as the ongoing war in Ukraine. Fox notes that attrition remains a powerful force in warfare, as it wears down the enemy over time, a lesson that modern militaries have sometimes been slow to learn.
Precision Strikes and the Illusion of Progress
The book concludes with a critical assessment of precision strike strategies. In Chapter 8, Fox argues that while precision strikes offer a degree of efficiency, they can also create a dangerous illusion of progress. Militaries, lulled by the ability to strike targets with pinpoint accuracy, may become overconfident, believing they are achieving more than they actually are. Fox emphasizes that precision strikes are not a substitute for the broader, more complex work of military strategy and cannot by themselves deliver victory.
Conflict Realism is an essential read for anyone serious about military strategy. Dr. Amos Fox’s direct writing style, combined with his deep understanding of military history and theory, makes the book a refreshing counterpoint to the trend of futurism in military thought. He challenges readers to confront uncomfortable truths about warfare, urging them to embrace a more realistic, practical approach. In an era when technology often overshadows the gritty realities of combat, Fox’s work is a much-needed reminder that war remains as brutal, unpredictable, and fundamentally human as ever. You can confidently place Conflict Realism next to your Liddle Hart, Robert Leonhard, and DuPuy collection, but far away from the futurist section of your library.
Tags: Attrition Warfare, Conflict Realism, Hard Power, Maneuver Warfare, Military strategy, Siege Tactics, soft power, SWJ Book Review, Urban Warfare
About The Author
18. The Katanga Secession, the Five Factors Model, and Counterinsurgency (COIN) Theory
I think this is some little studied history (except that we all watched the WIld Geese which was kind of about the Congo).
This is an interesting analysis of the conflict using the The SOIC Five Factors Model.
I am reminded of the saying, I don't care if it works in practice, I want it to work in theory (note sarcasm).
Conclusion:
The Five Factors Model failed to predict Katangan defeat during the Congo Crisis of 1960 due to lack of examination of certain characteristics. The Model did not explore the extent of foreign involvement nor the weakness of Katangese national identity. These two factors directly caused Katangan insurgent defeat despite the Model guaranteeing a rebel victory. However, the argument presented here is not suggesting the Five Factors Model is deeply flawed. Rather, this case proves that the theory is not as reliable as the Model’s figures suggest, lending credibility to the old saying about exceptions to every rule. The Katangan Secession represents a strong outlier in the 53 cases examined by the Study of Internal Conflict, but it should not be omitted from future study. I believe this case shows a unique path to government victory that straddles the line between conventional COIN ideas and the simplified predeterminate nature of the Five Factors Model. The rare circumstances of this insurgency are important lessons that need to be better understood by all COIN analysts.
Essay| The Latest
The Katanga Secession, the Five Factors Model, and Counterinsurgency (COIN) Theory
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/21/the-katanga-secession-counterinsurgency-coin-theory/
by John Miller
|
11.21.2024 at 06:01am
Introduction
In 1960, only days after being granted independence from Belgium, the Republic of the Congo, now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, collapsed into civil war. The ensuing series of insurgencies is known as the Congo Crisis and ravaged the country until 1965. The first and largest rebel movement was a secessionist attempt by the rich southern province, Katanga.
The US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute began the Study of Internal Conflict (SOIC) project as an investigation into why governments are defeated in internal conflicts. According to “COIN Doctrine is Wrong,” 40 military, geographic, economic, and political factors were identified in 53 different conflicts (including the Katanga Secession) that occurred post-1945. The project revealed that five factors were present in at least 90% of all cases where government forces were defeated by insurgencies. The study’s findings are a remarkable pivot in counterinsurgency theory, as they turn away from the commonly held beliefs that tactics like “clear, hold, build” and “nation building” are key to counterinsurgency. The SOIC model argues that the result of an internal conflict is effectively predetermined by the presence of five factors at the onset of the conflict. The Five Factors are:
- 85% of the country must share a national identity.
- 85% of the population must perceive the government as legitimate.
- The government must achieve or maintain security control over roughly 85% of the country’s overall population.
- The rebel movement must have persistent access to external sanctuary in a neighboring country to a militarily significant degree.
- There was a government army or armed constabulary force in existence at the start of the conflict.
The purpose of this paper is to determine why the SOIC’s Five Factors Model failed to predict the outcome of the Katanga Secessionist conflict of 1960-1963. The research shows that although the Katangese forces achieved the first four factors, which should predict government defeat to a probability of 100%, the Congolese government was victorious, defying the model. I believe that the Five Factors Model failed to predict government defeat due to its narrow scope which prevents deeper investigation into the role of foreign support and the strength of Katangan national identity.
Background
Roots of the Conflict
Although strains of the conflict can be traced hundreds of years back to the tribal history of the region, the primary catalysts were colonial. Belgian colonization began with the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. Unlike other African colonies, however, the new Congo Free State was not administered by the Belgian government, but rather it was personally managed by King Leopold II, who was enticed by the region’s rich natural resources. Following international backlash against the Belgian treatment of workers in the rubber industry, the control of the Congo Free State was turned over to the Belgian government in 1908. Shortly before the Belgian government replaced King Leopold II, a group of international investors formed the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) in 1906. UMHK represented Belgian and British mining interests and maintained significant political and commercial influence over the region through the colonial and secessionist periods.
The push for decolonization began in the mid-1950s when newly legalized regional ethnic movements began gaining momentum. The largest Katangan group was the Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT). It was formed in 1958 to attract members across different tribes by unification through a common Katangese identity. Another rival Katangese association also emerged at this time, the Association Générale des Baluba du Katanga (BALUBAKAT). Conversely, BALUBAKAT membership was chiefly tribal, leading to pre-independence skirmishes.
In the early summer of 1960, a new government was elected, including a president and a prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. On June 30, 1960, the Republic of the Congo officially gained independence. Due to the lack of preparation for separation from Belgium, internal conflict began immediately, with a mutiny by the Congolese National Army (ANC). On July 5th, enlisted black soldiers revolted against their white officers. Reports soon surfaced of atrocities being perpetrated against white colonists.
Without consulting the Congolese government, Belgian troops invaded to restore order. Outraged, Leopoldville appealed to the United Nations to force the Belgian troops to withdraw and for a peacekeeping force to replace the Belgians. The UN agreed and authorized the creation of an intervention force, the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, while simultaneously demanding the withdrawal of Belgian troops. However, two days prior, the country began to fracture, and on July 11th the providence of Katanga announced they would secede. Less than a month later, the neighboring South Kasai province followed.
The Katangese Secessionist Movement and the Gendarmes
The Katanga Secessionist Movement was led by Moïse Tshombe. A businessman turned politician in the 1950s, he was elected president of CONAKAT in 1959, gaining control of Katanga’s parliament. CONAKAT controlled southern Katanga, while its rival, BALUBAKAT, controlled the north. Ethnic and social differences between these two groups showed through internal conflicts over federal versus regional governance and industrial versus agrarian identities. CONAKAT was supported by Tshombe’s tribe, and, more importantly, UHMK.
As soon as Tshombe announced his intention for an independent Katangese government based in Elizabethville, he gained the support of several foreign governments and corporations. At the start of the conflict, the UN banned direct support of the insurgent forces in the Congo. Despite this, the British, French, US, and Belgian governments covertly supported Tshombe . However, no nation would ever officially recognize Katanga, not even Costa Rica, which was bribed $1 million by members of Katanga’s strong foreign delegation network to do so.
Alongside UMHK, many other European and American companies were active in Katanga, and several maintained large holdings in the mining industry. Corporate fears revolved around nationalization, especially after the Suez Crisis of 1956. Support from business was more than just financial, however. For example, British businessmen supplied Tshombe with arms and worked to prevent British munitions from being used by UN peacekeeping forces. Covert European support aligned with the anxieties of both European settlers and expatriates, as well as commercial interests. But as overt support was illegal, a tendency to use tribal dynamics to shield European aims emerged.
Despite these subtleties, in the years following the conflict, analysis has heavily focused on European influence and actors as drivers of secessionist attitudes. Work has recently been conducted, however, to illuminate the agency of black political leaders and the role of Katangese national identity in the conflict. Native Katangan leaders, for example, were able to mobilize local European interests and military assets to create the secessionist state’s administration and military institutions. Later, as Belgian support waned, a network of Katangese diplomats was able to recoup the support via France, the UK, and the US, albeit only commercially.
Katanga’s military forces, called the Katangese Gendarmerie, were officially christened in November of 1960. Despite initial plans for 1,500 men, they were able to raise around 7,000. Early members came from the ANC, who were loyal to Katanga. In the first year of the war, the Gendarmes were led by a Belgian officer corps, and during this time, the force heavily resembled a colonial army due to the racial makeup and experience of commanders. After the UN had recalled the Belgian officer corps by August 1961, they were replaced by white mercenaries. The new mercenary ranks included pro-colonial soldiers from South Africa and Rhodesia, French veterans from the Algerian War and First Indochina War, former Italian fascists, and German SS soldiers. Although ideology did serve as a motivator in some cases, the main attraction was financial. Mercenary fees were reportedly paid by UMHK. At its strongest, the Gendarmerie was estimated to be composed of up to 17,000 soldiers. In addition to this surprising mix of soldiers, the Gendarmerie remains notable as one of the only insurgencies with an air force.
Open War in Katanga
The UN sent 8,400 troops to the Congo in July 1960 in what would be the organization’s second peacekeeping deployment. Expecting minimal resistance, they found instead an adversary unlike any other in the institution’s short history. Troops from India, Sweden, and Ireland faced a force of indigenous soldiers, some in warpaint, led by European mercenaries and supported by fighter jets.
The United States supported UN intervention from the beginning, primarily due to fears of a communist takeover in the fledgling country. Initially, the Eisenhower Administration was hopeful that the new government would be pro-Western. But as the weeks following the UN declaration unfolded, it appeared that Prime Minister Lumumba was becoming increasingly friendly with the Soviet Union, stoking fears that a communist overthrow was imminent. Chaos ensued, and in September 1960, a military coup, orchestrated by General Joseph Mobutu, and supported by the US, toppled the new government and pushed the Soviets out of the country. Shortly thereafter, Mobutu had Lumumba assassinated.
By the autumn of 1960, the BALUBAKAT organization had built up its own militia and seized land in response to the growing militarism of CONAKAT. Tshombe understood that BALUAKAT represented a significant obstacle to Katangese independence and as such, retaking that territory became the first military objective. These are considered the first shots of the Katanga Secession and by early 1961, southern forces were able to retake nearly all territory lost to BALUAKAT.
American fears of further Soviet interference arose when the eastern province of Congo-Stanleyville announced secession in early 1961. Led by President Antoine Gizenga, the new state intended to maintain Lumumba’s pro-Soviet leanings. Strategically, the Kennedy Administration saw a united Congo as the best defense against communism despite the enormous challenge of defeating the various insurgencies. In response, the US sought to build up UN forces.
Once all of Katanga was under the control of Tshombe, the conflict evolved into a conventional civil war as pro-Congolese forces tried to reclaim the breakaway province. Negotiations between leaders of the two sides were common but often ineffective. In February of 1961, the stakes rose when the UN Security Council allowed the use of force to subdue the secessionists and expel the remaining Belgian soldiers. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the UN, led these early attempts to pacify Katanga. Hammarskjold wanted to limit the UN’s involvement in the conflict, as many saw the Katanga Secession as an internal matter.
UN forces were able to push deep into Katanga and entered the capital, Elizabethville, in 1961. Believing capturing the city meant the war was over, the UN announced a cease-fire. However, Tshombe had fled to Rhodesia without agreeing to UN demands, and Western backers were angered at the UN for taking such drastic steps outside of their specified mission. A second UN setback occurred in September 1961 when Hammarskjold died in a plane crash – a claim that many attributed to his plane being shot down.. Ultimately, his untimely demise opened the door to a larger UN presence, spearheaded by his replacement, U Thant.
Thant’s revised UN force would contain 20,000 peacekeepers that he believed necessary to effectively destroy the independence movement. From this point on, the UN campaign became increasingly aggressive, seeking to destroy all military forces not under UN or Congolese control. By December, the Katangese Air Force had been neutralized and Tshombe had signed an agreement stating Katanga would accept the rule of the Congolese government. Tshombe delayed reintegration, however, and as a result, the conflict continued for another year.
Despite losing Belgian military advisors throughout 1961, the Katangese Gendarmes did not collapse as many analysts believed. Instead, they maintained discipline and effectiveness in countering UN attacks. Many claimed this was due to the immediate hire of white mercenaries, but contrary to this common belief, these mercenaries had little day-to-day command over indigenous forces, and many groups of mercenaries operated autonomously. Thus, the continued success of the Gendarmes was largely due to the skill of their new black officer corps.
As 1961 flowed into 1962, UN forces maintained control of Elizabethville, turning northern Katanga into the final stronghold of the insurgents. Negotiations for reintegration continued as UN peacekeepers steadily chipped away at Gendarme territory. By May, CIA concerns over the fate of the Gendarmes after a seemingly inevitable Katangese defeat became the US’ top foreign policy priority. Fears that the group would resort to a guerilla campaign pushed the US to call for retraining and reorganization of the force once the conflict ended, as a non-hostile Gendarmerie was considered paramount for future stability.
Katangan Defeat and Post-Conflict Upheaval
By mid-1962, CONAKAT’s days were numbered: the Gizenga government had surrendered, South Kasai had been defeated, and Belgium had completely abandoned them. Now siding with the US, both countries pushed forcefully for a quick, negotiated end to the conflict. UN military pressure intensified through the Autumn, and by late December, nearly all Katangese forces had surrendered or fled. The remaining political and military leaders officially surrendered on January 14, 1963, ending the Katanga Secessionist Movement.
Immediately following the surrender, Tshombe fled to Europe, and thousands of Gendarmes escaped to Rhodesia and Angola. The UN mission formally ended in June 1964, just as new rebellions were springing up around the country. Faced with continued insurrection, the Congolese government turned to Moïse Tshombe to stabilize the country. In July 1964, he became prime minster of the Republic of the Congo. His return also brought previously exiled Gendarmes and mercenaries back from abroad who fought alongside ANC forces, Belgian paratroopers, and the US Air Force to pacify the country by November 1964.
The Congo Crisis ended with General Mobutu organizing a second coup in November 1965, ousting Tshombe again with US backing. Mobutu would hold power until 1997. Tshombe fled and would spend the next four years plotting to retake Katanga before his death in 1969.
Assessing the Five Factors
The SOIC Five Factors Model, as explained in “COIN Doctrine is Wrong”, represents a sharp shift in COIN discussion. The theory rejects previous fundamental beliefs like “nation building” and “winning hearts and minds” that were developed and reinforced based on American experiences in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Instead, the model depicts a highly simplified formula that looks at five factors present at the beginning of a conflict. While these factors may evolve over the course of the struggle, only their state at the onset is considered by the model. The first three factors are numerical, revolving around a limit of 85%, and the second two binary variables are commonly examined by COIN analysts. The Five Factors are:
- 85% of the country must share a national identity. (F1)
- 85% of the population must perceive the government as legitimate. (F2)
- The government must achieve or maintain security control over roughly 85% of the country’s overall population. (F3)
- The rebel movement must have persistent access to external sanctuary in a neighboring country to a militarily significant degree. (F4)
- There was a government army or armed constabulary force in existence at the start of the conflict. (F5)
According to the study, the loss of each factor to rebel control indicates a significant reduction to the likelihood of government victory. If F1 is lost, then government defeat is 96% likely. If F2 is lost, then defeat is 94%. F3 is 94%, as well and F4 and F5 are both 100%. Since the Katanga Secession case pushes the first four factors to the benefit of the rebels, government defeat is guaranteed – per the Five Factors Model.
F1: Does at least 85% of the country share a national identity?
“No.” The Republic of the Congo, as an entity, was completely artificial. King Leopold II drew the boundaries of the region irrespective of tribal, ethnic, and geographic lines. There was no real sense of Congolese nationalism as it would be interpreted by European eyes. Answering F1 is possible by looking at population figures and the total of the Congolese population that was Katangese equated to about 13%. However, since national identity was not shared across the rest of the country, the population living under the concurrent South Kasai rebellion movement must also be considered, due to Congolese and UN forces engaging both simultaneously. With a population of around 1.2 million, it constituted about 9% of the country’s population. Based on this evidence, in the summer of 1960 the two rebellions indicated that approximately 22% of the country’s population was living under two separatist governments. Therefore, 85% of the Republic of the Congo did not share a national identity, making F1 a rebel advantage
F2: Was the government perceived as legitimate by at least 85% of the population?
“No.” Due to the quantitative nature of F2 and the fact that it cannot increase, per the Five Factors Model, the best way to investigate this question is through population statistics. Like F1, the combination of the parallel Katangan and South Kasai, show that during this time, approximately 22% of the country’s population was living under the two different rebellious governments, indicating maximum perceived government legitimacy of only 78% of Congolese citizens. Therefore, 85% of the Congolese people did not view the government as legitimate during the Katanga Secession. The advantage goes to the rebels.
F3: Did the government achieve or maintain security control over roughly 85% of the country’s overall population?
“No.” The Katangese Gendarmes operated entirely inside of Katanga, and there was little to no popular support for the secessionist movement outside of the province. Inside of Katanga, the insurgent forces moved freely. Just like F1 and F2, the combination of the Katangan and South Kasai secessions shows that the Congolese government did not maintain security control over the minimum 85% of the Congolese people at the onset of the conflict. After the crisis began, both the Katangan and South Kasai movements maintained strong security control over their respective populations after declaring independence in near unison. Thus, the central government would have had control over only 78% of Congolese citizens indicating that the advantage was held by the insurgents.
F4: Did the rebel movement have persistent access to external sanctuary in a neighboring country to a militarily significant degree?
“Yes.” Throughout the conflict, the borders of Katanga were especially porous. Cross-border flight was most notably used by successionist leaders when they needed to flee into Rhodesia, as Tshombe did in 1961. Two years later, he escaped to Europe, and the ex-Gendarmes fled to Angola. Based on this historical evidence, we can conclude that the Katangese Gendarmes and top leadership did have access to external sanctuary throughout the conflict. However, even though an external sanctuary was available to rebel forces, it was not used to a military significant degree. Therefore, even though F4 is answered “Yes” as a benefit to the rebels, the fact that it was not used, negates any advantage that may have been ascertained. In the nomenclature of the SOIC model, the mere possibility of external sanctuary makes F4 a rebel benefit. However, even if this factor was answered “No”, it would not change the model’s prediction. Three pro-rebel factors still indicate overwhelming odds of a rebel victory.
F5: Was there a government army or armed constabulary force in existence at the start of the conflict?
“Yes.” The first domestic Congolese force was the Force Publique, established in 1885 as a military and police force. The Force Publique remained under control of King Leopold II until the Belgian government took over the colony in 1908. During the colonial period, their ranks were made up of both local and foreign Africans, but the officer corps was entirely white. After the Republic of the Congo gained independence in 1960, they were renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise. While mutiny is a clear indicator of incompetence in any military, command was quickly restored, and the ANC was deployed against the various insurgent factions. The advantage of F5 goes to the government, due to the clear establishment of the force many years prior to the start of the war.
Why the Model Failed: Foreign Intervention
The Five Factors Model failed to predict the outcome of the Katanga Secessionist Movement due to the limited scope of the factors, which, most crucially, does not include examination of foreign support. Foreign involvement in an internal conflict is not unique to Katanga. Since WWII, nearly 66% of all rebel groups have enjoyed some form of foreign support. But the difference in this conflict is the extent that both the rebel and the national governments were supported, manipulated and handpicked. Looking back to the colonial era, the history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is closely intertwined with that of two foreign nations.
The first was Belgium: King Leopold II brutally abused the Congolese people for financial gain. And while conditions improved under Belgian government control, it was hardly a free and fair society. Great Britian also had a hand in the suppression, as British individuals were heavily involved in UHMK. Even though the Belgians did grant increasing freedoms to the Congolese as the decades wore on, I believe it is fair to say that, had European colonial empires not collapsed after WWII, Belgium would have worked hard to keep its gold mine of a colony much longer than 1960. But that’s not what happened; the Republic of the Congo gained independence and collapsed into chaos due to the lack of preparation by the Belgians and Congolese leaders, which allowed Belgium to invade only days later.
Once the Congo Crisis exploded, the UN and the US both supported the central government, but the latter also lent covert assistance to Katanga. The Soviet Union supported Lumumba, and later Congo-Stanleyville. South Kasai was supported by the Belgians, Rhodesians, French and South Africans. White mercenaries, fighting on behalf of Katanga, came from all over Europe and the white-ruled countries of Rhodesia and South Africa. Support rose and fell throughout the course of the conflict, and after, defeated fighters found haven in Angola, Rhodesia and Rwanda. At no point was this conflict-free from foreign involvement. Shifting loyalties meant these actors propped up a failing Congolese government, sent troops to destroy breakaway movements, and gave financial and material support that was unobtainable otherwise. In a sense, foreign support of both sides completely shaped each’s warfighting ability. Without it, both the government and rebel forces would be unrecognizable. Thus, any analysis of this conflict must focus heavily on the role of foreign support.
Why the Model Failed: A Weak National Identity
Foreign involvement was the single largest, although not only, determinate factor of the Katanga Secession. The lesser, secondary factor was the hollowness of Katangese nationalism which was undermined by three factors. In the years following independence from colonial rule, many African national identities were largely created by white settlers to serve colonial agendas, and the Republic of the Congo was one of the most extreme examples. Just as the concept of a “nation-state” was alien, so too was “national identity.” This presented both a challenge and an opportunity to the forces in the Congo. Some sought to unite the country as it had never been before, and others saw the opportunity to divide it for opportunistic reasons. Nonetheless, national identity was frail across the country and Katanga was no exception. It was pushed in a top-down manner, rather than swelling up from the population. This distinction meant there was no stable base from which to build an insurgency. To be clear, CONAKAT did lay the groundwork for a Katangese identity, as did others, like the American Methodist Episcopal Church. But the CONAKAT-turned-Katangan secessionist identity was not adopted by the majority, and significant parts of the province pushed back against it. This is evidenced by early fighting with BALUBAKAT and the Tshombe’s narrow win in the 1959 elections. After independence was declared, this new national identity, with strong independence and anti-communist strains, was forced on the people, chiefly through propaganda. Local newspapers and international outlets pushed lines that promoted Katanga’s “special character” and “uniqueness”. Furthermore, while critics decried the close relationship between secessionist leaders and foreign companies, a significant portion of Katangese mythic history had evolved to deal with this. Historical accounts of tribal international trade were used to show that the presence of foreign companies was no different than in the golden days of the old tribal empires. Ultimately, Tshombe’s branding did not take hold. This is perfectly illustrated when ex-Gendarmes were turned away from their homes post secession. If these fighters were truly nationalist heroes, would they not have been embraced as martyrs and champions of a lost cause?
While the conflict was much shorter than many other insurgencies, it owes what endurance it had to the tactical effectiveness of the Gendarmes and to Tshombe, who drew out peace negotiations significantly. The first talks began early on and continued throughout the war. At the time, many thought these early negotiations would lead to some sort of power sharing agreement, where Katangan leaders would have a larger role in the Leopoldville government. The fact that Tshombe and other secessionists were willing to come to the table early in the conflict shows their own perceptions of the fragility of a unifying identity and futility of the cause. I believe that these men knew their position was hopeless in the face of mounting international pressure and decreasing Belgian support. They likely believed that drawing out the conflict would give them a better position from which to bargain for a soft landing, a tactic seen today in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
The third factor that perfectly illuminated the lack of Katangan belief in an independence based national identity was the lack of popular mobilization for the cause after Tshombe was elected Prime Minister in 1964. During Tshombe’s short tenure, the Leopoldville government was weak. UN forces had left the country, and several new rebellions had sprung up. The trained and loyal ex-Gendarmes had reentered the country. Many former secessionist leaders still held political office, and the choice of the Leopoldville government to appoint a former rebel leader to prime minister only projected weakness. Conditions seemed perfect- yet nothing happened. Tshombe appeared to have turned his back on the Katangan cause and instead successfully preserved the territorial integrity of the country, even if he did rely on foreign support. While Katangan identity had been championed by elites during the conflict, defeat in 1963 erased it from nearly all but those who went into exile abroad. Even though Tshombe supported ex-Gendarmes prior to returning to the country, his appointment to a legitimate position snuffed out the last real essence of any Katangan independence based on national identity. Following his ousting in 1965, he planned to reignite the rebellion, but never got the chance.
A Free Katanga?
I believe that had no Europeans, Americans, or international government organizations intervened, the Republic of the Congo may have split into three separate states. The central Congolese government did not have the strength, cohesion, nor popular support to defeat the rebels of Katanga, let alone the three concurrent movements in Katanga, South Kasai and Congo-Stanleyville. Based on Congolese military success against South Kasai, and its geographical position between the area under Leopoldville control and Katanga, I believe South Kasai could have been retaken by the ANC, as happened. However, as in reality, the conquest would have been very costly to the Congo and would have delayed and perhaps prevented further incursions into Katanga. Katanga was always able to field high numbers of Gendarmes and even without a Belgian officer corps, success would have been possible. After all, they only needed to fight a defensive war and there was always the possibility that South Kasai would have become a buffer zone, again like the factual conflict. I do not believe this hypothetical version of the Katanga Secession war would have lasted long and would have ended in late 1961. This was when UN forces sharply increased their offensive operations and pushed the Gendarmes onto their heels. Without UN support however, the Congolese campaign would have collapsed, and Katanga would have achieved independence.
That being said, I do agree with the opinion given by the US Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball in 1961 about the possible future of an independent Katanga. Ball describes a future where Katanga becomes a petrostate, exporting its natural resources under some sort of quasi-colonial commercial system. The combination of a white commercial elite class with their ties to Tshombe and CONAKAT and the enormous influence of foreign companies would have fortified the natural resource-based economy. Tshombe could have remained in power and preserved the country’s parliamentary democracy, albeit with commercial interests at its heart. It is also possible that Katanga could have become a part of the Central African Federation, as was discussed in 1960. Some experts believe this should have been a more attractive option for Tshombe, as Katanga was more closely linked to regions in southern Africa through industry and rail networks than it was to Leopoldville. As the years wore on, I find it likely that any quasi-colonial system would have faded with the inevitable withdrawal of European nations from Africa and this hypothetical Katanga would become similar to a typical modern petrostate, like an African United Arab Emirates or Bahrain. This would be in an economic sense, not a political sense; however, it is almost certain that a majority of political power and revenue would have remained in the hands of elites.
A counter-factual future for an independent Congo-Stanleyville is not as clear. Based on the way in which the province was defeated, I believe the government was weak, and control was vested entirely with Antoine Gizenga himself. However, if Congo-Stanleyville had succeeded in achieving independence, I believe it would have become a Soviet client state. During the Cold War, states like Cuba, Nicaragua and Syria were dependent on the USSR for goods and services, and in return these countries prevented the USSR from having to get involved in affairs of the Global South and supported them on the world stage. Due to the feebleness of Congo-Stanleyville, they would have taken all that the Soviets could offer, including military aid, doctors, technicians and teachers. And in return, they would have shielded the USSR from having to be involved in central Africa.
Conclusion
The Five Factors Model failed to predict Katangan defeat during the Congo Crisis of 1960 due to lack of examination of certain characteristics. The Model did not explore the extent of foreign involvement nor the weakness of Katangese national identity. These two factors directly caused Katangan insurgent defeat despite the Model guaranteeing a rebel victory. However, the argument presented here is not suggesting the Five Factors Model is deeply flawed. Rather, this case proves that the theory is not as reliable as the Model’s figures suggest, lending credibility to the old saying about exceptions to every rule. The Katangan Secession represents a strong outlier in the 53 cases examined by the Study of Internal Conflict, but it should not be omitted from future study. I believe this case shows a unique path to government victory that straddles the line between conventional COIN ideas and the simplified predeterminate nature of the Five Factors Model. The rare circumstances of this insurgency are important lessons that need to be better understood by all COIN analysts.
Tags: civil war, COIN, counterinsurgency, insurgency
About The Author
- John Miller
- John Miller is a current student at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies. He is pursuing a M.A. in International Security and with a focus on Homeland Security. His research interests include counterinsurgency, counterterror and special operations forces.
19. 'Russia only wins if the West quits' — Gen. Ben Hodges
Interview at the link: https://kyivindependent.com/russia-only-wins-if-the-west-quits-gen-ben-hodges/?utm
'Russia only wins if the West quits' — Gen. Ben Hodges
kyivindependent.com · by Chris York · November 20, 2024
The first reports of Ukraine striking deep inside Russia with U.S.-supplied ATACMS emerged on Nov. 19, marking a long-awaited shift in White House policy that could bolster Ukraine's defense against a 50,000-strong joint Russian-North Korean force assembled against them.
President Joe Biden's decision to finally grant Kyiv permission to use ATACMS is likely one of the last significant contributions to the war in Ukraine before Donald Trump takes up residence in the White House on Jan. 20.
With election promises of ending the war in "24 hours," and cabinet appointments marked equally by inexperience and disdain for the fate of Ukraine, a Trump-led U.S. will have a profoundly different stance towards Kyiv than the previous administration.
A few hours before reports of the strikes in Bryansk Oblast, the Kyiv Independent sat down with retired U.S. General Ben Hodges for his take on ATACMS, the prospect of peace negotiations, and how he feels personally about Ukraine's future.
Editor's note: This is a transcript of the video interview that has been edited for clarity and brevity.
The Kyiv Independent: This week, we heard the news that the Biden administration is going to authorize long-range strikes inside Russia. What do you think is the significance of the timing?
Ben Hodges: I'm not sure why this finally happened. Obviously this is something that should have happened two years ago. I'm glad it did happen, but I'm not sure what finally caused it.
Perhaps it had something to do with North Korea's involvement. I'm not sure. I am still frustrated that it's not a complete lifting of restrictions, that it still applies only to use against Russian and North Korean forces that are attacking the Kursk bridgehead. So it's better than nothing, but it still falls short of what's actually needed.
The Kyiv Independent: A lot of people have pointed out that this probably won't be a game changer, but what will Ukraine be able to do now that it wasn't able to do before?
Ben Hodges: I've never liked the phrase 'game changer' because the only thing that would really be a game changer would be if the Biden administration, and other European governments would say, "we want Ukraine to actually win this war" and then commit to that. New weapons or permissions by themselves are not game changing.
Nonetheless, this is still a positive step. I would anticipate that the Ukrainian General Staff will use these to target Russian headquarters, logistics, and artillery. That's how you defeat mass, and mass is the only advantage that the Russian forces have, the big numbers (of troops).
And if you can destroy the headquarters that are necessary to coordinate their movements and their support, if you can destroy the artillery that enables their attacks, and if you can destroy the logistics that provide the artillery ammunition, then I think you can really degrade the effectiveness of Russian mass attacks.
Members of the unit Dnipro One of the Joint Assault Brigade of the National Police of Ukraine "Luty" operate a Soviet-era howitzer D-30 near Toretsk, Ukraine on Nov. 9, 2024. (Diego Fedele/Getty Images)A Ukrainian serviceman of the 56th Motorized Brigade fires a grenade launcher during training in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine on Oct. 22, 2024. (Yevhenii Vasyliev/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images)
The Kyiv Independent: With the election of Donald Trump, there's a sort of a deadline now. Trump has said he's going to try and stop or freeze the war quickly. Do you think the timing of the decision for ATACMS has that in mind?
Ben Hodges: The Biden administration would certainly have been very conscious of the fact that the inauguration is only two months away, and that possibly influenced the thinking somehow. I'm not sure. But as I reflected on this all day yesterday, this is actually a gift from the Biden administration to the Trump administration, to have this policy in place so the Trump administration can just leave it (in place) or use it as a point of increased leverage against the Russians — or not.
Of course, I don't know what the Trump administration is going to do based on everything they've said during the campaign. I'm not hopeful that they're going to be supportive of Ukraine, but I am hopeful that the leadership of the Republican Party in Congress, both in the Senate and in the House, who are mostly pro-Ukraine, pro-NATO, pro-transatlantic, will be able to convey to the new administration how important it is that the United States to not turn its back on Ukraine. We'll see if they have the ability and the courage to push back against Trump's designs to end the war in 24 hours.
And, of course, these kinds of ridiculous assertions that he can end the war in 24 hours or freeze it somehow assume that Ukraine will just go along with it or that Eastern European countries — who are not confused about the threat that is Russia — that they'll just go along with it. I doubt that's the case because most of them know that they will end up paying the price if this conflict is frozen. None of them believe for a second that (Russian President Vladimir) Putin would ever live up to any agreement.
So I think once the Trump administration is in place, and they're faced with the reality of owning the situation and the implications, then perhaps that will moderate some of the language that comes from the incoming administration.
Ukraine strikes Russia with Storm Shadows for the first time, Bloomberg reports
According to the source, the strikes were approved as a response to the presence of North Korean troops in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, a sign of escalation by Russia.
The Kyiv IndependentBoldizsar Gyori
The Kyiv Independent: And how important is it that Ukraine retains some territory in Kursk Oblast by the time that Trump comes into office? Because if Trump does try to impose a freeze of the front lines, obviously Ukrainian troops on Russian soil greatly complicates things for the Kremlin.
Ben Hodges: This was one of the reasons I have been a supporter of the Ukrainian decision to launch the Kursk counteroffensive because it does create a real problem for the Kremlin. Both in terms of whether or not to commit forces to try and eliminate this bridgehead and in terms of some sort of negotiations coming up.
So, it does create a problem, and I think this was a brilliant move by the Ukrainian General Staff. Now, at the end of the day, the Ukrainian General Staff will have to decide if it is worth it. Are they getting the benefit of this versus the casualties and the costs of hanging onto it? We'll see. They will know much better than I ever will.
But again, Trump cannot impose a freeze on this conflict. There are no American soldiers there. Europe is providing more aid combined than the United States is.
So I think the idea that somehow Trump can impose a freeze or impose a ceasefire, that's just not what's going to happen. He can, of course, demand it. He can, of course, stop all aid.
But I think that people with cooler heads will understand that it's in our interest that Europe remains stable, secure, and prosperous for our own economic reasons. And China is watching to see how we handle this.
The Kyiv Independent: What sort of leverage will Trump have over Putin to try to get him to stop? Obviously, in Donbas, the Russian offensive is still relatively slow, but it's gaining pace. So Putin does have the upper hand there. So what kind of thing can Trump do to try and force Putin into a deal?
Ben Hodges: There are so many things that we have not done yet. We have not imposed all the sanctions that could have been imposed. We have not taken steps to block Russia from exporting oil and gas to China and India, which is what generates the money necessary for Russia to be able to buy ammunition and weapons from Iran and North Korea.
We've done nothing against those things. So there are still economic tools remaining for the incoming administration. And, of course, he could say, 'I'm going to accelerate delivery of ATACMs,' for example, or other capabilities.
So, the incoming president has a lot of leverage to build on what the Biden administration has already done, which has fallen well short of what I think could have been done. So, Trump will have a lot of leverage against Putin. Does he want to use that? That's what remains to be seen.
The Kyiv Independent: You mentioned China just before. What do you think China is hoping to see when Trump takes office?
Ben Hodges: I think the Chinese are waiting to see if the U.S. and our allies have the political will to actually defend these post-war constructs of respect for sovereignty, freedom of navigation, respect for international law, respect for international agreements. If we're not willing to do that in Europe, they may think we're not willing to do that out in the Indo-Pacific region, where, frankly, it will be much more difficult to do — it takes nine days for a U.S. Navy ship to go all the way from Hawaii to Japan, for example.
I think the Chinese are going to be watching that. They'll be watching to see if Trump follows through on the threat to impose these massive tariffs that will have a significant impact.
I think, like everyone, they want to know how much of what was said in the campaign is actually going to happen in reality.
ATACMS, Trump, and the increasing importance of Kursk Oblast for Ukraine
The Russian Defense Ministry claimed on Nov. 19 that Ukraine had launched the U.S.-made ATACMS missiles against Russia’s Bryansk Oblast. Hours prior, Ukraine struck a Russian military facility in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast, a two-hour drive from the Ukrainian-controlled part of Russia. President Joe…
The Kyiv IndependentChris York
The Kyiv Independent: Earlier on, you alluded to the differences in how particularly Eastern European states perceive the Russian threat and how America perceives the Russian threat. How do you think that's going to play out with an increasingly isolationist U.S.? Is Europe going to be able to fill that gap if aid slows or if they reduce support in other ways?
Ben Hodges: Well, they certainly can. The combined economies of the European Union — forget Canada and the U.K. — the combined economies of the European Union are about eight times greater than Russia. So this is about political will.
It's not about economic capacity or industrial capacity. It's about political will. And so what I would hope is that Europe, led by a new German government coming in February, probably led by Friedrich Merz and the CDU, Poland under Donald Tusk, Finland under Alexander Stubb, and Italy under Prime Minister Meloni, that together they could convince the American president 'hey, don't turn your back on Europe.'
We still need an American nuclear deterrent. But we, Europe, can pick up the slack if the U.S. needs to back away from its support for Ukraine. There's a lot of potential in Europe. The question is, do they have the political will?
The Kyiv Independent: And just to finish with, how do you personally feel about the future for Ukraine?
Ben Hodges: I've always believed in the eventual victory of Ukraine, not because I want it to be so, but because I have seen what Ukraine has been able to accomplish over the last 11 years, that they have stopped Russia without consistent, decisive aid from the U.S. or from Europe. I mean, this war started in 2014.
So all the people talking about how today is 1,000 days — that's only 1,000 days since the large-scale invasion. It's been almost 7,000 days since Russia first invaded Ukraine. And after 11 years, almost 7,000 days, Russia still only controls about 20% of Ukraine, and they have suffered devastating losses.
Russian industry is in tatters. And so I think it's clear to me that there's no way Russia can just knock Ukraine out of the war unless we in the West quit. So this sort of resilience and determination by Ukrainian soldiers and people, emergency services, is something that we're all going to be studying and admiring for a very long time.
Introducing official
merch from the Kyiv Independent
kyivindependent.com · by Chris York · November 20, 2024
20. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20, 2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20, 2024
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2024
Ukraine conducted a successful combined strike against military assets in the Russian rear on the night of November 19 to 20 using drones and Western-provided long-range weapons. The Guardian and Bloomberg both reported on November 20, citing anonymous sources, that Ukrainian forces have conducted the first strikes against military targets within Russia using UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles. Geolocated footage published on November 20 shows the aftermath of a likely Storm Shadow strike near Marino, Kursk Oblast. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched up to 12 Storm Shadow missiles at Kursk Oblast, fragments of which struck Marino. The geolocated footage of the strike suggests that the Ukrainian target may have been the Baryatinsky Estate in Marino, which the Ukrainian defense-focused outlet Defense Express suggested was housing a command post for Russian and North Korean troops operating in Kursk Oblast. ISW cannot confirm this claim at this time, but Marino is about 30km from the current Kursk Oblast salient, which would be an appropriate distance for an operational headquarters for troops conducting offensives along the salient.
Ukrainian forces also conducted a large-scale drone strike against the Russian rear on the night of November 19 to 20, particularly targeting military and defense industrial assets in Voronezh, Belgorod, and Novgorod oblasts. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defense systems destroyed or intercepted a total of 44 Ukrainian drones as of the morning of November 20, including 20 over Novgorod Oblast; five over Kursk Oblast; four over Oryol Oblast; three each over Belgorod, Tula, and Tver oblasts; and two each over Bryansk, Moscow, and Smolensk oblasts. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on November 20 that Ukrainian drones struck the 13th Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) arsenal near Kotovo, Novgorod Oblast, at which Russian forces were reportedly storing ammunition for tube artillery; mortar mines; "Grad," "Smerch," and "Uragan" multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS) missiles; Iskander ballistic missiles; S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles; North Korean provided KN-23 ballistic missiles; and Tor surface-to-air system missiles. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a command post of the Russian "Sever" (Nothern) Grouping of Forces in Gubkin, Belgorod Oblast. Ukrainian and Russian sources additionally posted footage of the aftermath of a reported Ukrainian drone strike against the EFKO Factory in Alekseyevka, Belgorod Oblast, which Kovalenko stated produces cargo drones for the Russian military. Russian sources reported that Ukrainian drones also hit an unspecified industrial enterprise in Voronezh Oblast and targeted an oil depot in Sosnovka, Samara Oblast.
The November 19 to 20 strike series indicates that Ukraine has already begun leveraging Western-provided long-range weapons systems to assemble more complex and effective strike packages. Ukrainian forces notably utilized both long-range strike drones and Storm Shadow missiles in the November 19-20 strike and struck a diverse range of military targets across the Russian rear.
ISW has long assessed that the systems and capabilities that Western partners are providing Ukraine, alongside Ukraine's indigenous defense industrial production and innovation efforts, are all constituent components of wider capabilities that Ukraine requires to successfully wage a multi-domain large-scale modern war. Ukraine has already proven itself effective in using often domestically-produced drones to strike a variety of military targets in the Russian rear, including air bases, command headquarters, and artillery depots. Ukraine's arsenal already includes aerial and naval drones and Western-provided systems such as F-16s, HIMARS, and ATACMS, although the conditions of use on the latter systems have been restricted enough to limit the benefit Ukraine can accrue by using them. The addition of more powerful and precise Western-provided systems, such as JASSMs and additional ATACMS, Storm Shadows, and SCALP systems, is crucial in enabling Ukraine to scale up the effects it can generate through long-range strikes against the Russian rear.
Russian forces, in contrast, have been experimenting and diversifying their strike packages to inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian critical infrastructure, conducting frequent strikes with a combination of Iranian-provided or Russian-produced Shahed drones and drone variants, North Korean-provided and domestically produced ballistic and cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and aerial bombs.
Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided weapons to strike within Russian territory have limited Ukrainian capabilities in developing commensurate strike packages. Ukraine requires continued Western military assistance, as well as domestic innovation and production, in order to continue building and utilizing strike packages to target the Russian rear and generate tactical to operational-level impacts on the battlefield.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine conducted a successful combined strike against military assets in the Russian rear on the night of November 19 to 20 using drones and Western-provided long-range weapons. The November 19 to 20 strike series indicates that Ukraine has already begun leveraging Western-provided long-range weapons systems to assemble more complex and effective strike packages.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces have been able to conduct optimized operational maneuver since Winter 2022-2023 due to legacy doctrinal and resource limitations, but both are learning, innovating, and adapting their respective tactics on the battlefield, emphasizing the dynamic nature of the current war.
- The US and Germany announced additional military assistance for Ukraine on November 20.
- Ukrainian officials continue to launch investigations into Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and provide statistics on Ukrainians living under Russian captivity.
- Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in Kursk Oblast.
- The Russian military command's lack of proper treatment of Russian soldiers and continued reliance on "meat assaults" is likely contributing to mass desertions.
21. The Myth of "No Military Solutions"
I am guilty of using this phrase especially in the context of the Korean Armistice paragraph 60 which called on the political leaders to find a political solution to the Korea question, which is the unnatural division of the peninsula. I often say that the military leaders added paragraph 60 because they understood that there is no military solution to the Korea question. But of course there is a military solution. If Kim Jong Un miscalculates and attacks the South, there will be a military solution when the north Korean People's Army is destroyed by ROK/US alliance forces. There is a military solution. But we don't want to have to resort to expending the blood and treasure of a military solution if we do not have to
The Myth of "No Military Solutions"
https://shurkin.substack.com/p/the-myth-of-no-military-solutions?utm
Michael Shurkin
Nov 19, 2024
One of the odder bits of dogma one frequently encounters in policy circles is the idea that conflicts have “no military solution.” For example, on 12 November 2024, US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield asserted before the UN Security Council the following regarding Sudan’s civil war:
There is, quite simply, no military solution to this crisis. None. All countries should cease providing military support to the belligerents. And every one of us must continue to press the parties to return to the negotiating table with the aim of ending this conflict.
Taken at face value, the statement is not remarkable. But this is far from being the only time a senior U.S. diplomat or any other senior diplomat has made this assertion about seemingly intractable conflicts. A simple google search with the terms “State Department” and “no military solution” turns up such nuggets as the U.S. Special Representative to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad insisting on 3 August 2021 that there was “no military solution” to the Afghanistan War. He was echoing a State Department spokesman’s statement in 2011 that there was “no military solution” to the Afghanistan War. On 12 September 2022, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken opined that there was “no military solution” to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Similarly, on 9 November 2022, another State Department spokesperson said that there was “no military solution” to the war in Libya. On 7 December 2014, a Washington Post columnist took the Obama Administration to task for insisting there was “no military solution” to no less than three conflicts (Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine). On 1 June 2006, Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, affirmed that there “is no military solution” to the conflict in Sri Lanka between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil rebels.
Honestly, I could go on and on, especially if one broadens the scope to foreign governments and international bodies like the United Nations. Thus UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres asserted at a press conference on 21 June 2024 that there was “no military solution” to the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
This is all complete bull shit.
There almost always is a military solution to most conflicts: It consists of one side winning. Take Sri Lanka, for example: It took a while—the war began in 1983, but in 2009, Sri Lankan government soldiers crushed the last remaining pockets of the Tamil Tigers (while ignoring calls by the international community not to do so, for fear of possible civilian deaths). Sri Lanka’s government won. The war ended. No more Tamil Tigers. And of course, we all know how the war in Afghanistan turned out: Despite the State Department’s confidence that the war had “no military solution,” the Taliban apparently disagreed. They won through military means.
Tamil Tiger founder and leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. The Sri Lankan army killed him and his family during a last stand by surviving Tigers. It turns out that killing him was part of a successful military solution.
Often, what US government officials really mean when they say “there is no military solution” is that the United States (or other international actors) do not care enough about the conflict to take measures that might end the war, perhaps by helping one side win. Yes, the U.S. helped the Afghan government that it created, but in truth, it conducted a limited war that reflected the fact that U.S. had no vital interests at stake. In some cases—and perhaps the current conflict in Sudan falls in this category—the disinterest is matched by ambivalence about which side should win. Both sides of Sudan’s civil war are bad. The debate usually is about which side is worse. (Most agree, by the way, that the Rapid Support Forces, the rebels, are worse than the government, but it’s not black and white.)
There is something else going on here that I think is important to consider. I think it has to do with how nuclear weapons reframed how many people think about conflict.
Let’s back up. Our old friend Carl von Clausewitz made very clear that the purpose of war is victory, which one is to achieve by destroying the enemy’s ability to fight. That enables one to impose one’s will, even if that means moving off the battlefield to the negotiating table. There, victory empowers the victor to negotiate from strength and impose its terms. Usually, for Clausewitz, victory comes through a decisive military victory. Clausewitz, as discussed here, allowed for the possibility of limited wars with limited objectives, but in that case as well, the idea is to “win,” which he defined as bringing the war to a conclusion that advances’ one’s interests at the expense of that of the adversary. In the 20th century, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the French commander who perhaps more than anyone can claim to have been the man to win the First World War, echoed Clausewitz’s remarks in his seminal 1903 classic The Principles of War, . This emphasis on winning through decisive battle basically held up until nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons had a profound effect on military strategy, for they rendered virtually impossible any major war between nuclear-armed powers. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union could not fight each other directly, and never seek anything like the kind of decisive victory Clausewitz of Foch considered the primary objective of war. At most, the two Superpowers could conduct acts of aggression in areas of marginal importance to either side, acts that both understood to be below the threshold of unleashing a major war that could escalate to a total war, and then to nuclear war. In this context, victory no longer meant what it had in the past. “Winning” really meant avoiding war, and managing conflicts such that they did not lead to all-out war. The point of military strategy now was winning what French theorist Guy Brossollet referred to as the “non-battle.” From this point of view, the outbreak of war was tantamount to failure.
During the Cold War, the Communist side did what it could to promote its interests at the West’s expense through marginal acts of aggression. Thus, it used proxies to fight in Indochina, Vietnam, or Afghanistan. The West more or less went on the defensive, striving to limit conflict and, ultimately, preserve the status quo. Western strategy became “status quo”-focused. If a conflict did break out, the priority was putting a lid on the crisis—freezing it, perhaps—and ideally restoring the status quo ante.
There is good sense to this, but my argument is that we’ve gone too far. First of all, not every conflict, especially not since the Cold War, carries the risk of an escalation that might lead to nuclear war. During the 1956 Suez Crisis or the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Soviets basically threatened nuclear war; first Eisenhower and then Nixon responded by hitting the breaks on those two conflicts. In the case of the Yom Kippur War, that meant stopping the war before Israel might have achieved the sort of decisive victory that Clausewitz or Foch would have savored. But so it goes: The U.S. put its interests first, and the U.S. understood its interests to lie in ending conflict before it reached a natural conclusion. The priority was managing the crisis, not enabling a victory by one side or the other.
Since the Cold War, however, none of the conflicts that have arisen, with the possible exception of Ukraine, has carried any real risk of triggering World War III. No Great Powers cared enough about Sri Lanka to intervene, not even India, which in early phases of the war helped the Tamil Tiger rebels. But even if India had intervened, no other major power had any interest in opposing it. So Sri Lanka crushed its enemy, and nothing happened. Israel could thrash Iran (or Hamas, or Hezbollah), which might lead to a nasty regional war or perhaps devastate the global economy if the Iranians shut down the Straits of Hormuz, but not a major war involving Great Powers. Armenia or Azerbaijan could win a decisive victory, which might be a tragedy for the people of one of those two countries, but it would not lead to the kind of major total wars involving Great Powers that nuclear weapons have made all but impossible. Likewise, one of the two parties to Sudan’s civil war could crush the other, with zero risk of a major war. That might even be an optimal solution if it brought the war to an end, and thus all the displacement, ethnic cleansing, etc. Honestly, the most humane thing to do for outside parties would be to ensure a decisive victory by either side. That won’t happen.
The only real possible exception is Ukraine, for Russia has determined that subjugating Ukraine is in its vital national interest. Still, the risk of an escalation that lead to World War III, or even a major war with NATO limited to Europe that might involve nuclear weapons is small, thanks in large measure to, well, nuclear weapons. In the meantime, it should be clear to all that letting Russia get away with its aggression out of fear of what is unlikely to happen would itself be contrary to the West’s interests, possibly even vital ones, at least for Europeans.
Basically, risk aversion and an emphasis on crisis management born of the Cold War have become an almost hegemonic paradigm with which Western countries, the United States chief among them, understand conflict, even when the risk of escalation is nothing like it was during the Cold War.
Perhaps it might be time to update the paradigm?
22. Xi Jinping lays out four red lines US must not challenge in meeting with Joe Biden
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Xi Jinping lays out four red lines US must not challenge in meeting with Joe Biden
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/xi-warns-biden-of-china-s-red-line-and-addresses-transition-to-trump-in-final-meeting/ar-AA1ufj7f?ocid=BingNewsSerp
Story by Shweta Sharma • November 20, 2024 • 3 min read
Xi Jinping used his final meeting with outgoing president Joe Biden to lay out four “red lines” that Washington must not cross and warned Donald Trump against pushing on the guardrails of US-China relations.
In the final chapter of their diplomatic engagement, the Chinese president and his American counterpart held a two-hour meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Lima, Peru.
Extending an olive branch to the incoming president, Mr Xi said China stood committed to continued dialogue and cooperation to sustain the “hardwon” stability in bilateral relations but warned against a “new Cold War”.
A lengthy readout of the meeting in Lima didn’t mention Mr Trump by name, but spelled out Beijing’s approach to dealing with his administration.
“The Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China’s path and system, and China’s development right are four red lines for China,” it quoted Mr Xi as saying.
“They must not be challenged. These are the most important guardrails and safety nets for China-US relations.”
Xi Jinping meets Joe Biden on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Lima, Peru (Reuters)
Mr Biden told Mr Xi that the two leaders did not always agree, but their discussions were always "frank and candid”.
The Lima meeting comes as the Chinese leadership prepares for a likely trade war under the Trump administration.
Mr Trump vowed during his campaign for president to impose a blanket 60 per cent tariff on Chinese goods as part of a package of "America First" trade measures.
“A new Cold War should not be fought and cannot be won. Containing China is unwise, unacceptable and bound to fail,” Mr Xi told the American president.
Mentioning Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te by name, Mr Xi urged the US to understand his true nature and handle the “Taiwan question with extra prudence”.
China considers Taiwan an integral part of the country and sees Mr Lai, a proponent of the island’s independence, as a “separatist”.
On the question of the South China Sea, Mr Xi warned that the US “should not get involved in bilateral disputes over the relevant islands”.
He slammed the policy of a “small yard and high fence”, a term employed by US national security advisor Jake Sullivan to describe American efforts to block China from accessing advanced technology.
Mr Biden reportedly raised the issue of alleged North Korean troop deployment in Russia, a close ally of Beijing.
He “condemned the deployment of thousands of DPRK troops to Russia, a dangerous expansion of Russia’s unlawful war against Ukraine with serious consequences for both European and Indo-Pacific peace and security,” it said.
“He expressed deep concern over the PRC’s continued support for Russia’s defence industrial base.”
On Taiwan, the readout said, Mr Biden reiterated that Washington opposed unilateral changes to the status quo from either side and expected any differences to be resolved by peaceful means.
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David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
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